ADVISABILITY OF RESTRICTING US STATISTICS ON THE IMPORTATION OF STRATEGIC MATERIALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 1998
• Sequence Number: 62
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP75-00662R000100170062-8
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D I SABILITY O r~'i' CI0`f'I' G U ~ TATI T O]'] TNti IN.dORT1-TION
OF c 'r n T i 'T `._ IALS
.sere are several ways in which this -problem 1migh be formulated.
be might attempt to determine the possible benefits w'r icb a potential
enemy could derive from the import information in question as against
the cost to the United stales of restricting it. if we were to assume
that the value of the data to the tactical or strate :-i_c Planning of the
USSR was rather small, we might postulate that we should at least -make
it more difficult for the ,soviets to obtain the inlor-rmation. We might
then consider ;-.'he cost to ourselves of this restriction in relation
to the Sovie cost of ccirci,mvention. All of these considerations have
a bearing on the problem, bi?t it must be pointed out that they are
extremely unamnenable to precise determination. It is ,articu_larly
to comment on the uses which the IT i could make of spec i_fic
infor ma. io:n, or of the difference wl-,ich the ready avnJ_labilit-r or lack
o + the informa :ion, as T,he case ma.,,r be, would make in `soviet ag^ressive
capah _lities. In general, all economic intellig .nce .onceri~.in
.countrp,r is closely interrela- e:d, and the importance of a sin.;..: e fra f--ment
to the whole will var. y.
Accepting the above limitations, it is believed the focus of
this _;rob lem ought to be on whether the particular t-\ u_.c of info r ma-[-,ion
would provide -r ?^e USSR with
the, capacity to arrive :rtt intelli
en-e evalu-
apion.;; which. 'could not otherwise be obtained. Ti,). this rea ' the _following
ppoint' ss can be made:
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*40~ 1%W
(b)
import date,., as such, ca::.n be derived from numerous a.lteri a -ive
sources
import data, even for the strategic- commodi tic:,,, Pave a
relati~_velu.r low utility value ~.:"or most intelligence 1.)ur-..:oses
(c) the type of intelligence indications which 1.mnort data do
reveal about, `,A-,e T;nited States is, for the r~ost partreadily
available i ,:tore , seful form in other dome--ti-allyuk?lisreed
ester. ials.
he `irs, 1_~oint, ha;- of a 1-,ernative sources, need not concern ~. is
extensively, it should su...i ce to state that import statistics are
either directly available or can. be derived from the export accounts
of other countries, fr. om. the activities of foreign producing and export-
ink; firms, and to some extent from the movement of land and sea transport.
The Import statistics for most strategic raw materials have a limited
value for intelligence. Such, data Co riot in themselves reveal industrial
use patterns, probable stockpiling rates, or specific strateg-sic ?Mans.
This type of intelligence is more ren.d-J_1y obtained from domestic production
ficures, from t%i.e allocations o_f critical tmmaterials, wnc fromm~t. various
__ i, is
inc_listr-. al exooansion pro f rams . --?. r h 4, ,r1 or, .. stn ~ s ~i are
~.,nra..cac.ive of the general level of industrial ac;tivitbut inform nation
on the C P or on genera levels: of employment
provide use useful
Information on trade i~ most useful in intelli7en,_~ for the
application o -' trade jontrols. TToweve r, 1l_nder s resen',_ old 4Tar cor.:diti_ons,
US' in r. is ar ~ sources of s C ra imports are in areas no',,- subject to Russian influence.
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Lh_t le thy: forerVoinr. discussion ~~~:oule. seem to y l _te a a_ ns ~.
??~Le adoption of widescread restriction of it port ~ statistics, a case
can be made for sele,',i_ve restriction on. individual commodities when
the following conditions or f n 1_r7~ obtain:
(a) commodity is one enters direr tly almost solely
into t ,e production of a strategy ically% significant end. product, in
isuch a way as to indicate. the total output iVow t',-.a-L-. produc-t 4
(b) information on the ~~3 ^ of the end product has been,
or is about- to be, restrict-led
the bourc es from which the import is obtai-n-~ed are amenable
security control.
Pu eurc u--le of a. commodity which meets he above criteria is uraniTm.
"n nature.
,..ere r;~..~T;r 9eVer,-..,.l of-her import 1 tens of this
. word on the cos--u of restriction of import information s',-ould be
R
i_ncl,u-de.:. ? v cost, ?-ewe do no,"*, refer to tr. t?-.naible costs related to an
ert,ainly these are important.
uninformed citizenryT e refer, rather, to costs related no intelligence
ob` c-`-ti_ves. An overall -,program for restricting import statistics i.n
order ~- o be m.eanin -ful would involve t} e co-operative sup ~ressi..on of
trade datra. -cr tJ e ocher countries of the non-^o,1~~~ni_su -~orld. i-These
measures, in :,urn, .ould cut off sources of inforr~ati on on the exports
n . J f. - y n..1 n g ~,.? ._, _ 1. l ~. ;.d i.
facilitate the USS?t' s circumvention, of US trade control.
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