INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITY AS RELATED TO BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING (Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000800040016-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2003
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 8, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
8 August 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Intelligence Capability as Related to Berlin Contingency Planning
1; In connection with current Berlin contingency planning, it has
become apparent that there will be an increasingly critical need for precise and
timely knowledge of Soviet military preparations and readiness. This knowledge
will become an especially important ingredient of U.S. and Allied planning and
decision-making the closer we move to a crisis situation, although it will also
be highly useful in the context of any negotiating situation over Berlin in which
we may find ourselves. The ability to discriminate between Soviet military
moves designed as pressure tactics and moves which represent geniune
preparation for hostilities will -- if attainable -- be of signal importance to U. S.
planning and decision.
2o In light of the above, the Office of International Security Affairs
has raised the following related questions:
a. To what extent can we count on the intelligence resources
available to us to provide precise and timely information on Soviet military
moves and readiness in a tightening Berlin crisis situation? For example, will
we be. able to determine the deployment and readiness status of Soviet missile
forces -- launching location, whether missiles are on pads, in depots, in
transit, etc. ? As another example, will we be able to determine whether
Soviet forces in the Central Europe area are preparing for employment of nuclear
as well as conventional weapons? (These are but two examples of numerous
factors on. which accurate and timely information will be required.)
b. To the extent that significant gaps in our capabilities to
satisfy information requirements appear likely to arise in answer to 2a. , above,
what steps can and should be taken between now and this autumn to improve the
situation? The answer should identify not only resources and actions applicable
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to the problem, but also areas in which major policy decisions may need to be
addressed -- for example, conditions under which close peripheral or overflight
reconnaissance may become necessary.
3. It is requested that the questions above, together with any related
considerations which appear perinent, be considered by USIB, with a view
toward recommending appropriate action and policy decision at an early date.
GRAVES B. ERSKINE
General, USMC (Ret.)
Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)
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172992
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21 Aug 61
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