BOTTLENECK IN U.S. INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000600040141-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 1998
• Sequence Number: 141
• Publication Date: August 15, 1965
• Content Type: NSPR

Sanotoze - pproved For Releas b &
Front Eel t Outer
I Pago Page
PHILADI1,1,1IA, PA.
BULLETIN
E. 718,167 CPYRGHT
S. 702,577
AUG151965
rC PYRG HT
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
Between the Lines
Bottlenec in U. S. Intelligence
Communism's Takeover in. Cuba an Example of Failure
01 i ence is as objecti
a task' for professionals as
telligence man cannot be pa
of a policy. ~
s e tting or.
with o u t be-
ing influenc-
ed in what
h e reports,
any m o r e
than a re-
?"1 porter c a n
be a news
aper ad-
v e r t i sing Miss Roosevel
an at the same time.
Unfortunately, the intelli-
ence man does not have the
ndepehdence of the report-
r. Policymalcers in the State
epartmcnt have the last say
ver his information. They can
ass it alpng or spike it. The
tate Department, of course,
divided ,into geographical
esks. Each has authority
ver everything concerning
s area. The Central ntelli-
ence Ag(21 is subordinate
_thi5J11 hanism._
The tremendous danger is
t at it is not the trival, ordi-
n ry "government informa-
ton" that is being held hack
;f om the key committees of
le Congress and top policy-
; akers in the Executive
anch, including the Presi-
~d nt himself. The informa-
it in that is blocked almost in-
!v riably concerns something
o "extraordinary impor.
t ce," which if objectively
IN ognized would require
~a fundamental change in the
Q curse of foreign and military
ip licy, Here is the gap.
iH man attitudes create_a sit-,
c apiratorial element:.
By
EDITH KERMIT ROOSEVELT
About-Face Aspect
Take, for example, the head
of a geographical desk in thu
,pent the last tew years Bevel,
oping a policy on some Af
i
r
-
can, South American or Mid. It
does lie react when an item,
of intelligence comes across
his desk which refutes every.
and doing over the years?n
Such an item would require
,
if recognized "and ,prnpcrly
evaluated, that a new nppro;!ch
he made. Stich an about-face;
might reflect badly on thr nf-,
ficial's judgment. Under such
circumstances, it is not sur-
risi
h
p
ng t
at data which con- i
flirts }vit:h "policy" becomes
lost or harried in State Depart-~
mot. files, somehow failing tot
h th
eac
e men at the top.
Actually, this could have
been the case with Cuba and,;
Ise the,only alternatives are f
upidity or subversion. In it
II th
i
ese
nstances thl
,e resuts'i
re the same.
aribbean Desk '
Here also lies the true sig-''? si
ficanre, for example, of the
enale Token security sub-
ommiitee's.'7indings concern P;
f the State Department's Of-rya
ce of Caribbean Affairs when P'll
astrn ...._LL_ (ton
una. the senators said: sat'
M
"T
W
'
~''~
r
o
ieland
dsk
r
ma
.se me, over a. period of years
,
teat quantities of solid 1. 0r
Hpprovea i-or Kele
CPYRGHT
Reports on Cuba
1=or the first time, this draft .
report contained the in orma -'
Lion that in late 1957 and.,
earl
058h
i
y
, e Communist ;
J Party of Cuba had captured
icy, we have here the perfect. hang August, 1358, reports pp
formula for diversion and, tom within the Cuban Com-?
baralvsis of
olic
_
p
y
eL;s To ort revealed that the party;
p Post nd the rebels had reached al
The protection which foreign ecret agreement guarantee-j
ervice officers who operate ng Communist labor leaders
nthin this framework give to ositions in anq post-revolu
or another explains Wie- ionary labor organization.
11P md's recent app lirs ni as The I & R report admitted ]
f^wi,ted tote; of Ott,. lace Reds in key positionS'j
;('P1;, 1, State Department ir'nughout -the government
em'it' chief. who exposed trough the assistance of
is system which has led to I aul Castro. "Che Guevara,
A careful reading of the full
xt of the many reports on
ha prepared by the State
partrhent's Bureau of In-
igence and Research (I&R)
eal,- the extraordinary con.
or Suppressed. Obviously
his bottleneck in 3ntplli
,
re than one official would g nee is no new situation, atl
cess. c se of World War 11, the
& R received a continous 1 partment failed to forward
w of factual material doe- t the White House the infor- 1
eons of c astro and his a anese Army in Kwantung~
Imunist supporters from P vince, Manchuria, was no
FBI, the Central Intelli- i to ger in existence.
ceAgency and our embas- he belief that this great,
in Latin'9tmerican coup- fo ce was close to Japan
,
s. This .is proved by the re dy to strike at our invad-.1
tents of a draft report pre- 'I in forces, led President Tru. it
of~19G0 th atom bomb and made-our
en unrealistic in refat on to
-s miable to doctin 'it th actual strength of Japan.
in ranee in which Mr.~ is failure to transmit. in-
d passed any of this, tel genre data is being prat-
l up to his superiors; tic d in the Viet Nam stns-
ntioned it as credible .. do , too, and it will continueccur until the gatherer of'
Inr rmation for the govern. ,1
well-roundg~ me t is i e t f the
iG~hplabiaafi4 QQ` e ift'l~f ilit-
~- L -t--.. ,ICaI pxftediency or 'ideology
swil not prevent vital iriforma- ii
tin frnm
n
a
e
e
i tclli,;ence conflicted with
licy so it was only, sent upf
the top after the damage, .
as done and Castro was in;
wer. a
A-Bomb Decision