STRATEGY CHANGE IN VIET NAM BELIEF GROWING THAT LARGE-SCALE U.S. EFFORT MAY SUCCEED SOON.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000100160057-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 57
• Publication Date: October 17, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

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.. As reliance on armed ?force increases,t ' Bombers attacking the north have kept
' less is heard about the winning. of the hearts! clear of the Hanoi area, where there would )
and minds of the population. be a chance of direct military. confronta- .,
Officials no longer are reluctant to talk tion with the Soviet Union. Russian-built 1
about American use of napalm, tear gas ? missiles, which are concentrated around, 1
and crop-destroying aerial sprays.. Six! the North Viet Namese capital, have shot?
months ago, if they were discussed at all it down five American planes in the last !,
was to emphasize how little they were being; four months. ,
used. 1 The American troop build-up has reached ,I
145,000 and is expected to reach 200,000 .,
i
' Despite efforts to avoid injuring civilians ;
1. . c'V'
, in the fight against the Viet Cong,. women ,, eventually. Some military leadens speak of ,
get ., antva I and children end old men are inevitablyila 1,000,000-man American force, but others t
among the victims of a war fought increas scoff at that figure. American troops in the t
C- r
' ingly with heavy bogribs and artillery. ? Korean war numbered about 250,000.
. .
A new defense of this strategy is being A measure of the build-up is the weekly'
That heard in Washington.
Belief Growing . Critics,are being as-
casualty figure. Fifty-eight Americans were .
i ? .
sured that surveys of civilian _populations ' killed in action in Viet Nam last week. '
1
Large-Scale U.S. Effort ?
! subjected to air attaelts? show that ? they Total American casualties rose to 806/
? I blame the war in general for their 'suffer- hostile deaths, 309 nonhostile deaths, 4259
May Succeed Soon_..I
'. 1 in rather than the particular nation that is wounded in action, 76 missing 'In action,';
By RICHARD DUDMAN
A Washington Correspondent of the
Post-Dispatch
WASHINGTON, Oct. 16
I doing the bombing. and 21 detained by the enemy." . Si
guing in support of the enlarged war in Viet
Strategists generallY avoid the term vic.',,,
1 ONE STUDENT of civilian behavior, ar- ,,,,
tory,.._ al though in : recent .wee ki that., is A
'
!Nam, contends that the nape of a single "clearly what some of themhave ".1,KE-a4A1.;"al
; Viet Namese woman by an American sol- had in mind.
I dier causes far more resentment against the THEY BASE their present op-4,'
^
'United States than does the destruction of
timism on the apparent ability "
Less is hearli, too, about a negotiated set. of the increased manpower and
0-lent. When the outlook was black, the fire-power to defeat the Viet
A.*--!strt:on was nagging potential go-
Cong any time the Reds stand
:
b- ::rns in Communist and neutralist goon- -
t ?--; to t-y to persuade North Viet Nam to
c t'.1 ????e c,:nference table.
toat the military situation appears
11-111, OUILIIN.Lb of a new bLi
egy in Viet Nam are emerging a
the influx of massive Americah
military strength begins to take
effect.
In its simplest terms, the new strategr
calls for the use of large amounts of Ameri.
can men and guns to win a military victory'
in the south. --
Some spectacular successes have changed
the official atmosphere from the pessimism
of six months ago, When the American et-
? fort faced imminent military defeat, to
? growing conviction that the back of the
surigency can be broken in the foreseeable
future, possibly within months.
Even the. failures have helped ?promot ,
the emerging strategy. The lesson man:'. planners, drew this week, when 2000
Viec
Cong slipped out of a trap sprung by coin-
. bined American and South Viet Names
forces, was: Secrecy is better kept whea
? the Americans go it alone..
? THE SUCCESSES have strengthened the
position of :the so-called war hawkshos
who never bad mueh use for "special Wai.
fare" and counterinsurgency techniqueswho wantqd:te bomb North Viet Nam o?
even China years ago, who have regretteil
Pres'et' ',Lyndon B. Johnson's effers, )
neietiata, ard- who bzlicve that peace tall:
. new wculd lead to ? a 'ne0,1ralist V:e:
'Nam inste*of the-lintl-COmmunist.baatioa
they see as a' pass:bility. ? - ? '?:: ?
The "felatively benign policy, of _counter.
Insurgency " 'Musf:be"put:asidelon the lien
being, in'thi words ,of a policy paper being
circulated at high levels j.it the, AdmipfstraA
Approved-Foe,Releas
an entire village. ?
still for a fight in regimental or
division strength. The war had I,
been going in the direetion of
br:ghter, offioials are emphasizing that big-unit engagements, and the
negotiation w:th?the Communists is not the
only likely solution.
Officials pointed out this week that the
problem could also be solved by an wean- 'The immediate task, therefore, ;
nounced slowing down of North Viet Nam:ese is to pound and kill arid harry
assistance and Viet Cong activity in the the Viet Cong's main force.untill
outh. its gives up or, more likely,i
s
The outcome thus need not follow the pat- breaks up into small guerrilla t
South Viet Namese army was in
serious trouble until tbolstered by
American combat troops.
tern of the Indochina war or the Algerian
revolution, with their formal peace talks
between the insurgents and the French. In-
bands to continue the fighting'
without affording a; good target.;
. Once the Viet Cong have been
stead, ..it could follow the examples of forced to return to guerrilla war-
Greece and the Philippines after World War fare, it is thought here, the in-%
II, when both nations succeSsfully resisted surgency will be close to defeat.:
Communist-led insurgencies.. The shift will mean breaking up
IN GREECE, the officials pointed out, elaborate supply lines for weep- I .
the Communists simply were worn down ons and supplies, going back to?I
and eventually retreated into Bulgaria. 'Theusing homemade or captured i
implication was that the Communist-led American arms, and, worst of I
forces in South Viet Nam might be worn ? all, admitting .to the Viet Congl
down eventually and caused to retreat into . rank-and-file that there will not:
l\torth Viet Nam. . be a quick victory after all. .i .
i
- President Johnson has b no means batit The strategy paper mentioned '
she 'entire ar ine e li117-1ot aFcepted earlier says that there are threes
the formula attributed to the new director possible outcomes from the;
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R000100160057-8
a stalemate, or victory. It says
fiat a stalemate would be the
; hardest to,achieve. The impli-
cation is that victory should be
the goal.
' One policy maker who holds
! that view makes the ;further
),point that victory is possible
; once the United States has
: forced the Viet Cong to return ?
' to guerrilla warfare.
; HE REASONS that guerrilla
I wars invariably are won or lost,
that they never end in a draw.
A cease-fire would mean that
the Viet Com; would promptly
; lese all the gray areas, the'terri.
l: tory where it can operate but
! cannot make &permanent stand.
The reason, he says, is that the
I Viet Namesa army would use a
1 cease-fire to clean out any guer-
I. willas remaining in such areas.
t.? Those who see the new strat-
egy in these terms contend that
progress cannot be measured
: merely in enemy casualties.
' They call an operation a suc-
cess even if it results in few i
Viet Cong bodies, because the
; objective is not so much to kill i
the enemy as to harass him and.
prove
prove to him that his war
, unprofitable. i
i: They insist also that the bomb.;
I ing of North Viet Nam is hurting?
1 ' the Hanoi regime seriou.sly and i
?.must be continued with no letup',I,'
'. This analysis rests on sonic
t, broad assumptions, which maj
i or may not stand up.
i,
1,, .. IT ASSUMES that the ?Vi
...:.,,,...r: ??? ? ' ......*4:...i':?'.i,..--i.
..,
Cong lack the resiliency to e4.
turn to guerrilla warfare and ;o!
on effectively with the kind of',
fighting that took the British 10
years to suppress in Malaya
It assumes also that American,
power?planes crisscrossing t le;
country and bombs poundi ig;
guerrilla hiding places ? can;
make a country almost as Fig,
as Missouri an impossible place
to operate. .
On the political side, it
slimes that the gevenunent of ;
Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky, the ch et
of the Viet Namese air for e,
represents a new breed of let-d-
ers, able at last to inspire tie
people with a revolutionary spi it
that will unify them in the figat. .
Finally, this analysis ;assumes':
that favorable results will cone:
wry soon. President Johnspn
would find it embarrassing to vq.
to Ithe country seeking re-elsc-t
tion 1968 with a stalemateV
war still on his hands, and ttei
ever-larger conflict could well stV ?
'an issue in the congrovklosal..
eleqon! !text year.
"
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : cl?RD075-00001R00010016047-8 .