MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. DULLES FROM L. K. WHITE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R000800020041-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: September 18, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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Pursuant to your request at the Deputies'
Meeting this morning, I have prepared the attached
proposed reply to Mr. Stans` letter of 9 September
1959.
On file OMB release
instructions apply.
Ap,
18 Sep 59
roW Fffi&lease 2003/05/23 : CIA-RDP80BQ 676R00080002
FORM IQI REPLACES C MAY FORM 10-101
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Executive Regis"
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SIGNED
Alka V. LEW"
Director
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CONCUR:
L. K. White
:Deputy Director
(Support)
18 Sep 59
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Dear M - Bitllee:
I have just finished reading a trip report recently
completed by my staff and am passing it along for your perusal
and possible use. The report, which concentrates on your cold
war activities, was most interesting to me, as I am sure it
will be to you.
The report alludes to several areas which could have
considerable budget impact in the future. In addition, I would
like to raise the question of the feasibility of merging Radio
Free Europe and Radio Liberty facilities. I hope you will give
this idea, as well as those mentioned in the body of the report,
your personal attention as we approach the time for a settlement
of your Agency's 1961 budget levels.
sincerely yours,
Honorable Allen Dulles
Director of Central
Intelligence
Washington 25, D- C.
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Report on 1959 European Field Trip Study of CIA
Cold War Activities and Related USIA Programs
This report is the result of a field trip made by staff members
of the Bureau of the Budget to USIA and CIA installations in
In all cases field represent-
atives were fully cooperative in extending assistance and support to
the Bureau of the Budget survey.
The primary purpose of the trig was to gain a detailed knowledge
of .political and psychological programs conducted by the two agencies
in their foreign operational environment. Of particular concern to
the Bureau were the method and extent to which the overt information
e political action programs of CIA, moreover, were studied on a
y~roject-by-project basis, and considerable attention was devoted to
management relationships between field and headquarters within the
Agency. Because of the limited time available, no effort was made
to review the conventional intelligence collection activities of CIA.
Roughly f CIA's dollar resources are expended directly
for cold war (PP) activities. As will become evident, the term is
extremely broad in its a_,plication and permits a great diversity of
covert U. S. governmental activity throughout the world. These activi-
ties are normally planned and conducted on an annual project basis,
subject to periodic renewal after appropriate foreign .policy coordination
with the Department of State. This phase of Agency effort has become
increasingly significant in recent years. Because the Agency budget
document contains very little substantive information on PP programs,
the only practical. way of comprehending them and relating them to
other U. S. Government programs is through a project-by-project review.
Such was the .procedure followed in conducting this study.
Conclusicns
2. The planning and programming cycle within CIA is so lengthy
and complex that it tends on the one hand to delay the timely initiation
of hard-hitting projects and on the other to inhibit the modification
or cancellation of marginal projects.
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3. CID station chiefs lack the discretionary authority and
flexibility needed to keep PP operations closely attuned to the
constantly changing international and national situations.
-I. Project reporting requirements within CIA are excessively
burdensome and result in a huge flow of paper which, in fact, may
actually reduce effectiveness.
5. Over the years CIA has developed a vast network of
0
of whose activities appear to be of marginal value to U. S. foreign
policy interests.
Discussion
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CIA programming procedure
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This type of long-rare programming, with senior officials
involving themselves in operational details of individual projects,
is obviously cumbersome and not geared to react quickly to current
political and economic conditions. In one instance we were told of
a project which after six months, still had not received Washington
approval or disapproval and which meanwhile had lost much of it.
timeliness. To a large extent PP activities are conducted through
assets of long-time duration. As a consequence field estimates often
are nothing but requests for the continuation of existing operating
levels, without particular regard for operational conditions which may prevail
a year and a half hence. To a degree the budget cycle itself requires
this type of prograriuning; ho4rever the procedure becomes objectionable
when the dollar levels at which projects are approved are adhered to with
considerable rigidity. Because of the difficulty in obtaining headquarters
approval to changes in project levels, field estimates tend to be inflated;
further, the long lead time discourages the hard-headed evaluation which
might lead to a more timely cancellation of marginal projects.
D