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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400520020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 5, 1968
• Content Type: OPEN

Sanitized -Approved FOr Release ; CIA-RDP75-0014 R0 040: ' 0 0-2
506 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks February 5, 1968
sales have been running at about $98 million During the Dominican Republic civil war
annually, although congressional action will in 1985, School of the Americas graduates
reduce this year's total. turned up in leadership spots on both sides.
As the program's backers point out, mili- When the Argentine army took over the gov-
tary aid is only 7 per cent of all U.S. aid to ernment in 1966, the colonel acting as spokes-
Latin America. It also accounts for only 7 man for the coup leaders greeted American
per cent of Latin America's total annual ex- correspondents by remarking how much he
penditures for defense purposes. had enjoyed his "year in Panama."
acquiring arms and equipment. This is sub-
ject The image Of glamor-and lightning rod
gs ttssn The e ceiling statutory recently ceiling In foreign-aid
was seign cut - by of controversy-in the military assistance
Congress from $85 ce million to o $75 maillion, aid program is another organization at Fort Gu-
Transfers of military hardware come lick. A neat row of barracks is headquarters
it sales and nd grants. for the 8th Special Forces-Special Action
The through grant cash prograandm credit
covers is red transport vehicles Force for Latin America, a unit of 800 Green
v,
helicopters, spare parts and communications Beret specialists in the art of guerrilla
equipment, but no tanks, fighter planes, ar- warfare.
tillery or combat vessels. The unit consists of 17 training teams that
The remaining aid funds are used for travel through Latin America at the request
training and miscellaneous functions. A small of Latin governments, supplementing the
portion (about $4 million a year) provides work of resident U.S. missions by offering
support for Civic Action-the highly pub- special instruction in counterinsurgency.
licized program of military participation in Since the unit was established in 1962, the
such national development projects as build- Green Berets have operated in all 17 coun-
ing roads and rural schools. tries where the U.S. has advisory groups.
EMPHASIS ON SECURITY It was one of these teams-its 16 members
making it the largest force ever sent into the
The overwhelming emphasis in equipment field in Latin America-that trained the
grants and training is on internal security. Bolivian troops who bagged the master guer-
Less than a decade ago the Defense Depart- rilla, Ernesto Che Guevara. In Venezuela,
meat.insisted that the greatest danger came Colombia and Guatemala, Green Beret ad-
from "submarine action in the Caribbean visers are given much of the credit for help-
Sea and along. the coast of Latin America." ing local military forces crush guerrilla
Since 1961, however, U.S. strategic thinking movements.
about Latin America has focused on guer- Despite the successes attributed to the
rills warfare. Special Forces, many U.S. diplomats view
The nerve center of U.S. military activity their presence in Latin America as a mixed
in Latin America is Gen. Porter's Southern blessing. They believe that the increasing
Command, headquartered in the Panama Ca- publicity they get draws too much attention
nal Zone, to U.S. relations with the Latin military and
Its functions include supervising the 43 hardens the image of the U.S. as a partner
military advisory groups scattered through of repressive forces.
17 Latin countries (all but Mexico and Haiti). COMPARED TO VIETNAM
These missions, separate from the military
attaches on each embassy staff. have a total Anti-American propaganda increasingly
100 in Brazil, and they train soldiers in-every- behind-the-scenes domination of Latin
thing from driver education to riot control. America. Even in the U.S., there are people
They are extremely well-heeled in compari- who recall that the Vietnam war started out
son with their sister civilian agencies. In with Special Forces troops in an advisory
Brazil the military mission's representation role, and who are uneasy about their prom-
allowance for entertaining is $17,900 a year. inence on the Latin scene.
The Agency for International Development During the Bolivian guerrilla campaign
people in Brazil, who administer the largest last summer, the air was filled with vague
single U.S. aid program in Latin America, reports of "thousands of Green Berets" flood-
have a total representation allowance of ing into the Andes. Actually, in the past
$7000. The U.S. Ambassador's similar allow- year the number of U.S. troops in Bolivia
ante is about $6000. has never exceeded 150, and these men never
The Southern Command also oversees a got anywhere near the fighting. Their activ-
:more advanced training program. Each year sties were carefully confined to training and
it enrolls more than 2000 Latin officers in U.S. helping the Bolivians unsnarl their supply,
:military courses at levels going all the way communications and intelligence problems.
up to the Command and General Staff School Similar roles hold in all the other Latin
at Fort Leavenworth and the Inter-American countries where the Special Forces operate.
Defense College in Washington. Because U.S. officials suspect the guerrillas
The focal point. of this program is the want to force the U.S. into combat by kill-
School of the Americas at Fort Gulick in ing some American advisers, U.S. troops are
the Canal Zone. (The school's location appar- forbidden to accompany Latin army units on
ently contradicts the 1903 treaty with Pana- patrol in countries with insurgency prob-
ma, which says U.S. troops should be sta- lems.
tioned in the Zone solely to defend the In Guatemala city recently, Communist
Canal.) guerrillas did kill two U.S. officers in an evi-
FORTY-WEEK COURSES dent attempt to stir up political trouble.
Although the school's stress is on counter The U.S. scrupulously avoided any direct re-
insurgency, its curriculum includes 23 differ- sponse to the provocation,
ent courses, some running for 40 weeks. All IS SUPPRESSION ENCOURAGED?
are taught in Spanish or Portuguese by U.S. Critics on both sides of the U.S. border
military instructors. The faculty is heavily argue that military assistance cannot avoid
weighted with Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Amer- the danger of encouraging Latin armed
scans and Cuban exiles. forces to suppress all dissent in the name of
More than 20,000 Latin military men have internal security.
studied at the school, and a graduate nos- Nor are they reassured by the official
molly commands respect among his fellow Washington doctrine that everyone is on the
officers back home. The school counts sa same team and working toward the same
many important Latin officers as alumni goals. They point out that many military
(including the current Defense Ministers of advisers view the U.S, role In Latin America
Colombia and_ Bolivia) that it is known in the simple terms expressed by one high-
throughout Latin America as the "escuela de ranking officer: "Our job down here is to
golpes" or coup school see that the Commies don't take over."
From there, it is but a short step to the
idea, long dominant in right-wing Latin cir-
cles, that Latin America is not yet ready
for democracy and needs guiding by a strong
hand like the armed forces.
Anyone who has much contact with U.S.
military personnel-In Latin America becomes
accustomed to remarks about how "Wash-
ington is awfully naive if it thinks it can
make the Latins over in our image."
YOUNG OFFICERS
But the assistance program also includes a
fair sprinkling of younger officers who recog-
nize that the day is passed when the U.S.
could maintain Latin America as a sphere of
influence through its friendship with re-
gional military chieftains.
Unlike those liberals who regard Latin
military as an institution to be destroyed,
these officers think the armed forces can
make a real contribution to the region's
future progress.
They support Civic Action and other plans
to rechannel the military's power from poli-
tics to national development. By greatly ex-
panding and accelerating this side of the
assistance program, they think, the Latin
armed forces gradually can be brought to
accept the idea of civilian dominance.
GENERATION GAP
"There's no denying that the top layer of
the Latin officer corps is set in its ways;" says
an officer with long Civic Action experience.
"But that's less an institutional problem
than the result of the generation gap.
"What must be done is to become much
more selective in deciding who we're going
to make an effort with-who we pick for the
openings in our schools. We've got to con-
centrate on the younger, idealistic men who
haven't had their thinking cast in concrete.
And if we do, we could revolutionize the
Latin military in a single generation."
There are signs that this sort of thinking
may eventually bring about big changes in -
the military assistance program. The pro-
gram's supporters talk less about the dan-
gers of communism now and more about the
democratizing influence of U.S. advisers on
their Latin counterparts.
But emphasis on internal security contin-
ues to be a very real and conspicuous first
principle of U.S. Latin American policy. As
long as it does, Washington's close ties with
the Latin military will continue to strike
most Latins as looking suspiciously like the
tail that wags the dog of U.S. devotion to
the Alliance for Progress.
Marketing Committee Serves Public
Interest
HON. JOHN D. DINGELL
OF MICHIGAN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, February 5, 1968
Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, last year
Secretary of Commerce Alexander B.
Trowbridge established a National Mar-
keting Advisory Committee. _One objec-
tive was to help bring to bear upon the
Nation's social and economic problems
the best thinking and the full resources
of this important private sector of na-
tional life. The first meeting of the Com-
mittee was held in Washington last
month, and it is already apparent that
we stand at the threshold of a new and
productive era in Government-business-
academic relations. This type of partner-
ship approach is constantly stressed by
President Johnson.
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 Sanitized = AISprowjd For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400520020-2
February 5, 1968 ? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-Extensions of Remarks
But while the armed forces are increas-
ingly willing to take part in the moderniza-
tion process, they see their role primarily in
physical development-the building of roads
and dams. In the more basic area of social
reform, the military seems haunted by the
fear that any radical change will lead to com-
munism, as it did in Cuba.
In fact, many observers think the militar-
ism that parallels the Alliance for Progress
is largely a reaction to Fidel Castro. Latin
military leaders recall how Castro lined
Cuba's senior officers up against the execu-
tioner's wall. They recall also that Castro
began as a moderate reformer and as a result
they view all reform movements as a poten-
tial threat to their lives and Institutions.
During the early 1960s, the military in
most Latin countries forced hesitant or re-
luctant civilian governments to make the
diplomatic break with Cuba. In all nine
countries where a civilian government was
recently ousted by coup, the armed forces
gave the need to save the countries from
communism as one of their main justifica-
tions.
The military does not seem in any hurry
to relax this attitude. In only five countries-
Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Pan-
ama--do armed forces have a tradition of
submitting to civilian authority. Colombia,
which a decade ago suffered under an op-
pressive military regime, also has shown signs
of moving in the direction of constitutional-
ism.
Eight countries are ruled by outright mili-
tary dictatorships. These range from such
tiny political backwaters as Paraguay, Nic-
aragua, El Salvador, Honduras and Haiti to
the two largest countries of South America,
Brazil and Argentina.
In the smaller countries, where there is
little or no democratic tradition, the mili-
tary rules pretty much in the "banana re-
public" style of past generations.
In Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser
extent in Bolovia, the armed forces have de-
cided that civilian leadership is corrupt and
Incompetent and that the military is the only
institution capable of prodding the country
toward industrial modernity. The result has
been a combination of capitalism and social
conservationism reminiscent of pre-World
War II Germany, Japan and Italy.
As Prof. Lieuwen points out, these armed
forces are "attempting revolutions from
above" with the emphasis on economic
change.
. In Argentina and Brazil, they favor the
business and landholding interests and put
the burden of sacrifice on such low-income
groups as trade unions and small farmers.
The justification is that if the economic re-
forms are successful, the entire country ulti-
mately will benefit.
While it will be a long time before the
final returns are in, all three countries have
shown some tentative success in combating
deep-seated economic maladies.
Although these experiments, particularly
in Brazil and Bolivia, have enjoyed the en-
thusiastic backing of Washington, the mili-
tary leaders of all three countries have made
only token efforts to implement the social
reforms envisioned by the Alliance for Prog-
reis. They have been increasingly dictatorial,
with political activity and dissent either sup-
pressed outright, as in Argentina, or kept.
under tight control; as in Brazil and Bolivia.
Finally, there are five countries-Peru,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Guatemala and the
Dominican Republic-where a civilian sits in
the president's chair but where the military
IS the power to pull it out from under him.
Here, the collisions between military atti-
tudes and Alliance ideals are not as obvious,
but they exist.
TFrg, MODEL OF PERU
At first glance, there seems to be much to
emulate.
The Peruvian army is a lean, tough force
that fought and won the last war on the
South American continent (a 1942 dustup
in which Peru decisively whipped Ecuador).
More recently, the Peruvian armed forces
have faced a challenge from Castroite guer-
rillas and wiped it out with a speed and
precision unmatched by any of the other
countries with an insurgent problem.
At the same time, the armed forces here
have participated in an extensive and so-
phisticated nation-building, program. Until
recently, the army was the only active road-
building agency in Peru. Its vocational train-
ing schools offer many young Peruvians their
only chance to learn such trades as brick-
laying or shoemaking. It runs literacy cam-
paigns for the peasants.
In the jungles of Peru's Amazon Interior,
a squadron of gunboats (facetiously called
"the Atlantic fleet") cruises the river tribu-
taries bringing medical and dental care to
remote outposts. The air force operates an
airlift whose pontoon planes swoop down on
the rivers to transport the sick.
The Peruvian military takes justifiable
pride in these services. The result of this
pride, however, is to bolster the military's
image of itself as a sort of supreme court
with the duty to act as arbiter between civil-
ian politicians and, if necessary, to cast them
aside and take over.
Twice within the last 20 years (from 1948
to 1956 and from 1962 to 1963), it has done
so. The memory of those times causes every
politician in Peru from President Fernando
Belaunde Terry on down to regard the good
will of the generals as their first rule of
survival.
Thus, when the air force decided recently
that it wanted to acquire a squadron of
French supersonic Mirage jets, neither the
vehement objections of the United States
nor the shaky state of Peru's finances were
able to prevent it from having its way.
Not a single voice was raised publicly to
question the wisdom of the move or point
out the problems, It would create for Be-
launde's efforts to bolster the sagging econ-
omy, even though the jet purchase probably
will cost Peru a badly needed U.S. loan.
Instead, Belaunde, who is regarded as
one of the region's most articulate advocates
of reform, led the bipartisan chorus ap-
plauding the purchase of the jets. The planes
were needed, he explained with a straight
face, to help further the armed forces' de-
velopment work.
No one familiar with Latin American af-
fairs is under any illusions about what hap-
pened in Peru. There are those who argue
that this is the price that must be paid to
protect Latin America from Castroism and
give the Alliance for Progress time to work.
But others wonder how much protection of
this sort the Alliance can stand.
LATINS BLAME THE UNITED STATES FOR MILI-
TARY COUPS-AID Is SUSPECT
(Second In a series)
(By John M. Goshko)
LIMA.-Brig. Gen. Vernon D. Walters is
an affable, urbane man whose many tal-
ents include a remarkable facility with lan-
guages. At one time, he was well-known in
Washington as President Eisenhower's fav-
orite interpreter.
More recently, "Dick" Walters has had a
reputation of a different sort. In Brazil,
where he served as U.S. military attache,
political circles still whisper about how he
allegedly prodded his old World War II com-
rade, the late Marshal Humberto Castello
Branco, into leading the 1964 coup that
brought Brazil under military rule.
A typical example is offered by Peru, whose Half a continent away, in the Bolivian
armed forces are frequently cited by U.S. capital of La Paz, similar stories are told
E 505
Force Col. Ed Fox. A flying instructor and
drinking companion of Gen. Rene Barrien-
toe Ortuno, he was regarded as one of the
Air Force leader's intimates in the days be-
fore the coup that catapulted him into the
Bolivian presidency.
The victim of that coup, exiled former
President Victor Paz Estenssoro, still in-
sists that Fox was behind his ouster. Among
Bolivians with an awareness of politics, it
is hard to find anyone who disagrees.
These stories are now part of Latin polit-
ical folklore. Spokesmen for the U.S. Em-
bassies in La Paz and Rio de Janeiro have
grown hoarse in their denials.
Washington, while conceding that it was
not unhappy to be rid of Brazil's leftist Pres-
ident Joao Goulart, insists that it gave no
comfort to the forces that toppled him. Lin-
coln Gordon, U.S. Ambassador in Rio at the
time, later told the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee: "Neither I nor other officials of
the U.S. Government nor the Government in
any way, shape or manner was involved ... 11
Still, U.S. officials admit that Walters did
drop around to have breakfast with Castello
Branco the morning after the coup and urged
him to assume the presidency. During the
ensuing three years, Walters, with his links
to the Brazilian military leadership, was
known to be one of the most Important be-
hind-the-scenes figures in the Embassy.
BOLIVIAN SITUATION
Denials of U.S. involvement in the Bolivian
coup follow the same pattern-with the ad-
ditional point that U.S. policy in 1964 aimed
at keeping Paz Estenssoro in office. Yet there
are former members of the U.S. mission in
Bolivia, who, in private, hint at "contra-
dictions" among the Embassy personnel at
the time of the coup.
Both Walters and Fox are gone from the
Latin scene. Argument about what they did
or didn't do would now be academic-except
for one thing. To most Latin Americans, the
stories of their alleged extracurricular ac-
tivities have the ring of truth..
So do the rumor-clouded reports of other
U.S. military activities in such places as the
Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Hon-
duras. More than six years of U.S. investment
in the Alliance for Progress have been un-
able to rid Latins of their conviction that
U.S. policy is made In the Pentagon.
For they are aware of the close collabora-
tion between the U.S. and the powerful Latin
armed forces, including those in most of the
eight countries that live under military dic-
tatonships. Why is there such collaboration?
SEE FEAR OF CASTRO
Latins believe the answer is fear of Fidel
Castro. They feel U.S. policy is aimed less at
furthering the Alliance than at keeping the
Latin military establishment pro-U.S. anti-
Communist.
U.S. officials insist that military and civil-
ian goals are really two chips from the same
block. A recent State Department pronounce-
ment puts it this way:
"Basically we support the Alliance for
Progress. But you can't separate the military
from the far-larger area of economic and
social change and improvement. The econ-
omy of a nation and the welfare of the
people cannot progress in a climate of civil
disturbance."
Gen. Robert W. Porter, head of the U.S.
Southern Command, praises the Latin armed
forces as an instrument for "change through
evolutionary rather than revolutionary
means."
In a recent Washington speech, Porter said
Latin America threatens to become another
Vietnam unless the U.S. helps armed forces
there provide a shield against insurgency.
while the governments build a stable society.
This is the rationale on which officials base
the equipment sales and training programs
that make the U.S. the chief outside influ-
ence on the Latin armed forces. Grants and
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