STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500400022-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 4, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN

June 4, 1973 Approved Ford;("ftgyMfQWJOR LI'bf$P75 k8 000500400022-3
"S. 421
"Resolution memorializing Congress to issue
a stamp with the new Slater Mill Com-
plex of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, on the
Stamp
"Whereas, The evolution of the mill Sam-
uel Slater built in 1.793 marks an important
era in American history; and
"Whereas, The birth of the industrial rev-
olution in America which reshaped the face
and fabric of the entire world took place
at the Old Slater Mill; and
"Whereas, The Old Slater Mill is the first
factory in the United States to use industrial
machinery successfully; and
"Whereas, The New Slater Mill Complex
has been expanded to include the Sylvanus
Brown House, an urban textile worker's home
which was carefully reconstructed; and
"Whereas, The Oziel Wilkinson Mill is
scheduled to open next June with a replica-
tion of a 19th-century machine shop and
blacksmith shop; now, therefore, be it
"Resolved, That the members of the Con-
gress of the United States be and they are
hereby respectfully requested to authorize
the issuance of a stamp with the New Slater
Mill Complex of Pawtucket, Rhode Island
on the stamp; and be it further
"Resolved, That the secretary of state be
and he hereby is authorized and directed to
transmit a duly certified copy of this resolu-
tion to the senators and representatives from
Rhode Island in Congress of the United
States."
A resolution of the State of Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations. Referred to the
Committee on Public Works:
"H. 5427
"Resolution memorializing Congress to study
the feasibility of providing Federal fund-
ing for solid waste disposal projects
"Resolved, That the members of Congress
of the United States are hereby respectfully
requested to study the feasibility of provid-
ing federal funding for solid waste disposal
projects; and be it further
"Resolved, That the secretary of state be
and he hereby is authorized and directed to
transmit duly certified copies of this reso-
lution to the senators and representatives
from Rhode Island in the Congress of the
United States."
REPORTS OF COMMITTEES
The following reports of committees
were submitted:
By Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee
on the Judiciary, With amendments:
S.978. A bill to amend the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to provide
that under certain circumstances exclusive
territorial arrangements shall not be deemed
unlawful (Rept. No. 93-188).
By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee
on Foreign Relations, with amendments:
S. 1443. A bill to authorize the furnishing
of defense articles and services to foreign
countries and international -organizations
(Kept. No. 93-189), together with minority
views.
By Mr. SPARKMAN (for Mr. STEVENSON)
from the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, with an amendment:
S. 1836. A bill to amend the International
Economic Policy Act of 1972 (Rept. No. 93-
190). Referred to the Committees on Finance
and Foreign Relations for a period not to
extend beyond June 20, 1973.
By Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the
Judiciary, with an amendment:
8. 1115. A bill to amend the Controlled
Substances Act to provide for the registra-
tion of practioners conducting narcotic
treatment programs (Rept. No. 93-192).
By Mr. BAYH, from the Committee on the
Judiciary, with amendments.
S. 645. A bill to strengthen interstate re-
porting and interstate services for parents of
runaway children; to conduct research on
the size of the runaway youth population;
for the establishment, maintenance, and
operation of temporary housing and counsel-
ing services for transient youth, and for other
purposes (Rept. No. 93-191), together with
additional views.
Mr. MAGNUSON, from the committee on
Commerce, without amendment:
S. Res. 108. Resolution authorizing addi-
tional expenditures by the Committee on
Commerce for inquiries and investigations.
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration.
EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF
COMMITTEES
As in executive session, the following
favorable reports of nominations were
submitted:
By Mr. FULBRIGHT, from the Committee
on Foreign Relations:
David H. Popper, of New York, a Foreign
Service officer of the class of Career Min-
ister, to be Assistant Secretary of State;
Gerald F. Tape, of Maryland, to be the
representative of the United States of Amer-
ica to the International Atomic Energy
Agency, with the rank of Ambassador;
Matthew J. Harvey, of Maryland, to be an
Assistant Administrator of the Agency for
International Development;
Kenneth A. Guenther, of Maryland, to be
Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-
American Development Bank;
William B. Dale, of Maryland, to be U.S.
Executive Director of the International
Monetary Fund;
Charles R. Harley, of Maryland, to be U.S.
Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund;
Hobart Lewis, of New York, to be a mem-
ber of the U.S. Advisory Commission on In-
formation; and
J. Leonard Reinsch, of Georgia, to be a
member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Information.
(The above nominations were reported
with the recommendation that they be con-
firmed, subject to the nominee's commitment
to respond to requests to appear and testify
before any duly constituted committee of the
Senate.)
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, as
in executive session, from the Commit-
tee on Armed Services, I report favorably
the nominations of 868. in the grade of
captain and below-822 permanent
Regular Navy-748 of which are mid-
shipmen-Naval Academy; 33 temporary
Regular Navy; 5 permanent Reserves
and 8 temporary Reserves, and in the
Army, 244 appointments in the grade of
major and below-includes distinguished
military students; scholarship students
and cadets graduating class of 1973 U.S.
Military Academy.
Since these names have already ap-
peared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and
to save the expense of printing on the
Executive Calendar, I ask unanimous
consent that they be ordered to lie on
the Secretary's desk for the information
of any Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND
JOINT RESOLUTIONS
The following bills and joint resolu-
tions were introduced, read the first time
S 10219
and, by unanimous consent, the second
time, and referred as indicated:
By Mr. JOHNSTON (by request) :
S. 1934. A bill to promote economic de-
velopment of the territory of American
Samoa. Referred to the Committee on In-
terior and Insular Affairs.
By Mr. PROXMIRE:
S. 1935. A bill to amend section 102 of the
Natioanl Security Act of 1947 to prohibit
certain activities by the Central Intelligence
Agency and to limit certain other activities
by such agency. Referred to the Committee
on Armed Services.
By Mr. PERCY:
S. 1936. A bill- to provide for better con-
trol and reporting of political contributions
and expenditures in Federal elections. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration.
By Mr. FANNIN:
S. 1937. A bill to amend the act of Sep-
tember 22, 1961 (75 Stat. 577), so as to au-
thorize the Secretary of the Interior to con-
tract for the sale, operation, maintenance,
repair, or relocation of certain Government-
owned electric utility systems constructed
and operated as a part of any irrigation sys-
tem. Referred to the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs.
By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. CURTrs,
Mr. YOUNG, and Mr. BELLMON) :
S. 1938. A bill to extend the time for con-
ducting the referendum with respect to the
national marketing quota for wheat for the
marketing year beginning July 1, 1974. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry.
By Mr. MONDALE:
S. 1939. A bill to prohibit pyramid sales
transactions, and for other purposes. Re-
ferred to the Committee on Commerce.
By Mr. ERVIN (by request) :
S. 1940. A bill to establish a fund for acti-
vating authorized agencies, and for other
purposes. Referred to the Committee on
Government Operations.
By Mr. TOWER:
S. 1941. A bill to foster and promote the
establishment, preservation, and strengthen-
ing of minority business enterprise. Referred
to the Committee on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs; and, if and when reported by
that committee, to the Committee on La-
bor and Public Welfare, by unanimous-con-
sent order entered May 23, 1972.
By Mr. FULBRIGHT (by request) :
S. 1942. A bill to enable the United States
to contribute its share of the expenses of the
International Commission of Control and
Supervision as provided in article 14 of the
Protocol concerning the said Commission to
the Agreement on Ending the War and Re-
storing Peace in Vietnam. Referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
By Mr. PACKWOOD:
S. 1943. A bill to establish the Cascade
Head Scenic-Research Area in the State of
Oregon, and for other purposes. Referred to
the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs.
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED
BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. PROXMIRE:
S. 1935. A bill to amend section 102 of
the National Security Act of 1947 to pro-
hibit certain activities by the Central In-
telligence Agency and to limit certain
other activities by such Agency. Referred
to the Committee on Armed Services.
TIME FOR REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on
April 10, I first spoke about the role of
the U.S. intelligence community in our
Government and domestic life, At that
time I talked about the historical need
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 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Jerre 4, 1973
for intelligence to overcome the barriers
nations erect to the free flow of ideas
and technology. I discussed the National
Security Act of 1947 to determine just
what Congress had in mind when this
broad leg..slation was enacted. And then
I went into the question of possible "spill-
over" effects coming from the use of
clandestine techniques overseas. In re-
cent days, the Watergate story has un-
folded in sufficient detail to shake all of
us into concern about the dangerous con-
sequences of domestic intelligence opera-
tions for political purposes.
My ori;inal speech also detailed the
composition of the intelligence commu-
nity and :'nade certain recommendations
regarding more efficient practices.
Let us now take a close look at what
has become the most alarming aspects of
the intelligence process--domestic and
foreign programs that are called covert
operation; or "dirty tricks" and include
espionage and subversion of foreign gov-
ernments.
Nothing in this speech comes from
classified sources. I have pieced together
my Information from public documents
and opera conversations with Govern-
ment officials.
Since a great deal of the following
analysis hinges on drawing distinctions
between various activities, I must rely
to some degree on language that has pre-
cise meaning within the intelligence c orn-
munity. Wherever used I will attempt to
clarify the meanings of such terms as
covert action or intelligence .collection.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CLANDESTINE SER'JICES
The Central Intelligence Agency is di-
vided into Directorates by function. Un-
til recently, these were called the Direc-
torate of Plans, the Directorate or In-
telligence, the Directorate or Support
and the Directorate of Science and
Technology, or as abbreviated: D: ),'P,
DD/I, DD/8, and DD/S. & T. standing for
the four Deputy Directors serving u:acler
the Director of Central Intelligence and
his Deputy Director. For the purposes of
this speech, I will concentrate mainly on
the DDP, that is, Directorate of Flans
now renamed DD/O for Directorate of
Operations.
Thus the CIA is several organizations
under one roof. The DD'I-Intelli-
gence-and DD/S. & T.-Science and
Technology--deal with intelligence col-
lection as opposed to intelligence opera-
tions. The DD/0--operations-and its
support elements in DD/S-Suppc rt -
carry out covert action programs. There
has been a great deal of discussion about
the propriety of this arrangement linking
the analysis and covert activities and I
will deal with the arguments later.
Author, ty for approving and continu-
ing programs and other activities that
are sensi-5ive-meaning the potentiality
of embarrassment or compromise--:'ests
with a Cabinet-level committee composed
of representatives of the Department of
Defense, Department of State, White
House National Security Adviser, Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence. This informal commit-
tee which meets several times a month
has been called by many names includ-
ing the 5.1/12 Group, Special Group: the
g03 Committee-named after a room
number in the Executive Office Build-
ing-and more currently the 40 Com-
mittee after a national security decision
memorandum with the same numerical
designation.
In theory, proposals for covert action
programs are presentcd to the 40 Com-
mittee after being worked out by the
participating agencies at a lower level.
Then the 40 Committee gives its approval
or rejects the concept or requires modi-
frcations in the original plan. Most proj-
ects, however are well coordinateed by the
time they get to the 40 Committee.
The primary, need for the 40 Commit-
tee and its authority to initiate covert
action programs is the stated require-
ment to provide the President with meth-
ods of accomplishing foreign policy ob-
jectives without attribution to the United
States.
We have cone a long way from See-
retary of State Stimson's comment
that gentlemen do not read other peo-
ples's mail. The modern world is far
mare complex now. More barriers to
the flow of information have been
erected. I believe that there are occa-
sions when this Government must for its
ov.m protection use techniques that are
by domestic U.S. standards extra-legal.
But there must be adequate control over
the exercise of these :spects of our for-
eign policy or we will find ourselves
gripped in an interminable cycle of false
information and foreign intervention.
These controls have been painfully in-
adequate. For this reason it is necessary
to take a hard look at what distinctions
can be drawn between activities that
are necessary for national security and
also productive and those that create
situations that actually erode our na-
tional security.
In practice, It appears that the 40
Committee mainly approves activities co-
ordinated at lower levels. If a promising
operation can be coordinated at a work-
ing level where the concept originates, it
often rises through the intelligence com-
munity with little critical challenge until
it arrives at the 40 Committee. There
because it has been reviewed by the "ex-
perts" it is frequently approved. Re-
sult: a serious effect on U.S. policy.
Having the 40 Committee consist
of high level officials :ts supposed to be a
safeguard against the initiation of ac-
tivities actually detrimental' to the na-
tional interest. It is presumed but never
st ited that major decisions of the 40
Committee are then checked with the
President. The reason for the lack of
substantiation of this latter point is
clear. The President Is insulated from
any direct association from such illegal
activities so that in time of crisis such as
a "blown"---es:posed---mission, he can
deny knowledge of the entire affair.
Again and again thin is the most irn-
portant point of many covert action pro-
grams-the insistence that the President
be insulated from any damaging effect,
regardless of his prior knowledge or role
in the command process. Thus when a
crisis occurs, say with the U-2 affair, the
President has the option of denying the
w'iole thing and preserving his innocence
by placing the blame on others. Presi-
dent Eisenhower chose to take responsi-
bility for the U-2 incident, a move that
many intelligence specialists criticized
as unnecessary and a bad precedent. In
my view, as I will develop later, President
Eisenhower was absolutely right.
Once a decision is reached and
approved by the 40 Committee and White
House, the resources of the DDO or as
it is soreetirnes called the Clandestine
Services--CS-are put into action. These
resources are enormous and consist of
worldwide depots of equipment and arms,
numerous communications networks, ar-
rangements with front organizations for
providing su:?port, working associations
with the military departments which can
supply men, material, and the normal
complement of case officers-the desig-
nation for DDO professional personnel
as opposed to agents which are those re-
cruited by case officers.
It can be said that the Agency-CIA-
probably can carry out a middle- or low-
level operation with more skill and speed
than any other arm of the Government.
There Is less bureaucratic interference
and the lines of communication are much
quicker. With regard to high level oper-?
ations of the size of an invasion, the
CIA's record is marginal:. But, paramili-
tary activities are a distinct part of the
Agency's resources.
There is far less command and control
of covert operations than should be the
case.
Here is why:
First. The 40 Committee's control Is
only absolute in the sense of a final de-
cision but not in the shaping of policies
regarding the initiation of such activities
or for that matter how they will affect
the long-range interests of the country.
Second. There is a tendency for those
in the business to fall into the mental
state of ,equiesence in the propriety and
necessity of such operations and thus
provide no effective restraint.
Third. In all of this, Congress plays
absolutely no role. While Congress may
be funding Ea certain international pro-
gram, the 40 Committee could be decid-
ing to impede that same program in a
certain country for other reasons.
Fourth. Small operations have a way
of becoming major operations even with-
out 40 Committee oversight. '
JUDGING rHE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INTEL-
LIGENCE COLLECTION PROGRAMS
Intelligence comes from varied sources.
It can be categorized in the following
manner:
First. Open sources such as newspa-
pers, periodicals, translated foreign liter-
ature, and radio broadcasts;
Second. Satellite derived intelligence
used for mapping, targeting observation
of military construction, industrial ca-
pacity communications, and military de-
ployments;
Third. Technical collection tech-
niques-intercept of signals, electronic
emissions, communcations, and radar
data;
Fourth. Human resources such as de-
fectors, agents in place, interviews with
selected travelers, Immigrants, and for-
eign government officials.
It is often stated that the bulk of all
intelligence comes from open sources
that are refined and analyzed. In terms
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June 4, 1973 Approved For&fQJO RJW75~~F000500400022-3
of quantity this probably is true. The
really significant intelligence, however,
now comes from satellites and technical
collection devices.
Reconnaissance activities provide high
confidence data about military and eco-
nomic questions of the highest impor-
tance such as missile deployments, sub-
marine development or industrial con-
struction. By far and away this is the
most important category of intelligence
information.
Somewhat below this in importance
are the other technical programs which
provide scientific data of interest for spe-
cialized purposes. Interrogating radar
systems would be one example. Other
signals might give information about
missile, characteristics or ABM develop-
ments. Intercept of communications, part
of a category of intelligence referred to
as Comint or -Communications intelli-
gence, once was a very important source
of information but with the ? counter-
measures now available such as land lines
and encpding devices, Comint is more dif-
ficult to obtain and process.
Human resources comprise this last
category. Human resources refers to any
traditional spy activities that involve the
direct use of human beings as opposed
to technical devices. The recruitment of
foreign government officials, the espio-
nage of military secrets by travelers, the
forced entry into offices to obtain data,
the establishment of spy rings, all are
examples of human resource programs.
By any measure of cost effectiveness,
human resourcessimply do not produce
the quantity and quality of reliable data
necessary for their justification. About
60 percent of the CIA budget continues
to go into human resource programs.
The argument has been made that
even though human resources provide
little information of value compared to
technical and satellite data, what they
do provide in a. few instances might be
of the most significant and valuable of
all-that of political or military inten-
tions. Hardward programs can be ob-
served by reconnaissance but a camera
cannot look into a man's mind.
But factual, data about intentions is
so illusive and fragmentary that it is
almost nonexistent. Knowledge of adver-
sary intentions requires a source of
reliable information at the highest levels
of a foreign government such as the
U.S.S.R. or People's Republic of China.
Human resources of this quality and
rank are rare indeed. We have heard
about Colonel Penkovsky and certain
other defectors and agents in place, but
it is the consensus of many experts that
high level human resources are few and
far between, and provide a pathetically
inadequate payoff.
DRAWING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN COVERT
ACTION PROGRAMS AND INTELLIGENCE COL-
LECTION PROGRAMS
What is the difference between intel-
ligence collection and covert action
"cloak and dagger" programs? At times
the distinction may be hazy. Both are
done, within the intelligence community
but Congress can act to separate and
define the two areas of activity.
Intelligence collected by covert means
including the satellite, technical devices
and human resources mentioned above
qualifies as intelligence collection. It in-
volves the acquisition by open and extra-
legal means of information determined
necessary to national security. Require-
ments are established to guide this type
of collection within given priorities.
The following are examples of selected
information acquired by intelligence
collection:
Photography, space and missile sig-
nals, economic data, power elite and
political party data;
Military construction, deployments,
research and development, troop move-
ments;
Industrial capacity, communications
capabilities, food production; scientific
information; mapping, geological, cli-
matic data.
In short the collection of all informa-
tion that could possibly be useful to
policymakers. The means of collection
might be covert "cloak-and-dagger."
One distinction: With intelligence col-
lection there is a conscious decision to
obtain the information without influ-
encing the source or its content. Such is
not necessarily the case with covert ac-
tion programs.
Covert action involves a more intru-
sive role than the passive acquisition of
science or economic data or even the in-
formation supplied by agents in place.
Covert action could involve any of the
following types of activities:
Paramilitary operations in support of-
foreign governments or dissident forces;
financial support for individuals, gov-
ernments, unions, political parties or
other internal organizations;
Operations in support of political al-
lies such as acquiring politically damag-
ing information or the creation of such
information or the supplying of internal
security techniques and equipment;
Exchange programs for social, eco-
. nomic or long term political reasons;
economic manipulations of companies,
governments, commodity supplies.
One characterization of all covert ac-
tion programs is their deniability. They
must be clgarly separable from official
U.S. Government sanction. Instead of
pure collection of information, covert
action programs are designed to influ-
ence future events or alter the expected
course of events in foreign countries to
the benefit of the United States.
ACCOUNTABILITY: ASSET OR LIABILITY?
The principle of a plausible deniabil-
ity is critical to any covert operation. I
relate to the capability of our Govern-
ment to know what the CIA has been
doing. If it were not a problem then op-
erations could be carried out in the open.
But since many operations would be
considered either illegal, immoral, hos-
tile, or be greatly embarrassing in the
target country, they must be done with-
out overt relationship to the U.S. Gov-
ernment.
There are certain "backstops" built
into a covert operation. An American
presence is kept at a low level.
Native personnel are used where pos-
sible. Third countries may be co-opted
to participate and other devices used so
as to preclude any tie in with the United
States.
S 10221
In the event that an operation is blown
and it becomes known that some Ameri-
can has participated, there are two fur-,
ther ploys to use. First, the U.S. Govern-
ment can disassociate itself from the
blown operation by stating that it was
not sanctioned. Arrangements then
would have to made to see that the U.S.
personnel involved could be provided as-
sistance. In the meantime, all affiliation
with the CIA would be denied. Such was
the case with John Downey and Rich-
ard Fecteau held captive by the People's
Republic of China since the 1950's.
As a second fall back position, in an
extremely serious case, it may be neces-
sary to admit U.S. responsibility but deny
that the President had anything to do
with it, thereby attempting to salvage his
prestige and reputation. The choice then
is up to the President whether he wants
to admit responsibility or continue to
bluff his way through the crisis. This sit-
uation occurred with President Eisen-
however and the U-2 affair.
I think the whole notion of deniability
should be reconsidered very carefully
by Congress and all our Government. It
is one that could get us into the deepest
kind of trouble.
President Eisenhower, to his enduring
credit, flatly refused the deniability op-
tion and manfully assumed responsibility
for the U-2 flights, although in doing so
he endangered vital negotiations at that
time with the U.S.S.R.
This brings up the critical point.
Should there be clear accountability by
the President? Mechanisms have been
established for foreign operations which
protect the President from failures and
embarrassment. He can shift the blame
to other people or organizations. The CIA
for example, has long been known as an
organization willing to assume the public
blame for operations approved by the
President that ended in failure.
In this Senator's view there is never
justification for a lie by anyone includ-
ing, and I might say especially by, the
President of the United States. Such de-
liberate, planned "official" lies under-
mine the credibility of the Government.
The coverup becomes a way of life. It is
a corroding compromise with integrity.
What is more, it is stupid because it
frequently does not work. It is not be-
lieved and when it is exposed as a lie,
the loss of faith in government is far
greater then any gain.
In domestic affairs the use of "plaus-
ible denial" could be a most insidious
antidemocratic political device. As in so
many other areas of covert activities, the
major fear is that a commonly accepted
technique used abroad will become so
successful that it is only an easy moral
judgement away from application in the
United States.
Six men sitting around a table week
in and week out discuss various covert
foreign operations. They are masters at
the techniques of deception, intrigue,
espionage, covert action. One,day they
receive a suggestion, couched in terms
of national security that involves the use
of these same techniques domestically.
The suggestion comes from the White
House, maybe even the President. They
have all served the White House, regard-
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less of its occupant for their entire Toes.
It is the center of power from which they
draw their authority. It is the justifica-
tion of their lives. How do they answer?
This fictionalized portrayal is not in-
tended to be taken literally. But it makes
the point. There are vast unrestrained
powers within the executive department
that may someday threaten more than
some foreign nation.
One additional aspect of accountability
needs to be explored.
It may be possible that the delegation
of authority in such matters as intelli-
gence cai=iection and covert action :pro-
grams has gone so far down from the
President that he has no functi?)nal
control over many of these programs.
In the delegation of authority rest:; an
immense commitment of trust. If sub-
ordinates are trusted and events seem
to be moving well, a President could be
insulated from those decisions taken in
his name that have widespread and dam-
aging consequences. I do not think this
is a very realistic situation but it is an
outside passibility.
I think we should be aware of this, be-
cause too few of us appreciate how very
'busy the President is, how involved he is
iii many areas, how distraught any Presi-
dent mus" become because the demands
on his interest and his time are so
enormous.
Congress has no way of knowing any
of these things because Congress never
has exercised any real control over the
intelligence community. We have all
thought that this was an area in which
:national security interests naturally
limited congressional participation. We
.have left 'lt to the experts. We have han-
dled it with informal relationships and
secret meetings , and inadequate staff
'work. We have looked the other way. And
we have paid the price.
We agonize over an appropriation of
$1 million, and I do that as much as any.
But we calmly let $4, $5, or $6 billion slip
through our fingers without so much as
one critical question on the floor of the
Senate.
There are certain matters that pertain
to the intelligence community that can-
not ever be made public for to do so
would be to endanger sources of informa-
tion or techniques of collecting that in-
formation.. Our potential adversaries
could deny us-that information if ;hey
'became aware of its value to us. We roust
also protect the lives of the Americans
serving overseas and their families from
hostile retaliation.
The intelligence budget is not such a
case. There is no sound reason why this
budget must remain hidden from the
public in aggregate terms.
There would be no security, risk in let-
ting the world know that the United
States spends $5 or $6 billion on intelli-
gence.It.is a form of deterrence. It would
tell our adversaries that we intend to find
out the truth about any potential hostile
actions on their part and that we are
willing to spend great resources to di) so.
Just as it was deemed important to let
the U.S.S.R. and China know of our mili-
tary strength as a deterrent to a surprise
attack, so would it be prudent to tell them
that we have other capabilities to guard
our Nation. We need not say more than
the size and general distribution of the
in;eligence budget by agency. We need
not speak of missions or other sensitive
in ttters. But we must reestablish the re-
sponsibility that Congress has in the for-
m ition and funding of foreign policy and
above all else we mm A protect our do-
mestic freedoms from any bureaucratic
cl allenge from within the executive de-
partment. The danger is here. We cannot
re.:use to act.
THE NATIONAL szcua TY ACT OF 1947
WHAT DOES IT ALLOW
The first thing to be noted about the
es ablishment of the CIA is that it is a
part of the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent and as such reports directly to the
President through the National Security
Council and the Director of Central In-
teligence which is a cabinet level post.
Under the National Security Act of 1947,
the CIA was given the duty of advising
anad making recommendations to the Na-
tional Security Council and of corre-
lating and evaluating intelligence relat-
illg to the national security and providing
fo. appropriate dissemination. All of
these duties are relatively passive. In
nc way can they be interpreted as au-
thority for engagement, in domestic oper-
rations or foreign operations. That is
clear.
Further on in the same section, the
act specifically states that the CIA shall
have no "police, subpena, law-enforce-
ment powers, or internal security func-
tions," This is a broad and widespread
prohibition. The meaning of "no inter-
nal security functions" is a blanket dis-
approval for any active domestic police-
ty?)e functions.
After that prohibition, however, come
three statements which are oblique by
nature and subject to various inter-'
pretations. They need to be quoted in
full for they constitute a possible justi-
fication for both domestic functions and
foreign covert activities.
And provided further, that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for
protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure;
To perform, for the benefit of the exist-
in intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National
Security Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally;
To perform such other functions and du-
ties related to intelligence affecting the na-
tional security as the National Security
Ccuncil may from time to time direct.
The first statement could be cited for
justifying operations domestically and
the following two could be used for jus-
tifying foreign operations or.even domes-
tic operations.
THE MISSING CHAPTER
It is not possible to state with authority
what interpretation the executive de-
pevrtrnent has placed on these particular
sections of the National Security Act of
1947 because subsequent interpretations
have been done in secret. In fact, the CIA
charter is not fully contained in the Na-
tional Security Act of :1947 but is extrap-
olated from the act by a series of Na-
tional Security Council intelligence di-
rectives after the passage of the act.
These were, and remain, classified. Thus
we are faced with a high y unusual situa-?
tion. Congress has enacted a law with a
set of prescribed relationships and duties
for the CIA. And the executive depart-
ment through the Ale tional Security
Council has interpreted this law in
secret. Whether this subsequent secret
interpretation is allowed by the original
act is in doubt. Whether the procedure
of allowing secret interpretations and ex-
tensions of authority upon a' congres-
sional act is in doubt.
This can only be resolved by a court
test, a review by the enacting committees
and bodies of Congress of the original
intent of the legislation, or by amending
the 1947, National Security Act to pro-
hibit extraneous interpretations or ex-
tensions..
It would be best for all concerned if
the charter for the CIA was distinctly
agreed upon by Congress and the execu-
tive department and at least in general
language made public.
AN AMEND MEN'..' TO THE NATIONAL SECVETTY ACT
OF 1947
In order to initiate .i full examina-
tion of the proper role of the intelligence
community i1 foreign affairs as well as
domestic affairs, I now introduce a bill
as an amendment to the National Se-
curity Act of [947.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows :
S. 1935
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled. That sec-
tion 102 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended (30 U.S.C. 405x), is amended by
adding at. the end thereof a new subsection
as follows :
"(g) (1) Nothing in this or any other Act
shall be construed as authorizing the Central
Intelligence Agency to-
"(A) carry out, directly cr indirectly, with-
in the United States, either on its own or in
cooperation or conjunction with any other
department, agency, organization, or individ-
ual any police or police-type operation or ac-
tivity, any law enforcement operation or ac-
tivity, or any internal sec^;irity operation or
activity;
(B) provide assistance of any kind, di-
rectly or lndir3ctly, to any other department
or agency of the Federal Government, to any
department or agency of any State or local
government, or to any officer or employee of
any such department or agency engaged in
police or police-type operations or activities,
law enforcement operations or activities, or
internal security operations or activities
within the United States unless such assist-
ance is provided with the prior? specific writ-
ten approval of the CIA Oversight Subcom-
mittees of the Committees on Appropriations
and the Committees on Arnied Services of the
Senate and the House of Representatives;
"(C) participate, directly or indirectly, in
any illegal act:.vity within he United States;
or
"(D) engage in any covert action in any
foreign country unless such action has been
specifically approved in writing by the CIA
Oversight Subcommittees of the Committees
on Appropriations and the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House
of Representatives.
"(2) As used in paragraph (1) (D) of this
subsection, the term 'covert action' means
covert action as defined be the National Se-
curity Ccunci:. based on the commonly ac-
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ccpted understanding of that term within
the intelligence community of the Federal
Government' and the practices of the intelli-
gence community of the Federal Government
during the period 1950 through 1970."
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this
amendment is designed to clarify the
role of the CIA with regard to domestic
activities. It has four provisions. First,
it makes it clear that the National Se-
curity Act of 1974 itself or any subse-
quent interpretations of the act by the
executive branch, be they. classified or
unclassified, shall not authorize the CIA
to engage in police, law enforcement,
and internal security functions by itself
or in conjunction with other organiza-
tions. Although there is a similar pro-
vision in the National Security Act, sub-
sequent interpretations of that act by
the National Securtiy Council intelli-
gence directives or other more loosely
worded language in the National Secu-
rity Act itself requires a reaffirmation-
and I mean a public reaffirmation-of
congressional intent.
A second provision would prohibit the
CIA from providing assistance to other
Government organizations engaged in
police, law enforcement, or internal se-
curity activities. The obvious question to
be dealt with here is the problem of nor-
mal, routine coordination between CIA
and the FBI. This type of activity would
be expressly approved on an ongoing
basis but within distinct limitations JAY
the CIA oversight; committees of both
houses.
The third provision of this amend-
ment expressly prohibits the CIA from
participating in any illegal activity
within the United States, either directly
or indirectly.
The fourth provision deals with the
foreign activities of the CIA. It is re-
markable that nothing in the National
Security Act of 1947 directly authorizes
the CIA to engage in covert foreign op-
erations. Subsequent interpretations of
the act have empowered the CIA to con-
duct such activities but the act itself
is not explicit. The hidden charter for
CIA is far more important in this regard
than the National Security Act. But due
to the classified nature of the hidden
charter, Congress has not participated
in the interpretation of the law it ap-
proved. Therefore, it is now necessary to
define just what is the congressional in-
tent of the act.
My fourth provision draws a distinc-
tion between the normal activity of in-
telligence collection and covert action
programs. It would prohibit the CIA
from engaging in any covert foreign ac-
tion programs without the written prior
approval of the CIA oversight commit-
tees of the House and Senate. The pat-
tern for prior approval, for example,
could be based on techniques worked out
between the executive department and
Congress such as exist for reprogram-
ing authority. I would also recommend
that both Houses of Congress form one
body with responsibility for CIA over-
sight.
WHY IS THE AMENDMENT NEEDED?
!'his amendment is necessary for the
national security. I do not say this light-
ly. The purpose of the intelligence com-
munity is to insure that the highest
policymakers have the knowledge and
means to protect this country. It is a vital
line of defense. But is there a possibility
that the very instruments established
to guarantee our national security could
be used to subvert it?
Mr. President, this is the most chill-
ing message of Watergate. The activities
we engage in overseas have come home
to roost. The techniques, the. organiza-
tion, the personnel, the equipment, the
power to obtain information and influ-
ence foreign events have been turned to
use domestically. Nothing could be more
dangerous. Are we successful in rigging
a few elections? In supporting a few
friendly organizations? Bribing officials?
Pressuring governments? Maybe, maybe
not. But it is not worth the price if the
same techniques become a more likely
threat to our freedoms than any in-
vasion.
Without proper controls we are in
danger of falling prey to our own nation-
al security mechanism.
Is it far fetched to contemplate the
illegal use of the FBI, CIA and the rest
of the intelligence community against
political opponents or any other faction
within the United States? That is ex-
actly what has been attempted. The FBI
and CIA have wavered under the pres-
sure. This is the most serious aspect of
the Watergate crisis. It has gone so deep
into the fabric of the Federal bureauc-
racy that even the untouchable agen-
cies have been tarnished.
Fantastic? No, indeed, it is real and it
is happening today. Firm steps must be
taken to reestablish the confidence that
should reside in the CIA and to eliminate
the nightmare that someday as Sinclair
Lewis wrote of the prospect of an Ameri-
can Hitler "It can happen here."
I have great admiration for the CIA
and its Directors. It appears that they
have resisted pressures of great intensity
from the White House itself. That took
a great deal of courage. It is for the sake
of the CIA as well as the American
people that I offer this amendment.
In closing, I would like to quote two
remarks by former U.S. Presidents, each
from a different era but both endowed
with the insight that comes from a keen
mind and a sense of American democ-
racy.
On May 13, 1798, James Madison wrote
to Thomas Jefferson stating-
Perhaps it is a universal truth that the
loss of liberty at home is to be charged to
provisions against danger, real or pretended,
from abroad.
On hundred sixty-five years later an-
other great President, Harry Truman,
reflected on his administration:
For some time I' have been disturbed by
the way the CIA has been diverted from its
original assignment. It has become an op-
erational and at times a policy-making arm
of the government. I never had any thought
that when I set up the CIA that it would
be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger
operations. Some of the complications and
embarrassment that I think we have expe-
rienced are in part attributable to the fact
that this quiet intelligence arm of the Pres-
ident has been so much removed from its in-
tended role that it is being interpreted as a
symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign
intrigue and a subject for cold war enemy
propaganda.
Mr. President, nothing that I have said
here today should be interpreted as con-
demnation of the CIA. The CIA has been
under the direction of several Presidents.
In many ways, the CIA has performed an
invaluable service to our Government
that could not have beendone by any
other agency. In its testimony before
Congress on foreign weapons programs
and in its estimates of capabilities and
intentions, the CIA has presented re-
markable unbiased analysis of the high-
est quality. This is an essential role.
But the CIA now must be protected
from the executive department and our
democracy must be protected from any
directed misuse of the CIA.
To do less is to risk our heritage.
Mr. President, I am confident if my
-amendment becomes law we will provide
that protection for the CIA and, more
importantly, for our form of govern-
ment.
By Mr. PERCY:
S. 1936. A bill to provide for better
control and reporting of political contri-
butions and expenditures in Federal
elections. Referred to the Committee
on Rules and Administration.
FEDERAL ELECTIVE OFFICE CAMPAIGN ACT
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the most
tragic consequence of the recent disclo-
sures of political corruption in Washing-
ton is the erosion of public confidence
in elected officials and in the two-party
system. Public trust in government has
been seriously undermined.
It is, of course, vital to uncover all of
the facts in the Watergate case and to
have swift and impartial prosecution of
the accused. But even after all this has
been accomplished, our task will be far
from completed. We will have to move to
eliminate public cynicism about the po-
litical process.
One of the major problems at the heart
of the Watergate scandal is big money
in politics. We must revise and rework
regulations governing campaign spend-
ing, as well as reexamine proposals that
would require full disclosure of personal
finances of public officials.
We are all familiar with the alleged
abuses of campaign financing in 1972.
Stories about suitcases full of money
coming to Washington and funds filter-
ing through foreign banks have been
widely reported. We are also familiar
with reports of the questionable use of
funds by persons who openly attempted
to interfere with campaign activities.
It is estimated that as much as $400
million was spent in all elections in 1972.
up from $300 million in 1968 and $200
million in 1964. We must reduce the
amount of money -spent in elections and
make the process more open to public
scrutiny.
The Congress made a start in this di-
rection in 1971 with passage of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act. It placed
a limit of 10 cents per eligible voter on
the amount that could be spent on media
advertising and also required that con-
tributions of more than $100 be made
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE June J,, 1973.
public. But, obviously, a great deal more
remains to be done.
Therefore, Mr. President, I am today
introducing legislation to further control
campaign financing. The legislaticn I
am introducing today would do seven
things:
First. It would eliminate the prolif-
eration of campaign committees by al-
lowing only one fundraising committee
per candidate. All contributions and dis-
bursements would flow through the one
committee. This would simplify the pro-
cedures for tracing contributions and ex-
penditures.
Second. Any contributions or disburse-
ments in excess of $10 to or from a fund-
raising committee would have to be
made by check. This would prevent un-
traceable cash from flowing through the
political process.
Third. All contributions would have to
be identified with the name, address, and
social security number of the donor.
This would make the task of identifica-
tion of donors clear and precise.
Fourth. The fundraising committee
would be required to regularly putlish
throughou.t the course of the campaign,
the names and addresses of the donor
and the amount contributed, as well as
the names of those to whom funds are
disbursed and the purpose of the ex-
penditure. This would present for public
scrutiny all sources of campaign funds
and the uses to which they are put.
Fifth. An overall limitation on cam-
paign spending of 20 cents per eligible
voter would be fixed. Current law sets
it 10-pent per eligible voter limit on
media spending, but sets no limit on
overall spending.
Sixth. A. limit of $5,000 on individual
contributions to a single candidate
would be established. There should no
longer even be the suspicion of big con-
tributions influencing political decisions.
This limitation would help to assure that
no one individual would be the principal
source of support to a candidate.
Seventh. To encourage contributions
from a broader segment of the public,
the tax credit for political contributions
of $12.50 for a single person and $25
per couple In the current law would. be
raised to :$25 for an individual and $50
for a couple.
In addition to submitting my own bill
for consideration at this time, I would
also like to take this opportunity tc go
on record as heartily endorsing other
campaign reform proposals already in-
troduced by my colleagues:
First. I endorse and support Senator
CASE'S financial disclosure bill which
would require full financial disclosure by
all Members of Congress, candidates for
Congress, and congressional officials and
staff receiving $22,000 or more per year.
Second. I urge passage of Senator
ScoTT's bill calling for an indepenc.ent
Federal Elections Commission with re-
sponsibility for monitoring campaigns.
Touch a commission would have full pow-
e' and authority to investigate and pros-
ecute financial misconduct in Federal
C ,, mpaignf .
It is important that all Federal cam-
paign reporting be under the jurisdiction
of a single agency, rather than continu-
ixi the current, fragmented system un-
der which reports of ]'.louse, Senate, and
Presidential campaigns go to separate
bodies. There should be one independ-
ent body with overall authority to moni-
tor and investigate all campaign spend-
in;; in all campaigns.
Mr. President, if provisions such as
these are enacted into law, we will have
gone a long way toward insuring honesty
and accountability in our political proc-
esses. We may also help to restore public
faith in our public officials.
( am delighted- that the Senate Com-
mAtee on Rules and Administration will
begin hearings on Wednesday on the
whole subject of campaign finance re-
fo-m. It is my hope that we will seize the
moment created by the abuses of the 1972
campaign and move swiftly in the Senate
to enact strong reform legislation.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the legislation referred to above
be printed in full at this point in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill was
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as
follows :
S. 193 3
3e it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this Act
may be cited as the "Federal Elective Office
Campaign Act".
SINGLE CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE; CONTRIBUTIONS
OF MONEY
SEC. 2. (a) Title III of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971 Is amended by redesig-
nating sections 308 through 311 as sections
310 through 313, respectively, and by insert-
ing after section 307 the following new sec-
tions:
"SINGLE CAMPAIGNS' COMMITTEE
"SEC. 308. (a) No person shall make any
contribution to or for the benefit of any can-
didate except by making ;hat contribution to
a political committee authorized by that
candidate to receive contributions on his be-
ha:.f.
"(b) No political committee shall receive
an,; contribution or make any expenditure
on behalf of a candidate unless it is author-
ized in writing by that candidate to do so.
" (c) No candidate shall authorize more
than one political committee to receive con-
tri :)utions or make expenditures in connec-
tion with his campaign for nomination for
election, or for election, to Federal, office.
"CONTRIBUTIONS OF MONEY
"SEC. 309. No political committee shall re-
ceive a contribution, or contributions in the
aggregate, from any person in excess of $10
other than in the form of a check drawn on
the account of the person making the con-
tri3ution. No political committee shall make
an:, expenditure in excess of $10 other than
by check drawn on the account of that conl-
mictee and signed by the treasurer of the
committee."
IDENTIFICATION OF CONTR;,DUTORS AND RECIPI-
ENTS OF EXPENDITURES
SEc. 3. (a) Section 301 of the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971 Is amended by--
11) striking "and" at the end of subse's-
tion (h),
(2) striking the period at the end of sub-
section (I) and nsertinl; In lieu thereof
and," and
13) adding at the end thereof the following
new subsection:
"(j) 'identification' means the name, ad-
dress, and-
'`(1) In the case of an Individual, his social
security number, and
"(2) in the case of a person (other than ail
individual) tt,e business and principal place
of business."
(b) (1) Section 302(b) of that Act is
amended by striking ", the name and address
(occupation and principal place of business,
if any)" and inserting '?oi the contribution
and the identification".
(2) Section 302(c) of that Act is amended
by striking "full name and mailing address
(occupation a:ad the principal place of busi-
ness, if any)" in paragraphs (2) and (4) and
inserting in each such paragraph "identifi-
cation".
(3) Section 304(b) of that Act is amended
by striking "full name and mailing address
(occupation acid the principal place of busi-
ness, if any) in paragraphs (2), (9), and
(10) and inserting in each such paragraph:
"identification".
REPORTING REQUI16EMENTS
SEC. 4. (a) '."he second sentence of section
304(a) of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 is amended to read as follows:
"Such reports shall be filed on the first day of
January, April, July, September, and October
in each year, on the tenth day before the date
on which any election is held and on the
fifth day following that date."
(b) Section 304(b) of sw,.h Act is amended
by--
(1) striking out "and" at the end of para-
graph (12),
(2) redesignating paragraph (13) as (15),
and
(3) inserting after paragraph (12) the fol-
lowing new paragraphs:
"(13) the ic.entification of any individual
who performs any service for the committee
without compensation, together with his reg-
ular place. of employment when not per-
forming services for the committee, and a
description of the services performed by him
for the committee;
"(14) the ic.entification of any individual
who is employed by the committee or who,
as a consultant or otherwise, performs serv-
ices for the committee for ompensation, to-
gether with t:ie amounts received by that
individua. as salary, reimbursement of ex-
penses, or other compensation, and that In-
dividual's next previous place of employment
and his regular occupation; and".
LcMI'rArION ON EXPENDITURES
SEC. 5. (a) Chapter 29 of title 18, 'United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end
thereof the fo:.lowing new section:
614. Limitation on expenditures
"(a) (1) Except to the extent such amounts
are increased under subsection (d) (2), no
candidate (other than a candidate for pres-
idential nomination) may make expenditures
in connection with his campaign for nomina-
tion for e:lecticn, or election, to Federal office
in excess of the greater of 20 cents multiplied
by the voting age population (as certified
under subsection (e)) of the geographical
area in which the election for such office is
held.
"(2) The limitation on expenditures im-
posed by this subsection shall apply sep-
arately to ea.h primary, primary runoff,
general, and ;special election campaign in.
which a candidate participates.
"(b) No candidate for presidential nomin-
ation may make expenditures in any State
in connection with his campaign for such
nomination in excess of the amount which a
candidate for nomination for election as
United States Senator from that Stag (or for
election as Delegate, in the case of the Dis-
trict of Columbia) might, expend within the
State in connection with his campaign for
that nomination. For purposes of this subsec-
tion, an individual is a candidate for presi-
dential nomination if he makes (or any other
person makes on his behalf) an expenditure
on behalf of his candidacy for any political
party's ncmina,tion for election to the office
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