BOTTLENECK IN U.S. INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040142-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1998
• Sequence Number: 142
• Publication Date: August 15, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

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Front Ed;+ t
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PHILAD-vL;';[IA, PA.
13ULLETIN'
E. 718,167
S. 702,577
AUG 15 195
pproved For Release ~Gqk-
I
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
CPYROHT Between the Lines
Uottleneci ' in U. S. Intelligence
Com.m.unisrn's Takeover in. Cuba an Example of Failure
Washin -ton-? The gathering
o intelligence is as objective By
a. task for professionals as is EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT
newspaper reporting. The in
telligence man cannot be par
0
of a policy-
s e tting or-
g a n ization
with o u t be-
' ing influenc-
ed in what
h e' reports,
any m o r e
t h a n a re-
pa pe rad-
v e r t i.sing Miss Roosevelt
man at the same time.
Unfortunately, the intelli-
gence man does not have the
independence of the report-
er. Policymakers in the State
Department have the last say
over his information, They can
pass it along or spike it. The
State Department, of course,
is divided into geographical
desks. Each has authority
.over everything concerning
its area. The Central Intelli-
gence Agency is subordinate
to this mechanism.
The tremendous danger is
that it is not the trival, ordi-
nary "government informa-
tion" that is being held hack
from the key committees of
the Congress and top policy-
makers in the Executive
Branch, including the Presi-
dent himself. The informa-
jtion that is blocked almost in-
variably concerns something
,of "extraordinary impor-
tance," which if objectively
recognized would require
a fundamental change in the
course of foreign and military
policy. Here is the gap.
Human attitudes create-a sit-
uation which facilitates the
conspiratorial element.
Sanitized
nut-ace Aspect
Take, for example, the head
of a geographical desk in the,
State Deparlmer.t who has
spent the last few years devel-
oping a policy. on some Afri-
can, South American or Mid-
dle Eastern country. ' How
does he- react when an item
of intelligence comes across
his desk which refutes every-
thing that he has been saying
and doing over the years?
Such an item would require,
f recognized and properly`
valuated, that a new npprorch,
he made. Such ;m ahmit-face-%
might reflect badly on the of-1
ficial's judgment. Under such a
circumstances, it is not stir-;l
prising that data which con-?i
lids jvith "policy" becomes
ost or huried in State Depart
ent files, somehow failing to
each the men at the top.
Actually, this could haves
een the case with Cuba and,
astro: It has to be this, or~
,.Ise the ,only alternatives are
t.upidity or subversion. In
CPYRGHT
Reports on Cuba ;
For the first time, this draft,'
tion that in late 1957 and'
I 'early 1958 the Communist
iCactio rmself and his 7 inei e 26th of July Movement.
pal lieutenants. The coinntil- ~.jC l ing August, 1'58, reports!
tee was unahhd to dnct'n-ent f tom within the Cuban Com
single iitst.ance in which Mr , unist Party, the I & R re-'
eland passed any. of \thi p rt revealed that the pally
m Lerial up to his superior. 'a d the rebels had reached a
or mentioned it as credihl ;
reem
nt
uarantee
ret
s c
g
ag
e
>in any retort or ? polic i g Communist labor leaders`
'p er." positions in any post-revolu-.,
ince well-rounded, factual ti nary labor organization.;
in ormation is the basis for The I & R report admitted:
wife and effective foreign pol-
pa alysis of policy.
C .ts Top Post
la d'' rec nt appnintme;~r as
tto eonsula:' nfficcr in At,sira--
lia I 1 also ' explains the
cis where in the world.
careful reading of the fall
te. t of the many reports on
Cu a' prepared by the State
11 these instances, the results`; tell rgence and Research (I&R)
h
re t
e same,
K'aribbcan Desk
ret ale the extraordinary con-
sis ncy with which intelli-
Here also lies .the true sig-l'
ilicance, for example, of the:'
,enate Tntrrn;.ySecurity sub-.
.ommittee.'s?-findings concern-i'
ng William A. Wieland, head:
f the State Department's Of-f
ice of Caribbean Affairs when,
astro grabbed power in;
uba. The senators said:
"To Mr. WieIand's desk";
ame, over a period of years,
,eat, quantities of solid inx
eeligence respecting the Cond..
unist.nature and connection:
f; : th'e Castrg; _movernep.k,, 't7
ge cc was ignored, block-
m e than one official would
hate to be involved in this
pr cess.
um[iiting the Communist con-
th FBI, LIHL
entral Intelli
ei ce,Agency and our a as-
s m 'tin rnerican coun-
tri i s, This -is proved by the
co eats of a draft report pre-,
pa d by I &, R Itself in, Aug-
proved For Release' : YA- 7P7'6--6 645R
also that the rebels and the
C nimunists had agreed toy
p ace Reds in key positions ,
ti roughout the government,
ti rough the. assistance of;
d others among Fidel Ca,,;-;
's principal advisers
)hvinlisiy, : this , true, ha rd{
IrlliFence conflicted with
lice so it was only sent upy
the top after the damage
is done and Castro was in
wer.
-Bo'nib Decision
his bottleneck in intellii-1
nee is no new situation at'
s State Department
At the
..
se of World War 11, the
partment failed to forward
the White House the infor-
tion that the tremendous
panese Army in Kwantung
ovince, Manchuria, was no
The belief that this great
cc was close to Japan,
dy to strike at. our invad-.11
forces, led President Tru- ? _
n to decide upon dropping'
atom bomb and made.our
w ole post-war policy at, the
ell unrealistic in relation to I
th actual strength of Japan.
tic
tic
to
in
rill
St
ed in the Viet Nam cit,r.--
n, too, and it will continue'
nt is independent of the
to Department. Then polit-
V p' 'nf Vita1 utformnfornia.
'
n from - reaching the to?. J