USIB DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00793R000200170002-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
12
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
September 6, 2002
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 7, 1973
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP75-00793R000200170002-8.pdf | 400.01 KB |
Body:
FOR OFFICIAL USE N1
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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
2. A copy of a Fifth Draft of the Guidelines is forwarded
for the information of the Members. This item will be discussed
at the 18 September 1973 meeting. It is noteworthy that Mr. Edwin
"Al" Thompson, Director of Records Declassification Division,
National Archives and Records Service, as well as Mr.
of the CIA Office of General Counsel will attend the meeting
to render the Working Group their views on the Declassification
Guide.
Secretary
Security Committee
SECURITY COMMITTEE
7 September 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Declassification Guide
Working Group
SUBJECT : USIB Declassification Guide
1. The Working Group Chairman, Mr.
has scheduled a meeting of the Working Group for Tuesday, 18
September 1973, at 10:00 a. m. in Room 4E64 of the CIA
Headquarters Building.
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29 August 1973
ARCHIVIST GUIDELINES FOR SUBMITTING INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO THE ORIGINATING AGENCY FOR REVIEW
BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
Documents and reports will not be declassified without prior
review by the originating agency if they contain or reveal information
on:
1. Identifiable individuals and/or organizations as sources
of intelligence information.
2. Methods and/or techniques of collecting intelligence information.
3. Identification of United States or foreign intelligence agents.
4. Assignment of United States intelligence personnel to overseas
areas.
5. Allocation and disbursement of funds for intelligence activities.
6. Organizational structure of intelligence elements operating
abroad.
7. Operational intelligence activities, including cover, deception,
escape, and evasion activities,
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SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY GUIDELINES FOR
DECLASSIFICATION OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINING
INFORMATION CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS
General
Under EO 11652 documents classified before 1 June 1972
must be continuously reviewed for the purpose of declassification
and/or retention of classification. Only the head of an Agency or
Department can extend classification protection beyond a thirty
year period. These- guidelines, therefore, are set forth to enable
Agency or Departmental personnel assigned to assist the U. S.
Archivist to identify documents for a classification decision by
the Agency head and to suggest the period of classification retention.
A major purpose of any declassification review is to make
available to the general public the maximum amount of data
consistent with an obligation to safeguard national security interests.
These interests include the protection of sensitive intelligence
sources and methods. Such intelligence is identified as that
classified intelligence, the unauthorized disclosure of which could
lead to counteraction (1) jeopardizing the continued productivity of
intelligence sources or methods that provide intelligence vital to
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the national security or (2) offsetting the value of intelligence vital
to the national security. At the risk of oversimplification, "sources"
can be identified as the origins of information and "methods" as the
ways by which intelligence data and/or intelligence sources are
developed. In many cases sources and methods are inseparable.
Classified materials or information which were received by
the United States from foreign governments or international bodies
with the express understanding that the information would be
protected cannot be declassified without the permission of the donor
government or organ a.tion. The suggested classification retention
period of such documents will be until the approval of the foreign
government or international organization is received.
If it is determined that a document must remain classified
but much of the information therein could be released provided
certain limited portions (those that identify sources and methods)
were excised, this fact should be noted. This will enable Agency
personnel assigned to the archivist to provide sanitized versions of
otherwise classified documents to researchers for publication or to
the public. However, care should be taken to ensure that the
sanitization of a document does not change its meaning.
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Detailed Guidance: Names or Identifiable Individuals:
1, Human intelligence sources may be divided into two main
categories: conventional and confidential.. A conventional source is
a) An individual or official with whom normal, unconcealed,
overt contact or liaison is maintained, and
b) Who provides all types of intelligence information with
the permission of his government, and
c) Under normal circumstances, his identity, relationship
and connection with intelligence is known.
A confidential source is one whose identity cannot be disclosed
.because
a) He revealed information which is protected or not authorized
for release by his country, or the organization to -which he is attached,
b) Revelation of his association with or the nature of his
association with US intelligence agencies must be protected because
his government requires it, or
c) The information he has provided could be used as grounds
for. criminal or civil charges against him, or
d) His known association with any representative of a US
intelligence service would be prejudicial to him,
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As a general rule, conventional sources do not require
continued protection, while documents containing information which
might reveal the identities of confidential sources must remain
classified to protect the fiduciary relationship between a source and
U. S. intelligence. Based upon the National Security Act of 1947 which
provides that the DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods; from unauthorized disclosure, classification
of these documents must be extended for the minimum period required
to preclude compromise of confidential sources. Nevertheless,
seventy-five years after the publication of the document and upon
request, such documents will be reviewed by the appropriate components
of the Agency concerned to determine if any adverse effects will occur
if the documents are then declassified. Unless the confidential source
is named in the document or a specific title or position is given, it is
believed that, after seventy-five years, a source will not be identified
by releasing documents wherein the source is described in general
terms, i. e. , a businessman with access to --, a Soviet naval officer,
etc. Before seventy-five years, the likelihood exists that sources
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described in such terms might be identified. However, the
information in the document containing the names of confidential
sources may be declassified based upon content provided the
identity of the sources can.be protected.
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Information on confidential sources cannot be prematurely
disclosed in cases where:
a) Disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause a
degree of harm to national security by adversely affecting the
motivation of current and future potential human intelligence sources
to provide intelligence information to United States intelligence.
b) Disclosure would place a person in immediate jeopardy.
2. Documents revealing the identities of liaison officers
from cooperating foreign intelligence or counterintelligence services
who are confidential sources cannot be declassified without the
permission of the foreign government concerned.
3. Documents which would reveal the identities of US private
citizens who furnished information or otherwise cooperated with US
intelligence with the understanding that their role be kept in confidence
may be declassified after seventy-five years or sooner with their
permission.
4. The identity of individuals, particularly US citizens,
mentioned in investigative, personnel, medical, or similar records,
the release of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of
privacy or a breach of confidence are protected from public disclosure
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by statute including the Freedom of Information Act. Such documents
will retain their classification based only on other content.
5. Documents exempted from declassification under Section
5B(4) will be declassified seventy-five years after the date of the
documents.
Detailed Guidance: Intelligence Methods
1. Sensitive intelligence methods which must be afforded
protection beyond the 30-year mandatory review period include
information concerning or revealing techniques of agent recruitment,
deception techniques, methods and equipment employed for covert
communications, technical surveillance devices and strategies,
microphotographic methods and equipment, and escape and evasion
techniques. Such documents can be declassified after seventy-five
years.
2. Documents containing information which would reveal the
true names of cover organizations which are still in existence require
continued protection. However, they will be reviewed after seventy-
five years, upon request, to determine if the cover organizations are
still in existence.
3. Methods related to logistical and other support activities--
as opposed to intelligence collection and covert action techniques--
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adapted to the particular operations and circumstances, do not in
themselves qualify as sensitive methods requiring continued
protection.
4. Information with respect to the internal organization
of US intelligence units, the chain of command, component functional
missions and personnel ceilings, and intercomponent working
relationships has lost much of its sensitivity with the passage of
time. Moreover, a considerable amount of this sort of information
has already appeared in open literature. Unless otherwise protected
by statute, such information can be declassified in accordance with
the provisions of EO 11652.
Detailed Guidance: Communications Intelligence and Cryptography
1. Communications intelligence cryptography and related
activities must be provided with protection from premature disclosure.
Included are any data concerning or revealing the processes,
techniques, technical material and equipment, particular operations
and overall scope of communications intelligence, and cryptographic
security. The date for declassification of such information, being
dependent upon the factor of obsolescence, is therefore impossible
to predetermine.
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2. Declassification of US Communications.
Unencrypted messages transmitted electrically will be declassified
under provisions of EO 11652, Declassification of encrypted messages
will be accomplished in accordance with the following policy:
a) Messages Encrypted Prior to February 1, 1946
Declassification of messages in this category has been and will
continue to be based solely on the informational content of the
messages.
b) Messages Encrypted During the Period February 1, 1946
through May 31, 1960
The requirement that messages in this category (so-called category
"B" messages) be paraphrased and the date-time group physically
removed prior to declassification is cancelled. Effective immediately,
declassification of such messages will be based solely on the
informational content of the messages,
c) Messages Encrypted Subsequent to May 31, 1960
Communications Centers have received instructions to perform
necessary cryptographic editing on these messages prior to release
from the Communications Center, Declassification of messages
in this category by holders outside Communications Centers is based
solely on the informational content of the messages. Further
cryptographic editing is not required.
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Detailed Guidance: Subject Matter Content
1. Intelligence documents and other record media, regardless
of the subject, which contain information which would reveal
intelligence sources or methods, the origin of which can be clearly
traced to other US Government Agencies should not be declassified
unilaterally by the holding Agency. Such information or material
can only be declassified after consultation with any other Department
having an interest in the subject matter.
2. US intelligence documents containing classified information
which would reveal intelligence sources and methods and which was
passed to US intelligence by foreign governments or international
organizations should not be declassified without the concurrence of
the foreign government or international organization concerned.
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