CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES - II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

F0IAb3b ~Q~',~~DP
Sanitized - Approved For Releas
/CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-I
THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF THE 20TH COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS
AND ITS AFTERMATH
From the Translations of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
Edited by Leo Gruliow
With the Assistance of Priscilla Johnson and the Staff
of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press
New York
FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, -INC.
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
 Sanotimad - r e ease : -RDP75-OO149ROOO4OO37OOO2-9
XI. KHRUSHCHEV'S SECRET SPEECH
CPYRGHT
CPYRGHT
[On June 4, 1956, the United States Department of State re-
leased a text of the speech delivered by the Communist Party
First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev at a closed session of the
20th Party Congress Feb. 25, 1956. The State Department's
introduction to the release pointed out that the session was
limited in attendance to delegates from the U.S.S.R.
["This version," said the release, "is understood to have
been prepared for the guidance of the party leadership of a
Communist Party outside the U.S.S.R. The Department of
State does not vouch for the authenticlt of the document and in
releasing it intends that the document speak for itself."
[The editors of this book have made minor stylistic changes
in the text to correspond with the translation of terms used
elsewhere in the book. ]
Comrades! In the Party Central Committee report to the
20th Congress, in a number of speeches by delegates to the
Congress, and earlier at plenary sessions of the Party Central
Committee, quite a lot has been said about the cult of the in-
dividual leader and its harmful consequences.
After Stalin's death the Party Central Committee began to
implement a policy of explaining concisely and consistently that
it is impermissible and foreign to the spirit of Marxism-
Leninism to elevate one person, to transform him into a super-
man possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a
god. Such a man supposedly knows everything, sees everything,
thinks for everyone, can.do anything, is infallible in his be-
havior.
Such a belief about a man-specifically about Stalin-was
cultivated among us for many years.
The objective of the present report is not a thorough evalua-
tion of Stalin's life and work. Concerning Stalin's merits, an
entirely sufficient number of books, pamphlets and studies had
already been written in his lifetime. Stalin's role in the
preparation and execution of the socialist revolution, in the
Civil War, and in the fight for the construction of socialism in
our country is universally known. Everyone knows this well.
At'present we are concerned with a question which has immense
importance for the Party now and in the future- [we are con-
cerned ] with how the Stalin cult gradually grew, the cult which
became at a certain specific stage the source of a whole series
of exceedingly serious and grave perversions of Party principles,
of Party democracy, Hof revolutionary legality.
Because not all as Vet realize fully the practical consequences
resulting from the cult of the individual leader, the great harm
caused by the violation of the principle of collective direction of
the Party, and because immense and limitless power was
gathered in the hands of one person, the Party Central Com-
mittee considers it absolutely necessary to make the material
pertaining to this matter available to the 20th Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Allow me first of all to remind you how severely the founders
of Marxism-Le ce ever manif s tion the
cult of the indi%wi lb dh ~ ROW a 1i
worker Wilhelm Bloss, Marx stated: "Because of my antipathy
2n flny',ult of thn Individual. I never made public during the
existence of the International the numerous addresses from
various countries which recognized my merits, and which an-
noyed me. I did not even reply to them, except sometimes to
rebuke their authors. Engels and I first joined the secret so-
ciety of Communists on the condition that everything making
for superstitious worship of authority would be deleted from its
statutes, [Ferdinand] Lassalle subsequently did quite the op-
posite."
Some time later Engels wrote: "Both Marx and I have always
been against any public manifestation with regard to individuals,
with the exception of cases when it had an important purpose;
and we most strongly opposed such manifestations as during
our lifetime concerned us personally."
The great modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir
4vich Lenin, is known. Lenin had always stressed the role of
the people as the creator o i ,
ing role of the Party as a living and creative organism, and
also the role of the Central Committee.
Marxism does not negate the role of the leaders of the work-
ing class in directing the revolutionary liberation movement.
While ascribing great importance to the role of the leaders
and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time merci-
lessly stigmatized every manifestation of the cult of the individ-
ual leader, inexorably combated "hero-and-the -crowd" views-
views alien to Marxism-and countered all efforts to oppose a
"hero" to the masses and to the people.
Lenin taught that the Party's strength depends on its indis-
soluble unity with the masses, on the fact that the people-the
workers, peasants and intelligentsia-follow the Party. "Only
he will win and retain power," said Lenin, "who believes in the
people, who submerges himself in the fountain of the people's
living creativeness."
Lenin spoke with pride of the Bolshevist Communist Party as
the leader and teacher of the people; he called for submitting all
major questions to the opinion of knowledgeable workers, to the
opinion of their party; he said: "We believe in it, we see in it
the wisdom, the honor, and the conscience of our epoch."
Lenin resolutely stood against every attempt aimed at
minimizing or weakening the directing role of the Party in the
structure of the Soviet state. He worked out Bolshevist prin-
ciples of Party direction and norms of Party life, stressing
that the guiding principle of Party leadership is Its collegiality.
As early as in the prerevolutionary years Lenin called the
Party Central Committee a collective of leaders and the
guardian and interpreter of Party principles. "During the
period between Congresses," pointed out Lenin, "the Central
Committee guards and interprets the principles of the Party."
Emphasizing the role of the Party Central Committee and its
authority, Vladimir Ilyich pointed out: "Our Central Committee
constituted itself as a closely centralized and highly authoritative
group***"
During Lenin's life the Party Central Committee was a real
country.
eaOMAN hjQq.LhlX e t v1 a of the Party the
ing in
mmattpppri1Rnfttciple, Lenin never Q0 yf
tte errss o 6f
imposed by force his views
upon his co-workers. He tried to persuade; he patiently ex-
 CPYRGHT
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II PAGE 173
lained his opinions to others. Lenin always diligently saw to it
.at the norms of Party life were realized, that the Party Stat-
les were enforced, that the Party Congresses and Central
ommittee plenary sessions took place at the proper intervals.
In addition to V. I. Lenin's great accomplishments for the
Ictory of the working class and working peasants, for the vic-
:)ry of our party and for the application of the ideas of scientif-
communism to life, his keen mind expressed itself also in
-at he detected in Stalin in time those negative characteristics
-hich resulted later in grave consequences. Fearing the future
.estiny of the Party and of the Soviet country, V. I. Lenin gave
quite correct characterization of Stalin, pointing out that it was
-ecessary to consider the question of transferring Stalin from
-ie position of Secretary-General because Stalin was excessively
ude, did not have a proper attitude toward his comrades, was
apricious and abused his power.
In December, 1922, in a letter to the Party Congress Vladimir
lyich wrote: "Having become Secretary-General, Comrade
talin has acquired immeasurable power in his hands, and I
_in not sure that he will always know how to use this power with
-ufficient caution."
This letter, a political document of tremendous, importance,
:nown in Party history as Lenin's "testament,,,",,hag been dis-
ributed among the delegates to the 20th Party.cpngress. You
nave read it, and will undoubtedly read it agaln,a-ore than once.
'ou might reflect on Lenin's plain words, in whlch expression
s given to Vladimir Ilyich's anxiety concerning the Party, the
People, the state and the future direction of Party policy.
Vladimir Ilyich said: "Stalin is too rude, and this failing,
vhich is quite tolerable in our midst and in relations among us
communists, becomes intolerable in the office of Secretary-
3eneral. Therefore, I propose to the Comrades,tl}at,,they think
of a way of removing Stalin from this post and appointing to it
mother person who in all other respects differs from Comrade
Stalin in one advantage alone, namely, that he be more tolerant,
-pore loyal, more courteous and more considerate to comrades,
ess capricious, etc."
This document of Lenin's was made known to the delegates to
he 13th Party Congress, who discussed the question of trans-
erring Stalin from the position of Secretary-General. The dele-
gates declared themselves in favor of retaining Stalin in this
post, hoping that he would heed Vladimir Ilyich's critical re-
-narks and would be able to overcome the defects which caused
Lenin serious anxiety.
Comrades! The Party Congress should become acquainted
with two new documents, which confirm Stalin's character as
already outlined by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in his "testament."
these documents are a letter from Nadezhda Konstantinovna
Krupskaya [Lenin's wife] to [Lev Borisovich] Kamenev, who
was at that time head of the Political Bureau, and a personal
letter from Vladimir Ilyich Lenin to Stalin.
I will now read these documents:
"Lev Borisovich) Because of a short letter which I had
written in words dictated to me by Vladimir Ilyich by permis-
sion of the doctors, Stalin allowed himself yesterday an unusual-
ly rude outburst directed at me. This is not my first day in the
Party. During all these 30 years I have never heard from any
Comrade one word of rudeness. The cause of the Party and of
Ilyich is not less dear to me than to Stalin. At present I need
maximum self-control. I know better than any doctor what one
can and what one cannot discuss, with Ilyich, because I know
-what disturbs him and what clge~ npt; in any case, I know better
than Stalin. I am turning to you and to Grigory [Zinoviev], as
-much closer comrades of V. I., and I beg you to protect me from
rude interference with my priuabe life and from vile invective
and threats. I have no doubt as to what will be the unanimous
decision of the Control Commission, with which Stalin sees fit
to threaten me; however, I have neither the strength nor
-the time to waste on this foolisl;,guq.rrel,,,,, 1ndI am a
living person, and my nerves are strained to the utmost.-
N. KRUPSKAYA."
Nadezhda Konstantinovna wrote this letter on Dec. 23, 1922.
Two and a half months later, in March, 1923, Vladimir Ilyich
Lenin sent Stalin the following letter:
"To Comrade Stalin. Sanitized - Approved For
"Copies to: Kamenev and Zinoviev.
"Dear Comrade Stalin You permitted you- se a
mons of my wife to the telephone and a rude reprimand of her.
Despite the fact that she told you that she agreed to forget what
was said, nevertheless Zinoviev and Kamenev heard about it
from her. I have no intention to forget so easily what is being
done against me, and I need not stress here that I consider as
directed against me what is being done against my wife. I ask
you, therefore, to weigh carefully whether you are agreeable to
retracting your words and apologizing or whether you prefer
the severance of relations between us." (Stir in the hall.)
"Sincerely, LENIN-March 5, 1923."
Comrades! I shall not comment on these documents. They
speak eloquently for themselves. Since Stalin could behave in
this manner during Lenin's life, could thus behave toward
Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, whom the Party knows well
and values highly as a loyal friend of Lenin and as an active
fighter for the cause of the Party since its creation, we can
easily imagine how Stalin treated other people. These negaative
characteristics of his developed steadily and during the last
years acquired an absolutely insufferable character.
As later events proved, Lenin's anxiety was justified: In the
first period after Lenin's death Stalin still paid attention to his
(Lenin's] advice, but later he began to disregard the serious
admonitions of Vladimir Ilyich.
When we analyze Stalin's practice in directing the Party and
the country, when we pause to consider everything Stalin perpe-
trated, we must be convinced that Lenin's fears were justified.
Stalin's negative characteristics, which in Lenin's time were
only incipient, turned during the last years into grave abuse of
power by Stalin, which caused untold harm to our party.
We have to consider this matter seriously and analyze it cor-
rectly in order that we may preclude any possibility of a repeti-
tion, in any form whatever, of what took place during the life of
Stalin, who absolutely did not tolerate collegiality in leadership
and in work and who practiced brutal violence not only toward
everything which opposed him, but also toward what seemed, to
his capricious and despotic character, contrary to his concepts.
Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation and patient
cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and de-
manding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed
this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint and the correctness
of his position was doomed to removal from the leading collec-
tive and to subsequent moral and physical annihilation. This was
especially true during the period following the 17th Party Con-
gress, when many prominent Party leaders and rank-and-file
Party workers, honest and dedicated to the cause of communism,
fell victim to Stalin's despotism.
We must affirm that the Party fought a serious fight against
the Trotskyites, rightists and bourgeois nationalists, and that it
disarmed ideologically all the enemies of Leninism. This ideo-
logical fight was carried on successfully, and as a result the
Party was strengthened and tempered. Here Stalin played a posi-
tive role.
The Party led a great political ideological struggle against
those in its own ranks who proposed anti-Leninist theses, who
represented a political line hostile to the Party and to the cause
of socialism. This was a stubborn and a difficult fight but a
necessary one, because the political line of both the Trotskyite-
Zinovievite bloc and of the Bukharinites led actually toward the
restoration of capitalism and capitulation to the world bourgeoisie.
Let us consider for a moment what would have happened if in
1928-1929 the political line of right deviation had prevailed
among us, or orientation toward "cotton-dress industrialization,"
or toward the kulak, etc. We would not now have a power-
ful heavy industry, we would not have the collective farms,
we would find ourselves disarmed and weak in a capitalist
encirclement. -
It was for this reason that the Party led an inexorable ideologi-
cal fight and explained to all Party members and to the non-Party
masses the harm and the danger of the anti-Leninist proposals
of the Trotskyite opposition and the rightist opportunists. And
this great work of explaining the Party line bore fruit; both the
Trotskyites and the rightist opportunists were politically iso-
lated; the overwhelming Party majority supported the Leninist
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
Worth noting is the fact that even during the progress of the
furious ideological fight against the Trotskyites, the Zinoviev-
ites, the Bukharinites and others, extreme repressive measures
were not used against them. The fight was on ideological
grounds. But some years later, when socialism in our country
had been fundamentally established, when the exploiting classes
had been generally liquidated, when the Soviet social structure
had radically changed, when the social base for political move-
ments and groups hostile to the Party had shrunk sharply, when
the ideological opponents of the Party had long since been de-
feated politically, then the repression directed against them began.
It was precisely during this period (1935-1937-1938) that the
practice of mass repression through the state apparatus was
born, first against the enemies of Leninism-Trotskyites,
Zinovievites, Bukharinites, long since politically defeated by
the Party-and subsequently also against many honest Com-
munists, against those Party cadres which had borne the heavy
burden of the Civil War and the first and most difficult years
of industrialization and collectivization, which had fought
actively against the Trotskyites and the rightists for the
Leninist party line.
Stalin originated the concept "enemy of the people." This
term automatically rendered it unnecessary that the ideological
errors of a man or men engaged in a controversy be proved;
this term made possible the use of the most cruel repression,
violating all norms of revolutionary legality, against anyone
who in any way disagreed with Stalin, against those who were
only suspected of hostile intent, against those who had bad
reputations. This concept, "enemy of the people," actually
eliminated the possibility of any kind of ideological fight or the
making of one's views known on this or that issue, even issues
of a practical nature. In the main, and in actuality, the only
proof of guilt used, contrary to all norms of current law, was
the "confession" of the accused himself; and, as subsequent
investigation has proved, "confessions" were obtained through
physical pressures against the accused.
This led to glaring violations of revolutionary legality, and to
the fact that many entirely innocent persons, who in the past
had defended the Party line, became victims.
We must assert that, in regard to those persons who in their
time had opposed the Party line, there were often no sufficiently
serious reasons for their physical annihilation. The formula
"enemy of the people" was specifically introduced for the pur-
pose of physically annihilating such individuals.
It is a fact that many persons who were later annihilated as
enemies of the Party and people had worked with Lenin during
his life. Some of these persons had made mistakes during
Lenin's life, but, despite this, Lenin benefited by their work,
he corrected them and he did everything possible to retain
them in the ranks of the Party; he induced them to follow him.
In this connection the delegates to the Party Congress should
familiarize themselves with an unpublished note by V. I. Lenin
directed to the Central Committee's Political Bureau in Oc-
tober, 1920. Outlining the duties of the Control Commission,
Lenin wrote that the commission should be transformed into a
real "organ of Party and proletarian conscience."
"Asa special duty of the Control Commission there is recom-
mended a deep, individualized relationship with and sometimes
even a type of therapy for the representatives of the so-called
opposition-those who have experienced a psychological crisis
because of failure in their Soviet or Party career. An effort
should be made to quiet them, to explain the matter to them in
a way used among Comrades, to find for them (avoiding the
method of issuing orders) a task for which they are psycholog-
ically fitted. Advice and rules relating to this matter are to be
formulated by the Cenral Committee's Organizational Bureau,
etc."
Everyone knows how irreconcilable Lenin was with the
ideological enemies of Marxism, with those who deviated from
the correct Party line. At the same time, however, Lenin, as
is evident from the given document, in his practice of directing
the Party demanded the most intimate Party contact with
people who had shown indecision or temporary nonconformity
with the Party line, but whom it was possible to return to the
Party path. Lenin eeal a pp a if of s
educated without the application of extreme methods.
CPYRGHT
Lenin's wisdom in dealing w people
work with cadres.
An entirely different relationship with people characterized
Stalin. Lenin's traits-patient work with people; stubborn and
painstaking education of them; the ability to induce people to
follow him without using compulsion, but rather through the
ideological influence on them of the whole collective-were
entirely foreign to Stalin. He [Stalin] discarded the Leninist
method of persuading and educating; he abandoned the method
of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass
repressions and terror. He acted on an increasingly larger
scale and more stubbornly through punitive organs, at th i same
time often violating all existing standards of morality ant' of
Soviet law.
Arbitrary behavior by one person encouraged and permitted
arbitrariness in others. Mass arrests and deportations of
many thousands of people, execution without tri,l and without
normal investigation created conditions of insecurity, fear and
even desperation.
This, of course, did not contribute toward unity of the Party
ranks and of all strata of the working people, but, on the con-
trary, brought about annihilation and the expulsion from the
Party of workers who were loyal but inconvenient to Stalin.
Our party fought for the implementation of Lenin's plans for
the construction of socialism. This was an ideological fight.
Had Leninist principles been observed during the course of this
fight, had the Party's devotion to principles been skillfully com-
bined with a keen and solicitous concern for people, had they not
been repelled and wasted, but rather drawn to our side, we cer-
tainly would not have had such a brutal violation of revolutionary
legality and many thousands of people would not have fallen vic-
tim of the method of terror. Extraordinary methods would then
have been resorted to only against those people who had in fact
committed criminal acts against the Soviet system.
Let us recall some historical facts.
In the days before the October revolution two members of the
Central Committee of the Bolshevist party, Kamenev and
Zinoviev, declared themselves against Lenin's plan for an
armed uprising. In addition, on Oct. 18 they published in the
Menshevist newspaper Novaya zhizn a statement declaring that
the Bolsheviks were making preparations for an uprising and
that they considered it adventuristic. Kamenev and Zinoviev
thus disclosed to the enemy the Central Committee's decision
to stage the uprising and that the uprising had been organized
to take place within the very near future.
This was treason against the Party and against the revolu-
tion. In this connection V. I. Lenin wrote: "Kamenev and
Zinoviev disclosed the decision of their party's Central Com-
mittee on the armed uprising to Rodzyanko and Kerensky.***"
He put before the Central Committee the question of Zinoviev's
and Kamenev's expulsion from the Party.
However, after the great socialist October revolution, as is
known, Zinoviev and Kamenev were given leading positions.
Lenin put them in positions in which they carried out most
responsible Party tasks and participated actively in the work of
leading Party and Soviet bodies. It is known that Zinoviev and
Kamenev committed a number of other serious errors during
Lenin's life. In his "testament" Lenin warned that "the October
episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, fortui-
tous." But Lenin did not pose the question of their arrest and
certainly not their shooting.
Or let us take the example of the Trotskyites. At present,
after a sufficiently long historical period, we can speak about
the fight with the Trotskyites with complete calm and can
analyze this matter with sufficient objectivity. After all, around
Trotsky were people whose origin cannot by any means be
traced to bourgeous society. Part of-them belonged to the
Party intelligentsia and a certain part were recruited from
among the workers. We can name many individuals who in
their time joined the Trotskyites; however, these same in-
dividuals took an active part in the workers' movement before
the revolution, during the socialist October revolution itself,
and also in the consolidation of the victory of this greatest of
revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and re-
tYG4DFR17 00it49I WOOOtaSilate
such people? We are deeply convinced that had Lenin lived
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CPYRGHT
CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II PAGE 175
such an extreme method would not have been used against many
of them.
Such are only a few historical facts. But can it be said that
Lenin did not decide to use even the most severe means against
enemies of the revolution when this was actually necessary?
No, no one can say this. Vladimir Ilyich demanded uncompro-
mising dealings with the enemies of the revolution and of the
working class, and when necessary resorted ruthlessly to such
methods. You will recall only V. I. Lenin's fight with the
Socialist Revolutionary organizers of the anti-Soviet uprising,
with the counterrevolutionary kulaks in 1918 and with others,
when Lenin without hesitation used the mostextreme methods
against the enemies. Lenin used such methods, however, only
against actual class enemies and not against those who blundered,
who erred, and whom it was possible to lead through ideological
influence and even retain in the leadership.
Lenin used severe methods only in the most necessary cases,
when the exploiting classes were still in existence and were
vigorously opposing the revolution, when the struggle for sur
vival was decidedly assuming the sharpest forms, even includ-
ing a civil war.
Stalin, on the other hand, used extreme methods and mass
repressions at a time when the revolution was already victori-
ous, when the Soviet state was strengthened, when the exploiting
classes were already liquidated and socialist relations were
rooted solidly in all phases of national economy, when our party
was politically consolidated and had strengthened itself both
numerically and ideologically. It is clear that here Stalin showed
in awhole series of cases his intolerance, his brutality and his
abuse of power. Instead of proving his political correctness and
mobilizing the masses, he often chose the path of repression and
physical annihilation, not only against actual enemies, but also
against individuals who had not committed any crimes against
the Party and the Soviet government. Here we see no wisdom
but only a demonstration of the brutal force which had once so
alarmed V. I. Lenin.
Lately, especially after the unmasking of the Beria gang, the
Central Committee has looked into a series of cases fabricated
by this gang. This disclosed a very ugly picture of brutal will-
fulness connected with the incorrect behavior of Stalin. As
facts prove, Stalin, using his unlimited power, allowed himself
many abuses. He acted in the name of the Central Committee,
not asking for the opinion of the Committee members or even of
the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau; often
he did not inform them about his personal decisions concerning
very important Party and government matters.
In considering the question of the cult of the individual leader,
we must first of all show everyone what harm this caused to the
interests of our party.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin had always stressed the Party's role and
importance in directing the socialist government of workers
and peasants; he saw in this the chief precondition for success-
fully building socialism in our country. Pointing to the great
responsibility of the Bolshevist party1 as the ruling party in the
Soviet state, Lenin called for the most meticulous observance of
all norms of Party life; he called for the realization of the
principles of collegiality in the direction of the Party and the
state.
Collegiality of leadership flows from the very nature of our
party, a party built on the principles of democratic centralism.
"This means," said Lenin, "that all Party business is accomp-
lished by all the Party members-directly or through repre-
sentatives-who, without any exceptions, are subject to the
same rules; in addition, all administrative members, all direct-
ing collegiums, all holders of Party positions are elected, are
accountable for their activities and are subject to recall."
It is known that Lenin himself offered an example of the most
careful observance of these, principlesit There was no matter so
important that Lenin himself decided it without asking for advice
and approval of the majority of the Central Committee members
or of the members of the Central Committee's Political Bureau.
In the most difficult period for our party and our country, Lenin
considered it necessary regularly to convoke Congresses, Party
conferences and Central Committee plenary sessions, at which
all the major questions,91FM#tjZ@ddajW
s~re~ep el
carefully worked out by the collective of a ders, were a opte .
We can recall, for example, the year 1UPS,
was threatened by the attack of the imperialist interventionists.
In this situation the Seventh Party Congress was convened in
order to discuss a vitally important matter which could not be
postponed-the matter of peace. In 1919, while the Civil War
was raging, the Eighth Party Congress met, adopted a new
Party program and decided such important matters as the re-
lationship with the peasant masses, the organization of the Red
Army, the leading role of the Party in the work of the Soviets,
correction of the social composition of the Party, and other
matters. In 1920 the Ninth Party Congress was convened and
laid down the guiding principles pertaining to the Party's work
in the sphere of economic construction. In 1921 the Tenth
Party Congress accepted Lenin's New Economic Policy and the
historic resolution entitled "On Party Unity."
During Lenin's lifetime, Party Congresses were convened
regularly; always, when a radical turn in the development of the
Party and the country took place, Lenin considered itlabsolutely
necessary that the Party discuss at length all the basic questions
of domestic and foreign policy and questions bearing on the de-
velopment of the Party and the state.
It is very characteristic that Lenin addressed to the Party
Congress, as the highest Party body, his last articles, letters
and remarks. During the period between Congresses, the
Party Central Committee, acting as the most authoritative di-
recting collective, meticulously observed the principles of the
Party and carried out its policy.
So it was during Lenin's lifetime.
Were our party's sacred Leninist principles observed after
the death of Vladimir Ilyich?
During the first few years after Lenin's death Party Con-
gresses and Central Committee plenary sessions took place
more or less regularly, but later, when Stalin began increasingly
to abuse his power, these principles were brutally violated.
This was especially evident during the last 15 years of his life.
Was it a normal situation when 13 years elapsed between the
18th and 19th Party Congresses, years during which our party
and our country experienced so many important events?
These events demanded categorically that the Party should have
adopted decisions pertaining to the country's defense during the
patriotic war [World War II] and to peacetime construction
after the war. Even after the end of the war a Congress was
not convened for more than seven years.
Central Committee plenary sessions were hardly ever called.
Suffice it to mention that during all the years of the patriotic
war not a single Central Committee plenary session took place.
It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee
plenary session in October, 1941, when Central Committee
members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They
waited two days for the opening of the plenary session, but in
vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and to talk to the Central
Committee members. This fact shows how demoralized Stalin
was in the first months of the war and how haughtily and dis-
dainfully he treated the Central Committee members.
In practice Stalin ignored the norms of Party life and trampled
on the Leninist principle of collective Party leadership.
Stalin's willfulness vis-a-vis the Party and its Central Com-
mittee became fully evident after the 17th Party Congress,
which took place in 1934.
Having numerous data showing brutal willfulness toward
Party cadres, the Central Committee created a Party commis-
sion under the control of the Central Committee Presidium;
it was charged with investigating what had made possible the
mass repressions against the majority of the Central Commit-
tee's members and candidates elected at the 17th Congress of
the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
The commission has familiarized itself. with a large amount
of materials in the N.K.V.D. archives and with other documents
and has established many facts pertaining to the fabrication of
cases against Communists, to false accusations, to glaring
abuses of socialist legality which resulted in the death of in-
nocent people. It became apparent that many Party, Soviet and
economic activists who were branded in 1937-1938 as "enemies"
were actually never enemies, spies, wreckers, etc., but were
tie~nqWiggp and
le7
tp,
 Ca~"J - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II
themselves (at the order of the investigating judges-falsi-
fiers) with all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes. The com-
mission has presented to the Central Committee Presidium
lengthy and documented materials pertaining to mass repres-
sions against delegates to the 17th Party Congress and against
members of the Central Committee elected at that Congress.
These materials have been studied by the Central Committee
Presidium.
It was determined that of the 139 members and candidates
of the Party Central Committee who were elected at the 17th
Congress, 98 persons, i.e., 70%, were arrested and shot
(mostly in 1937-1938). (Indignation in the hall.)
What was the composition of the delegates to the 17th Con-
gress? It is known that 80% of the voting participants in the
17th Congress joined the Party during the years of the [ Bol-
shevist] underground before the revolution or during the Civil
War; this means before 1921. By social origin the basic mass
of the delegates to the Congress were workers (60% of the
voting members).
For this reason it was inconceivable that a Congress so
composed would have elected a Central Committee, a majority
of which would prove to be enemies of the Party. The only
reason why 70% of the Central Committee members and can-
didates elected at the 17th Congress were branded enemies of
the Party and of the people was that honest Communists were
slandered, accusations against them were fabricated, and revo-
lutionary legality was gravely undermined.
The same fate befell not only the Central Committee mem-
bers but also the majority of the delegates to the 17th Party
Congress. Of 1966 delegates with either voting or advisory
powers, 1108 persons were arrested on charges of counterrevolu-
tionary crimes, i.e., decidedly more than a majority. This very
fact shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were
the charges of counterrevolutionary crimes made, as we now
see, against a majority of the participants in the 17th Party
Congress. (Indignation in the hall.)
We should recall that the 17t Party Congress is historically
known as the Congress of Victors. Delegates to the Congress
were active participants in the building of our socialist state;
many of them had suffered and fought for Party interests during
the prerevolutionary years in the underground and at the Civil
War fronts; they fought their enemies valiantly and often nerve-
lessly looked into the face of death. How then can we believe
that such people could prove to be "two-faced" and had joined
the camp of the enemies of socialism during the era after the
political liquidation of the Zinovievites, Trotskyites and
rightists and after the great accomplishments of socialist con-
struction?
This was the result of the abuse of power by Stalin, who be-
gan to use mass terror against the Party cadres.
What is the reason that mass repressions against activists
increased more and more after the 17th Party Congress? It
was because at that time Stalin had so elevated himself above
the Party and above the nation that he, ceased to consider either
the Central Committee or the Party. While he still reckoned
with the opinion of the collective before the 17th Congress,
Stalin in even greater measure ceased to reckon with the views
of the members of the Party's Central Committee and even the
members of the Political Bureau after the complete political
liquidation of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Bukharinites,
when the Party had achieved unity as a result of that fight and
socialist victories. Stalin thought that now he could decide all
things alone and all he needed were statisticians; he treated
all others in such a way that they could only listen to and praise
him.
After the criminal murder of S. M. Kirov, mass repressions
and brutal acts of violation of socialist legality began. On the
evening of Dec. 1, 1934, on Stalin's initiative (without the ap-
proval of the Political Bureau-which was passed two days
later, casually) the secretary of the Presidium of the Central
Executive Committee, Yenukidze, signed the following directive:
1. Investigative agencies are directed to speed up the cases
of those accused of the preparation or execution of acts of ter-
r or.
Sider the possibility of pardon, because the Presidium of the
U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee does not consider it pos-
sible to accept petitions of this sort.
3. Agencies of the N.K.V.D. [Commissariat of Internal Af-
fairs] are directed to carry out the death sentences against
criminals of the above-mentioned category immediately after
the passage of sentence.
This directive became the basis for mass abuses of socialist
law observance. During many of the fabricated court cases the
accused were charged with the "preparation" of terroristic
acts; this deprived them of any possibility that their cases
might be re-examined, even when they stated before the court
that their "confessions" were secured by force, and when, in a
convincing manner, they disproved the accusations against them.
It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances sur-
rounding Kirov 's murder hide many things which are inexplicable
and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There
are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, [ Leonid
V.] Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people
whose duty it was to guard Kirov's person. A month and a half
before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the ground of
suspicious behavior, but he was released and not even searched.
It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist
assigned to protect Kirov was being brought in for interrogation,
on Dec. 2, 1934, he was killed in an automobile "accident" in
which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the
murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad N.K.V.D.
were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We
can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of
the organizers of Kirov's killing. (Stir in the hall.)
Mass repressions grew tremendously from the end of 1936
after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, dated from Sochi
Sept. 25, 1936, was addressed to Kaganovich, Molotov and other
members of the Political Bureau. The content of the telegram
was as follows:
"We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade
Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for
Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be in-
capable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc. The
O.G.P.U. is four years behind in this matter. This is noted by
all Party workers and by the majority of the representatives of
the N.K.V.D." Strictly speaking we should stress that Stalin did
not meet with and therefore could not know the opinion of Party
workers.
This Stalinist formulation that the "N.K.V.D. is four years
behind" in applying mass repression and that there is a neces-
sity for "catching up" with the neglected work directly pushed
the N.K.V.D. workers onto the path of mass arrests and execu-
tions.
We should state that this formulation was also forced on the
February-March plenary session of the Party Central Commit-
tee in 1937. The session resolution approved it on the basis of
Yezhov's report, "Lessons Ensuing From the Harmful Activity,
Diversion and Espionage of the Japanese-German-Trotskyite
Agents," stating:
"The Plenum of the Party Central Committee considers that
all facts revealed during the investigation into the matter of an
anti-Soviet Trotskyite center and of its followers in the
provinces show that the People's Commissariat of Internal Af-
fairs had fallen behind at least four years in the attempt to un-
mask these most inexorable enemies of the people."
The mass repressions at this time were made under the
slogan of a fight against the Trotskyites. Did the Trotskyites
at this time actually constitute such a danger to our party and
to the Soviet state? We should recall that on the eve of the 15th
Party Congress in 1927 only about 4000 votes were cast for the
Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition, while there were 724,000 for
the Party line. During the ten years that passed between the
15th Party Congress and the February-March Central Commit-
tee plenary session Trotskyism was completely disarmed;
many former Trotskyites had changed their former views and
worked in the various sectors building socialism. It is clear
that there was no basis for mass terror in the country in this
of socialist victory.
situation
P it
eplerary s do in fA99 Ac 940ATt l4~Kdtee
2. Judicial org kileded
i ,M)Oe t'POPeRftha
of loath sentences for crimes of th a egory in or er to con-
 CPYRGHT
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R00040037 Q92i9,
CURRENT SOVIET. POLICIES-II
Methods for. the Liquidation of the Trotskyites and Other
Double-Dealers," contained an attempt at theoretical justifica-
tion of the mass terror policy under the pretext that class war
must allegedly sharpen as we march forward toward socialism.
Stalin asserted that both history and Lenin taught him this.
Actually, Lenin taught that the application of revolutionary
violence is necessitated by the resistance of the exploiting
classes, and this referred to the era when the exploiting classes
existed and were powerful. As soon as the nation's political
situation had improved, when, in January,' 1920, the Red Army
took Rostov and thus won a most important victory over
Denikin, Lenin instructed Dzherzhinsky to stop mass terror
and to abolish the death penalty. Lenin justified this important
political move of the Soviet state in the following manner in his
report at the session of the All-Union Central Executive Com-
mittee Feb. 2, 1920:
'We were forced to use terror because of,the terror prac-
ticed by the Entente, when strong world powers threw their
hordes against us, without scruples over any 'type of conduct.
We would not have lasted two days had we' 'not:.been ruthless in
meeting these actions of the officers and White Guards; this
meant the use of terror, but this was forced upon us by the
terrorist methods of the Entente.
"But as soon as we attained a decisive victory, even before
thie end of the war, immediately after taking Rostov, we gave up
the use of the death penalty and thus proved that we intend to
carry out our program in the manner that we promised.
We say that the application of violence stems from the decision
to crush the exploiters, the big landowners and the capitalists;
as soon as this was accomplished we gave up the use of all
extraordinary methods. We have proved this in practice."
4talin deviated from these clear and plain precepts of Lenin.
Stalin put the Party and the N.K.V.D. to using mass terror
whin the exploiting classes had been liquidated in our country
and when there were no serious reasons for the use of extra-
ordinary mass terror.
This terror was actually directed not at the remnants of the
defeated exploiting classes but against honest workers of the
Party and of the Soviet state; lying, slanderous and absurd
accusations were made against them- accusations of "double-
dealir.g," "espionage," "sabotage," preparation of fictious
"plotsi" etc.
At the February-March Central Committee plenary session
in 1937 many members actually questioned the rightness of the
established course regarding mass repressions under the pre-
text of combating "double-dealing."
Comrade Postyshev most ably expressed these doubts. He
s aid:
"I have philosophized that the severe years of the struggle
have passed; Party members who lost their backbone broke
down or joined the camp of the enemy, healthy elements fought
for the Party. Those were the years of industrialization and
collectivization. I never thought it possible that after this
severe era had passed Karpov and people like him would find
themselves in the camp of the enemy." (Karpov was a worker in
the Ukrainian Central Committee whom Postyshev knew well.)
"And now, according to the testimony, it appears that Karpov was
recruited in 1934 by the Trotskyites. I personally do not believe
that in 1934 an honest Party member who had trod the long road
of unrelenting fight against enemies, for the Party and for
socialism, would now be in the camp of the enemies. I do not
believe it. *** I cannot imagine how it would be possible to
travel with the Party during the difficult years and then, in
1934, join the Trotskyites. It is an odd thing.***" (Stir in the
hall.)
Using Stalin's formulation, lamely, that the closer we are to
socialism, the more enemies )ve will have, and using the resolu-
tion of the February-March Central Committee plenary session,
adopted on the basis of Yezhov's report, the provocateurs who
had infiltrated the state security agencies, together with un-
conscionable careerists, began to protect with the Party name
the mass terror against Party cadres, cadres of the Soviet
state and ordinary Soviet citizens. Suffice it to say that the
number of arrests based on charges of counterrevolutionary
ing Party workers. The Party Statutes approved at the
Party Congress were based on Leninist principles expressed at
the 10th Party Congress. They stated that to apply an extreme
measure such as expulsion from the Party against a Central
Committee member, against a Central Committee candidate,
or against a member of the Party Control Commission, "it is
necessary to call a Central Committee plenary session and to
invite to the plenary session all Central Committee candidate
members and all members of the Party Control Committee";
only if two-thirds of the members of such a general assembly
of responsible Party leaders found it necessary, only then could
a Central Committee member or candidate be expelled.
The majority of the Central Committee members and can-
didates elected at the 17th Congress and arrested in 1937-1938
were expelled from the Party illegally through gross violation
of the Party Statutes, since the question of their expulsion was
never studied at a Central Committee plenary session.
Now when the cases of some of these so-called "spies" and
"saboteurs" were examined it was found that all their cases
were fabricated. Confessions of guilt of many arrested and
charged with enemy activity were gained with the help of cruel
and inhuman tortures.
At the same time Stalin, as we have been informed by mem-
bers of the Political Bureau of that time, did not show them the
statements of many accused political activists who re-
tracted their confessions before the military tribunal and asked
for an objective examination of their cases. There were many
such declarations, and Stalin doubtless knew of them.
The Central Committee considers it absolutely necessary to
inform the Congress of many such fabricated "cases" against
the members of the Party Central Committee elected at the
17th Party Congress.
An example of vile provocation, of odious falsification and of
criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the
former candidate member of the Central Committee Political
Bureau, one of the most eminent workers of the Party and of
the Soviet government, Comrade Robert I. Eikhe, who had been
a Party member since 1905. (Commotion in the hall.)
Comrade Eikhe was arrested April 29, 1938, on the basis of
slanderous materials, without the sanction of the Prosecutor of
the U.S.S.R., which was finally received 15 months after the
arrest.
Investigation of Eikhe's case was made in a manner which
most brutally violated Soviet legality and was accompanied by
willfulness and falsification.
Eikhe was forced under torture to sign ahead of time a
protocol of his confession prepared by the investigative judges,
in which he and several other eminent Party workers were ac-
cused of anti-Soviet activity.
On Oct. 1, 1939, Eikhe sent his declaration to Stalin in which
he categorically denied his guilt and asked for an examination of
his case. In the declaration he wrote: "There is no more bitter
misery than to sit in the jail of a government for which I have
always fought."
A second declaration of Eikhe has been preserved which he
sent to Stalin Oct. 27, 1939; in it he cited facts very convincingly
and countered the slanderous accusations made against him,
arguing that this provocatory accusation was on the one hand
the work of real Trotskyites whose arrests he had sanctioned
as First Secretary of the West Siberian Territory Party Com-
mittee aid who had conspired to take revenge on him, and, on
the other hand, the result of base falsification of materials by
the investigative judges. Eikhe wrote in his declaration:
"***On Oct. 25 of this year I was informed that the investiga-
tion of my case has been concluded and I was given access to the
materials of this investigation. Had I been guilty of only one-
hundredth of the crimes with which I am charged, I would not
have dared to send you this pre-execution declaration; however,
I have not been guilty of even one of the things with which I am
charged and my heart is clean of even the shadow of baseness.
I have never in my life told you a word of falsehood and now,
when I stand with both feet in the grave, I am also not lying. My
whole case is a typical example of provocation, slander and
violation of the elementary basis of revolutionary legality. ***
"***The confessions which were made part of my file are not
It is known that brutalC i A dn~6r(keldna?gsudl t R b"n I 4V~000 V3 / UUU % 2.41
 ~p Approvedu REr> ~ .oI -sQP75-00149R000400370002-9
PAGE 178
Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars
because correct resolutions of the Party Central Committee
and of the Council of People's Comissars which were not made
on my initiative or with my participation are presented as
hostile acts of counterrevolutionary organizations performed
at my suggestion. ***
"I am now alluding to the most disgraceful part of my life
and to my really grave guilt before the Party and you: that is,
my confession of counterrevolutionary activity. *** The case
is as follows: not being able to suffer the tortures to which I
was put by Ushakov and Nikolayev-and especially by the
former-who utilized the knowledge that my broken ribs have
not properly mended and have caused me great pain-I have
been forced to accuse myself and others.
"The majority of my confession has been suggested or dic-
tated by Ushakov, and the remainder 10 my reconstruction of
N.K.V.D. materials from Western Sibiria for which I assumed
all responsibility. If some part of the`?$tory which Ushakov
fabric-I-1 and which I signed did not properly hang together,
I was forced to sign another variant. *e same thing was done
to Rukhimovich, who was at first desiginted as a member of
the reserve network and whose name tier was removed with-
out telling me anything about it; the sd ` ' was also done with
the leader of the reserve network supedly created by Bu-
kharin in 1935. At first I wrote my nani$.4n, and then I was in-
structed to insert Mezhlauk. There wd )r other similar inci-
dents.
"*** I ask and beg you that you aga, examine my case and
this not for the purpose of sparing me-put in order to unmask
the vile provocation which wound itself,4ike a snake around
many persons, in large measure throw my meanness and
criminal slander. I have never betray( 0 you or the Party. I
know that I perish because of vile and mean work of the enemies
of the Party and of the people, who fabricated the provocation
against me.'
It would appear that such an important declaration was worth
an examination by the Central Commit(. This, however, was
not done, and the declaration was transmitted to Beria, while
the terrible maltreatment of the Politiq Bureau Candidate,
Comrade Eikhe, continued.
On Feb. 2, 1940, Eikhe was brought before the court. Here he
did not confess any guilt and said as follows:
"In all the so-called confessions of mmne there Is not one let-
ter written by me with the exception of my signatures under the
protocols, which were forced from me. have made my confes-
sion under pressure from the investigative judge, who from the
time of my arrest tormented me. After' that I began to write all
this nonsense. *** The most important; thing for me is to tell
the court, the Party and Stalin that I am not guilty. I have never
been guilty of any conspiracy. I shall d(e believing in the truth
of Party policy, as I have believed in it,during my whole life."
Eikhe was shot Feb. 4. (Indignation in the hall.) It has been
definitely established now that Eikhe's case was fabricated; he
has been posthumously rehabilitated.
Comrade Rudzutak, candidate member of the Political Bureau,
member of the Party since 1905, who spent ten years in a Tsar-
ist hard labor camp, completely retracted in court the confes-
sion which was forced from him. The protocol of the session of
the Collegium of the Supreme Military Tribunal contains the fol-
lowing statement by Rudzutak:
"*** The only plea which he places before the court is that
the Party Central Committee be informed that there is in the
N.K.V.D. an as yet not liquidated center which is craftily manu-
facturing cases, which forces innocent persons to confess; there
is no opportunity to prove one's nonparticipation in crimes to
which the confessions of various persons testify. The investi-
gative methods are such that. they force people to lie and to
slander entirely innocent persons in addition to those who al-
ready stand accused. He asks the court that he be allowed to in-
form the Party Central Committee of all this in writing. He
assures the court that he personally never had any evil designs
in regard to the policy of our party because he had always
agreed with the Party policy pertaining to all spheres of eco-
Commission, which was called into being in accordance witn
Lenin's concept for the purpose of fighting for Party unity. In
this manner fell the chief of this highly authoritative Party
agency, a victim of brutal willfulness: he was not even called
before the Central Committee's Political Bureau because Stalin
did not want to talk to him. Sentence was pronounced on him in
20 minutes and he was shot. (Indignation in the hall.)
After careful examination of the case in 1955 it was estab-
lished that the accusation against Rudzutak was false and that it
was based on slanderous materials. Rudzutak has been re-
habilitated posthumously.
The way in which the former N.K.V.D. workers manufactured
various fictitious "anti-Soviet centers" and "blocs" with the
help of provocatory methods is seen from the confession of
Comrade Rozenblum, Party member since 1906, who was ar-
rested in 1937 by the Leningrad N.K.V.D.
During the examination in 1955 of the Komarov case Rozen-
blum revealed the following fact: When Rozenblum was arrested
in 1937 he was subjected to terrible torture, duri~ig which he was
ordered to confess false information concerning himself and
other persons. He was then brought to the office of Zakovsky,
who offered him freedom on condition that he make before
the court a false confession fabricated in 1937 by the N.K.V.D.
concerning "sabotage, espionage and diversion in a terroristic
center in Leningrad." (Stir in the hall.) With unbelievable
cynicism Zakovsky told about the vile "mechanism" for the
crafty creation of fabricated "anti-Soviet plots."
"
Zakovsky
"In order to illustrate it to me," stated Rozenblum,
gave me several possible variants of the organization of this
center and of its branches. After he detailed the organization
to me, Zakovsky told me that the N.K.V.D. would prepare the
case of this center, remarking that the trial would be public.
"Before the court were to be brought four or five members
of this center: Chudov, Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposh-
nikova (Chudov's wife) and others, together with two or three
members from the branches of this center. ***
"'*** The case of the Leningrad center has to be built solidly
and for this reason witnesses are needed. Social origin (or
course, in the past) and the Party standing of the witness will
play more than a small role.
"`You yourself,'" said Zakovsky, "'will not need to invent any-
thing. The N.K.V.D. will prepare for you a ready outline for
every branch of the center; you will have to study it carefully
and to remember well all questions and answers which the
court might ask. This case will be ready in four or five months
or perhaps a half year. During all this time you will be preparing
yourself so that you will not compromise the investigation and
yourself. Your, future will depend on how the trial goes and on its
results. If youbegin to lie and to testify falsely, blame yourself.
If you manage to'endure it, you will save your head and we will
feed and clothe you at the government's cost until your death.'"
This is the kind of vile thing which was then practiced. (Stir
in the hall.)
Even more widely was falsification of cases practiced in the
provinces. The N.K.V.D. headquarters of Sverdlovsk Province
"discovered" the so-called "Ural uprising staff"-an organ of
the bloc of rightists, Trotskyites, Socialist Revolutionaries,
church leaders-whose chief supposedly was the Secretary of
the Sverdlovsk Province Party Committee and member of the
All-Union Communist Party Central Committee, Kabakov, who
had been a Party member since 1914. The investigative ma-
terials of that time show that in almost all territories, provinces
and republics there supposedly existed "rightist Trotskyite,
espionage-terror and diversionary-sabotage organizations and
centers" and that the heads of such organizations as a rule-
for no known reason-were first secretaries of province Party
committees or republic Central Committees. (Stir in the hall.)
Many thousands of honest and innocent Communistshave died
as a result of this monstrous falsification of such "cases," as a
result of the practice of forcing accusations against oneself and
others. In the same manner were fabricated the "cases" against
eminent Party and State workers-Kossior, Chubar, Postyshev,
Kosarev, and others.
In those years repressions on a mass scale were applied
which were based on nothing tangible and which resulted in
that Rudzutak wa~i~Ai # e,Jhe y~t>~g~ OVe I& ff 'eBSehe v~~ac e&0%to00149,000400370002-9
 CPYRGHT
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II PAGE 179
The vicious practice was condoned of having the N.K.V.D.
-epare lists of persons whose cases were under the jurisdic-
::)n of the Military Collegium and whose sentences were pre-
tred in advance. Yezhov would send these lists to Stalin
-rsonally for his approval of the proposed punishment. In
337-1938, 383 such lists, containing the names of many
ousands of Party, Soviet, Young Communist League, army
nd economic workers were sent to Stalin. He approved these
sts.
A large part of these cases are being reviewed now and a
-eat part of them are being voided because they were baseless
-id falsified. Suffice it to say that from 1954 to the present time
.e Military Collegium of the Supreme Court has rehabilitated
379 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously.
Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers
aused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of
Dcialist advancement.
Mass repressions had a negative influence on the moral-
olitical condition of the Party, created a situation of uncer-
linty, contributed to the spreading of unhealthy suspicion, and
owed distrust among Communists. All sorts of slanderers
:-d careerists were active.
Resolutions of the January plenary session of the Party
entral Committee in 1938 brought some measure of improve-
aent to the Party organizations. However, widespread repres-
ion also existed in 1938.
Only because our party possesses such great moral-political
trength was it possible for it to survive the difficult events in
937-1938 and to train new cadres. There is, however, no doubt
^at our march forward toward socialism and toward the prepa-
ation of the country's defense would have been much more
uccessful were it not for the tremendous loss in cadres suf-
=red as a result of the baseless and false mass repressions in
!937-1938.
We justly accuse Yezhov of the degenerate practices of 1937.
ut we have to answer these questions: Could Yezhov have ar-
nested Kossior, for instance, without the knowledge of Stalin?
as there an exchange of opinions or a Political Bureau deci-
don concerning this? No, there was not, as there was none re-
-arding other cases of this type. Could Yezhov have decided
much important matters as the fate of such eminent Party
_gures? No, it would be a display of naivete to consider this
ze work of Yezhov alone. It is clear that these matters were
ecided by Stalin, and that without his orders and his sanction
ezhov could not have done this.
We have examined the cases and have rehabilitated Kossior,
:udzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev and others. For what causes
were they arrested and sentenced? ' The review of evidence
hows that there was no reason for this. They, like many others,
were arrested without the prosecutor's knowledge. In such a
ituation there is no need for any sanctid~;'for what sort of sanc-
ion could there be when Stalin decided everything? He was the
hief prosecutor In these cases. Stalin not only agreed to, but
n his own initiative issued arrest orders. We must say this so
that the delegates to the Congress can clearly understand and
themselves assess this and draw the proper conclusions.
Facts prove that many abuses were committed on Stalin's
-.rulers without reckoning with any norms of Party and Soviet
ugality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious;
ae knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man
and say: "Why are your eyes so shifty today?" or "Why are you
-urning so much today and avoiding looking me directly in the
-yes ?" The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust
even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for
-ears. Everywhere and in everything he saw "enemies,"
'double-dealers" and "spies."
Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in great willfulness
and strangled a person morally and physically. A situation was
treated in which one could not express one's own will.
When Stalin said that one or another should be arrested, it
as necessary to accept on faith that he was an "enemy of the
3eople." Meanwhile, Beria's gang, which ran the organs of
state security, outdid itself in proving the guilt of the arrested
and the truth of materials which it had falsified. And what
proofs were offered?, The c~o4nfess Ans o the arrested an ~}e
_nvestigative judges accepte3 bI ess~ wRior
it possible that a person confesses to crimes which he as no
committed? Only in one way-because of application of physical
methods of pressuring him, tortures, bringing him to a state of
unconsciousness, depriving him of his judgment, taking away
his human dignity. In this manner were "confessions" acquired.
When the wave of mass arrests began to recede in 1939, and
the leaders of territorial Party organizations began to accuse
the N.K.V.D. workers of using methods of physical pressure on
the arrested, Stalin dispatched a coded telegram on Jan. 20,
1939, to the secretaries of province and territory committees
and republic Central Committees of the Party, to the Peoples'
Commissars of Internal Affairs and to the heads of N.K.V.D.
organizations. This telegram stated:
"The Party Central Committee explains that application of
methods of physical pressure in N.K.V.D. practice is permis-
sible from 1937 on, in accordance with permission of the Party
Central Committee. *** It is known that all bourgeois intel-
ligence services use methods of physical influence againstjthe
representatives of the socialist proletariat and that they use them
in their most scandalous forms. The question arises as to why
the socialist intelligence service should be more humanitarian
against the mad agents of the bourgeoisie, against the deadly
enemies of the working' class and of the collective farm workers.
The Party Central Committee considers that physical pressure
should still be used obligatorily, as an exception applicable to
known and obstinate enemies of the people, as a method both
justifiable and appropriate."
Thus, Stalin had sanctioned in the name of the Party Central
Committee the most brutal violation of socialist legality, torture
and oppression, which led, as we have seen, to the slandering
and self-accusation of innocent people.
Not long ago, only several days before the present Congress,
we summoned to the Central Committee Presidium session and
interrogated the investigative judge Rodos, who in his time in-
vestigated and interrogated Kossior, Chubar and Kosarev. He
is a vile person with a bird brain, and morally completely de-
generate. And it was this man who decided the fate of prominent
Party workers; he made judgments also concerning the politics
in these matters, because, having established their "crime," he
provided therewith materials from which important political
implications could be drawn.
The question arises whether a man with such an intellect
could alone conduct the investigation in a manner to prove the
guilt of people such as Kossior and others. No, he could not
have done it without proper directives. At the Central Commit-
tee Presidium session he told us: "I was told that Kossior and
Chubar were enemies of the people and for this reason I, as an
investigative judge, had to make them confess that they were
enemies." (Indignation in the hail.)
He could do this only through long tortures, which he did, re-
ceiving detailed instructions from Beria. We must say that at
the Central Committee Presidium session he cynically declared:
"I thought that I was executing the orders of the Party." In this
manner Stalin's orders concerning the use of methods of
physical pressure against the arrested were in practice executed.
These and many other facts show that all norms of correct
Party solution of problems were invalidated and everything was
dependent upon the willfulness of one man.
The power accumulated in the hands of one person, Stalin,
led to serious consequences during the great patriotic war.
When we look at many of our novels, films and historical
"scholarly studies," the role of Stalin in the patriotic war ap-
pears entirely improbable. Stalin had foreseen everything. The
Soviet Army, on the basis of a strategic plan prepared by Stalin
long before, used the tactics of so-called "active defense," i.e.,
tactics which, as we know, allowed the Germans to come up to
Moscow and Stalingrad. Using such tactics, the Soviet Army,
supposedly thanks only to Stalin's genius, turned to the offensive
and subdued the enemy. This type of novel, film and "scholarly
study" entirely ascribes to Stalin's strategic genius the epic
victory gained by the armed might of the land of the Soviets, by
our heroic people.
We have to analyze this matter carefully because it has a
tremendous significance not only from the historical, but espe-
cially from the political educational and practical point of view.
Release tGI tEDt-J35 OO149R000400370002-9
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-11
CPYRCHT
Before the war our press and our po ca -e uca ona
work was characterized by its bragging tone: when an enemy
violates the sacred Soviet soil, then for each blow of the enemy
we will answer with three blows and we will battle the enemy on
his own soil and we will win without much harm to ourselves.
But these positive statements were not based in all areas on
concrete facts, which would actually have guaranteed the im-
munity of our borders.
During the war and after the war Stalin put forward the thesis
that the tragedy which our nation experienced in the first part
of the war was the result of the "unexpected" attack of the
Germans against the Soviet Union. But, comrades, this is
completely untrue. As soon as Hitler. came to power in Germany
he undertook the task of liquidating cgmmunism. The fascists
said this openly; they did not hide their plans. To attain this
aggressive end all sorts of pacts and blocs were created, such
as the famous Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axig. Many facts from the
prewar period clearly showed that Hitler was going all out to
begin a war against the Soviet state and'that he had concentrated
large armed units, together with armored units, near the Soviet
borders.
Documents which have now been published show that by
April 3, 1941, Churchill, through his Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.,
Cripps, personally warned Stalin that the Germans had begun
regrouping their armed units with the intent of attacking the
Soviet Union. It is self-evident that Churchill did not do this
at all because of his friendly feeling toward the Soviet nation.
He had in this his own imperialist goals-to bring Germany
and the U.S.S.R. into a bloody war and thereby to strengthen the
position of the British Empire. Just the same, Churchill af-
firmed in his writings that he sought to "warn Stalin and call
his attention to the danger which threatened him." Churchill
stressed this repeatedly in his dispatches of April 18 and in the
following days. However, Stalin took no heed of these warnings.
What is more, Stalin ordered that no credence be given to in-
formation of this sort, in order not to provoke the initiation of
military operations.
We must state that information of this sort concerning the
threat of German armed invasion of Soviet territory came in
also from our own military and diplomatic sources; however,
because the leadership was conditioned against such information,
such data were dispatched with fear and assessed with reserva-
tion.
Thus, for instance, information sent from Berlin May 6, 1941,
by the Soviet military attache, Capt. Vorontsov, stated: "Soviet
citizen Bozer***communicated to the assistant naval attache
that according to a statement of a certain German officer from
Hitler's headquarters, Germany is preparing to invade the
U.S.S.R. May 14 through Finland, the Baltic countries and
Latvia. At the same time Moscow and Leningrad will be heavily
raided and paratroopers landed in border cities. ***"
In his report of May 22, 1941, the assistant military attache
in Berlin, Khlopov, communicated that "***the attack of the
German Army is reportedly scheduled for June 15, but it is
possible that it may begin in the first days of June. ***"
A cable from our London Embassy dated June 18, 1941, stated:
"As of now Cripps is deeply convinced of the inevitability of
armed conflict between Germany and the U.S.S.R. which will
begin not later than the middle of June. According to Cripps,
the Germans have presently concentrated 147 divisions (includ-
ing air force and service units) along the Soviet borders. ***"
Despite these particularly grave warnings, the necessary
steps were not taken to prepare the country properly for de-
fense and to prevent it from being caught unawares.
Did we have time and the capabilities for such preparations?
Yes, we had the time and capabilities. Our industry was already
so developed that it waslcapable of fully supplying the Soviet
Army with everything it needed. This is proved by the fact that
although during the war we lost almost half of our industry and
important industrial and food production areas as the result of
enemy occupation of the Ukraine, North Caucasus and other
western parts of the country, the Soviet people were still able
to organize the, production of military equipment in the eastern
parts of the country, install there equipment taken from the
western industrial areas and supply our armed forces with
everything necessS ec ihAppitoved For Releat
a our
ply the army with the necessary materiel, our wartime losses
would have been decidedly smaller. Such mobilization had not
been, however, started in time. And already in the first days of
the war it became evident that our army was badly armed, that
we did not have enough artillery, tanks and planes to throw the
enemy back.
Soviet science and technology produced excellent models of
tanks and artillery pieces before the war. But mass production
of all this was not organized and as a matter of fact we started
to modernize our military equipment only on the eve of the war.
As a result, at the time of the enemy's invasion of the Soviet
land we did not have sufficient quantities either of old machinery
which was no longer used for armament production or of new
machinery which we had planned to introduce into armament
production. The situation with antiaircraft artillery was
especially bad; we did not organize the production of antitank
ammunition. Many fortified regions had proved tq be indefensible
as soon as they were attached because the old arks had been
withdrawn and new ones were not yet available there.
This pertained, alas, not only to tanks, artillery and planes.
At the outbreak of the war we did not even have sufficient rifles
to arm the mobilized manpower. I recall that in those days I
telephoned to Comrade Malenkov from Kiev and told him,
"People have volunteered for the new army and demand arms.
You must send us arms."
Malenkov answered me, "We cannot send you arms. We are
sending all our rifles to Leningrad, and you will have to arm
yourselves." (Stir in the hall.)
Such was the armament situation.
In this connection we cannot forget, for instance, the following
fact. Shortly before the invasion of the Soviet Union by the
Hitlerite army, Kirponos, who was Chief of the Kiev Special
Military District (he was later killed at the front), wrote to
Stalin that the German armies were at the Bug River, were
preparing for an attack and in the very near future would prob-
ably start their offensive. In this connection Kirponos proposed
that a strong defense be organized, that 300,000 persons be
evacuated from the border areas, and that several strong points
be organized there: antitank ditches, trenches for the soldiers,
etc.
Moscow answered this proposition with the assertion that this
would be a provocation, that no preparatory defensive work should
be undertaken at the borders, that the Germans were not to be
given any pretext for the initiation of military action against us.
Thus, our borders were insufficiently prepared to repel the
enemy.
When the fascist armies had actually invaded Soviet territory
and military operations began, Moscow issued the order that
the German fire was not to be returned. Why? Because Stalin,
despite evident facts, thought that the war had not yet started,
that this was only a provocative action on the part of several
undisciplined sections of the German Army, and that our re-
action might serve as a reason for the Germans to begin the
war.
The following fact is also known. On the eve of the invasion
of the territory of the Soviet Union by the Hitlerite army, a
certain German citizen crossed our border and stated that the
German armies had received orders to start the offensive
against the Soviet Union on the night of June 22, at 3 o'clock.
Stalin was informed about this immediately, but even this warn-
ing was ignored.
As you see, everything was ignored; warnings of certain army
commanders, declarations of deserters from the enemy army,
and even the open hostility of the enemy. Is this an example of
alertness of the head of the Party and chief of state at this par-
ticularly significant historical moment?
And what were the results of this carefree attitude, this dis-
regard of clear facts? The result was that already in the first
hours and days the enemy destroyed in our border regions a
large part of our air force, artillery and other military equip-
ment; he annihilated large numbers of our military cadres and
disorganized our military leadership; consequently, we could not
prevent the enemy from marching deep into the country.
Very ,, pgrievous consequences, especially in reference to the
04964&R? Gr@0449 ?0 0 -gf many
 CPYRGHT
military commanders and political workers in 1937-1941 be-
cause of his suspiciousness and through slanderous accusations.
During these years repressions were instituted against certain
parts of the military cadres, beginning literally at the company
and battalion commander level and extending to the higher
military centers; during this time the cadre of leaders who had
gained military experience in Spain and in the Far East was
almost completely liquidated.
The policy of large-scale repressions against the military
cadres led also to undermined military discipline, because for
several years officers of all ranks and even soldiers in the
Party and Young Communist League cells were taught to "un-
mask" their superiors as hidden enemies. (Stir in the hall.) It
is natural that this caused a negative influence on Mate of
military discipline in the first war period.
And, as you know, we had before the war excellent military
cadres which were unquestionably loyal to the Party and to the
fatherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to
survive despite the severe tortures to which they were subjected
in the prisons showed themselves real patriots from the first
war days and fought heroically for the glory of the fatherland.
I have here in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky (who as you
know, had been jailed), Gorbatov, Meretskov (who is a delegate
to the present Congress), Podlas (he was an excellent com-?
mander who perished at the front) and many, many others.
However, many such commanders perished in camps and jails,
and the army saw them no more.
All this brought about the situation that existed at the begin-
ning of the war and which was a great threat to our fatherland.
It would be incorrect to forget that after the first severe
disaster and defeats at the front Stalin thought that this was the
end. In one of his speeches in those days he said: "All that
Lenin created we have lost forever."
After this, Stalin for a long time actually did not direct the
military operations and ceased to do anything whatever. He
returned to active leadership only when some members of the
Political Bureau visited him and told him that it was necessary
to take certain steps immediately in order to improve the
situation at the front.
Therefore, the threatening danger which hung over our father-
land in the first period of the war was largely due to the faulty
methods of directing the nation and the Party by Stalin himself.
However, we speak not only about the moment when the war
began, which led to serious disorganization of our army and
brought us severe losses. Even after the war began, the
nervousness and hysteria which Stalin demonstrated, interfer-
ing with actual military operations, caused our army serious
damage.
Stalin was very far from an understanding of the real situa-
tion that was developing at the front. That was natural because
during the whole patriotic war he never visited any section of
the front or any liberated city except for one short ride on the
Mozhaisk Highway during a stabilized situation at the front. To
this incident were dedicated many literary works full of fan-
tasies of all sorts, and many paintings. Simultaneously, Stalin
was interfering with operations and issuing orders that did not
take into consideration the real situation at a given section of the
front and which could not help but result in huge personnel
losses.
I will allow myself in this connection to bring out one charac-
teristic fact that illustrates how Stalin directed operations at
the fronts. There is present at this Congress Marshal Bagram-
yan, who was once the Chief of Operations in the Headquarters
of the Southwestern Front and who can corroborate what I will
tell you.
When there developed an exceptionally serious situation for
our army in the Kharkov region in 1942, we correctly decided
to drop an operation whose objective was to encircle Kharkov,
because the actual situation at that time would have threatened
our army with fatal consequences if this operation were con-
tinued.
We communicated this to Stalin, stating that the situation
demanded changes in operational plans so that the enemy would
be prevented from liquidating a sizable concentration of our
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
Contrary to commoi aense;'Sfa.1Tn rej ' 'd ou$ eugges'tion
and issued the order to continue the operation aimed at the en-
circlement of Kharkov, despite the fact that at this time many
army concentrations were themselves actually threatened with
encirclement and liquidation.
I telephoned to Vasilevsky and begged him, "Alexander
Mikhailovich, take a map" (Vasilevsky is present here) "and
show Comrade Stalin the situation which has developed." We
should note that Stalin planned operations on a globe. (Anima-
tion in the hall.) Yes, comrades, he used to take the globe and
trace the ron line on it. I said to Comrade Vasilevsky: "Show
him the situation on a map; in the present situation we cannot
continue the operation which was planned. The old decision must
be changed for the good of the cause."
Vasilevsky replied that Stalin had already studied this problem
and that he, Vasilevsky, would not see Stalin further concerning
this matter because the latter did not want to hear any argu-
ments on the subject of this operation.
After my talk with Vasilevsky I telephoned to Stali i at his
villa. But Stalin did not answer the telephone and Malenkov was
at the receiver. I told Comrade Malenkov that I was calling from
the front and that I wanted to speak personally to Stalin. Stalin
informed me through Malenkov that I should speak with Malen-
kov. I stated for the second time that I wished to inform Stalin
personally about the grave situation which had arisen for us at
the front. But Stalin did not consider it convenient to raise the
phone and again stated that I should speak to him through
Malenkov, although he was only a few steps from the telephone.
After "listening" in this manner to our plea, Stalin said, "Let
everything remain as it is!"
And what was the result of this? The worst that we had ex-
pected. The Germans surrounded our army concentrations, and
consequently we lost hundreds of thousands of our soldiers. This
is Stalin's military "genius"; this is what it cost us. (Stir in
the hall.)
none occasion after the war, during a meeting of Stalin with
members of,the Political Bureau, Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan
mentioned that Khrushchev must have been right when he tele-
phoned concerning the Kharkov operation and that it was un-
fortunate that his suggestion had not been accepted.
You should have seen Stalin's fury! How could it be admitted
that he, Stalin, had not been right! He is, after all, a "genius,"
and a genius cannot help but be right! Everyone can err, but
Stalin considered that he never erred, that he was always right.
He never acknowledged to anyone that he made any mistake,
large or small, despite the fact that he made not a few mistakes
both in the matter of theory and in his practical activity. After
the Party Congress we shall probably have to re-evaluate many
wartime military operations and to present them in their true
light.
The tactics on which Stalin insisted without knowing the es-
sence of the conduct of battle operations cost us much blood
until we succeeded in stopping the opponent and going over to
the offensive.
The military know that as early as the end of 1941, instead of
great operational maneuvers flanking the opponent and penetrat-
ing behind his back, Stalin demanded incessant frontal attacks
and the capture of one village after another. Because of this we
paid with great losses until our generals, on whose shoulders
rested the whole weight of conducting the war, succeeded in
changing the situation and shifting to flexible maneuver opera-
tions, which immediately brought substantial changes in our
favor at the front.
All the more shameful was the fact that after our great vic-
tory over the enemy, which cost us so much, Stalin began to
downgrade many of the commanders who had contributed so
much to the victory over the enemy, because Stalin excluded
every possibility that services rendered at the front should be
credited to anyone but himself.
Stalin was very much interested in the assessment of Com-
rade Zhukov as a military leader. He asked me often for my
opinion of Zhukov. I told him then, "I have known Zhukov for a
long time; he is a good general and a good military leader."
After the war Stalin began to relate all kinds of nonsense
about Zhukov, among other things the following: "You praised
aoperation at tTq- hukov ROo?av follows:
 PAGE 192 %R'KRk4ff -Approved Fob-URellea a CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
IET POLICIES-11
to take a handful of earth, smell it and say, 'We can begin the Union is justly considered a model multinational state because
attack,' or the opposite, 'The planned operation cannot be car- we have in practice assured the equality and friendship of all
ried out.'" I stated at that time, "Comrade Stalin, I. do not know the peoples who inhabit our great fatherland.
who invented this, but it is not true." All the more monstrous are the acts, initiated by Stalin, which
It is possible that Stalin himself invented these things for the are gross violations of the basic Leninist principles of the
purpose of minimizing the role and military talents of Marshal nationalities policy of the Soviet state. We refer to the mass de-
Zhukov, portations from their native territory of whole nations, includ-
in this connection Stalin very energetically popularized him- ing all (their] Communists and Young Communists, without any
a great leader; in various ways he tried to implant exception; this deportation action was not dictated by any mili-
the people the fiction that all victories gained by the tary considerations.
uviet people during the great patriotic war were due to the Thus, already at the end of 1943, when there occurred a
courage, daring and genius of Stalin and of no one else. Exactly permanent breakthrough on the fronts of the great patriotic war
like Kuzma Kryuchkov [a famous Cossack who performed heroic benefiting the Soviet Union, a decision was taken and carried
feats against the Germans], he put one dress on seven persons out concerning deportation of all the Karachai from the lands
at the same time. (Animation in the hall.) on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December,
A propos of this, let us take, for instance, our historical and 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Kalmyk
military films and some literary works; they make us feel sick. Autonomous Republic. In March, 1944, all the Chechen and
Their true objective is propagation of praise for Stalin as a Ingush peoples were deported and the Chechen?Ingush Autono-
military genius. Let us recall the film "The Fall of Berlin." mous Republic was liquidated. In April, 1944, /all Balkans were
Here Stalin alone acts; he Issues orders in a hall in which there deported to faraway places from the territory of the Kabardino-
are many empty chairs, and only one man approaches him and Balkar Autonomous Republic and the republic itself was re-
reports something to him-that is Poskrebyshev, his loyal named the Kabardian Autonomous Republic. The Ukrainians
shield-bearer. (Laughter in the hall.) avoided this fate only because there were too many of them and
But where is the mi itary command? Where is the Political there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, 4Q would
Bureau? Where is the government? What are they doing, with have deported them too. (Laughter and animation in the ..'all.)
what are they occupied? There is nothing about them in the Not only no Marxist-Leninist, but so no man of com on
film. Stalin acts for everybody; he does not reckon with any- sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nationsre-
one; he asks no one for advice. Everything is shown to the sponsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old
people in this false light. Why? In order to surround Stalin people, Communists and Young Communists, to use mass re-
with glory, contrary to the facts and contrary to historical pression against them and to expose them to misery and suffer-
truth. ing for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of
The question arises: And where are the military on whose persons.
shoulders rested the burden of the war? They are not in the After the conclusion of the patriotic war the Soviet people
film; with Stalin in, no room was left for them, stressed with pride the magnificent victories gained through
Not Stalin, but the Party as a whole, the Soviet government, great sacrifices and tremendous efforts. The country experi-
our heroic army, its talented leaders and brave soldiers, the enced a period of political enthusiasm. The Party came out of
whole Soviet people-these are the ones who assured the vic- the war even more united; Party cadres had been tempered and
tory in the great patriotic war. (Stormy and prolonged applause.) hardened in the fire of the war. In such conditions nobody could
The Central Committee members, ministers, our economic have even thought of the possibility of some plot in the Party.
leaders, leaders of Soviet culture, directors of territorial But it was'precisely at this time that the so-called "Lenin-
Party and Soviet organizations, engineers and technicians- grad case" was born. As we have now proved, this case was
every one of them in his own post gave generously of his fabricated. Those who innocently lost their lives included Com-
strength and knowledge toward ensuring victory over the rades Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, Popkov and others.
enemy. As is known, Voznesensky and Kuznetsov were talented and
Our hard core showed exceptional heroism; surrounded by eminent leaders. Once they stood very close to Stalin. Suffice
glory are our whole working class, our collective farm it to mention that Stalin made Voznesensky first assistant to
peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia, who under the leader- the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Kuznetsov was
ship of Party organizations overcame untold difficulties and, elected Secretary of the Central Committee. The very fact that
bearing the hardships of war, devoted all their efforts to the Stalin entrusted Kuznetsov with the supervision of the state
cause of defending the fatherland, security agencies shows the trust Kuznetsov enjoyed.
Great and brave deeds were accomplished during the war by How did it happen that these persons were branded enemies
our Soviet women, who bore on their backs the heavy load of of the people and liquidated?
production work in the factories, on the collective farms and Facts prove that the "Leningrad case" is also the result of
on various economic and cultural sectors; many women par- willfulness which Stalin exercised against Party cadres.
ticipated directly in the great patriotic war at the fronts; our Had a normal situation existed in the Party Central Committee
brave youth contributed immeasurably at the front and at home and in the Central Committee Political Bureau, cases of this
to the defense of the Soviet fatherland and the annihilation of the nature would have been examined there in accordance with
enemy. Party practice, and all pertinent facts assessed; as a result,
Immortal are the services of the Soviet soldiers, of our com- such a case, as well as others, would not have happened.
manders and political workers of all ranks; after the loss of a We must state that after the war the situation became even
considerable part of the army in the first war months, they did more complicated. Stalin became even more capricious, ir-
not lose their heads and were able to reorganize in the course ritable and brutal; in particular, his suspicion grew. His per-
of combat; in the course of the war they created and toughened secution mania reached unbelievable dimensions. Many workers
a strong and heroic army, and not only withstood the strong were becoming enemies before his very eyes. After the war
and cunning enemy, but crushed him. Stalin separated himself from the collective even more. He de-
The magnificent and heroic deeds of hundreds of millions of cided everything alone, without any consideration for anyone or
people of the East and ?f the West during the fight against the anything.
menace of fascist subjugation which loomed before us will live The arrant provocateur and vile enemy, Beria, who had
centuries and millenia in the memory of thankful humanity. murdered thousands of Communists and loyal Soviet people,
(Stormy applause.) cleverly took advantage of this incredible suspicion. The eleva-
The main role and the main credit for the victorious con- tion of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria. As we have
clusion of the war belongs to our Communist Party, to the now proved, it was Beria who "suggested" to Stalin the fabrica-
armed forces of the Soviet Union, and to the tens of millions tion by him and by his confidants of materials in the form of
of Soviet.people raised by the Party. (Stormy, prolonged ap- declarations and anonymous letters, and in the form of various
~lau~se.) rumors and talk.
~.o raae , letAhni iierf] O1i~ri ergo ? ~i ~9 lease i D~ # Rt ~Q6~ZQh~fl~e9called
 CPYRGHT
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149ROO0400370002-9
CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II PAGE 183
"Leningrad case"; persons who suffered innocently are now
rehabilitated and the glorious Leningrad Party organization has
been restored to honor. Abakumov and others who fabricated
this affair were brought before a court; their trial took place
in Leningrad and they received their just deserts.
The question arises: Why is it that we see the truth of this
case only now, and why did we not do something earlier, during
Stalin's lifetime, to prevent the loss of innocent lives? It was
because Stalin personally supervised the "Leningrad case," and
the majority of the Political Bureau members at that time did
riot know all of the circumstances in these matters, and could
not therefore intervene.
When Stalin received certain materials from Beria and Abaku-
mov, without examining these slanderous materials he ordered
an investigation of the "case" of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov.
With this their fate was sealed.
Instructive in the same way is the case of the Mingrelian na-
tionalist organization which supposedly existed in Georgia. As
is known, decisions were adopted on this case by the Party
Central Committee in November, 1951, and March,.1952. These
decisions were made without prior discussion with the Political
Bureau. Stalin had personally dictated them. They made serious
accusations against many loyal Communists. On the basis of
falsified documents it was shown that there existed in Georgia
a supposedly nationalist organization, the objective of which was
liquidation of Soviet rule in that republic with the help of im-
perialist powers.
In this connection, a number of responsible Party and Soviet
workers were arrested in Georgia. As was later proved, this
was a slander directed against the Georgian Party organization.
We know that at times there have been manifestations of local
bourgeois nationalism in Georgia, as in several other republics.
The question arises: Could it be possible that in the period dur-
ing which the above-mentioned resolutions were adopted na-
tionalist tendencies had grown so much that there was danger
of Georgia's leaving the Soviet Union and joining Turkey? Stir
in the hall, laughter.)
This is, of course, nonsense. It is impossible to imagine how
such assumptions could enter anyone's mind. Everyone knows
how Georgia has developed economically and culturally under
Soviet rule.
Industrial production in the Georgian Republic is 27 times as
great as before the revolution. Many new industries have arisen
in Georgia that did not exist there before the revolution: iron
smelting, an oil industry, machine building, etc. Illiteracy,
which in prerevolutionary Georgia embraced 78% of the popula-
tion, has long since been eliminated. Could the Georgians,
comparing the situation in their republic with the hard situation
of the working masses in Turkey, have aspired to join Turkey?
In 1955 Georgia produced 18 times as much steel per capita as
Turkey. Georgia produces nine times as much electric power
per capita as Turkey. According to data of the 1950 census, 65%
of Turkey's total population is illiterate, and 80% of the women.
Georgia has 19 institutions of higher learning, which have about
39,000 students; this is eight times as many as in Turkey (per
1000 inhabitants). The prosperity of the working people has
grown tremendously in Georgia under Soviet rule.
It is clear that as the economy and culture develop, and as the
socialist consciousness of the working masses in Georgia grows,
the source from which bourgeois nationalism draws its strength
evaporates.
As it turned out, there was no nationalist organization in
Georgia. Thousands of innocent persons fell victim to willful-
ness and lawlessness. All of this happened under the "inspired"
leadership of Stalin, "the great son of the Georgian people," as
Georgians liked to refer to Stain. (Stir in the hall.)
Stalin's willfulness showed itself not only in decisions con-
cerning the domestic life of the country but also in the inter-
national relations of the Soviet Union.
The July plenary session of the Central Committee studied in
detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugo-
slavia. It was a shameful role that Stalin played there. The
"Yugoslav affair" ' contained no problems that could not have been
solved through Party discussions among comrades. There was
" it was
no substantial basis for the d@vglop ent f this "affair
,
entirely possible to hay bL ii ue-rspprevedifi?rviFlReheaseliv&CAw RO.GO4MaGG 2r4
that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav
leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings.
But these mistakes and shortcomings were monstrously magni-
fied by Stalin, which resulted in the breaking of relations with
a friendly country.
I recall the first clays when the conflict between the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia began artificially to be blown up. Once,
when I came from Kiev to Moscow, I was invited to visit Stalin,
who, pointing to the copy of a letter lately sent to Tito, asked
me, "Have you read this?" Not waiting for my reply, he
answered: "I will shake my little finger-and there will be no
more Tito. He will fall."
We have paid dearly for this "shake of the little finger." This
statement reflected Stalin's mania for greatness, but he acted
just that way: "I will shake my little finger-and there will be
no Kossior"; "I will shake my little finger once more, and
Postyshev and Chubar will be no more"; "I will shake my little
finger again-and Voznesensky, Kuznetsov and many otfhers
will disappear,"
But this did not happen to Tito. No matter how much or how
little Stalin shook not only his little finger, but everything else
that he could shake, Tito did not fall. Why? The reason was
that, in this case of disagreement with the Yugoslav comrades,.
Tito had behind him a state and a people who had gone through a
severe school of fighting for liberty and independence, a people
who gave support to their leaders.
You see to what Stalin's mania for greatness led. He had
completely lost a sense of reality; he demonstrated his sus-
picion and haughtiness not only in relation to individuals in the
U.S.S.R., but in relation to whole parties and nations.
We have carefully examined the case of Yugoslavia and have
found a proper solution which is approved by the peoples of the
Soviet Union and of Yugoslavia, as well as by the working masses
of all the people's democracies and by all progressive hilmanity.
The liquidation of the abnormal relationship with Yugoslavia was
done in the interest of the whole camp of socialism, in the interest
of strengthening peace in the whole world.
Let us also recall the "case of the doctor-plotters." (Stir in
the hall.) Actually there was no "case" outside of the decimation
of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or
ordered by someone (after all, she was an unofficial collaborator
of the agencies of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which
she declared that the doctors were applying allegedly improper
methods of medical treatment.
Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate
conclusion that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union.
He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical
specialists. He personally issued advice on the conduct of the
investigation and the method of interrogation of the arrested
persons. He said Academician Vinogradov should be put in
chains, another one should be beaten. Present at this Congress
as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade
Ignatyev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions
from the doctors we will shorten you by a head." (Tumult in the
hall.)
Stalin personally summoned the investigative judge, gave him
instructions, advised him on the investigative methods to be
used; these methods were simple-beat, beat and, once again,
beat.
Shortly after the doctors were arrested, we members of the
Political Bureau received transcripts of the doctors' confessions
of guilt. After distributing these, Stalin told us, "You are blind
as young kittens; what would happen without me? The country
would perish because you do not know how to recognize enemies."
The case was so presented that no one could verify the facts
on which the investigation was based. There was no possibility
of trying to verify the facts by contacting those who had made
the confessions of guilt.
We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was
questionable. We knew some of these people personally, for they
had once treated us. When we examined this "case" after Stalin's
death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.
This ignominious "case" was set up by Stalin; he did not, how-
ever, have the time in which to bring it to a conclusion (as he
conceived that conclusion). and for this reason the doctors are
 In the same places they were working before; they treat top in-
dividuals, not excluding members of the government; they have
our full confidence; and they execute their duties honestly, as
they did before.
In organizing the various dirty and shameful cases, a very
base role was played by the rabid enemy of our party, the agent
of foreign intelligence, Beria, who had stolen into Stalin's con-
fidence. In what way could this provocateur gain such a position
In the Party and in the state as to become the First Vice-
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union and a
member of the Central Committee's Political Bureau? It has
now been established that this villain climbed up the government
ladder over an untold number of corpsgs.
Were there any signs that Beria was an enemy of the Party?
Yes, there were. As far back as in 1937, at a Central Commit-
tee plenary session, the former People's Commissar of Public
Health, Kaminsky, said that Beria had worked for the Mussavat
intelligence service. But the Central Committee plenary ses-
sion had barely concluded before Kaminsky was arrested and
then shot. Did Stalin examine Kaminsky's statement? No, be-
cause Stalin believed in Beria, and that was enough for him.
And when Stalin believed in anyone or anything, then no one
could say anything that was contrary to his opinion; anyone who
would have dared to express opposition would have met the same
fate as Kaminsky.
There were other signs also. The declaration which Comrade
Snegov made to the Party Central Committee is interesting.
(Incidentally, he was also rehabilitated not long ago, after 17
years in prison camps.) In this declaration Snegov writes:
"In connection with the proposed rehabilitation of the former
Central Committee member, Lavrenti Kartvelishvili, I have
entrusted to the hands of the representative of the Committee
on State Security a detailed deposition concerning Beria's role
in the disposition of the Kartvelishvili case and concerning the
criminal motives by which Beria was'guided.
"In my opinion it is indispensable to recall an important fact
pertaining to this case and to communicate it to the Central
Committee, because I did not consider it suitable to include in
the investigation documents.
"On Oct. 30, 1931, at the session of the Organizational Bureau
of the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee, Kart-
velishvili, Secretary of the Transcaucasus Territory Committee,
delivered a report. All members of the Executive of the ter-
ritory committee were present; of them I alone am alive.
"During this session J. V. Stalin made a motion at the end of
his speech concerning the organization of the Secretariat of the
Transcaucasus Territory Committee composed of the following:
First Secretary, Kartvelishvili; Second Secretary, Beria. (This
was the first time in the Party's history that Beria's name was
mentioned as a candidate for a Party position.)
"Kartvelishvili answered that he knew Beria well and for that
reason refused categorically to work with him. Stalin proposed
then that this matter be left open and that it be settled in the
process of the work itself. Two days later a decision was ar-
rived at that Beria would receive the Party post and that Kart-
velishvili would be deported from the Transcaucasus."
This fact can be confirmed by Comrades Mikoyan and
Kaganovich, who were present at that session.
The long unfriendly relations between Kartvelishvili and
Beria were widely known. They date back to the time when
Comrade Sergo [Ordzhonikidze] was active in the Transcauca-
sus; Kartvelishvili was Sergo's closest assistant. The unfriendly
relationship impelled Beria to fabricate a "case" against Kart-
velishvili.
It is characteristic that in this "case" Kartvelishvili was
charged with a terroristic act against Beria.
The indictment in the eria case contains a discussion of his
crimes. Some things should, however, be recalled, especially
since it is possible that not all the delegates to the Congress
have read this document. I wish to recall Beria's bestial dis-
position of the cases of Kedrov, Golubev, and Golubev's
mother by adoption, Baturina, persons who wished to inform the
Central Committee concerning Beria's treacherous activity.
They were shot' without any trial and the sentence was passed
ex post facto, after the execution.
Saproved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
the Central Committee through Comrade Andreyev (Comrade
Andreyev was then a Central Committee secretary):
"I am appealing to you for help from a gloomy cell of
Lefortovo prison. Let my cry of horror reach your cars; do
not remain deaf; take me under your protection; please help
remove the nightmare of interrogations and show that this is al
a mistake,
"I suffer innocently, Please believe me, Time will testify to
the truth. I am not an agent-provocateur of the Tsarist Okhran
I am not a spy, I any not a membor of an anti-Soviet organiza-
tion, of which f am accused on the basis of denunciations. I am
also not guilty of any other crimes against the Party and the
government. I am an old Bolshevik, free of any taint; I have
honestly fought for almost 40 years in the ranks of the Party
for the good and the prosperity of the people. ***
"*** Today I, a 62-year-old man, am threatened by the in-
vestigative judges with more severe, cruel and degrading
methods of physical pressure. They the judges] are no longer
capable of becoming aware of their error and of recognizing tha
their handling of my case is illegal and impermissible. They
try to justify their actions by picturing me as a hardened and
raving enemy and are demanding increased repressions. But
let the Party know that I am innocent and that there is nothing
which can turn a loyal son of the Party into an enemy, even
right up to his last dying breath.
"But I have no way out. I cannot divert from myself the
swiftly approaching new and powerful blows.
"Everything, however, has its limits. My torture has reached
the extreme. My health is broken, my strength and my energy
are waning, the end is drawing near. To die in a Soviet prison,
branded a vile traitor to the fatherland-what can be more
monstrous for an honest man? And how monstrous this is! Un-
surpassed bitterness and pain grips my heart. 'Nol Nol This
will not happen; this cannot be,' I cry. Neither the Party nor the
Soviet government nor People's Commissar L. P. Beria will
permit this cruel, irreparable injustice. I am firmly certain
that given a calm, objective examination, without foul rantings,
without anger and without the fearful tortures, it would be easy
to prove the baselessness of the charges. I believe deeply that
truth and justice will triumph. I believe. I believe."
The old Bolshevik, Comrade Kedrov, was found innocent by
the Military Collegium. Despite this, he was shot at Beria's
order. (Indignation in the hall.)
Beria also cruelly treated the family of Comrade Ordzhoni-
kidze. Why? Because Ordzhonikidze had tried to prevent Beria
from realizing his shameful plans. Beria had cleared from his
way all persons who could possibly interfere with him. Ord-
zhonikidze was always an opponent of Beria, which he told
Stalin. Instead of examining this matter and taking appropriate
steps, Stalin permitted the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's
brother and brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state that
he was forced to shoot himself. (Indignation in the hall.) Such
was Beria.
Beria was unmasked by the Party Central Committee shortly
after Stalin's death. The particularly detailed legal proceedings
established that Beria had committed monstrous crimes, and
Beria was shot.
The question arises why Beria, who had liquidated tens of
thousands of Party and Soviet workers, was not unmasked dur-
ing Stalin's lifetime. He was not unmasked earlier because he
had very skillfully utilized Stalin's weaknesses; feeding him
with suspicions, he assisted Stalin in everything and acted with
his support.
Comrades, the cult of the individual acquired such monstrous
proportions chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable
methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is
confirmed by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic
examples of Stalin's self -glorificatiod-and of his lack of even
elementary modesty is the edition of his "Short Biography,"
which was published in 1948.
This book is an expression of the most dissolute flattery, an
example of making a man into a godhead, of transforming him
into an infallible sage, "the greatest leader," "sublime strate-
gist of all times and nations." Finally. no other wnrrda rniilrl ho
Here is what thtani iized'istAC~DradV@Q rydFvis%' I'6ase
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CRYRGHT
filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were ap-
proved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were
added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.
What did Stalin consider essential to write into this book?
Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers who were com-
posing his "Short Biography"? No! He marked the very places
where he thought that the praise of his services was insufficient.
Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity,
added in Stalin's own hand:
"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the Trots-
kyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there was
definitely welded together, after Lenin's death, that leading core
of the Party'***t that upheld the great banner of Lenin, rallied
the Party behind L-vin's behests, and brought the Soviet people
onto the broad road of industrializing the country and collectiviz-
ing the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding
force of the Party and the state was Comrade; Stalin."
Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:
"Although he performed his task of leader of the Party and the
people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved sup-
port of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work
to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-
adulation."
Where'and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this
worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. It was
precisely against this that Marx and Engels took such a strong
position. This was always sharply condemned by Vladimir
Ilyich Lenin, too.
In the draft text of his book appeared the following sentence:
"Stalin is the Lenin of today." This sentence appeared to Stalin
to be too weak, so in his own handwriting he changed it to read:
"Stalin is the worthy continuer of Lenin's work, or, as they say
in our party, Stalin is the Lenin of today." You see how well it
is said, not by the people, but by Stalin himself.
It is possible to give many such self-praising appraisals
written into the draft text of that book in Stalin's hand. Espe-
cially generously does he endow himself with praises pertaining
to his military genius, to his talent for strategy.
I will cite one more insertion made by Stalin concerning the
Stalinist military genius. He writes: "The advanced Soviet sci-
ence of warfare received further development at Comrade
Stalin's hands. Comrade Stalin elaborated the theory of the
permanently operating factors that decide the outcome of wars,
[the theory] of active defense and the laws of counteroffensive
and offensive, of the cooperation of all services and arms in
modern warfare, of the role of big tank masses and air forces
in modern war, and of the artillery as the most formidable of
the armed services. At the various stages of the war Stalin's
genius found the correct solutions that took account of all the
circumstances of the situation." (Stir in the hall.) And further,
writes Stalin: "Stalin's military mastery was displayed in both
defense and offense. Comrade Stalin's genius enabled him to
divine the enemy's plans and defeat him. The battles in which
Comrade Stalin directed the Soviet armies are brilliant ex-
amples of operational military skill."
This is how Stalin was praised as a strategist. Who did this?
-Stalin himself, not in his role as a strategist, but in the role of
author-editor, one of the main creators of his self-adulatory
biography.
Such, comrades, are the facts-the shameful facts, we should
say.
And one additional fact from the same "Short Biography" of
Stalin. As is known, the "History of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (Short Course)" was written by a commission of the
:Party Central Committee.
This book, incidentally, was also permeated with the cult of
'the individual leader and was written by a designated group of
authors. This fact was reflected in the following formulation in
the proof copy of the "Short Biography" of Stalin:
1' [Omitted portion, as found in "Joseph Stalin: Short Biography,"
KMoscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949, p. 89) is
as follows: "***consisting of Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Voroshilov,
I uibyshev, Frunze, Dzerzhinsky, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze,
Kirov, Yaroa,.Mikoy EUZI sh ,, ,For F
5hkiryatov and d othe others."-
"A commission of the Party Central Committee, under the
direction of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal
participation, has prepared a `History of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (Short Course).'"
But even this phrase did not satisfy Stalin. The following
sentence replaced it in the final version of the "Short Biography":
"In 1938 appeared the book, `History of the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union (Short Course),' written by Comrade Stalin
and approved by a commission of the Party Central Committee."
Can one add anything more? (Stir in the hall.)
As you see, a surprising metamorphosis turned a work pro-
duced by a group into a book written by Stalin. It is not neces-
sary to state how and why this metamorphosis took place.
A pertinent question comes to mind: If Stalin is the author of
this book, why did he need to praise the person of Stalin so
much and to transform the whole post-October historical period
of our glorious Communist Party into solely the product'of "the
Stalin genius"?
Did this book properly reflect the efforts of the Party in the
socialist transformation of the country, in the construction of
socialist society, in the industrialization and collectivization of
the country, and also other steps taken by the Party in undevi-
atingly traveling the path outlined by Lenin? This book speaks
principally about Stalin, about his speeches, about his reports.
Everything without the smallest exception is tied to his name.
And when Stalin himself asserts that he himself wrote the
"History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short
Course)," this calls at the least for amazement. Can a Marxist-
Leninist write about himself thus, praising his own person to the
heavens?
Or let us take the matter of the Stalin Prizes. (Stir in the hall.)
Not even the Tsars created prizes which they named after them-
selves.
Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of
the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist
Party; it contains, however, the following unprecedented praise
of Stalin: "Stalin brought us up in loyalty to the people/He in-
spired us to great labors and feats."
In these lines of the anthem the whole educational, directing
and inspirational activity of the great Leninist party is ascribed
to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear deviation from Marxism-
Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the Party.
We should add for your information that the Presidium of the
Central Committee has already adopted a decision concerning
the composition of a new text of the anthem which will reflect
the role of the people and the role of the Party. (Loud, prolonged
applause.)
And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest
enterprises and cities were named for him? Was it without his
knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected throughout the
country-these "memorials to the living"? It is a fact that
Stalin himself, on July 2, 1951, signed a decision of the U.SS.R.
Council of Ministers concerning the erection of an impressive
monument to Stalin on the Volga-Don Canal. On Sept. 4 of the
same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper available
for the construction of this impressive monument. Anyone who
has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the huge statue
which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any
people frequent. Huge sums were spent to built it at a time when
people of this area had been living in huts since the war. Con-
sider yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his biography
that "***he never allowed***the slightest hint of vanity, con-
ceit or self-adulation?"
At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for
Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision
taken more than 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a
monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this Palace was not built, its con-
struction was always postponed, and the project allowed to lapse.
We cannot fail to recall the Soviet government resolution of
Aug. 14, 1925, concerning "the establishment of Lenin Prizes
for educational work." This resolution was published in the
press, but to this day there are no Lenin Prizes. This, too,
should be corrected. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)
During Stalin's lifetime, thanks to known methods `which I have
IMP df iu, ii'$vonLs were explained as tf 7Le?in played9
 Rr i -Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
PAGE 186 CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-II
only a secondary role, even during the October socialist revo-
lution. Many films and many literary works incorrectly pre-
sented and inadmissibly belittled Lenin.
Stalin loved to see the film, "Unforgettable 1919," in which
he was shown on the steps of an armored train and where he
practically vanquished the foe with his own saber. Let Kliment
Yefremovich [Voroshilov], our dear friend, find the necessary
courage and write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows
how Stalin fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov to
undertake this, but it would be good if he did. Everyone will ap-
prove of it, both the people and the Party. Even his grandsons
will thank him. (Prolon ed applause.)
In speaking about a events of the October revolution and
the Civil War, the impression was created that Stalin always
played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had
suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. But this is
slander of Lenin. (Prolonged applause.)
I shall probably not be sinning against the truth when I say
that 99% of the persons present here heard and knew very little
about Stalin before 1924, while Lenin was known to all; he was
known to the whole Party, to the whole nation, from children to
graybeards. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)
All this has to be thoroughly revised, so that history, litera-
ture, and the fine arts properly reflect V. I. Lenin's role and
the great deeds of our Communist Party and Soviet people, the
creator-people. (Applause.)
Comrades! The cult of the individual leader caused the em-
ployment of faulty principles in Party work and in economic
activity; it brought about gross violation of inner-Party and
Soviet democracy, sterile administration by fiat, deviations of
all sorts, covering up of shortcomings and varnishing of
reality. Our country gave birth to many flatterers and spe-
cialists in false optimism and deceit.
We should also not forget that due to numerous arrests of
Party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to
work uncertainly, showed overcautiousness, feared everything
that was new, feared their own shadows and began to show less
initiative in their work.
Take, for instance, Party and Soviet resolutions. They were
prepared in a routine manner, often without considering the
concrete situation. This went so far that Party workers read
their speeches even at the smallest sessions. All this produced
the danger of formalizing Party and Soviet work and of bureauc-
ratizing the whole apparatus.
Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact
that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the prov-
inces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.
All those who interested themselves even a little in the na-
tional situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but
Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes,
we told him; but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin
never traveled anywhere, did not meet city and collective farm
workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.
He knew the countryside and agriculture only from films.
And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing
situation in agriculture.
Many films pictured collective farm life as if the tables bent
under the weight of turkeys and geese. Evidently Stalin thought
that it was actually so.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently. He was al-
ways close to the people; he used to receive peasant delegates,
and often spoke at factory gatherings; he used to visit villages
and talk with the peasants.
Stalin cut himself off from the people and never went any-
where. This lasted tens of years. The last time he visited a
village was in January, 1928, when he visited Siberia in con-
nection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known
the situation in the provinces?
.And when he was once told during a discussion that our situa-
tion on the land was a difficult one and that the livestock situa-
tion was especially bad, a commission was formed and charged
with drafting a resolution entitled "Means Toward Further De-
velopment of Livestock Raising on Collective and State Farms."
We worked out this draft.
Of course, our proposals of that time did not contain all pos-
then to raise the prices of animal products to create material
incentives for the collective farmers and M.T.S. and state farm
workers in the development of livestock. But our draft was not
accepted and in February, 1953, was laid aside entirely.
What is more, while reviewing this draft Stalin proposed that
the taxes paid by the collective farms and by the collective
farmers should be raised by 40,000,000,000 rubles. According
to him, the peasants were well-off and the collective farmer
would need to sell only one more chicken to pay his tax in full.
Imagine what this would have meant. Certainly 40,000,000,00
rubles is a sum which the collective farmers did not realize for
all the products which they sold to the government. In 1952, for
instance, the collective farms and the collective farmers re-
ceived 26,280,000,000 rubles for all their products delivered an
sold to the government.
Did Stalin's position rest, then, on data of any sort whatever?
Of course not.
In such cases facts and figures did not interbst him. If Stalin
said anything, that meant it was so-after all, he was a "genius
and a genius does not need to count, he only needs to look and
can immediately tell how it should be. When he expresses his
opinion, everyone has to echo it and to admire his wisdom.
But how much wisdom was contained in the proposal to raise
the agricultural tax by 40,000,000,000 rubles? None, absr lutely
none, because the proposal was not based on an actual assess-
ment of the situation but on the fantastic ideas of a person
divorced from reality. We are currently beginning slowly to
work our way out of a difficult agricultural situation. The
speeches of the delegates to the 20th Congress please us all.
We are glad that many delegates speak, that there are condition
for the fulfillment of the Sixth Five-Year Plan for animal hus-
bandry, not during the period of five years, but within two to
three years. We are certain that the commitments of the new
Five-Year Plan will be met successfully. (Prolonged applause.)
Comrades! If today we sharply criticize the cult of the in-
dividual leader which was so widespread during Stalin's lifetime
and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated b
this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism,
various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the
Party and the country for 30 years, and many victories were
gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion,
the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are
blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual
leader, only by those who do not understand the essence of the
revolution and of the Soviet state, only by those who do not
understand in a Leninist manner the role of the Party and of the
people in the development of Soviet society.
The socialist revolution was accomplished by the working
class and the poor peasantry, with the partial support of the mid
die peasants. It was accomplished by the people under the leade
ship of the Bolshevist party. Lenin's great service consisted in
that he created a militant party of the working class; he was
armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social develop-
ment and with the science of proletarian victory in the struggle
with capitalism, and he steeled this party in the crucible of the
revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people. During this
struggle the Party consistently defended the interests of the
people, became their experienced leader, and led the working
masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state.
You remember well Lenin's wise words that the Soviet state
is strong because of the awareness of the masses, because
history is created by the millions and tens of millions of people.
Our historic victories were attained thanks to the organiza-
tional work of the Party, to the many local organizations, and to
the self-sacrificing work of our great people. These victories
are the result of the great drive and activity of the people and
Party as a whole; they are not at all. the fruit of Stalin's leader-
ship, as was pictured during the period of the cult of the in-
dividual leader.
If we are to consider this matter as Marxists and as Leninists
then we must state unequivocally that the leadership practice
which came into being during the last years of Stalin's life be-
came a serious obstacle in the path of the development of Soviet
society.
sibilities, but w J fl ft ys tFbya=aa@tSe : 91" -I.E.. 000Bj3""2gXj important
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CPV-
problems-the solution of which could not be postponed-con-
cerning the life of the Party and state. During Stalin's leader-
ship our peaceful relationships with other nations were often
threatened because one-mw=1 decisions could and often did cause
reat complications.
In the recent years when we managed to free ourselves of the
armful practice of the cult of the individual leader and took
everal appropriate steps in the sphere of domestic and foreign
policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes,
ow the creative activity of the broad working masses developed,
ow favorably all this influenced the development of the economy
and of culture. (Applause.) ,
Some comrades may ask us: Where were the members of the
olitical Bureau of the Central Committee? Why did they not
ssert themselves against the cult of the individual leader in
ime? Why is this being done only now?
First of all we have to consider the fact that the members of
he Political Bureau viewed these matters in a different way at
afferent times. Initially, many of them backed Stalin actively
ecause Stalin was one of the strongest Marxists and his logic,
is strength and his will greatly influenced the cadres and Party
ork.
It is known that Stalin, after Lenin's death, especially during
he first years, fought actively for Leninism against the foes
f Leninist theory and against those who deviated. Basing itself
n Leninist theory, the Party, headed by its Central Committee,
tarted on a great scale the work of socialist industrialization
f the country, agricultural collectivization and the cultural
evolution.
At that time Stalin gained great popularity, sympathy and sup-
rt. The Party had to fight those who attempted to lead the
ountry away from the correct Leninist path; it had to fight
rotskyites, Zinovievites and rightists, and the bourgeois na-
ionalists. This fight was indispensable. Later, however, Stalin,
busing his power more and more, began to fight eminent Party
nd government leaders and to use terroristic methods against
o0
nest Soviet people. As we have already shown, Stalin thus
reated such eminent Party and government leaders as Kossior,
udzutak, Eikhe, Postyshev and many others.
Attempts to oppose groundless suspicions and charges re-
ulted in the opponent falling victim of the repression. This
haracterized the fall of Comrade Postyshev.
In one of his speeches Stalin expressed his dissatisfaction
ith Postyshev and asked him, "What are you actually?"
Postyshev answered clearly, "I am a Bolshevik, Comrade
talin, a Bolshevik."
This assertion was at first considered to show a lack of re-
pect for Stalin; later it was considered a harmful act, and con-
equently resulted in Postyshev's annihilation and in his being
randed without reason as an "enemy of the people."
In the situation which then prevailed I talked with Nikolai
lexandrovich Bulganin. Once when we two were traveling in a
ar, he said: "It has happened sometimes that a man goes to
talin by invitation, as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he
oes not know where he will be sent next, home or to jail."
It is clear that such conditions put every member of the Po-
itical Bureau in a very difficult situation. And when we also
onsider the fact that in the last years Central Committee ple-
ary sessions were not convened and that the sessions of the
olitical Bureau occurred only occasionally, from time to time,
en we shall understand how difficult it was for any member of
he Political Bureau to take a stand against one or another un-
st or improper procedure, against serious errors and short-
omings in the practice of leadership.
As we have already shown, maay decisions were taken either
y one person or in a roundaboutlway, without collective dis-
ussions. The sad fate of Political Bureau member Comrade
oznesensky, who fell victim to Stalin's repressions, is known
all. It is characteristic that the decision to remove him from
e Political Bureau was never discussed, but was reached in a
evious fashion. The same is true of the decision to remove
uznetsov and Rodionovfrom their posts.
The importance of the Central Committee Political Bureau
as reduced and its work was disorganized by the creation with-
the Political Bureau of p d" t -18
quintets," "sextets," "se a an novenar e " ~Ier-e s,
,
for instance, a resolution of the Political Bureau of Oct. 3,
1946:
"Stalin's Proposal:
"1. The Political Bureau Committee for Foreign Affairs
('sextet') is to concern itself in the future, in addition to foreign
affairs, with matters of internal construction and domestic
policy.
"2. The sextet is to add to its roster the Chairman of the
U.S.S.R. State Economic Planning Commission, Comrade Voz-
nesensky, and is to be known as a septet.
"Signed: Secretary of the Central Committee, J. Stalin."
What a card player's terminology! (Laughter in the hall.) It
is clear that the creation within the Political ureau of_ uch
committees-"quintets," "sextets," "septets" and 'novar-
ies"-was against the principle of collective leadership. The
result of this was that some members of the Political Bureau
were thus kept from participation in the most important ptate
matters.
One of the oldest members of our party, Kliment Yefremovich
Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation.
For several years he was actually deprived of the right of par-
ticipation in Political Bureau sessions. Stalin forbade him to at-
tend the Political Bureau sessions and to receive documents.
When the Political Bureau was in session and Comrade Voroshilov
heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he
would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but
always showed his dissatisfaction. Because of his extreme sus-
picion, Stalin toyed also with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion
that Voroshilov was a British agent. (Laughter in the hall.) It's
true, a British agent. A special tapping device was installed In
his home to listen to what was said there. (Indignation in the
hall.)
By unilateral decision. Stalin had also cut off another man
from the work of the Political Bureau-Andrei Andreyevich
Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of willfulness.
Let us consider the first Central Committee plenary session
after the 19th Party Congress when Stalin, in his talk at the
plenary session, characterized Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov
and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan and suggested that these old
workers of our party were guilty of some baseless charges. It
is not excluded that, had Stalin remained at the helm for another
several months, Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan would probably
not have delivered any speeches at this -Congress.
Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the
Political Bureau. He often stated that Political Bureau members
should be replaced by new ones.
His proposal after the 19th Congress concerning the selection
of 25 persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed
at removing the old Political Bureau members and bringing in
less experienced persons, so that these would extol him in all
sorts of ways.
We can assume that this was also a design for future annihila-
tion of the old Political Bureau members and in this way a cover
for all the shameful acts of Stalin which we are now consider-
ing.
Comrades! In order not to repeat errors of the past, the
Central Committee has declared itself resolutely against the
cult of the individual leader. We consider that Stalin was ex-
cessively extolled. However, in the past Stalin undoubtedly per-
formed great services to the Party, to the working class and to
the international workers' movement.
This question is complicated by the fact that all that we have
just discussed was done during Stalin's life, under his leader-
ship and with his concurrence; here Stalin was convinced that it
was necessary for the defense of the interests of the working
classes against the plotting of the enemies and against the at-
tack of the imperialist camp. He saw this from the position of
the interests of the working class, the interests of the working
people, the interests of the victory of socialism and communism.
We cannot say that these were the deeds of a giddy despot. He
considered that this should be done in the interests of the Party,
of the working masses, in the name of defense of the revolution's
gains. In this lies the whole tragedy!
Comrades! Lenin often stressed that modesty is an absolutely
person cation~o$he greateest modesty. Wee cannot say that
 Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9
CPYRGHT CURRENT SOVIET POLICIES-11
have been following this Leninist example in all respects. Suf-
fice it to point out that we have called many cities, factories
and industrial enterprises, collective and state farms, Soviet
institutions and cultural institutions after the private names-
as if they were the private property, if I may express it so-of
various government or Party leaders who were still active and
in good health. Many of us participated in the act of assigning
our names to various cities, districts, factories and collective
farms. We must correct this. (Applause.)
But this should be done calmly and slowly. The Central Com-
mittee will discuss this matter and consider it carefully to pre-
vent errors and excesses. I can remember how,the Ukraine
learned about Kossior's arrest. The Kiev radio used to start
its programs thus: ."This is the Radio Station [named for] Kos-
sior." When one day the programs began without naming Kos-
sior, everyone was quite certain that something had happened
to Kossior, that he probably had been arrested.
Thus, if today we begin to remove the signs everywhere and
to change names, people will think that the comrades in whose
honor the given enterprises, collective farms or cities are
named also met some bad fate and that they have also been ar-
rested. (Stir in the hall.)
How is the prestige and importance of this or that leader
judged? By the number of cities, industrial enterprises, fac-
tories, collective and state farms that bear his. name. Is it not
time -,-.eded this "private property" and "nationalized" the
factories, the industrial enterprises, the collective and state
farms? (Laughter, applause, voices: "Right.") This will benefit
our cause. After all, the cult of the individual leader is mani-
fested also in this way.
We should consider the question of the cult of the individual
leader quite seriously. We cannot let this matter get out of the
Party, especially not to the press. It is for this reason that we
are considering it here at a closed Congress session. We should.
know the limits; we should not give ammunition to the enemy;
we should not wash our dirty linen before their eyes. I think
that the delegates to the Congress will understand and assess
all these proposals properly.
Comrades! We must resolutely abolish the cult of the individ-
ual leader once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions
concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work.
It is necessary for this purpose:
First, in a Bolshevist manner to condemn and to eradicate
the cult of the individual leader as alien to Marxism-Leninism
and not consonant with the principles of Party leadership and
the norms of Party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at
bringing back this practice in one form or another.
To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work
the very important Marxist-Leninist theses about the people as
the maker of history and the creator of all mankind's material
and spiritual benefits, about the decisive role of the Marxist
party in the revolutionary struggle to change society, about the
victory of communism.
In this connection we shall be obliged to do much to examine
critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct
the widespread, erroneous views connected with the cult of the
individual leader in the spheres of history, philosophy, eco-
nomics and other sciences, as well as in literature and the fine
arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we
compile a serious textbook of the history of our party, edited in
accordance with scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of
the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of
the Civil War and the great patriotic war.
Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work
done by the Party Central Committee during the pat years,
work characterized by scrupulous observance-in all Party
organizations, from bottom to top-of the Leninist principles of
Party leadership; characterized above all by the main principle,
collective leadership; characterized by observance of the norms
of Party life described in the Statutes of our party; and, finally,
characterized by wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.
Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of
Soviet, socialist democracy expressed in the Constitution of the
Soviet Union; to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their
power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary socialist
legality which accumulated over a long period as a result of
the negative influence of the cult of the individual leader must
be completely corrected.
Comrades! The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union has manifested with new strength the unshakable
unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the Central Commit-
tee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building
communism. (Stormy applause.) And the fact that we present in
all their ramifications the basic problems of overcoming the
cult of the individual leader, a cult alien to Marxism-Leninism,
as well as the problem of liquidating its burdensome conse-
quences, is evidence of the great moral and political strength
of our party. (Prolonged applause.)
We are absolutely certain that our party, armed with the
historic resolutions of the 20th Congress, will lead the Soviet
people along the Leninist path to new successes, to new victories.
(Stormy, prolonged applause.)
Long live the victorious banner of our party-Leninism!
(Stormy, prolonged applause, culminating in an ovation. All rise.)
Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000400370002-9