DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1974

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75B00380R000500290006-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 6, 1974
• Content Type: OPEN

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May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA
cept of reciprocity is introduced into
diplomacy. In my view, it is time we drew
the line, recognized we cannot be all
things to all men, and introduced a bit
of reality into these proceedings.
Therefore, I will shortly present to
? this chamber a bill that would prohibit
the shipment of goods or services from
U.S. firms either here or abroad to U.S.-
owned firms in other countries being
forced to do business with Castro's Cuba.
My bill would put the teeth back in the
trading with the enemy act and take
U.S.-owned companies out of the position
of establishing foreign policy for this
country.
This measure would stipulate our posi-
tion without interfering with any other
nation's right to self-determination.
Passage of this bill would make it crys-
tal clear to all concerned that we have
no intention of changing our policy to-
ward Cuba until such time as Cuba
changes her policy toward the rest of
the hemisphere. That may sound like
harsh medicine, but harsh medicine
seems to be what is required. If the
choice lies between corporate profits and
the cause of freedom in the Western
Hemisphere, there can be no doubt, and
I think most every corporate executive
would agree with me on this, that the
cause of freedom must prevail. For our
sakes and for the sake of the freedom-
loving Cuban people, I hope that ConJ
gress will take the steps necessary to
see that it does.
NEW HAMPSHIRE BANK COMMIS-
SIONER SPEAKS OUT ON FEDERAL
INTEREST RATE CONTROLS
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the
distinguished New Hampshire State
Bank Commissioner, Mr. James W. Nel-
son, recently commented on the manner
In which Federal interest rate controls,
commonly referred to as "Regulation Q,"
work against the best interest of the
small saver.
I share Jim Nelson's feelings on the un-
fair impact that Regulation Q has on
the average saver and have also spoken
out against this Federal policy.
Federal interest rate controls were orig-
inally enacted in the hope that their
existence would tend EC hold down in-
terest rates on loans and particularly
with regard to mortgages. Our exper
ence, however, his been just the opposi
and we find ourselves in a situa
whereby the small saver is receivi q,an
unrealistically low return on his o ary
savings during a period of rec high
Interest rates.
These interest rate cont only ap-
ply to savings accounts o 00,000 or
less and, in effect, allow wealthy to
obtain a fair market p s for his sav-
ings and, at the same e, the smaller
saver is held to a .imum 5-percent
interest on his savin account at a com-
mercial bank and 4 percent on a reg-
ular savings acc t in thrift institu-
tions. These pre t interest rate maxi-
mums are tota unrealistic and cannot
be justified.
I compliment Commissioner Nelson for
the Public position he has taken and re-
quest unanimous consent that an article
appearing in the Saturday, April 27 edi-
tion, of the Nashua Telegraph be printed
in the Recoils.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the Recoao,
as follows:
NEW HAMPSHIRE BANK COMMISSIONER HITS
FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS
CONCORD, N.H.?New Hampshire Bank
Commissioner James W. Nelson said today
federal restrictions on the interest paid on
savings accounts give an unfair advantage
to the rich.
His pet peeve, and what he sees as the
big problem today in the struggle by banks
to attract investment money, is federal Reg-
ulation Q. It sets a limit of 5 per cent for
the interest commercial banks may pay on
ordinary savings accounts, 5.25 per cent for
savings institutions.
"Reegulation Q is undemocratic in that
It places at a disadvantage the little fellow,"
Nelson said.
"Regulation Q is undemocratic in that
can pay in interest, but there is no maxi-
mum prescribed on deposits of $100,000 or
more. Someone with that kind of money can
go in and bargain with the bank. A man
with 6100,000 to invest can probably get a
10 per cent on a certificate of deposit,"
said.
Besides favoring the rich, Nelson
Regulation Q drives savings money ay
from banks because the federal gove ent
itself offers a more attractive rate per
cent interest or more on some of secu-
rities.
But that 8 per cent is only f ose who
can buy in units of $1,000?o ore, if the
bills available on a given da ppen to be
in units of $10,000 or more, aid.
If banks can't attract gh money at
going interest rates fro vers, they lack
money to loan out?or Ye to bargain with
big investors for muc '-'gher rates, and in
turn will have to oh high loan interest
rates, Nelson explai
Bank security h een in New Hampshire
headlines as the erstate highway system
makes it possib ? or big city hoodlums to
rob formerly I cessible banks and get out
of New Ramp e again quickly.
"I myself der if we have to go back to
the old t ank we had at the turn of the
century," th tellers separated from the
public metal and stone counters and
grilles. son said.
"If lers can stay behind bullet proof
glass d have access to police through an
ala system, that's all you can do," he said.
PUBLIC PROTECTION
e outlined the department's purpose as
rotecting the public interest by securing
e safety and soundness of banks and by
promoting competition." Nelson said the
last time a bank failed in New Hampshire
was in 1953 when the Valley Trust Co. of
Penacook closed. It said it had made loans
"considerably over the legal limit" and some
loan recipients went bankrupt.
The commissioner said New Hampshire's
law limiting branch banks to those within
15 miles of the headquarters bank had
helped prevent takeover of the banking in-
dustry by out-of-state giants.
Nelson got into banking during the de-
pression when he worked for the New Hamp-
shire Savings Bank Association, a forerunner
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. "All
the savings banks in the state banded to-
gether for mutual protection. It liquidated
seven banks and paid off 100 cents on the
dollar on them," he said, making New Hamp-
shire one of the states least hurt by bank
closings.
Nelson joined the Banking Department
in 1942 as an examiner, became deputy com-
missioner in 1952, and was made commis-
sioner in 1968.
S 7113
Nelson recalls when his disgust w h leek
of money as a musician drove him in r. bank-
ing.
Early in the Depression, he w playing
clarinet with a band doing a T nksgiving
Eve dance at the armory in Tro N.Y., on a
60-40 profit split with the ma gement.
"When the dance was over e found the
management had run off wit I the money.
We didn't have a darn pe . We collected
five ginger ale bottles, t ed them in for
25 cents at a grocery stor and had five-cent
hamburgers and a cup coffee at a White
Tower. That was our anksgiving." Nelson
said.
DEATH OF
LEAVES A
OF LA
IN
VIRG
LES C. STANLEY
GE VOID IN RANKS
LEADERSHIP AND
HEARTS OF WEST
ANS
Mr. NDOLPH. Mr. President, on
Frid May 3, one of the ablest labor
lea s of our Nation died unexpectedly,
1 ng his friends and associates
cked and saddened. Miles Stanley,
esident of the West Virginia Labor
ederation, was a gentleman and a labor
union statesman. His life exemplified
character and compassion and courage.
His dedicated leadership, in a broad
range of worker, community, and educa-
tion interests was the hallmark of his
arduous career. His commitment to that
cause which he thought was right and in
the public welfare was never in doubt. He
presented his case always with earnest-
ness but without rancor.
Miles devoted more than half of his
life as an advocate for the well-being of
those who toil. He gained wide respect
among his adversaries by his gentle
manner and reasoned presentations.
At the age of 49, Miles Stanley stood
at the pinnacle of achievement in his ef-
forts on behalf of the people of our State
and region. In the early 1960's, President
Kennedy and our State officials turned
to this vigorous and selfless man to help
spearhead the endeavors to assess the ills
of Appalachia and recommend corrective
action. From these studies came the
basic structure of legislation creating the
Appalachian Regional Commission and
similar economic development bodies
across the country.
In 1964, Miles was instrumental in
creating the AFL-CIO Appalachian
Council, an organization composed of
State central bodies in a multi-State
region. Its purpose, he wrote?
Is to aid the Appalachian poor and secure
to disadvantaged regional inhabitants, to the
extent possible, the realization of their full
economic and cultural potential.
Working in cooperation with employ-
ers and funded by the Manpower Admin-
istration of the U.S. Departfnent of La-
bor and the Office of ...Education, the
Council has in the past 5 years recruited
nearly 20,000 youth to Job Corps Centers
and placed more than 14,000 other
trainees in jobs at minimal costs.
Last week, only hours before he was
felled by a massive heart attack, Miles
was scheduled to meet with Members of
Congress as a member of the board of
the Appalachia Educational Laboratory.
This is a research and development or-
ganization he supported strongly because
of his belief that in education lies the
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S 7114 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE Way 6, 1974
key to progress for t
loved mountains.
Miles Stanley was
the laborer because
the ranks and und
and aspirations. He
bor movement for m
beginning his career
serving .as recording
union local. After enlis
Army in World War
civilian life and becarn
local in the United
America. He was electe
children of his be-
true champion of
(wed up through
tood their needs
active in the la-
than 31 years,
machinist and
retary of his
service in the
he returned to
n officer Cf his
elworkers of
ocal president
In 1947.
After serving in a n
positions with the Stee
elected the first presicl
Labor Federation in 19
merger of the America
Labor and the Congre
Organizations.
Miles Stanley was bor
est home of loving pa
Kanawha County. He
tive of that community,
his service and dedica
movemer t extended to
councils of labor. A
Meany, who selected
ant in 1965, has descr
the most promising St
the union, and I. W.
the United Steelwor
death "a tragic loss fo
State of West Virginia
ment and, in partic
Steelworkers of Ameni
the Senate Labor an
Committee valued his
Miles Stanley was m
I recall that when he
his father brought him
I was speaking in Dun
shook hands with me
beginning of a valued f
This morning in Dun
his wife, Romaleda, th
tens, and his mother,
ley. Mike was truly a C
his values are reflec
knit family, devotion,
standing.
The passing of Miles
a large void in the rank
ship and in the hearts
ginians vat? shared his
human freedom and h
all Americans.
ber of official
rkers, he was
Of the State
following the
Federation of
of Industrial
a very inod-
ts in Dunbar,
a lifelong na-
t the scope of
to the ::ablor
internat io:nal
0 Presj.dent
s as an assist-
hirmas one of
presidents in
, president of
, termed his
e Nation, the
e labor move-
r, the United
" Members of
blic Welfare
nsel.
erished friend.
s 10 years old,
meet me when
r. Young Miles
that was the
ndship.
, I visited with
three dough-
Worthy Stan-
stian man and
in his closely
e, and under-
Stanley leaves
f labor leader-
all West Vir-
ncern for the
an dignity of
QUORUM d
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr esident. I sug-
gest the absence of a uorum.
The ACTING PRE PENT pro tem-
pore. The: clerk will c the roll.
The second as'sista legislative clerk
proceeded to call the r I.
Mr. THURMOND. President, 1: ask
unanimous consent th the order for the
quorum call be rescin d.
The PRESIDING ? CER. Without
objection it is so or ? erect
DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL APPRO-
PRIAT EON AUTHORIZATION ACT.
1974
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tent-
pore. Under the previous order, the l3en-
ate will now proceed to the consideration
of S. 2999, which will be stated.
The ASSISTANT LESISLATIVE CLERK. A
bill (S. 2999) to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1974 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
tracked combat vehicles, and other weep-
() is and research, development, test and
evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to
stithorize construction at certain instal-
lations, and for other purposes, which
was reported from the Committee on
Armed Services with an amendment to
strike out all after tkle enacting clause
and insert:
TITLE I?PROCUREMENT
SEC. 101. In addition so the funds author-
ized to be appropriated under Public Law
9e-tes there is hereby authorized to be ap-
propriated during fiscal year 1974 for the use
of the Armed Forces of she United States for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval ves-
sels, tracked combat vehicles, and other
weapons authorized by law, in amounts as
follows:
AIRCRAFT
For aircraft: for the Army, $15,000,000; for
the Navy and the Marine Corps, $37,500,000;
RA' the Air 'Force, $120,900,000.
MISSILES
For missiles: for the Army, $47,100,000;
for the Navy, $17,000,C00; for the Marine
Carps, $22,300,010; for the Air Force, $22,-
900,000. ?
TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES
For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army,
$ 2,000,000.
OTHER WEAPONS
For other weapons: for, the Army, $8,000,-
000.
AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER FUNDS
SEC. 102. In addition to the funds author-
ized to be appropriated under section 101 of
this Act, there are authorized to be made
available by transfer during the fiscal year
1974 to the Departmen; of Defense, out of
any unexpended funds appropriated under
the heading "Emergency Security Assistance
its* Israel" in title IV of the Foreign Assist-
ance and Related Pros;rams Appropriation
Al, 1974, the following amounts:
Alums ET
For aircraft: for the Navy and the Marine
Csrps, $63,600,010; for the Air Force, $33,-
900,000.
MISSILES
For missiles: for the Army, $19,200,000.
TRACKED COME/IT VEHICLES
For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army,
$58,900,000.
OTHER WEAPONS
For the weapons; for the Army, $200,000.
TITLE II?RESEARC/1, DEVELOPMENT.
TEST AND EVALUATION
SEC. 201. In addition to the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated under Public
Law 93-155, these is hereby authorized to be
appropriated during the fiscal year 1974, for
the use of the ,Armed Forces of the United
Ssates for research, deselopment, test and
evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts
as follows:
For the Army, $35,898.000.
For the Navy (including the Marine
C?srps), $33,523,000;
For the Air Force, $29,466,000; and
For the Defense Agencies, $5,016,000.
TITLE III?MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
SEC. 301. In addition to the funds au-
tLorized to be appropriated under Public
Law 93-166,, there ils hereby authorized to be
appropriated during the fiscal year 1974 for
use by the Secretary of Defense, or his des-
ignee, for military family housing, for
operating expenses and maintenance of real
property In s'apport of military family hous-
ing, an amount not to exceed $3,866,000.
SEC. 302. The authorization contained in
this title shall be subject to the authoriza-
tions and limitations of the Military Con-
struction Authorization Act, 1974 (Public
Law 93-166), in the same manner as if such
authorization had been included an that
Act.
This Act may be cited se the "Department
of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Au-
thorization Alt, 1974".
The ACTNG PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The time for debate on this bill is
limited to 3 hours, to be equally divided
and controlled by the majority and mi-
nority leaders or their designees, with a
limitation cl:! 30 minutes on any amend-
ment, except an amendment to be offered
by the Senasor from Massachusetts (Mr.
KENNEDY), on which there is a limita-
tion of 1 hour, and any debatable motion
or appeal.
Who yields time?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
suggest the absence of s quorum.
The ACT:IIG PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. On whose time?
Mr. THURMOND. Without the time
being charged to either side.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Is there objection? The Chair hears
none. The clerk will call the roll.
The secor.d assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACT:ENG PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. MANineeaLD. I yield myself such
time as I need on the bill.
Mr. President, what is the pending
business?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. S. 2990 is the pending business.
Mr. MANSFIELD. What is the title of
that business?
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. S. 2999 is a bill to authorize appro-
priations during the fiscal year 1974 for
procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and
other weapons and research, develop-
ment, test, and evaluation for the Armed
Forces, and to authorize construction at
certain installations, and for other pur-
poses..
Mr.
MANSFIELD. I (lid not expect to
get the full treatment. but I appreciate
It. [Laughter).
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that debate on the amendment to
be offered by the distinguished senior
Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN-
NEDY) begin at the hour of 2 p.m. today.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MANSFIELD. That 1 hour be al-
located on the amendment, and an hour
and a half to be equally divided under
the previous unanimous-consent agree-
ment.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the
Senator from Montana will yield, I will
not object, but just on that amendment
alone, to be equally divided between the
author of the amendment and the Sen-
ator from Mississippi, is that right?
Mr. MANSeatILD. That is correct.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 7115
Mr. ertmtis. I thank the Senator
very much.
The ACTING. PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. 1N8FThL1J In other words, the
vote on the Keim4xly amendment will
occur not later than the hour of 3:3-0
p.m. today.
I thank the Chair and the manager
of the bill.
? Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the follow-
ing people may have the privilege of the
floor during the discussion: of this bill:
John Goldsmith, Catherine 'Nelson, Don
Lynch, Nancy Berg, Edward Braswell,
Clark McFadden, and Edward Kenny.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
Pore. Without objection, it is so or-
dered:
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President,
the Senate now begins consideration
of S. 2999, the supplemental military pro-
curement authorization bill for fiscal year
1974.
At the request of Chairman STENNIS, I
chaired the hearings on this particular
legislation and will handle the bill at this
time on the floor.
The committee is recommending a total
authorization of $415,474,000. This is a
reduction of $841,981,000 from the re-
quest of $1,257,455,000, a reduction of 67
percent from the request.
Before outlining the major items in
this bill, I would comment on the gener-
ally acknowledged purpose of a supple-
mental request. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget's own guidelines for
submitting supplementals to Congress are
as follows:
No supplemental or amendment (or in-
crease in limitation) will be considered unless
the matter is of sufficient urgency to warrant
Immediate action.
Another general premise for request-
ing a supplemental is that subsequent ac-
tions by Congress have created additional
costs which cannot be absorbed within
existing funding; also, that the funding
of these additional costs cannot be de-
layed until the next fiscal year.
The items requested in this legislatien
were judged by the committee in accord-
ance with these "supplemental criteria"
as well as on their merits; and we con-
cluded that many of the programs for
which funds were requested did not meet
the qualification of "sufficient urgency to
warrant immediate action."
In an effort to conserve time, may we
point out that there is before each Mem-
ber a copy of Senate Report 93-781. It
discusses all the aspects of the pending
legislation, and we would hope each
Member would refer to this report with
regard to specific details.
The committee hearings on this sup-
plemental are also available to each
rie4er
I would 'hope that as many Members
as possible would read this important re-
port, Mr. President, because I note that
only two or three Senators are in the
Chamber at this time.
The purpose of this statement is to pre-
sent the highlights Of this legislation as
approved by the committee.
MIDDLE EAST PAYBACK
Included in this supplemental request
Is $155.8 million for what is known as
the Middle East payback?the difference
between what Israel would pay for the
equipment the United States shipped to
them and the cost of the new equipment
that our forces must by to replenish our
own inventory.
The committee recommends language
in this bill which authorizes the transfer
of that $155.8 million for the $2.2 billion
already funded under the military assist-
ance program account as "Emergency
Security Assistance for Israel."
The issue being addressed is not the
amount that is charged to Israel or any
. other foreign country for equipment pro-
vided out of U.S. inventory, but rather in
which account the actual replacement
costs are funded.
At the time the committee marked up
the supplemental request, the Defense
Department advised with respect to the
$2.2 billion that?
Cast data are not. yet complete, but it is
estimated that these additional approvals
(of defense articles and services for sale) will
bring the dollar value of items approved and/
or supplied to Israel since 8 October to ap-
proximately $1.5 billion.
In that some $700 million of the total
approved had not yet been either obli-
gated or identified for obligation, the
committee felt that the additional incre-
mental costs should be borne by the mili-
tary assistance program?MAP?ac-
count.
The committee fully supports the re-
quirement to replace equipment provided
to Israel; however, the committee does
not agree that the replacement costs
should be borne by the military depart,
ments and has included a new section 102
authorizing transfer of the $155.8 mil-
lion from the "Emergency Security As-
sistance for Israel."
DIEGO GARCIA
The committee deferred without prej-
udice the $29 million requested to up-
grade U.S. Navy and Air Force facilities
on the British-owned island of Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
It is the committee's view that testi-
mony did not indicate any great urgency
in this matter. Moreover, because of the
complexity of this issue from both a for-
eign and military policy standpoint, plus
the fact there is yet no signed written
agreement with the British, who own the
island, regarding the status and use of
this island, the committee deemed it pru-
dent to defer the matter for more thor-
ough examination in the fiscal year 1975
military construction authorization bill.
TRIDENT ADVANCE PROCUREMENT
The committee also recommends de-
ferral without prejudice of the $24.8 mil-
lion request for long leadtime compo-
nents for two Trident submarines in
fiscal year 1975, for the following rea-
sons:
In action on the regular fiscal year
1974 defense bill, Congress denied long
lead funding for more than a one Trident
program for fiscal year 1975.
The contract award for the Trident
submarine has slipped.
The Defense Department is now rec-
ommending backfit of the Trident I mis-
sile into the Poseidon.
Development funding for a new and
smaller ballistic submarine, the Narwhal,
is now being requested.
The leadtime for materials and equip-
ment has increased dramatically.
Navy shipbuilding programs continue
to exhibit delays and cost increases.
The peacetime backlog of shipbuilding
is at an alltime high, and the billions
upon billions of dollars involved should
be watched with more care.
INCREASED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY
Programs associated with increased
airlift capability in the supplemental are,
first, 40 million for the C-141 stretch pro-
gram; second, $108.9 million for C-5A/
C-141 increased war readiness replenish-
ment spares; and, third, $19 million for
the Civil Reserve Air Fleet modification.
The committee decided that sufficient
data had not been supplied to make an.
intelligent judgment as to both the
urgency and the merit of the programs in
question and, therefore, recommends
that consideration of these programs be
deferred until review of the regular fiscal
year 1975 budget request.
It should be pointed out that funds re-
quested for these programs in this sup-
plemental, when combined with other
programs in this same category recom-
mended in the fiscal year 1975 budget,
could exceed $3 billion.
In particular, it is the committee's view
that the Civil Reserve Air Fleet modifi-
cation, which involves the modification
of existing commercial airlines with fea-
tures that in a contingency would permit
their use as cargo carriers, should be de-
ferred because the Air Force, the Depart-
ment of Transportation, and the Office
of Management and Budget are still
working on legislation which the Air
Force counsel has recommended be en-
acted prior to implementation of any
such program.
MILITARY ASSISTANCE SERVICE FUNDED
AUTHORITY
The committee recommends denial
of a requested increase in the fiscal year
1974 ceiling on obligations from the
$1.126 billion voted last year to $1.6 bil-
lion, because a thorough examination
of this program by the committee staff
determined that statistical obligations
for ammunition which was delivered in
prior fiscal years should not have been
charged against the fiscal year 1974
ceiling limitation.
This "statistical" reporting method re-
sulted in the reporting during fiscal year
1974 of a $266 million obligation for am-
munition that was actually delivered to
South Vietnam in either fiscal year 1972
or fiscal year 1973, and thus reduced the
real amount of support available in fiscal
year 1974 to $860 million.
Based on congressional action last year
however, it would appear the intent was
to provide sufficient obligational author-
ity so as to permit obligation of new
fiscal year 1974 funds?$907.5 million?
plus unobligated funds?approximately
$200 million estimated by Defense at that
time.
The committee, therefore, points out
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S 7116 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE May 6, .1974'
that the Defense Department could
make a change in its bookkeeping proce-
dures which would enable obligation of
an additional $266 million of already ap-
propriated but unobligated prior year
funds during fiscal year 1974, without
increasing the current fiscal year 1974
ceiling.
The statistical method of reporting
may have been valid when United States
forces and South Vietnam forces were
supported by a common pipeline. How-
ever, since U.S. forces have been with-
drawn, statistical reporting is completely
unsatisfactory. I wish to add that the De-
partment of Defense fully agrees that
their cost-accounting records in this sit-
uation were, to put it mildly, "cockeyed."
The Department of Defense should
change its method of reporting obliga-
tions under the ammunition program
from a statistical basis to a more realistic
basis as soon as possible.
This concludes a summary of the
highlights of this bill. All of the recom-
mendations contained in the committee
report were adopted unanimously, and
the bill w as reported accordingly.
I would like to take this opportunity
to extend my thanks to Chairman
STENNIS, Senator THIJRAIOND, the rank-
ing minority member of the committee,
and to the entire membership of the
committee for their cooperation during
consideration of this legislation.
In addition, I would like to express my
appreciation to the staff for their fine
assistancS in reviewing this rather wide-
ranging legislation in terms of types of
programs; covered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President the
Senate Armed Services Committee re-
ports to the Senate today on the fiscal
year 1974 supplemental defense author-
ization bill, S. 2999, which contains
$571.3 million in new authorization.
The administration requested ape rox-
imately $1.6 million in new authority
and the committee approved about one-
third of that sum. A summary of the
funds requested by title and the arrtouts
approved follows:
lln millions of dollars!
Request Approved
Procurement
1,007.1
458.5
Research and ievelopment....... _
217.5
108.9
Construction _
32.9
3.9
Vietnam aid (MASI
(4740)
Of the $458.5 million approved by the
committee in the procurement request,
the committee directed that $155.8 mil-
lion, known as the Middle East payback
account, be financed from the $2.2 bil-
lion already authorized for emergency
security assistance to Israel. The $155.8
million represents the difference in the
cost to the United States for replace-
ment of Items transferred to Israel dur-
ing the October war period.
In the research and development ac-
count the -committee approved $108.9
million to cover the October 1973 classi-
fied civilian pay raises. The other $108.5
million requested as a "readiness" sup-
plemental was denied on the grounds
that the programs for which these funds
were requested Were not of sufficient ur-
gency to justify inclusion in the supple-
mental,
In the military construction account
the $29 million requested for the naval
buildup on Diego Garcia in the Indian
Ocean was denied without prejudice.
The committee concluded that a buildup
of this nature was of sufficient impor-
tance to justify more thorough examina-
tion in the regular procurement process
for the fiscal year 1975 program.
The final item in the bill involved the
Vietnam aid program which is shown
as the military assietence service funded
account. The administration requested
that the ceiling be lifted from the $1.126
billion approved last year to the $1.6
billion requested in the original fiscal
year 1974 account. In denying the in-
crease in the ceiling the committee did
approve a change in fiscal year account-
ing. This change would provide an addi-
tional $266 minion expenditure under
the $1.126 billion ceiling with a simple
accounting adj ustmen t.
Mr. President, this matter may be ex-
plained by noting that $266 million paid
out in fiscal year 1972 and 1973 for am-
munition was charged against the $1.126
billion ceiling authorized for 1974. Thus
the committee would allow that the
$266 million be shifted back to the ac-
counts during the period when the ex-
penditure actually took place. This pro-
cedure would allow the administration
an additional $266 million in fiscal year
1974. These funds weuld go chiefly for
ammunition, but also for some aircraft
replacement and operation and main-
tenance. Military support costs have ex-
ceeded expectations, because South Viet-
namese forces have met unforeseen
Communist attacks in the current fiscal
year.
Mr. President, frankly, it is my view
the committee was too severe in its paring
03: the fiscal year 1974 supplemental re-
quest. The Middle East war which came
in October of 1973 resulted in a depletion
of many U.S. supplies. The war has
taught 1.1,3 some lessons which require
prompt actions such as acquiring certain
types of new equipment and modifying
some equipment already on hand.
Mr. President, it would have been my
view that more of the approximately
$1.0 billion authority requested by the
administration should have been ap-
proved. However, I support this bill as
presented to the Senate, and urge its
prompt passage:
In closing, Mr. President, I want to
express my sincere appreciation to the
able and distinguished chairman of the
subcommittee, Mr. SYMINGTON, for the
splendid report he has given, which is
very thorough: and also for his unfailing
courtesy in the handling of this matter.
I would also like to express my appre-
ciation to majority counsel, Mr. Lynch,
who worked on the bill with Mr. Ken-
ney, minority counsel both of whom did
fine job.
Mr. SYMINGTION. Mr. President. I
suggest the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro teal-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. THITIMOND. Mr President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, I simply
want to ask whether th3 committee was
in full agreement on this report or not.
Mr. THURMOND. We are in agree-
ment on the report.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
suggest the :absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore. The clerk will cult the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to eall
the roll.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
yield the distinguished chairman of the
Armed Services Committee all the time
that he desires.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The Senator from Mississippi.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from Missouri. I shall use
only about 5 minutes.
As I understand it, this is time on the
bill, and not with reference to the so-
called Kennedy amendment. I shall
defer my discussion of that until later.
Mr. President, the record shows al-
ready, but I repeat now, that I requested
the Senator from Missmari (Mr. Syenero-
TON) to act as chairman for the purpose
of handling this supplemental bill. He
conducted the hearings, the markup, and
is in charge of the bill on the floor today.
The Senator, as my colleagues will re-
call, handled the authorization bill last
year, for fiscal 1974, and this is a supple-
mental bill to the fiscal 1974 authoriza-
tion. So he has continued the fine work
that he did lest year on the 1974' budget,
and I want t) thank him?for myself and
for the membership of the committee--
for his work and efforts on the legisla-
tive items last year and this one, too.
I do fully support the bill before the
Senate today as reported by the com-
mittee. Subatantial cuts were made in
this bill. The committee took the posi-
tion that no item should be included un-
less it met the strict test of need for
funding on ,an emergency basis, without
waiting for regular consideration in the
fiscal 1975 bill.
I want to emphasize that point to the
Senate. Congress must protect itself from
a supplemental bill for this, and a sup-
plemental bill for that, and for every-
thing that any department of the Gov-
ernment may want, just so they can get
the Budget 33ureau's approval. We spend
about 11 months of our time out of each
12, here in session now. I am not com-
plaining about that, except I complain
to this extent: that it keeps us away
from our home States away from our
constituents, and awes from the prob-
lems of those constituents far too much
in the course of a year. We are trying to
meet that problem by having periodic
recesses, which sometimes are called
vacations. 'They are the very opposite of
a vacation. -
Anyway, I shall not dwell on that now.
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CONGRtSSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE S 7117
We just think it should be the rule that
committees shall not take up matters
as an emergency?and that is what a
supplemental 'bill is?unless they are
really emergencies.
One of the Trident submarines, for in-
stance, Was deferred without preffidice
for the forthcoming regular authoriza-
tion bill, a ndthat was true with reference
to other items that just were not emer-
gencies.
The Diego Garcia project in the Indian
Ocean is certainly not an emergency to
the extent that it has to be acted on
now rather than 6 to 8 weeks later, or
even 4 to 5 weeks later.
So those matters were taken out of
the bill. I trust that thaf meets the ap-
proval of the Senate and tifose items will
not be brought up in this bill, but will
cOme in for their part of consideration,
debate, and votes in the regular annual
bill.
_
I think the Senator from Missouri has
spoken, hi his opening statement, for
the committee with one exception, to
which I shall refer briefly. He held the
hearings and had a very good considera-
tion of this matter around the table,
and it was marked up on the basis of
an active consideration.
I also want to pay J'thy respects and
my thanks to the Appropriations Com-
mittee of the senate. They would not let
themselves be pushed forward, or pushed
around, either, With reference to items
that were 'left out of the bill, but said
they would have to have an express au-
thorization before they would take up
matters like Diego Cia.rcia, the extra Tri-
dent, and other matters.
I think that is really the way to ap-
proach legislation here. Any other sys-
ter, except on a real emergency basis,
will create chaokand is not to be toler-
ated by this body.
Mr. President, there will be an amend-
ment considered this afternoon. I shall
not discuss the merits of it now. It is
the so-called Kennedy amendment, with
reference to the $266 million for military
aid in South Vietnam. ft is not new
money. That item will Toe fully debated
here this afternoon. The committee ap-
proved language regarding that money,
and I shall support the position of the
committee in that.
I thank the Senator for yielding time
to me on the bill, and I gladly yield the
floor. -
Mr. STIVIINGTON. Mr. President, I
would like to say to the able Senator
from Missouri what a privilege it is to
work with him and for him in these mat-
ters. I had the opportunity of having it
last year, and again this year. He is very
Lair and very sincere in his position,
which impresses us all as we take up what
could be the most important part of this
year's budget.
I thank him for what he has said
about the efforts 3 have made to han-
dle this matter to his satisfaction, and I
look forward to discussing this afternoon
the one relatively minor difference we
have.
Mr. President, I suggest the absence of
a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I ask unan-
imous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Who yields time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
yield to the Senator from Kentucky as
much time as he desires on the bill.
Mr. COOK. I thank the distinguished
majority leader.
CAMPAIGN FINANCING
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, the Sen-
ate recently passed and sent to the House
S. 3044, a bill which would provide for
the public financing of Federal primary
and general election campaigns as well
as significant campaign reform which we
had previously passed in S. 372. I think
the record will show that I supported
the principle advanced by this bill when
It was first introduced in the Rules Com-
mittee and reported favorably by this
committee to the Senate floor. I was one
of 20 Members who, along with other
Senators, signed the first cloture petition
and spoke against the filibuster so that
the bill could be voted on on the floor of
the Senate.
Unfortunately, during the lengthy de-
bate during which some 100 amendments
Were submitted, the bill was weakened,
and I felt in clear conscience that I was
forced to withdraw my support. One of
the amendments adopted which gave me
concern was the requirement that the
income tax returns of Federal employees
whose salary exceeded $20,000 a year
would be subject to audit. I did not feel
that we had given this matter sufficient
consideration before voting for its adop-
tion. Accordingly, immediately following
the passage of this legislation, I addressed
a letter to the Comptroller General to
determine the estimated cost of this leg-
islation and have now received a reply
which I would like to place in the RECORD.
The Comptroller General informs me
that he estimates there are approximate-
ly 312,000 employees and officials?in-
cluding military personnel?of the Fed-
eral Government having a gross income
in excess of $20,000 a year. Section 503
of S. 3044 would require that each of
these returns would be subject to audit.
The Comptroller General states that his
office has no experience in auditing in-
come tax returns; however, in consulta-
tion with the Internal Revenue Service
he has found that a cost of $66.64 is
standard for a detailed audit of tax re-
turns of a gross income range of $10,000
to $50,000 a year. He assumes that the
GAO could perform this audit at the same
cost as the IRS estimates that on this
basis the audit for 1 year would cost
nearly $21,000,000. This figure does not
include the added space rental, equip-
ment, travel and so forth. He further as-
sumes that the estimated cost for 1
year will have to be multiplied by five to
arrive at a figure for auditing each re-
turn submitted during the 5-year
period and arrives at an estimated cost
of $105,000,000 plus space rental, equip-
ment, travel, and so forth.
Mr: PreSident, there is ample argu-
ment for the complete audit of the re-
turns of a candidate for Federal office,
and if this requirement becomes law, I
will, of course, be very happy to comply
with the provisions._ However, I cannot
see how the auditing of the funds of a
lieutenant colonel who is stationed in
France, or an air force pilot who is flying
in Alaska, can in any way have an im-
pact on good or poor campaign proce-
dures. Neither do I believe that the gen-
eral public wishes to incur a cost of $105,-
000,000 to audit such returns.
Mr. President, I favor the reform of
our present method of conducting our
Federal election campaigns. I believe
that the provisions contained in S. 343
passed by the Senate to shorten the pe-
riod during which these campaigns are
held would go a long way to reduce the
cost of the campaign itself. I also believe
that the provisions of S. 372 to estab-
lish significant checks and balances for
the conduct of campaigns will satisfy
many of the deficiencies which we now
find in our procedures, and I urge my
colleagues in the House to act expe-
diently on these measures.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous, con-
sent that the text of the reply to my let-
ter to the Comptroller General be
printed in tht RECORD.
-There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., May 3, 1974.
Hon. MARLOW W. COOK,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR COOK: Reference is made to
your inquiry concerning the cost to the
General Accounting Office to carry out sec-
tion 503 of S. 3044, the "Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974", which
was passed by the Senate on April 11.
Section 503 requires the Comptroller Gen-
eral on or before July 1 of each and every
year hereafter to make an intensive inspec-
tion and audit of the income tax returns filed
by each Member of Congress and each em-
ployee or official of the executive, judicial and
legislative branch whose gross income for
the most`recent year exceeds $20,000, for the
five previous years.
We estimate that at present there are ap-
proximately 312,000 employees and officials
(including military personnel) of the Fed-
eral- Government having a gross income in
excess of $20,000 per year and therefore sub-
ject to the audit requirements of section
503.
We have had no experience in auditing
income tax returns. However, we have con-
sulted with the Internal Revenue Service
and have found that its experience shows a
cost of $66.64 for a detailed audit of a tax
return with a gross income range of $10,000
to $50,000. Assuming the GAO could perform
its work at the same cost as IRS, we estimate
that an audit for one year of 312,000 returns
would cost nearly $21 million. To that figure
must be added space rental, equipment,
travel, etc. We have not been able to make
an estimate of the audit of the previous four
years. It is conceivable that some economies
could be brought about by auditing five
years of returns at one-time but we have no
experience upon which to base an estimate
of any economies that might be achieved.
Therefore, we have to assume that our esti-
mated cost for one year would have to be
multiplied by five to arrive at a figure for
auditing each return submitted during a
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S 7118 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 6,, 1974
five year period- This would raise the first
year audit coat to 4105 million plus space
rental, eqtdpinent, travel, etc.
We de not think it is appropriate to re-
quire the GAG to peelers:a the auditing
work width le already the re:poem-Minty of
the Internal Revenue Service, parttoularly
In view of the eubstalitial expense inn:lived.
and we are, therefoie. oppesed to the enact-
ment of section 503 in ite present forra.
The GAO on its own initiative his not
been able to make any reviews of the audits
performed by the IRS of taxpayers' returns..
It is the position of the IRS, with which we
do not egret. that no matter involving the
administration of the Internal Revenue laws
can be efecialiky before the GAO and there-
fore GM) Ime no audit responsiloilite. The
Corernistioner of IRS in a letter to the
Comptroller General dated June 0, 1968,
stated:
"* * I must note that the (chief counsel.
IRS) opinion holds that the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue is barred by Section
6408 and 110,2g of the Internal Revenue Code
from allowing any of your represeni Wives
to review any documents that peiteirt to
the administration of the Internal Revenue
laws. Thus, Federal tax returns and related
records can be made available to you only
where the matter otteially before GAO does
not MvolVe adordnistratIon of those laws."
We are making sonim reviews of Ind' op-
erations for the Joint Committee on In-
ternal Revenue Taxation which involve the
administration of the tax laws. Under this
arrangement the IRS has given us complete
cooperation but we are considered as per-
forming work as agents of the Joint Com-
mittee rather than performing work on our
own initiative.
As an alternative to section 503, the Con-
gress could makes it clear that the GAO has
the authority to audit the work performed
by the IRS and the GAO could then make
periodic reviews of the audit performed
by the kierviee on individual incoina tax
returns.
Sincerely yours
ELM= B. STAAT&,
Comptroller Genera/. of Use United Stater.
Mr. COOK. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. On whose time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. On, the bill.
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore. On whose time?
Mr. MANSFIELD. On the bill--the
time to be charged to both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered. The clerk Neill
call the refl.
The assistance legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr, MANSFIELD. Mr. President, e ask
unanknoes consent that the order for
the quorturx call be rescinded.
The ACTING pitzsivairr Pre ;erne
pore. Without objection, it is so ordered,
MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT
Messages in writing from the President
of the United States were communicated
to the Senate by Mr. Hefting, one Of
his secretaries.
ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY DE-
VELOPMENT CORPORATION RE-
PORT---MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem-
pore (Mr. Nrnor) laid before the Senate a
message from the President of the
United States submitting the annual re-
port for 1973 of the St. Lawrence Sea-
way Development Corporation, which,
with the accompanying report, was re-
ferred to the Committee on Public
Works., The message is as follows:
To the Congress of the United States:
I herewith transmit the St. Lawrence
,Seaway Development Corporation's An-
nual Report for 1913. This report has
been prepared in accordance with Sec-
tion 10 of Public Law 83-358, as amended,
and covers the period January 1, 1973,
through December 31, 1973.
RICHARD NIXON.
THE WHITE ROUSE, May 6, 1974.
eeEPORT OF THE UNITED STATES-
JAPAN ODOPERATTVE MEDICAL
SCIENCE PROGRAM?MESSAGE
FROM THE PRESIDENT
The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern-
pore (Mr: lemen) laid before the Senate a
message from the President of the United
States submitting the annual report of
the United States-Japan Cooperative
Medical Science Program, which, with
the accompanying report, was referred
to the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. The message is as follows:
Yo the Congress of the United States:
I am pleased to send to the Congress
the Seventh Annual Report of the
United States-Japan Cooperative Medi-
can. Science Program.
This joint research effort in the bio-
medical. sciences, undertaken in 1965
following a meeting between the Prime
Minister of, Japan and the President of
the United States, continues to focus
upon diseases of both worldwide Impor-
tance and of special significance to the
peoples of Asia: cholera, environmentally
induced diseases, leprosy, malnutrition,
the parasitic diseases .elariasis and schis-
tosomiasis, tuberculosis, and the viral
diseases dengue and rabies.
The sustained success of this biomedi-
cal research program reflects its care-
ful management and the strong commit-
ment of both nations to its continuation.
The increasingly effective research plan-
ning and communication between inves-
tigators, ill our two countries has intensi-
fied our scientific productivity and
strengthened our detfrmination to work
together toward better health for all
mankind.
RICHARD NIXON.
TIIX WHITE HOUSE,. May 6, 1974.
.....??????????^ON11111111
EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED
As in executive session, the Acting
President pro tempore (Mr. NUNN) laid
before the Senate messages from the
President of the United States submit-
ting sundry nominations which were re-
ferred to the appropriate committees.
(The nominations received today are
printed at the end of the Senate pro-
ceedings.)
RECESS TO 1 P.M.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
move that the Senate stand in recess mi-
til the hour of 1 p.m.
The motion was agreed to; and at
11:50 a.m. the Senate took a recess until
1 p.m., at which time the Senate reas-
sembled when called to order by the Pre-
siding Officer (Mr. Melenente).
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President.
I suggest the absence of a quorum and
ask unanimous consent, that the time not
be charged against ether side on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is ,so ordered., and the clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
RECESS TO L:30 P.M.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate stand
in recess until 1:30 p.m. today.
There being no objection, at 1:08 p.m.,
the Senate took a recess until 1:30 pan.,
at which time the Senate reassembled
when called to order by the Presiding
Officer (Mr. Mclerreae) .
MILITARY PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATIONS, 1974
The Senate continued with the con-
sideration of the bill to authorize aP-
propriatiorui during the fiscal year 1974
for procurement of aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles.
and other weapons and research, develop-
ment, test and evaluation for the Armed'
Forces, and to authorize construction at
certain installations, and for other pur-
poses.
Mr. McGeeE. Mr. President, I suggest
the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. (Mr. MC-
INTYRE) . On whose time?
Mr. MeGle.E. Equally divided.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The clerk Will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. EYED. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING CeFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT
ON S. ell, POSTAL SERVICE
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President.
I make the following unanimous consent
request, conditioned on the approtval of
Mr. BEALL and Mr. JAVITS:
I ask unanimous consent that at suce
time as. Calendar Order No. 737, S. 411,
a bill to amend title 39, United States
Code, relating to the Postal Service, is
called up and made the pending busi-
ness before ethe Senate, there be a time
limitation thereon of 3 hours, to be equal-
ly divided tetween 'Mr. McGee and Mr.
FONG; that there be a ti ne limitation on
any amendment thereto of 30 minutes:
that there be a time limitation on debat-
able motions or appeals of 20 minutes:
and that the agreement be in the usual
form.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, re-
serving the right to object, would this in
any way interfere with the matter which
was being discussed in the cloak room?
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. This would in
no way interfere with that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
ask unanimous consent that at 10
o'clock Thursday morning the Senate
proceed to the considerations of S. 411.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER TO PROCEED TO RESUME
CONSIDERATION OF S. 2986, IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
ACT OF 1972, ON THURSDAY NEXT
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that upon the
disposition of S. 4 on Thursday, the
Senate then proceed to the considera-
tion of S. 2986, a bill to authorize appro-
priations to carry out the provisions of
the International Economic Policy Act
of 1972, as amended.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
ORDER TO CONSIDER, S. 3267, EMER-
GENCY ENDRO Y BILL, A.ND EDU-
CATION 13ILL ON WEDNESDAY
NE=
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that on
Wednesday, the Senate proceed, at the
hour of 10 a.m., to consider Calendar
Order No. 758, S. 3267, a bill toprovide
standby emergency authority to assure
that the essential energy needs of the
United States are met, and for other
purposes, and that at no later than 3
p.m., the Senate take up a bill to amend
and extend certain acts relating to
elementary and secondary education
programs.
I ask unanimous consent that at no
later than 3 p.m. it be in order for the
leadership to call up either of the two
elementary and secondary education
bills on the Calendar.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT 'C. BYRD. I think that
about -wraps up my unanimous-consent
requests.
It would mean that on Wednesday at
10 the Senate would proceed to the con-
sideration of the energy bill, S. 3267, and
would debate that bill until about 3 P.m"
at which time the leadership would then
lay the energy bill aside? and take up one
of the elementary-secondary education
bills. In other words, the Senate would
operate on a double track.
On Thursday, the Senate, at 10 o'clock
In the morning, would begin considera-
tion of the postal service bill, S. 411, un-
der a time limitation agreement.
Upon the disposition of that bill, the
Senate would take up S. 2986, upon which
an order has previously been entered lay-
ing it over until Thursday. That is a bill
to authorize appropriations to carry out
the provisions of the International Eco-
nomic Policy Act of 1972.
ORDER POR LAYING EDUCATION
BILL ASIDE THURSDAY
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that on Thurs-
day, the then unfinished business, which
would be one of the education bills, be
laid aside temporarily until the disposi-
tion of S. 411 and S. 2986?neither which
we will complete?or until the close of
business that day, whichever is the
earlier.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
on behalf of the leadership on both sides
of the aisle, I yield 2 minutes to the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wyoming (Mr.
McGss).
Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, I take this
opportunity to say only a brief word
about the pending matter. The Commit-
tee on Appropriations and the appropri-
ate subcommittee, of which I am a mem-
ber, have gone into great detail on the
examination and merits of this partic-
ular request for the $266 million to be
validated as a procedural operation. The
money has already been authorized in
1972 and 1973, and this proposal is sim-
ply to enable the adjustment of the dis-
crepancies that occurred at that time. It
has nothing to do with making new mon-
eys available. It has only to do with add-
ing equity in the procedural mechanisms
that at first brought up the question re-
garding the money.
I think it would be unwise for the Sen-
ate to strike down this pending request
only for the reason that the commit-
ments and the procedures entered had
already been undertaken and the proc-
ess agreed to, in an attempt to correct
the inadvertencies of the preceding 2
years. This measure would simply bring
the matter up to date, where it would
have been had the intent been pursued
at that time.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President,
I suggest the absence of a quorum, and
I ask unanimous consent that the time
be charged against both sides on the bill.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call
the roll.
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
INCREASE IN AUTHORITY OF THE
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRA-
TION
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, my
amendment to S. 3331 on minority busi-
ness contained an error in the last sen-
tence. I ask unanimous consent that the
third reading and passage of S. 3331 be
reconsidered and that all language after
"shall be responsible for," in the second
sentence be stricken and the following
new language be inserted in lieu thereof:
S 7119
The formulatiOn of policy relating to the
Administration's programs which provide as-
sistance to minority small business concerns
and in the review of the administration's
execution of such programs in the light of
such policy.
I have cleared this matter with the
minority side. It is just a tactical change,
and there is no problem about it.
The PRESIDING OrriCER. Is there
objection?
Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, I do not
know what consultation has been had on
this side of the aisle, but we would like
to know what is involved before we do
something.
Mr. CRANSTON. There has been con-
sultation with Mr. Dompierre of the Re-
publican licy Committee.
Mr. HRUSKA. What is it about?
Mr. CRANSTON. It is a technical mis-
take in the last sentence of the bill on
small business.
Mr. HRUSKA. On that basis and the
representations of the Senator from
California, I have no objection.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on the third reading
and passage of the bill.
The bill was ordered to a third read-
ing, read the third time, and passed, as
follows:
S. 3331
An act to clarify the authority of the Small
Business Administration, to increase the
authority of the Small Business Adminis-
tration, and for other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and Hcruse of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Small Business
Amendments of 1974".
SEC. 2. (a) The Small Business Act is
amended?
(1) by redesignating subsection (b) of sec-
tion 2 as subsection (c) and by adding after
subsection (a) of that section the following
new subsection:
"(b) The assistance programs authorized
by sections 7(i) and 7(j) of this Act are to
be utilized to assist in the establishment,
preservation, and strengthening of small
business concerns and improve the mana-
gerial skills employed in such enterprises,
with special attention to small business con-
cerns (1) located in urban or rural areas
with high proportions of unemployed or low-
income individuals; or (2) owned by low-
income individuals; and to mobilize for these
objectives private as well as public mana-
gerial skills and resources.";
(2) by striking out paragraphs (1) and (2)
of section 4(c), and inserting in lieu thereof
the following:
"(c) (1) There are hereby established in
the Treasury the following revolving funds:
(A) a disaster loan fund which shall be
available for financing functions performed
under sections 7(b) (1), 7(b) (2), 7(b) (4), 7
(b) (5), 7(b)(6), 7(b) (7), 7(c) (2), and 7(g)
of this Act, including administrative ex-
penses in connection with such functions;
and (B) a business loan and investment fund
which shall be available for financing func-
tions performed under sections 7(a), 7(b)
(3), 7(e), 7(h), 7(i), and 8(a) of this Act,
and titles III and V of the Small Business
Investment Act of 1958, including adminis-
trative expenses in connection with such
functions.
"(2) All repayments of loans and deben-
ture, payments of interest and other re-
ceipts arising out of transactions heretofore
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S 7120 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 'Way 6, 1974'
or hereafter entered to by the Administra-
tion (A) pursuant to sections 7(b) (1), '7(b)
(2), 7(b) (4i, 7(b) (5), 7(b) (6), 7:b) (7 e and
7(c)(2) er this Atat shall be peed into a disas-
ter loan fund; and B pursuant to seations
7tali 7(3)(3), 7(e), 7?11). 7(i): and 8(a) of
this Act, and titles III and V of the Small
Business Investment Act qf 1359, shall be
paid into the business loan and investment
fund.";
(3) by striking out paragraph (4) of ,sec-
lion 4(c), and inserting in lieu thereof 'the
following:
"(4) The total amount of loans, gualan-
tees, and other obilge.tions or commitments,
heretofore or hereafter entered into by the
Administration, which are outstanding at
any one time (A) under sectfons 7(a), '7(b)
(3), 7(e) 71h), 7(1), and 8(a) of this Act,
shall not exceed $6,000,000,000; (B) under
title DI of the Small Business- Investment
Act of 1988, shall not exceed $725,000,000,
(C) under title V of the Small Business In-
vestment At of 158. shall not exceed $525,-
000,000; end (D) under section '7(1) of this
Act, shall not exceed $450,000,000ne and
(4) by adding at the end of section 7 the
following three new subsections:
"(1) (1) The Administration also ik em-
powered to make participate (on an immedi-
ate basis) in, or guarantee loans, repayable
in not more than fifteen years, to any small
business concern, or to any qualified person
seeking to establish such a concern, when it
determines that such loans will further the
policies established in section 2(b) oL' this
Act, with particular emphasis on the pres-
ervation er establishment of small business
concerns :vested in urban or rural areas with
high proportions of unemployed or 10w-in-
come individuals or owned by low-incorae in -
dividuals Provided, however, That no such
Mane Shan be made, participated in, or
gusunnteed if the total of such Federal as-
sistance to a single borrower Outstanding at
any one lime would exceed $50,000. The Ad-
ministration may defer payments on the
principal of such loans for a grace period
and use such other methods as it deems
necessary and appropriate to assure this suc-
cessful establishment and operation of such
concern. The Administration may. in its dis-
cretion, as a condition of such financial as-
sistance, require that the borrower take steps
to improm his Management skills by par-
ticipating in a management training pro-
gram approved by the Administration. Pro-
vided, however. That any management
training program so approved must be of
sufficient scope and duratinn to provide rea-
sonable opportunity for *the
served la develep entrepreneurial and
managerial self-sufficiency.
"(2) The Administration shall encoaraige,
as far as possible, the participation of the
private business community in the program
of assistauce to such concerns, and shall seek
to stimulate new private lending activities to
such con:erns through the use of the loan
guarantees, participations in loam, and pool-
ing arrangements authorized by this sub-
section.
"(3) To insure an equitable distritiution
between urban and rural areas for loans be-
tween $3,500 and woo? made under this
subsection, the Administration is autharized
to use the agencies and agreements and dele-
gations developed under title III of the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended,
as it shall determine necessary,
(4) The Administration shall provide fur
the coatiming evaluation of programs under
this subsection, including full info/mat-On on
the location, income characteristics and
types of businesses and individuals assisted,
and on raw private lending activity stimu-
lated, and the results of such evaluation to-
gether with reciemmendations shall be in-
cluded in the report required by section 10(a)
0:7 this Act.
"(5) Loans made- pursuant to this sub-
section (including immediate participation
in and guarantees a such loans) shall have
such terms and conditions as the Administra-
tion shall determine, subject to the follow-
ug limitations--
"(A) there is reasonable assurance of re-
payment of the loan;
"(B) the financial assistance is not other-
wise available on reasonable terms from pri-
vate sources or other Federal, State, or local
r rograins;
"(C) the amount of the loan, together with
other funds available, ..s adequate to assure
completion of the project or achievement of
the purposes for whict the loan is made;
"(D) the loan bears tnterest at a rate not
Ins than (1) a rate determined by the Scare-
tery of the Treasury, taking into considera-
tion the average market yield on outstanding
Treasury obligations of comparable maturite,
r his (11) such additional charge, if any, to-
ward covering other costs of the program as
the Administration may determine to be con-
sistent with iteneurposes: Provided, however,
That the rate of interest charged on loans
made in redevelopment; areas designated un-
der the Public Works and Economic Develop-
ment Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3108 et seq.)
shall not emceed the rate currently applicable
to new loans made under section 201 of that
et (4213.8.0. 8142) ; and
"(s) fees not, in excess of amounts neces-
sary to cover adentnknrative expenses and
probable looses may be required on loan guar-
antees.
"(6) The Administration shall take such
steps as may be necessary to insure that. in
any fiscal year, at least 50 per centum of the
amounts loaned or guaranteed pursuant to
this subsection are allotted to small business
concerns located in urban areas identified by
the Administration as having high concen-
trations of unemployed or low-income indi-
viduals or to email business concerns owned
l'y tow-income individuals. The Administra-
tion shall define the meaning of low income
silt applies to owners of small business con-
cerns eligible to be ass nted under this sub-
section.
"(7) No, financial assistance shall be ex-
tended pursuant to thie subsection where the
Administration determines that the assist-
ance will be used in relocating establish-
ments from one area to another if such
relocation, would result in an increase in
unemployment in the area of original
location.
"(j) (1) The Admini-tration ie authorized
to provide financial assistance tes public or
private organizations to pay all or part of
the cost or projects designed to provide
technical or management assistance to indi-
eiduals, or enterprises eligible for assistance
-ender subsection 7(0 of tins Act, with
special attention to small business located
in urban knits of high concentration of un-
employed or low-income individuals or owned
t y low-income individuals.
"(2) Financial assist ;ince under this sub-
section may be provided for projects, includ-
iag without limitation---
"(A) planning and research, ineludieg
feasibility studies and market research;
"(B) the identification and development
Cf new business opport mit tee;
"(C) the furnishing f centralized service;
with regard to public services and Govern-
ment programs including programs author-
ised under subsection '7i);
"(D) the-establishment and strengthern
of business service agencies, including trade
associations and cooperatives;
"(E) the encouragereent of the placement
ef subcontracts by major business with small
liminess concerns located in urban areas of
high concentration of unemployed or low-
income individuals or owned by low-income
including the provision of in-
centives and assistance to such major busi-
nesses so that they will aid in the training
and upgrading of poen dal subcontractors
or other small business" concerns; and
"(F) the furnishing en business counsel-
ing, management traianim and legal and
other related services, tvih special emphasis
on the development of m magement training
programs using the resources of the business
community, including t le development al
management training opi:ortunities in exist-
ing businesses, and with emphasis in all caves
upon providing management training of suf-
ficient scope and duratio a to develop entre-
preneurial and manageritil self-sufficiency on
the part of toe individuan served.
"(3) The Administration shall give prefer-
ence to projects which leo-mote the- owner-
ship, participation in ownership, or manage-
ment of sma a business concerns by residents
of urban areas of high concentration of un-
employed or low-income Individuals, and to
projects which are planned and carried out
with the participation of local businessmen
"(4) The anancial assistance authorized by
this subsection ineludea assistance advanced
by grant, agreement, or contract, but does
not include the procurement of . plant oi
equipment, cr goods or services.
"(5) The ,edministrati in is authorized to
make payments under giants and contracts
entered into under this subsection in lump
SUM Or installments, anti in advance or by
way of reimbursement, and in the ease 01
grants, with necessary adjustments on ac-
count of overpayments or underpayments.
"(6) To the extent fmeible, services under
this subsection shall be .irovided in is loca-
tion which is, easily accessible to the individ-
uals and small- business concerns served.
"(7) The Administra.tion shall provide for
an independent and continuing evaluation of
programs under this :subsection. including
full information on, and analysis of, the
character and impact c1 managerial assist-
ance provided, the location, income charac-
teristics, and types of bnsinesses and individ-
uals assisted, and the extent to which private
resources and skills hays been involved in
these programs. 'Such (valuation together
with any recnnunendatioils deemed advisable
by the Administration s iall be included in
the report required by section 10(a) of this
Act.
"(8) The Administration shall take such
steps as may be neeessiey and sineromeate, in
coordination and cooperation with the heads
of other Federal departments and agencies
so that contracts, subctmtracts, and deposit-,
made by the Federal Go-s eminent or in con-
nection with programs aided with Federal
funds are placed in such a way as to further
the purposes of this sub.;ection and of sub-
section '7(1) of this Act. The Administration
shall provide, for the continuing evaluation
of programs under this subsection and the
results of such evaluation together with rec-
ommendations shall be included in the report
required by section 10( a of this Act.
"(e) In carrying out its functions under
subsections 1(i) and 7(I) of this Act, the Ad-
ministration is authorised?
"(1) to utilize, with their consent, the
services and facilities in Federal agencies
without reimbursement, and, with the con-
sent of any State or political subdivision of a
State. accept and utilize the services and fa-
cilities of Buell State or eubdivision without
reimbursement;
"(2) to accept, in the name of the Admin-
istration, and employ or dispose of in further-
ance of the purposes of this Act, any money
or property, real, personal, or mixed, tangible
or intangible, received ey gift, devise, be-
quest, or otherwise;
"(3) to accept vohmte ry and uncompen-
sated servicee. notwithrennding the provi-
sions of section 3679(b) of the Revised Stat-
utes (31 USC. 6435(b)); and
"(4) to employ experts and consultants or
organizations thereof as authorized by sec-
tion 15 of the Administrative Expenses Act
of 1946 (5 U.S.C. 55a1, eecept that no indi-
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May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL REConl)
vidual may be employed under the authority
of this subsection for more than one hundred
days in 'any fiscal year; to compensate indi-
viduals so employed at rates not in excess
of $160 per diem, including traveltime; and
to allow them, while away from their homes
or regular places of business, travel expenses
(including per diem in lieu of subsistence)
as authorized by section 5 of such Act (5
U.S.C. 73b--2) for persons in the Government
service employed intermittently, while so
employed: Provided, however, That contracts
for such employment may be renewed an-
nually."
(b) Title IV of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 is hereby repealed; and all refer-
ences to such title in the remainder of that
Act are repealed.
SEC. 3. The Small Business Act is further
amended?
(1) by amending section 5(b) by striking
out "and" following paragraph (8), by strik-
ing out the period at the end of paragraph
(9) and inserting in lieu thereof"; and" and
by adding at the end of paragraph (9) the
following new paragraph:
"(10) upon purthase by the Administra-
tion of any deferred participation entered
into under section 7 of this Act, continue
to charge a rate of interest not to exceed
that initially charged by the participating
institution on the aramint so purchased for
the remaining 'term of the indebtedness.";
and
. (2) by striking out the third sentence in
paragraph (2) of section 7(h) and inserting
In lieu thereof: "The Administration's share
of any loan made under this subsection shall
bear interest at the-rate of 3 per centum per
annum,"
Sac. 4. (a) Section 7(a) (4) (A) of the Small
Business Act is amended by striking out
"$350,000" and inserting in lieu thereof
"$500,000".
(b) Section 7(a) (5) (A) of such Act is
amended by striking out "$350,000" and in-
serting in lieu thereof "$500,000".
Sze. 5. Section 18 of the Small Business
,Act is amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subsection:
"(g) The Administration shall transmit,
not later than December 31 of each year, to
tho Committee on Banking, Plousing and Ur-
ban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee
on Banking and Currendy of the House of
ReinresentatiVes a sealed report with respect
to public 'complaints alleging illegal conduct
by employees of the Administration which
were received or acted upon by the Adminis-
tration during the preceding fiscal year."
SEC. 6. (a) The Small Business Investment
Act of 1958 is amended?
(1) by striking out in the table of contents
in section 101 all references to title IV and
section numbers therein and inserting in
lieu thereof the following:
"TITLE IV?OVAHANTEES
,
"Ran A?nnass atialtaNTEEs
"Sec. 401. Authority of the Administration.
"Sec. 402. Powers,
"Sec. 403. Fund.
"PAR'K B--Sinwry BOND GUARANTEES
"Sec. 410, Definitions.
"Sep. 411. Authority of the Administration.
"Sec. 412.Fund
(2) by sirikini out section 403 arxd insert-
ing in lieu thereef the following:
"FUND
"Sec. 403. There is hereby created within
the Treasury a separate fund for guarantees
which shall be available to the Administra-
tor without fiscal year limitation as a revolv-
ing fund for the purposea or this part. There
,are authorized to be _appropriated to the
fund from time to three such amounts-not to
exceed $10,000,000 to provide capital for the
fund. All amounts received by the Adminis-
trator, including any moneys, property, or as-
sets d'erived by him from a his operations in
connection with this part, shall be deposited
in the fund. All expenses and payments pur-
suant to operations of the Administrator un-
der this part shall be paid from the fund.
From time to time, and at least at the close
of each fiscal, year, the Administrator shall
pay from the fund into Treasury as miscel-
laneous receipts interest at a rate determined
by the Secretary of the Treasury on the cum-
ulative amount of appropriations available as
capital to the fund, less the average undis-
bursed cash balance in the fund during the
year. The rate of such interest shall be deter-
mined by the Secretary of the Treasury, and
shall not be less than a rate determined by
taking into consideration the average market
yield during the month preceding each fiscal
year On outstanding marketable obligations
of the United States with remaining periods
to maturity comprable to the average ma-
turity of guarantees from the fund. Moneys
in the fund not needed for the payment of
current operating expenses or for the pay-
ment of claims arising under this part may
be invested in bonds or other obligations of,
or bonds or other obligations guaranteed as
to principal and interest by, the United
States; except that moneys provided as capi-
tal for the fund shall not be so invested but
shall be returned to the fund in such
amounts and at such times as the Adminis-
trator determines to be appropriate, when-
ever the level of the fund herein established
is sufficiently high to permit the return of
such moneys without danger to the solvency
of the program under this part.";
(3) by striking out "$500,000" in section
411 and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,000,000";
and
(4) by adding after section 411 the fol-
lowing new section:
4 "FUND
"SEC. 412. There is hereby created within
the Treasury a separate fund for guarantees
which shall be available to the Administrator
without fiscal year limitation as a revolving
fund for the purposes of this part. There
are authorized to be appropriated to the
fund from time to time such amounts not
to exceed $35,000,000 to provide capital for
the fund. All amounts received by the Ad-
ministrator, including any moneys, proper-
ty, or assets derived by him from his opera-
tions in connection with this part, shall be
deposited in the fund. All expenses and pay-
ments pursuant to operations of the Admin-
istrator under this part shall be paid from
the fund. From time to time, and at least at
the close of each fiscal year, the Administra-
tor shall pay from the fund into Treasury as
miscellaneous receipts interest at a rate de-
termined by the Secretary of the Treasury
on the cumulative amount of appropriations
available as capital to the fund, less the
average undisbursed cash balance in the fund
during the year. The rate of such interest
shall be determined by the Secretary of the
Treasury, and shall not be less than a rate
determined by taking into consideration the
average market yield during the month pre-
ceding each fiscal year on outstanding mar-
ketable obligations of the United States with
remaining periods to maturity comparable to
the average maturity of guarantees from the
fund. Moneys in the fund not needed for
the payment of current operating expenses
or for the payment of claims arising under
this part may be invested in bonds or other
obligations of, or bonds or other obligations
guaranteed as to principal and interest by,
the United States; except that moneys pro-
vided as capital for the fund shall not be so
invested but shall be returned to the fund
in such amounts and at such times as the
Administrator determines to be appropriate,
whenever the level of the fund herein estab-
lished is sufficiently high to permit the re-
turn of such moneys without danger to the
solvency of the program under this part."
(b) Unexpended balances of appropriations
S 4121
made to the fund pursuant to section 403
of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958
(15 U.S.C. 694), as in effect prior to the ef-
fective date of this Act, shall be allocated,
together with related assets and liabilities,
to the funds established by paragraphs (2)
and (4) of subsection (a) of this section in
such amounts as the Administrator shall
determine.
SEC. 7. Section 4(b) of the Small Business
Act is amended?
(1) by striking out "three" in the third
sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "four";
and
(2) by inserting after the third sentence
the following new sentence: "One of the
Associate Administrators shall be designated
at the time of his appointment as the Asso-
ciate Administrator for Minority Small Busi-
ness and shall be responsible for the formula-
tion of policy relating to the Administration's
programs which provide assistance to
nority small business concerns and in the
review of the Administration's execution of
such programs in the light of such policy.".
MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE
A message from the House of Repre-
sentatives by Mr. Berry, one of its read-
ing clerks, announced that the House
had passed, without amendment, the bill
(S. 2509) to name structure S-5A of the
Central and Southern Florida Flood
Contra District, located in Palm Beach
County, Fla., as the "W. Turner Wallis
Pumping Station" in memory of the
late W. Turner Wallis, the first secre-
tary-treasurer and chief engineer for the
Central and Southern Florida Flood
Control District.
The message also announced that the
House had agreed to the amendment of
the Senate to the amendments of the
House to the bill (S. 1125) to amend the
Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alco-
holism Prevention, Treatment, and Re-
habilitation Act and other related acts
to concentrate the resources of the Na-
tion against the problem of alcohol
abuse and alcoholism.
ORDER OF BUSINESS
Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk
will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OPTICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
MILITARY PROCUREMENT
AUTHORIZATIONS, 1974
The Senate resumed the consideration
of the bill to authorize appropriations
during the fiscal year 1974 for procure-
ment of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels,
tracked combat vehicles, and other weap-
ons and research, development, test and
evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to
authorize construction at certain instal-
lations, and for other purposes.
AMENDMENT NO. 1238
Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. President, I call
up amendment No. 1238.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
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The assistant legislative clerk pro-
ceeded to read the amendment.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICkette Without
objedtiOn, it is so ordered; and, without
objection, the amendment will be printed
in the RECORD.
The amendment is as follows:
On pace 7, between lines 3 and 4, irsert
new title as follows:
TITLE IV----PROIECBITION ON CERTAIN USE
OF FUNDS
Sae. 401, None of the funds authortsed to
be apprcrxie.ted by this Act, and no funds
heretofore appropriated to or for the use of
the Department of Defense by any other Act
and which remain uuobligated on Uht. date
of enactment of this Act, may be expended
in, for, or On behalf of any country in South-
east Asia.
Mr. 101INNEDY. Mr. President, a par-
liamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING orricat. The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. KENNEDY. There is a time liraita-
tion On this amenciment. Is that corned?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. One and
one-half hours, to be equally divided.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that Dale DeHaan
and Jerky Tinker be permitted the priv-
ilege of the floor during the debate and
the vote.
The PRESIDING OlevICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 3uch
time as I May require.
Mr. President, the pending amend-
ment has three simple objectives.
First, it prohibits on the date of en-
actment any further transfer -Of funds
for the Military Assistance Service
Ftmd?MASF--for South Vietnam be-
yond thieve already obligated this fiscal
gear.
Second,, the amendment reaffirms the
decision of the Congress that the Penta-
gon must not spend one penny over the
ceiling established for this fiscal year?
a massive sum of $1.126 billion?for mili-
tary aid to Sputh Vietnam, notwith-
standing , the Armed Services Commit-
tee's finding that the Department of De-
fense wrongly charged $266 million to
this year's ceiling.
Finally, the amendment puts the Pen-
tagon on notice that Congress is tired of
the practice of shipping guns and am-
munition now, and paying for them
later. The amendment, in effect, sup-
ports the Important recommendation of
the Armed Services Committee that the
Department must put its bookkeeping on
military aid to South Vietnam in order,
and that all military supplies delivered
to Saigon during 1 fiscal year must be
charged to that year's ceiling. For too
long, the Pentagon has shipped ammuni-
tion to Saigon as if fiscal years did not
exist.
Clearly, the question before us toelaY
has as much to do with fiscal control as
it does with the issue of whether Saigon
needs or Should have more military aid.
The question is whether more money for
more guns will come by a vote of Con-
gress or through the back-door. And
the question is whether there is any real
ourpose in Congress setting a ceiling on
spending for military aid to South Viet-
nam, if the Pentagon continues to spend
as if ceilings did not exist?assuming it
will always get approval somehow, some-
way to spend more when it runs out.
Make no mistake about it, if we fail
to adopt this amendment the Pentagon
will, in effect, be allowed to expend up
to $266 million more?or nearly a quar-
ter of a billion dollars more?above the
congressionally mandated ceiling of $1.-
126 billion for military assistance to
south Vietnam this fiscal year.
On April 10, I requested the General
Accounting Office to compile statistice
on the totality of 13.5. assistance to
South Vietnam and Indochina. Regret-
tably, this has become a difficult task
for the GAO, for they have encountered
obstacles in obtaining complete and ac-
curate information from the Pentagon
on exactly how much it has spent this
fiscal year in providing military aid to
Saigon. But, according to the best in-
formation available to me, it appears
that the Pentagon has, to date, already
spent close to the ceiling of $1.126 billion.
2 months before the end of the fiscal
year. This includes the new appropria-
tion of $907.5 million as well as some
$219 million in pipeline and transfer
funds authorized for this fiscal year.
The Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, in a commendable effort to review
the accounting procedures the Depart-
ment of Defense has used in the MASF
program, has found the Pentagon's
bookkeeping system to be in error?to
the tune of $266 million. If we fail to
adopt this amendment, the Department
will be free to use these misobligated
funds this fiscal year.
No other Department is rewarded in
such a fashion if it makes a bookkeep-
ing error?after it had already spent the
money. If the agencies waging the war
on cancer made such an error, they
would have to live with their mistake
foe this fiscal year. Furthermore, there
is reason to believe that part of this $266
million transfer is illegal?according to
preliminary questions raised by the
GAO.
On April 4 the House of Representa-
tives, on a recorded vote of 177 noes to
154 ayes, barred the Pentagon from rais-
ing the ceiling on military aid to Saigon
this fiscal year. It did so, in part, because
in hearings before the House Armed
Se vices Committee, it became apparent
that the Department of Defense had ob-
ligated funds for Saigon at a rate which
was certain to make them run short in
the last quarter of the :fiscal year. It was
also clear that the Department was try-
ing to do through the back-door what
it could not do through the front, and
the House voted to reject it. Today the
Senate should do no- less in rejecting
another form of back-door financing and
stand with the House for greater fiscal
responsibility.
Let us also be clear that the issue be--
fore us today is not one that affects ow'
national defense?and hardly one affect-
ing our national security or national in-
terest. And it is not a question of "aban-
doning" an ally. The American taxpayer
is currently spending well over $2.5 bil-
lion dollars this 'year in military and
economic aid to support the Saigon goy--
eminent?over $1.126 billion of tb in mili-
tary aid. Such a sum hardly cosastitutes
"abandonment."
It is also :not a question of "scratching"
South Vietnam, or ending our aid pro-
gram there. America still bears heavy
responsibilities to the people of Vietnam
But these obligations are today less with
governments and armies than with peo-
ple?to the millions of war victims who
cry out for our help in relief and rehabil-
itation.
And, the basic question before the Sen-
ate today is really not whether we will
allow the Pentagon, by an accountant's
slight-of-hand, to spend another quarter
billion dollars in South Vietnam?al-
though it clearly exceeds the ceiling set
for this year. Rather, the true question
before the Congress and the Ameri-
can people is whether this additional
amount?and our continuing massive
military aid to South Vietnam?truly
contributes to the peaceful evolution of
the area.
The issue is whether our action today
will contribu.te to a reduction in our con-
tinuing involvement in Indochina, or
whether it will help perpetuate old rela-
tionships ard policies at the same old
levels.
If the Paris agreements, and peace
with honor, are to mean anything, they
must mean that our country's involve-
ment and relationship with South Viet-
nam must change?and change not only
from what it was 2 years ago, or 10 years
ago, but even from what it was last year.
The ceasefire agreements for Vietnam
and Laos?a:ad the persistent hope that
renewed diplomacy will achieve a similar
agreement in Cambodia--are bench-
marks of immense historical proportions.
Although conditions are mixed in the
field, and many difficult problems remain
for all parties involved, I disagree with
those who say "that nothing very much
has changed in Vietnam." The fact is for
the first time in many years, the United
States is no longer directly involved. And
for the first time in over a. decade we
have real opportunities to embark on
new policies?to change the character
and level of our involvement, to reorder
our aid priorities, and to finally practice
some lessons .from the failures and frus-
trations of the past.
But this hopeful opportunity implicit
in the ceasefire agreements apparently
is not shared by this administration,
which still seeks to maximize American
presence and influence In the area, with
the old- tools of war instead of a new
diplomacy for peace and reconciliation.
The dichotomy between the opportu-
nities for change provided by the cease-
fire agreemen:s, and the tired policies of
the past, is most explicit in the charac-
ter of the administration's continuing
budget requests for Indochina?and its
determined effort to ship more guns and
bombs to Saigon no matter what Con-
gress says the limit should be..
The administration is still more inter-
ested in funding armies than in provid-
ing humanitarian assistance to heal the
wounds of war. And the budget prior-
ity remains with the means of war,
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May 6, 1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
rather than with the tools for building
peace.
It is argued that this request for more
military aid is crucial for the survival of
South Vietnam because it is running out
of ammunition. But the question must
be asked, Why is Saigon running out of
ammunition?
According to a recent cable from Am-
bassador Graham Martin in Saigon it is
apparently not entirely due to North
Vietnamese violations of the cease-fire.
The Ambassador says it was only after,
and I quote, "U.S. imposed constraints"
and better South Vietnamese "manage-
ment controls," that the use of Ameri-
can-supplied ammunition dropped at a
rate of 20 to 50 percent. In effect, Am-
bassador Martin confirms what many
have observed over the past year, that
without some outside constraints on the
supply of ammunition, South Vietnamese
military commanders will continue to fire
their guns just as they have before, as
if nothing has changed. There has al-
ways been, and there apparently will al-
ways be, a strong connection between
the availability of ammunition and its
use, According to testimony given the
Armed Services Committee, the current
estimated average consumption of am-
munition in South Vietnam is 700 tons
fired each day by Saigon troops, at a cost
of over $1 million a day. That is a very
explosive and expensive peace.
So the question remains whether the
shipment of more arms to South Viet-
nam will help strengthen the cease-fire
agreement, or will it fan the flames of
violence. And it is questionable whether
shipping More will encourage greater
self-reliance and conservation by the
South Vietnamese Army, or simply en-
courage it to use more, not less.
It is argued also? that this additional
military aid to Saigon is necessary be-
cause of inflation?to which I can only
say, again, that inflation begins at home.
And the Vietnam veteran must Wonder
at this administration's worry over the
effects of inflation in Saigon, when the
costs for his schooling or job training
Climb every day. Apparently the Presi-
dent can find the money to fight the
effects of inflation in Saigon, but not
to help Vietnam veterans deal with
inflation here at home.
Finally, there are some who argue
that it would be unconscionable to de-
mand a cutoff or reduction of aid to
South Vietnam. The fact is, we are doing
neither today.
No one here has demanded a cutoff of
aid, or even a reduction in the ceiling es-
tablished by the Congress. A ceiling is a
ceiling, and that is what we are reaffirm-
ing here. It was the Pentagon which re-
fused to spend according to the ceiling.
And the issue is not the end of Ameri-
can aid to South Vietnam, but hox to
encourage a transition in our continuing
relationship?from a master-client aid
relationship, to a more balanced one that
encourages self-reliance rather than de-
penftnce.
I ,beileve teCogress acted respon-
sibly last year in limiting our funding of
military supplies to the South Viet-
namese Army. That wise decision should
not now be circumvented. Rather, we
should properly consider any further
American military support of South
Vietnam in the context of the budget
request for the next fiscal year?which,
again, will be in the neighborhood of
$1.6 billion. This is a sum for continuing
war in Vietnam that is over three times
the amount we now spend on the war on
cancer here at home?even though can-
cer will take next year the lives of 350,-
000 Americans, or seven times the num-
ber of Americans who lost their lives in
Vietnam over the past decade.
The recent action of the House, coupled
with the actions of the Senate over the
past year, correctly reflect the view of
most Americans that the time has now
come for us to reduce our funding of war,
not increase it.
In the absence of any new or mean-
ingful diplomatic initiatives by the ad-
ministration to reduce the level of con-
flict in Indochina and strengthen the
cease-fire agreements ? the Congress
must act to chart some new directions,
and to change the level and character of
our involvement in iVetnam. By accept-
ing this amendment the Senate will re-
affirm that this is the new road we should
follow?not the road that says more guns
and more ammunition for an endless war.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield to me?
Mr. KENNEDY. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from South Dakota.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, I wish
to commend the Senator from Massachu-
setts for offering this amendment which
provides for reasonable restrictions on
the amount of American military aid
flowing to South Vietnam. I think most
Americans would applaud any effort on
the part of the Saigon government to
heal the wounds of this war and to work
out some kind of an accommodation with
the people in their country that are chal-
lenging that government. But we do not
do either the people of Vietnam or our-
selves favor when we continue to pour
in more and more military aid which only
has the effect of prolonging the war.
I think it is quite clear from the avail-
able evidence that this military assist-
ance is not being used to restore peace
and it is no tbeing used to bring the coun-
try back together, but to perpetuate the
political rule of the present regime in
Saigon.
We did some calculations in our office
the other day on the South Vietnamese
military budget. That government is now
spending what would be the equivalent
here in the United States of a $350 bil-
lion American military budget. In other
words, for the United States to be spend-
ing as much on our military budget as
the regime of General Thieu is spend-
ing on their budget on a per capita basis,
we Would have to increase our own mili-
tary budget three and one-half times.
It is no wonder that the major prob-
lem in South Vietnam today is inflation
because the expenditure on that level of
military outlays will inevitably wreck the
economy of that country with the kind
of ruinous inflation that is now taking
place. It is the kind of aid that does not
contribute to the wealth of the country.
Mr. President, you cannot eat guns; the
consumer cannot go out and feed his
S 7123
family on bombs or weapons carriers. So
we are not contributing things to heal
the country and helping them to stand
on their own feet. We are further fuel-
ing the fires of inflation and setting back
the day when South Vietnam can estab-
lish the kind of viable economic base that
holds any hope for its independence.
So I think the Senator's amendment is
In the interest of the people of South
Vietnam and in the interest of moving
them away from a war that has gone on
far too long and which further weakens
the people of that country. As the Sen-
ator said, it comes at a time when our
budget is under a strain and when we are
asking the American people to pour in
tax funds for military purposes abroad,
at a time when those funds are desper-
ately needed to strengthen our own so-
ciety, not the least of which is meeting
the needs of the young men who partici-
pated in that war, as the Senator said.
I commend the Senator and I hope the
amendment is agreed to.
Mr. KENNEDY. I would like to ask the
Senator from South Dakota, who has
been spending a good deal of time in his
home State, whether the people of his
State understand that we are spending
in this fiscal year some $2.5 billion in aid
to South Vietnam; whether the people
of South Dakota understand the magni-
tude of that type commitment; and that
it appears, given the reasoning and ra-
tionale of the letter Dr. Kissinger sent to
me in explanation of policy toward South
Vietnam, that this apparently is a con-
tinuing and open-ended kind of commit-
ment or understanding by the present
administration; whether they under-
stand we are going to continue to spend
that kind of money in South Vietnam?
I would be interested in what kind of
reaction the Senator from South Dakota
is receiving from his constituents.
Mr. McGOVERN. I can only say to the
Senator that the people in my State who
do understand the dimensions of what
we are still pouring into South Vietnam
are not enthusiastic about it.
As the Senator knows, it is very diffi-
cult even for us here in the Senate to
keep posted on the way public funds are
being spent. Many of these arrangements
are worked out by executive discussions,
and even we do not catch up with them
as fast as we should. But I can say to the
Senator that the people in my State are
deeply troubled by the mounting cost of
living and are deeply troubled by the
growing scarcities of things they need.
We are basically an agricultural State.
We are short not only of fuel but of fer-
tilizer. Everything from baling wire to
binding twine is in short supply. Chemi-
cals that produce fertilizer are in short
supply.
One of the reasons is that for the last
10 years we have been pouring billions
and billions of dollars of the limited re-
sources of this country into Southeast
Asia. I think the people of my State and
the people of the country ag a whole
would not object to constructive assist-
ance to make life better for people
abroad. It is not that they are isolationist
people but the fact they see those re-
sources being wasted on an enterprise
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S 7124 CONGRESSION AL RECORD -- SENATE May 6, 1 7
that they thought had been put behind
us nearly 2 years ago.
One of the things that I find disturb-
ing is that our official policy as a country
is to stand on the terms of the Paris
agreement That was the so-called
"peace with honor that was supposed
to have come some 18 months ago. It is
interestingan fact that while that agree-
ment has apparently been violated on
both sides, the Government of South
Vietnam has made it illegal to publish
the terms of that agreement in South
Vietnam, whereas the other side, which
Is supposedly the culprit in this whole
enterprise, is distributing the agreement
widely. They are encouraging the read-
ing of its terms and coming to a better
understanding of It.
I think We had better be advised of
what we are doing when we back with
further millions of dollars of support a
regime that does not want its people to
know the terms of the Paris agreement.
We ought to be more interested in see-
ing the agreement enforced rather than
bankrolling a regime in South Vietnam
that is bent on sabotaging it.
Mr. KEN1sTEDY. I want to thank the
Senator from South Dakota for his
comments. As all Americans know, this
has been an issue and a question about
which he has felt deeply. and I think he
has made a substantial contribution to
the general understanding of the Ameri-
can people with respect to it.
ADDITIONAL Srn.ITARY AID TO VIETNAM IS ILL,
ADVISED
Mr. McGOVBRist. It is vital that Con-
gress exercise its constitutional powers
to end the further drain on American
tax dollar now fueling the continued
killing in Indochina. The time has come
- for healing, reconstruction and accom-
modation in Indochina. If these healing
efforts are to get under way we must stop
pouring In billions of dollars in Ameri-
can arms, oil and money to keep the war
going.
I ask unanimous consent that an im-
portant statement by Mr. Fred Branf-
man, codirector of the Indochina Re-
source Center, before the Asia and Pacific,
.Affairs Subcommittee of the Howe of
Representatives May 1, 1974, be printed
at this point in the RECORD:
There being' no objection, the s Ate-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
THE NEED FOR CONDE/ SSIONAL ACTION FOR
PEACE IN INDOCHINA
(Statement of Fred Branfman I
KEY POINTS
1. The Administration has quietly iclated
congressional intent to cut economic aid to
Indochina in FY 1974. The original ed
miii-
istration request was for $827.8 million. Con-
gress out this back to under $700 million.
By the end of FY 74, however, the Adminis-
tration has wound up allocating $1.1 Billion
in economic aid to Indochina. (See Table 1?
p. 28, as well as page 16.)
2. The Administration allocated a ,oaal of
$3.2 billion in FY 74 for Indochina, almost
as Much ineney as was allocated for specific
countries in the rest of the Third World com-
bined. This figure, for example, is C times
what wena to Africa and Latin America com-
bined for economic aid. This was part a the
Administration's continuing commitment to
combatting local insurgencies, despite a clear
public and congressional mandate for non-
interventionism in such ineurgencies. (See
PP- 4a-8)
3. This Administration commitment to
counter-insurgency is inflicting unaccept-
able costs on the people of Indochina?more
war victims in 1973 than the seat of the
world put together; and it is a disturbing
strn of the lack of Administration concern
far its own citizens, ct3 well as others in
serious need. Food For ?Peace shipments to
Indochina were increased by $300 mil/ion in
FY 74, for example, while hundreds of thou-
sands starved in Sahel. 413ee Parts III and IV)
4. Congress must "Pause for Peace" by sus-
pending aid pending progress towards politi-
cal solutions, or at least substantially reduce
what are greatly increased. Administration
requests for BY 1975. Military and "Indo-
china Postwar Reconstrention" requests have
jumped 45%. (p. 19). EY 74 total spending
SSW Only 0.1%. actually going toward "hu-
manitarian", "reconstruction", or "develop-
ment" projects. (p. 18) The FY 74 budget,
therefore, was a war budget?caused by the
structural unviability of the GVN and Lou
Nal regimes. Administration claims that U.S.
aid will allow them to -stand on their own"
are myths. (See pp. 18-2a)
I. INTRODUCTION--CONGBESS AND THE LESSONS
OF VIETNAM
As Congress considers this year's giant $3.7
b:llion Administration request for U.S. ex-
penditures in Indochina, (see table 1), it will
be deciding far more than simply the nature
of our Indochina involvement. During -the
1960s, millions of Amertcans turned against
the war?in the streets, at the ballot box, in
the army. Congress, however belatedly, fin-
ally responded to this mandate for peace
tram the American people.
Powerful congressional opposition to the
852 carpet bombings of urban centers in
Christmas 1972 helped farce the Administra-
tion to sign the Paris agreement. Congress
halted the bombing of Cambodia in Au-
gust 15, 1973, and passe: legislation aimed at
ending U.S. support for South Vietnamese
police and prisons on December 19, 1973.
And, last month, it took the historic step of
rejecting an Administration proposal for $474
million in supplemental military aid for
Indochina.
These congressional actions have saved
countless Vietnamese, Cambodian and Loa-
'Han lives; made billions of dollars available
for urgent domestic and humanitarian inter-
national needs; reversed what seemed like
lock-step progress toy:rands Presidential Dic-
tatorship; and, in a subtle and not yet fully
understood way, these 'congressional actions
have begun to restore the spiritual health of
a nation torn apart by our Indochina in-
volvement.
By so doing, Congress clearly embarked on
a new path, away from-Global Policemansbip,
away from silent and willing partnership in a
Presidential Dictatorship, away from war
and towards peace. If this process is to be
continued during the 1970s, Congress cannot
continue to assent this FY 1976 to the same
lond of covert Executive involvement that
got us involved in Indochina in the first
pace.
The Nixon Administration has in the past
year, however, quietly been subverting this
public and congressional mandate for peace
it Indochina. Intervening covertly as in
the early 1960s, the Administration has in-
itiated a spiral which will bring ever-in-
creasing U.S. escalation Unless Congress
acts.
During FY 1974, the Administration ex-
pended $2.53 billion in Indochina, only 7%
of which was designated for "humanitarian,"
or "reconstruction" and "development" pro-
grams. The remaining 93% went to prop
un military regtmes which are unwilling to
bring peace to their countries. The Thieu
government in South Vietnam, for exam-
ple, has refused all offers by the other side
to negotiate a standsaill ceasefire, allow
democratic liberties, and form a National
Council of National Reconciliation and Con-
cord to help plan elections. As a result, over
'75,000 were killed in Indochina last year,
125,000 were wounded. :and 1 million made
homeless?more war victims that in the rest
of the World put together, including the
Middle East. (See table 2).
The Administrations FY 1975 progsam,
moreover, offers even more of the same. Its
proposed FY '75 military and economic aid
requests, total $3.28 billion?or '27% more
than what was allocated last year.
Once more, over 90% of this aid is des-
tined neither for reconstruction nor human-
itarian needs but for the maintenance of
the war machines' in Cambodia and South
Vietnam.
And, the Administration's PY 75 program
offers even more disturbing visions for FY
76 and beyond. If General Thieu continues
to refuse to allow his opponents to partici-
pate in the p'slitical process outlined by the
Paris Agreement, for examnle, there is every
reason to believe that they will feel no
choice but to launch an offensive. And what
then? Are we to give even more billions to
Mr. Thieu in an attempt to repel such an
offensive? Is the 200th aniversary of this
country to find us convulsed in a national
debate over a Presidential attempt to re-
new U.S. bombing to save Thieu? And even
if U.S. bombing is renewed, what reason is
there to believe that it will "succeed" next
time?
Clearly, this fiscal year :1975 provides Con-
gress with a historic oeportunity to ensure
that our aid is no longer used for war in
Indochina, that the hesitant progress made
toward halting our global asterventionism be
'continued.
Congress OM achieve these goals by only
appropriating aid for Indochina in the letter
and spirit of the Paris Agreement. Two
means offer progress toward these goals:
(1) A pause for Peace: Congress could sun-
pond all non-humanitarian and non-devel-
opmental aid to either side in Indochina
until governing bodies emerge which reflect
the political realities of the situation. In
South Vietnam, this would mean waiting
until the political machinery outlined by
the Paris -Agreement was set into motion,
and a newly-formed National Council of
National. Reconciliation and Concord had
gotten off the ground. In Cambodia, this
would mean withdrawing from what over-
whelming evidence indicates is now a war
only among Cambodians, and allowing the
Cambodian parties to evolve whatever form
of government they will. in Laos, it means
absolutely halting all U.S. economic and
military inputs which are not approved by
all of the parties which have just entered a
fragile coalition.
This alternative, we believe, would lead
to a major change for peace on the part
of all parties concerned within fa matter of
weeks and would, in the end, result in far
less suffering and disrupt ani than any oth-
er alternative,
(2) A substantial reinction in non-im-
manitarian aid: although less likely to bring
peace quickly to Indochina, this alternative
would also reduce the level of violence and
generate pressures on all sides for peace.
It has been contended that such a suspen-
sion in aid?or even the more moderate step
of a substar.tial reduction--would deliver
South Vietnam "bound hand and foot to
the Communists."
It is our contention, however. thannresent
Administraticn policies can do nothing to
prevent such an outcome?and, indeed, are
quite likely to produce victory for the guer-
rillas in any event. All thst present Adminis-
tration programs mean is that there will be
millions more war victims billions more dol-
lars denied 'people in need. before Indo-
chinese guerrillas eventually seize power
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militarily because they were outlawed from
competing politically.
A suspension or substantial reduction in
American aid, such as we are proposing, offers
the only hope of moving the conflict away-
from the military and toward the political
arena. The present ifiTN administration?or a
successor?should have no trouble competing
politically, if it enjoys the pi:pular support
its advocates claim. Nor would it necessarily
be precluded from picking up the gun once
again, if it turned out that its opponents
were not willing to compete politically. Under
the Paris Agreement, niereover, Third Force
elements would be accorded an important
"balancing" role in the political play of
tOrces between right and left.
Under the circumstances, then, Congres-
sional aid designed in accordance with the
Paris Agreement offers far less chance of a
complete PRO takeover than present Admin-
istfation policy. And, in Cambodia, a serious
American attempt to move the conflict into
the political arena offers the only possibility
that moderate elements in the Lou Not
cabinet can avoid the complete eclipse an
all-out Khmer Rouge military victory could
bring.
Congress clearly has a public mandate for
such policies. The Administration can point
to no substantial group of Americans which
supports an admitted 'expenditure of $3.7
billion and hidden expenditures totalling
many billions more?to continue our futile
attempts to impose unpopular military re-
gimes on the people of Indochina. Millions
of Americans, however, support the notion
that the people of Indochina should be al-
lowed to determine their own affairs; the
Paris Agreement provides just such a vehicle
for this occnrring.
This year could be remembered as the year
that Congress finally regained its rightful
say in making ,foreign policy; a year which
future Americans would remember as the
one in which the Presidential Dictatorship
over our country's destinies was significantly
altered; in which this country began the
slow, painful and long process of turning to
peace and healing throughout the world.
If 1976 is to be a year of rebirth, however,
Congress must re-cast any U.S. aid requests
to Indochina into a form that will bring
peace. It can happen .. . this year. It is up
to Congress to act.
IT. U.S. INVOLVEMENT Di INDOCHINA--THE
DEOPOLITMAL CONTEXT
Before turning to the specifics of U.S.
expenditures for Indochina this fiscal year, it
is important to remember the overall con-
text in which the Administration is present-
ing them.
The key issue which Vietnam has symbol-
ized for many is 'whether the U.S. should in-
tervene to put down wars of national liber-
ation in the Third World. Most Americans
hire by now decided we should not?for
moral or practical reasons or a combina-
tion of both.
The Administration, however, has reached
just the opposite conclueion. It is as com-
mitted to tl.$, intervention to put down
local insurgencies in 1-974 as was the US.
presidental branch :60 years ago?and par-
ticularly in the East Asia and pacific region
that we are discussing today.
This is why the Administration has sta-
tioned more U.S. trOops in the East Asia and
Pacific region today than in 1964. We have
today 1'73,000 troops Stationed from Guam
to Thailand, compared to 156,000 in 1964.
(Another 33,000 naval troops .are afloat in
the Pacific.)
This is why 7 disguised and admitted mili-
tary dictatorships in the East Asia and Pacific
regions receive more Administration aid than
the rest of the world put together. In its
original FY 1974 budget presentation to Con-
gress, for example, the Administration spe-
cifically allocated $3.863 billion for South
:69P7M3ppRO00500290006-4
Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, the Philippines,
Indonesia, and South Korea. By contrast
$2.13 billion was specifically allocated for
military and economy aid to 97 other coun-
tries in the Third World. Put another way,
two-thirds of the Administration's aid world-
wide was destined for 7 nations having a
population comprising but 10% of the Third
World's population.
And this is why the Administration has
in FY 1974 allocated so much money to
South Vietnam and Cambodia's military
regimes, while millions went hungry around
the globe:
?In FY 1974, for example, the Thieu gov-
ernment received $878 million in economic
inputs (see table 2). This money that went
into the tiny land of South Vietnam, a na-
tion of 18 million, was 50% more than what
the U.S. gave to all of Africa and Latin
America combined, two continents with 534
million people ($500 million) .
?Also in FY 1974, tens of millions starved
and many died from hunger, in the Sahel
and Ethiopia. AID contributed some $130
million in food and non-food emergency
assistance, as of February. 4, 1974. The Ad-
ministration, however, has targeted nearly
30 times as much money for Indochina,
money which is designed to fight a counter-
insurgency.
Particularly reprehensible was an extra
$300 million in Food for Peace money which
the Administration added to its original
requests for Cambodia and South Vietnam?
to compensate for cuts made in economic
aid by Congress. The Administration clearly
had a choice between using that $300 mil-
lion worth of food to shore up military dic-
tatorships in Indochina or to feed starving
millions in the Sahel. It chose the former.
This commitment to Global Policing, fl-
ually, is why the Administration transferred
economic aid money from nations all over
the world to Indochina, where such money
is designed to help in the counter-insurgent
effort. A recent chart supplied to Congress
by AID administrator Parker, for example,
shows the differences between AID original
proposals for economic aid for FY 1974, and
their final allocations, in 18 selected coun-
tries plus the continent of Africa. The Ad-
ministration has reduced aid to nations
where millions go hungry precipitously?aid
to 13angladesh was down 41%, to India down
56%, to Pakistan down 40%, to Africa down
6%. Aid to Vietnam was listed as increasing
10% (our estimate is 34%, see Table 1),
however, aid to Cambodia was listed as in-
creasing 273% and aid to Thailand was up
16%. (Source: Hearings Before House Ap-
prop. Corn., Part II, on Second Supplemental
Appropriation Bill, 1974, pp. 877-880) .
It has been argued that detente has made
such counter-insurgency efforts obsolete.
There is little evidence to support this point
of view, however. The only Third World
"success" the Administration has been able
to point to as a result of detente has been
its ability to carpet-bomb Hanoi and block-
ade Haiphong Harbor without the Soviet
Union or China intervening in response.
Besides noting that not initiating World
War III due to saturation bombing of a tiny
far-off land is a curious measure of success,
we should point out that there is no reason
to believe that things would have worked
out any differently without detente.
More to the point, however, the impor-
tance of support from the Soviet Union or
China during the early stages of insurgency
has always been highly exaggerated. As the
Pentagon Papers make clear, such support
was almost nonexistent in the very begin-
ning in South Vietnam. And even at the
height of the war, only 3% of the military
expenditures by all three super-powers in
Indochina were those of the Soviet bloc and
the Chinese (see Table 3). Furthermore, of
course, there have been no signs whatsoever
S 7125
that the Soviet Union and China have de-
cided to eliminate the relatively minor aid
they give local insurgencies?or why they
should or would.
The Administration's massive and con-
tinuing commitment to counter-insurgency
in the 1970's was particularly brought home
to me during a visit to Thailand in the
snrina and summer of last year.
While in Thailand, I interviewed a large
number of American officials, including a
member of the U.S. counter-insurgency
board, a member of the 'U.S. Embassy po-
litical-military sections and members oi pri-
vate 'U.S.-supported counter-insurgent
think-tank.
I discovered that these officials also feel
that Vietnam was a "mistake", that to a
man they deride publicly the President's no-
tion that we have extricated ourselves
through "Peace with Honor".
But I also discovered, to my dismay, that
our failure in Vietnam has not led them
to draw the conclusions drawn by most
Americans: that we should get out. The only
lesson they seem to have drawn is quite the
opposite: that we should have gotten in
sooner. Time and again I was told that while
our cause was just in Vietnam, our means
appropriate, we had intervened too late. It
was absolutely essential to "get them before
they build up", I was told.
Which is precisely what the Nixon Admin-
istration is trying to do in Thailand. Un-
known to most Senators and Representa-
tives, not to mention the American people,
the U.S. Mission in Thailand has recently
embarked on an ambitious new counter-in-
surgency program in Thailand. I was told
by an official in the "Pot-Mit" section that
it would be modeled after the "Regional
Forces" and "Popular Forces" concept in
South Vietnam, and involved deploying dis-
trict and province-level "reaction" forces
throughout Northeast Thailand. It would be
much smaller than in South Vietnam, this
official told me, involving only several million
dollars and several thousand men. Other
Americans told me, however, that this pro-
gram was not at all modeled after thp RF-
RP program, but rather the infamous Phoe-
nix program. Assassination of civilians
thought to be working for the other side,
selective terror, programs for issuing ID
cards to all adults linked to computerized
bio-dossiers, and mass arrests?based on
quotas?had alreadly been tried out on an
experimental basis, I was told.
At this point, I have no way of knowing
which source was correct, i.e. whether U.S.
officials in Thailand have launched new
counter-insurgency programs modeled after
the RP or Phoenix programs.
I do know, however, that they are commit-
ted to such counter-insurgency efforts?as
are their counterparts from Indonesia to In-
dochina to the Philippines.
What we are seeing today in the East Asia
and Pacific region is an Orwellian vision
come true, as the leaders of our Executive
branch engage in the deadly serious business
of mass assassination, mass incarceration,
and mass labelling of human beings in a
Pacific region inhabited by several hundred
million people.
There is no more reason to believe it will
succeed than did similar visions of totalitar-
ian control held by American leaders in Viet-
nam during the early 1960's.
And I know that, just as in the 1960's,
Administration commitment to counter-
insurgency in the East Asia and Pacific re-
gion is inflicting unacceptable costs on
Asians and Americans alike.
rn. COSTS TO THE INDOCHINESE
At the end of his request for Indochina
funds during his Foreign Aid message last
week, the President of the United States said
that "the investment I am now seeking (Ls)
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S 7126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE May 6, /974'
an investment to sustain the peace, to over-
come' the human suffering resulting fro in the
war."
This statement is beyond. comprehension.
We have already pointed that officiel fig-
sures reveal that more than 1.5 million war
victims were created this past year.
To this number of newly killed, newly
wounded and newly refugeed last year, more-
over, must be added:
Several million refugees living in marginal,
undeveloped areas to whom the GVN has
denied the right to return to the villages ot
their birth.
Tens Or thousands of political prieonere
who remain in prison despite the Paris
Agreement, and the thousands more who
have been arrested, tortured, imprisoned
viithout trial since the ceasefire was signed.
Thome ads of people who are suffering and
dying from lack of medicine or an adequate
diet?in the cities, in the refugee camps, in
the villages.
If Compess does not substantially alter
the Adnamistrationas ai request, one can
assume that casualty figures will be at least
as high one year from today as during the
past year.
That is. Congressional acquiescence to the
Presidents aid request will guarantee al, least
50,000 corpses among people who are now
alive, in she coming sear. At least twice an
many will be wounded. And hundreis of
thousands?in Cambodia, in, South Viet-,
nam?wili. lose their homes.
For President Nixon to claim that his aid
bill is designed to "overcome human suffer-
ing" goes beyond mere duplicity, and enters
into a realm of Orweillan doublespea:e be-
yond my *understanding.
I know that to accept this statement, how-
ever, is to acquiesce in a monstrous lie; one
which continues to threaten the lives of all
Vietnarnigie and Cambodians, not merely the
war victims enumerated above.
xv. mars FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
The costs to the Arnericars people of con-
tinuing Insecutive involvement in Indoehina
are no less real, though perhaps less evident.
I need not tell U.S. Representatives what
$3.7 billion could do this fiscal year fol mil-
lions of the ill, aged, infirm, young and de-
prived in this society: The following examples,
however, may make clearer a larger point:
The chute/nail of this committee, for ex-
ample, has noted the distressing plight of
hospital workers around the country, earn-
ing woefully inadequate salaries. Ten ehou-
sand workers could have their annual wages
raised by over 25% for the $10 million the
Administration is proposing to spend each
day in the coming fiscal year.
During fiscal year 1975, the Nixon Admin-
istration has reduced federal funding of med-
ical research into diabetes, kidney disease,
egging, sudden infant death, glaucoma and
cystic fibrosis from $82.4 million allocated in
FY 74 to it proposed $14.8 million in FY 1975.
These ditseases affect tile lives of well over
15 million Americans, with the U.S. ranking
today 16th In infant mortality. The Adinin-
istrationas proposed saving of $7.6 million
will be expended before the next 24 houes are
up in Vietnam.
Another serious example is "Public Service
Employment", a program which allows tens
of thousands of Americans to engage in use-
ful constructive work during periods of
temporary unemployment. In FY 1974, ap-
proximately $1.25 billion was allocated to
these programs. This year, however, while the
Nixon Administration is proposing spending
$3.7 billion In Indochina, it has reduced its
FY 1975 Public Service Employment Program
by 1 billicm to a mere $250 million.
And, alehough the Nixon Administration
sent well over a million men off to fight in
Vietnam, ft has not yet been able to provide
them with adequate Hying benefits on their
return. Recently, the Senate Committee on
Veterans Affairs proposed raising GI benefits
from $220 a month to $270 a month, a move
which would affect the lives of 1,630,000
teterans in the first year alone. The Nieon
telministration is opposing this program. Its
cost? In EY 1915, it would come to $554 rail-
ion, about the cost of 11/2 months lighting
in Indochina. The total cost of the program.
over a five year period, comes to about $2.272
billion?about 60% of what the Administra-
t.cm proposes spending in the next year
alone in Indochina.
And, we may remember the dismember-
ment of programs reaching tens of millions
of Americans carried oat by the Nixon Ad-
ministration on January 29, 1973 when it
unveiled its FY 1974 budget. Proposed sav-
ings by abolishing the Office of Economic
Opportunity?an agency which had helped
millions of poor people in its decade of ex-
tence?were $62 million in FY 1973, $323
niillion in FY 11974, and $390 million in FY
1175. In other words, in order to save $780
million over a three year period, the Adrein-
ittration chose to abolish 0E0. Meanwiiile,
however, it spent four times that sum 'list
year alone for war in Indochina.
Finally, indeed, we may note the fact
that virtually all of the programs abolished
by the Administration in the fields of social
nelfare, job opportunities, health and educa-
tion, resulted in a saving of far less than
tile $3.7 billion proposed by the Administra-
tion for this year's FY 1975 budget. For
example, last year's $3.2 billion of Indochina
spending was $600 million more than the e2.6
billion the Administration expected to save
lii FY 1974 by termineding 0E0 ($328 mil-
lion), reducing child feeding programs ($59
million), phasing out the Economic Develop-
ment Administration ($35 million), elimi-
nating soil and water programs ($258 nal-
lion), terminating rural water systems find
waste disposal grants ($100 million), sus-
pending new housing programs ($305 mil-
lion), phasing clown of the Emergency Em-
ployment Assistance Program ($670 million),
cutting back Old Age Survivors and Disabil-
ity Insurance ($310 million), manpower
training programs ($3.54 million), federal
student loans ($264 million) and student
subsidies ($119 million).
I bring up these examples not because I
think that foreign policy objectives can al-
ways be weighed against domestic needs so
directly. There are indeed cases where it may
lir alto more sense to fend money abroad,
than to use it to help our own citizens at
h erne. This year, for example, when there are
millions starving in the Sahel and India,
flood and storm 'victims from Pakistan to
Nicaragua, a cogent case can be made that
such cases deserve urgent priority. And there
is also, to be sure, a very strong case for
reconstruction and rehabilitation in Indo-
china.
I bring up these examples of what our
Indochina experience is costing the Amer-
ican people, however, because the Adminis-
tration is doing none of these things. Not
only is it not aiding the starving and sick of
the earth anything like it might; not only
Is it not meeting humanitarian and develop-
ment needs in Indochina; but it even denies
its own citizens badly needed billions, only
to take this money for use in killing, main-
ir g and torturing abroad.
I have already in testimony before tis
cemmittee attempted to describe the .kind
oi mentality, shared by the highest Executive
leaders in this land, which I saw in Indo-
china; a mentality which reduced human
beings to numbers, numbers to be tracked.
Jelled and broken if deemed necessary.
My testimony today reveals the other side
of the coin. Not only has this mentality
created One of the most sophisticated police-
states in the world today abroad, but to
achieve this the Administration has begun
tlie process of reducing its own citizens to
mere objects, to be manipulated and de-
prived as well.
I do not think it is necessary for me here
to elaborate on the indecency, inhumanity
and wretchedness of the present occupants
of the Executive branch in following such
a policy.
But
feel I must stress again that in is
question of U.S. aid to Indochina goes beyond
mere outrage, or shock. I is an issue which
directly threatens every man, woman and
child in this country, an issue that will in
the end determine whether this is a country
to be ruled by its people, and, however im-
perfect, their representatives in Congress: or
whether policy will continue to be made by
a tiny group of war-makers who turn ever-
more to deception, as tileir foreign policy
runs ever-more counter to American ideals
and values.
The cost of our continuing involvement in
Indochina to the people of this country. in
a word, is riot to be measured merely in
ailancial terms,
What is at stake is no more or less than
the spiritual and moral lit alth of this nation.
To understand this point, we may now
turn to a consideration in detail of the
Administration's FY 1975 aid request.
For only through 11 microscopic look at
this gigantic demand can we see how
duplicitous, how indiffereet to human needs,
and how war-like our Executive branch has
become.
I daresay there is no other administration
in the world today which would dare tee
present a budget over 90% of which is de-
signed for war, and call it a budget for
"reconstruction". I know there has never
been a time in the history of this country
when the American Executive has been so
contemptuous of its people and Congress:
unilaterally eilloting money in direct viola-
tion of congressional intent, advancing the
crudest sort of propaganda to support its
position. The Administration has resorted lo
the most transparent sueterfuge simply to
mulct their FY 1975 appropriation out of
Congress.
"A -nation divided ars one, itself cannot
stand," said the President during America's
iirst civil war. The cost to Americans of our
continued involvement in Indochina will be
continued division during this present,
rather quiescent phase, all what has become
our second civil war.
V. THE ADMINISTRATIO1?: PROGRA NI FOR
17NENDING WAR--PRF-gENTED AS A PLAN FOR
PEACE
Realizing public and congressional senti-
ment for peace and against U.S. involvement,
the Administration has sought to present its
program to Congress as ore designed to heal,
rebuild, and bring peace In fact, however,
U.S. aid programs are doing precisely the
opposite.
What is mere important, moreover, is that
there is no end in sight. Henry Kissinger im-
plicitly admitted this recently, when he
wrote to Senator Kennedy on March 25, 1974,
that "we believe it is important that we
continue our support as long as it is needed."
This shockingly open-ended commitment
to involvement in Indochina, one year after
Mr. Kissinger had negotiated an agreement
committing the U.S. to ending its involve-
ment, is sufficient cause for alarm.
When it is realized hens ever, that there is
no possibility that pro-UnS. military regimes
will ever be able to etard alone, Mr. Kies-
singer's statement is revealed as nothing less
than a commitment to American involve-
ment for decades to come?with the cost
of this involvement, moreover, steadily
rising.
I. THE FY 1974 PRESENTATION: WAR PRESENTLD
AS arcesecunarrerrose" AND ''RECONSTRUCTION"
One year ago today, for example, the Presi-
dent of the United States went before Con-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECo &UN A
gress to present his FY 1974 foreign aid pro-
posals, and stated:
"The signing of the ceasefire agree-
ments . . will pcfrmit its to turn our atten-
tion to the condiderable post-war needs of
Southeast Asia.... The legislation I am pre-
senting today . . . Wtaild provide a sound
beginning of the process of reconstruction
and rehabilitation there."
In fact, however; only 4% of the Indochina
.Aid that President Nixon proposed for
FT 1974 was actually designated for "recon-
struction and rehabilitation" or "develop-
rnent" ($121.4 Million Out of $2.9 billion-
See Table 3). And only another 4% was even
termed "humanitarian" ($107.4 million out of
$2.9 billion).
Ninety-two percent of the Administration-
requested funds for FY 1974 were meant to
continue ?the war-both military funds,
which were 72% of the total, and "economic"
and "rood for Peace" funds, which were
-indirectly war-related.
Even more importantly, the Administra-
tion's aid programs went to feed our narrow-
based war machines in South Vietnam and
Cambodia, which offered no hopes of peace.
In South Vietnam, President Nixon had
announced on January 23, 1973-even before
he had signed the Agreement-that his
Administration would continue to recognize
the Thieu Administration as the "sole" and
"legitimate" government of the Republic of
Vietnam. In elaborating on this, Henry Kis-
singer explained that the U.S. would con-
tinue to recognize the GV,N "with its consti-
tutional structure intact".
This not ofily directly violates the Paris
Agreement, which establishes that there are
"two parties" exercising sovereignty only over
their respective zones of control, and that
neither held sovereignty over the Republic
of Vietnam until both-together with a
"third segment"-met together in a National
Council of National Reconciliation and Con-
trol to hold elections.
But the Nixon-Kissinger announcement of
their recognition of. the OVN as the "sole,
legitimate" government of the Republic of
Vietnam, also ruled out any serious chance
for peace. For the Thieu government's con-
stitution, left structurally 'intact," outlaws
the PRG from peaceful political competition.
By committing itself Solely to the Thieu re-
gime, the Administration also ensured no
hope for a political settlement because of
the nature of that regime. The GVN would
hardly favor allowing the refugees to return
to PRO-controlled villages, emptying its
prisons of its tens of thousands of political
prisoners, or allowing popular Third Force
leaders to have the freedoms guaranteed
them by the Paris' Agreement, as long as it
could count on an Administration lavishly
supplying aid with no conditions.
And the situation in Cambodia is even less
amenable to a political solution. In throwing
its weight behind the Lon Nol regime, the
Administration has managed to produce of
the most unpopular, ineffectual, corrupt, and
comic-operaieh regimes in modern history.
Visiting Cambodia last year after the cease-
fire, I not only failed to find any Cambodians
supporting the ren Nol regime. I was also
told by high-ranking officials in the American
embassy in Phnom Penh that Lon Nol had
lost even the support of the few groups-
students and intellectuals-who had sup-
ported him at the time of the 1970 takeover.
More Moderate elements within the Phnom
Penh regime- have -Made no secret- of their
distaste for Lon Nol-and he in turn has
systematically excluded them from power.
The latest casualty was Premier In Tam, who
had spoken vaguely of negotiations.
The result is that the Administration has
found itself in a no-win situation in Cam-
bodia, spending hundreds of millions annu-
ally to 'prosecute a War which cannot be
won.
2. FY 1974 mttPLEMENTATION: sinvintistaarioN
COVERTLY INCREASES ECONOMIC AID 34 PERCENT
Last year, Congress clearly showed its de-
sire to reduce our involvement in Indochina
by cutting the Administration's request for
Indochina Postwar Reconstruction. from $632
million to $450 million.
Through a variety of subterfuges, however,
the Administration succeeded not only in
restoring the cuts, but in actually spending
nearly twice as much for economic aid to
Indochina as the Congress had originally
intended.
The main means the Administration used
for this subversion of Congress was taking
money from world-wide Food for Peace allo-
cations and channeling it into Indochina.
Since Congress has until now only set world-
wide levels, such Administration subterfuge
was possible.
Food for Peace for South Vietnam shot up
from an original request of $176.4 million to
$309 million, and for Cambodia from $30.9
million to $191.2 million.
In addition, the Administration pushed
through two "loans" to South Vietnam to-
taling $110 million, and "supplemental" eco-
nomic aid of $49 million.
The result is that the Administration pro-
posed a total of $840.8 million in economic
aid to Indochina as of the spring of 1973;
Congress reduced this figure to about $700
million ($450 for "postwar reconstruction,"
$50 million "development loan," $208.8 "Food
for Peace") by Christmas 1973.
The Administration then proceeded to re-
store all cuts-and then go beyond even its
original request, winding up at $1.1 billion.
This $1.1 billion, moreover, is used almost
entirely for war-related programs and has
no impact whatsoever on the reconstruction
or human needs of Indochina. Almost half of
this money, for example, is for "Food for
Peace" "Food for Peace" is imported in South
Vietnam and Cambodia by local importers,
who pay local currency fb the GVN and Lon
Nol governments. The Administration has
used 100% of these funds in South Vietnam,
and 80% in Cambodia, for "common defense"
needs, i.e. war.
Most of the remaining money-for the
commodity import programs, "technical sup-
port" programs, etc.-are similarly used to
support the war. They are designed to pro-
vide the minimal economic backing neces-
sary for the Thieu and Lon Nol regimes to
survive, with much for the local currency
generated by the CIP and other programs
also finding its way into the budgets of the
army, airforce and police.
3. FY 1974 IMPLEMENTATION: HUMANITARIAN
AND RECONSTRUCTION FUNDS REDUCED
Despite the fact that the "economic" aid
has risen, moreover, the actual FY 1974 funds
devoted to humanitarian or reconstruction
needs has actually fallen. Total funds re-
quested for "humanitarian, reconstruction
and development" programs in the FY 1974
original presentation amounted to $228.8
million. At this writing, however, we have
found that the Administration has allocated
only $172 million or what is termed "devel-
opment", "humanitarian", and "reconstruc-
tion".
And even this miniscule amount of aid
contains a massive deception of Congress. Of
the $96.4 allocated for "humanitarian" needs,
some $75 million went to "refugee relief."
Much of this money pays for "refugee re-
settlement" which, as former U.S. AID offi-
cials Edward Blook and Leon Van Wagoner,
as well as the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on
Refugees, have recently pointed out, is not
humanitarian at all. Rather U.S. and GVN
officials have denied refugees the "freedom
of movement" guaranteed them under Ar-
ticle 11 of the Paris Agreement, by refusing
to allow them to return to the villages of
their birth and instead resettling them in
marginal areas, often without water and
decent farming land, so as to claim this land
for "strategic reasons".
Of a total of $3.2 billion appropriated by
Congress in FY 1974 for Indochina-related
expenses, then, only 96 million, or 3% has
actually gone to meet the humanitarian and
reconstruction needs of the people. The rest
has gone-directly or indirectly-for more
war.
4. REQUESTS FOR INCREASED FY 1974 AID: FOUR
ADMINISTRATION MYTHS
Since FY 1974 aid was not designed either
to meet the human needs of the people of
Vietnam, nor to lead to a political solution,
it is not surprising that the Administration's
FY 1975 aid requests far exceed FY 1974
allocations.
Just one week ago, on April 24, the Presi-
dent unveiled his FY 1975 budget proposal
for Indochina. This year, this section of the
President's Foreign Aid speech was entitled
"Toward Reconstruction of Indochina". In it,
the President requested $939.8 million for
"Postwar Reconstruction", more than double
last year's $450 million allocation.
Other Administration documents reveal,
moreover, that the President intends to ask
for $2.1 billion in military aid for FY 1975,
an increase of 42% over last year's military
appropriations.
The only major category which did not
jump up spectacularly for FY 1975 was the
Administration's "Food for Peace" request,
which was only $260 million, about half of
the FY 1974 allocation. Last year at this time,
however, the Administration ony requested
$208.8 million for "Food for Peace." Since it
eventually grew to $507 million, there is no
doubt that this year's request could grow
similarly over the next 12 months.
Depending on one's measure, therefore, the
FY 1975 Administration request represents
an increase over FY 1974 allocations of vary-
ing degrees:
1. Overall, the jump is from $3.2 billion in
FY 1974 to a requested $3.7 billion in F-Y
1975-an increase of 16%.
2. Total economic and military inputs into.
the three countries of Indochina have in-
creased 30%, from $2.5 billion to a requested
$3.2 billion.
3. The most real measure of the increase,
however, comes from ignoring the prelimi-
nary "Food for Peace" estimates for FY 1975.
Comparing "Indochina Postwar heconstruc- -
tion Aid" funds, with "Military Assistance
Service Fund" and "Military Assistance Pro-
gram" funds, we find an increase from $2.08
billion to $3.02 billion, a jump of 45%.
This large increase in requested FY 1975
aid has resulted entirely from the weakness
of the Administration position in Indochina.
Unable to triumph militarily, but unwilling
to try and compete politically for fear of
losing, the Administration is doing little more
right now than simply more of the same.
Unable to admit this to the American peo-
ple and Congress-and perhaps to them-
selves-however, Administration officials have
instead attempted to present this year's aid
requests in the best possible light. The
essence of their position is that if these aid
requests are passed, they will both give the
GVN and Lon Nol government a "fair
chance" against the weapons supplied the
other side by the Soviet Union and China,
and also make them economically and mili-
tarily viable so that they will not demand
American aid 3 or 4 years from now.
Unfortunately, such arguments by the Ad-
ministration are little but myths.
Myth (1). Administration Programs are
made necessary by our "commitments" under
the Paris Agreements. On March 25, 1974,
Henry Kissinger wrote to Senator Kennedy
that "as a signator of the Paris Agreemeni?
. . . the United States committed itself to
strengthening the conditions which made the
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S 7128 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 0, 1974
ceasefire possible . . with these commit-
ments in mind, we continue to provide the
Republic of Vietnam with the meanie neces-
sary for its self-defense and its economics
viabilitm"
The American people have been given
many Messons in public for our intolvement
In Vietnam over the years: there was the
domino theory, the Gulf of Tonkin, theBeato
treaty, the 'Yellow Peril" scare, and the ever-
popular commitment to allowing the Viet-
namese people the right of self-determina-
tion."
In fact, as the Pentagon Papers reveal, all
of these public rationales were mere sugar-
coating for what former Assistent Secretary
of Defense John McNaughton described as
70% of our goal: "To avoid a humiliating
defeat (to our reputation as a guarantor)."
McNaughton also stated that only "10%"
of our "aims" were to "permit the people of
SVN to enjoy a better, freer way of life."
Of all the previous untruths, however, none
Is more absurd than Mr. Kissinger's. The
notion that the Paris Agreement serves as
ratior ale for our continued intereention
is plainly untrue.
Article 1 of the Paris Agreement states
that "The United States . . , respect is) the
independence, sovereignty, unity, and terri-
torial integrity of Vietnam." By signing this,
the Administration conceded on the crucial
point of debate over the years: Vietnam is
one country, by definition wrought by a civil
war. Continuing U.S. involvement iii 'Viet-
nam, tY.eref ore, constitutes blatant inter-
vention in a civil war, one recognii.ted by
interne-tonal law and common sense to be
illegal,
If theee was any doubt on this question,
moreover, Article 4 of the Paris Agreement
removes it. Article 4 states that -The United
States will not continue its military involve-
ment or intervene in the internal aft airs of
South Vietnam." In signing the Agreement,
therefore, the Administration was making
a solemn commitment tra end our involve-
ment?military, political, and erionomic?in
South Vietnam, i.e. the zones controlled by
Presidene Thieu, as well as by the P11.0.
For Mr. Kissinger to now claim that this
Paris Agreement in fact "commits" tie U.S.
to further and massive involvement repre-
sents One of the most grotesque and twisted
myths ever put forward to the American
public an a reason for intervention abroad.
Myth 12) : This substantial amount of aid
will suffiiie to launch the GVN on the road
to economic recovery, allowing us to reduce
our aid substantially in the next 2- 3 years.
Recently, for example, the VS. Ameassa-
dor to -Saigon Mr. Clraham Martin stated
that, "If . . . the Congress approves the 850
million dollars I have recommended for fis-
cal year 1975, plus approximately 700 million
dollars f or the following year. I ani con-
vinced further economic aid from the United
States could be drastically reduced ox even
eliminated altogether by fiscal year 1977".
(U.S. News Sx World Report, April 29, 1974).
All available evidence suggests precisely
the oppatite, however. The World. Bunk, for
example, recently completed a survey for
South Vietnam's economy. In its report,
dated January 28, 1974, World Bane ex-
perts concluded that ". . . net aid reeuired
in 1980 will be on the order of $770 trillion
a year or about $100 million higher than
seems probable for 1974. In short, it seems
probable that Vietnam is at least a medium
'long haul' ease as far as foreign aid is con-
cerned. For what it is worth, as a purely
arithmetical exercise but with abou.; the
same parameters we have mentioned e.bove,
by 1990 the external resource gap would
close by exbout $300 million a year to about
$480 million." (Source: "Currant Economic.
position and prospects of the Republic of
Vietnam" a World Bank Study Mission, Jan-
uary 28, 1974, page 34),
Mr. Martin is alio rather disingenuous
about the total amount of funds necessary
to get the Thieu economy back on its feet
again. For example, he states in the same
interview that "We were able to give only
300 million dollars" in economic aid to the
Thieu government in JPY 1974.
In actual fact, however, AID provided a
chart to the House Government Operations
Subcommittee on March 20, 1974, indicating
that the U.S. had actually provided $708.5
million in "economic and humanitarian as-
sistance to Vietnam, fiscal year 1974." (House
Government Operations Subcommittee, Sec-
ond Supplemental Appropriation Bill, 1974,
part II, page 860). This figure, more-
over, does not include a $60 million "loan"
and $49 million supplemental appropriation
expected to pass Congress for FY 1974, and
an extra $59 million ' .tooril for Peace" money.
Thus the U.S. is supplying $878 million
to Thieu's economy this year, not only the
$300 million that Martin suggests.
Mr. Martin's $850 and $700 million figures,
moreover are based ore the assumption that
the fighting does not drastically increase in
the next year or two. In fact, however, esca-
lation is not only possible but probable,
given the refusal of the GVN to even test
the other side's offer for a ceasefire and po-
litical settlement.
Myth (3) : Our aid is "defensive", designed
to off-set weapons given the other sides by
the Soviet Union and China.
The only cmclsl figures of Soviet and
Chinese military aid to North Vietnam of
which I am aware are for the years 1969-68,
and 1970 and 1971. For these 6 years, during
which hundreds of thousands of US,
ground troops were fighting- in Indochina,
and the U.S. airforce dropped well over 5
million tons of bombs, U.S. military ex-
penditures were estimated to total roughly
190 billion. During these same 6 years,
source Soviet and Chinese military aid corn-
sled was esticriattad to total roughly $2.245
?or roughly about $180 million a year, or
!toughly 1/30 the amount of armament, we
ninnelled in.
Since the. ceasefire, moreover, Soviet and
Chinese aid has reportedly been substan-
tially reduced. Mr. Martin himself, for ex-
ample, stated on Jane try 16, 1974, that the
;Soviet and Chinese "are not resupplying
them (Hanoi) with massive weapons of war
as they have continuously over the past
;rears," ((Ioeroaessionat Recone, E2122, April
4, 1974.)
Given this fact, It is fair to assume the
noviet and Chinese military aid to its relies
;nay be on the order of $1-200 million, or less
for the coming fiscal . year. At the same
time, however, we find the Administration
proposing $2.03 billion or 19-20 times as
much military aid to the Thieu and Lon
Nol regimes, as well as $463 million more for
U.S. forcer; in the area.
Indeed, the Soviet and Chinese could turn
this equation around and argue that they
ere in fact only supplying their allies to pro-
tect them against the vastly greater quantity
of arms given the Thies; and Lou Nol govern-
ments. This case can be made even more
strongly, moreover, by noting that many of
the most expensive items in the other side's
iventory, e.g. SAM missiles, are quite clearly
defensive weapons; or-as In the case of So-
viet-supplied MIGs for the North Vietnamese
sir force?they are weapons which have his-
torically been used defensively.
Many of the most expensive item% we sup-
ply our allies in Indochina however e.g. air-
planes, spare parts of bombs, are often used
offensively. Numerous western journalists
visiting FRG zones since the ceasefire, for ex-
ample, have reported GVN bombing deep in-
side numerous PRO zones, where no PRG
military activity was taking place.
The thesis that our military aid is not at
ad geared to the threat from the other side,
moreover, is strengthened by a comparison of
our military aid to the GVN in calendar years
1972 and 1E73.
In CV 1972, we supplied $2.383 billion in
military aid to the Thiel; regime. In that year
39,587 ARVN soldiers were killed. In CY 1973,
ARVN casualties declined by two-thirds, to
13,822. Thin substantial decline in casualties
helps to substantiate tie universal opinion
that fighting was subidentially lower in 1973
than it was in 1972. And yet U.S. military
aid to the Thieu regime totalled $2,271 bil-
lion in 1972, precisely as much as it had been
In 1972 when the fighting had been much
higher. (Soiree: AID figures supplied to Con.
Abzug, Feb. 20, 1974)
All evidence indicates, therefore, that the
amount of U.S. military aid given to the
Thieu government is determined more by the
constant siee of the Civet army 1.1 million?
men?than by the amount of aid supplied by
the Soviet Union and thins to their allies.
Myth (4): Administr ition FY 75 aid re-
quests will allow pro-ills, regimes "stand on
their own !eet", thereby allowing the U.S.
to walk away in a matte of years:
At the en e of his request for economic aid
funds for Indochina last week, the President
stated that "the invesenient I an; now reek-
ing (is) . . to give the neople of Indochina
a chance to steed on their own feet."
Graham Martin, in the interview referrer; to
above, was even more ex.,licit about the time
required for the "to steno on their own feet":
"How do we end our invelvernent? ... I have
said our objective sec tild be to end it leaving
a Vietnam e000omies:411 ir viable, militarily
capable of defending lie t' with its own men-
power, and free to choose its own govern/melt
and its own leaders. I believe this can be denie
within the next three years."
These opinmistic and idealistic pronounce-
ments are reminiscent farmer predictions
of a "light tat the enel or the tunnel". And,
as in 1961, as in 1964, these predictions esn-
not and are not subset!, tilted. All available
evidence, indeed indicates exactly the op-
posite.
Th ieu 's opponents are, if anything,
stronger since the ceasefire Numerous re-
ports from western jourealists indicate that
the PRG has begun building sip its economy,
reconstructing its borne-leveled communities
In the zones under its e introl. The relative.
prosperity, cleanliness, sad lower prices in its
rural villages, moreoiier, have astonished
numerous outside observers who have visited
its zones.
The PRO las, moreever seieed the politica)
initiative. Oil my recent trip to Saigon, lox
example, one friend explained it this way:
before the ceasefire. hone sides meant war.
You might be for the PRO, but tc; join it
meant to opt for a dirlieuIt and dangerous
life. Since tie ceasefire, however. Thiele has
continued to call for w en while the PRO
have come to represent; !mace. It is common
knowledge, for example, that everyone in
PEG zones In encouraged to learn the Paris
Agreement, and the PRO las convinced many
Vietnamese that it sincerely wants to imple-
ment it. In C1VN zones, en Mlle other hand,
the Paris Agreement is not publicized awl
Thieu does little but talk of more war.
During my visit to S31: th Vietnam, snore-
over, I found that most exports believe that
the military balance 13 also shifting away
from Thieu. U.S. techeimans trying to keep
the GVN airforce together, for example, told
me -that VNAP mechanics have little interest
in maintaining their own planes. The deser-
tion rate is reportedly hieh shies the cease-
fire, and local aecomodations between PRO
and ARVN units have sin rocketed since the
ceasefire. This has allowed the PRO to more
more freely than eve; diroughout Sem ii
Vietnam, extending its influence into mar y
villages and hamlets it formerly could not
reach.
The notion, moreover, that by providing
well over 90% of the OriN's resources. the
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CONG
U.S. is leaving Vietnam "free to choose its
own government" makes no more sense to-
day than it did 20 years ago. The basic
fact is thdt the Thiess government is the
only administration in the world (except
for Laos and Cambodia) which derives 90%
of its resources froth a foreign government.
And, as such, it is not re-,ponsible to its own
people but to the U.S. This basic structural
fact means that the GVN will never be able
to "stand on its owii"-for it has no base
in its own country. (See Table 4)
The principal economic problem of the
GVN, for example, is the tremendous cost
of maintaining its 1.1 million-man army,
350,000 civil servants, and 120,000 police-
men. This huge parasitic class not only de-
vours our aid, but can only survive through
an ever-increasing amount of aid and war
material from the outside.
The Thieu government, unwilling to com-
pete politically, unable to allow a relaxa-
tion of tensions which might see its army
desert en masse, unable to relax police
control of its population, is therefore struc-
turally committed to maintaining this huge
bureaucracy indefinitely.
Thus it is, for example, that despite the
decline in the real value of U.S, transfers
of resources to South Vietnam's economy
since the 1969 peak, the per capita level
of imports into 'South Vietnam in constant
U.S. dollar values remains today at about
$25-still higher than the $21 per capita a
decade ago. Despite his tremendous influx
of funds from the outside, however, the
Thieu government has been unable to use
this capital for development. It has all been
eaten up by an ever-bourgeoning bureaucracy
which has seen GVN per capita spending
increased ,from about $25 to $50 during
the same period.
Another example of the structural inability
of the GVN to stand on its own is the arti-
ficial nature of its urban economy. By re-
fusing to allow millions of refugees to re-
turn to the villages of their birth-because
such villages are in zones controlled by the
GVN has ensured that millions of its citizens
will remain unproductive, and often 1,n need
of doles just to survive. This has in turn,
led to over-crowding and filth in and around
South Vietnam's major cities-and increased
the probability that the GVN will need aid
indefinitely.
Fundamentally, however, the most basic
structural inability of the GVN is its mili-
tary orientation and disinclination to shift
towards a peace-time economy and political
mode of competition. In part, it is a question
of sheer momentum. For over a decade, Gen-
eral Thieu and other top officials have re-
mained in power due to American largesse
in return for brderifig troops into battle.
Like any government anywhere, it finds it
easier to do what it knows best, than shift
to what appears to be a more high-risk
arena of political competition. In part, how-
ever, it may also be a realization or fear on
the part of the GVN's part that it simply
cannot compete politically with the PRG-
that the GVN's well-known corruption, its
police-state tactics, and its decade-long com-
mitment to war, will place it at a disad-
vantage against its adversaries.'
Whatever the case, it is clear that as long
as the war in Indochina continues-at what-
ever foreseeable level-the GVN will simply
not be able to "stand on its own" no mat-
ter how much aid is given it. (1) Agricultural
production will still be limited, with war
victims, refugees and often, urban dwellers,
demanding American food imports indefi-
nitely. (2) Domestic and foreign investors
will not put money into long-term invest-
ments. (3) Mobilization of manpower and
resources for the war machine will continue
to constitute a powerful inflationary force;
world prices will remain high, and the major
items required for capital intensive agri-
culture we have introduced to compensate
for lost production due, to war, will con-
tinue to be too expensive for most farmers.
And if all the above is true for South
Vietnam, of course, the situation is even less
hopeful for the Administration in Cambodia.
One need do little here but repeat the
obvious: the Lon Nol regime is composed
entirely today of hard-line extremists, with
such moderates as In Tam having left the-
cabinet in disgust. The Lon Nol govern-
ment's military position is hopeless, with
the Khmer Rouge controlling 70-80% of
Cambodia, and remaining on the offensive
in the rest. Politically, the Lou Nol govern-
ment has virtually no support at all-it has
even lost the support it originally enjoyed
from a numerically tiny group of intel-
lectuals.
For the Administration to suggest that
it is in either the American or Cambodian
interest for Congress to appropriate more
than $600 million in FY 1975-for war in
Cambodia is beneath comment. Even more
so than in South Vietnam, the only solution
for everyone is for us to stop intervening
in Cambodia and to allow what all admit
is a civil war among Cambodians to take
its course.
This fiscal year 1975 budget request for
Indochina aid, then, represents a funda-
mental attempt by the Administration to
deceive Congress and the American people.
It will not allow the GVN or Lon Nol gov-
ernments to become economically viable, it
is not a measured responde to Soviet and
Chinese aid to their allies, and it offers
no hope of ever ending.
TABLE 1.-FISCAL YEARS 1974 AND 1975 U.S. EXPENDITURES FOR INDOCHINA
Original Original
anal year 1974 Fiscal year 1974 fiscal year 1975
request allocation request
ECONOMIC AID
1. "Indochina postwar reconstruction"_ $619, 000, 000 1 $435, 000, 000 2 $939, 800, 000
2. "Food for Peace" 2 208, 800, 000 53 507, 300, 000 34 260, 000, 000
3. Loans_ 3 110, 000, 000
4. Supplemental . , 049,000,009
Subtotal, economic aid.... 827, 800, 000 1,100, ON, 000 1, 200, 000, 000
Original Original
fiscal year 1974 Fiscal year 1974 fiscal year 1975
request allocation request
MILITARY AID
5. Masf
6. Map
Subtotal, economic and military aid_
Indochina-related U.S. forces.
Grand total
G$1, 900,
000,
000
$1,
126,
000, 000
11,
600,
000,
000
0 181,
000,
000
2
342,
000, 000
5
480,
000,
000
2, 909,
000,
000
2,530,
000, 000
5 3,
280,
000,
000
15 1,000,
000,
000
41
691,
000,000
12
463,
000,
000
3, 909,
000,
000
3,
321, 000, OGO
3,
743,
000,
000
"Current Programing Levels Compared with fiscal year 1974 Congressional Presentation",
hearings ,-before ouse Operations Subcommittee, Mar. 20, 1974, p.877-879.
2 President's foreign aid message, Congressional Record H3094, Apr. 24, 1974.
o "GAO reports on U.S. Aid to South Vietnam," Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, Congressional Record,
E1917, Mar. 28, 1974.
Of this, $183,000,000 for South Vietnam (source-footnote 3 above), $77,000,000-Cambodia
(source-telephone conversation with Department of Agriculture).
$54,000,000 supplemental expected, though not yet appropriated at this writing.
O Hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee pt. II, 1973, P. 1363.
7 Letter from Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Kennedy, Congressional Record 54884,
Apr. 1, 1974.
8 "American Aid to Indochina", Hon. Ronald Dellums, Congressional Record, Apr. 3, 1974.
o 27 percent up.
10 This 9,000,000,000 was the figure advanced by Robert Moot, DOD Comptroller, on Jan. 29,
1973, when he stated that $1,000,000,000 was for "support of U.S. forces involved in the Southeast
Asia situation, both naval and air."
11 This figure was supplied the Indochina Resource Center from the DOD Comptroller's office on
Apr. 29, 1974, and defined as "incremental Southeast Asia costs for the support of U.S. forces
related to the phase-down of the Indochina conflict."
Is Annual Defense Department budget, Mar. 24, 1974, p. 24-"Included in the $1,800,000,000
for Southeast Asia costs in fiscal year 1975 is $463,000,000 for U.S. forces-largely the air bases in
Thailand.
TABLE 2.-HUMAN TOLL or WAR
'Civilian figures below prepared by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees'
Refugees I
Civilian
hospital
. entries-
annuals
Civilian
hospital
entries-
monthly
average!
Civilian
killed s
Civilian ARVN
wounded 3 killed
ARVN "Enemy" Total killed
wounded, killed' and wounded
1965 *772,1100 50, 000
,
1966 *906, 000 50, 000
1967 *463, 000 49,707
1968 *494, 000 86, 993
1969 *590, 000 66, 002
1970 4'410, 000 59,663
1971 136,000* 50,737
1972 *1, 320, 000 53,901
1973 *818, 700 43,166
Expelled from Cambodia 210, 000
PRG zones 700, 000
Estimated non registered 2,000,000
4,166
4,166
4,142
7,249
5,500
4,971
4,228
4,491
3,597
25, 000
50, 000
60,000
100, 000
60, 000
30,000
25, 000
65,000
15, 000
Total 8, 819, 700 510,169
4,723 430,000
O Refugees: Figures inarked by * are newly generated refugees as reported yearly by the U.S.
Agency for International Development. The 1970 figure, marked by **, includes 281,000 persons
who registered in 1970, but were generated as refugees from 1965-69.
a Hospital entries: These figures are official, supplied by the U.S. Agency for International
Development.
Approved For Release 2001/08/30
75, 000
11,234
23, 118
35,436
?
169,788
100, 000
01,953
20, 975
55, 524
238, 452
115, 000
12, 176
29, 448
88,104
304, 728
200, 000
27,915
70,696
181, 149
579, 760
140, 000
21, 833
65, 276
156, 954
444, 063
95,000
23,346
71, 582
103, 638
323, 566
75,000
22,069
59, 823
98, 094
279, 986
135, 000
39, 587
109, 962
111,949
481, 498
70,000
13,822
60,005
48, 237
207,064
1,005, 000
183, 935
510, 885
899, 085
3,020, 905
2 Civilian killed and wounded: These figures are estimates made by the U.S. Senate Subcom-
mittee on Refugees.
4 Soldiers killed and wounded: Figures for 1965 -Jan. 27, 1973, supplied by Pentagon Infor-
mation Office, (202)QX7-2873. Jan. 27 to Dec. 31, 1973, figures are those supplied by the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Vietnam.
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S 7130 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
TABLE 3.--A COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES, I, OVIET AND CHINESE EXPENDITURES IN INDOCHINA
In millions of U.S. dollars)
May 6, 1974
Soviet
Chinese
United States
Military aid
Year
Military
Economic
Military
Economic
Military
Economic
Soviet-Chinese
total
Soviet-Chinese
percent of total
U.S. percent of
total
1966
1967
210
505
85
200
60
145
50
BO
5, 263. 5
17,431.9
736.5
568.1
270
650
5.0
0.0
95. 0
91.0
1968
440
240
100
1)0
22, 463. 3
536.7
540
2.0
98.0
1970
70
345
85
60
16, 523.3
476.7
155
1.0
99,0
1971
100
315
75
1)0
11, 424. 3
575.7
175
1.5
98. 5
Total
1, 3(10
1, 200
165
390
73,100
2,900
1,800
2.0
98.0
?
SOURCES:
I. Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1966-68 ware drawn from national security study mem-
orandum No. 1, as reprinted in the Congressional Reiord, May 10. 1972. They are included in the
section prepared by the State Department, in response to question 28, in a chart captioned "le
Million U.S. Dollars at Soviet Foreign Trade Prices," 01 p. E5000.
2. Soviet and Chinese expenditures for 1970-71 a te taken from an Associated Press dispatch
published n the New York Times on Apr. 13, 1972. The dispatch cites "U.S. Government sources,
not allowir g use of their agency name." It is entitled "Soviet Arms Aid to Hanoi Is Down."
3. U.S. expenditures for 1966--SO, and 1970, are taken from "Impact of the Vietnam War," pro-
UNITED STATES Now SUPPLEES 86.3 PERCENT OF
THIEU'S TOTAL RESOURCES
Note. The chart following this page was
recently supplied by the U.S. Agency for In-
ternational Development. For the first time
in the war it officially outlines in the clear-
est way possible the fact that the U.I3. is re-
sponsible for over 85% of the Thieu govern-
ment's total resources. It is important to
note, moreover, that during 1973 the U.S.
was forbidden by the Paris Agreement from
interfetng in the internal affairs of Vietnam.
The 86.5% of the Thieu government's re-
sources supplied by the U.S. is divided up as
follows:
1973 INCOME 11110 SOUTH V ILTRA
Amount
(minions) Perm
U.S.-supplied income equals 86.3
percent:
U.S. nulitary aid. .__ 97, 270.S
U.S. commedity import program 300.0
U.S. Food for Peace 143. 0
U.S. project aid 86.1
ll S. loan 50. 0
66.8
8.8
4.2
2. 5
L 4
pared by the Library of Congress, June 30, 1971, p. 2. ents are given in fiscal years, and are
incremental; i.e., costs that would not have been incurred was the United States riot involved in
Indochina. The 1971 figure is an estimate reported by "The Air War in Indochina," by a Cornell
University study team, Beacon Press, p. 100. We have divided U.S. costs into military and econirnic
by subtracting from the total figure given in the sot rces just listed, the figures for U.S. economic aidl
listed in the "Fiscal 1,74 Year Program Presentation to the Congress " prepared by the U.S. Agency
for International Development, p. 10.
Note. The 5 selected years chosen above are the snip ones for which it is possible to compare U S.,
Soviet, and Chinese expenditures for Indochina.
Amount
(millions) Per cent
Import revenues the to U.S. presence
(minimum)
GVN-generated income equal, 13
percent:
Direct tarn,.
Indirect taxes................
Import revenues
Currency addit ons_ _
Bond sales
3rd country aid
91.44 2.6
58.6 1.7
283.2 8.3
10.16 .2
30.1 9
30,3 .8
40.0 1.1
Key to Chart following this page
Line (1) The GVN did accomplish a modest
gain in direct taxes during 1973. For a pop-
ulation of 20 million, however, the $3 per
capita raised in taxes is a telling indictment
of the GVN's political appeal.
Line (2) Although we have counted all
$283.2 million in "indirect taxes" as inter-
nally-generated, in fart 30% of indirect taxes
during the war were generated by the U.S.
presence, and a substantial portion of such
"indirect taxes" are still derived directly
from the U.S. presence.
Line (3) Virtually all import revenues are
derived from U.S.-bubsidized imports. None-
theless, we have estimated the GVN's inter-
nally-generated import revenues at 1G% of
the total, a. rather high estimated, Line (4)
This simply means that the GVN printed up
new currency, thus stimulating inflation.
Line (5) The GVN borrowed on the future
here, presumably from the national bank.
Line (6) The 1973 "loan" was from the U.S..
those in1974 will come from a variety of
countries find institutions LI:e the World
Bank. Lines (7)-(10) These are 4 overt and
admitted categories of U.S. funding. Inflaton
has meant that they amount to a declining
amount of real aid and thus declining living
standards. The 1974 "military aid" figure
of $1.026 billion is not taken seriously by the
Indochina :Resource Center, since it cannot
Oe correlated with t e requests of $1.6 billion
for FY 1974 and $1.6 billion for FY 1975. Line
(12) This indicates that portion of American
aid which enters GVN budget accounting.
The budget is quite obviously a small portion
of what 1; takes to keep the GVN in
existence.
SOU rfl VIETNAM- GOVERNMENT OUDGETS BY CALENDAR rpm 1964 74
tin millions of dollars]
1964
1. Direct taxes
12.3
7. Incline: and other domestic taxes_ _
07.7
3. Import revenues
63.0
4 Additiot to currency supply
63.0
5. Bond sales_
15.2
6. Loans hem foreign countries_
7 U.S. Alt) project Ant
46. 3
8. U.S. C.I P.
104.8
9. U.S. food for peace
33. 9
It. U.S. miltary aid
111.1
11. 3 country grant aid_.
19. 9
Grant total
627.9
12. Counterpart contribution to the budget
129.5
Total GVN budget
212.5
(Conversion rate V149/13ST)- -
(81/1)
Calendar year -
1965
1966
1367
1968
1969
1970
1971
1.972 11973
11974
12.7
11.7
13.4
24,4
28.1
35.4
34.0
39.2 58.6
65.5
124.1
128.3
135. 6
138.1
158.9
190.3
.99.0
261. . 283.2
301.0
70.9
215.8
171.5
158.9
275.5
328.8
:179.6
114,1 101.6
86.9
255.7
131.7
111.5
249.4
86.5
98.2
54.81
47. i 30.7
93.8
27.1
17.7
11.6
40.0
28.6
13.1
75.7
121 d 30.3
NA
50. 0
HO. 0
55,7
184. I
321.8
224. 1
153.0
115.9
95. 7
72. 1 86. 1
201, 7
157.5
259.1
-165. 2
104.4
176.1
182.3
239.4
225,1, 300.0
240.11
48. 2
76. 3
153.3
138. 3
94, 1
121.0
81. 8
118. I 143. 0
160.0
268.9
862.)
1, 203. 5
I, 504. 5
1, G08. 2
1, 692. 6
I, E82. 5
2,382,6 2, 270. 5
1, 026. 0
19. 9
19.')
, 20. 0
20.0
26.0
20. 6
20.3
34.1 40.0
60.11
.050.7
1, 907. 4
2, 32E. 4
2, 152. 1
2, 632. 3
2, 798. 2
3, 170. 8
3,356.63, 394. 0
2, 345. 6
174.5
301.2
217.7
177.4
190.6
239.5
267.4
305.11 400.2
390.2
382.2
657.11
fill,. 2
498.8
653. 1
794.0
180,0
675.0! 855.6
854.3
(79/1)
(120/1)
(160/1
(16811)
(192/1)
(22611)
(294/1)
(41211) (512/1)
(604/1)
Estimated
Source: Table 1, Letter to Congresswoman Bella Abzug,
from House Foreign Operations Committee, Feb. 20, 1974-from
U.S. ECONOMIC AID TO INDOCHINA, FOR FISCAL YEAR 1974
III millions of U.S. 80110r51
AID.
Humanitarian
Reconstruction
Development
Comm. Imp. Prot;
Stabiliz. Fund
SV 1 Cambodia Laos Total
Original I
Andel 2
Originall
Actual?
Original 1
Actual
Original'
Actual
85.0
70.0
4.0
13.4
18.4
13.0
107.4
96. 4
50.0
2.0
5.0
0
5.9
10.9
60.9
25.9
48.0
13.0
12.5
60.5
275.0
200 0
46.7
62.1
321.7
2(2.1
13.3
18.3
18.2
16.1
36.5
34.1
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENA
? Technical Support
Ind. Post-War Rec
Food for Peace
DOD Moneys
Supplemental, Cip
Loan, Cip
Development Loan
Grand total
swd
? Cambodia
Original;
Acutali
Original
Actual 3
17.0
15.0
1.0
1.2
475.0
300 0
75.0
95.0
176. 4
309.0
30.9
194.2
105. 0
115.0
49.3
(7)
(7)
60.0
50.11
756.4
873.0
105.9
289.2
Laos
Original
Total
Actual Original' Actual
18.0 16.2
55.0
1.5
(7)
39.8
3.6
605.0
208.8
(7)
435. 0
506.8
(7)
49. 0
60.0
50.0
56.5 43.4
813.8 1, 100.0
I Original :Stands for original administration requests for fiscal year 1974, present in spring 1973. 2 Accual: Stands for final administration appropriations.
Mr. /VIeGOVERN. I also ask unanimous
consent that a letter from the Saigon
Government denying permission to a
Vietnamese citizen to publish the terms
of the Paris Peace Agreement be printed
at this point in the nECORD.
There being no objection, the letter
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
Trams; Itt10111
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENCY, NA7/0NAL IN-
FORMATION COMMISSION,*
? gegen, June 9, 1973.
No.: 1JG [21 PTDtIV/P1311CRT/ICSAL.
To Mr. --:
DEAR Sm: We' regretfully inform you that,
alter examining your 'work with leniency, we
cannot issue you a permit to publish your
book; To End the War and Reestablish
Peace in Viet-Nam.
Please Come to the Bureau of Domestic
Printed materials, National Information
Commission, at 170 FhanViinh Phung Street,
Saigon, at your early convenience so that we
can return your manuscript.
Sincerely yours,
[The seal reads, around its circumference,
"Republic of Vietnam, Office of the Presi-
dency," and, in its center, "National Infor-
mation Commission .1
[Signature] EATUOC.
Chu-Bn-Tuoc.
Mr. MANSeleiLD. ?IVIr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does this amend-
ment by the distinguished Senator cover
just the $266 million which was "found"
a few weeks ago??
-
Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator has
stated it accurately. It is related only to
that amount of money which the Mai or-
ity leader stated.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
know whether that $266 million was
"found" in the Pentagon or in the Con-
gress?
Mr. KENNEDY. It is the understand-
ing? of the Senator from Massachusetts
that it was found in the Pentagon, and
not in a congressional appropriation.
Mr. STENNIS, 1V1r. President will the
Senator yield to me on that?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.
Mr. STENNIS. I think the answer is
that the Armed Services Committee dis-
covered the existence of those fund.
That is my information.
Mr. KENNEDY. If I may a..dd this, to
complete the matter, I would agree with
7
*Translator's note: The National Informa-
tion Commission is now the Ministry of In-
formation and Open Arms.
Translated by Phyong Khanh Nguyen,
Legal Processing Assistant, Far Eastern Law
Division, Law Library, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. 20540, April 1974.
the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, it was a result of congres-
sional investigation and pursuit, but still
the money that is being considered here
today was money that was in the Penta-
gon, and this does not represent any
additional funds that have been in any
way appropriated or earmraked by a vote
of the Congress.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Did I correctly hear
the Senator say the cost to the United
States as of now is $2.5 billion annually
in Vietnam?
Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator is cor-
rect. That is an estimated figure.
Mr. MANSFIELD. And that is exclu-
sive of costs in Cambodia. Does the Sena-
tor recall what those figures are? They
are roughly $400 million-
Mr. KENNEDY. Approximately $400
million. I will correct the RECORD if that
is wrong.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
recall what the costs are today in Laos?
Mr. KENNEDY. It is approximately
$125 million, I think.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator
know what the cost to this country is of
maintaining- 35,000 troops and airmeti
and planes, including B-52's, in
Thailand?
Mr. KENNEDY. Well, the Senator has
me on that one.
Mr. MANSFLELD. The Senator can get
those figures, I am sure.
Mr. KENNEDY. On April 10 I asked
the help of the GAO in compiling sta-
tistics on the totality of U.S. aid in Indo-
china; it is a massive sum.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The point I was
trying to get at is that we are still in-
volved in Southeast Asia almost a year
and a half after peace was declared and
after the remaining Americans were
withdrawn.
Does the Senator realim that the war
in Southeast Asia was not only the
longest war in the history of this Na-
tion, but the second most expensiVe war?
I have here a statistical extract of the
United States, 19'73, 93d Congress, first
session, House Document 93-134, a U.S.
Department of Commerce publication
issued by the Bureau of the Census.
The estimates based on the assumption
that the war would end by June 30,
1970-almost 4 years ago-except for
original war costs and for veterans' bene-
fits, 1973. It is estimated that the cost
for the Vietnamese war or the war in
Southeast Asia will extend almost
through the year 2050, and the estimated
ultimate cost of that war, listed as the
Vietnam war in this official Government
document, and based on the assurnntion
that war war would end by June 30, 1970,
almost 4 years ago, is $352 billion.
That is something to think about.
I hope the Senator is successful. I cer-
tainly will support his amendment, be-
cause I think we are throwing away too
much money, too freely, too far, and too
widely.
SENATOR RANDOLPH SUPPORTS IMPROVED CON-
TROLS ON MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM
Mr. RANDOLPH. Mr. President, I have
studied carefully the amendment of the
able Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
KENNEDY) and his compelling presenta-
tion. I strongly support the proposal. It
will provide reasonable restrictions and
a tightening of procedures on the mili-
tary aid destined for South Vietnam. '
My colleague has stressed this is not
a question of discontinuing aid to South
Vietnam. Rather, the issue is whether
the Congress will impose controls on the
expenditure of funds in South Vietnam.
Other departments of the Government
are required to operate under strict
budgetary controls-there is no reason
why the Defense Departments should
not be forced to utilize accurate and
proper spending procedures. Certainly,
vital domestic programs come under the
closest scrutiny and examination, and
any error in domestic activities of the
magnitude-$266 million-to which the
pending amendment is directed would
be viewed with alarm and pressures for
intensive investigation.
Our Nation has unfulfilled commit-
ments to our citizenry for improved
housing, health care, transportation,
water, and sewage systems and essential
public facilities. Programs authorized by
the Congress to meet these needs are op-
erating under the most severe budget
limitations. In my judgment, citizens
generally would- agree that foreign as-
sistance programs should be subject to
the same strict controls. The amend-
ment of the Senator from Massachu-
setts (Mr. KENNEDY ; is designed to
achieve this purpose and I earnestly hope
it will be approved by the Senate. It has
my complete support.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, in oppo-
sition to the amendment of the Sena-
tor from Massachusetts, these are rather
complicated facts. It is a great pity that
such a policy question is going to hinge
on one vote here with so few Senators
present to get the basic facts.
Just going back briefly as to the his-
tory of this legislation: this whole pat-
tern goes back to the Korean war. The
pattern of the operation was such in
the field of battle that, instead of making
a direct appropriation for military aid
to operate the Korean army, we merely
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put a ;provision in the law that money
appropriated for our military forces over
there would be eligible for use by the
Koreans.
When we got into the war in South
Vietnam, we adopted the same general -
pattern, and, by agreement with the
Foreign Relations Committee, tins pro-
gram was turned over to the Armed
Services Committee.
This was before I became chairman.
Originally, there was no ceiling on
these aid amounts. It was just possible
to spend any amount that the military
might aft fit for foreign aid in South
Vietnam, so long as they were spending
out of their money. But we put a ceiling
on it?in 1970, I think it was?and it was
$2.5 billion. We have put a ceiling on
the am3unt every fiscal year since then.
But let me digress a little, now. The
cost of this war to us, out of our Treasury,
was at one time running at the I ate of
$25 billion to $28 billion a year. So the
amount we are discussing is only a very
small part of the yearly cost of the war
when it was going full scale, and A per-
tains to the military aid that comes out
of money appropriated for our military
forces. Last year they asked for $1.6
billion.
The Senator from Missouri, in ins dili-
gent way, held hearings last year, and
the committee proposed a figure that was
lower than $L6 billion, but it was .anally
settled In confererece at $1.1 billion, as it
is rounded off. That is the same money
as is involved here,, the same subjit we
are discussing now. Then, this year, at
the beginning of this session, there was
a supplemental authorization bile that
contained an amount for Trident. It also
contained an amount for Diego Garcia,
in the Indian Ocean; and it contained
some additional money for this military
aid to South Vietnam. It is true that our
forces are no longer fighting there. This
assistance goes for the South Vietnam
Army and military.
The Pentagon asked, in this supple-
mental bill, for an increase of $474 mil-
lion as a supplemental item. / asked the
Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) ,
and he reacliy agreed, to hold hearings
on the supplemental bill, because A was
a part of the 1974 program. Everybody
has been open, straightforward, and
honest about this item, but I understood
we had all agreed on the bill as a pack-
age, as it is before the Senate now. No
one voted against any item. The Sen,a-
tor from Missouri will speak for him-
self. I do not blame him one bit. He is
going to speak for the Kennedy araend-
ment, which is why I am handling the
opposition to it, or at least why I am
the floor manager for the opposition.
I did not favor including in the sup-
plemental bill amendments that were
not emergencies. No one else did very
much, and we unanimously left them
out.
But as to this money for military aid
to South Vietnam, it having run out, I
felt that, we ought to do something about
it rather than simply totally and sud-
denly stopping all of it, which is what
this amendment would do.
There are some supplies on hand in
Vietnam., I am sure. They have what is
called an inventory base. There may be
some rifles, some bullets, some gasoline,
some trucks, and other essentials that are
necessary to make war, but they are being
depleted mighty fast. The Kennedy
amendment, if it became law, would stop
everything except this supply, which may
last for some weeks. It might be 8 weeks
or 10 weeks, or something like that, for
whatever they have on hand, and that
would vary. That is the real issue.
We found this money, which is not new
money. This supplemental bill does not
authorize any adclitionel new money, as
we ordinarily do. The report merely
points out that there am some =obli-
gated balances from previous fiscal years,
and that we can go on and use that
money. That is what the report says.
That is why it was so nearly unanimous
in the committee. Teat is all that is asked
for now.
This 'amendments?and I do not blame
the Senator from Massachusetts for it?
would write into hard law this cutoff
proposition; whereas the committee bill,
we brought it before the Senate, and as
the report speaks now, would Permit
the use of this money, the old money, the
old authorization, at least for these pur-
poses.
Let me say, though, that we are writing
into the regular authorization bill a
provision which will provide a much
larger sum for military aid, and we are
going to write in even stricter provisions
now, because there are no longer two
armies over there now fighting side by
side. That provision will say how much
more ammunition will be provided, since
there is only one ar ey now. We are going
to impose additional restrictions, more
than we have now.
So back to the provision brought in by
the committee, it does not violate the
ceiling set by the committee. It does not
violate the ceiling or any new authority.
It will not require the Committee on Ap-
propriations to appropriate more Money.
The supplemental appropriations bill will
be filed just as soon as we get through
with this bill.
They are awaiting the outcome of this
eupplemental bill on some items, but on
his program they did not have to wait
3ecause there is no money for this item.
So there is no money involved in it. The
bill is here, and as a practical matter it
.ather quickly boils down to this fact.
Talk about the billions invested. We
envested 54.000 lives over there, the lives
of men who were sent into that war and
died in battle or from wounds received
in battle. Many more were seriously
wounded. I am not willing to turn our
backs totally on those men and the mem-
ory of their sacrifices. I do not want to be
>entimental or emotional about this sub-
..ect. I just have not made up my mind
that I am ready to do that?not yet; not
yet. I will not do it all of a sudden, on ?an
amendment offered from the floor, by
whomever it may be offered. I will move
on this subject, for my part, on a more
gradual basis. That is what we did. We
said we were going to end the war by
gradualism, and we did. I think a great
majority of American people, although
they were sick and tired of the war, are
pleased that we did work on that basis,
rather than come out of their with cor
flags turned toward the ground. We came
out with our flags flying.
No one can yet say that the United
States over turned its back and ran out
of any war. We almost lost one a 100
Years ago, maybe, at one ? time. But
seriously I am glad, and most people
are, I believe, that we did- not turn our
back and come out: ?
Now, to a degree, the same issues are
involved, except the lives of our men
are no longer involved. None of our peo-
ple are going into battle, and there is
no prospect of them going back into
battle over there. This is a winding
down and getting out of that war, as far
as we can?not just turning our backs
and running out.
I do not know what was promised own
there. I would- be willing to go over there
and go into it, if anyone wants to go
into it, and get the most minute facts
about it. But I already know what my
position is, and my position is to get out
of there as fast as we reasonably can,
carrying out our obligations, first to our
men that we sent to their deaths there
and their loved ones left behind, and
carrying out our general obligations as
an ally there.
We stayed there for years. We knew
what we were doing. No one made us go
in. And I think we had just better take
a second thought here, and whatever
we are going to do, not do it on a sup-
plemental bill that has already been
stripped or almost everything in it. I
think we have taken out about 60 per-
cent of the original bill. And let us not
do it by a floor amendment on a matter
that is going to be back before this Sen-
ate in a few weeks. It will be only 4 or 5
weeks before the general authorization
bill is back before the committee.
The Senator from Montana has said
we must have it, and must have it soon,
and we will make- it the pending busi-
ness soon after the committee gets it
here.
Let us act on that, bill. Let us act on
that bill in the light of more extensive
hearings, and in the light of a full rec-
ommendation of the Armed Services
Committee
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. STENNIS. Yee, l yield to the Sen-
ator from Texas for a question.
Mr. TOWER. It is the understanding
of the Senator from Texas that by virtue
of the very specific language of this
amendmene, if the amendment were to
prevail and become law, it would mean
the end of ithe Joint Casualty Resolution
Center activities to resolve the MIA
cases, and would result in the withdrawal
of U.S. negotiators in the' four-party
joint military tier, which would end our
effort to get information from the other
side on MIA's, so it would mean the total
abandonment of our MIA's; they could
go to blazes, those 1 400 or 1,500 MIA's.
We can forget about them? The money Is
more important, apparently, than our
MIA's.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President can the
Senator quote the part of the amendment
that applies to that? The Senator is to--
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tally misrepresenting the effect of my
amendment.
Mr. STENNIS. Walt a minute I have
the floor,
The PRESIDINC4 OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Mississippi has the floor.
Mr. STENNIS. How much time do I
have remaining Mr. President?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator has used 15 minutes of his 45 mM-
.
utes.
Mr. ST 1$, Mr. President, there are
other Senators who wish to speak. I ask
the Senator from Massachusetts, if I may
yield to him briefly, and he then proceed
on his own time?
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President I will be
glad to respond to the question of the
Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. STENNIS. All right. Mr. President,
the Senator says he will answer the ques-
tions on the .time of the Senator from
Massachusetts. I yield the floor.
Mr. TOWER. As read the amend-
ment, it says:
None of the funds authorized to be appro-
priated by this Act, and no funds heretofore
appropriated to or for the use of the De-
partment of Defense by any other Act and
which remain unobligs Lid on the date of
enactment of this Act, may be expended in,
for, or on behalf of any country in Southeast
Asia.
That seems to me to be pretty com-
prehensive. ,
Mr., KENNEDY. If the Senator will
read it completely, he will see that it
directly applies to the MASF ,assistance
program, which deals only with ammu-
nition, and relates to the transfer of un-
obligated funds. So this distorts com-
pletely the meaning of the amendment
of the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. TOWER. No,'! have not. It says:
None of the funds authorised to be appro-
priated by this Act, and no funds heretofore
appropriated to or for the use of the Depart-
ment of Defense by any other Act
Mr. KENNEDY. This applies only to
the question of ammunition and the
MASF program. It does not relate to any
of the funding which is for the MIA pro-
gram, which comes from other DOD
funds which, I understand, are obli-
gated. .
The Senator can state whatever his
interpretation is, but he is stating it in-
accurately. He can put whatever mean-
' Mg he wants into it, but I am not going
to have my amendment distorted by the
Senator's language.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I have
not quoted anything but the Senator's
Own language.
Mr. k..E1INEDY. The Senator is?
Mr. TOWER. The Senator says "ap-
propriated by this act or any other act."
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield
to the Senator from Missouri. ?
Mr. MANSFIELD. If they did not find
it in one place, they could find it in an-
other, could they not?
TO,WEILIV: but it is specifically
barred, arid let us make that plain. I do.
hot care what interpretation may be
placed on it; the language here is very
specific.
The PRESIDING OrVICER. The Sen-
ator from Mi,ssouri has the floor.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, let
me first assure my colleagues I do not
want in any way to furl the flag of the
United States. I am mighty proud of
that flag and my service under it.
On October 3, 1967, on the floor of the
Senate, I made the following statement:
The resources of any country, even those
of the United States, are not inexhaustible;
and therefore developments in the Middle
East and Europe should also be considered
as we in turn consider future policies inci-
dent to Vietnam.
That was October 3, 1967. On that day,
I continued:
I have presented for many months my con-
viction that the United States is overcom-
mitted and overextended. We need a great
deal of money to handle all these commit-
ments along with our growing problems at
home, and we do not want to jeopardize the
integrity of the dollar.
Mr. President, every time anything
comes up about more money for Indo-
china, which means Cambodia, Laos, and
South Vietnam, there is talk about our
honored dead.
In that same speech, on October 3,
1967, I presented that 13,500 Americans
had already been killed in Vietnam, and
85,000 wounded.
A few days later, I was asked in Kansas
City, Mo., my own State, whether I did
not honor those men who had been
killed.
I replied, "I will answer that question
with another question: Would you rather
rather kill 13,500 more than admit we
were wrong?"
The able and distinguished chairMan
of this committee, ler whom I have the
greatest respect, has just given a figure
which is four times more that have now
been killed than were killed at the time
I'made that talk on the floor of the Sen-
ate 7 years ago.
Mr. President, for these reasons I sup-
port the Kennedy amendment. The
record is all too clear that the Defense
Departinent has spent and will continue
to spend every cent and more Congress
approves to support current military
and logistic activities in Indochina
Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.
This is the record over many years,
brought back to us by many staff, repre-
sentatives of the Senate.
Let me review briefly the history of
the fiscal year 1974 request for the mili-
tary assistance service funded program.
This is a matter of practical figures
and statistics. When it conies to the
romance of war regardless of what coun-
try is involved, I am tired of seeing all
these people killed with the premise it is
necessary to protect the best interests
of the United States.
The executive branch initially re-
quested a $2.1 billion ceiling on obliga-
tions for this MASF program.
As a result of the January 1973 cease-
fire, however, this initial request was
reduced to $1.6 billion.
After discussion, the Senate Armed
Services Committee placed an authoriza-
tion ceiling for said program of $952
million.
At that time, because of the illness of
our able and distinguished chairman,
S 7133
I chaired the conference with the House
of Representatives. They came in with
$1.3 billion. We compromised at $1.126
billion.
As early as July 31 of last year, the
Defense Department was put on notice
that their $1.6 billion request for MASF
would be substantially reduced. But there
is no evidence that any action was taken
to reduce the level of support so as to
conform to the planned reduced level;
in fact, for the first 6 months Defense
reported MASF obligations of $890
million, actually the rate Defense would
have obligated had Congress approved
their originally recommended ceiling of
$1.6 billion. Again, this is but typical of
their actions over the years with respect
to funds for Indochina.
Congress ultimately approved a ceil-
ing of $1.1 billion; but since in the first
6 months Defense obligated nearly $900
million, they are now out of obligational
authority. As we know, Mr. President, a
supplemental is to consider cases where
there must be prompt or immediate ac-
tion. Defense knew they were over-
spending the money. They continued to
over-spend. Now they ask for justifica-
tion in this supplemental.
Mr. President, I approved this in the
beginning, though I understood where
the $266 million came from, and I give
full credit to our staff.
Now I have had some accounting
training, but still am not entirely clear
where the money originates that was not
spent.
In any case, the Defense Department
solution to this, their own action, was to
come back to Congress with this supple-
mental request, one designed to raise the
limitation back to the $1.6 billion origi-
nally recommended and rejected?not
only by the Senate but also by the House
as well as in the conference.
Actually, the request to raise the MASF
ceiling was made but one month after
Congress had finished action on the fiscal
year 1974 appropriations bill.
I, for one, do not believe the Congress
should continually bail out the Defense
Department?and that is what this is,
a bailout?we should not bail out the
Department of Defense from monetary
jams which they deliberately plan them-
selves into.
Now we have heard arguments which
cite possible dire consequences of not
providing more money than the ceiling
imposed by Congress last year. But here
we are, with less than 2 months left in
this fiscal year. I am not convinced any-
thing will happen within the next 2
months if Congress maintains its pre-
viously established position, and does not
add to this obligational ceiling.
It would seem the time has come for
the Senate to hold the Indochina line.
We have been hearing for years and
years about the fact we were getting out
of Indochina, that we are getting out of
Indochina, but we are always coming
back for more money to get out of In-
dochina.
Only this morning I read that South
Vietnamese troops are attacking in Cam-
bodia.
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S 7T34 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Nay
We all know only too well that today
the United States has serious and current
ecorennieprobterns here at home. II any-
one does not so believe, they do noi have
to travel' to my State of Missouri. They
can go a few blocks from this Capitol
and see homes where people are Living,
under current Federal housing proerams,
without heat or light. There can no
longer he approval by us of every single
monetaey request now coming in from
all-parte of the globe.
mr. President we are now ehing a
great deal of aid to Egypt. I do not
protest that. We plan, according to the
press, to give military aid to Egypt. I
do not nrotest that. We are giving bil-
lions of dollars of aid to Israel and I do
not protest that. We are sending bil-
lions upon billions of dollars for oil to
Middle East counties. I do not protest
that. We are spending billions upon bil-
lions maintaining a very large military
force in Europe. At this tune I do not
protest that. But I do question whether
the American economy can continue to
bear all these burdens indefinitely; in
fact, that was the basic thrust of my
talk on this floor nearly 7 year!, ago,
October 1967.
Surely one could rate a few of the
more obvious needs of some of our own
American people as being higher in pri-
ority than this $266 million now being
requested, all of which is above the
agreed upon original ceiling for the sup-
port of Vietnam.
Let us remember that, if approved,
MASF would still be obtaining $174 mil-
lion more than what was originally
passed last year by the Senate.
It is for these reasons, let me repeat,
Mr. President, that I support the amend-
ment of the distinguished senior Sen-
ator from Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) .
The PRESIDING OrrICER. The 10
minutes of the Senator have expired.
Mr. SIT:INNIS. Mr. President, I yield
5 minutes to the Senator from New
Hampshire (Mr. MCINTYRE).
The PRESIDING OrriCER. The Sen-
ator from New Hampshire is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. IncINTYRE. Mr. President, I in-
tend to support the position of the
Armed Services Committee and vote
against the amendment offered by the
distingutshed Senator from Massachu-
setts (Mrs KENNEDY). Because so much
comment has surrounded this araend-
meat, and because many different inter-
pretation are likely to be placed cn the
results of this vote, I believe it is im-
portant to state the reasons for my
vote.
At the outset, let me make it clear
that:
This is not a vote for open-ended and
indiscriminate fending for the Thieu
regime.
This is not a vote for devious account-
ing procedures that allow the Pentagon
to "find' mysterious sources of funds.
This is a vote to fulfill congressional
intent regarding fiscal year 1974 aid to
Southeast Asia, and to live up to the
guidelines given to the Defense Depart-
ment.
Mr. President, this Issue can be put
In better perspective by a short ieview
of the Armed Services Committee action
After the Pentagon's request for an in-
:Tease in the fiscal year 1974 ceiling on
aid to Southeast Asia. When this matter
same before our committee, it was my
Arrow feeling that the request was not
justified, Accordingly, I voted with the
sommittee to remove this request from
the bill and thereby retain the $1.12
billion spending limit.
Close examination by committee staff
nembers of the Pentagon's accounting
)ractices revealed that a system was be-
am used that failed to differentiate be-
:ween aid given to Southeast Asia dining
escal year 1974 and replenishment to
domestic inventories for ammunition
end other aid supplied to Southeast Asia
.n previous years. Thus, the $266 million
figure which is the focus of the pending
amendment actually represents aid given
3efore fiscal year 1974. The total funds
;pent for aid to Southeast Asia in this
fiscal year would therefore be less than
'he $1.12 billion ceiling.
Mr. President, I do not regard the sum
$266 million as insignificant or trivial.
I would prefer that this money be spent
iere at home on some of our pressing
domestic problems. :But that is not the
issue at hand. This Congress has made
a commitment?to the Defense Depart-
ment and to the government of South
'Vietnam. We have stated that a certain
eum of money, but no more than that
Aim, will be available in this fiscal year.
To pass the amendment offered by the
Senator from Massachusetts would be to
eenege on that commitment with less
ehan 2 months remaining in the fiscal
year. However attractive that might
seem from the standpoint of domestic
oriorities, I believe it would be unfair
and capricious in light of the promises
:Implicit in the 1974 authorization. At a
lime when the integrity and credibility of
he governmental decisionmaking proc-
ess is under heavy scrutiny, we should
not diminish the value of a congressional
pledge.
But at the same time that we uphold
our previous commitments, let us also
serve notice on the Pentagon and on
President Thleu that we are not giving
a blank check for the future. In no way
should my vote be read as a promise to
"bail out" the Pentagon any time it over-
spends or seeks to vitiate a congressional
spending ceiling. One glance at the treat-
ment given the Pentagon's supplemental
research and development requests by
my R. & D. subcommittee should make
my position clear. Furthermore, I intend
to take a very hard look at the fiscal year
1975 budget requests and especially the
81.6 billion Vietnam aid ceiling sought by
DOD. I firmly believe that our policy
should continue to be to decrease our in-
volvement in Southeast Asia.
Mr. STEN/US. Mr. President, I yield
myself 1 minute to say that I certainly
thank the Senator nom New Hempshire
for going to the trouble of studying this
matter and for stay Ing here to make a
very fine and clear-cut speech that con-
tributes to the situation, and firmly and
strongly backs up the committee posi-
eion.
This is another illustration of how
valuable the Senator from New Hemp-
1914'
shire (Mr. Mcblegrue is not only on the
Armed Services Committee, but wherever
else he puts his hand to the plow.
Mr. McINTYRE, Mr. President, this
was a most difficult decision for me to
snake but I think we should live up to
the pledges that we make.
Mr. STINNES. Mr. President, I yield
7 minutes to the Se: lator from South
Carolina Ian TAURAWND) .
The PRESIDING 07eFICER. The Sen-
ator from South Carolina is recognized
for 7_ minuies.
Mr. THURMOND. nen President, when
the defense supplemental bill came in
this year, the adshinistration requested
$1.6 billion, for Southeast Asia for mili-
tary support. The committee reduced
that to $126 billion. We feel that this
is reasonable. We feel that it is proper.
We have het almost 50,000 men in Viet-
nam. We have had 300,000 wounded in
Vietnam. We believe that with some
ammunition and equipment, the South
Vietnamese would be able to hold their
own and maintain n ieir freedom. But
without this, they cannot do it.
Mr. President, under the amendment
of the distinguished Senator frone
Massachusetts, $266 million will be cut
from this $1.26 billion The Armed Serv-
ices Committee did not add any new
money. I would like this to be clear in
the minds of my colleaeues: We delivered
ammunition in 1972 and 1973 that was
charged to the 1974 authorization.
Therefore, that reduced the authoriza-
tion for this year, 1954, to $860 million.
All we are trying to do here is to pre-
vent the loss of that $266 million, which
we have already authorized and already
appropriated. I repeat: We are not add-
ing $266 million. We are merely trying
to keep that much frem being lost from
this year's authorization appropriation
which Congress made last year.
Mr. President, Congress has already
acted. We do not want to see now the
action of Congress undone. If there were
justificatioa for undoing it, that would
be one thing. But there is no justifica-
tion. The South Vietnamese need this
money.
We were pressed to vet out of the Viet-
nam war, and we made statements and
promises that if we could get our man-
power out, we- would provide them with
ammunition and equipment.
That is what we are trying to do now,
except on a smaller basis, because we are
not providing it on a 1-to-1 basis as
the agreement provided. This is less than
the agreement provided.
The question might be asked, How is
this money going to be used? This is how
it will be used: ammunition, $160 mil-
lion; aircraft procurement, $69 million;
operations maintenance and spare parts,
$37 million--a total of $266 million. The
South Vietaamese teed it. They need it
in order to stop the aggression of the
enemy.
I sincerely hope that _the Senate will
not undo uhanit has-already done. I re-
peat: We are not taking any affirmative
action to give them snore money. We are
just trying to hold what Congress has al-
ready given. It would be a great blunder,
In my opinion, if we were to take steps
to deny this $266 million to those people
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May 6, 1974
over there who are ftghting for their
freedom.
An article appeared in a newspaper a
few days ago which stated that a bat-
talion was lost over there because of lack
of ammunition. We do not want that to
happen again. The article reads: "A
Battalion Dies at Kontum. Officers Say
Lack of Ammo Hampers Operations."
Do we want that to happen? Do we
want South Vietnam to go down the
drain? Do we want the South Vietnam-
ese to lose their freedom? Do we want
the whole of Southeast Asia to go Com-
munist? It will be determined on the
floor of the Senate.
These brave people are willing to fight.
All they are? asking and pleading with us
for is a little ammunition and weapons
and equipment, and let them do their
own fighting.
We said we would do that, when we
pressed to get out, and now they have
taken it over. We have an obligation to
those people to provide them with am-
munition and equipment, because, after
all, they are fighting for the free world
as well as their own freedom.
Mr. President, I hope the Senate will
not adopt this amendment. I hope the
Senate will stand by what it did last
year and let South Vietnam have what
Congress already has considered, au-
thorized, and appropriated, and not dis-
turb that amount by trying to reduce it
by $266 million.
One might say that the Pentagon is
trying to pull a fast one or it is the
Pentagon's bookkeeping. V'es, the Penta-
gon made a mistake; and Mr. Don
Lynch, of the Senate Armed Services
staff, caught that mistake.
The VICE PRE$1DENT. The Senator's
'7 minutes have expired.
Mr. $TENNIS. I yield 1 additional
minute to ,the Senator.
Mr. THURIVIOND. Mr. Lynch caught
that mistake. What was done was that
this $266 million, instead of being
charged to the 1972 and 1973 fiscal years,
was charged against this year It was
purely an error. If anybody makes a mis-
take, can they not correct it? A mistake
should be corrected I commend Mr.
Lynch for catching that error. Ile is a
very able staff member. Simply because
the Pentagon made a inistake, we should
not punish the South 'Vietnamese in their
struggle and in their effort to maintain
their freedom, by denying them what
Congress has already anpropriated.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield
4 minutes to the Senator from Nebraska.
Mr. HRUSKA: Mr. President, I rise in
opposition to the amendment proposed
by the distinguished senior Senator from
Massachusetts.
The amendment, in reality, seeks to
nullify and revoke the considered action
of Congress earlier this session in enact-
ing the Armed Services regular authori-
zation and appropriation acts for fiscal
1974, which we are now considering. The
amendment is an attempt to deauthorize
and to cAnce1 an appropriation duly made
on the military assistance service fund-
ing in regard to South Vietnam and Laos.
It would be extremely unwise to adopt
this amendment, and it should be re-
jected. Previous action by Congress was
Approved pzes4Ranggi693N89il&S.M5RDPMR8OR000500290006-4
well considered; it was deliberate and
pursuant to sound, long-range policy. It
should be preserved.
There may be a time when the merit
of this action can be more fairly can-
vassed, and that time will be here within
a few short weeks. But to reverse the de-
liberate and well considered action of
both houses of Congress and the signa-
ture of the President on the basis of a
45-minute debate on each side of the
respective sides of this issue certainly
Is not in order and is not wise.
The complicating aspect of the current
situation results in the fact that approxi-
mately $266 million worth of ammuni-
tion had been delivered from Army in-
ventories to South Vietnam in prior
years. Under understandings with Con-
gress, and consistent with past practices,
the Defense Department charged this
amount to the 1974 ceiling on the
amounts that were set aside for the mili-
tary assistance to South Vietnam. In
reality, this was "payback" ammunition
for United States inventories delivered
in previous fiscal years. This resulted in
a reduction of $266 million from the
amount approved and appropriated for
support for fiscal 1974.
Mr. President, there are two ways con-
gressional intent and action can be re-
stored:
First, by increasing the ceiling from
$1.126 billion to $1.6 billion. The House
refused to do so. The Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee also recommended that
such increase be denied.
The second way is to correct the book-
keeping entry by which the $266 million
were charged against the fiscal 1974 limi-
tation and make that charge against
prior years unused authorizations and
appropriations. Such a correction would
do two very helpful things: First, the
actual military assistance rendered for
fiscal year 1974 will be clearly and real-
istically reported; and second, the au-
thorized and appropriated amount for
such military assistance will be restored
to the amount Congress intended it to be
for fiscal year 1974. This is the amount
which Congress authorized and appro-
priated in the regular fiscal year 1974
Authorization and Appropriations Acts.
The Senate Armed Services Committee
report in its final paragraphs at page 32
reads:
This $266 million should not have been
included under the MASF limitation for FY
1974. The funds in fact have been obligated
for accounting purposes in prior years, and
the ammunition was delivered in prior fiscal
years.
The statistical method of reporting may
have been valid when U.S. forces and South
Vietnam forces were supported by a common
pipeline. However, since U.S. forces have been
withdrawn, statistical reporting is completely
unsatisfactory to the committee. The De-
partment of Defense should change their
method of reporting obligations under the
ammunition program from a statistical basis
to a more realistic basis as soon as possible.
By making the correction of bookkeep-
ing to which I have referred, congres-
sional intent and previous action will be
obserired.
A great dear of painstaking study and
consideration was devoted to reaching
the decisions contained in the regular
S 7135
fiscal 1974 Authorization and Appro-
priations Acts.
At this late hour, we should not divert
the course of action so carefully and
deliberately achieved.
Policy decisions of far-reaching im-
pact are involved. They are well
grounded and well founded on a longer
range view.
A more clear understanding of the
situation can be gained from a reading of
the April 29, 1974, U.S. News & World
Report article entitled, "Envoy to South
Vietnam Answers His Critics."
I ask unanimous consent that its text
be printed at the conclusion of my
remarks.
The article consists of a verbatim in-
terview in Saigon by Wendell S. Merick
of the U.S. News & World Report with
Ambassador Graham A. Martin, a 40-
year veteran in the diplomatic service of
his country.
It is urged that the pending amend-
ment be rejected.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ENVOY TO SOUTH VIETNAM ANSWERS HIS
CRITICS?INTERVIEW WITH GRAHAM A.
MARTIN
Q Mr. Ambassador, has Vietnam made any
real progress toward peace since the January,
1973, cease-fire agreement?
A Yes, but the pace has been much slower
than most Americans had hoped for. How-
ever, many of us who have followed Indo-
China events over the years have been con-
vinced all along that there were essential
prerequisites to a real peace.
One is that Hanoi would have to become
convinced that the South Vietnamese still
retained the will to stay free, as well as re-
taining political unity and the military capa-
bility to do so even after all American com-
bat forces had left the country. This is, I
think, now clearly established.
The second prerequisite was some diminu-
tion of the bitterness which was the inevita-
ble aftermath of a quarter century of savage
fighting. That, of course, would take time?
but by then Hanoi would come to the reali-
zation that only the Vietnamese parties
could work our methods of implementing the
Paris accords. Then, perhaps, the political
machinery established by the accords could
be used, quietly and seriously, for real and
effective negotiations.
The Republic of Vietnam has been and is
now willing to do this. Any objective and dis-
passionate review of the record confirms that
attitude. And one hopes that Hanoi will soon
conclude that its own best interests will be
best served by a positive political response.
Q Are you optimistic about future prog-
ress?
A If you take into account only the two
prerequisites I've mentioned, then condi-
tions are certainly ripe for negotiations. But
actual progress toward a real peace really is
totally dependent on a third requirement.
Hanoi must come to realize the futility of its
marvelously clever, ingeniously sophisticated
and frighteningly pervasive propaganda
campaign to force the American Congress to
Immediately and drastically reduce Ameri-
can aid to the Republic of Vietnam.
I deeply believe that once Congress, by
taking action to provide adequate economic
and military aid to South Vietnam, shows
Hanoi that its campaign cannot succeed,
then we will see rather rapid progress. The
intensity of fighting and other violence then
should lessen, leading to real and meaning-
ful negotiations between the Vietnamese
parties.
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S 713 6
Q Is the U.S. committed to previda South
Vietnam with economic and military aid into
the indefinite-future?
A Searetary jof State] Kissinger pointed
out recently that while the answer, in a pre-
cise legal sense, is "No," nevertheless we un-
dertook eertaba obligations when we signed
the -Paris agreements. Among the obligations
waa oui commitment to the South Vietnam-
ese peciale's right to self-deternainanon.
The provision of adequate econoraie and
military aid is, of course, 4 matter for the
Congreas to determine as it eonsiders the
foreigmaid billa each year.
Howerer, I'd like to look beer a few years,
back to 1954. Many Americans have forgot-
ten that our real emotional involvement in
Indo-China affairs began in 1954, with a
characteristic American humanitarian re-
sponse when we helped move almost a mil-
lion?mostly Catholic?Vietnamese from the
North to the South. They abandoned every-
thing at material value, choosing to become
penniless refugees in the South rather than.
rerenne under the totalitarian rule of Hanoi.
Also, it seems to use that debate over
abstruse questions of "legality" ought not
to obscure the fact, the reality, that our
present commitment arises from an even
more characteristic American trait?our de-
termination and pride that we finish what
we set out to do. And in this case, it is to
leave Vietnam economically viable, militarily
capable of defending itself with its own man-
power, and its people free to Choose their
own government and their own leaders. I am
thoroughly convinced that this goal can be
achieved rather quickly.
Q Is South Vietnam's claim that it will
need 3 1:41lion dollars in U.S. comics:Mc aid
through the 1970's realistic?
A It Is probably correct that South Viet-
nam, win need a. billion dollars in a combina-
tion on foreign aid, foreign investment and
export earnings in the 1970s. But in my opin-
ion, if the decisions I have reconuner ded are
made now, not much more than half that
amount 'need come from the United States.
Q How much aid Is the U.S. providing
now?
A In this fiscal year, military aid has been
limited to a little over 1 billion dollars?a
very tight slim to help complete the last
step of the highly successful process Df Viet-
nam/ewe:ma
Unfortunately, Hanoi did not observe the
cease-fire to which it had agreed, and the
rate of necessary expenditures for ammuni-
tion fat exceeded the estimate made in the
expectirden of peace.
I'm very hopeful, however, that the Con-
gress will appropriate the full amount the
Department of Defense has requested for the
fiscal year 1975. If this is done, I am certain
the process of negotiation will be speeded,
leading to a drastic reduction in the intensity
of fighting. That, in turn, will result in a
decreased need for U.S. military Me there-
after.
It had originally been planned to provide
625 million dollars in economic aid for this
fiscal- year. We were able to give only 800
million dollars and. as it turned cut, the
aStual impact of that was much red aced by
the increase in world prices of commodities
that have to be imported, such as petroleum
products.
If, as I very much hope, the seecutIve
branch proposes and the Congress approves
the 850 million dollars I have recommended
for the fiscal" year 1975, plea approelinately
700 million dollars for the following year, I
am convinced further economic aid from the
United_ States could be drastically reduced
or even ea iminated altogether by fisial year
19'7'1. -
Q. Would South Vietnam be anywhere near
an "economic breakthrough" if there were
peace?
A. Very close to that, as a matter of fact.
When I. was told a year ago by some of the
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meat competent ecoaomists in the United
States that all essential conditions were pres-
ent In Vietnam for an economic break-
tbrough along the lines achieved in Taiwan
and South Korea?test, note this, in a much
shorter time frame?I thought they were
overly optimistic. NOW I am convinced they
were right.
Q. What will happen here if Congress fails
to appropriate the funds you've recom-
mended?
A. It will take us longer to finish what we
set out to do. You see, I do assume we are
going to finish it. I do assume this will not
be the first time we Americans will fail to do
so.
The question in any mind is whether we
will, but how long will it take? I do assume
that when we leave we will have accom-
plished our objective: leave Vietnam eco-
nomically viable, militarily capable of de-
fending need with its own manpower, and
free to choose its own government and its
own leaders. My goose is that we leave in the
quickest possible time, with that objective
accomplished.
My other goal is that, as quickly as pos-
sible, Americans will be able to look back at
Vietnam and say that the historians can sort
out what mistakes we made, but in the end
we did a few things right and it came out all
right. I want to get to that point as quickly
as possible, and I believe the recommenda-
tions I have made will greatly accelerate the
speed with which we reach that goal.
, Q. What sort of economic formula do you
see putting South Vietnam on its feet?
A. I am not an economist. But I have been
exposed to some of the. world's best and I have
been a long-time intensive student of the
economic-development process. I have
ri-
eluded that no special formula can repeal
c G
the basic laws of economics.
Occasionally, we find in a country a com-
bination of great natural resources, an able
administration comm .tted to sound economic
policies, an intelligent, ingenious, innovative,
incredibly tough people, with a proven capa-
bility for sustained effort and with a fierce
and passionate determination to maintain
their freedom. When this Combination exists,
as it does now in South Vietnam, an infu-
sion of sufficient outside capital acts as a
catalyst, bringing all. of the elements I've
mentioned together In a way that can pro-
duce truly remarkable results.
Q. Going back to the U.S. aid program. In a
cable to the State Department in March you
stated that Hanoi decided last autumn to
launch an all-out campaign to persuade Con-
gress to cut economic and military aid to
Saigon. In your opinion, has Congress been
In any way swayed by Hanoi?
A. What I actually said was that we had
long been aware of decisions taken last fall '
In Hanoi to mount an all-out campaign this
winter and spring to persuade the Congress
to drastically reduce the magnitude of both
economic and military aid to the Govern-
ment of Vietnam.
Hanoi's pians called for the Stockholm
International Conference on Vietnam to be
the main co-ordinating mechanism, and the
Provisional Revolutioaary Government dele-
gation in Parts?the South Vietnamese Com-
munist representatives?to be the principal
channel. The remnants of the American
"peace movement" would be used in such a
way as to bring influence to bear on selected
susceptible?but iniluential?elements of
American coramuniestions mettle and, par-
ticularly, on susceptible members of emigres-
sional staffs.
The eiemsat of timing was important.
First, as much material as possible con-
demning the South Vietnamese Government
was to be moved ir.to the "Congressional
Record." The hope was that these insertions
would show up in?or at least influence--
forrnal reports of congressional subcommit-
tees. These, in turn, could be followed up and
given wide circulation by "investigative re-
porting" which would tend to confirm and,
where possible, expana on the distortions
already in the congressional subconunetee
formal reports.
When I referred to t he Hanoi decision or
last autumn I was refer Ing to a special effort
designed to particularle affect the authoriz-
ing and appropriatioa process for the fiscal
year 1975 aid program or Vietnam.
Hanoi's campaign 4 not something new.
/ watched the same process being used in
France in the early '50s when the French
were still here in Vieinam. I became fas-
cinated by its efficiency and pervasiveness.
Q. But is it really effective in the U.S.?
A. Let me give you an example. Outside
the corps of professional Hanoi watchers. I
have probably been ene of the most regular
and consistent reader . of the output of
Hanoi's principal newspaper -Mum Dan"
and of Radio Hanoi. W. th a background like
that you'd think one should be immune to
the propaganda. Instea it, I find that even I
have on occasions aceeeted as true parts of
the "conventional wiactmn" so carefully im-
planted. I believe an Americans have been
touched by it to some degree, and since the
Congress is representative of our people, it is
Inevitable that Congres t would be influenced
by it,
When some of these listortions began ap-
pearing in the "Congressional Record" and
even in some congresieonal-comrnittee re-
ports, I began to worry more about what was
happening to us in the United States than
about what was happening in Vietnam.
"THE PEOPLE Mn, r .CAVE THE TIIITTR"
I deeply believe that when the American
people and the American Congress have the
whole truth, their decisions are almost al-
ways cense,. But they must have the whole
truth. Let me illustrate this with a wonder-
ful passage from Aleaander Solzhenitsyn,
published in Oslo last, fall. It reads like this:
"The error cammittea by man in his un-
derstancline of the -meaning of 'peace' is
nothing Int emotional I meant what I said.
This is nothing unueual. We often err not
because we find it hard to perceive the truth
(it is often right there at the surface), bet
because it is easier and more pleasant to be
guided by our feelings, especially if self-
centered.
"The truth has lone been demonstrated
and proved and explained, and yet it has
remained without attention -or sympathy,
like Orwelits '19E14' because of a 'universal
conspiracy of adulation' (ha the author's
own words).
"The bestial mass killings in Hue [South
Vietnam], though reliaJ sly proved, were only
lightly noticed and almost immediately for-
given because the sympathy of society was
on the other side, and the inertia could not
be disturbed.
"It was :list too bad that the information
did seep into the free press and for a time
(very briefly) cause embarrassment (just a
tiny bit) to the passiorate defenders of that
other social system."
I was well aware that if I chose to disturb
the intertia, if I openly Suggested the cur-
rent carefully cultivated "conventional wis-
dom" did not provide :he Congress and the
American people with the whole truth, which
was essential to reach decisions that would
truly corrmpond to A mer lean interests, I
would be subjected to tonsiderable personal
abuse. Nevertheless, I thought the abuse
would be vorth taking if it might contrib-
ute to providing the whole truth to the
American aeople.
Q Does the abuse bother you?
A Not really, Last fail my wife told me the
integrity of my 40 years of service to the
American people was lust too well known
for such attacks to be taken seriously. She
was confident the int jority of Ameriesties
still preserved an instinctive aversion to be-
ing "taken in," and would appreciate the few
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who w.erc still willing to fight to see they
were told the whole truth. She said our "pas-
sionate defenders of that other social system"
did not, any more than did the Soviets, know
how to handle a completely honest man who
Was not afraid, and if the fluttering in the
dovecotes gets too frantic, she would get me
a? broad-brimmed hat. Prejudiced and overly
generous as her appraisal of me may be, it
sure is awfully nice to have around.
Q. Senator Kennediin early April charged
that you had recommended that the State
Department refrain from giving him an
"honest and detailed answer" to questions
about U.S. policy in Vietnam. What was the
purpose Of your recommendation?
A My first reaction was that George Or-
well's 1984 world of "doublespeak" had ar-
rived prematurely.
I have always assumed that all reports of
the Secretary or the Department to the Con-
grass or any merriber thereof would be "hon-
est and detailed." It was obviously a deliber-
ate distortion a thd clear intent of my mes-
sage to suggest that / 'recommended that
Renator Kennedy get any other kind.
? On the other hand, I have not been in-
formed that the Senate Judiciary Subcom-
Mittee op. Refugees has superseded the For-
eign Relations and Appropriations commit-
tees. I had been impressed by the feet that
Senator Kennedy had giVen a rather free
rein to his SubcOmmittee Staff which, it
seemed to me, sometimes ill-Seri/0 him by
being more conderhed - with headlines than
- with the thorough; painstaking Leareh for
accuracy and perceptive insight that has long
been the hallmark of the highly competent
and professional staffs of the Foreign Rela-
tions, Foreign Afra,ini and Appropriations
committees,
Therefore; since the rather linportarit mat-
ters of substance raised in Senator Kennedy's
lettex were very Stier): to be given: an "honest
and detailed" presentation to the 'Foreign
Relations Committee and, .to, the Appropri-
ations Committee, my recommendation was
simply to convey-privately-MY feeling that it
would be the height of "folly to give the same
"honest and detailed" presentation -to the
Subcommittee on Refugee's before it ' was
given to the committees which had always
handled these affair's. I have not the ...slightest
apology for this recommendation.
NOW TO END THE WAS. "VERY QUICKLY"
Q Mr. Ambassador, A lot of Americans ask:
"Why should we worry any longer about Viet-
nam?"
A The important questions remain:. How
do we end our involvement? Mow quickly Can
this be accomPlishecl? My personal belief is
that we should end it very quickly, and /
believe this, pan be done. Ilow we end it is of ?
crucial importanee. I have said our objective
should be to end it leaving a Vietnam eco-
nomically' viable, militarily capable of de-
fending itself with its own manpower, and
free to choo:se its own government and its
own leaders. I believe this can be done within
the next three years.
I believe that the, effect on our power re-
lationships elsewhere in the world of being
able to walk away from such a Vietnam with
the evidence of American commitments fully
discharged may well determine whether our
grandchildren will live in a peaceful world or
one where senseless Violence will be the daily
norm. Only those Who are incapable of un-
derstanding the intricate interplay of the bal-
Rf loves now loose in the world, or
TV* .tp lii,k abOnt it; will, con-
tend that the preceding -sentence is other
than a dispassionate Statement of a simple
fact.
I also believe that if the Congress and the
people are given the whole truth, we will end
our involvement quickly, with that objective
accomplished.
, .
Mr. STENNLS. Mr. President, I yield
5 minutes to the Senator from Arizona.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
was present at the subcommittee meet-
ing when the distinguished Senator from
Massachusetts (Mr. KENNEDY) made the
first presentation of his amendment.
After listening to it and without having
had at that time.an up-to-date briefing
on the whole subject, I said to Senator
KENNEDY, "I would not find a lot of diffi-
culty in supporting the amendment." I
further said, "I do not think the Defense
Department should use domestic infla-
tion as a reason for upping the ceiling."
When I made that statement I felt just
exactly as I expressed it. However, since
that time, and the full committee having
been briefed on the entire concept which
has been discussed on the floor today,
and which I will not repeat. I have
changed my opinion, and I think that
the money should be allowed. I do not
want to make a long speech on this mat-
ter. I will just say briefly that I think it
Is a question of whether or not we want
South Vietnam to stand or fall.
I doubt seriously, too, that $266 mil-
lion would answer that question, but if
this amendment is adopted and it leads,
as it will inevitably lead, to other amend-
ments, that could mean a striking of the
entire sum, something the Senator from
Massachusetts assured me he does not
want to happen. Then, I think we would
be in difficulty.
I refer, for example, to an editorial
that appeared in this morning's Wash-
ington Post?and I might say they have
never felt too strongly that Vietnam
should stand.
Referring to a letter Secretary Kis-
singer wrote to Senator KENNEDY?and I
have not seen it?I do not know if Sec-
retary Kissinger sent it to anybody else,
but the Post probably has seen it?they
r3ferred to a characteristic statement
made by Secretary Kissinger:
The presence of large numbers of North
Vietnamese troops in the south demonstrates
that the military threat from Hanoi is still
very much in evidence.
I go on to read the editorial:
His plain implication was that Hanoi is
violating the peace agreement by keeping
troops in the south. Yet the accords permit
Hanoi to keep in the south as many troops
as it had there in January 1973. By suggest-
ing that Hanoi is doing something it has no
right to do, he is implicitly granting Saigon
an excuse to take countering steps in its
own "self-defense," even though those steps
may not be contemplated in the Paris ac-
cords. In the aid vote, the Senate has the
opportunity to inform the administration
whether?and to what extent?it agrees.
Now, I would point out that in the
briefings I have had, the North Viet-
namese have far greater strength in the
South than they had at any time during
the actual war. They have completed two
paved highways through the South, one.
going to within 25 miles of Saigon. They
have completed a railroad part way down
and they have completed a petroleum oil
line to points where it could be of ad-
vantage to them.
It has been my observation that if we
ever withdraw our support from South
Vietnam, South Vietnam cannot stand
S 7137
on its own against the forces of North
Vietnam, bolstered as they are by air-
craft reaching them from the Soviets
through Red China and Hanoi.
So, Mr. President, I do not think the
Post- really understands what is going
on over there. I admit I did not at the
time I told Senator KENNEDY I liked his
amendment. I think the North is merely
awaiting the time when the South does
not have ample ammunition to make
their major attack.
As I see the military situation over
there now it clearly indicates that the
North is far stronger in men and equip-
ment and, of much more importance to
me, of course, is the fact that their air
force has been greatly restructured and
reinforced by the advent of the new MIG
aircraft, not the most modern aircraft
but something they did not have during
the war to any extent, aircraft with
which they can now fight the very goc d
South Vietnamese air force. They also
have constructed many new airfields
and rebuilt airfields that had been com-
pletely destroyed during the course of
the conflict in the Vietnam War.
So while I once agreed in part with the
Senator from Massachusetts, I find my-
self in opposition now.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator's
5 minutes have expired.
Mr. GOLDWATER. I thank the Chair.
I was just going to conclude. The Chair
is a good observer of time, having been
trained properly in the House.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, how
much time do we have?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Massachusetts has 12 minutes re-
maining and the Senator from Missis-
sippi has 6 minutes remaining.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield
myself 11/2 minutes.
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for one question?
Mr. KENNEDY. I shall yield to the
Senator after I speak for 11/2 minutes. I
will be happy to yield then.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Massachusetts is recognized,.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, there
have been inflammatory statements -
made here about whether the effect of
the impact of this amendment would cut
back on the funds that would be avail-
able to the Joint Casualty Resolution
Center. This is a new argument. When
the administration appeared before the
House Committee looking for an increase
of $474 million, they never said for one
moment they would need this money for
the Joint Casualty Center.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, may we
have order? Will those who are not
Members be still for a while? The Sen-
ator is entitled to be heard.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senate
will be in order.
Mr. KENNEDY. Second, the amend-
ment as stated makes reference to funds
which remain unobligated. Funds for the
Joint Casualty Center are obligated. The
comments of the Senator from Texas are
mistaken with regard to the amendment.
I have listened to the argument of the
-
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S 7138 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE May 6, 1974
Senator from South Carolina and other
comments made here. Either the ceilings
whiich are established by Congress have
some meaning in terms of authorization
or they do not. The American taxpayers
are investing their money at the rate of
$42,500 per year in electing each Mem-
ber of Congress, and they are wasting
their money if we go ahead and provide
a ceiling which does not have any mean-
ing for the Department of Defense or
any other department.
What we have done here is to se; the
ceiling at $1.128 billion, and they are
trying to Increase it by $266 million.
Then, :1 hear the argument that :f we
do not provide the $266 million we are
defaming the 55,000 Americans whc lost
their lives and the 300,000 who were in-
jured. But those who make that argu-
ment do not say anything about the $2.5
billion we will be spending on Vietnam, or
the fact that the administration wants
to double economic aid for Vietnam in
the next fiscal year and to increase ,nili-
tary spending by about one-third.
How long are we going to hear those
arguments? We have been hearing them
long enough. It is basically because the
Defense Department has not proceeded
to allocate our resources wisely and has
frustrated the will of the Congress.
Finally--
The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of
the Senator has expired.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield myself 1 imn-
ute.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
is recognized for 1 additional minute.
Mr. KENNEDY. The General Account-
ing Office has said that this is probably
illegal in the first place, because we
follow the line of reasoning of the Armed
Services Committee and say the money
is actually for ammunition that came
from 1973 funds and that 60 percent of
that was delivered in fiscal 1973, that
would raise the ceiling which we au-
thorized. The fact is that the Mita, re-
ports of the GAO show that this is clearly
I hope the amendment is going to
stand. It makes sense. Are we going to
comply with a decision that has been
made as a result of conferences between
the Armed Services Committees of the
House and the Senate on putting a ceil-
ing into effect, or are we not?
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield 1 minute for a question?
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield.
Mr. JAVITS. Does the rationale the
Senator wishes us to follow in any way
involve the question of judgment as to
whether or to what extent the United
States should back South Vietnam finan-
cially, or is it involved in the fact that
we are not being asked to pass upon that
issue frontally but, rather, in an implied
or indirect way, by asking us to author-
ize money as if we were being asked to
Pass on the issue? In other words, are
we being asked to add $266 milion
frankly and frontally because that is de-
sirable because of our interest in South
Vietnam, or are we asked to do it in the
cover of? some accounting which does
not let us face the issue?
Mr. KENNEDY. The Senator's latter
statement is correct. There is no frontal
Approved
facing of the issue. No hearings were held
on this $266 million payback transfer. It
is an accounting change.
It is very interesting to listen to the
fiscal conservatives say they are willing
to authorize this kind of backdoor fi-
nancing, but when we are talking about
the need for programs having to do with
poverty, health, and similar issues they
sing a different tune.
Mr. JAVITS. And no backdoor spend-
lg.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 2 minutes to
the Senator from Iowa (Mr. HUGHES) .
Mr. HUGHES. I thank the distin-
gaished Senator from Massachusetts for
yolding.
Mr. President, I would like," by way
o beginning, to associate myself with
the remarks of the distinguished Sena-
tor from Missouri primarily because on
that day at that particular committee
I had given the Senator from Missouri
my proxy, because I was unable to be
there. He has stated his own thoughts
and his confusion as a result of that pro-
cedure. So- my proxy must have been
voted on that basis.
Mr. President, I welcome this oppor-
tunity to join in supporting the amend-
ment proposed by the distinguished Sen-
ator from Massachusetts (Mr. KEN-
ICEDY) to deny an increase in military
aid to South Vietnam.
The issue, as I see it, is a simple one
of obeying the law.
Last year the Congress set a ceiling
of $2,735 million for the MASF program,
and the Pentagon reported, as required
by law, obligations of $2,713,100,000?
that is, all but $22 million of its author-
ity.
Now the Pentagon claims that $266
million for ammunition, reported to the
Congress for the first time last ,f all
should not be counted against this year's
ceiling of $1.126 billion.
Where should it be reported? I am
told that most; of those funds properly
sliould be counted against the fiscal year
1973 ceiling, but that would invoke a
violation of that restriction on spend-
ing.
So now the Pentagon wants us to sanc-
tion an ex post facto violation of the law
and, in the process, allow over a quarter
of a billion dollars more for South
Vietnam,
The most charitable interpretation is
that the MASF program has the
shoddiest bookkeeping in the entire Pent-
agon. Alternatively, the administration
chose to pour money and equipment into
V..etnam without regard for the legal re-
strictions imposed by the Congress.
In any case, I believe that the Defense
Department should be held to the letter
of the law. And since this extra $266 mil-
lion was not reported to the Congress
until fiscal 1974, then this program
should be held accountable for its re-
ports.
Otherwise, we will be in the position
of letting misleading reports to the Con-
gress become justifications for violations
of the restrictions we wrote into law.
This year alone, we will spend $1.852
billion in South Vietnam for all U S.
Government programs, according to the
GAO. Our aid comes to 6.Y2 times what
the Thieu government raises for its own
budget.
We have built up a massive military
machine in South Vietnam, one which
have over one-fourth of the male labor
force under arms.
And despite the talk of cease-fire vio-
lations, the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment's own figures show that its force
have suffered over 40 percent fewer
casualties and two-thirds fewer deaths
since the cease-fire agreements went into
effect.
Reduced violence dons not justify in-
creased aid.
Nor should we allow the current scare
tactics to force us to capitulate to these
demands for more money. ?
Every time an aid bill is before the
Congress, it; seems that Saigon starts
shouting about a new offensive. We
heard it last, December; we hear it now.
But just as no offensive took place
last winter, I doubt that anything sur-
prising will happen this spring, espe-
cially not since the rainy season is about
to begin.
A few weeks ago, Saigon trumpeted
the "fall" of a ranger base called Tong
Le Chan after heavy righting. U.S. re-
porters subsequently discovered that the
base had been quietly evacuated at
night.
As the New York Times reported:
It appeared that Pra4ident Thieu was
superheating the atmosphere of tension in
order to increase the chances that a mili-
tary appropriations bill would be approved
In the United States Senate.
Mr. President, I think we have had
enough of deceit and manipulation. The
time has cane to draw the line.
I strongly support this amendment,
because I believe it will do that job.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield
the Senator from California a minute
and a half.
Mr. CRANSTON. I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator.
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to
vote for the Kennedy amendment. I think
that nothing less than responsible gov-
ernment is at stake.
In the last year or two, Congress has
taken inrnportant steps toward self-re-
form. Improving its budgetary proce-
dures is one of the most crucial.
Even though the mechanism set up by
the budget reform bin has not yet come
Into being, the budgetary review process
has already become more effective. The
Senate Armed Services Committee offers
us a fine example. This year, the target
date for the regular military procure-
ment bill is mid-May instead of well into
the fiscal year, as it has been in past
years. I commend the distinguished
-chairman of the Armed Services Commit-
tee for that new anel more rational
timetable. '
The Kennedy amendment conforms to
this spirit of more responsible budgetary
review.
Originally, the Pentagon asked the
Congress to :increase the ceiling on mili-
tary aid to Saigon from its present level
of $1.126 to $1.6 billion. But on April 4,
the House voted 177 to 154 to keep the.e
ceiling where. It is.
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The Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee voted to retain the present ceiling as
well. But at the same time, the commit-
tee approved a change in fiscal year
accounting which has the effect of pro-
viding an additional $266 million to
South Vietnam?money which the com-
mittee -says is available because of "in-
accurate accounting."
Mr. President, I have struggled with
the Pentagon's accounting system ever
since I came to the Senate. I know full
well how frustrating it Is to try to dig
statistics out of the files, only to find
that you cannot use them, because they
are not consistent. I wholeheartedly
agree with the committee's insistence on
straightening out the bookkeeping maze
surrounding military aid to Saigon.
The effect of reform in this case should
have been to tighten the procedure and
to close the loopholes. Instead, the imme-
diate result is qUite different. Somehow,
$266 million has suddenly materialized,
seemingly from nowhere. And unless we
Pass the Kennedy amendment, the Sen-
ate will go on record in favor of mailing
that money directly to General Thieu?
airmail special delivery.
When I say that responsible govern-
ment is at stake; I mean this: Congress
should not set formal imits on spending
at the "front door" and then allow money
to go out the back door.
Congressman MAnon, chairman of the
House Appropriations Committee, put
the matter very ine'cinctly. He said on
April 10:
If Congress. docs net see fit to provide addi-
tional funds in a forthright way, then I am
not in favor of making funds available by
changing accounting procedures or by
changing reports, or by any other legerde-
main, and I will oppose any attempts to ac-
complish in committee reports what cannot
be accomplished by law.
,
Mr. President, only 5 months ago. Con-
gress reduced the Pentagon's request for
military aid to South Vietnam froin $1.6
to $1.126 billionAt did so in the appro-
priate way; namely, through action on
the regular flical. year 1974 military pro-
curement authorization bill.
We should not reverse our decision
now?particularly when nothing has
happened to justify a supplemental
request. -
A supplemental funding authoriza-
tion should not be normal procedure. It
should he used only when something
major and unexpected has happened,
such as the "October War" in the yfiddle
East. It should not he a way Of getting
around the regular budgetary process.
In this case, there has been no emer-
gency. The "major new offensive" that
North Vietnam ,Was. supposed to have
launched by now has not occurred.
I went back to my files and fmmd that
there 1-4Ve been Periodic predictions that
sack an ,offensive was Just about to take
place, tn. November, veteran reporter,
Denis Warne;, filed a dispatch which
began:
North Vietnam is openly preparing to
launch its heaviest offensive ever against
South Vietnam.
In December, tbe National Observer
quoted unnamed U.S. officials as saying
there was "a strong possibility" of a new
offensive by early 1974. In the same
month, someone described as a "veteran
Vietnam hand" in the State Department
told the Chicago Tribune that?
The next couple of months are going to
be extremely crucial . . . in that time it
will be clear to everyone whether there will
be a major offensive.
And General Thieu, who hardly
needed any encouragement, announced
in January that his army was going on
the offensive against Communist base
areas in South Vietnam to preempt the
possibility of a major new North Viet-
namese offensive.
So much for offensives.
In presenting the administration's
case to the House Armed Services Com-
mittee, Deputy Secretary of Defense
William Clements did not haul out the
bugaboo of a major new offensive, but
talked instead about inflation and high
prices.
He said on March 18:
The present ceiling is insufficient to keep
up with inflation and price rises.
Now those are things that Americans
really understand at this point in time.
But Deputy Secretary Clements was not
talking about the inflation and high
price hitting American consumers so
hard. The consumer he was talking
about was the South Vietnamese mili-
tary.
Perhaps it has not occurred to him
that Thieu and his generals should do
just what the American consumer has
had to do?make do with a little less.
Certainly there is no way that this
$266 million is going to help South Viet-
nam's economy. Nothing which has the
effect of fueling the war will help South
Vietnam's economy. In fact, the World
Bank recently went on record for the
first time against considering capital de-
velopment funds for South Vietnam as
long as the war continues.
Similarly, there is no way that this
$266 million is going to help our economy.
Actually, it hurts it?for this sort of
spending feeds and fuels our own infla-
tion. And certainly this $266 million
would not help American small busi-
nesses to weather the energy crisis. It
would not . build a new factory which
would provide jobs: It would not help
our elderly citizens to cope with the
higher cost of living.
What will it do? It will buy ammuni-
tion and aircraft for what the Pentagon
calls "H and I"?harassment and inter-.
diction?in a war whose continuation is
not in our national interest.
That is why Congress reduced the re-
quest for military aid to Saigon last De-
cember. Inflation and higher prices?the
factors cited by Deputy Secretary
Clements in support of more military
aid?were live issues then, too. Oil prices,
which he also mentioned, had already
risen dramatically.
In other words, Mr. President, nothing
has changed. We must not rubberstamp
back-door funding practices designed in
part to get around congressional opposi-
Win to military aid.
Sure they have inflation in Saigon. So
do we. That is all the more reason why
military aid to Thieu shoffid be going
down?rapidly--not up.
If we really want to help South Viet-
nam, we should remember that our com-
mitment is not to Thieu, but to peace.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, how
much time do I have?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
has 3 minutes.
Mr. KENNEDY. I yield 1 minute to the
Senator from South Dakota.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from South Dakota is recognized.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President I lis-
tened to the argument made by the dis-
tinguished Senator from Texas that we
would be jeopardizing information on
our missing men if we restricted military
aid to South Vietnam. That is the same
old argument that used to be made by
President Nixon, that if we did not have
such a military operation we would never
get our prisoners out. It turned out it was
just the opposite. As long as we carried
on our military operations, not one sin-
gle prisoner was released, and it was only
after we terminated our military opera-
tions that we were able to sit down with
the other side and arrange for the release
of our prisoners.
None of us knows what the condition
is of those men who are missing in action.
We are operating in the dark. But it
would seem clear that if there was any
relevance in this particular issue to our
experience, we would be cutting back
on the military operations in conse-
quence of opening up negotiations -with
the other side with regard to the ques-
tion of men missing in action.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of
the Senator from South Dakota has ex-
pired.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, how
much time do I have?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
from Mississippi has 6 minutes.
Mr. STENNIS. I yield 3 minutes to
the Senator from Texas.
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I was very
Interested in the comments of my dis-
tinguished friend from South Dakota.
He said that the cessation of military
activities on our part resulted in the re-
turn of the POW's. Obviously the POW's
do not believe that way, and obviously
that is not the way it happened. The
escalation of military activity against
North Vietnam in December of 1972 re-
sulted in the termination that resulted
from the negotiations that began in Jan-
uary 1973, and that is why the prisoners
are home today.
Now, relative to the matters of MIA's,
the Senator from Massachusetts has con-
tended that the funds are already obli-
gated.My question would be: Under what
obligation and under what specific ap-
propriation are they actually obligated
on an open-end basis? They are not. The
amendment before us reads:
None of the funds authorized to be appro-
priated by this Act, and no funds heretofore
appropriated to or for the use of the De-
partment of Defense by any other Act and
which remain unobligated on the date of
enactment of this Act, may be expended in,
for, or on behalf of any country in Southeast
Asia.
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S 7140 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 6, 1974
And whatever the intent of the Senator
Irons Massachusetts is?and I am sure
that he did not intend this?the actual
effect of his language is so specific that
do not think any court in the land
would sai that this language does not
prevent our maintenance of the joint
fund for casualty activities. And there-
fore, the enactment of this amendment
into law constitutes an abandonment of
the MIAs. The language is specific. There
is no undeliga,ted authority, that is au-
thorized funds appropriated on an open-
end basis. Let us, therefore, understand
what we do by this amendment.
Let us, therefore, understand when we
'do by this amendment.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of
the Senator from Texas has expired. The
Senator from Mississippi is recognized.
Mr. STENNIS. X will be quite brilef.
Let me refer to this fact. There has been
talk about the Pentagon asking for one
thing and then shifting to an-other. This
situation was found by Mr. Donald
Lynch, a very able and faithful member
of the staff of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, who did a great deal of the staff
work on this bill, He was checking, first,
to see if all of the fiscal year 1974 author-
ity had been used up. He was checking
back on the prior fiscal years also. And in
that checking he found this ammunition
situation. And that is why the committee
adopted this course. We are going to
have the same matter of military aid for
South Vietnam up 4, 5, or 6 weeks from
now in the large authorization bill.
And my thinking on that is that if they
get the $266 million here, we can well
charge them with part of that or all of
it in the big authorization bill.
Now, ELL the way through we have had
criticism of the Pentagon for handling
this money. But all the way through the
Congress had to yield to the fact that
they were operating under battlefield
conditions'. We allowed estimates to be
used. We did not require obligations as
we ordinarily do in good accounting
practices. We allowed estimates to be
used, because the battle was going on in
a dozen different places. We were send-
ing shells, rifles, and gasoline from our
Army to their army day after day and
night after night.
So, these were the circumstances.
These estimates were the only thing that
we required. And that is why they vary.
We do not find that the General Ac-
counting Office has condemned this mat-
ter. They have told us, through our staff,
as late as today, that they had formed
no kind of conclusions about this mat-
ter, that they had to find out about this
matter for themselves.
So, I hope that this vote does not go on
what the GAO says. They have not said
anything.
Again, X emphasize that this matter is
coming back before the Senate?the
Congress--as it will necessarily have to
in the other bill. And the supply is so
thin now that they emphasize it is
down to what they call the 90-day in-
ventory. And certainly we are not going
to let them use up all of that.
The VICE PRESIDENT. All of the
time of the Senator from Mississippi has
expired.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, is
ar y time left on amendments or on the
bill?
The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator
fie an Massachusetts has 11/2 minutes re-
maining.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, may
I have 1 minute?
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, could I
have 2 minutes on the bill from the
Se nator from Mississippi?
Mr. STENNIS. That will be satisfac-
tory.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield
2 uninutes on the bill to the Senator from
M I nnesota.
The VICE PRESIDENT. Without ob-
jection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
have supported military assistance to
Scuth Vietnam. I have supported eco-
nomic assistance to South Vietnam. I did
so because I thought it was right. How-
ever. I do believe that if the Pentagon
n( eds more money, it should not be
bind in a bookkeeping transaction. They
can request an authorization. They
failed to do so and the House of Repre-
sentatives turned them down.
We cannot, afford to let the Pentagon
juggle the books on the basis of using
the taxpayers' funds for that basis on
that or on any other basis.
We do not permit it with any other
department, and we cannot afford to do
it with this one.
I shall with great reluctance, support
this amendment. I do not want to see
South Vietnam in trouble. However, we
have poured our resources in there. And
the fact of the matter Is that just prior
to the cease-fire, we poured our resources
In there as fast as they could be put
on the docks in South Vietnam.
I have introduced and we have adopted
In the Foreign Relations Committee an
amendment to the foreign aid measure
that directs the Secretary of State to sub-
mit to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House within 120 days after the en-
actment of the authorization, a detailed
plan for the future of U.S. economic and
military assistance to the Government
of South Vietnam, including a specific
timetable for phased reduction of such
assistance, to the point when the United
States will cease to be the principal
source of funds and materiel for South
Vietnam's self-defense and economic
viability.
Now, why? Not because I am opposed
to assistance. In fact, I want us to
develop a plan. for a phased reduction.
However, I think it is wrong for the peo-
ple in the Pentagon to decide what they
w ll spend and then spend at a higher
figure than that authorized by the
Congress.
This is reverse impoundment. When
the President disapproves of a program
voted by Congress, he refuses to spend
the money, When the Pentagon believes
it needs niore funds, it seems willing to
violate the Anti-Deficiency Act and allo-
cate more than the Congress has
authorized.
I believe the Senate must express its
condemnation of such spending prac-
tices which violate the intent of this body
as to the allocation of funds.
The Pentagon has overspent for the
MASF program. Now they ask:
"We need help. Bail us out." I do not
think it will be necessary between now
and the end of the fisca; year. I am per-
fectly willing to take a good look at fis-
cal year 197f; when the matter is before
us. I have supported foreign aid. And I
have managed that bill on the floor, and
I am perfectly willing to do it again.
However, I am not prepared to see the
administration ignore toe intent of the
Congress concerning appropriated funds.
And defy the Anti-Deficiency Law. That
is the issue before us. And that is why
I support the amendment offered by
Senator KENNEDY.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I yield
2 minutes to the majority leader.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
have no hesitation and no reluctance
whatsoever in supporting the amend-
ment of the Senator from Massachusetts
(Mr. KENNEDY) .
It has been said on the floor of the
Senate this afternoon: "If anyone has
made a mistake, he should be allowed to
correct it."
I agree completely. think the 'war in
Southeast Asia and South Vietnam was
one of the greatest tragedies that have
ever struck this country in the field of
foreign affairs. I think it was unrealistic
as well as tragic.
What has come Cu'; of that war?
55,000 dead, sent home in flag-shrouded
coffins; 303,000 wounded. Among those
303,000 wounded, somewhere between
25,000 and ;i:0,000 were paraplegics and
quadriplegics.
Do we want to forget that these men
died? Do we want to know what they
died for? Was it in defense of this
country?
I served in a war. T. was not much in
the way of rank. However, when I served,
I served in defense of fey country..
Was the war to stop communism in
Southeast Asia? What was it for? Mi
Leis? The destruction of a society and
the creation of a refugee class? The use
of herbicides to destroe forest lands?
What was it for? We will never forget
Vietnam, at least I never will, because it
is a stab wound in the heart of America.
It is an episode in which this country
should never have become .involved. It
was an involvement in a civil war, and
we have paid a tremendously high: price.
Yes, when you make a mistake, admit
It: and they way to do that is to get out.,
get out of South Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, and the sooner the
better as fa: as this country and those
countries are concerned.
I ask unanimous consent that esti-
mates of the total cost of American
wars, by rank, contained in the Statis-
tical Abstracts of the Urited States, 1973,
93d Congress, 1st Session, House Docu-
ment 93-184. a U.S. Department of Com-
merce publication issued, I believe, by
the Official and Economic Statistics Ad-
ministration of the Bureau of the Cen-
sus, be printed in the RECORD at this
point.
There being no objection, the table
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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? N..408.?ESTIMATES OF TOTAL COST OF AMERICAN WARS, BY RANK
41In millions of dollars, except percent!
Veterans' benefits
Estimated interest
payments on war
loans
War
Estimated
Ultimate
costs
Original
war
costs 1
Total costs
under_ pros-
ent laws 2
Percent of
original
war costs
Total
costs to
1973
Total
Percent of
original
war Costs
World War II
664, 000
288, 000
290, 000
100
96, 447
86, 000
30
Vietnam conflict +
352, 000
I 128, 000
0 220, 000
?200
7,271 7
22, 000
20
Korean conflict
164, 000
54, 000
99, 000
184
16, 960
11,809
20
World War I
112, 000
26, 000
75, 000
290
52, 411
11, 000
42
Civil War (Union only)
12, 952
3,209
8,580
260
8,572
1, 172
37
Spanish-American War
6, 460
400
6, 000
1, 505
5, 526
60
15
American Revolution
190
100
70
70
70
20
20
War of 1812
158
93
49
53
49
16
17
Mexican War. ,.
147
73
64
88
65
16
14
Based on expenditures of Departments of the Army and Navy to World War I and major national security expenditures thereafter.
Usually the figures begin with the year the war began but in all cases they extend 1 year beyond the end of the actual conflict. Seo.
"HistoricalStatistics of the United States, Colonial Tinies to 1957," series Y 351-352 and Y 358.
P To World War I: estimates are bleed on Veterans' Administration data. For World War I, World War II, and Korean conflict, esti-
mates are those athe 1956 report of the President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions plus 25 percent (the increase in the average
value of benefits since the Commission made its report).
6 Source; 11. $. Veterans Ad-ministration, "Annual Report of Administrator of Veterans' Affairs."
Estimate's based on aisum-ption that war would end by June 30, 1970 (except for original war costs and for veterans benefit costs
to 1973).
6 Estimated Department of Defense expenditure in support of Southeast Asia for fiscal year 1965 to 1972.
Medium-level estimate of 200 percent (high, 300; low, 100) based on figures expressing relationship of veterans' benefits payments
to original costs of other major U.S. wars.
7 Medium-level estimate of 20 percent (high, 30; Inc. 10) based on figures showing interest payments on war loans as percentage
of original costs of other major U.S. wars.
Source: Except as noted, U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, The Military Budget and National Economic Priorities, pt. 1,
91st Congress, 1st sess. (Statement of James L. Clayton, University of Utah.)
Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, today
the Congress has an opportunity to ex-
press its resolve to support the Vietnam
peace accords signed in 1973. Specifically
I refer to the obligation we undertook to
supply replabernent military hardware
on a one-to-one basis to the South Viet-
namese.
One cannot overestimate the signifi-
cance Of this provision for the? mainte-
nance of the integrity of the cease-fire
areeinent. Althoutgh combat has con-
tinued to take place since the accords
Were signed,- there has been a substan-
tial reduction in activity when compared
to the situation ;which obtained prior to
the signing of the accords. To maintain
the uneasy peace which has existed since
January of 1973, it is essential that the
military balance in the region be main-
tained. During the past year, in the Mid-
dle East, we haVe witnessed a tragic ex-
ample of the consequences of the ero-
sion of a military balance when the Arab
military buildup made an attack on
Israel an inviting opportunity.
The uneasy peace which has been
maintained in Southeast Asia has re-
moved this area as a direct source of
superpower confrontation. If the United
States should fail to maintain an ade-
quate level of military assistance as pro-
vided in the pending bill, the uneasy
cease-fire would almost certainly turn
into full-scale war because South Viet-
nam would provide an inviting target if
In a weakened military state as a result
of a shortage in military supplies.
Finally, for us to reach so important
an undertaking could have far-reaching
consequences. The accredibility of Amer-
ican tmdertaking in other parts of the
world would inevitably be brought into
question. The imPlidations of a default
can have reverberations that reach far
beyond the boundaries of South Viet-
nam.
The interests of the United States
clearly call for a strong demonstration
of support for this continuing program
of military assistance. I, for one, will sup-
port this necessary assistance.
Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, it is
heartening to know that in this day and
age necessity can still be the mother of
invention. The old saw has not been so
well exemplified in years as recently in
the fortunate discovery that the Depart-
ment of Defense had "mislaid" at least
$266 million. The $36,000 a year account-
ants claim to have found the quarter of a
billion dollars just in the nick of time for
use as supplemental aid money to South
Vietnam during the remaining 2 months
of this fiscal year.
? Certainly this "newfound 266 million
dollar" mystery is as challenging to the
mind as the 181/2-minute tape gap and
other puzzles which have emanated as of
late. How can anyone mislay $266 mil-
lion? Better yet, how in the nick of time,
with their backs to the wall, did they
happen to find it just now? There is
more than an air of sheer coincidence at-
tached to the roots of this story, I fear.
It is interesting that, in the shadow of
the sharp refusal by the House to go
along with the original $476 million re-
quest, the Pentagon has now discovered a
chunk of money already signed, sealed
and delivered to DOD by the Congress
back in 1972.
Mr. President, I am convinced that if
this issue were taken to the American
people, they would overwhelmingly re-
fuse to send an additional $266 million?
or any amount?to South Vietnam in the
remaining 2 months of this fiscal year.
Already the United States spends more
than 10 times as much helping South
Vietnam, with a population of 19 million,
than it spends aiding just three of its
Asian neighbors?India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh?with more than 35 times
South Vietnam's population.
The truth of the matter is that this
additional amount is needed by the
Thieu regime to finance the next 2
months of our "peace with honor" in
that war-ravaged place. Everyone, of
S 7141
coarse, knows by now that there is
neither peace nor honor over there. The
blood-soaked tradgedy of the sixties and
early seventies is haunting us now more
than ever. Our latest blackmail pay-
ment?the payoff so to speak so they
leave sus alone?is now $266 million. A
sale price you might say considering the
original request was for $476 million.
Mr. President, the Vietnam war has
continued steadily and has even esca-
lated in violence in recent months. With
reports that Saigon's war effort would
have to be curtailed, the Pentagon had
apparently promised General Thieu an-
other half billion dollars. When the
House balked, I believe that the Penta-
gon simply moved then to "Option No.
2". Who knows how many more options
they had up their sleeves had they
needed them.
The DOD position has been and con-
tinues to be, that we support a strug-
gling government trying desperately to
establish a democracy. Yet, it is clear
from reports of recent months that the
elements of repression that reflect a
cruel military dictatorship have never
been more obvious. Thieu and his regime
are rapidly abandoning even lipservice
to deniocracy. There is complete sup-
pression of dissent and arrests are as
common as parking tickets in this coun-
try.
Most disturbing of all, however, is the
torture that is routine upon arrest and
the horrible maltreatment which con-
tinues to be the norm. According to one
reporter who recently talked with a
South Vietnamese police official, he ad-
mitted that?
We torture the guilty and they confess we
torture the innocent until they become
guilty.
Mr. President, a statement such as this
only illustrates the erosion of whatever
remnants of democracy there may have
been at one time in South Vietnam.
The unfortunate fact of life, however,
is that without the massive injections of
U.S. financial support, this corrupt
regime could fall in an instant. What
troubles me, however, is that, while
everyone knows this, we continue to go
on living in some kind of myth that
things will one day change. I believe that
nothing could be further from the truth.
Nothing will change until this country
decides that the $21/2 billion we insist on
giving to Saigon could actually be better
served at home on programs in this
country.
In fact, I am not so sure that even the
Vietnamese people would not rather have
it that way.
The people in Vietnam believe that
without our paternalistic and over-
whelming presence, they can work out
their own destiny and find a future in
which the wounds of war will one day
be healed. They plead with us in the
Congress to give them the right to work
out this destiny and to allow them the
responsibility of true self-government.
Even more importantly, I would add
that the quarter of a billion dollars
which has been so conveniently over-
looked by the Pentagon is desperately
needed for programs right here at home.
I can guarantee that you would not find
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S 7142 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
266 million in "mislaid dollars" in pro-
grams for Vietnam veterans, Indian
health services or in rural housing pro-
grams.
It is obvious, Mr. President, that these
funds have not been spent, primarily
because they were not needed in the first
place. I believe that now that the money
has been found, rather than turning the
money over to the Thieu treasury, it
ought to te put back in the U.S. treasury
where it le elongs.
If the Pentagon cannot find anything
better to do with the funds than to give
it to General Thieu, we ought to save it
or use it en programs here at home.
Mr. McGEE. Mr.- President, I would
have to oppose the amendment being of-
ferred to cut $266 million from the De-
partment ef Defense's military assistance
service funded program.
I oppose the amendment because the
$266 million does not violate the MASF
ceiling- authorized and appropriated by
the Congress. The MASF obligations re-
ported in the first quarter of fiscal year
1974 include $266 million for payback
ammunition for U.S. inventories. This
ammunition replaced that which was
Paid for with moneys authorized in prior
3-ears and Was, in fact, delivered to South
Vietnam in 1972 and 1973.
If, indeed, there had been a violaeion
elf law, I would have to support the
amendment striking $266 million from
the Department of Defense's MASF pro-
gram. However, the case for such a vio-
lation has not been made.
In addition, today's tenuous balance of
forces in South Vietnam must be main-
tained to lead the North Vietnamese and
Vietcong to the recognition that their
objectives are better served through
Peaceful political means than through
force of arms. This is being impaired by a
reduction in purchasing power to provide
the South Vietnamese with the capability
for self-defense. This reduction in pur-
chasing power is the result of interna-
tional economic events which were we-
foreseen last year when the Congress
considered. the MASF request.
The South Vietnamese Government is
facing dramatically increased fuel prices.
Inflation of about 65 percent in Vietnam
and significant equipment prices in-
creases in the United States have re-
duced the purchasing power of the funds
available under the current ceiling.
Denial of the $266 million adujstment
recommended by the Senate Armed Serv-
ices Committee would certainly create
grave problems for South Vietnam.
In conclusion, I would reemphasize
that had an actual violation of law oc-
curred, I would have to support this
amendment. However, the $266 million
would not break the congressionally-im-
posed ceiling of $1.126 billion for the
MASF program.
The VICE PRESIDENT. All time on
the amendment has expired.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I ask
for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered,
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I move
to lay on the table the amendmene of
the Senator from Massachusetts, and I
ask for the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
Is on agreeing to the motion to lay on
the table the amendment (No. 1238) of
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
KENNEDY) . On this question, the yeas
and nays have been ordered, and tile
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. WEICKER (after having voted in
the. negative). Mr. President, on this vote
I have a pair with the distinguished mi-
nority leader, the Senator from, Pennsyl-
vania (Mr. HUGH SCOTT). If he were pres-
ent and voting, he Would vote "yea." If
I were at liberty to vote, I would vote
"nay." Therefore, I withdraw my vote.
Mr. ROBERT C. Pi ITRD. I announce
that the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
Bien), the Senator from Texas (Mr.
BeNTsoN), the Senator from Florida (Mr.
CrinEs), the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH), the Senator from North Cam-
lira (Mr. ERVIN) , the Senator from
Arkansas (Mr. Fruenneverr), the Senator
from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), the Senator
from Indiana (Mr. HAETKE) , the Senator
from Maine (Mr. HATE;AWAY) , the Sena-
toe from Louisiana (Mr. METCALF) , the
Senator from Ohio (Mr. METZENBAUM)
and the Senator form Alabama (Mr.
SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.
'C further announce that, if present and
voeing, the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
BIM!) , the Senator from Alaska (Mr.
Gr AVEL) , and the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
METZENBALIM) Would vote "nay."
GRIPI'Lg. I announce that the
Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT) , the
Senator from 'Wyoming (Mr. HANsEN),
the. Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK-
woon) , the Senator from Pennsylvania
(Mr. HUGH SCOTT), and. the Senator from
Ohio (Mr. TAFT are necessarily absent.
7 also announce that the Senator from
Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) is absent on official
bu dness.
The result was annotmeed?yeas 39,
nays 41, as follows:
[No. 179 Leg.1
YEAS? 39
AR en
All m
Baer
Ba -Hat
Beall
Be' imon
Brock
Bu Arley
By 11,
Harry F., Jr.
Ca Anon
Co ton
Cu rtis
Do e
Domenici
Dominick
Eastland
Fong
Goldwater
Griffin
Gurney
Helms
Hollings
Hruska
Jackson
Johnston
McClellan.
McClure
NAYS? 11
McGee
McIntyre
Nunn
Roth
Scott,
William L.
Stafford
Stennis
Stevens
Talmadge
Thurmond
Tower
Young
Ab3urezk Huddleston Nelson
Bible Hughes Pastore
Bitten Humphrey Pearson
Brooke Inouye Pell
Burdick Javits Percy'
By 11, Robert C. Kennedy Proxmire
Cae Magnuson Randolph
Clf rk Mansfield Ribicoff
Cook Mathias Schwelker
Crknston McGovern Stevenson
Ea -jeton Mondale Symington
Ha rt Montoya Tunney
Ha kell Moss Williams
Hatfield munkie
PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, Aa
PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1
Weicker, against
Bayh
Bennett
Bentsen
Chiles
Church
Ervin
Fannin
May 6, 1974
NOT VOTING-19
Fulbright
Gravel
Hansen
Hartke
Hathaway
Long
Metcalf
Metzenbaum
Packwood
Scott, Hugh
Sparkman
Taft
So the moeion to lay on the table was
rejected.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
recurs on agreeing to the amendment of
the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr.
KENNEDY).
On this question the yeas and nays
have been ordered and the clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called
the roll.
Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce
that the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
BAYH) , the Senator from Texas (Mr.
BENTSEN) , the Senator from Florida (Mr.
Cren.Es), the Senator from Idaho (Mr.
CHURCH) the Senator from North Caro-
lina (Mr. ER HE), the Senator from Ar-
kansas (Mr. FULBRIGHT) , the Senator
from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) , the Senator
from Indians. (Mr. HARTKE) , the Senator
from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY), the Sen-
ator from Louisiana (Mr. Lorre), the
Senator from Montana (Mr. METCALF),
the Senator from Ohio (Mr. MirrzEN-
Einem) , and the Senator from Alabama
(Mr. SPARKMAN) are necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Indiana (Mr.
BATH). the Senator from Alaska. (Mr.
GRAVEL) and the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
METztersAum:, would each vote "yea."
Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the
Senator from Utah (Mr. BENNETT), the
Senator froni Wyoming (Mr. HANSEN)
the Senator from Oregon (Mr. PACK-
wool)), the Senator from Pennsylvania
(Mr. HUGH SCOTT), and the Senator from
Ohio (Mr. TAFT) are necessarily absent.
I also anncunce that the Senator from
Arizona (Mr. FANNIN) is absent on offi-
cial business.
I further announce that, if present and
voting, the Senator from Ohio (Mr.
TAFT) would vote "nay."
The result was announced?yeas 43,
nays 38, as follows:
Abourezk
Billie
Blden
Brooke
[No. 180 Leg.]
YEAS-43
Hughes
Humphrey
Inouye
Javits
Burdick Kennedy
Byrd, Robert C. Magnuson
Case Mansfield
Clark Mathias
Cook McGovern
Cranston Mondale
Eaglet= Montoya
Hart Moss
Haskell Muskie
Hatfield Nelson
Ruddiest= Pastore
Aiken
Allen
Baker
Bartlett
Beall
Bellmon
Brock
Buckley
Byrd,
Harry F., Jr.
Cannon
Cotton
Curtis
Dole
NAYS-3R
Domenic!.
Dominick
Eastland
Fong
Goldwater
Griffin
Gurney
Helms
Hollings
Hruska
Jackson
Johnston
McClellan
McClure
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Ribicoff
Schweiker
Stafford
Stevenson
Symington
Tunney
Weicker
Williams
McGee
McIntyre
Nunn
Roth
Scott,
William Is.
Stennis
Stevens
Talmadge
ThunnOnd
Tower
Young
May 6,
Approved For Release 2001/08/30 : CIA-RDP75600380R000500290006-4
1974 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
NOT VOTING-19
nayb Fulbright Metzenbaum
Bennett Gravel Packwood
Bentsen Hansen Scott; Hugh
Chiles Ha rtke Sparkman
Church Hathaway Taft
Ervin Long
Fannin Metcalf
?
So Mr. KENNEDY'S. amendment was
agreed to.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I
move to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I move
to lay- that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question
is on agreeing to the committee amend-
ment as amended:
The committee amendment, as
amended, was agreed to.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I
yield back the. remainder of my time. -
Mr. STENNIS. I yield back the re-
mainder of my time.
- ? The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading and was read the
third time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
having been read the third time, the
question is, Shall it pass?
The bill (S. 2999) .was passed, as fol-
lows:
S. 2999
An act to authorize appropriations during
the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of air-
craft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked com-
bat vehicles, and other weapons and re-
search, development, test and evaluation
for the Armed Forces, and to authorize
' construction at certain installations, and
for other purposes
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I?PROCUREMENT
SEC. 101. In addition to the funds author-
ized to be appropriated under Public Law
93-165 there is hereby authorized to be ap-
propriated during fiscal year 1974 for the
use of the Armed Forces of the United Statea
for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval
vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other
weapons authorized by law, in amounts as
follows:
AIRCRAFT
For aircraft: for the Army, $15,000,000; for
the Navy and the Marine Corps, $37,500,000;
for the Air Force, $120,900,000. SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL
MISSILES PRIATIONS, 1974
? MISSILES
For missiles: for the Army, $10,200,000.
TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES
For tracked combat vehicles: for the Army,
$38,900,000.
OTHER WEAPONS
For other weapons: for the Army, $200,000.
TITLE II?RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT,
TEST AND EVALUATION
SEC, 201, In addition to the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated under Public
I..Law 03-155, there is hereby authorized to be
appropriated during the fiscal year 1974, for
the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States for research, development, test and
evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts
as follows:
For the Army, $35,808,000.
For the Navy (including the Marine
Corps), $38,528,000;
For the Air Force, $29,466,000; and
For the Defense Agencies, $5,016,000.
TITLE III?MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
? SEC. ? 301. In addition to the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated under Public Law
93-166, there is hereby authorized to be ap-
propriated during the fiscal year 1974, for use
by the Secretary of Defense, or his designee,
for military family housing, for operating
expenses and maintenance of real property in
support of military family housing, an
amount not to exceed $3,866,000.
SEC. 302. The authorization contained in
this title shall be subject to the authoriza-
tions and limitations of the Military Con-
struction Authorization Act, 1974 (Public
Law 93-166), in the same manner as if such
authorization had been included in that Act.
TITLE IV?PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN
USE OF FUNDS
SEC, 401. None of the funds authorized to
be appropriated by this Act, and no funds
heretofore appropriated to or for the use of
the Department of Defense by any. other Act
and which remain unobligated on the date of
enactment of this Act, may be expended in,
for, or on behalf of any country in Southeast
Asia,
This Act may be cited as the "Department
of Defense Supplemental Appropriation Au-
thorization Act, 1974".
Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, I move to
reconsider the vote by which the bill was
passed.
Mr. SYMINGTON. I move to lay ?that
motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
For missiles: for the Army, $47,100,000;
for the Navy, $17,000,000; for the Marine
Corps, $22,300,000; for the Air Force, $22,900,-
000.
TRACKED COMDAT VEHICLES -
Por tracked combat vehicles: for the Army,
$12,000,000.
OTHER WEAPONS-
. For other weapons: for the Army, $8,000,-
000.
AUTHORIZATION TO TRANSFER FUNDS
Sze,. 102. In addition to the funds au-
thorized to be appropriated under section
S 7143
The second assistant legislative clerk
proceeded to eon the roll.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. Pre
unanimous consent that the
quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFIC
objection, it is so ordered.
The PRESIDING OFFICE The Sen-
ator from Arkansas in reco lized. How
much tune does the Senatm yield him-
self?
Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. esident, a
parliamentary inquiry.
The PRESIDING OFFICE . The Sen-
ator will state it.
Mr. McCLELLAN. Is the ti e control-
led?
- The PRESIDING OFFICE . Under the
previous order, there will be 2 hours on
the .Schweiker amendment, 1 hour on
' other amendments, with the Utile to be
equally divided and controlle
Mr. McCLELLAN. I was n consulted
about the agreement. I did not know
about it.
. The PRESIDING OFFICE The Sen-
ator from Arkansas is recogn
. Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. Pr ident, the
Committee on Appropriati s recom-
mends in the pending meas c a grand
total of .$9,645,935,398 In r w budget
obligational authority for fisr 11974.
This amount is an Mere e of $834,-
273,355 over the $8,811,662, t 3 provided
by the House and is a red tion of $1,-
454,594,679 from the reviset udget esti-
mates of $11,100,530,077.
Included in these totals i he $530 mil-
lion estimated cost of t fiscal 1973
retroactive pay increase, !ovision for
which is recommended I he Senate ill
Senate document 93-72. asmuch as an
indefinite appropriation recommended
the exact effect on new bligational au-
thority is not known at is time. An ex-
Planation of this 3-mol 3, retroactive pay
increase is found on ge 149 of the re -
port.
Of the total RMO t of $9,645,935,398
recommended in th kS ill, as reported, $3,-
910,443,595 is to fi mace increased pay
and related costs, d is included in titles
II and III.
The committ also recommends
transfers betwe appropriations total-
ing $295,118,800 n lieu of providing new
budget authori in these amounts. The
amount provi d in transfer authority
is $212,155,20i more than the total re-
quested and 225,221,000 more than the
House bill p vides.
Rather r, an ? detail every item in the
bill, I wi riefly summarize the major
-highligl contained in each chapter of
title I tile general program supple-
ment
C Yjter I, agriculture, environmental
consumer protection, provides for
w budget authority of $616,641,000,
hich is $40,991,000 more than the
budget estimate and $56,411,000 more
than provided in the House bill, The in-
crease over the budget estimate is repre-
sented in two items?$26,161,000 for the
Soil Conservation Service, and $15,000,-
000 for the school lunch program.
Chapter II of the bill and the title H
80R000500290100164 the Department
of Defense provide ffscal year 1974 sup-
plemental funds in the amount of
$4,906,871,000, This is $1,293,550,000 be-
dent, I ask
der for the
Without
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate turn
to the consideration of Calendar Order
No. 781, H.R. 14013, that the bill be laid
before the Senate and made the pending
business. -
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
DomEmcf) . The bill will be stated by title.
The bill was read by title as follows:
A bill (H.R. 14013) making supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending June
30, 1974, and for other purposes,
101 of this Act, there are authorized to be The PRESIDING OFFICER. der
made available by transfer during the fiscal the previous order the Senate 21 Pro-
year 1974 to the Department of Defense, out ceed to consider the bill.
of any unexpended funds appropriated under
the heading "Emergency Security Assistance The Senate proceededVi consider the
for Israel" in title IV of the Foreign As- bill which had been reported from the
sistance and Related grams ApPro.nriation Committee on Appropriations with
Act, 1974, the followin*pprioivet1 For Releasedleerti08/30_: CIA-RDP756003
AIRCRAFT Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
For aircraft: for the Navy and the Marine suggest the absence of a quorum.
Corps, $63,600,000; for the Air Force, $33,900,. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk