(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500400009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

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According to the statement, this tightening up is needed because the
law prescribes other duties for CIA which justify "operations
domestically" and "even domestic operations."
It is believed that a review of the language and background of
the law establishes that:
(a) The word "powers" in the phrase "police, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers" means legal ability or authority.
The Agency has no police, subpoena, or law-enforcement
powers, has never attempted to exercise such powers, and
its legal inability and lack of authority to exercise such
powers is abundantly clear.
(b) The meaning of the phrase "internal-security
functions" is equally clear when considered in the
context of both the legislation in which it appears and
the legislative history which surrounds it.
The heart of the Central Intelligence Agency section of the
National Security Act of 1947 is subsection 102 (d) which sets forth
the duties of the Agency under the direction of the National Security
Council. The proviso in question appears in a paragraph of a
subsection dealing specifically with the correlation, evaluation, and
dissemination of intelligence information.
The legislative history of section 102 of the National Security
Act reflects congressional intent that there be no confusion between
the pursuit of intelligence abroad and police powers at home. In
1947, it was very clear that the merging of these two functions was
characteristic of totalitarian states. The concern simply put was
that there be no "gestapo in the United States." While this country
has never had a national police force, experience with the conduct
of totalitarian states was uppermost in the nation's mind,.
In light of these concerns, a proviso was written into law to
add to the assurance that the Agency would not be engaged domesti-
cally in collecting information on citizens of the United States who,
unlike Agency employees and others having access to our information,
are not of legitimate interest to the Agency. The proviso was
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patterned after the wording in paragraph 4 of the 22 January 1946
Presidential directive which established the Central Intelligence
Group, the predecessor organization of the Central Intelligence
Agency (i. e. , "4. No police, law- enforcement, or internal-security
functions shall be exercised under this directive. ").
We do not view any provision in 102 (d) as authority to
override the proscription that the CIA shall have no pol:,ce, subpoena,
law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions. However,
neither do we view that proscription as prohibiting this Agency from
protecting its installations in the United States, conducting security
investigations of its personnel and. persons having a need for access
to its information, and, of course, engaging in activities in the
United States solely in support of the Agency's foreign intelligence
mission.
The functions assigned to this Agency under subsection 102(d)
relate only to foreign intelligence activities although the word "foreign"
does not appear in the subsection. While it is not believed that any
amendment is necessary, the insertion of the word "foreign" appro-
priately throughout the subsection would be preferable to (g)(1)(A) and
(B) of S. 1935 and would appear to substantially meet the same objectives.
With the word inserted, the introduction of subsection 102(d) would read
as follows:
"For the purpose of coordinating the foreign intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies
in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the
Agency, under the direction of the National Security Council. .
New subsection (g)(1)(B) proposed in S. 1935 would prohibit this
Agency from providing assistance of any kind to any agency of the
Federal or local government engaged in police, law-enforcement, or
internal-security operations and activities unless such assistance is
provided with the prior approval of the CIA oversight committees of
the Committees on Appropriations and the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
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In carrying out its foreign intelligence function, the Agency
frequently develops information of major concern to domestic
law-enforcement agencies. In such areas as narcotics smuggling,
aerial highjacking, international terrorism, and, of course, foreign
directed espionage and subversion, the Agency has a capability, and.
we think an obligation, to provide information which this Agency
acquires abroad in carrying out its foreign intelligence mission to
those domestic agencies who alone might be in a position to use it
effectively to forestall serious criminal action or security threats
within the United States.
Illegal Domestic Activities
New subsection (g)(1)(C) proposed in 5.1935 would preclude
this Agency from engaging in "any illegal activity within the United
States. " We see no merit in a proposed law forbidding this Agency
from doing what it is already forbidden to do under the law of the
land.. Moreover, the very enactment of such a law would. imply that
the Agency has conducted illegal activities in the past.
"Covert Action" Abroad
New subsection (g)(1)(D) proposed in S. 1935 would prohibit
this Agency from engaging in "covert action" abroad without the
specific written approval of the oversight committees of CIA in the
Congress. While the new subsection is proposed as a tightening up
of the current law, it actually constitutes a specific authorization for
the CIA to engage in "covert action in any foreign country. 11 It is
believed that a statutory acknowledgement that the United States
engages, or will engage, in covert action against foreign nations,
contrary to the United Nations Charter and principles of international
law, could be a cause for embarrassment in our international relations.
The present practice of providing a full and complete account of our
activities to our four oversight committees appears to be a more
satisfactory method for meeting the objectives of the proposed new
subsection.
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In view of the above considerations, it is recommended
that S. 1935 in its present form not be favorably acted upon. by
your Committee. The Office of Management and Budget advises
that there is no objection to the submission of this report; that
serious constitutional questions are :raised by those provisions
in the bill imposing a condition of pr:Lor approval by congressional
committees; and that the enactment of S. 1935 in its present form
would not be cons=istent with the Administration's objectives.
Sincerely,
W. E. Colby
Director
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Nationality Act specifically authorizes cooperation with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in transmitting biographic
information on aliens who are coming into this country.
In the past we have afforded assistance to the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration and other agencies where we have developed
techniques or equipment in the pursuit of our activities abroad where
such techniques or equipment seem to have applicability in the law
enforcement field. Two notable examples in this regard are the metal
traces technique and the explosive handling techniques. These two
were developed for use in Southeast Asia and clearly have applicability
in the law enforcement field.
By Presidential direction, we have expanded our efforts in
collecting intelligence in the narcotics area. The information we are
able to develop abroad is passed to appropriate agencies such as
BNDD and Customs. Generally, our assistance to law enforcement
agencies is limited to information. In the case of the Secret Service,
however, there is a specific law authorizing the Secret Service to
request assistance of other Federal agencies in carrying out its duties.
(P. L. 90-331, 18 U. S. C. A. 3056nt) When called upon the Agency has
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assisted in augmenting Secret Service capabilities by detailing
employees to the Secret Service for the duration of their performance
of duties for the Secret Service.
I would intend to limit our assistance to conform with our
basic statute ar..d not participate actively in any way with. the various
law enforcement agencies in performance of their funct _ons.
3
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Comments on Proxmire (and Harrington) Bill_
The bill amends the National Security Act of 1947 by providing
that nothing in this or any other act should authorize the Agency to:
(a) engage directly or indirectly, or in conjunction with any
other agency or individual, in any law-enforcement or internal-
security activity;
(b) assist directly or indirectly any Federal, State, or
local agency in any police, law-enforcement or internal- security
actions within the United States unless approved in writing by
our oversight committees;
(c) participate in any illegal activity in the United States;
(d) engage in any covert action abroad unless approved in
writing by our oversight committees.
Section 102(d) of the National Security Act already forbids the
Agency to engage in any "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers
or internal-security functions. " The legislative history of the National
Security Act makes clear that this provision was designed to ensure against
the Agency's ever becoming a "gestapo" type organization. At no time has
the Agency ever attempted to exercise any of these proscribed powers.
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However, in carrying out its foreign intelligence function, the Agency
frequently develops information of major concern to domestic law-
enforcement agencies. In such areas ,as narcotics smuggling, aerial
highjacking, international terrorism, and, of course, foreign directed
espionage and subversion, the Agency has a capability, and we think an
obligation, to provide to domestic agencies through appropriate channels
information which this Agency acquires abroad in carrying out its
foreign intelligence mission.
The bill in question would appear to prohibit the communication of
information of this :kind to Federal, State or local authorities who alone
might be in a position to use it effectively to forestall serious criminal
action or security t'zreats within the United States.
The bill also creates a serious constitutional problem by providing
that any assistance given to domestic law-enforcement agencies, and any
covert action conducted abroad, be undertaken only with the prior written
approval of our congressional oversight committees. Among the problems
this creates are:
(a) explicit statutory recognition that the United States is
involved in covert action which on its face is a violation of international
law;
(b) violence to the principle of separation of powers by requiring
that the Legislative and Executive Branches share responsibility
for executive action.
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]Finally, the bill contains what appears to be a completely super-
fluous provision that it shall be illegal for the Agency "to participate,
directly or indirectly, in any illegal activity in the United States. 1
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S. 1935 Purpose: To amend Section. 102 of the National
(Proxmire) Security Act of 1947 to prohibit certain activities
H. R. 8592 by the CIA and to limit certain other Agency
[Harrington] activities
Comment:
S. 1935 and companion bill H. R. 8592 add a new subsection to
102 of the National Security Act of 1947, to ;specifically preclude CIA
from engaging in any internal security or police activities directly or
indirectly, any "illegal" activities within the U. S. , or to engage in any
covert action abroad unless approved in writing by the CIA oversight
subcommittees of House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services
Committees.
Position:
By letter to the Director dated 8 June, Chairman Stennis requested
Agency views on S. 1935. Chairman Hebert, House Armed Services Com-
mittee, by letter to General Walters dated 13 June, requested the views
and recommendations of CIA on H. R. 8592. The Agency's position was
coordinated with OGC, all Deputy Directorates, and the IC.
.A proposed reply to Chairman Stennis on S. 1935 was circulated, for
comment and coordination on 30 August. The proposed reply recom-
mended that S. 1935 not be favorably acted upon. The proscription against
the Agency?s involvement in law enforcement activities was considered
adequately covered in our present law. This provision in the bill was
considered so broadly stated that it would preclude CIA from providing
information to law enforcement agencies, both Federal and State, in
foreign intelligence matters which are of direct concern to law enforce-
ment agencies. This would include areas as narcotics smuggling, high,
jacking, terrorism, and all aspects of foreign directed espionage and
subversion. The proscription against "illegal" activities by CIA was
considered of no merit since CIA is already forbidden from doing any-
thing illegal. The amendment to require the written approval of CIA's
oversight committees before the Agency conducts any "covert action"
abroad is considered to be contrary to international law and could cause
embarrassment in international relations since it constitutes a specific
authorization for CIA to engage in covert action in any foreign country.
IC, OGC and DDO concurred. The DDI recommended deletion
of the statement in the draft that a statutory acknowledgement that the
U. S. engages in covert action against foreign nations was contrary to
the principle of international law.
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On 16 July Mr. Colby met with Chairman Hebert and they
discussed the Proxmire/Harrington bill. Chairman Hebert said
not to be concerned about the bills as the matter of revising the
Agency's charter is before his committee and would be brought
into a proper point of discussion at the right time. Mr. Colby at
that time raised the same points as are contained in the written
response to Chairman Stennis on'S. 1935.
The reply to Chairman Hebert on H. R. 8592 consists of a
copy of the Agency reply to Chairman Stennis since the two are com-
panion bills.
Status:
S. 1935 was referred to the Senate Subcommittee on Armed Services
on June 4. H. R. 8592 was referred to the House Committee on Armed
Services on June 12.
Agency reply sent to OMB on 24 September.
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 Approved For Release 2003/12/Q3",- ( l -8 75
SEEIDER. WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM
A F UNCLASSIFIED T--I CONFIDENTIAL -SECRET-
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
Mr. Maury.
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks:
The original of this went to Mr. Colby
per his telephone request of me.
ohn S. Warner
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Acting General Counsel
6/28/73
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
FORM NO. .)O7 Use previous editions
1-67 GJ
25X1
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27 June ].973
CIA relationships with other agencies of Government cover
a wide spectrum. With the other agencies of the intelligence community
there is widespread two-way cooperation and assistance in the fields of
information, techniques and equipment. There are also exchanges of
personnel and detailing of personnel from one agency to another.
In the area of Agency relationships with law enforcement
agencies of the Federal Government, we are at all times guided by the
prohibitions of section 102(d) (3) of the National Security Act, "That the
Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or
internal-security functions. " We have never exercised or attempted to
exercise any police, subpoena or law enforcement powers. When the
Agency comes into possession of information of interest to law
enforcement agencies as a result of its foreign intelligence collection
activities, we routinely pass such information to the interested agency.
Additionally, where by virtue of the investigation of our own employees
we have accumulated considerable biographic data, this is also routinely
made available upon request. Section 105 of the Immigration and.
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 USE TERNAL
^ UNCLASSIFIED ^ IN
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[I SECRET
C 88P
-
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
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EXTENSION
NO. - T- -
OLC 73--0692
John M. Maury
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Legislative Counsel
A
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17 September 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
D
ATE
building),
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show (ror, whom,
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
}
t t'. -ad f~3 -Mr. -C I ] ~' ~i F 7. _
Mr. Evans
atur. e is a proposed. Agency 3 epoi i.
on S. 1935 (Hie Proxmire Bill)
2-
which. will be submitted to OMP
for clearance prior to transi-nit.t.al
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Mr
Colb
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91
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Committee Committee which requested Our
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4
OGC, ODO, DDI, DDM&S,
D S&T, and IC have concurred i
II
5
.
the report and it as been reviewed
informally by Tim. Woolsey, CeTera.
6.
Counsel
of theSenate Armed
..
ervice s Committee.
T
--
Also attached for Mr-, Colby'
signature is a. report to Chan mi:taIi
Hebert on a companion bill
8'
introd.u.ced. by Harri.izgton (D. Ma.>
In this case we recommend sub-
90 --
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m.i.tting to Hebert our report: on
the Senate hill. with. a short coverijif
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letter., The language of the bill is
10.`
vague,! particular ly with h i respect.
to covert action. and Harrington,
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unlike Proxmire, did not insert. a
11.
statement in the record explaining
~_ - -
the bill to which we could key our
12.
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comments. (Slatinshek, of the
Committee Staff, agrees with this
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app r
13.
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TATIN
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ta.
JOHN M, MAI)R.Y
Legislative Counsel.
15.
3-62 U I U EDITIONS
SECRET
^ CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL `` 1.
F1 C_- USE SE ONLY UNCLASSIFIED
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WASHINGTON, D.G. 20505
Honorable John C. Stennis, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your request of 8 June 1973 for the
recommendations of this Agency on S. 1935, "To amend section 102
of the National Security Act of 1947 to prohibit certain activities by
the Central Intelligence Agency and to limit certain other activities
by such Agency. "
In view of the nature of our comments with respect to certain
provisions of the bill, this report has been classified Confidential.
S. 1935 adds a new subsection to section 102 of the National
Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U. S. C. 403), which, according
to the statement accompanying the introduction of the bill, modifies
the authority of the National Security Council to proscribe certain
functions for this Agency in the areas of: (1) internal security,
(2) illegal domestic activities, and (3) "covert action" abroad. (119
CONG. REC. Daily Ed. 4 June 1973. )
Internal-Security Functions
The provisions of S. 1935 relating to internal-security functions
appear in new subsection (g) (1) (A) and (B). According to the statement
accompanying the introduction of the bill, the proposed subsection is
designed to tighten up an existing provision of law:
"PROVIDED, That the Agency shall have no police,
subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security
functions. " (National Security Act of 1947, section 102 (d)(3). )
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