UNDERWATER COCKPIT ESCAPE EVALUATIONS IN THE S-1010 PPA
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
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Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 18, 1968
Content Type:
MF
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IDEA-0710-68
Copy .'of /d
18 September 1968
Underwater Cockpit Escape Evaluations in the
S-1010 PPA
1. Subject evaluations were conducted at the U. S. Navy
Physiological Training Facility, Miramar NAS, San Diego,
California, on 7, 8 August 1968. Participants were as follows:
Headquarters - R&D
eadquarters - Intel
Det. G - Personal Equipment
7 David Clark Co. - Project Monitor
Det. G - ARO Tech Rep
ARO Corp - Project Engineer
- Escape System Engineer
J LAC - Parachute Tech Rep
:2. Purpose of Evaluations: There were three primary
purposes in conducting this evaluation program, as follows:
A. To evaluate and develop procedures for emergency
egress from the U-2R cockpit in the event of a
landing or takeoff accident during carrier operations,
which results in the aircraft being submerged with
the pilot in the cockpit.
B. To evaluate the S-1010 PPA/U-2R life support
equipment, in terms of effects on the emergency
situation described above.
C. To evaluate and develop a special egress training
program for project pilots involved in U-2R carrier
operations.
3. Equipment Used:
Navy review(s) A. Trainer Used. The device (called a "Dilbert
completed. Dunker" in which the tests were conducted, consisted
of a platform approximately 15-20 feet high with
rails sloping downward at approximately 35-400 and
entering a swimming pool at the deep end (12 ft.).
The rails project beyond the edge of the pool and
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enter the water to a depth of approximately one foot.
A cockpit mockup with a dummy instrument panel and
an ejection seat mounted inside is boarded at the
top of the platform. Upon release, the cockpit
slides down the rails and impacts the water. Upon
water entry, the cockpit is automatically rotated
forward and over to an inverted position, with the
bottom of the cockpit ending up just slightly above
the surface of the water. The occupant is therefore
suspended upside-down in the cockpit with his head
approximately 4-5 feet below the surface.
B. Life Support Equipment: The evaluations were
conducted using a stripped U-2R ejection seat
mounted in the trainer, a U-2R type seat/kit emergency
oxygen system installed in the seat, a dummy U-2R
parachute, and the prototype S-1010 PPA worn by the
undersigned as evaluator. The ground egress handle
("scramble handle") on the ejection seat was only
tied into the parachute arming lanyard release .
mechanism for these tests. Normally this handle,
when pulled, will release the lap belt, cut the foot
cables, and cut the D-ring cables in addition to
releasing the parachute arming lanyard. Therefore,
for these tests the lap belt had to be manually opened
in addition to pulling the scramble handle. The
ejection D-ring and foot retraction cables were not
installed.
C. Breathing Supply. Compressed air for breathing
was used in both the cockpit supply tied into the
seat mounted quick disconnect, and the seat kit
emergency cylinders tied into the suit emergency
oxygen leads.
D. Photographic Coverage. The personnel at the
physiological training facility kindly arranged for
an underwater photographer to cover the evaluations.
Both 16 mm color motion pictures and 35 mm color slides
were obtained.
4. Tests Conducted:
A. Preliminary Pool Test was conducted wearing the
S-1010 PPA with parachute and seat kit (packed with
some bulky items for weight/volume similar to opera-
tional kit) attached. Water entry was made from the
side of the pool with the visor closed, breathing
from the emergency oxygen supply in the kit, but
without the flotation garment inflated. The purpose
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of the test was to evaluate the buoyancy character-
istics of the system, without the flotation garment
inflated, in terms of the effects on emergency egress
from an inverted and submerged cockpit. The complete
system, as used in this test, provided a
great
of buoyancy. This buoyancy decreased with timedasl
the seat kit and parachute took on water, but the
suit buoyancy still prevented complete submergence.
When the visor was opened momentarily, the water
pressure forced trapped air from the suit out the
open helmet and thus reduced buoyancy further.
Even with diver assistance, it was impossible to
attain an inverted position under these conditions
and therefore could not simulate the condition to be
encountered in the "dunker" tests.
B. Cockpit Escape Test #i
first test was planned to be madepwithgboth thethe
seat kit and parachute attached to the suit. The
planned sequence of steps was to be as follows:
1. After water entry and inversion, check the
breathing capability from the ship's supply.
2. Pull the green apple to activate emergency
oxygen and manually disconnect from ship's supply
to check breathing capability from seat kit.
3. Pull scramble handle, manually open lap belt
(only required in test conditions), stand up to
release personal leads, and egress over the side
of the cockpit.
4. Pull flotation lanyard when clear of the
cockpit. Surface while breathing from seat kit
supply.
Water impact, inversion and bubbles in the visual
field caused a momentary disorientation that resulted
in a delay in starting the planned escape sequence.
I then started to reach for the "green apple" which
was not secured to the PPA as it is with operational
suits. As I was experiencing difficulty in locating
the green apple, I noted that the upper part of the
helmet was filling with water rather rapidly. After
another attempt to locate the green apple, I determined
that the helmet was filling too rapidly to allow time
for the planned sequence to be accomplished.
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I therefore pulled the scramble handle to release
the pa.ra.chute arming lanyard, pulled the seat kit
handle to release all kit connections (since I
wouldn't be able to breathe the emergency air with
the helmet full of water), stood up to break all
personal leads and egressed over the side of the
cockpit and headed toward the surface. I did not
activate the flotation device. Upon cockpit egress
and heading to the surface, the water in the helmet
was now filling the lower half, covering the nose and
mouth which necessitated holding my breath. The suit
still provided positive buoyancy and upon surfacing,
I held onto the side of the cockpit and opened the
visor to empty the helmet and breathe. I was unable
to determine at this point where or how the water
had entered. the helmet, so additional preliminary
tests were conducted.
C. Pool Test for Helmet Leakage. Following dis-
cussions, the most likely point of helmet leakage
was felt to be the antisuffocation valve on the lower
left side of the helmet shell. To confirm this, I
entered the pool fully suited, breathing from a
portable LOX supply, without seat kit or parachute,
and with the flotation garment uninflated. Holding
myself underwater on the ladder in an upright position
produced no water entry into the helmet. However,
upon pulling myself down the ladder in an inverted
position, I could observe water entering the helmet
in the region of the antisuffocation,valve. This
valve was then sealed with tape and water was
re-entered in an inverted position with no helmet
leakage. I maintained this inverted position, fully
submerged for a few minutes and determined that
breathing capability was excellent. To determine
whether being inverted had shifted trapped air to the
lower extremities, I then released the ladder. Suit
buoyancy remained primarily in the upper part of the
suit/helmet and therefore brought me to the surface
headfirst. Therefore, there is no danger of floating
feet upwards regardless of the period of time spent
inverted in a submerged cockpit. For the remaining
cockpit escape tests, the antisuffocation valve was
sealed with tape.
D. Cockpit Escape Test #2. Since Escape Test #1
planned procedures were aborted due to helmet leakage,
they were evaluated on this second test. The first
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test had evaluated escape with the parachute and
without the seat kit. In test #2 the green apple
was pulled as the cockpit impacted the water.
Upon inversion, I waited for bubbles to clear and
noted that breathing from the ship's supply was
satisfactory. The ship's supply leads were then
manually disconnected to switch over to breathing
from the seat kit. Breathing remained satisfactory.
The scramble handle was pulled and the lap belt
manually opened. Using my hands on the cockpit rails
I stood up, with the kit and parachute attached, to
disconnect remaining personal leads (vent hose) and
egressed over the side of the cockpit. The combined
suit/seat kit buoyancy brought me to the surface,
breathing from the kit supply, in an upright seated
position with my head well out of the water. I
then inflated the flotation garment, opened the
visor and pulled the seat kit handle. The released
kit floated to the. surface. The Koch canopy releases
and kit strap side locks were operated to release
the parachute. Suit flotation rema.ined satisfactory
throughout these procedures.
E. Cockpit Escape Test #3. To simulate a. failure
of the scramble handle mechanism, the final test was
to escape from the cockpit without the seat kit or
parachute. In addition, the flotation garment was
to be inflated prior to leaving the cockpit to see if
egress was possible despite the added buoyancy tending
to force the occupant into the seat. This was to
evaluate the possible situation of confusion causing
the pilot to inflate his flotation garment while
still in the cockpit. Specifically, the sequence of
procedures were as follows: after water entry,
inversion, and.checking breathing, the scramble handle
was pulled followed by pulling the seat kit handle.
The seat kit side strap locks were released and the
Koch canopy releases operated. The lap belt was
manually opened and the flotation garment was inflated.
Using my hands on the cockpit rails and feet against
the floor I was able, with considerable effort, to
stand up to release personal leads and egress over
the side of the cockpit. The inflated flotation
garment and suit buoyancy brought me to the surface
rapidly, where the faceplate was then opened.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations:
A. Protective Equipment. The S-1010'PPA, in combina-
tion with the U-2R seat kit, provides excellent
pilot protection for emergencies involving cockpit
submergence, either upright or inverted. The anti-
suffocation valve of the helmet is being redesigned
to allow the pilot to manually close the valve in
the event of being inverted underwater where the
water pressure on the valve is slightly greater
than on the breathing regulator, which allows the
valve to open and introduces water into the helmet.
Because of the advantages, for any type of carrier
operation accident, afforded by the S-1010 PPA, it
is recommended that all carrier operation flights
be made with the pilot wearing his S-1010 PPA. It is
further recommended that, providing there are no
visual restrictions, that all carrier landings be
made with the visor down and locked and the ship's
oxygen supply turned on. This maintains maximum
suit protection for any potential accident including
ejection, water impact or submergence.
B. Carrier Accident - Recommended Escape Procedures.
With the U-2R zero-zero stabilized escape system,
ejection is the primary means of surviving an
accident where the aircraft is heading overboard
with no chance of on-deck recovery. However, if
ejection is not initiated prior to the aircraft
contacting the water for any reason (i.e., malfunction
of escape system or delayed decision by the pilot),
cockpit egress would be involved. If the aircraft
remained afloat the pilot would follow emergency
ground a ress procedures, inflate his flotation garment
prior to leaving the cockpit, enter the water and
swim clear of the aircraft. If the aircraft was
submerged and/or inverted, the recommended procedure
is to egress from the cockpit with both the seat kit
and parachute still attached, as the quickest and
safest method. In the event of difficulties en-
countered in accomplishing these procedures, it is
still possible for a well trained pilot to escape
leaving both the seat kit and parachute behind.
C. Underwater Escape Training. On the basis of the
evaulations conducted, it is recommended that a
formal training program on carrier accident/underwater
escape be conducted for all project pilots who will be
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involved in U-2R carrier operations. As the first
base of this training program, the undersigned and
(INTEL/O/OSA) have developed a
briefing/discuss on based on the August evaluations
and utilizing 16 mm motion pictures and 35 mm slides
from that exercise. It is planned to present this
information to Detachment G pilots and life support
personnel in late September.. It is proposed that
each pilot to be involved receive "dilbert dunker"
indoctrination in early 1969, prior to any U-2R
carrier operations.
LAWDJ/7=~~
ASD/R&D/OSA
Distributio
Cy 1 - D/O/OSA
2 - D/SA
3 - SAS/O/OSA
4 - IDEA/O/OSA
5 - INTEL/O/OSA
6 - D/R&D/OSA
7 - D/M/OSA
8 - ASD/R&D/OSA
9 - ASD/R&D Chrono
10 - RB/OSA
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PROPOSED TEST SCHEDULE
UNDERWATER SEAT EJECTION
PRELIMINARY TESTS
Test Sequence
No.
Dunk fuselage less seat and catapult to 5 ft. depth and
observe leakage and structure. "Dry" run for equipment,
cameras etc.
EJECTION TESTS WITH DUMMY
2
Depth
Feet
5
Cockpit Press.
at start of
immersion - psi
.4
Immersion
Time min.
1
Ejection
Attitude
Normal
Canopy
ON
3
7.5
Ambient
z
Normal
ON
7
10
.4
2
Normal
ON
8
10
Ambient
1
Normal
OFF
23
5
.4
1
Inverted
ON
21
Dunk fuselage less seat and catapult slowly to 15 ft. level.
Observe leakage and structure. Level off if required.
22 15 or less .4 2 Normal ON
if required
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CANOPY OPENING TESTS
- UNDERWATER
Test Sequence
Depth
Cockpit Press.
Immersion
Release
ndle
H
No.
Feet
at start of
immersion psi
Time - min.
a
1
Cockpit
4
5
.4
5
5
Ambient
1
Cockpit
6
5
Worst config.
(Tests 4 & 5)
1
External
1
Cockpit
9
10
.4
10
10
Ambient
1
Cockpit
11
10
Worst config.
(Tests 9 & 10)
1
External
1
Determine
12
7.5
.4
how difficult to break glass from outside.
NOTE: Cockpit Handle - cockpit handle to be released by remote
cable attached to handle.
External Handle - handle to be released by person using
underwater breathing apparatus.
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CANOPY OPENING TESTS - UNDERWATER
LIVE PARTICIPANT USING UNDERWATER
BREATHING APPARATUS
Test Sequence Depth Cockpit Press. Immersion
No. Feet at start of Time - min,
immersion - psi
13 3
.4 Upon reaching
depth
14 3 Ambient
15 5 .4
16 5 Ambient
17 10 .4
18 10 Ambient
19 15 .4
20 15 Ambient
NOTE: No instrumentation other than cockpit pressure
is planned for these tests. However, test
progress may dictate a need.
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MRMPA (Maj. Lee) > ? 3 I f
SUBJECT: Special Test
1. On 18 March 1964 tests were performed to determine the capability of
the MC-3A partial pressure suit to function underwater and provide surfacing
capability for the wearer.
2. The test conditions were as follows:
a. Subject wore standard MC-3A partial pressure suit with standard
oxygen fittings attached to capstan and breathing pressure leads from
F-2+00 regulator.
b. Seat kit was attached to subject and one-hundred (100) pounds of
lead weights were attached to the seat kit to retain the suited subject
underwater.
c. Subject entered the test pool in Bldg. 824 and descended to a
depth of eight (8) feet.
3. The results of the test were as follows:
a. The subject breathed without difficulty and no water entered the helmet.
b. Upon release of the one-hundred (100) pounds of lead weights the
subject surfaced due to the buoyancy of the suit.
c. Surface flotation was adequate and the subject remained in a
satisfactory attitude with respect to the water.surface.
4. The following recommendations are made:
a. In the event of a situation which places the suited crewmember under
water within an aircraft cockpit, the following procedures should be followed:
jettison canopy
pull green apple
release lap belt
stand up and exhale continously during ascent to surface.
(5) Upon reaching surface disconnect capstan and breathing pressure
lines from seat-kit leads.
(6) open face plate after disconnecting capstan and breathing
pressure lines.
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5. The following comments are considered pertinent:
a. If the canopy is not of the explosive jettison type, it must be
broken and the cockpit allowed to fill with water before it can be opened
and jettisoned. It is recommended that the green apple not be pulled
prior to completing this procedure.
b. In the event that there is a common multiple disconnect on the
seat kit, it is recommended that the capstan and breathing pressure lines
not be disconnected at this level. These lines whould be disconnected at
their attachments to the corresponding suit inlet lines.
c. The characteristics of the oxygen system are such that adequate
breathing pressures can be provided for a descent to one-hundred and
fifty (150) feet.
WILLIAM L. LEE, JR.
Major, USAF, MC
Chief, Altitude Protection Branch
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