U-2 AIRCRAFT CARRIER OPERATION PROJECT 'WHALE TALE' (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00446R000100210015-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: December 1, 1964
• Content Type: REPORT

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U-2
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
OPERATION
project "WHALE TALE"
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Navy has no objection to declassification
and release.
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Navy review(s) completed.
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The Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelli-
gence Agency, wishes to express his appreciation to the National
Photographic Interpretation Center for assistance in the preparation
for publication and printing of this report.
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EARLY HISTORY
The U-2 overflight program commenced in
the summer of 1956 and for the ensuing four
years, operating from land bases in various
parts of the world, scored a record of suc-
cesses which have resulted in its being widely
acclaimed as one of the most effective and
productive intelligence collection programs in
the history of the craft.
On I May 1960 the loss of a U-2 deep inside
the Soviet Union brought a torrent of world-wide
publicity. Subsequently, the problem of obtaining
even temporary staging rights in friendly foreign
countries became progressively more compli-
cated. Because of the notoriety associated with
the aircraft, its appearance in a foreign country,
if detected, was likely to create political prob-
lems for the host government. This was likely
to be true even in those instances where the
host country was not subject to immediate pres-
sure by the Soviet Union but was more often a
function of internal domestic politics within the
host government.
While all such foreign governments recog-
nized the usefulness of the U-2 as an intelli-
gence acquisition vehicle and all were eager for
the protection such knowledge affords, few were
readily willing to undergo the varied political
pressures inherent in granting staging rights
to the aircraft.
Given the state of affairs alluded to above,
resorting to aircraft carrier based operations
was a hopeful prospect not only for coverage of
those targets not readily accessible from friend-
ly foreign soil, but for any critical operations
where valuable time could not be expended in
protracted political negotiations.
The concept of operating the U-2 from an
aircraft carrier was not a new or particularly
imaginative idea at this time. In fact, it had
been considered early in the U-2 program and
had been the subject of a discussion during a
briefing given to President Eisenhower in May
of 1957.
~ji3 nPPE511NG NOOK
onorneie Eocos
DESIGN PROPOSALS for developing a U-2 with a carrier launch
capability were submitted as early as 1957, as shown here. The
configuration ultimately chosen most nearly resembles that in the
lower drawing with the addition of some additional features such
as the mechanical spoilers installed on the wings.
At this time, the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Arleigh Burke, recommended to the
Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles,
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that immediate action be initiated to develop a
U-2 carrier based capability, On 2 August
1957, Lt. Gen. Charles 1. Cabell, Acting Direc-
tor, Central Intelligence Agency, in a memo-
randum to the Chief of Naval Operations stated
as follows:
"(A) The carrier capability at this
time would add little to the coverage of
the Soviet Bloc obtainable by the U-2
from the land bases to which it now has
access.
"(B) The availability of alternate land
bases provides a fair degree of insurance
against political evictions, but
"(C) Carrier operations, by reason of
flexibility and independence of foreign jur-
isdiction, would generally enhance the re-
connaissance capability of the United States,
especially with respect to areas outside the
Soviet Bloc. Accordingly, although the
benefit to the project would be too limited
to justify the expenditure of project funds
for the conversion of aircraft, this Agency
would be happy to see this additional capa-
bility in hand. These views have, of course,
been made known to the Navy in recent
conversations. It Is suggested that the
Navy approach the Air Force directly
and seek a resolution of the issue.'
Since the U-2 project was a joint CIA-
USAF project administered and operated by
CIA and supported logistically by USAF, any
proposal such as the conversion of U-2's for
carrier suitability would have required both CIA
and USAF concurrence. It subsequently devel-
oped that USAF decided there was no need for
a carrier capability and in 1957 the attempt
to develop the carrier capability was disapproved
by the Chief of Staff of the United States
Air Force.
The Navy attempted on several occasions
between 1957 and 1960 to obtain a join, agree-
ment between CIA and Air Force to the effect
that a carrier capability should be de?zeloped.
These attempts met with little success due
primarily to the fact that the Agency was able
to land-base the U-2 at selected bases compa-
tible with coverage of the Soviet Union and
Bloc countries.
Despite the loss of the U-2 over the Soviet
Union on I May 1960 and the limited operations
of the U-2 which followed, the carrier proposal
was not seriously pursued aga-n until 1963.
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APPROVAL
The proposal to develop a carrier con-
figured U-2, designated the U-2G, gained im-
petus early in 1963 when Lt. Gen. Marshall
S. Carter, Deputy Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency, took a personal interest
in the project.
General Carter engaged in discussions with
Mr. Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson of Lockheed
Aircraft Corporation, designer of the U-2, on
the question of whether there would be major
problems involved in modifying one or more of
the CIA owned U-2's for carrier operations.
Mr. Johnson assured General Carter that the
aircraft could be modified with relatively minor
design and engineering changes and at a reas-
onable cost.
In view of Mr. Johnson's assurances, Gen-
eral Carter instructed Colonel Jack Ledford,
Assistant Director, Office of Special Activities,
and his deputy, Mr. James A. Cunningham, Jr.,
to have their staff commence the required
action for investigating the feasibility of opera-
ting CIA U-2's from aircraft carriers, and to
determine the necessary measures to imple-
ment such a program.
The first of the actions taken by Col.
Ledford and his staff featured a series of sur-
veys and familiarization trips to various U.S.
aircraft carriers and Naval air stations. The
Agency team, headed by Mr. Cunningham, was
accompanied by representatives from Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. and the Office of the CNO. The
purpose of the visits was to enable members
of the Agency, Lockheed, and CNO jointly to
investigate and define any potential problem
areas which might affect the development of the
U-2G and to work out, as quickly as possible,
solutions to whatever problems that might
arise. It was during the course of these visits
and discussions that a tactical doctrine for U-2
carrier based operations began to emerge.
After the initial series of visits and meet-
ings, the group concluded that there were no
insolvable problems that would preclude opera-
tion of the modified U-2's from an aircraft
carrier. Based on the findings and recommenda-
tions of the survey team, Mr. Cunningham under-
took a comprehensive staff study on the proposal
which was subsequently submitted to General
Carter.
In addressing the substance of the concept,
Mr. Cunningham wrote in part, as follows:
"The basic question then is whether or
not this aircraft can be economically adapted
to work from carriers with an acceptable
margin of safety in flight operations,
and, once so adapted, can it operate
with frequency varying from occasional to
repeated, in this manner, without affecting
the Navy's disposition of forces under ex-
isting Navy Single Integrated Operational
Plan (SIOP) commitments. As indicated
earlier, present engineering analyses con-
firm that the aircraft can be so operated
theoretically as to produce a viable carrier
capability for reconnaissance purposes.
"Aside from the unknown range and
altitude characteristics of the converted
aircraft (which will depend upon arresting
gear weight for the most part), the only
apparent aerodynamic question is associ-
ated with the behavior of the aircraft in
the landing configuration when it is ap-
proaching a fast moving carrier from the
stern. One suggestion which has been made
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SURVEY PARTY aboard the U. S. S. INDEPENDENCE. Left to right. Capt. Swanson, U. S. S. INDEPENDENCE;Capt. Martin D.
Carmody, Office of the CNO; Chief of Security, OSA; Mr. Edward L. Green, Eastman-Kodak;
Lockheed Aircraft Corp.; Mr. James unning om, Jr., DAD,'OSA; OSA Project Officer; and
Agency U-2 pilot.
is that the standard angle of attack for such
an approach with Navy aircraft which is
three or four degrees to the horizontal be
reduced to approximately l 1/2 to 2 degrees
in the case of the U-2 to permit a flatter
angle of approach with power on so that
"ballooning" of the aircraft prior to con-
tact with the deck will be minimized.
"In a normal landing attitude, the U-2
rides tail high, which unless compensated
for by a skillful power-on approach just
above the stall speed may make the en-
gagement of a carrier hook relatively dif-
ficult. There is a possibility that aproblem
may exist in wind pattern over the stern
of a fast moving carrier, which according
to Navy statistics, normally produces a
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down-draft immediately to the rear of
the stern, followed by an up-draft from
1.000 to 1,500 feet aft of the carrier. With
its sizeable wing area and with flaps fully
extended, there may be some adjustments
in technique which will have to be accom-
plished in order to overcome the possible
adverse effects of these phenomena.
"Stack wash from the carrier's funnels
can largely be eliminated as a deterrent
characteristic, since carriers on which the
U-2 would be landed make their arrested
landings on the angled deck, approximately
nine degrees from the cen:ral axis of the
hull away from the island, and the captains
of both the USS LEXINGTON and USS
INDEPENDENCE stated categorically that
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they 'could put the stack wash wherever the
pilot wanted it.' This, of course, means
that they could adjust the carrier's steam-
ing angle to take maximum advantange of
existing wind conditions to deflect stack
wash. The only time this might be a
modest problem would be when the air-
craft is landed in a no wind condition, at
which time it must rely solely on the car-
rier's forward momentum for relative
wind.'
Recognizing that the physical handling of the
U-2G aboard a carrier would pose some unique
problems, Mr. Cunningham further wrote:
"Movement of the aircraft from the
hangar deck to the flight deck and convers-
ely can be accomplished, despite the fact
that no carrier in the United States Navy
has elevators large enough to accommodate
the U-2 without a portion of the wing ex-
tending beyond the outboard edge of the
elevator. The largest elevator in the Fleet
.,. -- -mv was manuracrurea by Lockheed which permits on and off-loading of U-2 from the carrier when it is necessary to re-
move it or replace it aboard other than under its own power. This photo was taken at North Island NAS as aircraft is prepared for
initial launch tests.
measures only 70 by 52 feet, while those
on the carriers in the group most likely to
be employed in U-2 operations (CVA's 59
through 62), measure 63 by 52 feet. Lock-
heed has designed a special fuselage cart
called a 'LOWBOY,' which permits side
castering operations essential to movement
from the hangar deck floor to the elevator
and from the flight deck to the elevator, etc.
This will be equipped with adjustable brakes
to prevent any incident should the aircraft
be on the elevator during period of rough
weather.
In addition, Lockheed has manufac-
tured a special sling using a fuselage cart
as the basic ingredient, which will permit
on-and off-loading of the aircraft from the
carrier when it is necessary to remove it
or replace it aboard other than under its
own power. The hangar deck offers adequate
space for a compartmentalized working and
refueling area.
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"Minor adjustments in the aircraft
component of an operational carrier must
be made to provide adequate storage space
on the hangar deck, but Navy assures us
that this is anadministrative problem which
can be encompassed by proper direction
from higher authorities, beginning with the
Chief of Naval Support and the CNO, aug-
mented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in those
cases where such temporary depletion of the
Air Carrier Group would affect the Navy's
SIOP capabilities."
On the subject of cover, the staff study
stated:
"A clear and plausible cover story,
stoutly maintained by responsible persons
concerned and supported by the IDEALIST
Detachment aboard the carrier, can prob-
ably preserve the fiction of innocuous use of
the U-2 for considerable time. This story
will require precise and unequivocal at-
tention to every detail. The IDEALIST De-
tachment and the carrier commander must
be given detailed guidance, not only on the
objective of the story, but also the neces-
sary supporting actions. The basic require-
ment is to have a plausible reason for the
presence of the U-2 aboard a carrier.
Present discussions with the Navy, In-
cluding Vice Admiral Rayburn, Director of
Research and Development for the Navy,
and his Deputy, Admiral Weakley, Indicate
that sponsorship for the U-2 aircraft on the
carrier in the long run can be anticipated
from the Office of Naval Research headed
by Admiral Coates. The discussions thus
far have not only indicated that ONR would
be willing to have the U-2's attributed to its
organization, but that a workable cover ar-
rangement not unlike that which the Agency
worked out in 1955 with NACA (ultimately
NASA) could be effectuated."
The study concluded with a series of rec-
ommendations which, if approved, were designed
to produce an operational capability at the ear-
liest possible date.
On 23 July 1963, General Carter approved
the staff study and its recommendation and Lock-
heed immediately began working on the design
changes and modifications for two of the Agency
U-2's. Concurrently, the OSA staff began co-
ordination with the U.S. Navy for the imple-
mentation of the pilot training program and for
U-2 suitability tests aboard a carrier.
The principal configuration changes incor-
porated in the U-2G in order to enable it to op-
erate effectively from carriers included a mech-
anically operated fuel jettison system to permit
the aircraft to be reduced to maximum gross
landing weight in the event of either an inflight
emergency requiring an immediate landing or in
those cases where the aircraft is returned to the
ship from a mission with fuel to spare. A fur-
ther modification was the incorporation of a
heavier landing gear which effectively more than
doubled the original design specification of
maximum deceleration in terms of feet per
second. Coupled with this beefed-up landing
gear were heavier pressure bulkhead.5 in the
landing gear section and augmented longerons in
the fuselage at the trailing edge of the wing to
withstand the added impact of carrier hook
engagement. A modified T2V arresting hook
was installed in the aircraft, covered by a
plastic fairing which reduces aerodynamic drag,
and which is jettisoned at the time the aircraft
enters the traffic pattern around the carrier
preparatory to landing.
The single most importan- modification,
however, was the addition of a pair of ;nechan-
ical spoilers situated midway outboard on the
trailing edge of each wing. These are activated
by a simple switch on the throttle cuadrant.
Upon actuation at the point of touch-down of
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the aircraft the wing stalls almost immediately,
enabling the pilot to spot-land with nearly the
same accuracy that would be encountered in
more conventional aircraft. Light weight, one
inch arresting cables have been substituted for
the normal heavier arresting cables on the CVAs
in order to reduce critical vibration encountered
when the aircraft runs over the cables in the
process of arrestment.
It subsequently proved necessary to depress
the Fresnel lens landing system to an angle of
1.5 degrees to give the pilot of the U-2 a
proper representation of the "meatball" during
his final approach to the deck. Experience has
shown that under normal landing conditions
with an approach speed of approximately 82
knots and with from 26 to 30 knots wind across
the flight deck, effective arrestments at a rela-
tive speed of 50-55 knots can be obtained with
the ship's arresting engines set at the lowest
available figure of only 10,000 pounds of force.
All takeoffs from the carrier with the U-2 are
normally made on the axial as opposed to the
.angle deck which requires a clear deck for-
ward in all cases. Catapult launch of the U-2G
is not feasible for structural reasons.
BEEFED UP LANDING GEAR more than doubled the original design specification of maximum deceleration in terms of feet per
second.
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ARRESTING HOOK installed in U-2 is shown in both the retracted and extended positions. Note in the upper ?iclure the partial
plastic fairing which reduces aerodynamic drag.
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PILOT TRAINING AND SUITABILITY TESTS
The first tests of a U-2 on an aircraft
carrier were undertaken in August of 1963.
For the preliminary tests a conventional (un-
modified) U-2 was used. The operation was
designated "Project WHALE TALE."
On the night of 2 August, an Agency U-2
was flown to North Island Naval Air Station at
San Diego, California, where, under cover of
darkness, and after midnight, it was loaded
aboard the Aircraft Carrier USS KITTY HAWK
and stowed below decks in the hangar bay. The
most stringent security precautions were em-
ployed by both Naval and Agency security
personnel to limit unwitting persons gaining
knowledge of the operation. The North Island
base personnel who assisted in moving and
loading the U-2 (fire chief, SP's, crane operator,
etc.) were briefed in general terms as to the
sensitivity of the "ONR exercise" and were
admonished not to discuss it with anyone.
The following day, the KITTY HAWK pro-
ceeded to a pre-determined test area approxi-
mately 50 miles off the coast. While a sharp
look-out was maintained for any intruding sur-
face or aircraft, the U-2 was brought up from
the hangar deck and prepared for launch.
The aircraft was marked with the large
letters "O.N.R." on the vertical stabilizer, in
keeping with the agreed cover story that this
was an Office of Naval Research project. All
personnel participating in the tests were alleged
to be either O.N.R. personnel or Lockheed
civilian technical representatives.
While the U-2 was being readied for take-
off, the commanding officer of the KITTY HAWK,
Captain Horace H. Epes requested the attention
of the ship's personnel on the public address sys-
tem and read the following prepared statement:
"This morning we will be conducting a
series of tests sponsored by the Office of
Naval Research to determine the suitability
of launching the U-2 from a carrier. In
today's operation we will be assisted by
personnel from Lockheed Aircraft Corpora-
tion, the manufacturer of the U-2.
"The details of this program, and to-
day's test, are classified because of the
obvious far reaching implication of this
program with relation tol
this regard, it is important that there be
no discussion or disclosures of this test
with unauthorized persons. This means
anyone who is not aboard today. It is pos-
sible that you may read or hear something
about this program in the newspapers or
on the radio but this does not relieve you
of your responsibility not to discuss today's
test with unauthorized persons."
Insofar as it was possible to determine, this
story was accepted without question by the car-
rier crew and as of the date of publication of
this report, there have been no known security
violations or even undesirable speculation by
Naval personnel involved in the operation. The
same cover story, with minor modifications,
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4 August 1963. Left to right: Captain Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, skipper of the KITTY HAWK; Captain Martin C. Cormod,, USN,
Office of the CNO; Mr. C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, Lockheed Aircraft Corp.; Vice Admiral Paul D. Stroup, USN, COMNAVAIRPAC; Mr.
James A. Cunningham, Jr., CIA; and Captain George C. Duncan, Asst. Chief of Staff for Force Readiness, COMVAVAIRP,\C.
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was used on subsequent carrier operations, in-
cluding the operational overflight mission in the
South Pacific, with equally successful results.
The KITTY HAWK was underway at 20
knots; this, combined with a 10 knot headwind
resulted in a 30 knot wind across the flight deck.
The impressive wing span and light construction
of the U-2 under these conditions gave the
maintenance crew some difficulty in holding the
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the deck, even without application
On signal, the U- 2 with
LAC test pilot, at the controls,
started its take-off run down the flight deck. As
the throttle was advanced, the 16,000 pound thrust
Pratt & Whitney J-75 engine catapulted the U-2
toward the bow of the ship. In approximately one-
third the length of the flight deck the aircraft
was airborne, the pogos fell away, and by the
time the U-2 cleared the bow it was already
approximately 1,000 feet above the carrier.
Then, with pardonable exhibi_ionism, Schu-
macher racked the U-2 into a steep zlimb--a
breath-taking spectacle to anyone who had never
previously witnessed a U-2 take-off climb under
full power. To the carrier crew, accustomed
to the flat trajectory take-off of the heavier and
more conventional carrier-bawd aircraft, the
U-2 maneuver was a new and somewhat start-
ling experience.
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The ensuing flight maneuvers were accom-
plished without incident. Schumacher made sev-
eral low approaches to the flight deck to ascer-
tain whether there were any aircraft controll-
ability problems in the landing area and found
that the U-2 was easily controlled throughout
all the maneuvers. On his last pass at the KITTY
HAWK's deck, he let the U-2 touch-down briefly
and then reapplying power lifted off and set
course for the LAC plant at Burbank, California.
The initial tests were complete and proved that
the U-2 could be operated successfully from
carriers of the FORRESTAL class. They also
furnished the Lockheed engineering staff with
valuable data for use in the development of
design changes necessary for modification of
the U-2 for arrested landings aboard ship.
The U-2 pilots' Carrier Training Program,
already well advanced in planning, was desig-
nated Project WHALE TALE II.
The decision to implement a training pro-
gram for the Agency U-2 pilots was made con-
current with the decision to modify the U-2 for
carrier operations. Mr. Cunningham, with other
Agency staff members and Captain Martin Car-
mody, Office of Naval Operations, had previously
met with the Naval Air Training Command Staff
at Pensacola NAS, Florida, on 5 June 1963 to
formulate and approve a syllabus for a training
program for the pilots selected for the project.
It was agreed that these pilots, because of
their high degree' of competency and proficiency,
would require only a short, but comprehensive,
flight training program to qualify them for car-
rier operations. It was decided that the program
would be accomplished in three phases, as
follows:
(1) Phase One - Initial flight check-out
in the Navy T2A aircraft and carrier type
approaches and landings, all under the su-
pervision of highly qualified Naval Landing
Signal Officers at Monterey NAS, California.
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(2) Phase Two - Further carrier type
landings and approaches in the T2A at
Pensacola NAS, Florida, until the Landing
Signal Officer considered each pilot ready
to land aboard an aircraft carrier. Actual
T2A landings and qualifications aboard the
aircraft carrier LEXINGTON in the Gulf
of Mexico completed this phase.
(3) Phase Three - Initial carrier type
approaches and landings in the U-2G at
Edwards AFB until the Landing Signal Of-
ficer considered each pilot ready to land the
U-2 aboard ship. Actual U-2 landings and
qualifications aboard a FORRESTAL Class
41
C
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arr
er completed this phase.
The first group of four pilots began Phase
One of the Carrier Flight Training at Monterey
NAS on 17 November 1963, under the super-
vision of (sub-
sequently assigned to Project IDEALIST as
resident Landing Signal Officer). After two
weeks of training at Monterey, the group was
ready for Phase Two, and on 21-23 November
proceeded to Pensacola NAS where all four
pilots performed the transition to qualified car-
rier pilots in their usual professional manner.
The second group consisting of four Agency
pilots, Lockheed test pilot I land
the Edwards Detachment Commander,
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uled to begin Phase One in December of 1963.
However, due to heavy project operational com-
mitments, their training was delayed until 5
January 1964. Training, once begun, went
smoothly and professionally, and was completed
on 15 February.
Phase Three commenced on 29 February
1964, the date the first U-2G was delivered to
the Edwards AFB detachment. Each of the
Agency pilots was given numerous sorties in
the "G" where much practice went into the
development of his flying techniques as derived
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from his experience in the T2A. It should be
initially were used to check-out U-2 pilots in carrier operations.
PRECISION PERFORMANCE of U. S. Navy T2A's is demonstrated in this photograph of Project Headquarters personnel living air-
lifted to the U. S. S. LEXINGTON to engage in planning for the WHALE TALE program. These aircraft were the training ships which
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The RANGER operations were Flanned in
three phases designed to take full advantage of
the time the carrier was allotted for project
use. This phase was designated WHALE TALE
III and consisted of the following:
(1) Phase One - This pha;e was to
be devoted to Lockheed Aircraft Corpora-
tion's exclusive use in testing the U-2G in
carrier landings and suitability of opera-
tions aboard ship.
(2) Phase Two - Agency pi.ots' U-2G
qualifications. This phas was to begin as
soon as Lockheed had completed the Phase
One test and had turned the aircraft over
to the Edwards Detachment.
(3) Phase Three - This phase was to
exercise the Edwards Detachment's opera-
tional capability and effectiveness while
aboard ship.
WHALE TALE III began when a team com-
posed of Headquarters, Detachment and Lock-
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the pilots operationally ready, each felt confi-
dent of his ability to undertake the arrested
landings. having developed a profound respect
for judgement and exper-
ience in carrier operations.
As the development of the U-2G was reach-
ing its final stages by Lockheed and pilot train-
ing was nearing completion, the OSA staff began
coordinating details for the suitability tests and
pilot qualification with representatives from the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the
Commander Naval Air Pacific, Vice Admiral
Paul D. Stroup. With the cooperation and as-
sistance of these officers, the program pro-
ceeded to the point where all elements were
ready at the same time; the U-2G, project pilots,
and the aircraft carrier USS RANGER which had
been selected for the tests.
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heed personnel proceeded to the RANGER on 25
February 1964 and briefed and cleared the ship's
Commanding Officer, Captain William E. Lemos,
and other personnel for Project IDEALIST and
the WHALE TALE III operations.
On 28 February 1964, Lockheed and Detach-
ment personnel and equipment were loaded
aboard the RANGER. On the following morning,
the RANGER proceeded to the test area off Sari
Diego where the operations were to be conducted.
Phase One began with LAC pilot
flying aircraft number 362 in a series of touch-
and-go landings on the RANGER. The touch-and-
go landings all went smoothly; however, on the
first attempt for a hook engagement landing,
the aircraft bounced and the hook engaged the
wire while the aircraft was in the air. This
caused the aircraft to be slammed back on deck
and nose over. Minor damage resulted to the
nose section of the aircraft which was taken
below deck for repairs. After repairs were
completed, the aircraft was flown back to Bur-
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bank for the instrumentation read out. As a
result of this incident, Phase One was resche-
duled for 2 March 1964.
On 2 March, LACpilot lIreturned 25X1
to the RANGER in aircraft 348 and completed
four successful arrested landings. This com-
pleted Phase One. The aircraft was then turned
over to the Edwards Detachment and Phase Two
began.
On the same day, the first Agency pilot,
I began his U- 2G qualifications
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in 348 and made several touch-and-go landings,
but was unable to perform any arrested landings.
He ran short of fuel while waiting for the
RANGER to maneuver away from a foreign ship
which had entered the operational area. He
proceeded to North Island NAS for landing, and
air operations were discontinued for the day. 25X1
On 3 March 1964, the
next pilot, flew out to the RANGER from North
MINOR MISHAP aboard the U. S. S. RANGER is recorded in this series of photos. In the first photo the aircraft is making a normal
approach to engagement.
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The minor damage to the nose section was the result of the engagement taking place while still airborne. The damage was readily
repaired cboard the carrier.
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DESIGNING WAYS of C. L. "Kelly" Johnson, a Lockheed vice president and designer of the U-2, were put to the test in configuring
the aircraft for carrier operations. Here he appears to be not displeased with the results on completion of the initial launch and re-
covery tests.
Island NAS in aircraft 348 to continue Phase
Two. Ion his first touch-and-go
landing, allowed the right wing to drop. The
right wing skid caught on an arresting cable and
was torn off. then flew the aircraft
to Edwards and landed safely on the dry lake
bed without further incident.
As a result of these two incidents, both
of the modified U-2's needed minor repairs be-
fore Phase Two could be continued. Therefore,
with the Navy's concurrence, the remainder of
this exercise was planned to be conducted on 9
and 10 March 1964. This delay, as it worked
out, was advantageous for all. The pilots refined
their approach techniques by applying the ex-
perience gained from the 3 March flights.
On 9 and 10 March 1964, Agency pilots
qualified in the U-2 without
further incident. Phase Two and Phase Three
were concluded. At this time the Detachment
was considered operationally ready.
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RECOGNITION - On 30 September 1964 before a capacity audience in the United States Intelligence Board meeting r3om of the Langley
Headquarters of CIA, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Deputy Director of CIA, (Right) presents the Distinguished Intelligence Medal to Mr.
James A. Cunningham, Jr., DAD/OS A, for his singular contribution to the development of the U-2 carrier capability. Mr. Cunningham,
a former U. S. Marine pilot himself, was cited for "the development of a unique method of acquiring foreign intelligence information."
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