AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATION, FISCAL YEAR 1974, FOR MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ACTIVE-DUTY AND RESERVE STRENGTH, MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000600160002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 149
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 18, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN

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93D CONGRESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st .Cession C
AUTHORIZING APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1974, FOR MILITARY
PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ACTIVE-DUTY AND
RESERVE STRENGTH, MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
JULY 18,19-73.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of
the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. HEBERT, from the Committee on Armed Services,
submitted the following
REPORT
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 9286]
The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill
(H.R. 9286) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974
for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat
vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test
and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized
personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected
Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces and the mili-
tary training student loads, and for other purposes, having considered
the same, report favorably thereon without amendment and recom-
mend that the bill do pass.
PURPOSE
This bill would :
(1) Authorize appropriations during fiscal year 1974 for (a)
major procurement and (b) research, development, test and evahi-
ation by the Department of Defense;
(2) Authorize the personnel strength for each of the active-
duty components of the Armed Forces for fiscal year 1974;
(3) Authorize the personnel strength for the selected reserve of
each of the reserve components of the Armed Forces for fiscal
year 1974;
(4) Authorize the annual average military training student
load for each of the active and reserve components of the Armed
Forces for fiscal year 1974;
Referral To CONG Not Required
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(5) Continue the autho rit,3- for merging military assistance and
financing for South Vietnam, and local forces in Laos, with the
funding of the Department cd Defense, subject to a dollar limita-
tion and other restrictions ;
(6) Prohibit the obligation or expenditure of funds authorized
by this or any other act for crrryrno- out directly or indirecty
any econorrric. or military r isistance for \Tortli Vietnam in fiscal
year 11074, and
(7; Impose certain limitations with respect to procurement a,-,-
t ions, and for other purposes
The bill authorizes appropriations totaling $21,394,997,000. This
includes ~~13,073.200,000 for p ociirement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, tracked combat vehicles. torpedoes and other weapons, and
$8,321,797,000 for research, de-Telopment, test and evaluation.
II.R. 928i~__;1 CLEAN Rrra.
I1.R. 928U is a clean bill sir e.r,vding H.R. 6722 on which hearings
were held..
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CONTENTS
Page
1
H.R.9286 a clean bill------------------------------------
2
Summary of committee revisions--------------------------
7
Cost totals---------------------------------------------
9
Relationship of authorization to total appropriation---------
10
General discussion:
Cost escalation and military procurement- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
10
Cost growth in major weapon systems report -----------
11
(Summary of a report by the Comptroller General)
The development process----------------------
11
Cost growth resulting from greater capability
being demanded of replacement systems------
13
Cost growth due to acquisition management- - _ _
14
Estimating errors----------------------------
15
Solutions to weapon-systems acquisition problems
proposed by various authorities- - - - - - - - - - - - -
15
Reforms which should be emphasized----------
15
Cost escalation--------------------------------------
17
(Summary of a study by the Department of Defense)
Investment spending has been stable-----------
19
Weaknesses in predicting and controlling costs - -
21
Corrective efforts----------------------------
23
Conclusions---------------------------------
24
Committee comment on cost-escalation studies----------
25
Discussion of major procurement programs- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
27
A-10----------------------------------------------
27
F-15-----------------------------------------------
28
F-14A---------------------------------------------
28
Attache service aircraft------------------------------
31
F-111----------------------------------------------
32
C-5A----------------------------------------------
33
Safeguard------------------------------------------
34
Lance-----------------------------------------------
35
DLGN---------------------------------------------
35
Nuclear aircraft carrier-------------------------------
36
Trident--------------------------------------------
38
Nuclear attack submarine-SSN-688------------------
39
DD-963---------------------------------------------
40
LHA----------------------------------------------
41
SSBN conversions -----------------------------------
41
The M60A1 tank------------------------------------
42
The XM198 towed Howitzer--------------------------
42
M-16 rifle------------------------------------------
43
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Research and development programs ----------------------- 43
Technological base--------------------.------------. __ 43
Accomplishments from techno ogy base- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 44
Support for military personnel _-___---------------------- 45
Mobility---------------------------------------------- 46
Weapons technology ------------------------------------ Comman(l, control and target acquisition_______________ 47
Supporting science and technology- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 48
Civilian spin-off from DOD and R & D----------------- 48
Aeronautics------------------------------------- 49
Electronics--------------------------------------- 49
/Iaterials ----------------------------------------- 49
Medicine and biotechn:)logy----------------------- 50
Budget activities--------- --------------------------- 51
1. Military sciences ------------------------------- 52
_'. Aircraft and related eciuiipment_.-__------___-__- 54
Committee change: Army ---------- ------- 54
Utility Tai,tical Transport Aircraft Sys-
tem (UTT,AS)---------------------- 54
Corn rnittee change;: Air Force------------ _ _ 56
Subsonic Crui,e Armed Decoy (SCAD) _ 56
Lightweight fi:,hter prototype 56
:~. Missiles and related equipment_____ --__- 57
Committee ch ange u : Army3 -------------------- 57
Safeguard defc,nse system______________ 57
Site defenso.._ _ __ ------------------- 57
4. Military astronautic; and related equipment-_ 59
5. Ships small craft and related equipment- - _ 60
ti. Ordnance combat vehic es and related equipment- 60
Committee change,: Army----------------- 61
Howitzer n edinm 155mm .XM198 _ _ _ _ _ _ 61
.Nuclear mL.nitions -------------------- 61
.. Other equipment- ------------------------- 62
Committee change,: Air Force_____________ 63
Airborne Warning and Control System
(AWACS)__ 63
1-luman Re;ources Laboratory-___ 63
8. Programwide managenu,nt and support---------- 65
Active-forces strength authorization 66
The nature of the threat to Western Europe------------ 68
NATO strategy ---------------------- 70
Committee support of NATO Common Fund proposal-- 70
The all--volunteer force ------------ __________________ 71
Committee reductions--------- --------------------------------- 73
Enlisted aides ------------------------------------- 73
Graduate-education studerts ----------------------- 74
Additional Army reduction------------------------- 74
Reserve-forces strength authorization------------------------- --- 74
Military training student loads ------------------------------ 77
Officer graduate education-------------------------------- 80
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Page
General provisions---------------------------------------
81
Section 601-Southeast Asia support-------------------
81
Section 602-Prohibition against aid to North Vietnam- -
86
Section 603-Limitation on multi-year procurement con-
tracts --------------------------------------------
86
Section 604-Codification of statutes requiring annual au-
thorization for Department of Defense appropriations--
86
Review of weapons procurement authorized by service-------
86
86
Navy ----------------------------------------------
Force--------------------------------------------
96
Committee position--------------------------------------
99
Fiscal data---------------------------------------------
99
Annual cost ----------
------------------------------
99
Five-year cost projection-----------------------------
100
Departmental data--------------------------------------
100
Additional views:
Dissenting and additional views -of:
Dellums, Hon. Ronald V---------------------------
107
Leggett, Hon. Robert L----------------------------
107
Schroeder, Hon. Patricia-------------------------
107
Dissenting views of Hon. Les Aspin---------------------
121
Additional views of Hon. Ronald'V. Dellums-------------
123
Minority views of Hon. Patricia Schroeder--------------
125
Additional views of Hon. Patricia Schroeder -------------
128
Changes in existing law----------------- ---
131
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SUMMARY OF MAJOR COMMITTEE REVISIONS
The changes made in the authorizations requested by the Depart-
ment of Defense are discussed in detail throughout this report. Follow-
ing is a summary of major revisions made by the Committee:
1. The authorization for the F-15 is reduced from the $918.5
million requested to $587.6 million, a net reduction of $330.9 mil-
lion. This reduces the buy of aircraft authorized from 77 to 39.
2. Safeguard antiballistic. missile funds are reduced by $50.7
million. This includes a $25.7 million reduction in procurement
authorization and a $25 million reduction in the RDT&E author-
ization, leaving a net authorization of $350.3 million.
3. The authorization for conversion of ballistic missile sub-
marines is reduced from $229.8 million, the amount requested, to
$79.9 million, a reduction of $149.9 million.
4. The funds for the M60A1 tank are reduced from the $26.6
million requested to $18.2 million, a reduction of $8.4 million.
5. The Air Force request for $9.6 million to procure 16 attache
aircraft is denied. '
6. The authorization requested to complete funding of the
C-5A program, $43.1 million, is reduced to $37.2 million, a re-
duction of $5.9 million.
7. The request for $9,476,000 for development of the XM198
Howitzer is denied.
8. The request for $3.1 million for procurement of 31,000
M-16 rifles is denied.
9. Navy shipbuilding and conversion authorizations are in-
creased by $79 million to provide long-leadtime procurement for
two nuclear frigates, DLGN-41 and -42. Language is added to
the bill providing that contracts for this advance procurement for
the DLGN-41 and -42 shall be entered into as soon as practicable
unless the President advises the Congress that their construction
is not in the national interest.
10. Authorization requested to cover cost growth of prior-year
programs for the Navy is reduced from $196.7 million to $174
million to reflect a reduction of $22.7 million in funds requested
for the LHA program. The authorization requested for conver-
sion of conventionally-powered frigates is reduced by $20 mil-
lion, from $93.7 million to $73.7 million.
11. The authorization re uested for the Subsonic Cruise
Armed Decoy is reduced by $$50.2 million. A $22 million RDT&E
authorization remains in this program category to allow com-
mencement of a new technology program looking toward a sys-
tem to replace SCAD.
12. The Air Force's proposed lightweight fighter prototype
program is reduced by $6.5 million, from the $46.5 million re-
quested, to $40 million.
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13. The $1.08,825,000 requested for the Utility Tactical Trans-
port Aircraft System (IITTAS) is reduced by $6.2 million to
reflect a reduction of 6 in the number of prototypes.
14. Authorization for the Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) is reduced by $42 million, leaving a net
authorization of $155.8 million.
15. The Army's request fo:,- $14,498,000 for the development of
nuclear munitions for shout-range tactical weapons is denied.
16. The request for $170, million for the site defense program
is reduced by in25 million.
17. A general reduction of $30,400,000 is made in the RDT&E
authorization for the Navy and Marine Corps, the reduction
to b3 applied on the, basis of priorities established by the Depart-
ment of Defense.
18. A general reduction of'~E;1 million is made in the RDT&E
authorization for defense agencies, the reduction to be applied
on the basis of priorities ~ostablished by the Department of
Defense.
19. The authorization requested for the Air Force Human
Resources Laboratory, $8,200,000, is reduced by $2,989,000.
20. There is added to the bill $172.2 million for the procure-
ment of 12 F-111 aircraft. Language, is inserted in the bill pro-
viding that these funds shall be available only for procurement, of
the F-ill. This anthorizatioi was not requested by the Depart-
ment of Defense.
21. At the request of the D ~,,partment of Defense an authoriza-
tion for procurement of 10 F?-4J aircraft for the Navy is deleted
and the funding authorizatio i therefor, $130.7 million, continues
in the bill for the procurement of F-14A aircraft, increasing the
buyofF-14'sfrom48to50.
22. The requested active duty authorized end-year strength
of the Armed Forces is reduced by 13,037, including a reduction of
11,900 from the Army, reflecting a further reduction possible as a
result of the withdrawal from south Vietnam; and reductions
reflecting the committee inte ition to curtail the use of enlisted
aides and reduce graduate education programs for officers.
23. The allowance of enlisted aides for senior officers in the
military services is reduced by 3.55 per cent.
24. Each service is reduced by 10 per cent in the number of
officers who may participate in full-tune graduate education
programs.
25. The authorization for reserve strength for the Coast
Guard is increased by 500 to a new total. of 11,800 for Fiscal
Year 1974.
26. The ceiling on author zat ion for expenditures in Fiscal
Year 1974 for the MASF program in support of the military
forces of South Vietnam and-Laos is reduced from $2.1 billion
to $1.3 billion, a reduction of $800 million from the amount
originally requested by the Lepa:rtment of Defense.
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The total dollar authorization recommended by the committee in the
bill, $21,394,997,000, is $625,391,000 below the amount requested by
the Department of Defense.
The following tabulation compares the amounts authorized for fiscal
year 1973 with the amounts requested by the Department of Defense
for fiscal year 1974 and the amounts recommended by the committee
for fiscal year 1974 in the present bill.
COMPARISON OF AUTHORIZATIONS REQUESTED BY DOD FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974 WITH CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
IN FISCAL YEAR 1973 AND COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974
[In thousands]
Requested
fiscal year
1973
Authorized
fiscal year
1973
Appro-
priated
fiscal year
1973
Requested
fiscal year Committee
1974 recommends
Procurement:
Aircraft:
Army___________ __
- -----
-
$162,900
$133,800
$33,500
$181,000 $181,000
s_
Navy and Marine Corp
3,276,200
2,073,400
2,822,100
2,958,300 2,958,300
Air Force_____________________________
3,255,700
2,283,900
2,239,300
2,912,800 2,739,100
Missiles:
Army--------------------------------
896,700
700,400
668,200
599,900 574,200
Navy--------------------------------
842,400
769,600
719,240
680,200 680,200
Marine Corps_________________________
22,100
22,100
22,100
32,300 32,300
Air Force-----------------------------
1,816,800
1,745,300
1,670,000
1,573,200 1,573,200
Total, missiles -------- _-------------
3,578,000
3,237,400
3,079,540
2,885,600 2,859,900
Naval vessels -----------------------------
3,564,300
3,179,200
2,970,600
3,901,800 3,788,200
Tracked combat vehicles:
Army--------------------------------
260,700
186,500
130,500
201,700 193,300
Marine Corps_________________________
62,200
54, 500
54, 500
46, 200 46, 200
Total, tracked combat vehicles--------
322,900
241,000
185,000
247,900 239,500
Torp
edoes: Navy_________________________
194,200
194,200
192,400
219,900 219,900
Othe
r weapons:
Army________________________________
114,400
57,800
56,300
51,300 44,700
Navy________________________________
25,700
25,700
25,700
41,900 41,900
Marine Corps_________________________
900
900
900
700 700
Total, other weapons----------------
141,000
84,400
82,900
93,900 87,300
Total, procurement__________________ 14,495,200
12,427,300
11,605,340
13,401,200 13,073,200
Research, development, test, and evaluation:
31
686
Arm
Nav
y___________________ _______________
y (and Marine Corps)__________________
2,122,716
2,816,787
1,978,966
2,708,817
1, 829, 032
1,829,032
2,545,213
2,108, 700 2,0
,
r 2,711,700 12 , 675, 300
Air
________
Force
3,262,177
3,272,777
3,122,940
3,212,500 3,110,811
Defe
________________________
nse agencies_________________________
520,087
505,987
435,313
2525,000 2504,000
Dire
ctor of Test and Evaluation Defense______
___________
___________
27,000
-----------
------------
Eme
rgencyfund__________________________
50,000
50,000
p
p
Total, R.D.T. & E________________________
8,771,767
8,516,547
7,959,498
8,557,900 8,321,797
Total, procurement and R.D.T. & E________
23, 266, 967
20, 943, 847
19,564,838
21,959,100 21,394,997
Safeguard construction and family housing (mili-
tary construction, Army; family housing,
Defense)-----------------------------------
-----------------
I Includes $2,600,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. authorization.
2 Includes $24,600,000 for the activities of the Director of Test and Evaluation, Defense.
3 The total request figure includes $61,288,000 for the civilian pay raise, effective Jan. 1, 1973, for in-house laboratory
employees. This adjustment was identified subsequent to the initial submission of the authorization request. The actual
total of the R.D.T. & E. request supported by the backup justification supp!n' by the services including the civilian pay
raise, was therefore $8,619,188,000.
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RELATIONSHIP OF ATTTHoRIza'rI.oN TO TOTAL APPROPRIATION
The $21,394,997,000 authorized for appropriation in the present bill
is only part of the $85,165,000,000 in new obligational authority re-
grlested by the President for the Department of Defense in fiscal year
1974.
The appropriation categories covered by authorization in the present
bill are those for major procurement and research, development, test
and evaluation. Appropriations for the categories of personnel, opera-
tion and maintenance, and a part of procurement are made on the basis
of continuing appropriations. M[ilii ary construction is authorized in
separate legislation.
The strength levels of the active-duty components and the selected
reserve for each of the reserve components are, however, authorized by
the present legislation and the leglsat.ion, therefore, has a substantial
impact on the appropriations wiic]i may eventually be provided for
personnel and operation and maintenance.
GENERAL DISCUSSION : COST ESCALATION AND
MILITARY PROCUREMENT
The Committee on Armed Servic=~s reported to the House last year
its deep concern with the continuing problem of unforeseen cost escala-
tion in military procurement and with the manner in which escalation
factors are taken into account in the letting of contracts by the Depart-
ment of Defense. Hearings by ti.e committee at that time determined
that insufficient data were available to clearly identify the elements
which contribute most to cost escalation. The committee was, for ex-
ample, unable to obtain a breakdown as to the percentage of cost in-
creases in a given contract which were due to inflation as compared to
the percentage due to technical changes. The committee at the time,
therefore, directed two separate studies of cost escalation, one to be
made by the. Comptroller General of the United States centering on the
basis of cost escalation in procurement contracts and one ordered from
the Department of Defense to provide such analysis of cost escalation
as is necessary to develop a capacity to provide for accurate cost-
accounting data to the committee.
The studies were performed independently as requested and the re-
ports were fled in March of this year according to the deadline set by
the committee.
The full text of both studies arc in the record of the committee's
hearings, and the committee wo-zld urge all Members of Congress to
read them.
It is estimated that it will cost more than $153 billion to acquire
the 116 weapons systems now under development. Some $89 billion of
that amount is yet. to be approp -iat ed. The heavy impact of weapons
spending on the allocation of the Nn.tion's resources is self-evident. At
the same time, as the Defense Department study shows, it is possible to
misread and overemphasize the plate of weapons procurement in de-
termining the impact, of defense, spending on the national economy.
Therefore, because of the enormous sums involved and the crucial im-
portance of improved congressional and public understanding of this
issue and because they will be oil great benefit to the committee in its
follow-on work to better control future Defense expenditures, the com-
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mittee has had a synopsis of both studies prepared and presents them
here for the edification of Members of the House :
COST GROWTII IN MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS REPORT
(Summary of a report by the Comptroller General)
The report analyzes the two principal causes of cost growth : (1)
increases resulting from the greater capability (performance) de-
manded of the replacement system; and (2) increases resulting from
the way an acquisition program once started, is managed. Although it
is not possible to measure precisely the cost growth contributions of
these two factors, many knowledgeable people believe that the great-
est cost growth comes from the continuously expanding performance
requirements.
The development process
The development process for a major weapon system is a highly
structured, complex enterprise involving interaction among users, de-
velopers, and contractors often in many tiers; weapon system acquisi-
tion thus involves considerable interaction between the public sector
and private sector. Common understanding between the Congress and
DOD of the bases for initiating and supporting the development of
new weapons and of their relation to weapons in being in the total
military posture must be sought so that needed stability in acquisition
programs can be achieved. Candor with the Congress about such things
as the uncertainties associated with cost estimates, technical-risk as-
sessment, and the status of development must be practiced lest sur-
prises undermine the confidence of the Congress and the congressional
support for programs.
An oversimplified representation of the manner in which weapon
systems evolve from an idea to production is shown below :
THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS FOR
A MAJOR WEAPON ,SYSTEM
Appro
m t
?
o ,n
eptual I Validation on i Full-Scale
se i I Phase I Development
ry
--- D '_ fl1Tfl cI
For,,
60002-1
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In the conceptual phase of development, the need for new military
capability is drawn up, a concept to provide this capability is formed,
and its technical feasibility is explored. As a rule, the conceptual phase
is the least costly of the four phases shown above. In this phase, how-
ever, the services commitment fo: its system hardens but at this early
stage the involvement of the Sec?etr~ryof Defense is generally small.
Ia-c the validation phase the preliminary designs and engineering for
the weapon system are verified or accomplished, management plans are
made, proposals for engineering development are solicited and evalu-
ated, and the development contractor is selected.
In the full-scale (engineering; development phase the design and
the detailed engineering is completed by the contractor. The develop-
ment contract is negotiated and awarded to start full-scale develop-
ment. Pre-production prototypes, are built and tested in this phase
to verify final design or producib:lity.
It is in full-scare development that massive financial commitments
begin. Most of the research and development outlay is spent here and
the system acquires sometimes irreversible momentum toward produc-
tion and still larger allocation of funds.
The production phase begins when the production contract is negoti-
ated and awarded. Here the funds commitment is the greatest. When
production gets underway-, DOD'3 commitment to the program is fully
public. Larger resources are committed. Cancellation then or later
creates a. public confrontation, widespread publicity, angry reaction of
interest groups, and hazards to cvxecrs. These effects build up a strong
bureaucratic reluctance to halt or cancel a development program.
The pattern of deeper involvement and decreasing options is shown
bel?w. Although the greatest opportunity for far-reaching decisions
occurs during the earliest phases of acquisition, the involvement of the
Secretary of Defense, is insubstantial until called upon to approve a
military services specific weapon proposal at the end of the conceptual
ACQUISITION CYCLE
CONCEPTUAL VALIDATION
PHASE PHASE
Co IMITHEUT
- - DECISION! FLEXIBILITY
TIME
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phase. By this time the service is solidly behind its weapon selection
and alternatives have been effectively eliminated. Thus his attention
is drawn to discuss one weapon system at a time. Inadequate attention
is believed to be paid to root questions bearing on the entire mission
force and its weakness or its usefulness.
Cost growth resulting from greater capability being demanded of
replacement systems
Most resources are invested in weapon systems to replace systems to
perform the same types of missions. The successive generation of sys-
tems which follow this pattern push state-of-the-art frontiers and, of
course, costs increase with each increment of improvement. This tech-
nological momentum can be expected to drive costs up no matter how
well the programs are managed.
The cumulative effort of the rising costs of military bombers and
transport aircraft is illustrated below.
Between 1945 and 1955 the cost of one complete Air Force aircraft
system unit with its supporting equipment jumped by a factor of
seven. Between 1955 and 1970 the cost of a system unit doubled.
Fighter aircraft, tanks, heavy ordnance, and ships have followed a
similar trend.
How serious the situation is can be illustrated by a simple compari-
son. The money that bought 100,000 fighter aircraft during World
War II, when adjusted for inflation would buy less than 1,000 F-14
fighters today.
The money that bought 57,000 tanks during World War II would
now buy fewer than 2,000 main battle tanks.
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+20%
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The tendency ro constantly seek higher performance systems might
be described as "performance co 3t growth." This is one of the most
serious aspects of cost growth since under realistic budget constraints
the rising cost of systems can be nut only with reduced force levels.
The, following table shows weapons programs where costs have forced
reductions in the number of units to > be bought.
System
Original
quantity
Cost
(millions)
Current
quantity
Cost
(millions)
C-5a------------------------------------------------
120
$3,423.0
81
$4,526.0
DLGN-38-------------------- .-----------------------
23
3.980.0
5
820.0
F-14 -----------------------------------------------
710
6,166.0
313
5,272.0
LHA--------------------------------------------
9
1,380.3
5
970.0
In addition, entire programs, suc`A as the MBT-70 tank program,
have been canceled because they were too expensive.
Coxt growth due to acquisition management
Cost histories of 45 systems under development at June 30, 1972,
show that current estimates of cost to acquire systems increased by
some $31.5 billion--39 percent-over the planning estimates and $19.1
billion-20 percent-over the development estimate. It is these widely
publicized overruns that have shake _1 public confidence in the ability
and credibility of both Government and industry management. Cost
growth in development programs is not a new phenomenon. Studies of
development programs in the 195 )'s show cost growth of 200-300 per-
cent. There are at least three different reasons for cost growth. These
reasons are displayed below.
ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM COST HISTORIES ON 45 WEAPON SYSTEMS
DEVELOPMENT CURRENT
ESTIMATE ESTIMATE
ESTIMATING ERRORS
25%
INFLATION
30% '
CHANGES IN REQUIREMENT
(QUANTITY, SCHEDULE, SPECIFICATIONS
45% 1
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Estimating errors
Both the competing contractors and service representatives are
strongly motivated-the one to propose and the other to accept low cost
estimates-to win the contract and to gain approval against competing
systems within the same service or similar systems proposed by another
service. These strong competitive forces show up as:
Unrealistically high performance requirements.
Sheer difficulty of guessing the unknowns or predicting tech-
nology.
Overoptimism on the part of the bidders and the buyers or even
"buying in" in the hope of recovering possible losses through
engineering change orders.
Cost-estimating changes, however, accounted for about 25 percent
of the growth instead of 100 percent, as many people are prone to
assume.
A second cause is in flation-accounting for about 30 percent of the
growth.
The third cause deals with revisions to the specifications-time
schedules, quantities, or engineering changes. Much of this type of cost
growth results from unrealistic performance targets at the outset,
including :
Trying to do too much-challenging the state-of-the-art
frontier.
Trying to develop and produce the system too fast. One of the
most prominent attempts has been concurrency ; that is, beginning
production before full-scale development and testing have been
completed.
Solutions to weapon systems acquisition problems proposed by various
authorities
No aspect of Federal procurement has received more attention by
the Congress, the executive branch, and the press during the past
several years than the subject of the acquisition of major weapons.
There has been a steady stream of critiques, hearings, and recom-
mendations-and a high degree of consensus among various experts-
about causes and solutions. Among those who have made contribu-
tions :
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.
National Security Industrial Association.
Congressional Hearings and Reports.
Rand Corporation.
DOD, Especially Deputy Secretary David Packard.
Commission on Government Procurement.
Reforms which should be emphasized
The past four years have been a period of vigorous activity devoted
to solving the problems in weapon systems acquisition and to initiat-
ing new policies, philosophies, and management techniques.
The variety of actions proposed and being implemented are aimed at
three key objectives. (Detailed explanations of each proposed action
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ii
may be found in Chapter,,-), "Re forms Which Should Be Emphasized"
of the full report, which is in the committee hearing.)
A. MAKING THE RIGHT DECISION AT THE OUTSET ON WTTAT TO DFVFLOP
AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE
1. Obtain 0ST), service, and 2ongressional agreement on the basic
operation need, the fundamental rceapon, system characteristics, and
the expected level of resources to be allocated to that need.
2. Strengthen the staff support to provide the Secretary of Defense
with comprehensive and objective ulalyses of missions and weapons
requirements.
1. L'rtend the spare of congressional authorizations--at least one
year in advance of the upcoming budget year.
4. 81remjthencongressional reviews of weapons budgets by first
considering and approving budt-et =_otals for major missions. This re-
view will be based on consideration of the overall needs of the various
military missions.
R. APPLYCNG LESSONS LEARSEL AT;OUT SLIPPAGES AND OVERRUNS
:~. Avoid concurrent development and production and adhere to or-
derly and sequential design, test, an_l evaluation.
f,.. Stress austerity in ceveloplnert, small design teams, freedom to
innovate, and maximum competitic n in the design phase with clear
separation of development and production. Encourage continuous de-
velopment of subsystems.
7. Adopt contractinq practices and Government-contractor relation-
ships Which will encourage the mot effective team, performance.
u. Continue to improve the Government's capability to develop cost
estimates covering the development phase, as well as the production
phase, of new systems.
9. Emphasize 7,r'fe-cycle costin,7 to gain better perspectives on pro-
posed new systems and to strenrthcn cost-effectiveness analysis.
C. STRENGTTIFN7NG THE OVERAT.I. MANAGEMENT OF THE. SYSTEM
ACQUISI7'IO:, PROCESS
10. Continue the current, stroTg emphasis on upgrading the com-
petence, stature, and tenure of program managers and procurement
specialists.
11. Continue to emphasize the operational test and evaluation, by es-
tablishing in each military department an organization independent
of the developer and the user. Tl(e smior 051) official in this activity
should report to the Secretary of Defense or to his deputy.
12. One of the deputy secretaries of Defense should assume the re-
sponsibility for mission analysis an 7 sr~sfem acquisition.
13. Improve the planning for maintaining the development and
production base,
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COST ESCALATION
(Summary of a study by the Department of Defense)
It is necessary to emphasize that the weapons acquisition area has
not been a major area of long-term growth in the Defense budget.
Egon 1.
OUTLAYS, DOD/MAP
CURRENT PRICES
PAY AND
OPERATING COST
I A; I- I I I 1 I I I I I I . I l...I.~.I I . ..~..I J_
r0 61 52 63 S4 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 E3 64 66 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 FY
Figure 1 shows a two-way break of total Defense spending since FY
1950. The top line shows pay and operating costs. This includes all mil-
itary personnel costs, active, reserve, and retired; the entire civil
service payroll; and all non-pay operating costs financed in the O&M
appropriations. The lower line is primarily procurement, RDT&E
and construction-the investment area of our budget..
Note that in the 1950's, after Korea, on up into the early 1960's, these
two lines were reasonably close, together. In the past 10 years espe-
cially, pay and operating' costs have surged up. From 1964 to 1974-
the past 10 years-Defense spending has risen $28.2 billion. Of that
increase, $27.2 billion has gone into pay and operating cost, and $1
billion into the investment area. Measuring from 1954-20 years ago-
investment spending is up $2.5 billion while pay and operating costs
rose $32.9 billion, for a total increase of $35.4 billion.
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These figures have not been adjusted for inflation. If we allow only
for normal, economy-wide purchase inflation, we find that-in dollars
of constant buying power--i;he investment area is sharply down over
this period. Over the past 20 years, there is a real drop of 36 percent;
over the last 10 years, the drop is 26 percent.
Investment programs, then, have not caused major increases in the
Defense budget over there }ears. Nor has the investment area been
particularly prone to inflation, or escalation, as these terms are de-
fined-an increase in the number of dollars required to buy the same
thing.
The report presents a great deal of data with respect to the impact
of inflation upon Defense ar,d other economic sectors. Some of the
key findings are :
According to the Department of Commerce, state and local gov-
ernments have been hit much harder by inflation than has the
Federal Government, including Defense.
The same calculations make it plain that inflation is much
greater in the area of pay and operating costs than in investment.
In considering the imps:-t of inflation among various sectors of
industry, it is apparent that inflation is lowest where Defense
does most, of its buying, and highest in those sectors (such as con-
struction) where Defense accounts for a small share of the
business.
A series of spectacular charges have been made regarding "cost
overruns," and it is alleged that these have amounted to $35 billion.
Such charges, though, use planning estimates as a starting point, and
this is inappropriate. Starting from the development estimate-the
point at which a significant portion of the total cost is committed-
cost growth is $16 billion, not $"*,5 billion. This represents an increase
of about 1.7 percent, on the a,Terage, for all the systems involved.
The cost growth is the n>t of all factors---changes in quantity,
design, schedule, inflation rates, and others. Some of these increases
resulted from design or other changes, deliberately chosen. Others
arose from failure to anticip?,te the extent of inflation, an especially
easy mistake to make in preparing estimates in the 1960's. Many other
developments are subsumed i t tr?ese overall figures-the turbulence
brought by the war, and the sharper cutbacks that have followed.
Current all-time cost estimates ire 17 percent higher on the average
than the development estimates for time systems, made at various
points since the early 1960'.s, f gr programs extending into the 1980's.
About, half of the all-time estirnases involved amounts that have not
even been requested of the Concre,,s, and some of these costs will never
he incurred. To sum it up, the investment area is not particularly prone
to im.flation, as that term is define? and measured, nor is it an area of
rampant spending growths. The "cost overrun" charges are distorted
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and misleading. It is necessary to set aside these mistaken impressions
in order to focus more clearly on the real problems.
Investment spending has been stable
There are immense problems. The underlying problem is that tech-
nology, over the years, has multiplied the unit costs of weapons sys-
tems. Both the GAO and DoD reports contain numerous examples
of this point. Clearly, unit cost growth of this kind has little to do
with general inflation.
The main reason for these long-run increases in unit costs are, first,
higher performance brought on by advanced technology and, second,
a sharp reduction in quantities procured. Technology has involved
several quantum leaps in electronics and powerplants, especially, as
well as in airframes, ordnance, and metals and materials generally.
Whatever the reasons, weapons unit costs have been increasing
fair beyond anything that could be attributed to general inflation.
DILLIONS
(PT 74,$)
STRATEGIC FORCES .? .. '
ALL OTHER BASELIBE INVESTMENT
. INVESTMENT OUTLAYS
CONSTANT PY 74 PRICES
(BILLIONS)
57 58 ' 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
FISCAL YEARS
/
/
WAS COSTS - ~`
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Figure 2 shows the tre=ad of our spending in the investment area, in
constant prices-that is, setting aside general Inflation. Note that FY
1974 outlays are significantly lower than those of the 1950's and early
1960's.
War spending largely involved munitions, weapons attrition, and
items procured for Free World Forces-items that do not add to our
long-run baseline force. For the baseline force alone, excluding war
costs, the downward trend is even sharper.
,The, late 1.950's and early 1960's saw very heavy investment in stra-
tegic forces---several tinressthe level of more recent years. Setting aside
strategic force investment, remaining baseline investment (the dotted
line) compares much more favorably with the levels of earlier years--
sonaewhat higher than tare late 1950's, and lower than the early 1960's.
As noted earlier, technology has multiplied the unit costs of weapons
dramatically over this period. And, as shown in Figure 2, total base-
line investment has actually trended down, sharply, in real terms?
Pe f Defense programs have ieei' accommodated to this surge in weapons
unit costs within a declining dollar total in two ways: a sham drop
in strategic force investment; sharp reductions in the quantities of
'weapons procured. (In the decade 1956-65, for example, an average of
more than 1,800 fixed wing aircraft were procured per year. Recent
annual buys have been about 500.)
These expedients are new exhausted:
In the earlier years shown in Figure 2, 1956-59, strategic force
investment was about $1:3 billion per year, falling to less than $4
billion per year in FAT 1973 and FY 1974. Cutbacks in strategic
forces will not provide the cushion they have in the past.
Quantify cutbacks cannot go on indefinitely. Having cut annual
aircraft: procurement quantities from 1,800 to 500 over roughly
the past decade, the, string has been substantially run out. It
Would be unwise in the extreme to count on further large cuts in
weapons quantities, from a base that has already been sharply
depleted.
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It is important. to have a clear understanding of what the problems
are, and what they are not. The weapons investment area is not pe-
culiarly prone to inflation, as that term is generally defined and meas-
ured, nor has investment spending grown rapidly over the past 20
years, nor do the spectacular charges of "cost over-runs" provide a
meaningful measure of the problem. The underlying problem has been
the increase in weapons unit costs clue to advancing technology. This
problem now assumes critical proportions for two reasons : 1. The ex-
pedients by which programs have been accommodated to the surge in
unit costs-that is, the diversion of the falloff in strategic force invest-
ment and the cutback in quantities procured-have been exhausted.
2. There is now a much higher threshold of unit costs. If technology is
to continue to drive unit costs upward, starting from the high unit
costs of today, the problem becomes several orders-of-magnitude
greater than those of the past.
Weaknesses in predicting and controlling costs
In addition to the long-range problem caused by advancing tech-
nology, a number of serious weaknesses have been identified in the
Defense Department's system for predicting and controlling costs. A
number of factors made the problems more acute.
There were several reasons for bad estimates, the most important
being advocacy. The people presenting estimates had every reason to
be optimistic as to costs and technical aspects-they themselves believe
deeply in the program, and they were out to sell it. There was thus a
strong tendency to be optimistic regarding critical variables, leading
to a compounding of the ultimate error.
Top-level concern. was quite often directed heavily to technical and
performance factors, with much less attention paid to costs. Costly
design and schedule changes were inevitable under conditions of con-
currency.
Cost estimating was not systematic. In some cases the original esti-
mates included an allowance for change orders, special tooling, sup-
port equipment, specialized training equipment and spares, for ex-
ample. In other cases, these items were routinely regarded as additives
to the bare-bones initial estimates.
To this situation, we must add the developments of the latter 1960's.
DOD peacetime experience with procurement of major weapons was
largely confined to the post-Korea period. That, as it happened, was a
period of very stable prices.
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Fig- 3
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX
(CM 1967100.0)
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As Figure 3 shows, the wholesale price index hardly budged. Then
in 1966 and thereafter prices began to shoot up. At the same time,
schedules had to be rearranged because of the war; the labor market
tightened ; and defense demands on industry grew. These factors in
themselves caused major increases in costs measured from estimates
prepared during this period. Inflation alone was a major factor. DOD
did not foresee its magnitude and duration and usually did not allow
for it in systems estimates.
DOD had been allowing for escalation in one area : shipbuilding. In
this area DOD sharply reduced escalation allowances in 1965, just
before prices began to skyrocket and just as DOD was introducing
other complex changes into the shipbuilding program.
There was a great deal of turbulence in Defense budgets and pro-
grams over this period. Investment spending grew 71 percent in three
years-1965-68-then fell almost by half in the next five years-
1968-73. Service requests were reduced by the Office of the Secretary
by large amounts-$20 billion or more-each fall, and congressional
action came to be increasingly delayed. All of these developments
added up to turbulence and uncertainty.
Corrective efforts
Thus the spectacular instances of cost growth arise from a com-
bination of the long-run cost thrust of technology, the weaknesses in
the DOD management systems and the turbulent economic conditions
of the late 1960's.
The corrective steps being taken may be summarized in seven major
headings. The Defense Department has :
1. Put increased stress on careful evaluation of weapons pro-
posals in terms of military needs, alternatives, cost, technical risk,
timing and other factors.
2. Placed major emphasis upon improving and standardizing
cost estimates and the means for keeping costs within bounds.
3. Developed means for monitoring progress against technical
objectives and highlighting technical problems promptly.
4. Strengthened the weapons system manager.
5. Moved to eliminate concurrency of development and produc-
tionand generally slowed the pace.
6. Emphasized hardware, rather than paper, testing, attempt-
. ing to follow a philosophy of fly before buy.
The basis for decision-making at the top levels in the Department
of Defense is provided by the Development Concept Paper (DCP)
and the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC)
process.
The DCP is a summary document that provides a broad overview of
a major defense system. The Secretary's decision recorded in the DCP
establishes the limit of authority delegated to the service for manage-
7. Begun to apply a design-to-cost approach.
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meat of the program. It represents a contract between the Secretary of
Defense and the military department involved.
The DS ARC serves as an. advisory body to the Secretary of Defense.
Cost considerations have co we to be emphasized increasingly, espe-
cially o~ner the past year, tc t7r? point where they now share ebill-
ing with per forinance and schedule goals in the work of the MARC.
DSIn some r.~ stances, cost ranks as the primary consideration.
A cumber of steps have been taken to improve cost estimating and
control.
DOD has established un-_ form criteria as to what is to be included
in system cost. estimates, delining such items as fly-away costs, weapon
system costs. procurement cosh and program acquisition costs.
DOI) requires that independent cost estimates be prepared, in a.ddi-
tion to that developed in the program manager channel.
Working with contractors, 1)OD has developed and applied- Cost/
Schedule Control Systems Critria, with an associated Cost/Perform-
ance Report.
With the approval of tlra Office of Management and Budget, ex-
pected impact of inflation is incorporated in all systems cost estimates.
The Selected Acquisitior Reports (SAR) reflecting the project
manager's current "best, estmate' of key performance, schedule and
cost indicators, are prepared on 45 systems with a cumulative acquisi-
tion cost of over $100 million.
The design-to-cost approach. deserves particular emphasis. In the
last 10 years pay and operating costs have grown $27.2 billion--in
spite of a cutback of 474,000 jr. military and civil service personnel.
Investment spending is $1 billion liiu-her than 10 years ago, and 112.5
billion higher than 20 years ago-not enough, by a wide margin, to
cover even general inflation. f technology continues to drive unit costs
constantly upward, the result can only be a falloff in weapons quali-
ties. 1)01) believes that the deign-to-cost approach will have to be
increasingly emphasized-designing a.n adequate quantity of weapons
within a given amount of mcmey. In large parts of the Defense pro-
gram, I)OD will have to forego technological gains otherwise
achiev-able to stay within this financial constraint. Quite often, the last few
points of performance add immensely to the unit cost; it. is these that
we must.. in some instances, forego.
Everyone who is involved in the formulation and execution of na-
tional-security policy must recognize that we are dealing with a finite
level of resources and that the national interest will not always be
well served if every system is pushed to the ultimate level of attainable
technology.
(`one7nsJons
The Department of Defense believes it is making substantial prog-
ress particularly in improving' co-it estimates and in the application of
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the design-to-cost approach. Escalation should not be over-emphasized
since the weapons procurement area has not been particularly prone
to inflation. The key factor is the cost-thrust of technology.
There must continue to be flexibility as to the means of providing
for escalation in individual contracts, using explicit escalation clauses
in some cases. Such escalation clauses should be pegged to indices not
to cost experience of individual contractors. The critical point to re-
member is that there is interaction between escalation provision and
the basic estimate itself.
The Defense study has uncovered no areas where legislative changes
or extensive changes in contractor accounting systems are required.
Areas were found where the guidance from the Office of the Secre-
tary of Defense isn't adequate. There are problems with incorporating
escalation in certain parts of particular cost estimates, and guidance
is not specific enough for categorizing cost changes under the SAR
system. The Department of Defense is continuing to work to improve
these areas.
The Committee believes these studies are important steps in the
continuing effort that must be made to improve control over defense
costs.
The Committee believes that one of the most salutary effects is aiding
those who made the studies to better identify the areas where greater
effort is needed. The report by the Comptroller General will be ex-
tremely helpful to the GAO in sharpening the work it is doing for the
Congress on defense programs. Similarly, the Defense Department
study should aid the Department's administrators in identifying prob-
lems to which they .must give particular attention.
The Committee would call attention to the recommendation in the
report of the Comptroller General that the Congress get involved in
weapons decisions at an earlier point in the decision-making process,
before executive branch positions have solidified. The Committee be-
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lieves that this is central to mffective control by the Congress and will
continue to explore means b which this can be accomplished.
The. Committee calls to the attention of Defense Department offi-
cials, military and civilian the part of the Comptroller General report
stressing the need for candor with the Congress about uncertainties in
programs and the importnncce that such candor will have in developing
the necessary confidence in the Congress for support of defense
programs.
The Committee believes; it is significant that the Comptroller Gen-
eral's report was able to pros ide a rough percentage break-down as to
the impact on cost escalation of such factors as inflation, cost-estimat-
ing errors, and changes in requirements. Such a breakdown was not
available in the past.
The Committee would partcularly call to the attention of the House
the point made in the Defense Department's study that absorbing in-
creases in investment costs, or weapons procurement costs, by decreas-
ing the quantities purchased cannot go on indefinitely. The Congress
cannot allow obsession with unit cost to result in inadequately
equipped forces. The Committee thinks it is important to stress the
point made in the Defense report that total weapons procurement
spending has been surprisingly stable over the years and major weap-
ons procurement per se has not been the driving force in the growth of
the Defense. budget.
The Committee would I articularly emphasize for the Members of
Congress two other points :
First, as both reports makc clear, there are no easy panaceas, but
rather a. requirement for a lot of hard work at all levels in the defense
business.
Second, that providing an adequate national defense is a continu-
ing business and we cannot halt the development and procurement
of weapons systems while the process is being improved.
Finally, the Committee would say that it recognizes its own need
for independent analysis of defense programs and with these reports
as a base will continue to l urs.ue avenues of more effective review of
military authorization requ?st,,.
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DISCUSSION OF MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROGRAMS
A-10
The Air Force request in the procurement account for the A-10
Close Air Support Aircraft was $30 million in advance procurement
authorization. The committee spent a considerable amount of time dur-
ing the hearings on this program. The particular point which caused
the most concern was the Air Force schedule for the various milestones
in their contract with the aircraft manufacturer.
The program presented to the committee calls for 10 RDT&E air-
craft to be produced for flight testing and demonstration of the opera-
tional capability of the weapons system. The contract for the 10
RDT&E aircraft was entered into on March 1, 1973 and was a cost-plus
incentive fee contract in the amount of $159,279,888 (target cost plus
target fee) to Fairchild Industries, Inc., for the development of the'10
RDT&E aircraft. The contract provides for a cost sharing arrange-
ment whereby the cost above target is shared by the Government and
the contractor on a 70/30 ratio, respectively. If the cost reaches
$186,810,083, the contractor will have lost all his fee. The Government
assumes all additional cost over this amount.
A contract was also awarded on March 1, 1973 to the General Elec-
tric Company for the delivery of 32 TF-34-100 engines with options
for additional production engines included in the contract.
The committee learned that the Air Force schedule calls for exercis-
ing the first production option in May 1974, seven months prior to the
delivery of the first RDT&E aircraft.
When the committee questioned the Air Force about this apparent
discrepancy in the "fly before buy" concept, it was advised that the Air
Force had 180 days from May 1974 in which to exercise the first pro-
duction option, which would expire on 1 November 1974. This is still
over a month before the delivery of the first RDT&E airplane. Ilow-
ever, the committee further learned from the Air Force that if it de-
layed exercising the option for the 180 days provided in the contract,
the production costs for the first 48 aircraft would increase aproxi-
mately $12 million. Therefore, the committee is very distressed about
the situation in which the Air Force's A-10 contract has put the
Congress.
Because of the many assurances given the committee about the mini-
mum risk involved in a production decision on this close air support
aircraft and the strict adherence to the contractual milestones, the com-
mittee recommends the approval of the $30 million request for advance
procurement.
F-15
The FY 1974 Air Force request, as originally submitted, contained
an authorization for 77 F-15 aircraft in the amount of $801.9 million.
Also requested was $116.6 million for initial spares. This request, to-
gether with the FY 1973 procurement (30 aircraft) would have com-
pleted the procurement of aircraft for the first wing, a total of 107.
The contract for the engine development program for the F-15
was awarded to Pratt and Whitney and development was started on
1 March 1970. It was to be a joint development program for the Air
Force and the Navy. The Air Force engine is called the F-100, and
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the Navy engine is called the F-401. The program has continued to
the present point in time, with the Air Force completing what they
call "preliminarv flight rating test" in February 1972. Since that time,
they have been flying the engine at Edwards Air Force Base in F-15s
and the engine has over 800 flight hours to date with no significant
deficiencies in actual flight not d. However, the ground tests of the
F--100 engine have been plagued with difficulties and failures on the
test stand and in wind tunnel testing.
The most recent controversial point was the test which is called
the Military Qualification Test (MQT), a 150-hour durability test
which become:; the base line for a production configuration. The con-
tract milestone called for the MQT to be completed in February.
There was a failure to meet the test requirement on schedule, which
will be an added cost of "a iew tens of millions of dollars."
Because the contracts that the Government has with industry are
two separate contracts, one w_th. McDonnell-Douglas for the airframe
and one with Pratt and Whitney for the F-100 engine, the Air Force
found itself in a position where McDonnell-Douglas had satisfied all
of their required milestones either on or ahead of schedule, but the
engine contractor had not. The Air Force Program Manager testified
before the committee that he felt that because the test experience to
date showed that he had a minimum risk program, and that it was
within his prerogatives as the Program Manager to make certain
trade-offs regarding the test 'ioro{`rain for the engine, he should exer-
cise those prerogatives, and he (lid. This is where the present contro-
versy concerning the engine prcgram arose. The Program Manager
modified the MQT, 150-hour diurability test run in two particular
points, altitude and mach number.
The F-100 engine snccesslulIv passed the modified MQT, which
legally bound the Air Force to exercise its production option with
the engine contractor. However., the Air Force testified that it would
rerun the 150-hour durability test at the ariginal .speeiftcation?s and
hopefully have it, completed by September 30, 1973.
After very detailed Air Forco testimony, the committee members
determined that because of the t.pparent engine deficiencies, that the
program should be slowed down at least until the MQT was success-
fully performed, and therefore, voted to reduce the Air Force F-15
request by 50 percent.
Accordingly, the committee recommends that the Air Force pro-
gram for the F-15 for FY 1974 b reduced from a buy of 77 to a buy of
39 aircraft, and the procurement and the initial spares authorization be
reduced from $918.5 million to $587.6 million, a, net reduction of $330.9
million.
F-14A
Again. as last year, the F-14 aircraft request was a cause of major
concern to the committee. Navy', original FY 1974 budget request of
$572 million for 48 aircraft included flyaway hardware, support, spares
said advance procurement. The airframe portion of the $572 million:
budget reflected Grumman's original F--14 contract ceiling price as
adjusted for application of the ab:iormal escalation clause. This request
was submitted prior to completion of negotiations between the Navy
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and Grumman regarding the FY 1973 buy of 48 F-14As (Lot V).
The committee began hearings on the FY 1974 Procurement Author-
ization Bill on April 10, 1973 knowing that on December 11, 1972
Grumman "rejected" the option exercised by the Navy on December 8
for its Lot V procurement of 48 F-14 aircraft.
The committee was advised that in order to get Grumman to agree
to produce Lot V at the original contract price, Navy agreed to cancel
all future contract options and negotiate any future F-14 buys on an
annual basis.
Therefore, the committee was in a quandry in connection with the
F-14 program until the receipt of a letter on June 11 from Deputy
Secretary of Defense Clements outlining the proposed F-14 program
for FY 1974.
The committee was pleased to receive testimony from Deputy Sec-
retary Clements on June 14, 1973 outlining the Navy's current position
regarding the F-14 program. Secretary Clements pointed out that he
had determined that the Department's current position was to request
50 F-14's in FY 1974 in the approximate amount of $703 million,
which is a summation of the $572 million originally requested by the
Navy for 48 F-14's and $131 million originally requested by the
Marine Corps for 10 F-4J's. Further, subsequent buys, in incre-
ments of 50, 50 and 29, to bring the F-14 inventory to a total of 313
would cost an estimated $2.823 billion. The desired inventory of 313
F-14s was determined by Secretary Clements as the total requirement
for the Phoenix-equipped weapons system.
Secretary Clements further testified, in support of his recommenda-
tion to the committee, that (once 313 Phoenix _equipped F-14 's are
procured) the fighter modernization program for the Navy and
Marine Corps required a less expensive prototype flyoff between
the Navy F-14 and the Air Force F-15 aircraft. Ile stated that he had
decided to not authorize the Navy, nor recommend to the committee,
the initiation of any new aircraft development program, but rather,
draw upon developments underway or completed. He further stated :
Within this general approach, I have directed the Navy to
take the following action and to seek your committee's
approval.
First, two different types of aircraft will be developed and
tested to determine their cost and effectiveness as replacements
for part of the F-4 inventory in the Marine Corps and the
Navy.
Two aircraft of each type will be procured for the testing
program. The first aircraft will be a modification of the F-14.
It will not have a. Phoenix missile capability, though it is pos-
sible its avionics can be based upon the existing weapons sys-
tem, such as the F-14's APG63, rather than an entirely new
avionics development.
I will. look to the Navy and to the contractor to take aggres-
sive, innovative measures to substantially reduce the cost to
the F-14 airframe so that it can be a credible competitor. The
second airframe will be a modification of the Air Force F-15.
The weapons systems capability for this competitor will be
the same as the Air Force aircraft.
The principal difference will be in changes to make the air-
craft carrier-compatible on a structural basis, including the
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inc:,orporation of lift devices to reduce the approach speed of
the aircraft.
I considered the possibility of including an improved F-4
prototype in this program and determined that status of the
development and testing of the improved F-4J is such that
further investment in r; as a prototype is not necessary.
We know enough about the airplane and its avionics to
make an adequate appraisal of its capabilities, and would not
learn enough more than we already know to justify the addi-
tional expense.
The second action that l directed is that these prototype
aircraft be available fe - flight testing by late 1973. We will
make every effort to assure that this timeframe is met. In no
case will wet accept initiation of flight tests later than Decem-
ber, 1975.
The flight test program will be conducted by the Navy and
closely monitored by th e. Deputy Director of Defense, Re-
search and Engineering for Operational Test and Evaluation.
The third step that I have directed is that a decision will be
made by the Navy-Marine Corps of F-4 replacement aircraft
by July `76. This decision will be based upon a minimum of
six months competitive Navy flight testing after any neces-
sary contractor flight tes;.
A considerable amount of work remains to be done to es-
tablish exactly how much this program will cost, and I am
not prepared to state specific totals at this time.
However, to initiate the program I estimate that $150 mil-
lion will be, needed in RET&E in FY'74. I will be able to pro-
vide the committee with specific details regarding costs after
we have gone to the contractors and obtained their proposals.
I would estimate we can do his within 30 days.
After studying the proposals, I will present the necessary
details to you. At this time, I request the committee's approval
and support of the plan and, your assistance in getting off to a
good start.
Subsequent to the appearan^e of Deputy Secretary of Defense Clem-
ents, the Committee received testimony from Mr. George Spangenberg,
recently retired as Director of Evaluation in Naval Air Systems Com-
mand, relative to the propo,-,al on the prototype program for the
F-14/15. Among other thing, Mr. Spangenberg provided the Com-
mittee with cost estimates developed by the Department of the Navy
which indicated that no money would be saved in following the pro-
posed prototype programs. The study indicated, as a matter of fact,
that the Department of Defense would be more prudent to go forward
with its established program rather than attempting to develop a
stripped down economy version of a less capable F-14 or F-15.
In view of this testimony and :in the absence of any persuasive re-
buttal from the Department of Defense, the Committee rejected the
proposal advanced by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
The Committee therefore recommends approval of the revised re-
quest to delete ten F-4Js and increase the F-14A buy from 48 to 50.
There will be no change in the amount of authorization requested.
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Attache Service Aircraft
Last year, this committee approved the Army's request for the pur-
chase of 20 U-21F aircraft at a cost of $12.7 million. The committee
also approved the purchase of 14 aircraft in the Air Force request
designated CX-X at an estimated cost of $8.4 million. The Air Force
specifications called for an FAA certified, off-the-shelf, medium-
weight, executive transport to serve the needs of the Defense Attache
Service. In our report, we stated:
The (Air Force) specifications described to the committee
appear to be identical with the U-21F type aircraft requested
in the Army program.
Therefore, the committee feels that it would be feasible for
the Air Force to designate the Army as its procurement agent
and that a. common buy be made. The committee is advised
that an approximately 10-percent savings on each aircraft
could be realized in a single buy of 34 aircraft rather than a
separate buy of 20 for the Army and a separate buy of 14 for
the Air Force.
The Senate deleted both of these aircraft in their deliberations. In
conference, the Senate receded after the conferees received assurance
from the military departments that the buy for the Army and Air
Force would be a common procurement of a single aircraft and that
there be a competitive joint procurement of off-the-shelf aircraft with-
out unnecessary military modifications.
Accordingly, a Request for Proposals was issued on October 6, 1972
with specifications incorporating "minimum" and "desired" levels of
performance. Subsequent to receipt and evaluation of proposals, Secre-
tary Froehlke, on January 20, 1973, canceled the procurement when it
generally became known that the Source Selection Board had ap-
parently picked a jet aircraft rather than a turboprop aircraft.
Since cancellation of this negotiated procurement, the Army and
the Air Force have been meeting to reach agreement on the specifica-
tions to be utilized in resoliciting for the procurement of the aircraft.
The committee is advised that Army's minimum requirements have
not changed since its testimony before the Congress during the FY
1973 hearings, i.e., a U-21F type aircraft would comply with and
satisfy its operational requirements. The Air Force, on the other hand,
has determined that its requirements are higher than the U-21F in two
areas. These are single engine rate of climb and single engine service
ceiling.
To resolve this dilemma and to permit the expeditious replacement
of the deteriorating fleet of utility aircraft, discussions have continued
between the services. The attempted single service consolidated pro-
curement did not produce the desired result since requirements for the
Army and Air Force aircraft are said to be somewhat different. Per-
formance requirements representative of the turboprop type aircraft
satisfy the Army's minimum operational requirements. However, the
Air Force has taken the position that an increased capability is needed
for the CX-X to assure that minimum safety of flight performance
requirements can be satisfied.
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As a result. the. committee received a request front the Army asking
permission to procure aircraft that met its minimum requirements
separate and apart from the Jr Force.
During the hearings, the Arr iy, in their FY 1974 request for 20
additional aircraft., at a cost of Ii12.2 million, again justified it turbo-
prop-type aircraft to the satisfaction of the cornrrrittee, and the com-
mittee recommends approval of the Army request. Ilowever, the
committee was not convinced that the Air Force justified a higher
specification than the Army for the uses to which these aircraft are
to be put. Therefore, the committee recommends that the Air Fo:-ce
request. for 16 CX-X attache aircraft,, in the amount of $9.6 million,
be disapproved.
fi'--111
Members of this committee have expressed concern over the fact that
the Department of Defense did not submit a request for further pro-
duction of the F--111 type aircraft in the FY 1974 budget. Many
members expressed amazement that, the administration's budget would
let the F-111. production line die while continuing other lines such as
the A-4. which is 1948 technology; the A-6, subsonic 1950 technology;
the A-7, 19,50 technology; and the F-4, of which the U.S. already has
more than 1,000.
The committee discussed at. length this particular program and re-
ceived testimony in connection ihere.with. The majority of the com-
mittee arrived at the conclusion that w e might be creating an unneces-
sary problem for ourselves b:7 blindly accepting the strategic bomber
schedule of the Department of Defense. It seemed that a simple solu-
tion to the whole problem would be to preserve the alternative that is
found in the F-111. That production line is the only existing bomber
source in the free world toda,7. The F--111 is the only tactical aircraft
we have which can be converted to a strategic aircraft, the FB-111,
with minor modifications.
In response to discussions and inquires, the committee requested and
received a letter from the Genera I Dynamics Corp. dated ,June 14, 1973
submitting an estimate for continuing the production of the F-1.11
weapon system beyond the ctrrent program which ends in December
1974. The committee had beer. advised that the Air Force and Gene:ral
Dynamics some time ago negotiated a program for 12 F--111 aircraft
in FY 1974.
These negotiations contemplated authorization to proceed on 1
January 1973 and the target pri-e established for a fixed price incen-
f ive fee contract was $136.3 million. At that time, it was estimated that
$30 million in long lead items should be added for the required engines
and other (WE for purposes of determining the total program cost.
Since the FY 1974 program has not been authorized and the $30 mil-
lion long lead procurement fund:: have not been released, some changes
to the negotiated program, d--scribed above, are necessary. Assuming
a release of long lead funds (830 million) not later than 1 August
1973, General Dynamics is able to make a firm commitment for a 12
F--111 program at a target pr' We of $1.48 million. The target price
excludes the prices for engines mud other GFE as well as spares and
other initial support items. With that background, the General Dy-
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namics proposal of the total program cost for a 12 F-111 program
follows :
12 F-111 airplanes : Millions
Airframe and avionics------------------------------------- - $148.0
GFAE _ 32.2
-----------------------_-------------------------
Spares and support (8 percent) ---------------------------------- 14.4
Program total------------------------------------------------ 194.6
NOTE.--These figures include (1) the additional cost caused by delay in release
of long lead funds, and (2) the $30 million long lead funds provided in the FY
1973 budget.
The above information was transmitted to the Air Force and their
comments were requested. The reply received from the Air Force indi-
cated that they agreed, in general, with the General Dynamics figures.
However, the Air Force's estimate for spares and support equipment is
$23.5 million as compared with $14.4 million shown above estimated by
General Dynamics, a difference of $9.1 million.
Further, there is an apparent discrepancy of $19.1 million between
the General Dynamics' letter to the committee and the Air Force letter
in the estimated cost of a 12 aircraft buy of the F-111. The difference
involved their respective estimates of initial spares and support equip-
ment ($9.1 million) plus the Air Force claimed requirement for an
additional flight simulator ($10 million).
As far as the simulator is concerned, the Air Force stated that it
would be possible to defer the $10 million, and it should be deferred
until a later year program.
Regarding the difference of $9.1 million for the initial spares and
support equipment, the contractor's estimate was based on a straight
actuarial calculation using 8% of the basic cost, or $14.4 million. The
Air Force estimate of $23.5 million ($15.3 million support equipment
plus $8.2 million initial spares) was presumably arrived at by a more
detailed item by item analysis. The reason that this figure is higher
than the more usually accepted 8% is, quite frankly, that during the
last several years' buys of the F-111s, the Air Force has scrimped on
these items in order to hold down the total cost. In other words, the
extra $9.1. million that the Air Force estimates is needed for initial
spares and support equipment is as much to support these previous
aircraft as it is for this year's buy. However, $1 million of the $9.1
million difference was added by the Air Force for FY 1975 initial
spares. The committee believes this $1 million can be deferred until
next year.
The committee, therefore, recommends the authorization of $172.7
million for a 12 F-111 aircraft buy.
C-5A
As the committee reported last year, the C-5A continued to provide
the Military Airlift Command with the unique capability to move
combat and combat support units, including "outsized" equipment and
logistical supplies, rapidly and efficiently under wartime or emergency
conditions. It continues to assure the balanced and effective deploy-
ment of manpower and materiel.
As of the end of May 1973, when the last C -5A was delivered to the
Air Force, this aircraft had logged over 100,000 hours in test, training
and airlift missions. Operational units have flown over 2800 scheduled
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airlift missions transporting over 150,000 tons of cargo for the Depart
ment of Defense. In addition, the f"-5A has flown over 600 Special
Assignment Airlift Missions (SRAM) carrying over 29,000 tons of
cargo predominantly outsized to an)' other Air Force airlift aircraft.
Our Strategic Airlift Force, consisting of C-5s and C-1.41s, is now
fully equipped. These aircraft, i-i concert, with the Civil Reserve Air
Fleet, have the capability to air' ift armored divisions with virtually
all of their heavy equipment-worldwide.
In FY 1973 the Air Force reluested funds to complete the C-5A
program. Congress reduced the reiuest, leaving funding to be ap-
proved incrementally. For FY 1S" N the Air Force requested $43.1 mil-
lion to cover the: C-5A requirements. however, the committee has
learned that X37.2 million will sati:dfy the FY 1974 requirements.
Air Force Secretary Seamans advised Congress that the fatigue life
of the C-5 A. continues to be a subject of concern. Further, an independ-
ent structural review team formed i n late 1971 has outlined a number
of alternative methods for increasing fatigue life of the aircraft. As a
result of this review, the Air Force is implementing flight and fuel
management techniques, and is going ahead with an active lift dis-
tribution control system, to reduce stress on critical wing areas during
flight operations. Other tests, refurbishment, and depot AGE can all
be accommodated with the funds r,commended by the committee.
The committee recommends the approval of $37.2 million for the
(t-5A program.
AS'rr. f egiurrd
The bill contains $350.3 million for the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic
Missile System, including $159.3 million for procurement and $191
million fair research, development, test and evaluation. The total au-
thorized, $350.3 million, represents Li $50.7 million reduction below the
amount requested.
The funds authorized provide for the continuation of Safeguard
deployment at one site at Grand Forks, North Dakota, consistent with
the Treaty on the Limitation c,f ABM Systems entered into by the
U.S. and the Soviet Union in 197-?. Tinder the terms of the Treaty.
each nation is limited to two ABM[ sites, one for the defense of ICBM
fields and one for the defense of the nation's Capital. Congress last
year made the determination not ta field the system in the Washing-
ton, D.C. area. Consistent with that determination by the Congress.,
this year's request included only finds necessary for the deployment
at the Grand Forks site.
The system i~; due to become operational at Grand Forks during fis-
c:il 1974 and this year's authorization represents the last significantly
large funding request for the Grand Forks site.
During the Committee's initial review of the Safeguard procure..
ment the. Committee questioned Army witnesses closely concerning
the level of funding required for the. program. Following that review
the Armv reanalyzed its request and indicated to the Committee that
it could take a reduction of $255.7 million in the procurement account,
for Safeguard, the major portion representing reduction in the amonm;
requested for ground equipment. The procurement authorization was
accordingly reduced by that am curt.
In addition, the Committee determined that the level of R. & D.
funding was extraordinarily high for a system which is close to com-
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pletion. The Committee, therefore, while recognizing that most of the
R.D.T. & E. funds were for testing and advance software for the sys-
tem, nevertheless concluded that a reduction of $25 million could
safely be made in R.D.T. & E. funds for Safeguard.
The combined effect of the procurement and R.D.T. & E. reduc-
tions, therefore, is a net decrease in the Safeguard authorization of
$50.7 million below the amount initially requested.
Lance
The bill provides $83.7 million, the amount requested for procure-
ment of the Lance (MGM-52C missile). In addition, the bill provides
$1.5 million for initial spares for a net total authorization of $85.2
million for the system. R. & D. has been completed on the Lance and
no R.D.T. & E. funds are included for the system in the present bill
or planned in the future.
The Lance is a mobile surface to surface ballistic missile system to
provide general fire support at the corps and division level. The pres-
ent authorization continues the level of procurement initiated last year
looking towards the gradual introduction of the Lance into the Army
system replacing the Honest John and the Sergeant missile battalions.
The authorization provided in the bill provides for a nuclear-only
capability for the system. The Armed Services Committee has in the
past indicated its support for a non-nuclear as well as a nuclear_ war-
head for Lance. The Army is, however, pursuing a R & D program
looking toward an eventual non-nuclear capability for the system. A
study presently being conducted with the cooperation of the Institute
for Defense Analysis is examining the cost effectiveness of the non-
nuclear warhead. The results of the study are expected to be available
in April. of 1974. The Committee will expect the results of the study
to be available to it in time for consideration of the fiscal 1975 missile
procurement program so that funding for a non-nuclear capability can
be included in next year's authorization bill if the study indicates that
such would be cost-effective. The Committee notes that the Army con-
tinues to support a non-nuclear capability for Lance.
DLGN
The House Armed Services Committee in acting on the recom-
mendation of its Seapower Subcommittee added to the authorization
this year the sum of $79 million to cover additional long-leadtime
funding for two nuclear frigates DLGN-41 and -42.
The Navy presently has only two nuclear frigates in commission-
the BAINBRIDGE (DLGN-25) and the TRUXTUN (DLGN-35).
Despite the initial objections of the Department of Defense, the Com-
mittee on Armed Services and the Congress gave the Department of
the Navy authority, which it utilized, to initiate construction on two
additional nuclear frigates, the CALIFORNIA (DLGN-36) and the
SOUTH CAROLINA (DLGN-37). These nuclear frigates will enter
the fleet in calendar year 1974 and 1975 respectively.
Subsequent to that action, the Department of the Navy recom-
mended the initiation of a new class of nuclear frigates, the so-called
DLGN-38 class. At the time Congress was requested to approve this
program, the Department advised that this class would consist of at
least four nuclear frigates. Congress approved this program but the
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Department has seen fit to limit construction on this new class of nu-
clear frigates to three ships-the DLGN-38, -39, and -40. Un-
fortunatety, the Department has. no provision in its 5-year plan for
initiating construction of any additional nuclear frigates of this class.
In view of these circumstances, and because of the obvious require-
ment for additional nuclear-powc;red frigates to accompany our nu-
clear-powered aircraft carriem, the Committee is providing for long
lead time items in this bill for the DLGN-41 and -42. Aside from the
military and strategic considerations that prompt this decision, the
Committee wishes to point out that the decision to go forward with
these additional nuclear-powered frigates of the DLGN-38 class will
offer the opportunity for economies in ship construction costs that wi71
not be available in the event the Navy fails to exercise its option for
future construction under the, existing DLGN-38 contract.
As the escorts for each nuclear-powered aircraft carrier are con-
verted to nuclear power, the ca rric r achieves far more of its potential
capability. With four nuclear-powered carriers planned for the Fleet,
a minimum of 16 escorts is neede .. The escorts have proven to be ex-
trenmely valuable for independent work as well. Because of their
nuclear powerplant they can move without waiting for black oil in
order to meet an emergency ar.d f,,rrive at their destination ready to
fulfill their mission. Neither th ~ commanding officer of a ship nor the
commanding officer of any group utilizing nuclear power ever has to
concern himself about, fuel levels dropping to such a point as to make
it necessary to curtail any mission.
In order to provide the funds for the DLGNs the committee took
$22.7 mill=ion from the item Cost (growth of Prior-Year Programs, it
sum Navy had earlier advised th(. committee it did not need for the
LIIA program. However, the -''rrn:ls were still included in the Presi-
dent's budget. The committee took $36.3 million from the program
for the conversion of Polaris to Poseidon. This program has his-
torically had a large amount of funds available for reprogramming
because of superior management. The committee also took $20 million
from the conversion of conventionally-powered frigates since these
were going to be sent to private yards instead of public yards which
the Navy informed the committee would involve a saving and also
would involve it time delay.
Because the Congress has had great difficulty persuading the execu-
tive. branch to build nuclear frigates. the committee added language
to the bill requiring that the $79 million be used on.lz/ for the purchase
of the long-leadlime items for DL(xN-41 and -42. The committee also
incorporated language (such as used by the Congress in 1966 and later
years) requiring that the contract `or the long-leadtime items be let as
soon as practicable unless the President fully advises the Congress
that. the construction of the nuclear frigates is not in the interest of
national defense. This approach by the Congress forced the construe
tion of DLGNs- -36 to -40 and the committee believes it, is necessary
again in order to get the program back underway.
?4%uolear aircraft carrier
The President's budget requests $657 million to complete the fund-
ing of the new unclear aircraft carrier CVN-70. Other items of the
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budget request $52.7 million for escalation and $11.4 million for out-
fitting of the Nimitz and Eisenhower, CVN-68 and -69.
The nuclear aircraft carrier is it fast mobile base for the support of
sea-based tactical airpower. The carrier gives the United States the
capability to fly ship-based airplanes against some of the strongest
land-based airplanes of the Soviets. Circumstances might be such-
as they have been in the past-that there would be little or no sup-
port from friendly nations or we would be denied the ability to use
land-based airfields. At that time it would be necessary to have in
the air our strongest naval fighters, the F-14, and the only naval plane
able to keep track of and direct an air battle, the E-2C.
Modern nuclear-powered carriers have been designed for these mod-
ern aircraft. The deck length, the catapult strength and the arresting
gear configuration are all designed together to enable these planes
to fly from the deck. In turn, the spaces below deck are designed to
provide for the maintenance and supplies of the new aircraft.
The following table is an illustrative example of the relative capa-
bilities of old and modern attack carriers, by class, reflecting single
strike capabilities and air ordnance, jet fuel, and steaming endurances
without replenishment :
Commissioning periods______________________________
1944-50
1945-47
1957-68
1972-
2
0
Single strike capability_______________________________
1.0
1.3
1.6
.
8
3
Ordnance endurance_________________________________
1.0
1.4
2.5
.
5
Jet fuel endurance__________________________________
1.0
1.8
2.6
.2
1
Steaming endurance_________________________________
1.0
1.0
1.0
(
)
I Virtually unlimited.
The carriers are also needed to defend against a heavy attack on our
naval forces from cruise missiles that could be launched by the Soviets
from the air, surface ships or undersea craft.
The funds sought this year will allow the completion of the fourth
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. This will permit us to station two
carriers in the Atlantic and two in the Pacific ready to respond to
emergencies in either area. Some have suggested that we can rely upon
land base airfields in times of difficulty. However, the number of bases
around the world has dropped from 500, which we had just after
World War II, to 37. Many of these remaining bases might be denied to
us for political reasons in times of crisis. The possible denial. of these
rights makes it imperative that we keep up our carrier forces as one of
our most effective weapons. As the number of carriers in the fleet de-
creases, it is all the more important that we provide the strongest
carrier fleet possible within the numbers permitted to the Navy.
The committee has frequently stressed the importance it attaches
to having first-line ships of the Navy nuclear powered instead of con-
ventionally powered. The two nuclear cores in the Nimitz deliver
energy the equivalent of 11 million barrels of fuel oil.. That is the
equivalent of a line of tank cars extending from Washington to Boston,
close to 500 miles. The two nuclear cores in the new frigates each will
deliver the equivalent energy of two million barrels of fuel oil. These
are over a life of more than 10 years. This means that the nuclear-
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powered ships will be able to operate effectively without any need for
fuel for its own propulsion and with only the need for airplane fuel for
the planes on the carrier. This releases what would otherwise be a heavy
demand for fuel oil on the civi liar n economy.
Trident
Included in the bill is $1,527,400,000, the amount requested, for Tri-
dent. The Shipbuilding and Conversion portion of Title I includes
$86 7.8 million ; of this amount., $536.8 million is to complete funding of
the first Trident submarine. The balance is for long-leadtime items for
three submarines. This request follows the authorization and apps
priation last year of $194 mill ion which was used to buy the long-lead
nuclear propulsion items for the first, Trident submarine and long-lead-
time items for three additional submarines.
The Trident submarine is be.inff planned for introduction into the
fleet about 1978. It is planned to be equipped with the Trident I mis-
sile which will have a range of over twice the present Poseidon missile.
This will enable the Trident :;ubnarine to operate in over 41/2 times
the ocean areas that the Polaris submarines can operate in. This greater
area is desirable in order to make it much more difficult to find and
destroy our submarine-based ballistic missiles.
The Trident submarine with the Trident I missile system, when it
enters the fleet in 1978, will th,m give the United States equivalent of
what the Soviets presently have;; a deployed 4,000-mile sea-launched
ballistic missile. This capability allows the Soviets to target locations
in the United States from area,; where the U.S. Navy has a diminished
ability to detect and track their submarines.
In addition, the new submarine is being designed to operate much
more quietly than our present ballistic-missile submarines, to operate
faster and to last longer. Our present ballistic missile submarines were
basically designed out of one class; Of attack submarine with the hull
literally being cut in two and stret'hed to take care of the missile silos.
When they were built the suhrrarines were not expected to have a life
longer than 20 years. No ship ?n the fleet has been worked as hard as
the. Polaris/Poseidon with its 131u and Gold Crews. Each submarine
has generally come in from a mission, replenished its supplies and gone
right back out on a new mission, leaving the old crew on shore. The
result has been that these submarines have been subjected to more
missions and have been longer )n ,tation than any other class of ship
iii the fleet. When the Trident submarines enter the fleet, most of the
Polaris submarines they replace will have served 1.8 or more years.
The. Trident submarines are being designed to last 30 years despite
the increased activity involved in their operation.
Extensive efforts in quieting the submarine are incorporated in the
ship. new reactor design is an important factor in this quieting, as
the incorporation of other new modern quieting techniques that have
been developed over the years. Thk size of the ship itself permits the,
use of many quieting techniques that could not be incorporated in a.
smaller ship.
The increased speed of the Tride~it submarine has been incorporated
to allow the submarine to break arv trail that may be on it. It is also
an important factor in helping the submarine to maneuver when nec-
cssa.ry for the safety of the ship.
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The $654.6 million in the budget for RDT&E this year is divided
between research for the missile and research for the submarine sys-
tems.
In both cases the development is that necessary to achieve a fleet
operating capability in late 1978.
$529 million allows the continuing development of a new long-
range strategic ballistic-missile weapon system which will be capable
of being carried by older submarines as well as the new Trident sub-
marines.
$125.6 million provides for development effort in support of a new,
quiet, highly reliable submarine incorporating an advanced nuclear-
propulsion plant, an integrated command and control system and ma-
jor improvements in underwater acoustic systems.
Admiral Rickover informed the committee that if the submarines
are not funded this year as requested, the cost of the first Trident sub-
marine will increase by $100 million and the cost of the others will
increase by comparable amounts. The nuclear components, consisting
of huge masses of metal being shaped and formed to meticulous
reactor requirements are coming off the production line as planned.
Any halt in the production line will not only delay the long-leadtime
items for the other submarines, but will increase the cost. In the event
this program is not funded, it is not unlikely that the manufacturers
of these very complex components will then find it better business to
concentrate on the reactor program for private industry than to deal
with on-again, off-again programs of the Navy-a matter of signifi-
cant concern to Navy managers and to the Congress.
Trident
Millions
Procurement: $867 8
Naval vessels-------------------------------------------------- 5.0
Missiles
Total ------------------------ 872.8
R.D.T. & E.: 125. 6
Naval vessels-------------------------------------------------- 529.0
Missiles -----------------------------------------------------
Total ---------------------- 654.6
Grand total-------------------------------------------------- 1,527.4
Nuclear Attack Submarine-SSN--688
The President's budget requested $783.2 million to complete five
nuclear attack submarines for which the. nuclear long-leadtime items
were requested last year. In addition, there was a request for $130
million for advanced procurement for long-leadtime items for an-
other set of five nuclear attack submarines included in next year's
program. This is a total of $913.2 million. There was also a request
for $36.5 million for escalation and $8.4 million for outfitting for sub-
marines involved in prior-year programs. The full authorization re-
quest -is recommended by the Committee.
The nuclear attack submarine has been proven to be one of our
most effective weapons. It not only can be used against surface ships
but also against enemy ballistic-missile submarines. We are moving to
convert all our submarine forces as rapidly as possible to nuclear sub-
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marines. 'T'hose eonventionally-.powered submarines remaining in our
-C'leet were built during or just a.ftor World War II.
The ccatstrnction of nuclear attack submarines would have been
halted in the late 1960s if t1e Armed Services Committee had not
f-hallenged the construction limitations imposed by the Department
of Defense. To counter the 3.,0 Soviet submarines, Defense had set
fled on an allowance of 69 nuclear attaek submarines. Since that time
the Soviets have built more nuclear submarines; their total number
of nuclear attack submarines in (commission or under construction is
larger than our total number o'' nuclear attack submarines.
Ballistic missile----- -- _. _ 6f1 41
Attack missile -------------------_ 65 0
- -----------
Attack 44
atal ------ --- --------------- 340 1,?5
Total nucfoar__.--------___ ---------------- ll0 101. Includes 30 modern Y lass submarines, An iddmal 12 or more listic e are be under construction with aak new Delta class in prod ci ion.tThe Yankee class carries 16iSS IN-6bm ssiles having arrange of
1,300 nautical miles and the Delta class is expected to carry 12 SS-NX-8 missiles having a range of about 4,000 nautical
miles. Soviets are estimated to have facilities for building 1:' nuclear-lowered balistic missile submarines a year. A con-
s(ruction rate of 8 a year will enable them to achieve a force level of 62 Yankee and Delta class submarines by expirati(n
of the initial SALT agreement in May 1977.
1)D-?91)1,3
This year they e is a total of $612,.1 million in the bill for the DD-W.
Of this sum *387.5 million is to complete the construction of the seven
ships for which long-leadtime terns were authorized last year. There
is also :h1148.3 million for advlnred procurement for long-leadtime
items for the final seven destroyers required for which full authoriza-
tions will be requested next year. -there. are also provisions for $21.2
nlilliou for escalation and $5.1 million for outfitting for a total o:i
$612.1 million for D1)-963.
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Litton Industries has advanced its program for the construction of
the DD-963 destroyers by half a year. There has been some small
delay from this advanced schedule. However, all of the contractural
milestones are being met on or ahead of schedule and the construction
of the first DI)-963 hulls is proceeding apace. The Navy told the
committee that it had to have all of these funds for the DI)-963 this
year in order to meet the contract requirements for funding. Otherwise
Litton Industries would be able to say that Navy had breached the
contract and it could ask for additional funds to complete the pro-
gram. While the committee would like to have had another year in
which to see whether Litton will be able to complete the DD-963s on
time, within cost and to specifications, it did not want to force Navy
to break the contract. Hence, the committee approved all of the funds
requested this year.
LHA
The LHA program continues to be beset by problems. The com-
mittee was informed that there would be additional delays in the
delivery of the LHA ships. The two items in this year's shipbuilding
program involving LHA are cost growth (going from target to ceil-
ing), $103.8 million, and escalation, $65.4 million, for a total of $169.2
million. The committee was informed that these are contract obliga-
tions which need to be paid in order to force Litton Industries, the
builder, to complete the five ships within the terms of the contract.
The amount of escalation was reduced on March 1, 1973 by $22.7
million by the contracting officer's decision, and the committee accepted
this reduction.
SSBN conversions
Originally the President's budget required $351.5 million for the
conversion of five ballistic-missile submarines from Polaris to Posei-
don missiles. Since there had been advance procurement of $121.7 mil-
lion, this left a total of $229.8 million requested this year. The com-
mittee noted the large number of reprogrammings by which the
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Navy had taken out 15 percent of the funds of this program and ap-
plied them to other programs over a period of years. Bence, it con-
cluded that. the program had been amply financed in the beginning
and was also well managed. Wit a this background the Committee was
prepared to make reductions in this oiccount.
Subsequently, it was brought to the committee's attention that Mr.
Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, had decided that it would
be possible to remove $113.6 milt on from this program in order to pro-
vide a major part of the funds of the $150 million for the prototype
flyoff for the stripped down F-L= and F-15 airplanes. Since Mr. Clem-
ents' action indicated the $113.6 million was not absolutely necessary
for the SSBN program, and since the committee had rejected the
F--14/F-15 prototype proposal, the committee deleted. the $113.6 mil-
lion which together with the $36.3 million reduction previously men-
tioned under discussion of the DII-IGN's, leaves $79.9 million in the con-
version program.
The .1160AI Tank
The bill contains $18.2 million for advanced procurement of long-
leadtime components for the M?OA1 tank. Approximately half of the
tanks will be an improved versicn of M60A1 to be designated M60A3.
Technical problems have arisen in the fire-control components of the
improved version; and while correotive action has been initiated, the
result will be a slippage of approximately 6 months in the fielding of
the, product improved tank. Be-!air e of the slippage and consequent
delay in the introduction of the T46(4A3 version, the full advanced-pro-
curement funding initially requested will not be required in fiscal
1974.
At the same time requirements for other portions of the program
were determined to be somewhat understated. The changes, however,
allowed for a. net reduction of $8.4 million below the $26.6 million
initially requested by the Army.
The committee, therefore, approved the level of authorization at
$1.8.2 million.
The M198 Towed Howitzer
The bill contained a request for S3.5 million for long-leadtime pro-
curement for the XM198 towed Howitzer. In addition, $5,976,000 was
requested in RDT&E funds for this weapons system for a total of
$9,476 million.
During the course of the heaiinvs it was determined that technical
problems had developed in a number of items in the R&D prototypes
of the weapon. It was determined that these problems would delay
the system to such an extent that long-leadtime items would not be
required M. fiscal year 1974 and, therefore, could be eliminated from
tlio bill.
Further review by the committee determined that the committee
could not with confidence continue the funding for the proposed
system.
The purpose of the program is to extend the range of the weapons
system. The committee learned that ammunition has been developed
that achieves the desired range using existing weapons.
The committee has, therefore? deleted all of the R&I), as well as all
of the procurement funds for the XM198.
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M-16 Rift
The bill contained a request for $3.1 million for procurement of
31,000 M-16A1 rifles for the Army. The analysis by the Committee
determined that the procurement request was based on a desire to
maintain a warm production base and did not reflect a valid require-
ment for the Army. The Committee also determined that the initial
request had incorrectly stated the projected unit cost of these rifles,
and that, therefore, the authorization would have had to be increased
to procure the number of rifles requested.
In the view of the Committee the Army presently has an adequate
inventory of M-16 rifles. The Committee, therefore, denied the $3.1
million authorization request.
TITLE II-RESEARCII, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND
EVALUATION
The following tabulation compares the amounts authorized and
appropriated for research, development, test, and evaluation in fiscal
year 1973 with the amounts requested and recommended by the Com-
mittee for fiscal year 1974.
Appro-
Requested Authorized priated Requested Committee
fiscal year fiscal year fiscal year fiscal year recom-
Research, development, test, and evaluation 1973 1973 1973 1974 mends
Army------------------------------------------ 2,122,716 1,978,966 1,829,032 2,108,700 2,031,686
Navy (and Marine Corps) ------------------------ 2,816,787 2,708,817 2,545,213 2,711,700 12,675,300
Air Force______________________________________ 3,262,177 3,272,777 3,122,940 3,212,500 3,110,811
Defense agencies____________________520,087 505,987 435,313 525,000 , 2504,000
Director of test and evaluation, Defense___________________27,000 ________________________
Emergency fund________________________________ 50,D00 50,000 0 0 0
Total, R.D.T.&E-------------------------- 8,771,767 8,516,547 7,959,498 8,557,900 8,321,797
1 Includes $2,600,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T. & E. authorization.
2 Includes $24,600,000 for the activities of the Director of test and evaluation, Defense.
The fiscal year 1974 budget request for research, development, test,
and evaluation of $8,557,900,000 is $41,353,000 more than was author-
ized by the Congress for fiscal year 1973. The amount recommended
by the Committee, $8,321,797,000, is $236,103,000 less than was re-
quested by the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1974 and is
$194,750,000 less than was authorized by the Congress for fiscal year
1973.
The reductions of $77,014,000 recommended in the Army and $101,-
689,000 in the Air Force budget requests are made on a specific pro-
gram basis whereas the $36.4 million reduction for the Navy and the
$21 million reduction for Defense Agencies should be taken on the
basis of defense priorities.
The Committee agrees with the position taken by the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering that
it is essential for the United States to maintain a technological base
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which is superior to that of potential adversaries. Testimony was re-
ceived by the Committee that the Soviet Union is making a determined
effort to surpass the United Stites in technological achievement. The
Soviets can take obvious advantage, of open Western societies, while
the United States and our allies can have only incomplete knowledge
o1' Soviet progress. Defense w.tn_ esses indicated that because of this
closed versus open society, the United States needs an adequate, long-
term level of research and development funding if we are to avoid
technological surprises and maintain a reasonable margin of techno-
logical superiority in key areas important to the over-all military
balance.
Our technology base is comp-ised of research, exploratory develop-
anent, and portions of advanced development in the researeh, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation budget. It includes the exploration of science
and engineering to find applications of military worth. Defense wit-
nesses testified ghat this technology base is needed to open up new
avenues of technology that make lr ossible significant, improvements in
current weapons systems or in entirely new kinds of systems. It is
needed to reduce the cost of current military equipment and to help
make effective use of military personnel.
Because of the importance ard the necessity of maintaining an ade-
quate technology base, the Committee recommends authorizing the
full amount requested for this area..
Often 1Vlenibe:rs of the Committee are questioned about accomplish-
ments from the defense techno_ogv base as well as the balance of the
Defense research and development expenditures over the years. At
the Committee's request, the Office of the Director of Defense Research
and EnLri-leering submitted information on accomplishments from
the defense technology base along? with examples of civilian spin-off
from defense research and development programs. The information
submitted follows :
DIRECTOR OF 1RESEARCII AND ENGINEERING,
Washington, D.C,., March 23.1973.
lion. MELVIN PRICE,
Chairman., AS'uzhcommittee No. 1, Committee on Armed 8ervices, U.S.
'house of Representatives, -W ' shington, D.C.
DEAR MR. CILIIRMAN : Severn weeks ago you mentioned to me that
examples of accomplishments from the defense technology base, writ-
ten in non-technical terms, would be of use to your committee. We
have compiled such a list, and enclose it herewith. A number of these
achievements undoubtedly will find application in the civilian sector.
Basic and applied research, by its very nature, is carried out by
small teams or project groups. As a result, there are some 20,000 prot-
ects comprising the defense technology base. Describing the technology
base in terms of a few dozen of these projects--for example, in terms
of the project examples enclosed---is a little like trying to describe a
supermarket by displaying a few of the items "on special' : A can of
peas, a jar of peanut butter, a box of soap. "That's a supermarket?"
The answer is, of course, "No, that is not a supermarket. The `specials'
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are only representative, and don't give a perspective of the scope and
magnitude of the store as a whole, or of the many quality products on
its shelves." In a similar fashion, it is difficult for the attached exam-
ples, even though they represent significant achievements, to portray
the scope and magnitude of the base, or to give an indication of the
large accumulative value which accrues from many small research ef-
forts over a period of time. Let me illustrate the latter by an accumu-
lative example from the medical field :
VIETNAM CASUALTY RATES COM- INCREASED VIETNAM COSTS IF KO-
PARED TO KOREAN EXPERIENCE REAN RATES HAD PREVAILED
44 percent lower battle death rate
28 days shorter average hospitali-
zation of wounded
25 percent reduction in wound dis-
ability separations
15 day reduction in hospital stay
for malaria
50 percent reduction in wounded
having amputations
22,000 deaths, $385M death bene-
fits
12,000 man-years, $210M hospital
costs
3800 men
2,500 man-years, $115M in hospi-
tal costs
3000 limbs
In addition, within the span of the Vietnam War itself, both the
incidence of malaria and the mortality from burns were reduced by
50%Jo. These changes, brought about solely by technology base effort
carried out over a period of years, are dramatic, representing a saving
in lives, hardship, and funds of great value. Yet, examples taken from
any one year might not seem very startling because the accumulative
value is not portrayed by the example. This accumulative value runs
through all of the technological and scientific fields comprising the
technology base. Citing just two examples: the 1970 jet engine has
triple the thrust to weight ratio of its 1950 counterpart (with a re-
sultant very large impact on aircraft-capability), and the 1970 large
number-crunching computer provides more versatility and capability
than one could even imagine from a consideration of its 1960
counterpart.
I hope the comments above on how examples from the technology
base fit into the. overall picture, and the examples, themselves, will be
of value, to you. The examples have been categorized in 5 main areas
of support for the Armed Forces.
Sincerely,
Gus D. DOROUGH,
Deputy Director (Reseeveh. and Advanced Technology),
(For John S. Foster, Jr.,
Director of Defense Research and Engineering).
SUPPORT FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL
Military dogs are an essential element of DOD security police activi-
ties. Common canine diseases such as hook worm and heart worm
result in costs to the government in both non-availability for the dogs
for ditty and veterinary medical care. New treatments for these infec-
tions have decreased their occurrence in DOD dogs by about 50 percent
and cut the cost of treating infected dogs from $40 to $5.85 per dog.
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Severe burns are Common is combat and in training accidents, re-
sulting in many deaths. The I)oI) burn research program has led the
world in producing new treatrients for burns. One development was a
new antibiotic ointment to cover burns. The cumulative, result of this
research program is that deatls f,-om burns in the Armed Forces have
been cut by 50 percent since 19?5.
Induction of poorly suited recruits into the military services is very
costly in terms of wasted training time, disciplinary problems and
ineffectiveness in assigned duties A 10-year Navy research program
on psychiatric screening developed some simple guidelines by which
recruiters can forecast success in first enlistments, thereby screening
out poor risk recruits. The Navy estimates costs of about $B million
per year, that would be incurred f these men were. inducted and then
prematurely separated, that ar,e avoided.
Better methods for collecting, quantifying, organizing and report-
ing data about the properties of Air Force enlisted jobs were devel-
oped. These new methods have been used to restructure military
training courses, yielding a $4.31 cost avoidance in FY 73.
A new Army helicopter synthetic flight training system device, con-
ceived and developed as a technology base effort, has now been sub-
jected to operational suitability testing. Students participating
required 37 hours less than the custonrary training required to qualify
for an instrument rating, result.irg in it cost avoidance of $4,500 per
trainee.
LWoalr.r Ty
The first advanced aircraft auxiliary power unit, development in
more than a. decade was recently completed. The program demon-
strated a. new unit capable w' producing 150 horsepower per cubic
foot-over twice that of the moss advanced operational unit at it, 20
percent lower specific fuel corsurnption. These power units are used
for starting aircraft and other ground operations where external
power is required.
New chassis suspension svstmis for tracked vehicles were recently
demonstrated which will make it possible to increase the average cross
country speed of these vehicles fom the present 10-12 mph to a re-
rnarkable 30 mph.
A computer simulation technique has been developed by the Army
which predicts Cross country spee'I of any wheeled or tracked vehicle,
in any terrain. This capability. Irot previously available, will perm9t.
a more precise assessment of military L round vehicle needs. As much
.~ a 25 percent reduction in the A rmy's, fleet of wheeled vehicles may
be realized without it significant '!')Ss of Capability. A large savings in
acquisition and maintenance costs would result.
The engine selected for the A rmy TITTAS helicopter is a direct out-
-rowth of the Army technology base's demonstrator cugine. program.
This research technology program is also an example of the fly-before-
Yon-buy concept.
A new fire extinmuishing svutern was. demonstrated for use in air-
craft that is two to three times more effective than standard equipment
now in use. This new fir(, exti ugnisher will significantly shorten the
time to extinguish a flame.
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A joint Air Force-Navy program developed a solid state power
system and incorporated it in a full-scale aircraft electrical system
simulator. Successful operation resulted in the system being selected
for the 13-1, at a saving of some 40 miles of wiring per airplane.
The Army has developed a technique for sealing the soil under roads
against moisture. Native soil can be substituted for crushed rock and
cement in constructing roads and air strips. The technique is already
saving millions of dollars in construction of B-52 bomber dispersal
runways. It will double the road construction rate of an engineer
battalion.
An aimable warhead for air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles has
been demonstrated using selective guidance controlled techniques. This
warhead, which can project its lethal effects in a preferred direction,
should provide a 30 percent greater effectiveness of these weapons.
One of the major limiting factors to the range of smaller caliber
ammunition is atmospheric drag. The Army has demonstrated a new
design incorporating a "gas generator" on the base of the projectile
which reduces the drag by CO percent. This concept will provide in-
creased range for small caliber ammunition.
A new solid missile propellant binder has been developed which can
lead to savings of thirty cents per lb. in propellant costs-$3 million
can be saved in the purchase of SAM-D motors alone. This solid pro-
pellant has more propulsive energy per pound and has better storage
capabilities than current propellants.
Improved thrust control methods for solid rockets have been dem-
onstrated. This new technology can increase several-fold the target
intercept capability of future long-range surface-to-air missiles.
COMMAND, CONTROL AND TARGET AcQuisiTION
An inexpensive radar power tube has been developed for use in an
advanced ballistic missile defense radar. The new tube can be produced
for less than $100 vs. at least $350 for its nearest competitor, and would
reduce costs of an ultra reliable ballistic missile device radar system by
at least $11 million.
A serious deficiency in our ground forces is the lack of secure voice
capability in field radios. Current radios, without secure voice, weigh
25 lbs. If the. secure voice capability were. to be added to these radios,
using conventional integrated circuit technology, the weight of the
radio would approach 50 lhs, making it unsuitable for carrying by the
infantryman. Introduction of a new type of integrated circuit, which
significantly reduces power consumption, will now permit the design
of a radio with voice security that will weigh only 12 or 13 lbs.
A new solid state electronic component, known as an acoustic surface
wave device, is currently being demonstrated in several defense appli-
cations. One such device, the size of a tiny chip and costing $300, can
replace a radar component currently in use that occupies a volume of
72 cu. in. and costs approximately $3,000. Each Air Force AWACS
radar will use 26 of these devices.
The use of fiber optics in aircraft to replace electric wiring will be
demonstrated by the Navy in an A-7 aircraft. In this program, 4,832
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feet of wire weighing 82 pounds and costing $7,900 per aircraft 1`1o
install, will be replaced with 832 Feet of fiber optic cables weighing 13
pounds and costing $2,100 per airplane. In addition to the savings
which result, the fiber optics ire immune from interference problems
encountered in conventional w:.rec1. systems.
Low light level television cameras are used in several defense appli-
?ations. such as guidance for electro-optical bombs and night vision
_,ystems. -Recent advances in defense research in solid state electronics
technology indicate that size aid cost of these cameras can be reduced
io 10 percent of their current values. In addition, these new systems
will be far less fragile and therefore more reliable.
`A new steed armor material has been developed which promises to
provide the same protection at one-eighth the cost as the armor mate-
rial now tinder consideration for use in helicopters and land vehicles.
The Armv has developed a technique for testing the fatigue life of
Cannons which eliminates most of the live firings previously required.
he technioue, which uses preasur?ized hydraulic fluid, cost $3 million
to develop. It is estimated that X426 million can be saved during the
development of four new cannon tubes.
Exploratory Development has brought along new materials devel-
2ipments with excellent strength I:o weight and other properties. For
instance, the use of metals and plastics containing ceramic or graphite
fibers (so-called composites) I,erniits weight savings of about 40 per-
eeent and at the same time result: in improved fatigue and corrosion
resistance. The F-14 and the F-15 use one of these materials in the tail
surfaces which will result in greatly improved performance.
The Dr.fense Department conducts an extensive R. & I). program in
support of the national defense. Although meeting defense require-
ments is the sole objective of this endeavor, products of this work
have, over the years, made significant contributions to the civilian see-
tor of our economy.
These contributions range. from the concept of chlorination of wa-
ter supplles to the wide body airframe and engine technology of com-
mercial jumbo jets. They incLtde such ingredients of modern life as
the transistor. German measles vaccine, and the jet engine. DoD spon-
cored scientists did not "invent" all of these items, but the presence in
the civilian world of these inventions is nevertheless directly traceable
]rack to R&1) efforts sponsored by the Dol.
hhere are two separate processes by which DoD makes technology-
i.ntense products available to the civilian market. The first process is
simply tlrat of invention. Radar, a military invention now an essen-
I ial part of civilian traffic control., is a single example. The second proc-
ess may he termed "Industrialization." In. terns of total economic im-
I)act, this process is probably much more important. For example,
l)ol) did not discover aluminum. but its need for aluminum for air-
'raft led I)oD to undertake work which made possible the production
:end fabrication of the material, uid which provided much basic en-
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gineering design data for its use. DoD also supplied an original mar-
ket large enough so that production economies developed by the indus-
try could in time make aluminum competitive in countless consumer
products. The same situation seems to be developing for titanium and
composite materials. In electronics, DoD invented neither the tran-
sistor nor micro-integrated circuits, but DoD demand for the products,
and Dol) support of production technology, soon reduced unit cost to
the point that they could be profitably used in the civilian market.
Similar examples can be given in every discipline of technology. By
way of example, consider briefly the areas of aeronautics, electronics,
materials and medicine.
Aeronautics
Over the years most of the aviation developments first achieved in
military programs have been utilized by the civil sector. The list of
these achievements is quite lengthy and includes weather analysis and
forecasting and aviation medicine, as well as conceptional and hard-
ware contributions exemplified by swept wings, cabin pressurization,
aviation fuels, and turbine engines. The most recent major transfer to
the civil sector is the wide body airframe and engine technology stem-
ming from the C-5A program, and now being used in the Boeing 747,
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and Lockheed L-1011 transports. Another
major spin-off from the military is the inertial navigation system de-
rived directly from military programs which provides simpler, more
reliable and adequately accurate navigation for the civil airlines.
Military R. &, D. programs currently underway which are expected to
find significant civil application include "fly-by-wire" control sys-
teams which will result in lighter, less expensive, and more easily
maintained civilian airliners; and VTOL technology which may dra-
matically advance the state-of-the-art in inter-urban transportation.
Electr mice
The DoD technology program in electron devices has resulted in
contributions which have had significant impact on the civil sector. As
in example, growth in semiconductor technology has been paced by
I)oD sponsorship. Defense needs fueled the development of the tran-
sistor and integrated circuits to the point where these devices became
cost-effective for such commercial applications as radios, TV's, phono-
graphs, automobiles and digital computers. Solid state devices and
integrated circuits have been responsible for improving the capability
and lowering the cost of computers which impact daily in busness,
scientific research and industrial processes. Support is continuing in
this area to improve performance, reliability and to lower costs.
Current programs underway in the areas of night vision, informa-
tion storage. microwave devices, information display and sensors may
have potential impact and importance in such non-defense areas as
crop damage detection, medical diagnosis, computer-aided instruction,
public safety, and traffic management.
Materials
Materials technology is another area wherein the DOD has made
major impact on the civil sector. The new titanium industry is a direct
consequence of DOD-sponsored materials research and development.
Starting about 1948, the Army, Navy and Air Force each sponsored a
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substantial research, development and experimental application effort
on. this metal. The impetus for this work was the potential of titanium
alloys to become the strongest structural alloys known in proportion
to their weight, with the added bonus of high corrosion resistance.
The expectations were fulfilled. Today, titanium alloys are used in
both military and civilian aircraift, in both the air frame and in engine
compressor stages. Its corrosion resistance has put it into such civilian
applications as food and chemical processing. Uses in the near future.
wv'd.l include desalination plants and steam power generating equip-
ment as well as equipment for the transportation industry. An addi-
tional payoff of the titanium program has been the. development of
vacuum melting, a process which leas advanced the technology of ma-
terials processing in general.
Another example in the field of materials is the development of glass
reinforced plastics (GRP)-the first important milestone in the field
of composites for military use.. -[Pocket cases of both stages of the
Polaris missile, as well as the thirdt stage of the Minuteman, now con -
t;rin this material. In addition, a number of pressure vessels, small
missile cases, gun tubes and small secrface craft are manufactured from
(RP. Thc:se military developments have spurred the use of GRP in
boats, truck cabs, trailer bodies, geodesic structures, and fishing poles.
Filament winding of glass-reinforced plastics, initiated strictly for
military use. is now used for shotgun barrels, pipe, battery cases, stor-
age tanks, and aerial booms for uddlity trucks. Glass-flake reinforced
plastics are found in electrical insulo-ation and polyethylene laminates
iu waterproof Liners and containers It is estimated that in the next
five years there will be a growth of over 300% in the commercial use of
glass-reinforced plastics.
:liedieine and biotechnology
Passengers in an airliner with a pressurized cabin making an instru-
nient flight-a young woman receiving German measles vaccine-a
camper spraying mosquitoes iii his tent--the man who unbuckles his
seat belt and walks away from an auto accident, are probably unaware
of their debt to military medicine. Likewise, medical professionals
usually are unaware of any military medical origin of such diverse
matters as the Weather Bureau, the - ational Library of Medicine,
routine physical examinations, mass immunizations, and community
Fsyclriatr'y.
Some lines of military medical research are easily translated into the
Civil sector--knowledge related to infectious disease or trauma moves
=ai.rly easily. A greater lag occurs in preventive, occupational and en
ronmental medicine. For example, the shoulder harness was routine
;ii military aircraft for many years before it became available in an
:rutomobi le.
Several main lines of biomedical research which have been produc-
tive of useful civil application. are as follows: Service infectious dis-
ease research began with mass vaccination for smallpox in 1777, and
was followed by work leading to the control of typhoid, hookworm,
and yellow fever. World Wai Ir saw the formulation of a malaria
program which discovered much of the biology of malaria, developed
zd cure for two types of malaria, h,rought synthetic antimalarial drugs
into use, and provided a management model for post-war civil research
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in cancer chemotherapy and antibiotic research. DDT and other insec-
ticides added to chemoprotection and brought about major world
health improvement.
Military research with one of the WWII developed antibiotics
(penicillin) showed a way of preventing rheumatic fever and showed
broad spectrum antibiotics worked against typhoid, typhus and scrub
typhus. More recently, new drugs to control chloroquine-resistant ma-
laria have been developed and effective vaccines for typhus, Venezue-
lan Equine Encephalitis, adeno-viruses and meningococcus have been
produced. A modern fluid therapy for cholera has been introduced,
lowering the death rate from 50% to about 1%. Military research in
the management of severe burns is world-famous and has resulted in
wide acceptance of a rational fluid therapy, grafting, sulfamylon and
other techniques to control infection. The military benefits of all this
research are dwarfed by the impact on world health in general, with
literally millions of lives saved annually.
The military concern with heat injury and cold injury has pro-
duced important understandings of human physiology under these
stresses, and practical heat load and cold chill guides for industrial
and public health applications. Much cold weather gear, e.g., thermal
boots, is an outgrowth of this work.
Recognition of undersea medical research will grow as civil explora-
tion of the sea bottom increases. Already DoD research has provided
improved diving and decompression tables, better scuba and diving
equipment, and has evolved treatments for decompression sickness.
Military aviation medicine had its beginning in WWI, and has been
a cornerstone of civil aviation and space programs since. Research in
physical standards, cockpit design, hypoxia, vision, pressurized cab-
ins, flight illusions acceleration and instrument flying have fed di-
rectly into civil aviation. The early work in weightlessness pressure
suits, remote telemetering, artificial atmospheres, greatly supported the
civil space programs, and have been applied to civil medical practice
(monitoring units, remote diagnosis, physiology of bed rest).
SUMMARY OF ADJUSTMENTS TO FISCAL YEAR 1974 R.D.T. & E. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST RECOMMENDED
BY THE COMMITTEE
Fiscal year 1974
request
Committee
changes
Committee
recommendations
Army_____________ _
$2, 108, 700, 000
-$77, 014, 000
$2,031,686
000
Navy (including the Marine Corps) _ ____________________
2,711,700,000
-36,400,000
,
12,675,300
000
Air Force____________________________________________
3,212,500,000
-101, 689,000
,
3,110,811,000
Defense agencies______________________________________
525,000,000
-21000,000
2 504, 000, 000
------------------------
Total. R.D.T.&E-------------------------------- 8,557,900,000 -236, 103, 000 8,321,797,000
1 Includes $2,600,000 for special foreign currency program for Navy under R.D.T, & E. authorization.
ncludes $24,600,000 for the activities of the Director of test and evaluation, Defense.
BUDGET ACTIVITIES
The research, development, test, and evaluation budget is presented
in eight budget activities. The amounts indicated under each activity
by departments reflect the funds requested by the Department of De-
fense. The breakdown by budget activities follows :
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i. Military sciences:
Thousands
Army ---------------------- ----------------------------- $187,400
Navy (including the Marine Corps)---------------------------- 141,2(10
Air Force---------------------..------------------------------ 134,60^0
- , 339
57, agencies------------------------------------------
included in this amount is $2,600,00) fox Navy research which is a portion of the tiscil
;ear 1974 special foreign currency program.
Arnuj This budget activity covers the functional areas of research
and exploratory development relevant to meeting the technological
needs of the Army. It includes efforts ranging across all major scienti-
lic disciplines-physical, environmental, mathematical, psychological,
social, biological, and medical, Technological investigations are alE.o
included in areas such as materias, warheads, nuclear effects, combat
support, and military engineering technology. Major program coin-
ponents of this activity which arxt separately identified by the Army
are the Defense Research Sciences and the In-House Laboratory Inde-
pendent Research Programs. Overall, the Military Sciences budget
activity supports about two-thirds of the Army's technology base.
GVork is carried on by in-house Laboratories, other federal agencies,
universities, and industry.
This work is done under nurlerous research projects and tasks.
Navy (including the Manse Corps) : For the Navy, this budget
activity consists of two area,; o efforts, research and studies and
analyses.
In-house laboratory independent research provides a principal
means to stiinuLate original work in science and technology related to
their missions and the interests cf the Navy. Objectives are to initi-
ate challenging research, capitalize on ideas germinating out of phase
with budget cycles, enhance the competence of in-house laboratories,
,and attract and retain talented acid creative scientists.
The Defense Research Sciences Element provides funds to govern-
ment and non-government resmr ;h activities for the performance of
scientific study and experimentation directed toward increasing
knowledge and understanding in those fields of the physical, engi-
neering, environmental and 11'e sciences directly related to long-term
naval needs. Effort is divided into fourteen subelements identified
with specific scientific disciplines such as General Physics, Nuclear
Physics, Chemistry and Mathematical Sciences.
In addition to Research, various studies are conducted for both
Navy and Nlarine Corps under this budget activity. Studies and Anal-
.vses Support and Center for Naval Analyses provide technical
and operational analyses to determine requirements for weapons sys-
tenls, tactics and the basis for decisions with respect to new concepts,
potential threats, military effectiveness, and problems in personnel.
Air 1i'cerce: This budget activity provides funds primarily for de-
'cnse research sciences, environmental and materials research which
are relevant to the mission of the Air Force. Funds are used to obtain
basic scientific knowledge and provide technical investigations for
potential application to the solution of known or anticipated Air Force
c?equi rements.
The defense research sciences program is a continuing program to
achieve l..nowledre and understanding of scientific phenomena which
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may solve the many problems involved in the development and main-
tenance of a superior Air Force. This program also includes funding
for operation of the Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories, the
Aerospace Research Laboratory, the Frank L. Seiler Laboratory and
the Air Force Office of Scientific Research.
The Environment Program covers the acquisition of geophysical
and astrophysical information and the development of related tech-
niques for the application of this information to Air Force engineer-
ing and operational problems of Aerospace Systems.
The objective of the Materials Program is to develop new or im-
proved aerospace materials and to discover new ways to use materials
to a better advantage. This program also provides for the operation
of the Materials Laboratory, a central Air Force agency knowledge-
able in all materials which can provide a quick reaction capability to
solve operational problems involving materials technology application.
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.-In the past year, the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was estab-
lished as a separate Defense Agency. Heretofore, DARPA functioned
as an integral part of the Office of the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering. The change in organizational structure permits a
clearer delineation of its functions and responsibilities. The Depart-
ment of Defense has restored the full focus of DARPA's work to basic
research and exploratory development and has put applied research
and program management back into the Services.
DARPA has the flexiblity and capability to react quickly on items
of new interest. Long-term commitments are not the rule in DARPA
programs; rather, its function is to act as a leader and catalyst, demon-
strating military potential as fast as possible. If a program undertaken
by DARPA is successful, the findings are transferred to the Military
Departments. In general, DARPA's programs emphasize research in
areas that reach farther into the future than those normally under-
taken by the Services and explore areas in which the technology is not
well in hand. These areas need innovative approaches to technology.
DARPA's fiscal year 1974 programs in this budget activity approxi-
mates $41 million with emphasis in the areas of materials sciences,
human resources research, and information-processing techniques.
Technical Support to Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs of
Staff.-Funds in this budget activity support the Weapons Systems
Evaluation Group (WSEG) which conducts operational research
analyses and evaluations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for the Office of
the Director Defense Research and Engineering and for other ele-
ments of the Office of the Secretary of Defense as authorized by the
Secretary of Defense. The funds will support the WSEG study pro-
gram in two ways : (1) to pay for contractual services in the In-
stitute for Defense Analysis (IDA), and (2) to pay for contractual
services in private companies. WSEG provides the funds for all out-
side operations research for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This budget activity also supports studies on those political-mili-
tary, arms control, and economic matters which have a direct rele-
vance to the charter and responsibilities of the Office, Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (International Security Affairs).
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2. Aircraft and related equip>ncnt: Thousands
Army
$301,400
Navy
including the Marino Cc rps) --------------------------
252, t00
Air Foroe---------------------------------------------------
1,226,000
Army. ? The Army budget activity for aircraft and related equip-
m:nent includes research, develbprnent, test and evaluation of aircraft
systems. subsystems, component and supporting developments to
improve the, combat effect ivener?,s of Army aviation operations in
support of t he ground forces.
Major aircraft systems developments and improvements include:
development or a new Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH), the de-
sign of -Al-filch ',vill stress flight handling qualities and hover perform-
ance, two characteristics that wll form a sound foundation for the
integration of a Cannon, an Anti-tank Missile, Night Vision equip-
ment, and other mission essential items; component development for a
future heavy lift helicopter and fabrication of a prototype aircraft to
demonstrate technical feasibility; and development of the Utility
Tactical Transmort. Aircraft System that will be able to lift an infan-
try squad over 85 percent of the earth's land mass giving our infantry-
man tremendous battlefield mobility.
Supporting developments and application of new and improved
techniques are conducted in the areas of:: engines and propulsion com-
ponents: weapons. night vision and fire control; avionics; surviv-
ability: reliability and mainrair.ability and air drop/aerial delivery
equipment. A particularly significant achievement has been the de-
velopnient. of crashworthy fuel cells which have been so successful in
reducinse host crash fires that this majority of the fleet has been retro-
fitted with these cells; they will be included in all future aircraft
development.
Comn??,ittee changes: Army
Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS) The Com-
mittee recommends a reduction of $6.2 million from the $108,825.000
requested for the Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
(TTTTAS). This reduction can b~ made because of a reduction of six in
the number of prototypes. The decrease was directed by the Congress
in the fiscal year 1973 author:.zation Act. The Army's efforts to justify
restoration of these prototypes in the fiscal year 1974 budget failed to
convince the Committee and the additional funds are denied.
Navy (including the Marne Corps) : For the Navy, this activity
finances research, development, test, and evaluation related to air-
frames, engines, airborne detection, fire control equipment and e.'.ec-
tronic warfare equipment. ae_lial targets and additional related
systems and equipment.
The major efforts in FY 174 are related to sea control with the
V/STOL aircraft and the LAMPS helicopter and to the high per-
formance tiatiter aircraft F-14. -
The 17/STOL for Sea Coatr=:r1 Ship prototype effort will validate
new V/STOL technology by the design, development, construction and
flight test of the Augmented Wing Fighter-Attack prototype aircraft.
This vehicle will provide su:'"face surveillance and a strike capability
when operating from the Sea Control Ship. In FY 1974 design and
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fabrication of the first two flight aircraft will continue. The related
sea control effort Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS)
using a helicopter equipped with electronic detection equipment will
be able to detect and identify missile firing surface platforms beyond
the surface detection capability of the parent ship, and will provide re-
detection, classification and ASW weapon delivery out to the maxi-
mum destroyer sonar detection ranges. In FY 1974 component Techni-
cal Evaluation will be conducted by test flying airborne systems in a
H-2 helicopter and evaluating ship equipment in specially configured
vans.
The F14A aircraft will operate as an airborne combat air patrol or
deck launched interceptor. It will be equipped with Phoenix, Sparrow
and Sidewinder missiles with a gun. In FY 1974 Navy will support
Technical and Operational Evaluation and Board of Inspection and
Survey tests. Efforts will continue on the advanced technology engine
for the F14B aircraft with flight tests in FY 1974.
The S3A carrier ASW aircraft will replace the S-2 which will have
been in service in excess of 20 years at the time of S3A deployment.
Two high by-pass ratio turbofan engines give the S3A speed and alti-
tude capability plus economical operations at the low altitudes re-
quired by ASW. This coupled with the latest ASW sensors will permit
the S3A to counter the advancing Soviet submarine threat.
Another important effort, the CH-53E program, will develop a
shipboard compatable helicopter intended for the lift and movement
of cargo and troops/passengers internally, the tactical recovery of
downed aircraft, the lift of heavy bulky equipment and other heavy
lift duties. The CII-53E lift will increase to 16 tons by the incorpora-
tion of three engines, a canted tail and horizontal stabilizer and a large
rotor with an additional blade. Two development protoytpe aircraft
will be completed in FY 1974.
Work is also conducted, in addition to these programs, in the areas
of Air ASW and Electronics Warf are equipments, aerial targets and
propulsion systems.
Air Force : This budget activity provides for the research, develop-
ment and certain costs associated with the test of aircraft and their
related equipment. Included are costs for A-10 aircraft which is de-
signed to provide accurate and timely fire support for ground troops.
In fiscal year 1974, drag reduction studies and mating of the GAU-8
30mm gun with the A-10 airframe are two primary goals.
Funds are also requested to cover the F-15 which is ,an all weather
air superiority fighter capable of engaging and destroying any known
aircraft. During fiscal year 1974, F-15 test aircraft are planned for
delivery with primary emphasis on Air Force flight evaluation.
The B-1, a long-range strategic bomber to replace the present B-52
aircraft, will include the latest technology to permit it to penetrate all
known or contemplated defenses. It is scheduled for first flight during
the middle of calendar year 1974.
The Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMAS'T) prototype which will demonstrate applicable new technology and offer additional
engineering development could provide a low cost development option
for the modernization of the tactical airlift force in the early eighties.
While the AMST is being developed to satisfy tactical transport re-
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quirements, technology front ft, is program is expected to have direct
carryover into civilian STOI, as plications.
The conceptual and preliminary design of the Advanced STOL pro-
totypes will be completed. These efforts, through future flight tests, will
lessen the technology risks a Ord provide decision makers with possible
production options based on demonstrated hardware.
Also included are. developments involving airframes, avionics, ECM
(EF- l 11 A), power plants and other aircraft related equipment. This
activity also provides funding for the Aerospace Flight Dynamics,
Ihotechnolot?'y, Propulsion, and Avionics Exploratory Development
La born tors es.
Committee Air Frrc6
,ti'abROV.%c t cruise .4 rip ed Deenn (S(A.D).-The committee was c,an-
cerned that the unit cost of aSC'AD had grown to the point that the cost
elfe.ctiveness of the. decoy was seriously questioned. The decoy was
planned to be deployed on less than half of the B-5 2G/H aircraft
force. anal is not, programmed for the F13-111. the B-52D's or he
1~ -S aircraft . In addition.' there was lack of decision on the part of the
Defense Department to arm the decoy. For these reasons, the Com-
enittee. on the advice of its R & 1) Subcommittee, was prepared to rec-
omrnend deletion of the entire million requested and termination
~-if the, }rogra-m.
During full Committee markup of the bill, a letter was received
from thc+ I)epnty Secretary o' Defense. announcing his decision to ter-
oiina.te cnmineering development of the SCAD program "inasmuch as
As pro iccted cost is ineommeus` t -aite with its currently perceived ben-
The Deputy Secretary further announced that the SCAD "will
be replaced with a vigorous technology program which will not only
keen alive an option to and rta.ke development of SCAD or other
appropriate penetration systems with a minimum of lead time should
the, threat to bomber penetration develop more rapidly or more acutely
than anticipated. but will a]s,) provide for a subsonic cruise missile."
Secretary Clements requested S22 million to support the technology
t)ronrain proposed. The Committee reduced the SCAD budget request
by $50.2 million and recommends; authorization of the $22 million re-
~;uested for the new teehnolo f-y program.
1,; uh t- weight Fighter Prot ot?rire.-The Committee recommends a
reductiori of million from the 046,500,000 requested for this pro-
t ra.m. One of the prototype fighters plans to utilize the F104-PZW-100
turbofan engine being-developed for the F-15 aircraft. This engine
program foiled. to meet the military qualification test milestone and
continues to experience failures in ground tests. Because of these fail-
ores it is believed that. the engine program will be delayed. Any delay
in the en;rine development program could have an adverse impact on
lie nrototvpe aircraft program. Therefore, the Committee recom-
t lends t more conservative approach with a slight stretchout in this
development program. However. should the engine development pro-
.,rams he satisfactorily resolved in the near future. the Committee
would consider reprogramming funds to restore the program to ii's
original schedule.
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3. Missiles and related equipment:
Thousands
Army ----------------------------------------------------- $967,200
Navy (including the Marine Corps) -------------------------- 921, 900
Air Force------------- - 292,400
--------------------------------
efense agencies------------------------------------------- 72,500
Army: Included in this activity is $336,000,000 for SAFEGUARD
ABM System and Site Defense. In addition, $100.0 million is for the
Advance Ballistic Missile Defense development program. The purpose
of this program is to provide qualitative improvement in ballistic mis-
sile defense technology and components to cope with the growing spec-
trum of threats. Also included in this budget activity are the funds
needed to support the test and evaluation of weapons systems con-
ducted at Kwajalein and White Sands Missile Ranges. These Army
managed national ranges support test programs of all services includ-
ing the Army's SAFEGUARD, Air Force's MINUTEMAN, the
Navy's POLARIS at Kwajalein, and the Air Force's SRAM and
ATHENA, NASA programs, and several Navy tactical missiles at
White Sands.
Other Army weapons programs for which significant development
funding was requested include: the surface to air missile, SAM-D,
which will replace the NIKE HERCULES and HAWK Air Defense
Systems; development of a manportable air defense system,
STINGER, to replace REDEYE; continued development of the
terminal homing concept which is directed toward defeating tanks,
armored personnel carriers, field fortification, air defense sites and
other point targets; the laser guided heliborne fire and forget missile
(HELLFIRE) which has been impressive in tests conducted during
the year and promises to be an excellent contender as the anti-tank
missile of future attack helicopters; and continued exploratory and
advanced development work in the missile field.
Committee changes : Army
Safeguard Defense System.-The Committee recommends a reduc-
tion of $25 million from the $216 million requested for the Safe-
guard program. The ABM Treaty and previous congressional action
limits the deployment of Safeguard to one site, Grand Forks, North
Dakota. The Equipment Readiness Date for that site is October 1974
and the development and deployment for that site is in its final stages.
In view of this early readiness date and the lack of approved plans to
deploy the system to protect the National Command Authority, the
Committee seriously questions the need for the full $216 million
requested for research and development by the Army for fiscal year
1974. The amount recommended, $191 million, should adequately
support the limited development effort remaining along with adequate
test and evaluation support needed in the coming year.
Site Defense.-The Committee recommends a reduction of $25 mil-
lion from the amount requested, $170,000,000, for the Site Defense
program. The amount requested by the Army for fiscal year 1974
reflects an increase of 112 percent over the funds appropriated last
year.
The ABM Treaty of last year permits very limited deployment of
Site Defense components to augment the Safeguard defense of Minute-
man near Grand Forks and permits possible use in an ABM defense
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of the National Command Authority. Since no decision has been made
to deploy such a system in defense of the National Command Au-
thority, the Committee believes that a program of $145,000,000 is suf-
ficient for an orderly research and development program in fiscal year
1974. The Committee is of the opinion that the increase requested over
fast year was not adequately justified.
Yarn/ (including the Marine Corps') . The Navy missile program
oxmsists of three aspects, submarine launched (strategic), surface
launched and air launched missiles. The maior effort in the FY 1974
Arategir area is the submarine launched Trident missile. Beginning
.his Year the Trident submarine has been separated and carried out
under another budget activity R. R P. effort will continue engineering
development of the Trident I ((--4) missile with the missile propul-
-ion minor liri.ngs.
Related strategic effort for V BM system, FBM Command and Con-
trol and F'BM Defense will also be carried out.
The princimd effort in surface launched missiles is the Aegis, a ship-
board anti-air warfare system n oaring the end of development. with
_i capability for improved area defense. It is of modular design pro-
viding a family of systems each compatible with a specific hull and
consisting of a common set cf modules. In FY 1974 an engineering
development model, having mompleted land based tests will be in-
stalled In ITSS Norton A,~;oun.d -for tests at sea.
The surface launched efforts include also the Standard family of
Interim Surface to Surface Missiles in the Semi-Active, Active and
Anti-Radiation versions. ThEse missiles are intended for use on de-
stroyer types and gunboats.
The Harpoon program will provide a versatile air launched/surf?rce
launche(i and now submarine launched missile utilizing minor varia-
tions of a basic missile. The surface missile can be launched from ex-
isting missile launchers and tit'ilizes a rocket booster and a turbojet
engine. For submarine launca, a slightly modified surface missile is
encapsulated and ejected from the submerged submarine's torpedo
tube. The air launched version `i ill be carried on P3 and S3A aircraft
and is launched without a booster.
The Navy's Strategic and Tactical Cruise Missile programs have
been combined for FY 1974 into a single technical program under
which the testimr of system components such as navigation subsystems
will be conducted and various airframe and propulsion approaches
will be examined. It is the Navy intent to develop both a strategic
and a tactical version of the mtssile with initial efforts in FY 1974
slanted toward the strategic missile. The prime contractor for missile
system and system integratior. will be selected in FY 1974.
There are several important, efforts in the air launched missile area
namely the Phoenix missile slstern for use with the F14, improvement
programs for the Sparrow 111 and Sidewinder missiles and develop-
ment of the short range Agile missile.
The Phoenix is completing; final phases of evaluation prior to fleet
introduction. A recent significant accomplishment was the successful
attack with four Phoenix missiles on four targets.
The Agile program is intended to provide a greatly improved very
short range-dogfight missile system for future air combat. In the
interim, the present short rsnge Sidewinder is undergoing improve-
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ments to increase its capability in the dogfight mode. Similarly the
medium range Sparrow is being improved in the areas of launch range,
guidance and fuzing.
Also supported under this activity is the operation of the Pacific
Missile Range.
Air Force : This budget activity provides for the development and
test of ballistic and other missiles and related equipment as well as op-
eration of the Western Test Range. Included in this budget activity
are funds for Minuteman, and ABRES (Advanced Ballistic Re-entry
System). The principal efforts in the Minuteman program are the
improvement of prelaunch survival through the Upgrade Silo pro-
gram, and improvement in the capability to management the force
through the Command Data Buffer program. Design and development
will continue on the Minuteman Missile Performance Measurement
System, and in-flight hardness assessment, and ground testing. The
ABRES program provides for the development and test of new tech-
niques in re-entry systems and penetration aids for all Department of
Defense ballistic missiles.
Defense agencies
The Strategic Technology project for Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency is responsible for a broad program of research and
development designed to identify, explore and demonstrate advance
concepts and technology which could have major technical impact on
the offense/defense balance and hence on the U.S. national strategic
capability.
4. Military astronautics and related equipment: Thousands
Army ------------------------------------ $17,900
--------------------
Navy (including the Marine Corps)----------------------------- 55,500
Air Force----------------------------------------------------- 529,100
Army: The Army funds under this budget activity are for: develop-
ment of new ground terminals and subsystems to increase the efficiency
and reliability of the world-wide defense satellite communications
system; development of small terminals for tactical application in the
field army, which are also compatible with the defense satellite system;
investigations of navigation by satellite; and for Defense Communica-
tions Systems digital communications system development.
Navy (including the Marine Corps) : Effort in FY 1974 is in two
major fields-Satellite Communications and Satellite Navigation. The
Fleet Satellite Communication System (FLEET-SATCOM) is
currently under contract. It will partially satisfy the most urgent
needs of the Navy in this field and at the same time provide service to
US Air Force users.
In the field of Satellite Navigation, programs will transition into
the demonstration of hardware. One effort is devoted to the develop-
ment/testing of modifications to existing TRANSIT satellites and
user equipment. In addition the Navy will complete development, fab-
rication launch and test of a Navy technology satellite applicable to a
future Defense Navigation Satellite System.
Air Force: This budget activity provides for the research, develop-
ment and test of military space programs and certain associated costs
for flight tests. Included are costs for the continuing development of
space programs such as Defense Support, Military Satellite C'ommu-
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nications Systems, Satellite Data, System, and Space Defense System.
Warning satellites have been deployed to provide early warning of
land and sea launched missila attacks. This surveillance system pro-
vides near global coverage and reportS information almost instantane-
ously. Also, significant progress Les been made which provides reliable
and secure global communications. Both of these projects are in con-
tinued development.
1,. A5`fzdxs, sm, ll craft and re'atcd equipnnent: Thousands
;ivy ------------------------------------------------------- $620.100
This activity provides for development, test and evaluation of ship
structures and equipment incl idiag propulsion, communications, navi-
gation and surveillance systems directly affecting ship operations. It
supports the design, prototype fabrication and performance evalua-
tion of new types of ships, sorart. countermeasures devices, marine gas
turbines and nuclear propulsion plants.
The Navy will complete teatir g and evaluation of the two 100 ton
Surface Effect Ship testeraf and proceed with preliminary design
efforts on the 200() ton testcraft.
The air cushion vehicle A.nl-iribiou.s Assault Craft Program will
proceed with construction of two prototypes. This fully amphibious
craft with a planned speed in excess of 50 knots will be capable of
carrving 60 tons of personnel. equipment and cargo ashore.
The prime effort in hvdrol'oil development in the Navv is a joint
effort with our NATO allies, the NATO PHUT. This nominal 215-ton
ship will have waterjet propulsion and a formidable weapons suite
consisting of the IIARPOOY surface.-to-surface missile and a 76mm
gun.
Navy development in the feld of advanced propulsion will consist
of programs in Nuclear propulsion, as turbine power plants and
super conducting electrical machinery. This last system, through the
use of greatly refrigerated components, could reduce the size and
weight of l)ropnlsion machinerv by as much as 50%.
In addition to a program -,chrre a High Energy Laser will be : n-
stalled in a converted cargo ship for test, of this exciting new weapon
concept in the at sea environment, the Navy will also continue nr?o-
gVrams for develonnient of sys-,errs and improvements in surface ASW
and Electronic Warfare.
G. Ordnance. eombat vehicle,? and related equipment: Thousands
;% rmv --------------------------------------------------------
$240,300
1 avv (including the Marine Corps) ._------------------------
50,100
Air Force---------------------------------------------------
:123, 2200
-1 in ia: This hiidnet activity nr'ovides for research and development
of weapons and vehicles. Included are field artillery weapons and am-
munition, air to surface wearons except missiles, infantry small arms
and ammunition. combat vehi?les inclndinmtheirintegral v-eannns and
ammunition, and nuclear am non-nuclear munitions required for in-
creased combat efl'ectivenes, Additionally tactics I vehicles both
wheeled and tracked, and amphbious and ground effects vehicles ror
conducting warfare in all co,id;i ions of terrain, weather and climate
are developed under this budget,,-ctivity.
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The principal programs in this budget activity are the new main
battle Tank (the XM1), the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle,
the Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle, the XM204 Towed
105MM Howitzer, the Bushmaster, and Scatterable Mines. The XM1
will have better armor to reduce its vulnerability and a better track,
suspension and power plant will increase its cross-country mobility,
speed and agility, thus providing the Army with a superior tank. The
Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle, which will replace the M113
in selected units, will have increased effectiveness in cross-country
mobility, ballistic protection, and improved stabilized weaponization.
The Armored Reconnaissance Scout Vehicle, designed to replace the
M114, will provide significant improvements in mobility, maneuver-
ability, armor protection, and reliability. The Bushmaster, designed
as the primary armament for the Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehi-
cle, will have a variable high rate of fire and a selective dual ammuni-
tion feed system for a family of ammunition. In the area of mines,
the primary effort is developing delivery systems for a variety of
mines.
Committee changes : Army
Howitzer Medium 155mm XM198.-The Army budget request in-
cluded $5,976,000 for the development of a new 155mm howitzer to
achieve extended range. During review of the Defense R&D budget
requests, testimony was received indicating that the Navy has pre-
viously tested an ammunition which achieves the desired range using
existing weapons. In view of this approach to solving the range prob-
lem by improving or modifying ammunition which can be fired from
existing weapons, the Committee believes that the Army and the Navy
should exert greater efforts in this less expensive approach before pro-
ceeding with a costly weapons development program.
For this reason, the Committee recommends deletion of the entire
$5,976,000 requested.
Nuclear Munitions.-The Army budget request included $14,498,000
for the development of nuclear munitions for certain short-range tac-
tical weapons. The Committee is greatly concerned that the use of these
short-range tactical nuclear weapons could create serious problems for
our allies as well as U.S. forces. The radioactive fallout which could
result from the use of short-range nuclear weapons could endanger the
lives of friendly allies as well as our own troops.
The Committee is not convinced that the problems have been ade-
quately resolved. The use of this type weapon in time of emergency
is seriously questioned, therefore the Committee recommends deletion
of these funds until the various problems are resolved to the satisfac-
tion of the Congress.
Navy (including the Marine Corps) : In FY 1,974, the Navy will
emphasize completion of the engineering development models of the
CAPTOR ASW mine which can be delivered by air, surface and sub-
marine and utilizes a MK-46 homing torpedo in lieu of a conventional
warhead.
As the MK-48 torpedo is now entering the fleet, the FY 1974 effort
will be a modest one devoted to development of improvements.
Marine Corps programs will fund efforts in the development of
homing ordnance, a Multi-Shot Portable Assault Weapon and a
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Lightweight, Air Defense