CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500340016-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: February 21, 1973
• Content Type: OPEN

February 21,
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CONGRESSIONAL RgCORD? SENATE S 2965
sary statutory revisit) is. I believe that
the bill which I introd ed today will go
a long way toward ac mplishment of
these objectives, and I pe that it will
receive early and favorab consideration
by the Senate.
Mr. President, I ask :' .ous con-
sent to have the text of the ill printed
in full at this point in the RD.
There being no objection, th bill was
ordered to be printed in the R ORD, as
follows:
8. 936
Be it enacted by the Senate and ouse
of Representatives of the United Stat of
America in Congress assembled, That
Act may be cited as the "Executive Reorg
zation Improvement Act of 1973".
SEC. 2. Section 905 of title 5, United State
Code, is amended by striking out "April 1,
1973" and inserting in lieu thereof "April 1,
1975".
SEC. 3. (a) Chapter 9 of title 5, United
States Code, Is amended by inserting imme-
diately after section 905 the following new
section:
"? 906. Notice of intended reorganization
plans
"(a) The President shall transmit to the
Congress, as part of his budget message re-
quired under section 201 of the Budget and
Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 11), for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, and for each
succeeding fiscal year, a summary of re-
organization plans which the President in-
tends to submit under this chapter during
the ensuing fiscal year for which that budget
is submitted, together with a general descrip-
tion of the areas to be affected by any such
reorganization plan.
"(b) In order to provide an opportunity
for the Congress to propose modifications
and amendments in any reorganization plan
proposed to be submitted under this chapter,
not less than thirty days prior to the date
on which a reorganization plan is to be sub-
mitted to the Congress under this chapter,
the President shall notify the President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives that he intends to submit
such a plan, which notice shall include a
statement of the purposes of that plan and
the substance of the proposed reorganiza-
tion."
(b) Section 903(a) of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by striking out "Whenever"
and inserting in lieu thereof "Subject
the provisions of section 906, whenever".
BEC. 4. Sections 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 1,
912, and 913 of title 5, United States
and all references thereto, are redesigns as
sections 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 9 , and
914, respectively.
SEC. 5. Section 907(a) of title , United
States Code (as redesignated by ection 4
of this Act), is amended to read follows:
"(a) Except as otherwise pro ided under
subsection (c) of this section, reorganiza-
tion plan is effective at the e d of the first
period of sixty calendar day; of continuous
session of Congress after the' date on which
the plan is transmitted to it if, between the
date of transmittal and the end of the sixty-
day period, the two Houses pass a concurrent
resolution stating in substance that the Con-
gress favors the reorganization plan."
SEC. 6. Section 909 of title 5, United States
Code (as redesignated by section 4 of this
Act), is amended by striking out "Sections
909-913" and inserting in lieu thereof "Sec-
tions 910-915".
Six. 7. Section 910 of title 5, United States
Code (as redesignated by section 4 of this
Act), 16 amended to read. as follows:
"? 910. Terms of resolution
"Por the purpose of sections 909-915 of
this title, 'resolution' means only a concur-
rent resolution, the matter after the resolv-
ing clause of which is as follows: `That the
Congress of the United States favors the re-
organization plan numbered ? transmitted
to the Congress by the President an
19__.' The blank spaces therein are to
be appropriately filled. The term does not
include a resolution which specifies more
than one reorganization plan."
Sm. B. (a) Section 912(a) of title 5, United
States Code (as redesignated by section 4 of
this Act), is amended by inserting: "(or, in
the case of a resolution received from the
other House, twenty calendar clays after its
receipt)," immediately after the word "in-
troduction".
(b) Section 912 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following new subsection:
"(d) If, on the fiftieth day after the date
on which a reorganization plan was trans-
mitted to the Cbngress, the committee to
which a resolution with respect to that pi
s been referred has not reported it, or h
n been discharged from further consi
at ri of the resolution under subsectio (a)
of t is section, the committee shall be uto-
matt.: lly discharged from further co eider-
ation that resolution, except th when-
ever m e than one resolution w respect
to a re ganization plan has intro-
duced, th committee shall be ischarged of
the resolut
SEC. 9. Ch
Code, is funt
end thereof th
"? 015. Procedur
resoluti
n first introdu
ter 9 of title
amended
followin
after
fr
, United States
y adding at the
ew section:
ne House receives a
the other House
"If, prior to the sage by one House of
a resolution of tha House with respect to
a reorganization such House receives
from the other use resolution with re-
spect to the sa - plan, then the following
procedure appli .
"(1) If no solution the first House
with respect o such plan s been referred
to committ , no other reso tion with re-
spect to t e same plan may reported or
(despite e provisions of sec an 912(a) )
be ma he subject of a mo on to dis-
charge
.,(
res
If a resolution of the first use with
ct to such plan has been re -rred to
mittee--
(A) the procedure ,with respect t that
other resolutions of such House wit re-
spect to such plan which have been refe ed
to committee shall be the same as if o
resolution from the other House with r
spect to such plan had been received; bu
"(B) on any vote on final passage of a
resolution of the first House with respect
to such plan the resolution from the other
House with respect to such plan shall be
automatically substituted for the resolution
of the first House."
SEC. 10. The analysis of chapter 9 of title
5, United States Code, is amended?
(1) inserting immediately after item "905"
the following:
"906. Notice of intended reorganization
plans.";
(2) by striking out
in lieu thereof "907";
(3) by striking out
lieu thereof "908";
(4) by striking out
lieu thereof "909";
(6) by striking out
lieu thereof "910";
(6) by striking out
lieu thereof "911";
(7) by striking out
lieu thereof "912.";
(8) by striking out
lieu thereof "913";
(9) by striking out "913" and inserting in
lieu thereof "914"; and
(10) by adding at the end thereof the
following new item:
"906" and inserting
"907" and inserting in
"908" and inserting in
"909" and inserting in
"910" and inserting in
"911" and inserting In
"912" and inserting in
"915. Procedure after one House receives a
resolution from the other House.".
SEC. 11. The amendments made by this
Act shall apply with respect to reorganiza-
tion plans submitted after the date of en-
actment of this Act. The amendments made
by sections 5, 7, 8, and 9 of this Act shall
also apply to any reorganization plan which
has been submitted to the Congress and
has not been acted upon pursuant to chap-
ter 9 of title 5, United States Code, prior to
the date of enactment of this Act. Each such
plan, if any, shall be deemed to have been
submitted to the Congress on the date of
enactment of this Act.
By Mr. THURMOND:
$. 937. A bill to amend title 37, United
grates Code, to provide an incentive plan
for participation in the Ready Reserve.
Referred to the Committee on Armed
Services.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in a
time of peace and greater dependency
upon Reserve and Guard Forces it is
more important than ever to enact laws
which will help insure the strength of
our military units.
Therefore, I am introducing today a
bill which would provide bonuses to en-
courage participation in the Ready Res-
erve and National Guard. This legisla-
tion offers cash inducements for res-
ervists who reenlist for at least 3 years
following their first 6 years of reserve or
guard duty. It also provides a bonus for
a member of the regular forces if he
elects to enlist in the reserves following
his 2 years of active duty.
At present, upon reenlistment in the
Regular Army, a bonus is given to those
who have acquired specific skills while in
the Armed Forces. This bonus serves as
a realistic incentive for servicemen to re-
main in the Armed Forces. However,
there is no such bonus offered to res-
ervists, although recent surveys show
only a small percent of enlisted Reserves
reenlist after their first tour of duty. The
low reenlistment rates are reflected by
the latest compilations by the various
reserve and guard units. Reenlistment
rates of all enlisted first termers under
the present 6-year service requirement
are as follows:
[In percent]
val Reserve 15
A y National Guard 13
Aiilational Guard 11
Arn Reserve 8
Air qrce Reserve 4
Marin Corps Reserve
Mr. esident, because the retention
of high- ality enlisted personnel is of
the utmoslj importance, I believe that
unless more definite incentives are pro-
vided the Reserves and National Guard,
the United Sta es may reach a danger-
ously low level of personnel strength
in these two vita elements of our na-
tional defense structure.
This bill would giv6 those qualifying a
$1,000 bonus upon reen tment and $200
at the end of each of th 3 reenlistment
years. The present cost o filling a va-
cancy with a new trainee, 0lk the other
hand, is between $2,400 an $4,000.
Thus, a reenlistment bonus sudh,,as the
one proposed would not only create an
incentive for Reserve reenlistments, but
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S 2966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 21, 1973
also effect significant savings to the, Gov- lands to the National Wilderness Preser-
ernment. %ration System, to amend section 3(b) of
As the United States moves toward a the Wilderness Act, and for other pur-
peacetime armed service, the Nation poses. Referred to the Committee on
must provide more inducements if mill- Interior and Insular Affairs.
tary personnel strength is to be main- Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, for my-
tained at even minimum levels. Passage self and the senior Senator from the
of this bill is important if we are to start State of Arizona (Mr. FANNIN), I intro-
making a career in the armed services duce by request a bj,11 submitted by the
equivalent to a career in the other sectors Secretary of Agriculture to provide for
of our economy, the addition of certain eastern national
Mr. Eresident, I introduce this bill for forest lands to the .National Wilderness.
appropriate reference and ask unani- Preservation System; to amend section
mous consent that it be printed in the 3(b) of the Wilderness Act, and for other
RECORD. purposes.
There being no objection, the bill was Mr. President, earlier this yeaa along
ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as with several of my colleagues, introduced
follows: S. 316, a measure to expand the wilder-
S. 937 ness preservation systemio include more
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of areas in the Eastern United States. I am
Representatives of the United States of pleased that the ariniinistration has sub-
America in Congress assembled, That chap- mitt,ed their bill ,--which I hope will be
ter 5 of title. 37, United States Code, is useful in preSartring many of these areas
amended as follows: for the use laid benefit of the American
(1) By adding the following new item at
people fongt.?ierations to come.
the end of the chapter analysis:
"Si& I ask Special pay: participation in Ready ter fron nfianimous consent that the let-
Reserve." t the Department of Agriculture
accoMpanying this proposed legislation
(2) By adding the following new section
at the end thereof: 1)0-tainted in the RECORD at this point in
my remarks.
"? 313. Special pay: participation in Ready There being no objection, the letter
Reserve
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
"(a) an enlisted member of a Reserve aim- lee follOWS:
ponent who?
"(1) has completed a total of at lelirti two
years of active duty, or a total of .at least
six years of service, in one or more of the
armed services;
"(2) Is accepted for enlistment, reenlist-
ment, or extension of enlist:iv/Sit in a ]Reserve
component, in a pay grade 'above Ea% for a
period of at least three jeers; and
"(3) agrees to remaiff in the Ready Re-
serve for a correspondifig period and to per-
form such drills or, other duty as may be
prescribed:
is entitled to sppeial pay computed under
subsection (b)..'
"(b) The aniunt of special pay to which
a person covered by subsection (a) is entitled
is?
"(1) 41,000 upon reenlistment or extension
of his enlistment;
"(2) $200 upon completing each year un-
der that reenlistment or extension of enlist-
merat of satisfactory participation in the pro-
grain prescribed for his Reserve assignment,
ea' determined by the Secretary concerned.
However, no member is entitled to inceptive
pay for any year of satisfactory perform-
ance that ends after he has completed twenty
years oil service computed under section 1332
of title 10.
"(c) The special pay authorized by this
section is in addition to any other basic pay,
special pay, incentive pay, er allowance to
which the member concerned is entitled. -
"(d) A member who voluntarily, or be-
cause of his misconduct,: does not complete
the first year of service Under his reenlist-
ment ex* extension of .enlistment fat' which
he was paid under subsection (b) (1) shall
refund that percentage of the amodnt that
the unexpired part of that year bears to the
entire year for valich the amount was paid.
"(e) This section 'shall be administered
under regulations prescribed by the Secre-
tary of Defeo* for the uniformed services
under late jurisdiction, and by the Secretary
of the Treasury for the Coast Guard when
the Coast Guard is not operating as a service
in the Navy."
By Mr. JACKSON (for himself
and Mr. FANNIN) (by request):
S. 938. A bill to provide for the! addi-
tion of certain eastern nationak forest mineral leasing laws, and commercial grazing
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DEPARTMENT OF AGR/CULTURE,
Office of the Secretary,
Washington, D.C.
Hon. SPIRO T. AGNEW,
President of the Senate.
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Transmitted here-
with for the consideration of the Congress
Is a draft bill. "To provide for the addition
of certain eastern national forest lands to
the National Wilderness Preservation System,
to amend Section 3(b) of the Wilderness Act,
and for other purposee."
The Department of Agriculture strongly
recommends that the draft legislation be en-
acted by the Congress.
This proposed draft legislation, the East-
ern Wilderness Amendments of 1973, would
provide a means for i;uppIementing the Na-
tional Wilderness Preservation System with-
in National Forests ,east of the one hun-
dredth meridian. It would permit inclusion
in the Wilderness System certain National
Forest lands in the eastern United States
which were once significantly affected by
man's works, but where the imprint of man's
work is :rubstantially erased, and which have
generally reverted to a natural appearance.
The Act would also specifically provide for
the review of fifty-three Hated areas for pos-
sible addition to the SyStem. With respect to
approximately one-fourth of these fifty-three
"study" areas, theaForest Service has com-
pleted many of tale studies and procedures
needed to makaapecilic recommendations on
their suitaballey for inclusion in the Wilder-
ness systef We believe analyses and inter-
agency re ews of these areas should be at
least sr agora to thcise contemplated for
Natio Fairest Primitive Areas by the
Whldeness Act. We expect to complete this
revlaw process soon and will be in a position
to "present further recommendations in the
near future.
! The Act would further provide that all
National Forest System units east of the one
hundredth meridian would be generally
managed in accordance with the provisions
of the Wilderness Act. Notable exceptions
would be that the condemnation limitation
of the Wilderness Act would not apply to
eastern units, all Federal lands within such
units would be withdrawn from appropria-
tion or disposition ander the mining and
would not oe permitted in such units. Al-
though the need for acquisition of private
lands in eastern National Forests results
from fragmented ownerehip patterns, we
intend to use the condemnation authority
sparingly.
In his Februart-8, 1972, message on the
environment, ..resident Nixon highlighted
the unequal! distribution of wilderness units
throughout the Nation The President di-
rected- the Secretaries of Agriculture and
the/Interica to accelerate identification of
areas in the eastern United States having
wilderness potential.
In response to this directive, the Forest
Service has invited public input on several
alternative ways of meeting eastern needs
for areas such as those included in the Na-
tional Wilderness Preservation System. A
series of public listening sessions was held
in 21 eastern states in the summer of 1972,
to discuss the issues raised by these alterna-
tives. This proposed legislation represents
an assessment of the input from those meet-
ings and recommendations to further the
President's directive.
An environmental statement/ as being pre-
pared pursuant to the provisions of subsec-
tion 102(2) (c) .of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (83 Stat. 833), and will be
transmitted as soon as it is available.
A similar letter l's being sent to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
The Office of Management and Budget
advises thaa the submission of this proposed.
legislation 1.s in accord with the program of
the President.
Sincerely,
EARL L. BUTZ,
Secretary of Agetielature.
By 3/Ir. R.D3ICOFF:
S. 942. A. bill to transfer arid reorganize
all existing law-enforcement functions of
the Federal Government related to traf-
ficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs
in a Division of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs established in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation. Referred to the Com-
mittee on Government Operations.
THE FBI SHOULD TAKE OVER ALL FEDERAL DRUG
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I intro-
duce a bill for appropriate reference to
transfer and reorganize the widely scat-
tered Federal law-enforcement programs
related to trafficking in narcotics and
dangerous drugs into a single new di-
vision of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation.
Since 1969, Federal law-enforcement
efforts aimed at curbing the supply of
heroin and other narcotic and dangerous
drugs have mushroomed at a rate rival-
ing the growth of the drug crisis itself.
A sevenfold increase in Federal fund-
ing, from $36 million in 1969 to $257
million proposed in 1974, has served to
Perpetuate, proliferate, and magnify a
disorganized Federal response to the Na-
tion's No. 1 law-enforcement problem.
As difficult as it is to come to grips
with the drug crisis, it is even more dif-
ficult to get an accurate count of the
number of law-enforcement programs
the Federal Government has established
to meet the crisis. A special analysis of
the fiscal 1974 budget related to drug
abuse control, prepared by the Office of
Management and Budget, places the
number at nine. A recent study prepared
by the Library of Congress describes 13
such drug law-enforcement programs.
The number of programs would not be
an issue V. the end result was an efficient,
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February 21, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
well-coordinated, highly effective en-
forcement effort which was succeeding
in eradicating the scourge of heroin and
other deadly and dangerous drugs. How-
ever, the very opposite is the case. No
one has stated the problem more pre-
cisely than President Nixon himself
when, in a related context, he declared:
At present, there are nine federal agen-
cies involvea in one fashion or another with
the problem of drug addiction. In this man-
ner our efforts have been fragmented through
competing priorities, lack of communication,
multiple authority, and limited and dispersed
resources. The magnitude and severity of the
present threat will no longer permit this
piecemeal and bureaucratically dispersed ef-
fort at drug control.
The most disturbing element in the
entire Federal drug law enforcement pic-
ture is the sharp rivalry and often bitter
feuding between the Nation's two major
enforcement agencies?the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the
Justice Department and the narcotics
component of the Customs Bureau in the
Treasury Department, A recent GAO re-
port on the heroin-smuggling problem in
New York City said the problems between
BNDD and Customs "include failing to
share intelligence or other information,
untimely notice of arrest or seizure, lack
of communications, misunderstandings,
and personality conflicts."
The report concluded:
Cooperation and coordination between law
enforcement agencies are vital in the govern-
ment's battle against heroin trafficking. To
the extent that cooperation is not fully real-
ized, the government's effort is impeded. The
mere existence of overlapping jurisdiction is
always a threat to cooperative efforts. Some-
times, as has been the case with these two
agencies, the threat becomes actual.
The GAO findings are supported by a
task force report sponsored by the crim-
inal law section of the American Bar
Association and the Drug Abuse Council.
Reporting that "friction, confusion, and
jealousies" have arisen between BNDD
and Custom agents, the task force con-
cluded:
The long-standing jurisdictional dispute
between BNDD and the Bureau of Customs
has not been settled. Resolution of this prob-
lem is essential to the effective planning and
execution of a joint narcotics investigation
involving these two agencies. Because nu-
merous proclamations and policy statements
have failed to alleviate this problem, other
actions are necessary.
My own investigation of the problem?
which will be further developed and fully
aired during the course of hearings I will
hold as chairman of the Subcommittee on
Reorganization, Research, and Inter-
national Organizations?reveals a situa-
tion which amounts to nothing less,than
a national tragedy.
The rivalry between BNDD and Cus-
toms which, under controlled circum-
stances, might take the form of healthy
competition and better detective work
by each agency, instead has often de-
generated into uncontrolled bitter feud-
ing and the actual sabotaging of each
other's investigations. Major cases, in-
volving millions of dollars in smuggled
heroin and some , of the biggest traf-
fickers, are rife with reports of BNDD
and Customs agents spying on one an-
other, prematurely seizing the other's
evidence, arresting the other's inform-
ants, kidnaping the other's witnesses?
all for the purpose of seeking credit for
the "big bust."
One high BNDD official has estimated
that about 2 dozen major cases a
year?or about 20 percent of the major
narcotics caseload?have been adversely
affected by the BNDD-Customs rivalry,
with some of these cases being blown
altogether.
The problem is perhaps worst in New
York City, the site of some of the largest
heroin convoy cases.
A convoy involves allowing an illicit
drug shipment to pass into the country?
rather than seizing it at the border and
arresting the low-level courier, or
"mule"?in the hope of following the
shipment and arresting the major traf-
ficker for whom it is destined.
The situation has required the per-
sonal intervention of President Nixon,
who, in July 1971, issued detailed guide-
lines to BNDD and Customs agents in the
hope of resolving their jurisdictional
dispute. Basically, the guidelines gave
BNDD primary jurisdiction in both do-
mestic and overseas investigations?even
in convoy cases as they crossed Customs
lines at ports and borders?and required
that jurisdictional disputes be settled by
the Attorney General. But Customs was
still permitted to initiate smuggling in-
vestigations, and with additional Cus-
toms agents stationed abroad under
guidelines issued in July 1972 the juris-
dictional lines have remained blurred.
There is no better evidence of the
depth and bitterness of the BNDD-Cus-
torns rivalry than in the incredible de-
tail and intricacy of the guidelines them-
selves. The document is more reminis-
cent of a cease-fire agreement between
combatants than a working agreement
between supposedly cooperative agencies.
I ask unanimouS consent that the guide-
lines be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
To make matters worse, the feuding
between BNDD and Customs in New
York has spread to the Southern and
Eastern Districts of the U.S. Attorney's
office. I have been informed that As-
sistant Attorney General Henry E. Peter-
son, chief of the criminal division, is cur-
rently investigating the consequences of
an apparent alliance of the southern dis-
trict with BNDD and of the eastern dis-
trict with Customs. Among the incidents
under investigation are arrests of each
other's informants and a possible shoot-
out involving rival undercover agents
who were uninformed of each other's
participation in the same case.
The bill I introduce today?the Fed-
eral Narcotics and Drug Abuse Law En-
fbrcement Reorganization Act of 1973?
seeks to put an end to this dangerous
rivalry, as well as to penetrate the bur-
eaucratic morass that generally plagues
Federal narcotics law enforcement. It
seeks to assure once and for all that Fed-
eral agents and other employees will not
be pushing papers while criminals re-
main free to push drugs.
The bill places total responsibility for
enforcement of the Federal drug laws in
the one agency which, incredibly, has
never exercised drug jurisdiction, but
which surely has the potential to handle
S 2967
it; namely, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
A new Division of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs would be established in the
FBI. The division would be preeminent
among the FBI's other divisions by being
placed under the supervision of an asso-
ciate director and two assistant direct-
ors, rather than under .the supervision
of a single assistant director, as is the
case for the other divisions.
The Associate Director for Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, as his title im-
plies, would be responsible for the full
Spectrum of the drug enforcement prob-
lem?dealing both with trafficking in
narcotics, or such "hard drugs" as heroin
and cocaine, and in dangerous drugs, in-
cluding such "soft drugs" as ampheta-
mines and barbiturates which pose an
increasing problem of abuse, especially
among teenagers.
At present, most Federal enforcement
efforts are aimed at hard drugs. To assure
that soft drugs receive greater enforce-
ment priority, the new division's opera-
tions would be geared to the jurisdictions
assigned to each of the assistant direc-
tors?one with the title of Assistant Di-
rector for Narcotics, the other with the
title of Assistant Director for Dangerous
Drugs.
The new division would be built from
the manpower and other resources of the
narcotics component of the Office of In-
vestigations of the Customs Bureau,
which would be transferred from the
Treasury Department to the Justice De-
partment, and of the BNDD, jurisdiction
over which would be delegated to the FBI
within the Justice Department by the At-
torney General. Customs would retain
its investigations arm for all other forms
of smuggling but drugs. The Attorney
General, in consultation with the FBI
Director, would establish standards and
procedures for the selection of customs
and BNDD agents, all of whom are civil
service appointees, to be brought into the
non-civil service FBI. Transferred agents
would retain their present civil service
status for at least 1 year, and those not
selected for transfer would remain either
in Treasury or Justice in the same civil
service grade for at least 1 year.
The bill provides for other drug en-
forcement operations currently within
Justice to be delegated wholly to the FBI
by the Attorney General?namely, ONNI,
the aforementioned intelligence unit, and
DALE, the Office of Drug Abuse Law En-
forcement, which has used BNDD and
customs agents in a Federal assault
against street-level heroin pushers. Also,
the drug-related functions of LEAA, the
Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration?primarily in the form of block
grants to State and local police for the
establishment of narcotics units?would
be coordinated in Justice by the Attorney
General through the new drug division
of the FBI.
The bill also provides for coordination
by the President, after consultation with
the Attorney General, of all other efforts
related to drug law enforcement wherever
they may be found in the Federal bu-
reaucracy. These include such diverse ef-
forts as the antismuggling operations of
the Border Patrol?in the Immigration
and Naturalization Service of Justice?
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S 2968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 21, 1973
and of the Coast Guard and the Federal
Aviation Administration?each in the
Transpo.7tation Department?the techni-
cal assistance for better narcotics
enforcement provided to foreign govern-
ments by the Agency for International
Development?in the State Depart-
ment?tae tax investigations of major
suspected drug traffickers by the Internal
Revenue Service?in the Treasury De-
partment?and information gathering on
the international narcotics traffic by
military intelligence?in the Defense De-
partment?and by the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
Thus, for the first time all Federal
activities related to combating traffic in
illicit drugs would be subject to basic
policy coordination by a single law en-
forcement agency. To facilitate such co-
ordination, the bill would establ.sh a
Policy Carnmittee on Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs, comprised of the heeds of
all departments and agencies and their
subdivis:.ons which would be subject to
the policy directives in the new inte-
grated Federal Drug Enforcement Sys-
tem. The Attorney General would be
Chairmen of the Committee, and the
Director of the FBI and the Associate
Director for Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs watild be vice chairman and exec-
utive director respectively. The commit-
tee would replace the Cabinet Committee
on International Narcotics Control,
chaired by the Secretary of State.
The Chaos resulting from our present
efforts to enforce the laws against traf-
ficking in narcotics poses a major threat
to our national well-being. The President
has called the drug problem "public
enemy No. 1." I agree. I hope that
he agrees with me that now is the time
to assign responsibility for it to the Na-
tion's No. 1 law enforcement age.acy?
the FBI.
It ip en anchronism for the FBI?the
Nation's most highly esteemed, gener-
ously funded, and most resourceftl law
enforcement agency?not to be engaged
in combating the most widespread and
dangerous crime problem of our day.
Sucha situation represents an imbalance
in our law enforcement priorities and
has resulted in the fragmented, fractious
enforcement of drug laws by other Fed-
eral agencies.
I submit that infusion into the FBI
of the best in manpower and expertise
from BNDD and Customs will result in a
more effective and relevant FBI.
Surely the FBI already has much to
bring to narcotics enforcement. Its ex-
pertise in surveillance and wiretapping,
its superb laboratory and identification
resources, and its vast experience in
combating organized crime, well equip
it to gc after the major internasional
traffickers. One prominent Federal law
enforcement COCIEd has advised me that
about 60 percent of the hard drugs
moved in New York is controlled by or-
ganized crime. It is time that the FBI
be brought into this battle.
It should be noted that FBI Director-
Designae Patrick Gray III, appears to
have inede a first step in this direction.
Last August he initiated a new procedure
whereby FBI agents now specifically de-
brief their informants on drug matters
end pass on such intelligence to BNDD,
Customs, and ONNI agents. Previously,
FBI agents did not actively seek narcot-
ics intelligence from their informants.
Although Mr. Gray has repeatedly as-
serted the FBI's lack of narcotics juris-
diction, he also has expressed a very defi-
nite interest in drug abuse. I hope now
that he has been nominated Director.
subject to Senate confirmation, he will
advocate an active, primary role for the
FBI in this field. Surely, his views on
drug enforcement should be a matter of
interest and concern to the Senate.
My remarks are not intended to de-
mean the often heroic efforts of BNDD
and Customs agents in their fight to
bring major traffickers to justice. They
have had some enormous successes, as
the convictions in recent major cases at-
test. But their competitiveness and esprit
de corps often prove counterproductive,
even in these major cases, which could
have been even more successful in terms
ef traffickers arrested and drugs seized,
had the BNDD and Customs agents
worked harmoniously. My bill would offer
them the opportunity to make peace be-
tween themselves and to broaden the war
effort against traffickers.
The hearings I plan on this bill will
carefully explore the need to reorganize
etug law enforcement, and I am confi-
dent that the subcommittee and the par-
ent Committee on Government Opera-
tions will produce a reorganization bill
that will not only serve the best interests
of all agencies but of the American peo-
ple as well.
I ask unanimous consent that the fol-
lowing materials be printed in the REC-
ORD at the conclusion of my remarks: an
article from the June 1972 issue of Wash-
ington Monthly magazine describing en-
forcement problems stemming from the
BNDD-Customs rivalry; an article from
the January 3, 1973 issue of New Yorker
magazine describing the role of organized
crime in the New York narcotics traffic;
the Presidential directive and guidelines
of July 2, 1971 which sought to end the
BNDD-Customs dispute; followup guide-
lines issued in the form of a State De-
partment; telegram to numerous missions
on July 26, 1972; excerpts from Special
Budget Analysis R of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget describing Federal
law enforcement programs, and excerpts
from a Library of Congress survey of
Federal drug abuse programs dealing
with drug law enforcement programs,
I ask unanimous consent that the text
of the bill be printed at this point in the
RECORD.
There being no objection, the bill and
material were ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
S. 942
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, that this
Act may be cited as the "Federal Narcotics
and Drug Abuse Law .Enforcement Reorga-
nization Act of 1973." .
DEF/NTIIONS
Sec. 2. (a) As used :sa this Act:
(1) The term "narcotics and dangerous
drugs" means controlled substances as de-
lined in Sections 101, 201 and 202 of the
Controlled Substances Act. ?
(2) The term "function" means power and
duty; transfer of a function, under any pro-
vision of law, of an agency or the head of
a departmer.t shall also be a transfer of
all functions under such law which are exer-
cised by any office or officer of such agency
or department.
FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY
Sec. S. (a) The Congre:ss hereby finds and
declares?
(1) that the proliferation of narcotics and
dangerous drugs is the Nation's number one
law enforcement problem;
(2) that the enforcement of laws related
to narcotics and drug abuse is scattered
widely throughout several Federal depart-
ments and agencies;
(3) that overlapping jurisdictions, failure
to share intelligence and other information,
general lack of communication and coopera-
tion, and counterproductive rivalries and
competitiveness among law enforcement
agencies have resulted from this diffusion
of efforts within the Federal government
against trafficking in narcotics and dangerous
drugs;
(4) that many Americans are needlessly
subjected to narcotics addiction, drug abuse
and to drug-related crimes because of the
breakdown in coordination among Federal
law enforcement agencies;
(5) that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion is the preeminent Federal law enforce-
ment agency as a result of its extensive man-
power, laboratory, intelligence and investiga-
tive resources, and because of the high
esteem in which it is held by many Ameri-
cans for its efforts against organized crime,
internal sub version and other criminal as-
saults against the Nation;
(6) that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion has never exercised jurisdiction in the
area of narcotics and drug abuse law en-
forcement;
(7) that effective narco ides and drug abuse
law enforcement requires establishment of
a new division of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation with jurisdiction to integrate
enforcement of all Federal narcotics and
drug abuse laws which is now exercised by
other agencies, and to issue policy directives
governing the continued law enforcement
functions of certain agencies as provided in
this Reorganization Act., related to narcotics
and dangerous drugs;
(8) that the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, through the new division established In
this Reorgarization Act, integrate the best
of the manpower and expertise that has been
developed by other federal agencies In build-
ing its own capability to deal effectively with
all aspects of the narcotics and drug enforce-
ment problem, including combatting inter-
national and domestic trafficking, improving
the quality of state and local enforcement of
narcotics ar.d dangerous drug laws, and
eradicating narcotics and drug-related cor-
ruption at all enforcement levels.
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM TREASURY
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 4. (a) There are hereby transferred
to the Attorney General?
(1) All functions of the Secretary of the
Treasury wh:ch are administered through or
with respect to the Bureau of Customs (also
hereinafter referred to as the "Customs Serv-
ice") and which involve investigations by its
Office of Investigation (Reorganization Plan
Number 1 of 1965; 30 Fed. Reg. 7035) leading
to seizures and arrests for violations of any
Federal law of the United States relating to
trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs.
(2) all other functions of the Customs
Service and the Commissioner of Customs
determined by the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to be directly re-
lated to funotions transferred by paragraph
(1) of this section. Nothing in this section
shall be construed (A) to preclude the Cus-
toms Service from conducting investigations,
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February. 21, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
making seizures and arrests related to smug-
gling of contraband other than narcotics and
dangerous drugs (B) to make seizures and
arrests based on chance discovery of narcotics
and a dangerous drugs during actual passage
as undeclared merchandise or contraband,
through customs lines, or (C) to make seiz-
ures and arrests related to narcotics and
dangerous drugs at the direction of the
Attorney General as provided in section 5(b)
of this Reorganization Act.
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM
STATE DEPARTMENT
SEC. 5. (a) There is hereby transferred to
the Attorney General all functions of the
Secretary of State which are administered
through or with respect to the Cabinet Com-
mittee on International Narcotics Control.
(b) There are hereby transferred to the
Department of Justice all of the positions,
personnel, property, records and other funds,
available or to be made available, of the
Cabinet Committee on International Nar-
cotics Control.
(c) the Attorney General shall make such
provisions as he may deem necessary with
respect to terminating the affairs of the
Cabinet Committee on International Narcot-
ics Control not otherwise provided for in
this Reorganization Act.
(d) the Cabinet Committee on Interna-
tional Narcotics Control is hereby abolished
and replaced by the Policy Committee on
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, as provided
in section 13 of this Reorganization Act.
DIVISION' OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROLTS DRUGS
SEC. 6. (a) There is established in the
Department of Justice a new division of the
Federal Bureau of Investtgation which shall
be known as the Division of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (hereinafter referred to as
the "Division").
(b) All function S transferred to the At-
torney General pursuant to the Act shall be
delegated to the Director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. All functions delegated
to the Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation by the Attorney General pursuant
to the Act shall be administered through the
Division.
(c) The Division shall be headed by an
Associate Director for Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation who shall be appointed by the At-
torney General. In addition to the functions
authorized in this Reorganization Act the
Associate Director of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs shall perform such other duties as
the Attorney General shall delegate.
(d) There are hereby established in the
Division, in addition to the position estab-
lished in subsection (c) of this section, two
new positions of Assistant Director for Nar-
cotics and Assistant Director for Dangerous
Drugs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
appointments to which shall be made by the
Attorney General. Each Assistant Director
shall perform such functions as the Attorney
General shall delegate.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITHIN THE
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
SEC. 7. (a) The Attorney General shall dele-
gate authority over functions performed by
the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
under Reorganization Plan Number 1 of 1968
to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(b) The Attorney General shall delegate
authority over functions performed by the
Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement under
Executive Order 11641 of 1972 (FR Doc. 72-
1525) to the Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
(c) The Attorney General shall delegate
authority over functions performed by the
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence un-
der Executive Order 11676 of 1972 (FR Doc.
72,-11930) to the Director of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation.
(d) The Attorney General shall assign to
the Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation the positions, personnel, prop-
erty, records, and unexpended balances of
appropriations, allocations and other funds,
available or be made available, under terms
and conditions that the Attorney General
shall designate, (1) of the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs, (2) of the Office of
Drug Abuse Law Enforcement and (3) of the
Office for National Narcotics Intelligence.
(e) The Bureau of Narcotics and Danger-
ous Drugs, the Office of Drug Abuse Law
Enforcement, and the Office of National Nar-
cotics Intelligence, including the Offices of
Directors of each of these agencies, are hereby
abolished. The Attorney General shall make
such provision as he may deem necessary
with respect to terminating the affairs of
these agencies not otherwise provided for in
the Act.
(f) The Attorney General shall delegate to
the Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation authority over functions per-
formed by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service, including functions performed
by the Border Patrol, related to-trafficking in
narcotics and dangerous drugs across the
borders of the United States at places other
than ports of entry. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service, including the Border
Patrol, shall perform functions related to en-
forcement of any law of the United States
pertaining to narcotics and dangerous drugs
consistent with policy directives that shall be
issued from time to time by the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation:
(g) The Attorney General shall delegate to
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation authority over functions performed
by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration related to the awarding of block
grants for the planning, establishment and
operation of narcotics and dangerous drug
enforcement units at the state and local
levels, pursuant to Parts B and C of Title I
of the Omnibus Crime Control and safe
Streets Act of 1968 (PL 92-351; 82 Stat. 197).
The Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration shall perform such functions consist-
ent with policy directives that shall be issued
from time to time by the Attorney General
after consultation with the Director of the
Federal Bureau Of Investigation.
(h) The Attorney General shall promul-
gate regulations for the purpose of delegat-
ing authority not otherwise provided in this
section but necessary for achieving the ob-
jectives of this Reorganization Act.
POLICY DIRECTIVES TO THE TRANSPORTATION
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 8. The President, after consultation
with the Attorney General, shall direct the
Secretary of Transportation with respect to
the following functions related to trafficking
In narcotics and dangerous drugs.
(1) Operations of the Coast Guard in the
enforcement of any law of the United States
relating to trafficking in narcotics and dan-
gerous drugs.
(2) Operations of the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration in the enforcement of any law
of the United States relating to trafficking
in narcotics and dangerous drugs.
POLICY DIRECTIVES TO THE STATE
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 9. (a) The President, after consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, shall di-
rect the Secretary of State with respect to
the following functions related to traffick-
ing in narcotics and dangerous drugs.
(1) Operations of the Agency for Inter-
national Development in supplying economic
and technical assistance to foreign govern-
ments for development of narcotics control
programs.
(2) Relations generally with foreign gov-
ernments for the purpose of coordinating
S 2969
POLICY DIRECTIVES TO THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 10. (a) The President, of consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, shall direct
the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency with respect to all of the Director's
functions related to trafficking in narcotics
and dangerous drugs.
POLICY DIRECTIVES TO THE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE
? SEC. 11. (a) The President, after consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, shall direct
the Secretary of Defense with respect tO all
of the Secretary's functions related to traf-
ficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs.
POLICY DIRECTIVES TO THE TREASURY
DEPARTMENT
SEC. 12. (a) The President, after consulta-
tion with the Attorney General, shall direct
the Secretary of the Treasury with respect
to functions administered through or with
respect to the Internal Revenue Service that
relate to the trafficking in narcotics and
dangerous drugs.
POLICY COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRUGS
SEC. 13. (a) There is established a Policy
Committee on Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs.
(b) The Attorney General shall be Chair-
man of the Committee. The Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be
Vice Chairman of the Committe. The Asso-
ciate Director for Narcotics and Drug Abuse
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
be Executive Director of the Committee.
(c) Members of the Committee shall be
appointed by the President from all depart-
ments and agencies and their subdivisions,
which, under the provisions of this Reorga-
nization Act, have functions related to traf-
ficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs and
of such other departments and agencies, and
their subdivisions, as the President, after
consultation with the Attorney General, may
subsequently designate.
(d) The Committee shall meet from time
to time to expedite and coordinate the policy
directives issued by the President after con-
sultation with the Attorney General.
TRANSFER MATTERS
SEC. 14.(a). The Attorney General, in con-
sultation with the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, shall establish
standards and procedures for the selection of
personnel of the Bureau of Customs in the
Treasury Department and of the Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Justice
Department to be transferred to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in accordance with
the provisions of this section. Criteria for
such standards and procedures shall reflect
consideration of each employee's record in
meeting the responsibilities of, and possess-
ing the skills for, effective investigation re-
lated to trafficking of narcotics and danger-
ous drugs. All personnel selected for trans-
fer shall be without reduction in classifica-
tion or compensation for one year after such
transfer, except that the Attorney General
shall have full authority to assign personnel
during such one year period in order to effi-
ciently carry out functions transferred under
this Reorganization Act. After such one-year
period the Attorney General, in consulta-
tion with the Director, shall establish ap-
propriate status for all transferred personnel
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(b) All orders, determinations, rules, regu-
lations, permits, contracts, certificates, li-
censes, and privileges?
(1) which have been issued, made, grant-
ed, or allowed to become effective in the
exercise of functions which are transferred
under this Act by the Treasury Department
and the State Department any functions of
which are transferred by this Act- and (2)
control of international narcotics traffic, which are in effect at the time this Act
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S 2970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 21, 1973
takes effect, shall continue in effect accord-
ing to their terms until modified, terminated.
superseded, set aside, or repealed by the Jus-
tice Department, by any court of competent
jurisdiction, or by operation of taw.
(c) The provisions of this Act shall not
affect any proceedings pending at the time
this Act takes effect before any department
or agency, functions of which are trans-
ferred by this Act; except that such proceed-
ings, to the extent that they relate to func-
tions so transferred, shall be continued before
the Justice Department. Orders shall be is-
sued in such proceedings, appeals shall be
takemtherefrom, and payments shall be made
pursuant to such orders, as if this Act had
not be enacted; and orders issued in any such
proceedings shall continue in effect until
modified, terminated, superseded, or repealed
by the Justice Department by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction, or by operation of law,
(d) The provisions of this Act shall not
affect suits commenced prior to the date this
Act takes effect and in an such suits proceed-
ings shall be had, appeals taken, and judge-
ments rendered, in the same manner and
effect as if this Act had not been enacted;
except that if before the date on which this
Act takes effect, any department or agency
(or officer thereof in his official capacity) is
a party to a suit involving funct:ons trans-
ferred to the Justice Department, then such
suit shall be continued by the Justice De-
partment. No cause of action, and no suit,
action, or other proceeding, by or against
the Treasury Department and the State De-
partment (or officer thereof in his official
capacity) functions of which are transferred
by this Act shall abate by reason of the en-
actment of this Act. Causes of actions, suits,
actions, or other proceedings may be asserted
by or against the United States or the Justice
Department as may be appropriate and,, in
any litigation pending when this Act takes
effect, the Court may at-any time, on its own
motion or that of any party, enter an order
which will give effect to the provisions of this
paragraph.
(e) Such further measures and dispositions
as the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget shall deem to be necessary in
order to effectuate the transfers provided In
this section shall be carried out in such
manner as he may direct and by such agen-
cies as he shall designate.
[From the Washington Monthly, June 19721
THE AMERICAN CONNECTION
(By John Rothchild and Tom Ricketts)
No matter how well organized they are,
we will be better organized.?President Lyn-
don Johnson, on creating the Bureau. of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
The government has made a certain kind
of progress in fighting the drug traffic. There
was a time when the dope smuggler, making
the deal with Frog One, had to worry that
a narc might be watching. Now, the smug-
gler has to consider that a whole trail of
narcs?from the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), the Bureau of
Customs, the new Special Office of Drug
Abuse Law Enforcement, the city police, and
the state police-gmay be strung out behind
him, all with steely eyes, shouleer holsters,
and ham sandwiches, all ready to move in
for the bust.
The dope smuggler might get scared at
the prospect of so many agencies watching
him, except for one detail. It Is more likely
that Nare One has an eye on Nave Two, who
in turn is tailing Narc Three, and so on down
the line. While the match of wits between
the law and the drug trafficker is interest-
ing, it is the jostling between the various
government agencies along the trail which
demands even more cunning, daring, and
attention from the aggressive narc. It would
be easy enough for a Customs agent to fol-
low a car of junkies to a bust, except when
he considers that at any corner an unmarked
BNDD car might squeeze in between him and
the seizure, or if 'he realizes that those
junkies themselves might be undercover
agents, believing him to be the junkie and
enticing him into a trap. Such are the perils
of the .American connect ion.
Why do so many agencies follow the same
drug dealers? In the genius of a multi-
agency approach, each has its own reason.
The treasury men from the old Bureau of
Narcotics used to be there because drugs
were a tax problem, while the pill people
from the Food and Drug Administration
were on the street because drugs were a
medical problem. President Johnson abol-
ished these agencies in 1968 and established
BNDD, in the Justice Department, with jur-
isdiction over all drug trafficking, because
drugs are primarily a law-enforcement prob-
lem. Customs agents from Treasury, mean-
while, continue to search out dope because
of their special mandate to attack the drug
smuggling problem. The enforcers, therefore,
have divided their territory through the dic-
tionary, while the underworld defined its
turf with a map.
This means that only one junkie will be
there to pick up the drugs, but several en-
forcers may arrive to pick up the junkie.
Such a spectacle can be a show of force, in
keeping with President Nixon's declaration
that drugs are public enemy number one.
It also increases the government's chance of
stumbling onto something. Finally, the
heroin dealer might wonder if he is actually
a smuggler, potential prey for Customs?or
a trafficker, grist for the BNDD. Customs and
BNDD are wondering, too.
NARC, NARC, WHO'S THERE?
Consider a case still in the works. The
ENDD, through its continental network of
agents, has enough evidence to convict a
major dealer in France and prepares to swoop
in. The Bureau of Customs, through one of
its couriers, has developed an equally strong
case against the same person. Both are fever-
ishly clawing toward him like two lovers on
a single strand of spaghetti. A U.S. District
Attorney agrees to prosecute both cases, but
the BNDD refuses to cooperate unless its in-
dictment is heard first. Meanwhile, the heroin
smuggler dropt; out of sight, and nobody
can find him.
In another case, BNDD has been struggling
for years to gather enough evidence to bust
a major trafficker in a large city. They finally
get to his bank account and trace an entire
network of buyers and sellers through the
withdrawals and deposits. The central traf-
ficker, however, continues to elude the BNDD.
Then one day he shows up in a Customs line,
coming into the country with heroin packed
in picture frames. After all of BNDD's work,
some Customs luggage-shaker gets the guy
by pure accident. Customs is anxious to put
its man together with BNDD's bank ac-
counts, but BNDD refuses. Each side takes
its piece of the evidence and goes home.
John Ingersoll, head of the BNDD, explains
euch common squabbles between two agen-
cies dedicated to the same objective: "In
many things, there are differences of opinion,
but that does not impede our cooperation."
Cooperation, however, is not something that
federal drug agencies throw around loosely.
Nobody can be trusted in this drug mirage,
least of all another agency. Go down to any
border, where Customs, the nation's first line
of defense against smugglers, is watching out
from behind those reflector sunglasses. Cus-
toms men are not supposed to divert their
gaze. They are not going to show easy favor-
Aism by taking their eyes off some drugs just
because another federal agency, the BNDD,
:aappens to want to bring them in.
Such BNDD requests usually involve con-
voy cases. A convoy takes place when an
agency knows a drug shipment is coming into
the country, but decides to let it pass un-
hindered through the border so that import-
ant buyers or dealers can be arrested farther
up the line. Usually, only the lowly couriers,
or mules, show up with the stuff at the
border.
The danger in every BNDD convoy, as
BNDD sees it, is that at some point the
convoy must unavoidably permeate a border
and enter the fiefdom of Customs. The BNDD
worries about this, much as a heroin traf-
ficker sweats a little when his carload has
to drive through a rival's territory. Customs
doesn't deliberately try to be nasty, but its
agents know that sometimes it is prudent to
haul in the drugs while they are within their
grasp, rather than risk a later screw-up due
to another agency's mistakes. BNDD, in con-
trast, says the reason Customs likes to stop
convoys at the border is that the only way
Customs ever finds any heroin is to hear in
advance from BNDD that a batch is coming
through. The urge to see heroin makes Cus-
toms itchy at the border when the trafficker
passes by with a gloating BNDD agent fol-
lowing' behind.
But while Customs may miss most of the
illegal heroin that pours by under its nose,
Customs has little trouble uncovering and
busting BNDD Convoys, even without prior
information. Within the last year, for ex-
ample, BNDD tried to sneak a boatload of
marijuana into the port of Miami. BNDD
failed to notify Customs of this convoy, but
Customs found out about it anyway, seized
the BNDD vessel, and promptly impounded
it.
EITST/NG JOSE GARCIA
Since the IINDD has trouble actually slip-
ping its convoys through Customs' border,
the option of cooperating with the agencies
could never reach agreement on how such
cooperation might actually work, the Pres-
ident's Advisory Council on Executive Or-
ganization came up with some proposals
which were adopted by President Nixon in
June, 1970, ratified by the directors of both
agencies, and printed in the agent's man-
ual. The BNDD agent can find on page three
of his manual that "smuggling violations not
terminated ae ports and borders come within
the jurisdiction of BNDD unless such juris-
diction is waived," while the Customs parti-
san discovers on page six of the same manual
that "smuggling investigations not termi-
nated at ports and borders . . . are con-
sidered potential joint investigations. In-
vestigative direction of such cases . . . will
remain with the initiating agency." These
guidelines are not understood by the under-
world, who wonder why the two agencies
don't go to the mattresses and clear things
up once and :for all.
A source high in the BNDD recently de-
scribed for Congressman John Murphy of
New York (who has introduced a bill to
eliminate the American connection by mak-
ing the BNDD the sole drug cop) how Cus-
toms weighs the relative strength of these
two mandates and decides whether to au-
thorize the convoy, or bust at the border
and hit first with a press release.
Murphy: 'Did you tell me that BNDD
would rather let a hundred pounds through
thedemake the seizures.......
BNDD: "Customs doesn't prefer to make
the seizures at the border as a general rule
unless it's our case. And then they always
prefer to made the case at the border."
Murphy: "You're saying it depends on
who's in charge. . . . If it is their case they
let it go through. . . ."
BNDD: "They want to follow their things
through without cutting us in on it except
to notify us that they are bringing a con-
vey through. . . . Let's take this example.
Our undercover agent in Chicago has been
introduced to a drug trafficker by one of our
informers and it turns out this drug traf-
ficker happens to be an informer of the Bu-
reau of Customs who's up in Chicago solicit-
ing purchasers. So he makes a deal for the
drugs to come in and Customs convoys the
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damn stuff through from Mexico up to Chi-
cago and there is a possibility that they
may be delivering it to one of our under-
cover agents. To reduce that possibility they
have agreed to tell us every time a convoy
is coming through. But there is great diffi-
culty for us to join up with that convoy,
and they will not allow us to assume inves-
tigative jurisdiction in the case because they
call it a smuggling violation and they do
not want to bust that on the border because
they say they are getting no one except Jose
Jesus Garcia and the one they really want
to get is the trafficker in Chicago. But when
it is one of our cases they want to bust the
damn thing at the border and get Jose Jesus
Garcia."
BNDD is sometimes not pleased to see its
convoy bounce off Customs and land on
Jose Garcia, the proverbial mule. Convoys
take months to develop and often involve
risks to agents and informers, plus thou-
sands of dollars to pay people off and buy
the drugs. Garcia by himself they can live
with?a lot of cases never, get beyond the
mules. But the bust at the border also puts
Garcia on Customs' side of the counter?
one more Customs arrest, a little more heroin
sprinkled on their yearly pile, a little more
ink on ther seizure charts. BNDD is res-
cued from having to accept this indignity
by its overseas agents. Customs may hold
court over the border pores of the nation,
but BNDD has control over the rest of the
world, where it can make arrests in con-
junction with foreign police. If Customs is
waiting to get Jose Ciarica at the border;
BNDD can outflank them by busting Pierre
Garcia before the case ever leaves France.
BNDD calls this "going to the source" of
the drug traffic.
In the LaBay case, for instance, a French
businessman was arrested in Paris last
October with 233 pounds of heroin stuffed
into five suitcases and hidden in his car.
Customs got wind of the case, and sug-
gested that BNDD convoy the car over to
New York, where the pick-up person could
be hit or traced back to the higher-ups.
BNDD and the French police, however, de-
cided the car was not up to the long trip.
A few months earlier, Customs was looking
out over the Mexican border, waiting for a
heroin shipment. Customs planned to follow
the junk to some major distributors on the
American side. They kept watch, nothing was
moving, and the agents began to get restless.
Maybe the smugglers were tipped off, or may-
be the buyers couldn't raise the money. While
Customs was wondering, BNDD moved in
with Mexican police to scuttle the convoy
and jail the mules somewhere south of the
border. A few more miles and the smug-
glers would have been in Customs territory.
When you add up all these differences of
opinion between Customs and BNDD which
have jeopardized, in the estimate of a high
BNDD offlical, at least 20 per cent of all fed-
eral drug cases, you are tempted to make the
quick judgment that the agencies cut off
each other more than they cut off drugs.
However, before you blame an agency for
not cooperating, it is only fair to ask what
the agency has to go through when it actually
tries to cooperate on a collective bust, as pre-
scribed in the various guidelines and memo-
randa of understanding. One example of such
an effort is the Jaguar case, where both Cus-
toms' director Myles Ambrose and BNDD's
John Ingersoll co-announced the seizure of
200 pounds of heroin and the arrest of five
persons in New York last September?the
second largest seizure in the city's history.
SNTTCHING THE FLOUR
Before the beige jaguar, loaded with
heroin, was ever permitted to be convoyed
from France on the Queen Elizabeth II, the
case was in the solid grip of the BNDD. They
had found the informant, paid him $50,000,
set up the shipment, and discovered where
the stuff was hidden in the car. BNDD was
ready to bring the Jaguar to New York,
secretly confiscate the heroin and replace it
with white flour or milk sugar, and follow
the car to the buyers.
Customs had no particular quibble with
this plan, except for one detail. It was clear
to them that the principals in the Jaguar
case were acting much more like smugglers
than like traffickers, and that called for Cus-
toms' special expertise. They would be more
than glad to exempt the car from border
seizure provided that they could take out
the herion and substitute Customs flour.
While the French were loading the heroin
into the Jaguar with comparative ease, the
dispute over whose flour would replace it
began slowly rising to the top of both agen-
cies. According to one source, the final flour
decision went beyond Ambrose and Ingersoll
and "got as high as Kleinclienst." (Under the
guidelines, the Attorney General's office is
the final arbiter. Customs views this ar-
rangement as unfortunate, since BNDD is in
the Justice Department.) Sure enough, BNDD
flour prevailed, and that agency would be in
charge of all arrangements, although the
names of both agencies would be attached to
the case and it would be announced to the
public as reflecting on the cooperative spirit
of both bureaus.
To a Customs agent down at the port,
however, Kleicichenst is one thing and heroin
is another. Customs has seen the Klein-
diensts come and go, but it has not seen all
that much heroin, having picked up, for
instance, just 346 pounds in the year preced-
ing Jaguar?while tons were flowing over,
'under, and across its borders. An agent wants
to respect the wishes of the Advisory Com-
mission and Reorganization Plan Number
One, which created BNDD, but not when 200
pounds of smack is sitting in a car right in
front of him, separated from his grasp by a
memorandum. It was too much for the Cus-
toms agent to bear. He tapped into the
Jaguar and pulled out just one small packet,
just to get the feel, and to prove to BNDD
that Customs knew how to find the stuff.
(BNDD could otherwise have Chided Customs
for not being able to uncover the cache even
though BNDD told them in advance where it
was.) A Customs agent made this token
snitch before BNDD could make the big flour
exchange.
The token snitch would eventually pro-
vide an opportunity to jeopardize the Jaguar
case once It came to trial, but before that, at
least one other agency would have its chance
to complicate matters. This time, it was the
U.S. Army. Based on prior agreement, BNDD
and the Army had installed a homing device
into the electrical system of the Jaguar so it
could be tailed by Army helicopters. The plan
was abandoned at the last minute when
somebody pointed out that Americans get
nervous seeing Army helicopters over the
highways. The homing unit was removed and
the flour substitution effected while the car
was stored at a New York garage awaiting its
pick-up by hopefully unsuspecting couriers.
When the couriers arrived and drove the
Jaguar out of the garage, a long procession of
narcs fell in line. Unfortunately, the elec-
trical system of the Jaguar, still recovering
from the homing surgery, fizzled, leaving the
Jaguar stalled and the narcs strung out be-
hind like a funeral procession when the
hearse has a blow-out.
The lead narc, wearing long hair and carry-
ing a purse so as not to arouse suspicion,
walked up to the stalled Jaguar and asked if
the occupants needed any help. Could it be
the wiring? The couriers, unaware of where
the stuff was stored, and worried that the
loosening of any bolt might result in a flood
of heroin, turned down the road service. The
narcs had to make the bust right there.
Meanwhile, somewhere in the city, the buyers
went home empty-handed, not knowing that
they were saved by BNDD electricians from
being arrested while receiving BNDD flour.
While the big boys were slipping through
the faulty wiring, Customs, rarely outdone
by the BNDD, gave the arrested couriers a
potential free ticket out of court on the token
heroin snitch. At the trial, the heroin packet
found its way into the arguments of defense
lawyers, who dug up an obscure legal preced-
ent under which only one border search is
permitted. They argued that the Customs
agent's revenge constituted that single
search, thus invalidating the entire flour ex-
change as evidence. The judge ruled against
them and the traffickers were convicted.
Usually, this Kilroy-Was-Here urge of
Customs agents doesn't jeopardize cases, but
it does keep the BNDD on its toes. Recently,
for instance, a BNDD undercover operative in
a major city had talked his way into the con-
fidence of some buyers and was preparing to
sell them a little convoyed heroiri. The BNDD
man stood by sheepishly while the traffickers
opened the packets, only to find that a Cus-
toms agent on the border had autographed
the shipment and put a date on it. The
BNDD's clandestine network suffered a set-
back, but the traffickers would at least realize
that you can't fool Customs.
ARRESTING YOURSELF
This jealousy developed over convoy oases
and the fruscration over successful coopera-
tive joint ventures like Jaguar would be
greater if the agencies did not do so much
of their work under cover. Much of the
time, an agent who might get mad at a rival
agent encroaching on his territory either
doesn't know that the other person is an
agent or that he is pursuing the same case.
If a Customs informant, for example, knew
that he had just sold dope to an undercover
BNDD man, he might harbor resentment.
Luckily, much of the time he doesn't know.
Every solution in one place creates prob-
lems in another, of course, and this ignor-
ance lessens direct conflict only, at a high
cost in confusion. Because there are often
four agencies working under cover, an agent
has to try to guess whether the person he
Is tracking down is really a junkie, a police
pigeon, an informant for another agency,
or a combination of all three. During an
episode in New York, a police informant led
some narcs to a buy, and they waited in the
shadows to make the arrest. The seller, how-
ever, happened to be working for another
agency. He was there to sell flour and he
didn't know his client was the police
department.
BNDD and Customs are particularly sus-
ceptible to this confusion because the former
likes to bust large purchasers, the big boys,
and uses its undercover operatives to sell
narcotics. Customs, on the other hand,
specializes in nabbing the sellers, and uses
its undercOver men to buy narcotics. It is
possible that the federal government has
actually sold dope to itself. The same govern-
ment has, on occasion, tried to arrest itself.
The most recent example occurred at a
warehouse on the West coast, according to
a BNDD source. BNDD has the place under
surveillance and comes in with guns drawn
to nab some heroin dealers with the goods.
Customs is watching the same warehouse
and thinks that those men with guns are
a rival drug faction trying to heist the drugs.
A scene is narrowly averted in whieh the
incredulous heroin dealers walk out of the
trap after watching two federal agencies gun
each other down.
One wonders what all these interagency
blitzes have to do with the drug traffic. Such
an approach, however, inhibits understand-
ing. In 50 years of creative organization, the
narcotics agencies have had about as much
luck stopping heroin as the Prohibition peo-
ple had in drying up the country. The Amer-
ican connection tussles over seizures which
in the best years represent perhaps 10 per
cent of the heroin traffic, a 10 per cent that
is probably replaced into the system. The
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S 2972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 21, 1973
addicts are well enough supplied. For them,
the difference between legal and illegal hero-
in Is the price. For the public, the difference
is between the cost of maintaining clinics
for legal. dope and the cost of all the crime
generated to buy illegal dope, plus the cost
of the neves who fail to deter it.
To the federal agency, however, there is
a difference between actually stopping the
drug traffic and preserving the potential to
stop the drug traffic. This is why the agencies,
for all their apparent confusion, have the
ultimate advantage over the heroin pusher
and dealer. The heroin dealer must actually
deliver the goods or else go out of business.
The federal agent, on the other hand, has
already demonstrated his ability to survive
even if he is not actually sopping up the
drug flow. As a matter of fact, the more drugs
that come in, the more agencies that are
created to stop them?the more the traffic
is rerouted, the more the agencies are re-
organized. These bureaus are smart enough
not to become dependent on the product
itself. They are dependent on statistics. Even
when there are no drugs, there will be drug
statistics,
Numbers in hand, any federal agency has
two roads to survival. It can attach itself
to an insoluble problem, such as poverty,
racism, or war. Thus, the agency becomes
immortal on the grounds of potentiality. Or
it can take the gradual-improvement ap-
proach, basing its existence on the fact that
some condition was much worse before, is
better now, and will be still better in the
future. The latter approach has ultimate
disadvantages, as we see in the old Bureau
of Narcotics, the BNDD's predecessor.
TURNING ON THE SKI JUMP
The Bureau of Narcotics, under Harry J.
Anslinger, took the gradual-improvement
road when it began sliding down the ski-
jump curve in 1930. The ski-jump curve, ex-
plained Alfred Lindesmith in his book, The
Addict and the Law, was a depleps method
of counting the number of licitlits in the
U.S., based on the notion that there was a
peak somewhere between 250,000 and 2.5
million addicts between the turn of the cen-
tury and World War I. By showing a slow
downfall in this number from 1930 forward,
the Bureau of Narcotics could continue to
prove its indispensability to the public and
to each successive Congress.
The ski jump was based on local and state
police reports to the Bureau of Narcotics on
how many addicts they had identified during
a given year. Most years the Bureau said
there were thousands of new addicts, but that
the total number continued to decline. For
this to happen, as Lindesrnith says, thou-
sands of addicts must have been miraculously
recovering from their habit every year, a fact
not supported by the Bureau's theories on
the perils of addiction. (The Bureau had al-
ways been good with numbers. A declining
drug-arrest rate meant that addiction was
on the wane, while an increasing arrest rate
meant the Bureau was curbing addiction by
catching more dealers.)
Even (luring its prosperous years, however,
the Bureau had not looked as healthy on the
ski-jump curve as other agencies who took
the dismal or insoluble crisis approach.
There is always more money, and therefore
security, in working against bad housing,
which is always around, than against the
Mediterranean fruit fly, which may not be.
The Bureau of Narcotics always got praise,
but almost never got budget increases, or new
offices. It also had to prepare for the day
when the curve would level out or fall to
zero, thus dumping the entire agency out-
-
on its tail.
The successor agenCy to the Bureau of
Narcotics, the BNDD, was rescued from this
dilemma by the hippies and by the nar-
cotics epidemic of 1968. The ski-jump curve
was promptly buried in an avalanche of ad-
diets. Nobody knew just how many addicts,
but there were a lot more than the old
Bureau had estimated. John Ingersoll, di-
rector of the BNDD, began saying 100,000
(this figure, of course, did not reflect on the
policies of his fledgling agency). Myles Am-
brose, head of Custc-nas, was saying some-
times 250,000, sometemes 300,000 addicts.
One congressman coimplained about a "stag-
gering" 62.000. Recently, the BNDD put all
speculation to rest with a new reporting
system based not only police reports, but on
interviews with addicts. Matching the ac-
curacy of its predecessors, BNDD has dis-
covered that there are now .559,224 addicts
In the United States.
This number made It heed to continue to
fall back on the gradual-improvement the-
ory, so both Customs and BNDD quickly
embraced the insoluble problem alternative,
which turned the ski jump upside down.
Instead of slowly slitting toward perfection,
the agencies were all of a sudden blocking
the nation's slide into drug oblivion. Eu-
gene Rossides, an official at Customs, de-
scribed the dynamics of the new effort:
"In my judgment President Nixon's war
on drug abuse is succeeding. He has arrested
the United States' incredible downward
slide into drug abuse [we have done a lot]
. .. but let the-re be ne false optimism [don't
expect too much]. We have a long :and
steep climb ahead of us just to return to
the level from which we fell [we are in a
crisis]. It will require the active participa-
tion of all of us [mere money]. However, I
am confident that the challenge will be met.
[The money will be worth it.]"
A word should be ,iaid in support of the
departed ski-jump carve. If there had been
no curve in the first place, there could never
have been an incredible downward slide into
addiction for the agencies to rescue us
from. Nobody can tell exactly how many new
addicts have appeared in the last three years,
but it is clear that these extra 500,000 didn't
shoot up overnight. Thus, the addict who
was left off the ski-jump curve 10 years ago
for the sake oil the Bureau of Narcotics, now
can be put back on the trolls for the health
of the new BNDD. If the old Bureau had
kept reliable statistic;, or no statistics we
would probably see merely a slow rise in
addiction which would prcimpt criticism of
the agencies' practices and perhaps even
budget cuts. Nobody, eowever, can be blamed
for an epidemic.
THE: SEIZURE CHART WAR
All this luxury does have its drawbacks.
Until the agencies can come up with some
way of showing another decline in addiction,
they have to prove their worthiness by other
means. Both the BNDD and Customs have
turned to the seizure chart, once merely win-
dow dressing for the old Bureau of Narcotics
when the proof was :n the ski-jump curve.
Now, the public depends on the seizure chart
for its knowledge of whether the war against
the drug traffic is succeeding or failing.
Seizure charts are in some ways superior
to addict counts. They are certainly more
exciting, because the numbers represent ac-
tual lumps of heroin taken from Frog One
and his colleagues in dramatic episodes.
Moreover, whne the addict count is a direct
measure of addiction, the seizure rate is
hard to connect with the actual heroin traf-
fic. Nobody knows whet effect increased seiz-
ures has on drug sales, whether more is put
into the system to replace what is lost, or
whether less is available for the addict. No-
body, for that matter, has any idea of how
giuch heroin Domes into the country. Cus-
toms can therefore claim a gigantic increase
in heroin seizures, from 210 pounds in 1969
to 346.8 pounds in 1970 to 1,308.85 pounds in
1971, with the issura.nce that nobody, not
even Customs, will know what that number
really represents. When U.S. News and World
Report recently asked Myles Ambrose, "Is the
traffic in narcotics increasing?" he said: "It
has been at such an inordinately high level
that it would be very difficult to measure
whether it is increasing or decreasing."
Seizure charts have still a' third bureau-
cratic advantage. If the drug traffic is ac-
tually increasing, the odds are that govern-
ment drug arrests and confiscations will also
increase, although the narcs will still be
getting the same percentage of the traffic.
This means that the worse the problem gets
the more tt.e federal government will appear
to be solving it. If you accept the BNDD's
addiction rates, the two agencies are already
making the most of these misfortunes.
Finally, seizure rates provides numerical
flexibility. An addict is an addict, but a seiz-
ure can be a gram, a pound, a kilee, or a
dose, depending on which looks better. In
1967, for instance. EiNieD was confiscating
heroin in grams (35,000), while in 1969 it
was picking up pounds. In times of real
drought, the agencies can switch to doses,
diluting their statistics much as the traf-
fickers dilute their heroin. The agencies also
have the option, unavailable to drug pushers,
of lumping everything together into one spec-
tacular junk pile. Instead of promoting a
heroin seizure figure, the agency comes out
with its total hard -drug haul, which includes
heroin, morphine, cocaine, and others. Most
important, seizures can be converted into
money. This: makes possible a direct compari-
son with the agency budget allotment. A
sample seizure press release, this one from
Customs, reads like this:
An unprecedented total of $817.3-milliofl-
worth of illicit drugs and narcotics?approxi-
mately three times its annual budget?was
seized by the Bureau of Customs in the first
10 months of the calendar year, U.S. Com-
missioner of Customs Myles J. Ambrose an-
nounced today.
The figure was based on the estimated
street value of the drugs. It represents a
400-per-cent increase over the volume of
narcotic drugs seized during the correspond-
ing 10-month period in 1970 when the total
was $119.3 million.
The number of individual seizures climbed
from 7,961 to 8,806 while the aggregate
quantity of all drugs rose from 124,720 to
165,281 pounds.
CONTINENTAL BLITZ
Things may be confusing to Narc One on
the street, but his boss has -no trouble keep-
ing the BNDD seizure chart separate from
the Customs seizure chart. Nam One is told
that he should cooperate with Nero Two, he
has heard the officials proclaim the historic
unity between the agencies. But he also
knows what happens if the junkie ends up
as a Narc Two statistic-Cooperation with
your rival agents, therefore, means walking
arm-in-arm out of New York Attorney Gen-
eral Andrew Maloney's office slowly enough
so the other agent won't get panicked and
think you are trying to out-race him, and fast
enough so you will make it to the bust first.
That happened recently after Maloney ad-
vised both a Customs and a BNDD agent that
a shipment was coming in. Customs got the
case when BNDD's car wouldn't start.
At the start of the Nixon Administration,
BNDD was safely in the lead of the coopera-
tive war. It had the tradition of Harry An-
slinger, the statisticians of the ski-jump
curve, and the Justice Department. BNDD's
foreign agents could blitz Customs on every
continent. Customs, from its position down
at the border, had never done much drug
catching, and the agency hadn't gotten any-
where by approaching Congress year after
year with warnings about the mound of
suitcases piling on its harried inspectors from
the international tourist boom. But, under
bulldog Myles Ambrose. who reportedly has
a "Bust a Junkie" sign on his desk, the
agency began to get healthier when it could
show that some of these suitcases had false
bottoms and contained dope. Customs got an
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? extra $8.75-million boost in 1969 for 915 ad-
ditional narcs, and was also given enough
airplanes and sensors to create a pusher's
DMZ at the Mexican border. Its total budget
grew from $89 million in 1968 to $189 mil-
lion in 1972. BNDD, meanwhile, was expand-
ing from an original $14.4 million for 600
agents in 1968 to $65.1 million for over 1,300
In 1971.
UP AGAINST AGENT O'HARA
There were two ways the agencies could
approach this seizure war. One would be to
actually bust more junkies than the other,
and the second would be to concentrate on
a more creative use of what was actually
seized. It is in the latter area that Customs
gained ground. Ambrose's men began to
make historic and dramatic busts, as op-
posed to the run-of-the-mill beasts of the
BNDD. The difference between a dramatic
bust and a routine bust is the difference
between a human Customs inspector sniffing
out some marijuana, and a pot-smelling dog
doing the same thing. Ambrose had the dogs,
and they made newspaper stories, while
BNDD was stumbling around looking for
Frencli heroin labs.
Ingersoll also made the classic mistake of
going after the Families, the 10 or so under-
world systems responsible, he said, for most
of the drug traffic in this country. The Fam-
ilies technique had been tried before, and
as any narc can tell you, it never works.
Some mules you get, but not the Families.
"People out in White Plains may have some
fascination for the big shots," says one ex-
flare. "But it doesn't mean much. They want
to get that pusher down the street." Going
after the Families, like writing the Great
American Novel, can be an excuse to sit
around and do nothing. Ambrose, meanwhile,
was taking the street approach, making the
neighborhood safe from the old dope peddler.
Ingersoll's narcs were off on this wild goose
' chase while Ambrose was secretly meeting
with Jack Webb and the network television
people. Both Customs and BNDD had hoped
to get their own TV shows, but "O'Hara,
U.S. Treasury" beat BNDD to the living
rooms, and by the time Ingersoll got to the
networks, according to John Finlator, former
BNDD deputy director, "the anti-violence
thing had taken over" and the BNDD show
was turned down. O'Hara put the double
screw on BNDD; even as real Customs agents
were outmaneuvering BNDD at the street
level, its television agent, O'Hara, was busting
the major pushers. Every week, Customs'
high-quality detective would crush another
Big Family on ABC, while its luggage-shakers
were getting a high-quantity seizure record
by mopping up all the little busts. BNDD
was squeezed out somewhere between O'Hara
and the border.
BNDD, not easily outdone, retaliated with
the open files and the incredible lump. Open-
ing the files to reporters finally got the
BNDD into the newspaper, where Ambrose's
pot-sniffling dogs and computer narcs and
heroin-DMZ had been all along. (Newsweek
recently ran a big feature on BNDD's South
America work.) And the BNDD surfaced with
the incredible lump in its January, 1972,
seizure press release, when it heaped all its
seizures of narcotics and dangerous drugs
from an entire world-wide illicit market into
one, unprecedented, $920-million pile. This
total included heroin, morphine base, and
opium?domestic and foreign hauls?and
pushed the BNDD chart to 3,784 pounds, far
beyond anything previously claimed. The fact
that some of these ingredients might not
have been destined for 'U.S. consumption, or
that many of thse seizures, as one Customs
official charged, "were made entirely by for-
eign police," was obscured by the numerical
heft of the composite bust.
Customs, meanwhile, aware of the growing
benefits of this go-to-the-source technique,
asked Congress for more of its own overseas
agents, so as not to be "blindfolded at the
border." This would provide the chance for
cooperation with BNDD abroad as well as at
home. BNDD complained that the guidelines,
would prohibit this, but Customs offered to
help write new guidelines.
While both agencies wrestled over inter-
national coordination, Ambrose outflanked
both his friends at Treasury and his rivals at
BNDD. What the drug way really needed, he
convinced President Nixon, was a totally
new agency, able to integrate its attack
with all the other agencies. The others were
doing a pretty good job, but they did not
have the promise of a Special Office of. Drug
Abuse Law Enforcement?the President's
arm?especially if that Office were headed
by Myles Ambrose. Some reorganization
would be needed, since Ambrose planned to
take 250 agents, or about 20 per cent of the
entire drug force, away from BNDD, and
would also draw from other government
flare pools. Ingersoll assured everybody that
this would be no problem for BNDD. His
agents might be working for Ambrose, but
he would retain, as he put it, "administra-
tive jurisdiction."
The new agency would also demand a
revolutionary approach?an all-out blitz on
the street-level heroin pusher, reminiscent of
the traditional clean-up campaigns. (Carl
Perrian, of Rep. Murphy's staff, notes that
before a big drug hearing in San Diego in
1965. Customs boasted that its men had
just "cleaned up" Tijuana. Perrian left the
meeting, took $190 into Tijuana and returned
a few hours later to lay a pocketful of
drugs on the committee table) . Ambrose's
clean-up, carefully timed over the next few
months, will be national in scope.
With Narc Six sneaking up at the rear
of the long line of agents behind the drug
smuggler, some new problems might arise.
Is the BNDD narc on loan to the new agency
supposed to bust for Ambrose or for Inger-
soll Three federal agencies might try to sell
flour to each other, and there might be
some uncertainty about the triple convoys.
But the magnitude of the drug crisis is great
enough to override such limitations, and the
only thing that remains is to explain why
another agency is necessary. President Nixon
did:
At present, there are nine federal agencies
involved in one fashion or another with the
problem of drug addiction. In this manner
our efforts have been fragmented through
competing priorities, lack of communica-
tion, multiple authority, and limited and dis-
persed resources. The magnitude and severity
of the present threat will no longer permit
this piecemeal and bureaucratically-dis-
persed effort at drug control.
ANATOMY OF THE DRUG WAR
(By Nicholas Pileggi)
After a series of secret meetings in August,
the city's Mafia leaders decided to end their
ten-year self-imposed prohibition and re-
enter the narcotics business. It was a deci-
sion based on the fact that the profits in
drugs today are greater and the risks more
remote than ever. Long before the public was
aware that the police department property
clerk's office served as a major drug supply
center, Mafiosi knew that law enforcement
in the area had broken down. It was the
Mafiosi, after all who were buying back
much of the same heroin and cocaine that
was being seized from them by narcotics
agents.
The decision, aside from its probable social
consequences, is expected to escalate fur-
ther what is already open warfare among the
independent junk dealers who now control
the importation and distribution of drugs in
the city. In the last two years, for instance,
there have been more than 250 murders of
middle-level non-addict pushers. There has
been, in fact, even without the Mafia's heavy
hand, an exotic orgy of violence among the
city's free-wheeling dealers, wholesalers,
smugglers, importers, corrupt cops, double
,S 2973
agents and street-Corner pushers. There are
parts of Bedford-Stuyvesant in which black
heroin dealers control so many killers that
even state legislators and local political lead-
ers admit privately that they are terrified to
speak out against specific individuals.
There are streets in Harlem, the South
Bronx, and around the Sunset Park area of
predominantly white working-class South
Brooklyn where pushers openly argue over
choice sidewalk locations, like chestnut ven-
dors outside Radio City. In upper Manhat-
tan's Washington-Heights area where Cuban
dealers have established themselves in some
of, the bars along Broadway, from 138th
Street north, daily shootouts have paralyzed
police action with sheer volume. In the
Bronx, wholesale junk markets on Walton
Avenue off the Grand Concourse continue to
proliferate even though police records show
repeated arrests and harassment.
The drug world seems to gain strength
from adversity. It is an environment of
thoughtless, mechanical, clockwork vio-
lence. Since many of the deaths occur in
black, Puerto Rican and Cuban neighbor-
hoods, however, the media and the public
have missed most of the fireworks, Occasion-
ally, a murder involving middle-class whites,
an undercover cop or a Mafia soldier makes
the papers and the Six O'Clock News. On
November 1, 1972, for instance, there was a
front-page story in The New York Times
about an N.Y.U. senior and his roommate, a
suspected drug dealer, being murdered in
their apartment across the street from the
school's uptown campus. On the same day,
a typical day, the following drug-related
homicides and assaults also took place in
the city, but without any mention in the
press (the list does not include addict street
crimes such as muggings and holdups) :
John Spann, 35, shot and killed at 111th
Street and Fifth Avenue by an unknown man
hiding in a doorway; Ronald Lucas, 24, stab-
bed to death in front of 590 East 21st Street,
Brooklyn; Luis Rivas, 28, shot and killed
while standing in front -of 54 Jesup Place,
the Bronx; Bartolo Courasco, shot and crit-
ically wounded by two men from a passing
car while standing on Columbus Avenue,
near West 82d Street; Clark Jackson, shot
and seriously injured at Eighth Avenue and
114th Street; Robert Smith, shot and serious-
ly injured while standing in front of 19
West 126th Street; Hector Santiago and Guil-
lermo Rodrigues, shot and critically injured
by two men in a passing car at the corner
of Graham and Seigel Streets, Brooklyn; Is-
rael Ortiz and James Delgado, shot and
critically injured while standing in front of
1228 Morris Avenue, the Bronx; Eliot Roman,
shot while standing on the corner of Vyse
Avenue and East 179th Street, the Bronx.
The real danger for the city's drug dealers,
quite obviously, does not come from the law.
As the center of the nation's drug traffickers,
New York has become Junk City, a predatory
scene of unrivaled violence, official corrup-
tion and Byzantine plots. No army of anthro-
pologists could ever have constructed a
laboratory habitat better suited to the en-
richment of the Mafia's style. The very chaos
of the city's drug business has made it a
temptation to the mob.
When the Mafia abandoned the narcotics
business in the early 1960s it was because too
many bosses suddenly found themselves go-
ing to jail for drug conspiracies hatched by
their underlings. Carmine Galente, John Or-
mento and Vito Genovese were all top men
who were jailed during that period. A few
Mafiosi had continued dealing in narcotics,
even during the boss-imposed ban, and today
increasing numbers of the mob's aggressive
and avaricious young Turks refuse to accept
the timidity of rich godfathers as enough rea-
son to stay out of narcotics. The profits are
simply too great. Dealers in the United States
who paid $18,000 for a kilo (2.2 pounds) of 80
to 90 per cent Turkish heroin in 1971 are now
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S 2974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 21, 1973
offering $40,000 for a kilo of Asian heroin that
Is only 25 per cent pure. An investment of
$500,000 in Corsica, Sao Paulo or Saigon can
return $10 million on the city's streets.
Compered with other illicit Mails business-
es, importing and distributing drugs is ad-
ministratively painless. Junk deals are con-
summated once or twice a year, and exposure
to the public, corrupt cops and underworld
employees is minimal compared with such
vulnerable day-to-day operations as book-
making, policy and loansharking. Someone
has to take those bets, count the money, deal
with the telephone installers, to say noth-
ing of paying off the winners, cops, land-
lords, bail bondsmen and disgruntled Mafia
employees. In the drug business, there Is very
little exposure and thus a minimum of
vulnerability. In addition, there are now very
few hoods around who do not know how
easy it can be to smuggle contraband into the
United States. Along the 1,200-mile Canadian
border between Erie, Pennsylvania, and the
Maine mese for instance, there are two Great
Lakes (Erie and Ontario), Niagara Falls, Lake
Champlain, the St. Lawrence Seaway, scores
of small waterways, 100 unguarded border
roads and 1,000 rural airstrips upon which a
small plane can land undetected. This entire
stretch is patrolled by 100 border guards,
with never more than twenty of them on duty
at one time.
Just as the Mafiosi had replaced the Jewish
racketeers who controlled the narcotics busi-
ness before the end of World War IL ("smack"
as slang for heroin is derived from the Yid-
dish word schrneck, or smell), a loose amal-
gam of multi-racial and multi-ethnic en-
trepreneurs took the Italians' place in the
early sixties. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Cubans,
Argentinians, Brazilians and, lately, Chinese
distributors moved in on the wholesale and
Importation level. Independent black junk
dealers like Julian St. Harrison, Gerald Hart-
ley, Leroy Barnes, and Robert Stepney have
developed their own Latin-American connec-
tions. Harrison, at 53, is known to police as
a ten-kilo man who specializes in supplying
out-of-towners from his East 215th Street
headquarters in the Bronx. Hartley and
Barnes are both considered major traffickers,
Barnes having been a front for the East
Harlem Mafiosi before they got out. Stepney,
who police say commutes from Teaneck, New
Jersey, to Bedford-Stuyvesant every day, is
another of the city's top dealers.
The money being made by black racketeers
in narcotics, of course, is finding its way into
other illegitimate enterprises. Blacks are not
only running their oWn policy and loanshark
operations in areas that were once Mafia
controlled, but they have begun moving into
legitimate businesses as well. Bar-and-grills,
drycleaning shops, liquor stores, even ghetto
tenements are being swallowed up by black
racketeers In payment for gambling and
loanslaark debts, a pattern of upward crimi-
nal mobility ominously familiar to the Ma-
fiosi themselves.
One of the biggest Cuban operators in the
city today is Rene Texeira, who lives in the
Bronx but controls, along with Begin() Fer-
nandez, another Cuban, most of the traffick-
ing in northern Manhattan and New Jersey.
The Matla's greatest problem in retaking
their netherworld interests will undoubted-
ly come from the Cuban racketeers. In West
New York, Union City and Hoboken, New
Jersey, as well as Washington Heights and
much of upper Manhattan, junk has been
controlled by Cuban gangs since the Mafia
families of Simone Rizzo (Sam the Plumber)
DeCavalcante and Joseph (Bayonne Joe)
Zicarelli were decimated by continuous Fed-
eral harassment and jail. The Cubans, mean-
while?some with a paramilitary training
left over from their Batista, anti-guerrilla
days?have become a powerful criminal group
as well organized, some say, as the Mafia
itself. The Cubans' greatest enemies at pres-
ent, however, are the city's Puerto Rican
racketeers, who are in direct competition for
he Latin junk market and for gambling and
can-shark operations
On Manhattan's Upper West Side, with his
-ease of operation around Broadway and 110th
3treet, Anthony Angelet, a 54-year-old Puerto
Rican racket boss, is holding the fort for
.Raymond (Spanish Raymond) Marquez,
who is in all. Lionel Gonzalez, another of
the city's powerful Puerto Rican dealers, con-
centrates his activities in the South Bronx,
:.-nore specifically from his headquarters along
;3outhern Boulevard between 149th and 150th
Streets. In Brooklyn, the top Puerto Rican
,lealer has been identified as Jose Rosa, whose
connections along Fourth Avenue in South
ierooklyn are as good as his connections on
she island of Puerto Rico. He is, in fact, the
island's key supplier. These top dealers are
so carefully insulated from their day-to-day
operations that it is extremely difficult, de-
spite almost daily harassment and question-
ing by the police, to land any of these men
in court.
Further complicating the Mafia's takeover
plans are the Chinese. Ten 'years ago, when
ihe Italian-American Mafiosi left Junk City,
the main suppliers were Sicilian, French and
Clorsican. By controlling these suppliers, the
Mafiosi controlled the amount of drugs that
entered the United States. During the mid-
dle sixties, however, increasing numbers of
Chinese seamen began jumping ship in the
United States with as much as ten kilos of
heroin strapped to their backs. Suddenly,
the poppy farms of Turkey, the smuggling
routes through Sicily and Corsica, and the
refineries in Marseilles were no longer the
only sources. Today, it is estimated that more
than half the heroin used in the United
States comes from the Far East, much of it
smuggled into the country by ship-jumping
Chinese seamen. Customs and immigration
cfficials say it is impossible to deal with the
problem effectively. The relaxation of immi-
gration rules has recently filled America's
Chinatowns with new inhabitants, and it is
comparatively simple for a seaman with
$50,000 forth of pure heroin to disappear in
these communities. On April 11, seven Chi-
r ese were arrested in New York with eleven
pounds of heroin, and I;EX of the seven turned
out to be ship-Jumpers, The heroin was part
of a 100-pound batch brought into the coun-
t by a European diplomat. On June 30, four
Chinese were arrested in a Sunnyside,
Queens, apartment trying to extricate eight-
een pounds of heroin trona behind a base-
board where two other Chinese had hidden
it earlier in the year at the time of their
arrest. And, on August 21, as the godfathers
niade up their minds to get back into the
Junk business, Federal. agents arrested 60-
y iar-old Kan Kit Rule, the unofficial mayor
of Chinatown, in a $200,000 deal involving
twenty pounds of heroin, two Chinese busi-
nessmen, a Chinese ship-jumper, two Chi-
nese-American undercover cops, 40 Federal
aeents using twelve unmarked cars, and a
seven-hour circuitous tour led by cautious
Buie that took the entire entourage through
the alleys, factory buildings and streets of
the Lower East Side.
The Mafiosi explored a return to the drug
ade about a year ago. Key men were given
permission to make buys, and a few have
hien caught.
On January 1.8, Louis Cirlllo, a Luechese
ft mily associate, was indicted in Miami in
a 1,500-pound multi-million-dollar heroin-
smuggling conspiracy. On April 29, while
se arching through Chino's Bronx home,
Facieral agents found nearly $1.1 million
buried in the backyard and the basement.
Oa February 4, another Lucchese family
associate, Vincent Papa, was arrested in the
Heine with $967,500 in a green suitcase des-
tined for a 200-pound heroin buy. Papa had
mice served five years for selling narcotics
and had a record of 26 arrests. On May 10,
Jcseph (Jojo) Manfredi, a Gambino family
captain, was arrested along with two neph-
ews and fourteen other men ln a $25-million-
a-year heroin operation that specialized in
supplying
midwestern
15, Michael Papa, Vincent Papa's 24-year-old
nephew, WSJ arrested with another man for
selling eleven pounds of cocaine to an under-
cover agent.
In addition to the unusual rash of Mafia-
associated drug arrests, police began hearing
rumors that, a number of gangland killings
were dirctly related to the mob's re-entry
into drugs. On August, 10, for instance, the
bodies of two of Joseph Manfredi's nephews,
one of whom had been arrested with him on
May 10, were found in the deserted Classon's
Point sectio: a of the Bronx. The killing was
apparently intended to insure silence In the
drug case invblvIng their uncle.
On July 16, when acting Genovese family
boss Thomas (Tommy Ryan) Eboli was shot
and killed on a Brooklyn street corner, it was
at first suspected that his death had some-
thing to do with the Gallo-Colombo war. He
had just walked out of his girl friend Elvin%
(Dolly) Lease's Lefferts Avenue apartment,
shortly after midnight, when two men
stepped out of a yellow panel truck and
opened fire, hitting Moll five times in the
head and neck. Since the killing, Federal
agents suspect that Eboll was killed not be-
cause of a Mafia family feud, but because he
was involved in a $4-million narcotics
scheme in which he tried to withhold more
than a millen dollars. On April 29, when
Federal ager.ts dug up Louis Cirillo's back-
yard in the Bronx and found $1,078,100,
Eboli's fate was sealed. It is now suspected
that Eboli had withheld that sum from his
peers, the very top-level. Mafia financiers who
had originally bankrolled Cirillo's heroin-
smuggling plan. As is customary in such
eases, underlings like Cirillo are not held
responsible for the greed of their bosses and
are, therefore, spared. Ebohi, however, knew
better. "They had to blow him away," an
informer explained, "because he had held
out on bosses. He had made fools of his own
kind. The only thing that took them so long
[Moll was killed two months and seventeen
days after the money was uncovered] was
that they were probably trying to get him
to replace the million so he could live."
Other signs of the mob's re-entry into junk
were apparent when top Mafia bosses like
Santo Traffic ante of New Orleans suddenly
took trips to the Far East. Federal narcotics
agents, who have spotted both men in Sai-
gon, Hong Hong, Singapore and Thailand,
are almost certain that Asian connections
were being established to supplement the
mob's traditional French and Corsican sup-
pliers. Another indication was the appear-
ance in New York late last year of Thomas
Buscetta, a Sicilian-born man of many pass-
ports and the Mafia's main South American
connection. Buscetta was arrested in front
of the United Nations as an illegal alien, but
left the country after posing $40,000 ball.
He was wanted at the time by Sicilian police
for masterminding a 1963 massacre in which
seven policemen and three civilians died.
Today, Buses tta lives in Sao Paulo, Brazil,
under the name of Robert V.. Cavalaro, and
owns a fleet af 275 taxicabe and a string of
luncheonettes. Slipping in and out of the
United States almost at will, Buscetta was re-
cently caught coming through the Canadian
border at Champlain, New York, with an
American, three Italians, and two Argen-
tinian passports. While customs officials
marveled at the fact that each of the pass-
ports bore a different name under his photo-
graph, and as they searched his car, finding a
Playboy Club credit card slip, a booklet of
lottery tickets and a reel of obscene film,
Buscetta disasepeared from the border patrol
station.
Buscetta's importance to the Mafiosi is
twofold. He is not only their man in. South
America, but he also represents, at 44 years
of age, just the kind of potential Mafia boss
that old-word dons like Carlo Gambino
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February 21, 1973 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
would like to see take over the secret so-
ciety. Gambino has been importing foreign-
born Mafiosi like Buscetta for several years,
and police intelligence officers suspect that
much of the pressure being applied to or-
ganized crime leaders to return to narcotics
has been exerted by these old-world imports.
"Greasers are taking over the whole opera-
tion," one Federal informant explained. "Car-
los Marcella has spread them through the
South and the Southwest. They are in up-
state New York. Gambino and Marcello and
Magaddino are bringing Sicilians over. Right
here, in downtown New York, the numbers
are all theirs. Joe Mush had a gigantic policy
operation, but the greasers told him 'bow or
you're dead.' First they started by just hang-
ing around, but pretty soon they were bring-
ing over their buddies, until today, on Mul-
berry Street, the American wise guys are
scared of them.
"These guys are bringing everybody into
line. They've got the old man's okay, and"
when they move it's going to be a bloody
mess."
On August 4, in Trinchi's Restaurant in
Yonkers, the first of the mob's meetings
took place. Despite the fact that it was held
in public on a busy Friday night, it was not
until months later that the New York City
police found out that it had taken place.
(Inexplicabl, the NYPD, to the mob's de-
light, has decided to cut back the kind of
surveillance work needed to fight organized
crime.) The PSI had apparently missed the
meeting as well, and, if it had not been for
an IRS agent in search of an acquaintance
of one of those who attended the meeting, no
law enfdrcement unit would have known
,of the meeting. Those attending included
Carmine Tramunti, acting head of the Luc-
chese family, long known for its drug opera-
tions. Based in East Harlem, it had a virtual
monopoly in supplying drugs to black and
Puerto Rican ghettos before the Mafia-im-
posed ban. While Tramunti has no personal
involverrient 'with narcotics (his interests
are almost exclusively gambling), as the fam-
ily's titular head his approval was not only
expected but required. Philip Rastelli, act-
ing boss of the Bonanno family, was also
present. The Bonannos have been well known
as a drug family since the early 1930s, when
Joseph Bonanno first put ?the Sicily-Mar-
Wiles-Montreal-New York route together.
The Bonanno Mafia family has always been
evenly divided between Montreal and New
York, and it has specialized in smuggling
? of all kinds. Rastelli, who has taken over the
Bonanno mob and moved into a racket vac-
uum in New Jersey, is expected to be the
first Mafia boss to make a move in solidify-
ing the drug business. Bonanno soldiers, per-
haps more than those of any other family,
have been most debilitated by internal wars,
jail, and a loss of illicit income. Bookmak-
ing, loanshark concessions, labor union in-
filtration, waterfront pilfering franchises?
all of the fringe benefits and income that
accompany a thriving Mafia family?were
denied the Bonanno crew as a result of their
leadership vacuum after Joseph Bonanno was
kidnapped and his heir was rejected by the
Mafia's commission. As a result, it is the
remnants of the old Bonanno family who are
most in need of the drug trade, and it will
therefore fall to Rastelli in New Jersey to
take on the well-organized and deeply en-
trenched Cuban gangs. He is expected to go
about it, according to various police inform-
- ants, by systematically killing off top Cuban
imparters until eventually the entire Cuban
operation is under control. With Rastelli at
all of the meetings was another Bonanno
boss, Natale Evola, an older and highly re-
spected don. It Is Evola who often serves as
a voice of moderation when Rastelli, who
has a volatile nature, explodes.
Also present at the meeting was Michael
Papa, the 24-year-old nephew of Vincent
Papa the Lucchese family associate arrested
last February with the cash-filled green suit-
case. It is suspected that Michael, who was
on bail at the time of the dinner, was repre-
senting his uncle's interests. The last and
most mysterious of the Mafia dinner com-
panions was Francesco Salamone, an illegal
Sicilian alien who has a long history of
international narcotics smuggling and many
Corsican friends.
A second meeting took place on August 11,
the day after the two Manfredi nephews were
shot and killed, and it was held at the Staten
Island home of John (Johnny Dee) D'Alessio,
a Carlo Gambino captain. At this meeting,
Evola, Rastelli and Salamone their European
connection, apparently presented their plans
to the bosses and acting bosses of other Mafia
families. Present were acting Genovese boss
Alphonse (Funzie) Tieri; septuagenarian,
gum-chewing Michele Miranda, a highly re-
spected Genovese family cansigliere; Aniello
DellaCroce, Carlo Gambino's most likely suc-
cessor; Alphonse (Allie Boy) Persico repre-
senting his brother Carmine (Junior) Persico,
a Colombo family captain, and Joseph N.
Gallo, a man unrelated to the Brooklyn
Gallos, who often represents the interests of
the New Orleans and Tampa Mafia families
in New York. (Trafficante and Marcello both
refused to attend the meetings according
to police, since their last dinner with friends
in New York resulted in their seizure in La
Stella Restaurant on Queens Boulevard.)
Gallo's presence at the meeting, therefore,
was significant since it is through the Far-
Eastern connections established by the bosses
of the two southern Mafia families that so
much of the heroin brought into the United
States originates. Also attending the second
'meeting was Luciano Leggio?another illegal
Sicilian alien wanted for murder in Palermo
and an old-world Mafioso with excellent Cor-
sican connections.
The third meeting, at which Evola and
Rastelli once again presided, is expected to
be the last. It took place on August 17, in
Gargiulo's Restaurant on West 15th Street,
off Mermaid Avenue, in Coney Island. The
acting Genovese boss, Alphonse Tieri, and
the Luchese boss Carmine Tramunti were
present as was Joseph N. Gallo. The five men
met on a Thursday evening and sat down to
dinner unnoticed by the rest of the cus-
tomers. They were, after all, five neatly
dressed, soft-spoken businessmen who were
discussing with varying degrees of enthu-
siasm the problems inherent in any new
business venture.
AGENTS MANUAL-BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND
DANGEROUS DRT.TGS
(Presidential Directive and Guidelines, dated
July 2, 1971, pertaining to BNDD-Customs
liaison, as they appear in BNDD Agents
Manual)
CHAP= 66 ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
Subchapter 668 special enforcement
programs
66,5 Liaison BNDD/Customs Agency Service
6685.1 General.
It is the policy of BNDD that every agent
will extend the fullest possible cooperation
with the United States Bureau of Customs
on matters of mutual concern in accordance
with the following policy and procedural di-
rectives.
6685.2 Presidential Directive.
The following is the text of the President's
directive to the Attorney General on Febru-
ary 5, 1970: ?
"A difference of opinion has existed be-
tween the Justice and Treasury Departments
as to the responsibility for dealing with the
international traffic in narcotics.
"This issue was referred to the Advisory
Council on Executive Organization for study
and submission of proposed recommendations
for a solution. I have reviewed the Advisory
Council's report and have approved its rec-
ommendations as follows:
"1. Representatives of BNDD should con-
S 2975
tinue to be accredited to represent the
United States Government in dealing with
foreign law enforcement officials on narcot-
ics questions. Customs should not represent
the United States in this area, except when
authorized by BNDD.
"2. BNDD should be designated the agen-
cy to control the narcotics area. Customs
should support BNDD's efforts to reduce and
eliminate the flow of narcotics into the
United States and its intelligence network
should be used to assist in the overall effort.
"3. Consistent with the recommendations
made in this paper, the Attorney General
should be designated to pass on disagree-
ments that cannot be resolved by the bu-
reaus concerned.
"The Attorney General is requested to pre-
pare guidelines to implement these recom-
mendations and to submit them to me for
approval by February 15, 1970."
6685.3 Presidential Approval of the BNDD/
Customs Guidelines.
On May 5, 1970, the President approved the
guidelines prepared by the Attorney Gen-
eral. On June 22, 1970, the President directed
the following memorandum to the. Attorney
General and the Secretary of Treasury:
"In my directive of February 5, 1970, I ap-
proved the recommendations of the Advi-
sory Council on Executive Organization out-
lining responsibility for dealing with the
international traffic in narcotics.
"Pursuant to niy directive, the Attorney
General has submitted the attached pro-
posed guidelines to implement the recom-
mendations of the Advisory Council on Exec-
utive Organization. It is my conviction that
these guidelines provide a basis for a clearly
directed effort to curtail the traffic in nar-
cotics, marijuana and dangerous drugs.
"I have reviewed these guidelines and ap-
proved them for immediate implementation."
6685.4 BNDD/Customs Guidelines.
The approved BNDD/Customs Guidelines
are quoted below:
"1. BNDD's Responsibilities:
"A. BNDD controls all investigations in-
volving violations of the laws of the United
States relating to narcotics, marihuana, and
dangerous drugs, both within the United
States and beyond its borders except as set
forth in the first sentence of 2A below. BNDD
has primary jurisdiction over all investiga-
tions originated by officers of that Bureau
either within or outside the United States,
including smuggling of narcotics, marihuana,
and dangerous drugs into the United States.
"B. In foreign areas, BNDD is the accred-
ited United States agency for contact with
foreign law enforcement officers on narcotics,
marihuana, and dangerous drug matters. To
insure unity of purpose, Customs personnel
shall communicate on narcotics, marihuana,
Or dangerous drug matters with foreign law
enforcement officials only after prior ap-
proval (in writing, if possible) of the Direc-
tor of BNDD or his designee. If BNDD does
not give approval, BNDD will communicate
with foreign officials with respect to the par-
ticular matter requested by Customs and
will expeditiously advise Customs of the re-
sults of the communication.
"C. BNDD has as one of its principal mis-
sions the detection of persons in foreign
countries who may transport contraband
drugs to the United States. BNDD also has
the responsibility for fully advising Customs
of all information (in writing, if possible)
regarding the identity and circumstances of
the probable movement into the United
States of smugglers and/or contraband.
"D. In order to promote greater efficiency
and to minimize risks, in those BNDD inves-
tigations where smuggling of narcotics, mari-
huana, or dangerous drugs is probable, BNDD
shall fully and promptly advise Customs.
When it is in the best interests of overall
enforcement objectives to have controlled
passage of contraband drugs into the United
States to be delivered to the intended re-
cipient, BNDD shall request Customs assist-
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S 2976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE February 21, 1973
ance for this purpose. Customs shall be in-
vited to participate in the controlled passage
of the smuggled contraband to the intended
recipient.
"E. The Director, BNDD, will assign such
officers of BNDD as he deems necessary to
any foreign country with which arrange-
ments may be made in consultation with
the Department of State. BNDD officers will
work with enforcement officers of that coun-
try in developing information and evidence
against international narcotics, marihuana,
and dangerous drug traffickers. They will
pursue illicit producers of opium, marihuana,
and other dangerous drugs and endeavor to
immobilize illicit manufacturers and distrib-
utors of dangerous substances destined for
the United. States.
"F. BNDD has jurisdiction and authority
to investigate and coordinate with foreign
personnel in all narcotics, marihuana, and
dangerous drug matters in those Foreign
countries where both BNDD and the Bureau
of Customs have assigned personnel.
"G. BNDD may establish offices in border
cities where necessary and conduct investi-
gations in other border locations to achieve
Its mission and objectives. BNDD shall in-
form Customs as soon as possible of all in-
vestigative activities in the Mexican and
Canadian border areas of the United States
which have a smuggling aspect to insure
maximum safety, cooperation, and coordina-
tion.
"2. Bureau of Customs Responsibilities:
"A. The Bureau of Customs, because of its
responsibility to suppress smuggling into
the United States, has primary jurisdiction
- at ports and borders for all smuggling in-
vestigations, including those involving nar-
cotics, marihuana, and dangerous drugs,
except those initiated by ENDIS. For this
urpose, smuggling is understood to mean
the actual passage of undeclared merchan-
dise, or contraband, through the Customs
lines. It does not include preparatory acts
prior to bringing the articles within the
boundaries of the United States. Smug-
gling violations not terminated at ports or
BNDD unless such jurisdiction is waived (in
writing if possible) by the Director of
BNDD or his designee.
"B. Customs shall promptly make avail-
able to BNDD information or investigative
leads relating to the illicit production, pos-
session, trafficking, or transportation of nar-
cotics, marihuana, or dangerous drugs. The
direction of subsequent activity with respect
to such productien, possession, trafficking,
or transportation is the responsibility of
BNDD.
"C. Customs officers with the advanced
concurrence (in writing, if possible) of the
Director of BNDD or his designee, may con-
voy narcotics, marihuana, or dangerous drug
investigations to their destination from the
point of entry into the United States. To
insure proper coordination, BNDD may as-
sign Special Agents to accompany the con-
trolled delivery.
"D. In the vicinity of the borders, Cus-
toms officers may communicate with Mexi-
can and Canadian officials on narcotics,
marihuana, and dangerous drug matters. In
this regard, the Bureau of Customs will
support l3NDD's efforts to eliminate the
flow into the United States of narcotics,
marihuana, and dangerous drugs, and shall
inform BeIDD with respect to the nature and
extent of such contacts involving narcotics,
marihuana, and dangerous drug smuggling,
and all information derived therefrom shall
be transmitted to BNDD upon request.
"3. Interagency Cooperation.
"A. The President of the United States has
directed that there be the fullest possible
cooperation and exchange of information
between BNDD and the Bureau of Customs
in the investigations of violations relating
to narcotics, marihuana, and dangerous
drugs. To this end, employees of each agency
me directed to transmit promptly to the investigations unless the intended result
other agency any information which would will seriously jeopardize an active BNDD
3e of value in discharging that agency's investigation or will not be consistent with
eesponsibilities more effectively. If there is the objectives of both Bureaus.
a. question if the Information would be of "5. Smuggling investigations not termi-
nated at ports or borders involving narcot-
ics, marihu.sna, and dangerous drugs are
considered potential joint investigations.
Investigative direction of such cases within
the United States will remain with the
intiating agency providing:
"a. It has consulted with the other to
determine that the same matter is not al-
ready under active investigation.
, "b. It does not involve a third law en-
forcement agency within the United States
without mutual concurrence.
"c. It keeps the other fully informed via
reports of the progress of the case.
"6. Press Releases.
"Upon cor.clusion of successful joint in-
vestigation by Customs and B/W, in-
'formation will be released to the press on a
local or national level as the circumstances
may warrant. All releases shall reflect the
cooperative effort of both Bureaus.
"7. Joint Statistics.
"Arrest and seizure statistics reflecting the
combined efforts of both services shall be
reported individually by both agencies as
cooperative efforts. These statistics will in-_
chide the results of joint foreign investiga-
tion efforts when applicable as well as joint
smuggling investigations.
"8. Joint Participation in Significant Cases.
"All joint case reports submitted to the
US. Attorney will be reviewed and signed
by both BNDD and Customs cases agents.
"9. Cooperation with Local Authorities.
"In all instances BNDD and Customs will
portray a united narcotics enforcement effort
to all County, State, and municipal enforce-
ment agencies. Both agencies will decline to
participate in any investigative case presented
by local authorities under single agency con-
ditions which could serve to divide the uni-
fied effort.
"10. Review of Operations.
-mitre to the other agency, the question
should always be resolved by transmitting
, he information.
"B. To insure the follest cooperation, the
13irector of BNDD and the Commissioner of
Customs shall each designate a person
charged with the responsibility of investi-
gating alleged breaches and for liaison with
las counterpart with regard to all matters
Jailing under these guidelines.
"C. Informatan relating to narcotics, mari-
huana, or dangerous drugs in those countries
1 there the Bureau of Customs has personnel
end ENDO dors not, shall be reported im-
mediately (in writing, if possible) to the
Director of BNDD or his designee, Who may
send, agents Imo those countries to develop
any necessary investigation. In any such
rise, unless the BNDD specifically directs
ctherwise, the Bureau of Customs may take
such action as it deems necessary, pending
tee arrival of representatives of the BNDD,
nureau of Customs representatives are re-
uired to take further action only in cases
1:1 which their assistance I specifically re-
quested by the BNDD and approved by the
C ommissioner of Customs.
"D. An expedited system of communication
of information from abroad will be initiated
and its mechanics will be set up in such a
way that information will be conveyed to the
aepropriate agency with the least possible
delay. The information shall be transmitted
directly to responsible field offices, except as
otherwise specified, of the appropriate agency
aed information copies will be transmitted
promptly to both Bureau headquarters.
"4. Border Patrol Seizures.
"The Border Patrol of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service when making a sei-
a ire of narcotics, marihuana, or dangerous
drugs incident to their primary duties, will
aglow this procedure:
"a. U it can be established or it seems
likely that the violator 'smuggled the illicit
dams into the United States, the matter
shall be referred to the Bureau of Customs.
"b. In all other situations, the matter shall
b a referred to BNDD.
"5. Resolution of Disagreements between
BNDD and Customs.
"In event of disagreement between BNDD
and Customs with respect to the application,
effect, and/or interpretation of the fore-
going guidelines, such disagreement shall be
resolved in writing by the Attorney General."
6685.5 Joint Implementation Agreement.
A joint agreement has been signed by the
Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs arid the Commissioner of Cus-
toms to implement the guidelines. The Joint
Implementation Agreement is set out below:
"noint Implementation Agreement BNDD/
Customs Guidelines, May 5, 1970
Pursuant to Presiden tial Directives of Feb-
ruary 5, 1970 and June 23, 1970.
In order to ,enable the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and the
B email of Customs (Customs) to most ef-
fectively hnplement the approved guidelines
It is agreed that:
"1. Customs Agents will be assigned to
BeTDD offices at Paris, Rome, Montreal, Mex-
ico City, Bangkok, and Hong Kong.
"2. 'BNDD Special Agents will be assigned
at Customs offices at San Ysidro, Calexico,
N3gales, El Paso, Laredo, and McAllen.
"3. For the purpose of assuring expedi-
tious Customs preclearance, Customs repre-
sentatives at Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa,
Montreal, Bermuda, and Nassau may coor-
dinate a drug matter of mutual interest di-
rectly with law enforcement officials at those
locations.
"4. BNDD will concur in Cuetome convoy
"Customs (Office of Security) and BNDD
(Office of Immection) will be charged with
jointly inveseigating and reporting any al-
legations of non-cooperation that cannot
first be resolved at the lowest level of field
supervision.
"Josue E. INGERSOLL,
"Director, Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, U.S. Justice De-
partment.
"Myr.Es' J. AMBROSP1,
"Commissioner, Bureau of Customs,
U.S. Treasury Dcpcolm,ent."
6685.6 Instructions for BNDD Special
Agents to Implement the BNDD/Customs
Guidelines.
6685.61 Delegation of Authority.
The following instructions will be com-
plied with in applying the approved guide-
lines to BNDD/Customs activities. Where the
guidelines refer to "the Director of BNDD or
Iris designee,' the following BNDD officials
are designated to act for the Director:
A. The Assistant Director for Enforcement.
B. The Chief of Operations.
C. All Regional Directors in their assigned
Regions.
D. BNDD Special Agents stationed at Cus-
toms border effices for concurrence in Cus-
toms convoy oases.
E. Regional Directors for Regions 11, 12,
and 14 at U.3./Mexican border areas in co-
ordjnation with the Regional Director, Re-
gion 15.
F. Regional Directors in Regions 1, 6, 7, 10,
12, and 13 at U.S./Canadian border areas in
coordination with the Regional Director, Re-
gion 2.
Questions that cannot be resolved at the
Regional level, will be referred to the Assist-
ant Director for Enforcement or the Chief of
Operations for resolution.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE S 2977
6685.62 Exchange of Personnel.
BNDD and Customs agents May be sta-
tioned at offices of the other agency in stra-
tegic cities where agreed.
The purpose of this personnel exchange
will be to expedite the exchange of intelli-
gence information, coordinate joint investi-
gations, and insure that information of in-
terest to the other agency is obtained
promptly and disseminated for action.
Special Agents -of IINDD assigned to the
Customs border offices will be directly re-
sponsible to the Regional Director in whose
jurisdiction the office is located.
6685.63 BNDD/Customs Liaison.
Specific individuals will be designated re-
sponsibility by Regional. Directors for Cus-
toms/BNDD liaison in New York, Miami, Chi-
cago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston,
and other offices where sufficient interagency
activity warrants the assignment of a liaison
officer. In offices where a specific individual is
not designated, the Regional Director or
agent-in-charge will be responsible for
BNDD/Customs liaison. In each office a back-
up individual will be designated to act in
the absence of the primary liaison officer.
6685.64 Open Files.
BNDD will maintain an open file policy
in regard to investigative files. Any investi-
gative file containing information of interest
to Customs will be open for review of the
appropriate Customs agent.
6685.65 Exchange of Reports.
Copies of investigative reports will be fur-
nished to Customs on a local level on mat-
ters pertaining to that agency's specific re-
sponsibility. Paragraph 1C of the guidelines
gives BNDD the responsibility for advising
Customs of all information regarding the
identity and circumstance of the probable
movement into the United States of smug-
glers and/or contraband. BNDD will im-
mediately (without regard to normal duty
hours) refer to Customs any information
which has a smuggling aspect even though
there is no specific information as to the
time or place of such suspected smuggling.
Included in the report, if appropriate, will
be BNDD's interest and proposed course of
action with regard to the information and
any appropriate action desired by BNDD. If
limited time requires that the information
be forwarded orally It will be documented
when time permits. This documentation can
be in the form of a memorandum to the ap-
propriate Customs agent-in-charge or can be
accomplished through the transmittal of
BNDD investigative reports.
If the information is a part of an investi-
gative file, a copy of the memorandum will
be placed in the case file as well as the Cus-
toms cooperation files both in the Region
and at Headquarters. Paragraphs 1D and 10
of the Guidelines generally require BNDD to
inform Customs of all investigative activities
which have a smuggling aspect. Paragraph 10
specifically requires BNDD to inform Cus-
toms as soon as possible of all investigative
activities in border areas .gf Canada and
Mexico which have a smuggling aspect.
All information of this nature will be re-
ported immediately (without regard to nor-
mal duty hours) even though it has not been
fully developed. In any investigation where
BNDD contemplates activity which might
develop into a smuggling situation, Customs
will be advised in advance that the activity
may be of interest so they can prepare to
react in cooperation with BNDD if necessary.
, This notification will be accomplished
through -the BNDD agents assigned to the
Customs border offices and/or the appropriate
BNDD liaison representative.
Where the guidelines indicate "in writing
if possible" this is interpreted to mean that
the writing may follow the required action
when absolutely necessary; however, all ac-
tions will be confirmed in writing.
Where BNDD is required to concur in an
action by Customs the written concurrence
will be in the form of a memorandum from
the BNDD official to the appropriate Customs
official with an information copy forwarded
to Headquarters.
6685.66 Procedures for Communieation of
Information or Requests for Investigation
Between the Customs Agency Service and
BNDD Foreign Regions.
The following procedures apply to all
forms of communication.
A. Any transmittal of information or re-
quest for investigation by a domestic Cus-
toms office to a foreign BNDD Region will be
routed to the domestic BNDD Regional Di-
rector in whose jurisdiction the originating
Customs office is located. The originating
Customs office will also:
1. Transmit an information copy of the
communication to the Bureau of Customs,
Office of Investigations.
2. Forward an information only copy to
the Customs liaison officer in the concerned
foreign BNDD office.
3. Make additional distribution to other
interested domestic Customs offices.
The domestic BNDD Regional Director
will:
1. Forward the communication to the for-
eign Regional Director of BNDD for action.
2. Make additional distribution to BNDD
Headquarters and other concerned offices
within BNDD.
B. In responding to Customs requests for
investigation or transmitting information of
interest to domestic Customs Agency Serv-
ice Offices, the foreign Regional Director
will:
1. Transmit the information to the domes-
tic Regional Director of BNDD in whose
jurisdiction the requesting or interested
Customs offiCe is located. The domestic Re-
gional Director is then responsible for dis-
semination of the information to the con-
cerned Customs office.
2. Provide a copy to BNDD Headquarters.
3. Provide a copy to the Customs liaison
officer located in the foreign office of BNDD.
The Customs liaison officer is then respon-
sible for expeditious dissemination of the
information to Customs Headquarters.
C. Domestic BNDD Regional Directors will
forward classified correspondence to the for-
eign Regions following established BNDD
procedures. (See subchapter 823, Inspection
Manual.) Until the domestic Regions are
provided with teletype equipment capable
of sending classified or sensitive messages
through BNDD Headquarters to the foreign
Regions, information of this nature will be
transmitted to BNDD Headquarters follow-
ing currently established procedures for
transmission to the foreign Regions. Clas-
sified correspondence originated in the for-
eign Regions will be transmitted to the con-
cerned domestic Regional Director for refer-
ral to Customs domestically ? following es-
tablished procedures. Classified or sensitive
teletype messages originated in foreign Re-
gions will be routed to BNDD Headquarters.
BNDD Headquarters will in turn disseminate
the information to the concerned domestic
BNDD Regional Director for transmittal to
the concerned Customs office located in his
jurisdictioh following current procedures for
domestic dissemination of such material.
BNDD Headquarters will also provide Cus-
toms Headquarters with copies of these clas-
sified or sensitive messages from the foreign
Regional Directors.
D. Under emergency conditions the origi-
nating Customs office will:
1. Attempt to communicate following pro-
cedures as set out in A above.
2. In the rare instance that the Customs
originator 16 unable to obtain a response
from the domestic Regional Director of
BNDD, the Customs originator will commu-
nicate directly with the Bureau of Customs
Headquarters which will transmit the infor-
mation to BNDD Headquarters for referral
to the foreign Regional Director concerned.
The Customs originator may also notify the
Customs liaison officer in the foreign Re-
gion that an official request for action in the
foreign Region has been made through
BNDD Headquarters. The Customs origina-
tor will notify as soon as possible the domes-
tic BNDD Regional Director in whose juris-
diction he is located that a direct request
was made through BNDD HeadquArters.
6685.67 Convoys.
BNDD has been given responsibility to
concur with Customs prior to the advance of
convoy cases from the border point of seizure
to the recipient. (See 6685.4 2c.) This con-
currence is required to avoid any possible
conflict between the two agencies at the
point of delivery and also to avoid any com-
promise of enforcement objectives. Since
convoy investigations are an effective en-
forcement technique, Customs may prop-
erly expect that BNDD will concur in these
cases as a general rule. When a convoy is
related to a BNDD investigation, considera-
tion should be given to utilizing the convoy
in furtherance of the BNDD investigation
whenever possible. A convoy should not pro-
ceed if it will seriously jeopardize an active
BNDD investigation. There must be signifi-
cant reasons established which show that
the convoy will be detrimental to the
investigation.
There may be other circumstances in
which it may not be advantageous to pro-
ceed with a convoy investigation. Such situ-
ations would be limited and each must be
evaluated on individual circumstances. Ex-
amples might be where the defendant is de-
termined to be a BNDD fugitive or where
the BNDD files establish that the person ar-
rested at the border is of greater stature in
the traffic than the intended recipient. Also
where no effort has been made to determine
the intended recipient's involvement in the
traffic it may be appropriate to request such
an .effort before permitting the convoy to
proceed. An opinion from the appropriate
U.S. attorney as to the legality of the pro-
posed convoy will be obtained by Customs.
It is imperative that BNDD react immedi-
ately when notified by Customs that a con-
voy is possible. Customs will notify the BNDD
agent assigned to the border offices or the
Customs liaison officer in other offices near-
est the point of seizure, who will obtain
complete details of the investigation. This
person will then communicate with - the
BNDD office at the point of destination to
determine if there is any conflict with cur-
rent BNDD operations. The BNDD agents sta-
tioned at the Customs border offices or,
where the crossing is not at the Mexican or
Canadian border, the BNDD liaison officer
nearest the point of seizure will transmit
BNDD's concurrence to Customs after con-
ferring with the appropriate BNDD offices
involved. The Regions through which a con-
voy will pass enroute to its destination shall
be notified that a convoy is proceeding
through their jurisdiction. The agents as-
signed to Customs border officers or the liai-
son officer at the point of seizure will be re-
sponsible for this notification.
6685.68 Mexican/Canadian border areas.
In the vicinity of the border areas Customs
officers may communicate with Mexican and
Canadian officials on narcotic, marihuana
and dangerous drug matters in support of
BNDD efforts to eliminate the flow of drugs
into the United States. Customs may develop
and maintain sources of information in these
border areas and work directly with Mexican/
Canadian officials in intelligence gathering
functions at the borders.
All operational activities developed as a
result of these intelligence gathering func-
tions which are directed toward the arrest of
individuals or seizure of contraband drugs
will be coordinated and worked jointly with
BNDD and border authorities of Mexico and
Canada. (See paragraph 5, Joint Implemen-
tation Agreement.)
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S 2978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Febraitry
6685.69 Reporting of Investigation.
If action is taken by BNDD on investigative
Information received from Customs, a file
number will be assigned and normal investi-
gative reporting procedures will be followed.
A copy of the information received from
Customs will be filed in the Customs co-
operation files both in the Region and
at Headquarters. All pertinent subjects
will be indexed.
6685.7 Resolution of disputes.
In the event of a dispute, the circum-
stances of disagreement will be submitted
by memorandum to the Assistant Director
for Enforcement for referral to the Chief
Inspector, BNDD. The Chief Inspector will
immediately provide a copy of the memo-
randum to the Customs Office of Internal
Security and arrange for joint investigation
of the matter.
Any statements included in the investi-
gation file explaining the conduct of the
Investigation that relate to the jurisdictional
guidelines will be placed on an Administra-
tive Page attached to the pertinent report
and not In The body of the report itself.
COPY OF STATE DEPARTMENT T:-:LEGRAM
(From: Secretary of State to numerous
Missions dated July 28, 1972.)
Following is joint White House/State/CIA/
Treasury/Justice Message:
Subject: Relationship of Customs and Bei DD
agents overseas engaged in narcotics con-
trol work.
Reference: State 230669.
1. As of this date, 18 Customs special
agents have been ordered on assignment to
the posts listed below in the numbers indi-
cated: Madrid (1), Barcelona (1), Hamburg
(1), Munich (1), Monterey (1), Quito (1),
Buenos Aires (1), Panama City (1), Bogota,
(1), Asuncion (1), Bangkok (1), Saigon (1),
Tokyo (1), Ottawa (1).
2. These assignments will be carried out
under the following arrangements which will
supersede prior directives concerning the re-
lationship of Customs and BNDD agents en-
gaged in narcotics control work. This cable
sets forth these arrangements.
3. The chief of mission is the official ac-
credited directly by the President to deal with
the host government on narcotics matters.
As with other mission elements, the chief
of mission has full authority and responsi-
bility for the direction of all the elements
of the mission dealing with the international
problem in narcotics and dangerous dregs.
This authority and responsibility is consist-
ent with the President's letter to all chiefs
of mission of December 9, 1969.
4. The Commissioner of Customs and Di-
rector of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dan-
gerous Drugs agree that representatives of
each of the agencies can best contribute to
the total country team effort to suppress the
movement of narcotics and dangerous drugs
by working cooperatively but maintaining
agency identity and focusing efforts accord-
ing to their respective domestic statutory
responsibilities. This will be carried out under
the technical direction of their respective
agencies. The senior representatives of both
Customs and BNDD will be members of the
country team.
5. Customs is to concentrate on the de-
velopment of intelligence concerning people
and transportation means used ta facilitate
smuggling (routes of travel, methods of
transportation, and places of concealment).
BNDD is to concentrate on producers, re-
finers, and distribution organizations. Each
customs and BNDD representative is ex-
pected to cooperate wholeheartedly in mat-
ters of mutual concern under the general
policy recuirementa of the chief of mission:
6. Customs will appoint coordinators to
work with BNDD regional directors in Raris,
Bangkok, Manila, Mexico City, and Buenos
Aires to insure infra- and inter-regional
c _operation and coordination among cus-
toms and BNDD personnel assigned to spe-
missions. Each agency will contribute
information for analysis, dissemination and
a ::tion to all mission elements involved in the
t .S. Government ant:,-narcotic activities.
Each agency will input and use the central
source registry. The CIA's role in interne-
e anal narcotics control is to remain as de-
fined in REFTEla.
7. The commissioner of customs and di-
n ctor of BNDD have agreed that there will be
tee fullest possible cooperation and exchange
ol' information between their agents. To this
end, customs and BNDD personnel will be
located in the same or adjacent office space
ii at all possible.
8. The chief of missien has authority and
responsibility tc, ensure that the requisite co-
?aeration and exchange of information be-
t veen the two agencies is effected within
his mission and in their commudications
with their regional and Washington head-
quarters.
9. The chief of mission has the authority
to review all outgoing communications and
will- receive copies of all incoming traffic.
Li operational matters the chief of mission
must be kept fully informed by represent-
a eves of each agency and contacts with the
hest government must be conducted with his
knowledge and concurrence.
10. Information on customs use of the
NAROP channel or an equivalent communi-
cations capability will be forthcoming as
soon as details are resolved. Until that time,
no change will be effected concerning exist-
ing usages.
11. Action taken in response to this cable
sliould be reported not later than August 3,
1172. Rogers.
????-
[ ilircerpt from Office of Management and
Budget]
SPECIAL ANALYSIS R : FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR
THE CONTROL OP DRUG ABUSE
Overview.?Spending for Federal drug
ammo prevention and drug law enforcement
programs has increased from $150 million to
$719 million since 1971, a fivefold increase in
3 years.
Testa R-1. Estimated spending for drug
abuse prevention and drug law enforce-
ment programs
[In millions f dollars]
Fiscal year: Oult5i0cry. 2s
1971
1972 413.2
1973 654.8
1974 719.0
Federal drug law enforcement programs
see designed to reduce the supply of Illicit
narcotics and dangerous drugs available in
tee United States. Federal obligations for
such programs will rise in 1974 to $257 mil-
lien from $36 :caillion in 1969, a sevenfold
increase. These programs include such ac-
t vities as international, law enforcement co-
ooeration and cooperative Federal-State-
local law enforcement efforts to identify and
aerest street-level pushers.
Drug law enforcement program activities
as closely linked to drag abuse prevention.
Law enforcement efforts that reduce the
supply of drugs also serve to lower drug
potency and drive up the price of drugs,
thus reducing experimental usage. Together,
higher prices combined with lower potency
aad scarcity can motivate abusers to seek
teatment.
Federal drug abuse prevention programs
a re designed to reduce the demand for illicit
narcotics and dangerous drugs. Activities
funded include ;' treatment programs for ad-
dicts; drug abuse education; research; and
taining. Total estimated Federal obligations
for drug abuse prevention programs will rise
in 1974 to $528 million from $46 million in
1'169. These activities account for 67% of
21, 1973
the total Federal funds for drug abuse pro-
grams in 1974.
Highlights of the drug law enforcement
effort include:
Substantial increases in funding and
manpower for both the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangercus Drugs aid the Bureau of
Customs. These funds support concentrated
attacks on smuggling and increased domestic
and internaeional investigation of major
drug traffickers. In 1972, the Departments of
Justice and .-nreasury removed from the U.S.
market or seized overseas:
5,613 pounis of heroin:
887 pounds of cocaine,
451,800 pounds of marihuana, and
220 minion dosage units of dangerous
drugs.
Initiation of a coordinated attack on drug
trafficking in over 40 target cities by teams
of narcotics agents from Federal, State, and
local law enforcement agencies. The Office
of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement was respon-
sible for 4,245 arrests since the spring of 1972.
An intensified investigation of the income
tax returns of middle and 'upper level nar-
cotics traffickers aimed at'reducing the
amount of working capital available for ille-
gal drug operations by assessing and collect-
ing taxes and penalties on unreported in-
come
Development of a national narcotics intel-
ligence system to assure proper analysis and
distribution of trafficking intelligence infor-
Mation.
Activation in 1972 of tee ban on cultiva-
tion of the opium poppy in Turkey and form-
ulation of narcotics control action plans in
59 foreign countries to secure international
cooperation in the global war on heroin.
Preparatior. and release in 1972 of The
World Opium Survey, presenting a compre-
hensive picture of the location and quantity
of opium poppy cultivation.
Establishment of special narcotics courts
in New York City with Federal assistance
eo assure rapid prosecution of narcotics
Offenders.
Development of the Treatment Alterna-
tives to Street Crime program (TASC), link-
ing the criminal justice system to the treat-
ment system. Under this program, drug
abusers who are arrested can be placed in
treatment to reduce street crime and im-
prove social adjustment.
Highlights of the drug abuse prevention
effort include:
An expanaon of federally funded treat-
ment facilities, providing the capacity to
treat 100,000 addicts annually. Funds will be
available to expand the capacity for addict
treatment to over 250,000 addicts by mid-
1974, if necessary. More fedeally funded treat-
ment facilities were created in 1972 than in
the previous 5-0 years.
A nationwide review of all methadone
maintenance programs. As a result of that
review, new methadone regulations were is-
sued on December 15, 1972, designed to as-
sure high quality treatment for addicts and
to prevent illicit diversion of this synthetic
narcotic subseance.
A worldwide treatment and rehabilitation
program for military servicemen, including
a large scale screening and early intervention
program to identify and treat drug abusers
before they become dependent. From June
17, 1971 to September 30, 1972, 250 drug
treatment and rehabilitation facilities were
activated. During this period, an average of
8,500 servicemen were receiving treatment.
A newly developed Veterans Administra-
tion treatment system that offered care to
more than 20,000 veterans in 1972.
Total estimated obligations for drug law
enforcement will rise in 1974 to $257 million
l'rom $228 m:llion in 1973 and $164 million
in 1972. Drug law enforcement programs ac-
count for 33% of the total funds available
in 1974 for drug abuse. Detailed obllgationa
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by both program category and agency are
shown in a table at the end of this analysis.
TABLE R-2,-DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT OBLIGATIONS
tin millions of dollars]
Agency
1972
1973
1974
Justice:
LEAA
BNDD
Other Justice
State
Agency for International Do-
velopment
Treasury:
IRS
Customs
Agriculture
Transportation
Total
19. 6
63.3
1.0
20. 7
10.1
46.9
2.1
.1
36.3
70.5
2.2
1.5
42. 7
18.9
54.3
1.8
.1
44. I
74.1
6.7
1.5
42.7
19.7
66.2
1.8
.1
163.8
220.3
256.9
This increase reflects an intensified effort
to deny narcotics to abusers and addicts by
halting production and tracking from abroad,
interdicting narcotics smuggling at national
borders, and preventing the sale of drugs on
city streets.
The Office for Drug Abuse Law Enforce-
ment (DALE) in the Department of Justice
conducts operations -against street pushers
with criminal investigators from BNDD and
Customs and with special U.S. Attorneys.
These groups serve on task forces with State
and local enforcement personnel in over 40
target cities. Special grand juries expedite
consideration of cases. In its first 8 months
Of ? operation, DALE arrested 4,245 alleged
heroin pushers and convicted 470.
The Office of National Narccitics Intelli-
- gence (ONNI) in the Department of Justice
was created to bring together all information
regarding production, smugglers, trafficking,
and sale of drugs. ONNI brings together in-
telligence information, coordinates and ana-
lyzes the information, and disseminates com-
bined reports to Federal and State and local
enforcement agencies for their use.
The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs (BNDD) in the Justice Department in-
creased its agents and compliance officers in
the 'United States and overseas from 808 in
1969 to 1,652 in 1973. Its principal activities
include the investigation of major drug traf-
fickers; enforcement of Federal antidrug
laws; the conduct of research and specialized
drug training programs for foreign law en-
forcement agents; and the provision of tech-
nical assistance to Federal, State, and local
personnel. BNDD supported foreign govern-
ments in seizing 4,342 pounds of hard drugs
and 115,000 pounds of marihuana from illicit
foreign markets in 1972 compared to 3,173
pounds of hard drugs and 40,000 pounds of
marihuana in 1971.
The Law Enforcement Assistance Admin-
istration (LEAA) in the. Department of
Justice provides financial support for State
and local drug law enforcement efforts.
The Bureau of Customs in the Department
of the Treasury is responsible for the inter-
diction of illicit drugs at U.S. borders. Over
the past 4 years, Customs has increased its
personnel in order to expand its efforts to
monitor traffic at points of entry, police
borders, and conduct research into drug
detection techniques. The Bureau seized
1,077 pounds of hard narcotics and 218,500
pounds of marihuana in 1972.
The ,Internal Revenue Service (IRS), also
within the Treasury Department, attacks
mid-level and top-ranking traffickers through
intensive investigations of incomes and tax
returns. An estimated $10.1 million has been
spent on IRS activities in 1972. In 17 months,
IRS has assessed 682.5 million in taxes, col-
lected $15.8 million in currency and prop-
erty, and obtained 44 indictments and 20
convictions.
The Department of State is responsible
for mobilizing the efforts of foreign govern-
TABLE R 7.--DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT FUNDING
tin millions of dollars]
ments aganist the overseas production and
distribution of narcotics and dangerous
drugs, and for coordinating the narcotics
programs of all Federal agencies abroad. The
Agency for International Development (AID)
in the Department of State assists other
countries in stopping the illicit production,
processing, and traffic in narcotics. AID
provides equipment, training in narcotics
control techniques, and assistance for de-
velopment of alternative crops or other
income-producing activities.
The Department of Agriculture supports
research projects to develop means of erad-
icating the opium poppy and develop suit-
able substitute crops.
The Department of Transportation en-
forces narcotics laws through the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the
Coast Guard. FAA supports Federal, State,
and local authorities in their efforts to com-
bat use of commercial planes in smuggling,
and the Coast Guard polices coastal water-
ways and ports.
DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION PROGRAMS
Drug abuse prevention programs support:
the treatment of addicts; activities designed
to prevent drug addiction; the education and
training of individuals; and research into all
medical aspects of drug abuse treatment and
rehabilitation.
Total estimated Federal obligations for
drug abuse prevention will rise in 1974 to
$528 million. Prevention programs may be
subdivided into:
Directed programs specifically earmarked
for drug abuse purposes and generally funded
directly by a Federal agency.
Bloc grant and financing programs over
which the Federal Government exercises
minimal direct control, e.g., public assistance
and Federal bloc grant programs.
The following table summarizes aggregate
Federal obligations for drug abuse prevention
programs for selected years from 1969.
Agency
Law Ed uca-
en- tion/
force- infer- Trai n-
ment mation ing
Re- Eval u-
sea rch ation
Plan/
coordi-
nation/
sup-
port Total
1972 OBLIGATIONS
Justice:
Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration_-
. ___ 16. 6
Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs 49. 5 2.7
State 1.0
3.0 19.6
I., 5 9.6 63.3
1.0
Agency for International
Development 20.7
Treasury:
Internal Revenue Service. __ _ 10.1
Bureau of Customs 42. 8
Transportation .1
Agriculture
20.7
10.1
.6 0.2 3.4 46.9
1
2.1 2:1
Total 140. 8
2.7 7.1 .2 13.0 63.81
; 1973 OBLIGATIONS
Justice: -
Law Enforcement Assist-
ance Administration 30. 3
Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs 57.7
Drug Abuse Law Enforce-
ment .2
National Narcotic Intelli-
gence 2.0
State ? 1.4
Agency for International
Development 42. 7
6.0 36.3
2.8 1.6 8.4 70.5
. 2
2.0
.1 1.5
42.7
Agency
Law Educe-
en- tion/
force- infor- Train- Re- Evalu-
ment matins leg search ation
Plan/
coordi-
nation/
sup-
port Total
Treasury:
Internal Revenue Service__ _ _ 18.9 18.9
Bureau of Customs 49.0 0.8 0.2 4.3 54.3
Transportation .1 .1
Agriculture 1.8 1.8
Total 202.3 0. 1 2.8 10.2 .2 12.7 228. 3
1974 OBLIGATIONS
Justice:
Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration 34.1 10.0 44.1
Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs 60.0 2.9 2.0 9. 2 74. 1
Drug Abuse Law Enforce-
ment 3.7 3.7
National Narcotic Intelli-
gence 3_I 3.0
State 1.4 .1 1.5
Agency for International
Development 42.7 42.7
Treasury: ?
Internal Revenue Service__ 19.7 19.7
Bureau of Customs 58. 1 2. 6 .2 5.3 66. 2
Transportation .1 . 1
Agriculture 1.8 1. 8
Total 222.8 .1 2.9 16.4 .2 14.5 256 9
EXCERPTS PROM FEDERAL PROGRAMS RELATING
TO TTIE CONTROL QE DRUG ABUSE
(By Barbara Puls, EcruCation and Public
Welfare Division, ,Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress)
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1971, President Nixon identified
drug abuse as "America's public enemy num-
ber 1." The statistics relating to drug abuse
indicate how widespread and costly the prob-
lem has become. The Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs has estimated that as of
December 31, 1971, there were about 559,000
narcotic addicts in the United States, A
report reltased in October 1972, by a New
York State commission on education found
that 45% of the high school students in New
York City are using hard or soft drugs. Up
to 50% of all metropolitan area property
crime is believed to stem from the addict's
need to support his habit. A study conducted
by psychologists at UCLA for the Bureau of
Narcotics estimated that drug addiction is
costing the U.S. more than 4.7 billion dollars
annually in crime, enforcement, treatment
and research expenses-to say nothing of the
tragic human loss.
In response to the increasing number of
problems related to drug abuse, the Federal
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government has been expanding its efforts
significa:ntly over the past several years to
prevent drug addiction and to treat and
rehabilitate those who have become drug
dependent. New programs have been devel-
oped, existing programs have been expanded,
and appropriations have been sharply in-
creased (see chart, "Federal Drug Abuse Pro-
grams?Estimated Obligations Summary").
More than 30 agencies, departments, offices,
and commissions now operate programs
which in some way attack the problem of
drug abuse.
As more and more agencies became in-
volved in drug abuse prevention activities,
the need arose for coordination of the Fed-
eral effort. Therefore, in Tune 1971, the Pres-
ident created by Executive Order the Special
Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. (SAODAP)
in the Executive Office of the President. In
March of 1972, Congress_ established SAODAP
as an independent office with passage of the
Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972.
The primary function of SAODAP is to co-
ordinate all major Federal drug abuse pre-
vention programa relating to education,
training, treatment, rehabilitation, and re-
search. The Special Action Office is Charged
with setting goals, establishing priorities,
evaluating performance, and specifying how
Federal resources of funds, programs. services
and facilities shall be used to combat drug
abuse in the United States.
LAW ENFORCEMENT
I. Department of Justice
A. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
(RNDD)
The Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs was established in the Justice De-
partment by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of
1968. Its primary 'mission?to prevent; nar-
cotic and dangerous drug abuse through law
enforcement?is accomplished through (1)
controlling legally manufactured drugs, and
(2) through suppressing the illicit drug traf-
fic. BNDDis activities include working with
officials ct foreign governments to halt the
International drug traffic, immobilizing dom-
estic illicit drug distribution networks, pre-
paring cases for prosecuting drug law viola-
tors, and seizing drugs subject to Federal
control. BleDD also provides technical as-
sistance to States and local governmeats In
the form of drug evidence analysis, testi-
mony in court, advisory services and counsel-
ing, and dissemination of technical informa-
tion concerning narcotics and other abused
drugs. The Bureau assists States in drafting
enforcement and regulatory legislation re-
lating to controlled substances, and it offers
training programa to acquaint appropriate
professional and enforcement perionnet with
techniques of investigation, analysis, and
other aspects of drug abuse law enforcement.
B. Law Enforcement Assistance Administra-
tion (LEAA)
Under Title I of the Omnibus eirime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (see "Treat-
ment and Rehabilitation" section), States
can receive block grants for the planning,
establishment and operation of narcotic and
dangerous drug enforcement units. Under
the discretionary fund program, cities and
counties may be granted supplemental sup-
port for projects directly addressing law en-
forcemene and crime control needs, including
rehabiltation, education and eaforcernent
programs..
C. Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement
(DALE)
DALE was created by Executive Order No.
11641 on January 28, 1972, to develop and
implement a concentrated program for en-
forcemene of laws relating to drug abuse
control. DALE task forces, which are investl-
gation-prosecution teams consisting of Fed-
eral investigators, attorneys, Assistant 'U.S.
Attorneys, and State and local police officers,
operated in 34 target cities in 1972. These
task forms are designed to maximize the
campaign to stamp one the illegal drug traf-
lc through effective law enforcement. DALE
eso operates the "Heroin Hotline" through
Which citizens may report information re-
garding alleged narcctics law violators in
.ftrict confidence,
Office of National Narcotics Intelligence
The office of National Narcotics Intelligence
vas created by Exec'ative Order No. 11676
on July 27, 1972, to settle as a clearinghouse
:or Federal, State and local law enforcement
iigencies to collect and disseminate intelli-
gence on the illegal drug traffic and teat-
eickers. The office is not given independent
nuthority to collect information or investi-
gate drug-related cases; all information Is
supplied to the office by existing agencies.
E. Criminal Division
The Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section
of the Justice Department's Criminal Divis-
ion was estabLished as parte of the 1968 re-
organization plan. This section supervises all
Federal prosecutions for criminal violations
of the laws relating to narcotics and danger-
ous drugs. It is also responsible for litigation
to commit addicts under the authority of
the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act.
F. Immigration and Naturalization Service
The Service's Border Patrol is responsible
for cooperating in preventing the smuggling
of narcotics and dangerous drugs across the
U.S. border at places other than ports of
entry.
II. Department of the Treasury
A. Bureau of Customs
The Bureau of Customs is responsible for
preventing the illegal entry of drugs into
the country by seizing such substances at
border potnts and ports of entry. The Bureau
makes use of the Customs Automated Data
Processing Intelligence Network (CADPIN)
which contains the records of known and
suspected smugglers and related data. The
Detector Dog Program, which was initiated
in August 1970, is directed mainly against
the smuggling of marihuana and hashish.
"Operation Cooperation," which is a joint
'U.S.-Mexican eftort, is a Custom's operation
esigned to reduce the flow of illegal drugs
Into the United States from over the Mexican
border.
B. Internal Revenue Service
IRS is Involved in a systematic drive
against middle and upper echelon distribu-
tors and financiers involved in narcotic
trafficking for possible civil and/or criminal
elolations of the Internal Revenue Code.
Traffickers are identified by BNDD, and local
lee enforcement agencies, and they are then
investigated for possible prosecution on in-
come tax evasion charges.
III. Department of State
A. Office of the Senior Advisor to the Secre-
tary for International Narcotics Matters
This office has primary responsibility
within the State Department for mobilizing
and coordinating foreign and U.S. efforts to
control the international narcotics traffic.
Also, narcotics control ceordineytors have been
assigned to all American embassies in coun-
tries affected by the narcotics problem either
as narcotics-producing or narcotics-transit
countries.
L. Agency for International Development
(AID)
Economic assistance required by foreign
countries to develop narcotics control pro-
grams is supplied by AID. In addition, the
egency trains foreign local officials, provides
teem with, technical assistance, and procures
equipment required for the narcotics pro-
grams approved by the Agency atid the in-
volved country.
IV. Department Of Transportation
A. Coast Guard
The Coast Guard cooperates with Customs
and BNDD by providing assistance to these
agencies when they require the use of Coast
Guard equipment or personnel during an
investigation.
B. Federal Aviation Administration
The Federal Aviation Administration pro-
vides radar coverage for U.S. borders and
flight information on aircraft when requested
by agencies such as Customs and IINDD.
V. Cabinet Committee on International
Naropties Control
This Cabinet level committee, chaired by
the Secretary of State, wee established by the
President on September 7, 1971. The commit-
tee is charged with formulating and coordi-
nating all policies of the Federal govern-
ment relating to the goal of eliminating the
now of illegal narcotics and dangerous drugs
into the 'U.S. from abroad. In July of 1972, the
committee Issued its first report, "World
Opium Survey 1972.
By Mr. BROOKE (for himself and
Mr. Kanneay) :
S. 943. A bill to provide for the estab-
lishment of an urban national park
known as the Lowell Historic Canal Dis-
trict National Cultural Park in the city
of Lowell, Mass., and for other purposes.
Referred to the Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs.
Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, it is with
great pleasure that I reintrodtice with
Senator Keineene a bill to provide for
the establishment of the Lowell Historic
Canal District National Cultural Park.
As I told this Chamber last May, the cre-
ation of an urban national park In Low-
ell, Mass., would represent an innovative
means of grappling with the problems
not uncommon to cities which have a
rich historical tradition, but a declining
industrial base.
This bill was first introduced before
the 92d Congress by one of Massachu-
setts' most distinguished Congressmen,
Representative Brad Morse, now Under-
secretary General of the United Nations.
Iris very able successor, Representative
PAUL CRONIN has reintroduced the bill
in the House with cosponsorship from
every Representative in the Massachu-
setts delegaiion. Behind this measure lies
the steady, dedicated work of the citizens
of Lowell who have worked so closely
with Representative Morse and now Rep-
resentative CRONIN in making this idea
a reality.
This legislation proposes that the his-
toric mill section of Lowell be included
within the national park system, under
The Natural Cultural Park category.
Lowell is uniquely qualified for this hon-
or. Established over 150 years ago, this
great city was the first in America
planned entirely for industry. It has over
5 miles of 'canals which once were the
lifeblood of the most productive textile
mills in America. To these mills came
people with wonderfully divergent ethnic
backgrounds blessing Lowell with a
unique cultural heritage.
However, modern technology has ini-
tiated a new industrial revolution and
the city of Lowell has suffered unfortu-
nate conseqeences. The once proud mills
now lie silent. A booming economy now
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