PITTSBURGH NAVAL RESERVE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100240002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 15, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 20, 1967
• Content Type: OUTLINE

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Pittsburgh Naval Reserve Intelligence Division
20 May 1967
I. Introduction
A. Preliminaries
B. Preview
1. Talk about 30 minutes; then questions
2. Coverage
a. Development of the basic concepts
b. Development of CIA
c. The policy problem
d. The accountability problem
II. Development of the Basic Concepts
A. The Pearl Harbor lesson -- central coordination
1. Usual oversimplification
a. Pearl Harbor an intelligence failure
b. CIA created to prevent a repeat
2. Pearl Harbor proved need for central coordination
a. Nature of military intelligence unity
b. Concept not new - - Donovan in July 1941
B. The World War II lesson -- total coverage
1. Limitations of pre-WWII intelligence
a. Military -- G-2 and ONI -- two voices
b. Political -- State -- a third voice
2. Not coordinated and not enough
a. The hindsight books
b. Examples -- Schweinfurt raids; Pacific area
C. Concepts embodied in present Intelligence Community
1.
2.
Central coordination -- one voice
Total (National) Intelligence coverage
III.
Development of CIA and Functions
A,
Military antecedents
1.
ONI -- 1882 under Bureau of Navigation
2.
CIP -- 1917 -- later became CIC
3.
MID -- 1918 -- later G-2 (ACSI. AFNIN)
B.
World War II and later
1. Office of Coordinator of Information -- July 1941
a. Donovan reported to President
b. Structure and progress
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2.
3.
4.
Office of Strategic Services -- June 1942
National Intelligence Authority -- January 1946
National Defense Act 26 July 1947
a. The three-hat position of the DCI
b. The missions of CIA -- policy is not one of them
IV.
Agency Relation to Policy
A.
The recent controversey -- Fulbright, et. al (89th Congress)
1.
Settlement -- The Dean Rusk statement, etc.
2.
Popularized the problem
B.
The non-policy concept
1:
2.
Intelligence only one factor in policy
The major policy-background instrument
a. The National Intelligence Estimate
b. Product of entire intelligence community
C.
The policy implication situation
1.
The estimate of a consequence -- Cuba, 1962
2.
Alternative courses of action
D.
The Agency as an instrument of policy
1. The act of 1947 -- "other activities as directed"
2. Covert action as directed
V. Accountability (The Invisible Government)
A.
Executive
1.
The President and the National Security Council
2.
The 303 Committee (Vance, Kohler, Rostow, DCI)
3.
The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
B.
Legislative
1.
The Senate subcommittees
a.
b.
Armed Services -- Russell of Georgia (5 members)
Appropriations -- Mahon of Texas (4 members)
2.
The House subcommittees
a. Armed Services -- Rivers of South Carolina (11 members)
b. Appropriations -- Hayden of Arizona (4 members)
C. Fiscal -- Burial of funds and DCI's spending authority
1. The Bureau of the Budget
2. Internal audit procedures
VI. Conclusion
A.
Evaluation of Intelligence
What happens is not valid standard
2.
Defense or justification dangerous
3.
Internal self-evaluation
B.
New concept
1. Weapons system -- a deterrent force
2. Ultimately a preventive -- Chinese War Lords
Sanitized - Approved For Release: CIA-RDP75-00001 R000100240002-9