INVASION OF LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: March 9, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

- E1644
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks Mar h 9, 1971
School-and elected to the New Jersey
State Senate from our Passaic County
district in 1967 and concurrently con-
tinued to serve out his term as mayor of
Wayne to which he had. been,elected in
1964. He was named delegate to the State
Constitutional Convention in 1966 and
was nearing the end of his initial term as
State senator at the time of his demise.
A stanch Republican, Senator Sisco
joined the Wayne organization in 1958
and was party leader before being elected
Wayne's Sixth Ward Councilman in
1962. He also became the first council
president that year under a new form of
government, and served two terms.
A member of the Wayne Planning
Board and the Wayne Library Board, he
was also past president of the Lions
Club and past public relations director
of District 16A Lions International. He
was an active member of the Elks, the
Wayne Post of the American Legion,
Passaic County Republican Organiza-
tion, Black Oak Ridge Homeowners As-
sociation, Pica Club, Wayne Township
PTA, and the Wayne :Musical Theatre
group. He served as Passaic County spe-
cial deputy sheriff, and treasurer of the
Quad-City Incinerator Solid Waite Dis-
posal Committee. if
Senator Sisco was a former employee
of the Erie Railroad Co. and served 5
years as a labor representative of the
Order of Railroad Telegraphers. He was
a representative with the Maryland
Glass Co. and president of the Lor Mark
Packaging Co. and T-Bowl Interna-
tional. He was director and member of
the executive committee of the Ramape
Bank.
The Wayne Elks Lodge, of which Sen-
ator Sisco was a member, conducted,
services at the Moore's Home for Fu
nerals, Wayne Chapel, and with State
policemen as honorary pallbearers and
Reverend Robert Grant of Embury
United Methodist Church of Paterson,
where Senator Sisco had served on the
board of trustees, officiating, the Senator
was laid to rest this morning in Laurel
Grove Cemetery, Totowa, N.J.
I ask my colleagues to join with me
in a moment of silent prayer to the
memory of a distinguished American,
Senator Edward M. Sisco from the
Township of Wayne, County of Passaic,
State of New Jersey. May his wife and
children soon find abiding comfort in
the faith that God has given them and
the knowledge that Ed is now under His
eternal care.
HON. WILLIAM J. SCHERLE
OF IOWA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 9, 1971
Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, a child
asks: "Where is daddy?" A mother asks:
"How is my son?" A wife asks: "Is my
husband alive or dead?"
Communist North Vietnam is sadis-
tically practicing spiritual and mental
genocide on over 1,600 American prison-
ers of war and their families.
How long?
INVASION OF LAOS repealed and indeed the rep( ti-r was signed
b President Nixon himself T),ere is there-
HON. ROBERT F. DRINAN
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 9, 1971
Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Speaker, I attach
herewith an excellent document pre-
pared by the Lawyers Committee on
American Policy Towards Vietnam. This
committee of which Mr. William L.
Standard and Joseph H. Crown are co-
chairman has an advisory council made
up of distinguished scholars such as Pro-
fessor Stanley Hoffman of Harvard Uni-
versity, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau of
the University of Chicago, and Professor
Richard A. Falk, Milbank Professor of
International Law at Princeton Univer-
sity.
The statement below is a clear, cogent
and compelling statement on the errors
and evils of the invasion of Laos by the
Nixon administration.
I "Include the statement as follows:
LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARD VIETNAM
The Administration's argument that Con-
gressional restrictions on the use of Ameri-
can ground combat troops in Laos and Cam-
bodia authorize, by implication, the air war
in those countries is sheer sophistry. War,
under our Constitution, cannot be author-
ized by implication; military operations are
valid only by affirmative action by Congress.
In the present constitutional crisis, members
of Congress have seemingly overlooked the
National Commitments Resolution over-
whelmingly adopted (70 to 16) by the Senate
on June 25, 1969. This Resolution states (so
far as here pertinent) :
"Resolved. That (1) a national commit-
ment for the purpose of this resolution
means the use of the armed forces of the
United States on foreign territory, * * *
and (2) it is the some of the Senate that a
national commitment by the United States
results only from affirmative action taken by
the executive and legislative branches of the
United States Government by means of a
treaty, statute, or concurrent resol- tion of
both houses of Congress specifically provid-
ing for such commitment."
It is indisputable that the President's use
of American armed forces (warplanes, heli-
copter gunships, etc.) in Laos and Cambodia
has not been authorized by any treaty,
statute or concurrent resolution (specifically
providing for such use). Indeed, our Govern-
ment has solemnly signed the 1962 Geneva
Accords, agreeing to respect the neutrality
and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of
Laos. The President's actions In ordering
American armed forces into Laos and Cam-
bodia flagrantly contravenes the National
Commitments Resolution which was adopted
to preclude such ]'residential unilateral ac-
tion.
In the absence of affirmative action taken
by Congress specifically authorizing military
y
fore not a vestige of Congrc s oval author-
ization for committing Am( At an forces to
hostilities on foreign territc v (Laos, Cam-
bodia).
The national commitment > esolution re-
flected an accurate descript::;r of the con-
stitutional responsibilltties c he President
and Congress, adopted tow:-rv the end of
restoring the proper constiustional balance.
We believe the Foreign Rela' to, is Committee
should take all measures nec ?s=ary to assure
compliance with the nation .1 ommitments
resolution and to bring to c h:tlt the viola-
tion thereof.
Since Congress has not e.: ithorized mili-
tary hostilities in Southeast Asia, President
Nixon, in continuing to wa e war in Indo-
china, has been violating t: ,e Constitution.
President Nixon's constitut. mal powers, as
Commander-in-chief, to pro o(, the lives of
American troops do not ai il orize him to
wage war, but are limited c c restricted to
measures necessary to the if and expedi-
tious withdrawal of these troops. Two years
are far too long a period c ithin which to
have fulfilled that constity .ional responsi-
bility. The best way to pro ec L the lives of
American troops is to remove them from
Vietnam-not to retain th-riT to continue
military operations.
Madame Binh, Foreign ai lister of the
Provisional Revolutionary G+.vernment of
South Vietnam, has officiallg p ?-oposed at the
Paris Conference that if 'resident Nixon
will establish and abide bl a date for the
complete withdrawal of all US. troops, the
P.R.G. will assure the saf, 'withdrawal of
our troops as well as immrrli (te discussion
for the release of prisoners . f war, President
Nikon has failed to explain a by he rejects
this offer and prefers inste::d a policy that
jeopardizes the lives of our roops and post-
pones indefinitely the rele se of American
prisoners of war. President a ixon's refusal
to establish a timetable far complete U.S.
withdrawal makes continuiAA">n of the war
inevitable-as does his persi teat support for
Thieu and Ky, who have em ibatically stated
their opposition to the with -Ir iwal of Amer-
ican military support. Thee 'vish to retain
their present position as herd: of a narrowly
constituted military regim- maintained by
a massive foreign presence Put as Ambas-
sador Harriman has so poir redly said, "Why
should we give Thieu the ri :ht to dictate
American policy? I can't conceive why any-
body should give a veto to :a foreign poten-
tate no matter who he is. Look, Novem-
ber 17, p. 39).
Congress, in enacting th ('ooper-Church
amendments, made clear tl?:it, whatever the
asserted powers of the President as Com-
mander-in-chief, no grounc troops or advis-
ers were to be sent into L- of or Cambodia.
The Cooper-Church amen ?n tints were in-
tended to restrict America involvement in
Indo-China not to exacerb, e it. The air war
being waged in Laos and ('ambodia is con-
trary to the intent and srirct of Congres-
sional restrictions as point( -3 ut by Senator
Mansfield in the T.V.-Radi program, "Face
the Nation" (Jan. 4).
powers under the commander-in-chief clause gress should act to halt .u -h unconsiRtu-
do not authorize him to wage war. The tional activities. If the Pr( silent persists In
Founding Fathers vested in Congress alone violating the Constitution. t is Congress' re-
the sole power to commit our armed forces sponsibility to institute it Ipeachment pro-
to hostilities abroad-to safeguard our na- ceedings. Andrew Jonson v is impeached for
tion against unchecked executive decisions acts much less iniquitous.
to commit our country to a trial of force. We have been told. that -v( are defending
The commander-in-chief clause merely American honor; but mar :Americans and
placed the President at the top of the most of the world's nati( is feel that the
pyramid of military command-making him, spectacle of the enormous) ; destructive U.S.
in Alexander Hamilton's words, "first general military arsenal, especially 'a the case of the
and admiral of the Confederacy." virtually unchallengeable cower of the U.S.
President Nixon cannot even rely on the Air Force, arrayed against p .usant soldiers,
Tonkin Gulf Resolution on which President has defiled American hon(- (s never before
Johnson relied as a legal basis for waging in our history.
war in Vietnam for that Resolution has been We urge the Foreign Re tons Committee
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
March 9, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks
It changes an open ear and mind to a closed,
clenched fist.
The Boston Massacre and Kent State both
look interesting in the history books, but
they are complete dead ends.
Perhaps the heritage of those before us
is like a ship's log: It reminds us of where
the ship has gone and how the men who
sailed the ship before us got her through
other storms and shoals and kept the ship
free.
Like any ship, she is not steered by the
hand at the wheel alone. A single lonely
man, free In his courage and defiance, pull-
ing a sheetline, can alter the course of the
ship, and of history. His actions can be
called mutiny and treason, but he is in his
own right and he is free.
In his freedom, that one man can guide
the ship on to clearer waters.
EDITORIAL COMMENT ON
REVENUE SHARING
HON. DAVID R. OBEY
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 9, 1971
Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, the Milwaukee
Journal took a recent editorial look at
some revenue sharing proposals and
found merit in the one proposed by
Congressman HENRY REUSS and Senator
HUBERT HUMPHREY.
Their proposal differs from others by
requiring Governors in the second year
of revenue sharing to come forward with
plans for modernizing State and local
governments.
How to improve the financial prospects
of State and local governments is of more
than passing interest to residents of
Wisconsin, which supplies 1.98 percent of
Federal tax revenues-excluding social
security and other trust fund receipts-
while receiving only 1.58 percent of cate-
gorical Federal grants paid to States.
The text of the editorial of February 25
follows:
REVENUE SHARING ON THE MOVE
The way appears to be opening for a com-
promise on President Nixon's far reaching
revenue sharing proposals, with the adminis-
tration backing down on its "no strings at-
tached" grants to state and local govern-
ments. in Congress, too, there seems to be
recognition that in the face of the need for
revenue sharing of some sort it would be
fatal to have a knock down, drag out battle
over how to get the job done.
Secretary of the Treasury John Connally,
in the first interview he has granted, told
David Broder of the Washington Post that
the president's goals could be accomplished
by broadening present federal grant in aid
programs should Congress reject the con-
plan.
Murray L. Weidenbaum, an assistant secre-
tary of the Treasury, indicated to the Joint
if there were any compromise it would have
to come from the White House.
Reuss and Humphrey have indicated that
they want to find accommodation with the
administration on the matter of revenue
sharing.
The Reuss-Humphrey measure would not
place any more restrictions than the ad-
ministration would on how state and local
governments spend any new money. But it
would impose significant new requirements
and restrictions in other ways. They would
require governors, in the second year -,f
revenue sharing, to come forward with plans
for modernizing state and local governments.
They recommend such reforms as annual leg-
islative sessions. eased restrictions on bor-
rowing and taxing powers of local govern-
ments, elimination of small units of govern-
ment, formation of regional government)
bodies.
Reuss and Humphrey would also offer in-
centives for states to enact more "progres;-
sive" tax systems under which wealthy peo-
ple would carry a higher share of the burden.
This would entail instituting income tax
systems in states that do not have them and
raising such taxes in states that do. And,
ultimately, the Reuss-Humphrey plan con-
templates a federal takeover of welfare costs.
Revenue sharing on an increased basis
seems inevitable. The administration and
Congress seem to be moving toward a system
mutually agreeable. No system. that does
not carry some restrictions or does not give
incentives for better local management is
desirable. It Is here that compromise must
come.
HON. JAMES V. STANTON
OF OHIO
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 9, 1971
Mr. JAMES V. STANTON. Mr. Speak-
er, the following editorial, which ap-
peared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer
on March 7, raises questions about the
proposed SST project that its supporters
have never completely answered. I be-
lieve this editorial will be of considerable
interest to my colleagues in the House
who also question the priority of the-
SST:
CONGRESS SHOULD VETO THE SST
The SST debate is on again In Congress
Supporters of the supersonic transport, In-
cluding President Nixon, are back for more
federal funds to continue development of
two prototypes.
We- think Congress should say "no."
The arguments for continuing the devel-
opment of this plane now, when so many
questions remain unanswered, are not
strong.
The proponents say the work must go on
to preserve jobs In the aviation industry.
Cutting off federal support would cost 150,-
000 jobs, they say-
We agree it Is Important to maintain em-
ployment, but we think the capital, the de-
sign talent
the en
ineerin
i
,
g
g gen
us and the
Economic Committee of Congress that the work skills involved in the SST program
administration might accept a revenue shar- would be better directed at other goals than
ing program of a different size than it has production of an aircraft that could cut the
proposed and with some new restrictions. trans-Atlantic flight time In half for the
Asked about an alternative plan proposed by benefit of a relatively few jet-satters and
two Democrats, Sen. Hubert Humphrey of busines:;men.
Minnesota and Rep. Henry Reuss of Wiscon- Would it not serve a far greater public
sin, he said: "They have introduced a good interest to put aviation experts at work de-
bill, and I will not attack it." However, signing short take-off aircraft that could
Weidenbaum said later that he hoped the ad- help solve urban flight problems? Couldn't
ministration bill would be adopted and that some of the managerial talent In the avia-
Lion industry be used to solve mass trans-
portation problems on the ground? Couldn't
engine designers make a far more valuable
contribution to society by fashioning a pol-
lution-free auto engine?
We are sure America would earn the world's
gratitude for halting the SST if It turns out,
as some scientists suspect, that flights in the
stratosphere could alter the world's climate
or disturb the ozone layer that screens out
harmful radiation from outer space.
No country should permit large-scale
fights at SST altitudes until these environ-
mental questions are answered. And It does
not take two SST prototypes to find the an-
swers. Existing supersonic military aircraft
could be used for research.
A third argument advanced, weakest of
the lot, is that the nation has already sunk
more than $90 million into the SST, and
should continue funding the plane to protect
the investment.
Many a poker player has lost a bundle
following that philosophy. Sticking with a
bad hand is not a good investment, but just
the opposite. And the SST is a bad hand, a
plane that very likely cannot be flown at a
profit. British and French airline experts
have the same doubts about their SST, the
Concorde..
The Senate last year asked 16 leading
economists-such men as Paul Samuelson,
Walter Heller and Milton Friedman-what
should be done about the SST. Fifteen of
them said the U.S. should cut its losses and
get out.
We think W. T. Baumo:i, one of the econ-
omists, put it well. "Neither the govern.-
ment nor private enterprise should be
tempted to throw in good money after bad,"he said. "Everything necessary should be
done to facilitate the transfer of the capital
and labor tied up in the development of the
SST to other activities that do serve the
public interest."
IN MEMORIAM TO NEW JERSEY
STATE SENATOR, THE HONORA-
BLE EDWARD M. SISCO
HON.- ROBERT A. ROE
OF NEW JERSEY
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 9, 1971
Mr. ROE. Mr. Speaker, during this
past weekend the residents of my con-
gressional district and the State of New
Jersey were shocked and saddened by
the sudden untimely death of one of our
outstanding and distinguished states-
men and my dear personal friend, the
Honorable Edward M. Sisco of Wayne,
N.J. Our condolences are extended to his
wife Evelyn; his daughters, Nancy and
Lori; and his son Mark.
Senator Sisco suffered a stroke on
February 26, 1971, and passed away on
March 6, 1971, at the height of his public
service career at the young age of 47
years. Let the history of his service to his
fellowman, his dedication, devotion, and
sincerity of purpose be forever remem-
bered through this historical journal of
the House of Representatives of the U.S.
Congress.
He was born in Paterson, N.J., and was
a resident of my hometown, Wayne, for
almost 19 years. He was a graduate of
the Paterson public school system-
Paterson School 5 and Central High
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
`%i arch 9, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks E 1645
to forthwith endorse legislation prohibiting employment has been translated in real life The insufficiency of budge- xr: stimulus and
all offensive military action in Southeast into 6 per cent unemployment and consumer the implausibility of consu zi' r and invest-
Asia and setting an early deadline in 1971 fo:r price inflation of approximately the same ment revival, compel me to ;l are the wide-
the withdrawal of all American forces. figure. The tale is as familiar as it is dis- spread skepticism in my trac, i bout the abil-
We believe it would be a mistake to adopt piriting. ity of the economy to travai within hailing
the Javits bill designed to "regulate unde- I intend today to identify the reasons why distance of the President's t-:rre 1971 targets,
Glared war" for under the guise of "protect.- Nixon economic policy Mark II is only mar- GNP of $1,065 billion, infla is it tapering to
Ing American lives" it could be construed to ginally superior to its discredited predeces- 3 per cent by year's end, an unemployment
place a stamp of approval upon the military sor. Here the President's cerebrated remark, obediantly declining by the a:ae date to be-
operations in Laos and Cambodia. In our "I am now a Keynesian in economics", ought low 5 per cent. Unless Cong 'e:.s, as I believe
view, it detracts from the force of the na-? to be evaluated within the context of the and hope it will do, suppli, he additional
tional commitments resolution. present adequacy of Keynesian policy. Keynes budgetary stimulus, there it n )where visible
Lamentably, too many members of Con?? himself had an opinion worth recalling about the expansionary forces upo -which the Ad-
gress have accepted as valid the insidious the durability of economic ideas and the re- ministration rather mysteric..siy is counting.
false notion projected by the Administration lationship between such ideas and political Here I come to the major >igas of decrepi-
that the President is authorized under the action. In the closing paragraph of "The tude in the Administration }rind of simple-
Commander-in-chief clause to do "anything, General Theory of Employment, Interest and minded Keynesianism. If by :o tie chance the
anywhere" merely by pronouncing the magic Money," published in England at the end of rate of economic expansion flicks up speed,
words-"f
wors-"for r the protection of our troops."^In 1935, he had this to say: In dutiful accord with the p 'o ections of the
rejected similar claims made by the Execu-
tive as to the scope of power conferred by
the Commander-in-chief clause. The Admin-
istration's claims would confer upon the
President unlimited executive power to wage
war-an evil which the Founding Fathers de-
cided to exorcise when they vested the war
making power In the Congress-in the body
most broadly representative of the people.
The tragedy in Southeast Asia bespeaks the
calamitous price we have paid for the Pres-
idential transgression of our Constitution.
We urge this Committee to take the action
we have proposed.
Respectfully,
WILLIAM L. STANDARD,
Cochairmen.
PROFESSOR ROBERT LEKACHMAN'S
INCOMES POLICY RECOMMENDA-
TIONS -
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, March 9, 1971
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, fashioning a
sound economic policy which would con-
trol inflation without increasing unem-
ployment constitutes one of our most
critical problems. Robert Lekachman,
professor of economics, State University
of New York at Stony Brook, in testi-
mony before the Joint Economic Com-
mittee on February 25, 1971, and the
House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency on February 26, 1971, showed his
usual perspicacity and incisive analytical
powers in examining this issue.
In outlining his proposed incomes pol-
icy, Professor Lekachman commented:
when they are wrong, are more powerful than
Is commonly understood. Indeed the world is
ruled by little else. Practical men, who be-
lieve themselves to be quite exempt from all
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist."
It would not have shocked Keynes, the
owner of one of the century's most agile
minds, to observe that after a third of a cen-
tury his theories of economic behavior and
economic policy required drastic revision.
Were he still alive, he would no doubt be
leading the revisionists.
Certainly this Administration's Keynesian-
ism is timid at least even by the criteria of
1935. The Administration now estimates a
budget deficit of $18.6 billion in fiscal 1971.
Obviously this substantial sum was too small
to overcome the forces of recession, as the
unemployment and output statistics demon-
strate. Hence it is not intuitively' obvious
.why a substantially smaller deficit of $11.6
billion for fiscal 1972 should be the salvation
of the economy. The difficulties in the path
of aspiring true believers are accentuated by
the refusal of both the Council of Economic
Advisers and the Office of Budget and Man-
agement to make the detailed sectoral fore-
oasts upon which administration economists
have in the past relied.
One explanation. of the emission might be
the presence in the White House of a power-
ful surrogate for Dr. Milton Friedman, the
puissant Dr. George Schultz. An alternative
explanation is the pessimism which such de-
tailed inquiry is highly likely to instill. The
respected University of Michigan continuing
-survey of consumer attitudes and intentions
identifies few signs that ordinary Americans,
afflicted by uncertainties about prices and
jobs, are about to turn cheerful, run to the
stores, and happily increase their burden of
debt. Indeed wistful expectations that con-
sumers will save less and spend more appear
to be based on little more than the histori-
cal observation that in most years consumers
have saved smaller percentages of their dis-
posable income than lately they have been
Wherever private economic power threat- doing.
ens public policy, Congress and the President Will business investment be the answer?
must take pains to regulate the people and According to recent surveys, business spend-
the organizations which exert the power. sus ton capital goods, wi increase only in any
The more concentrated the power is, the erately during ng the expansion. of 1971. . If, mod-
greater is the menace to public purpose and e rest of as is now
the more immediate is the necessity of pub- anticipated, dollar expenditures on capital cent despite 11 per cent ,r employment
lic intervention. goods rise by under 2 per cent, real invest- among building trades work, -s
ment will of course shrink, possibly by as Both cases are almost ra. id ;m illustra-
I include in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD much as 3-4 per cent. Nor are the revised tions of the realities Of marl si power. The
the full text of Professor Lekachman's depreciation rules a panacea. At Harvard, concentration of this power ema?fed Bethle-
testimonies, which I commend to my col- Professor Dale Jorgenson's econometric in- hem to choose higher prices at d -mailer sales
leagu s: quiries lead to the conclusion that In the in preference to lower prices a d larger sales.
short run the new rules will have little im- The same circumstance, pern t- ed the con-
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE JOINT ECONOMIC COM- pact. I might observe parenthetically that struction unions tacitly to ba iin for fewer
MITTEE OF ROBERT LEKACHMAN, PROFESSOR this new $2.5 billion boon to corporations de- jobs at higher pay rather t] :its more jobs
OF ECONOMICS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW serves inclusion in the next compilation of at lower wage rates. As Adar ' inith wrote
YORK AT STONY BROOK, FEBRUARY 25, 1971 tax expenditures made by the Treasury. Al- In 1776, what renders the gre. :-1 of business-
There is no need here to reiterate the fail- though the tax expenditure notion was .a men harmless and even social 1 beneficial is
ures of the initial Administration game plan. parting Democratic gift by Stanley Surrey to the pressure of competitive -n,:rkets upon
Mr. Nixon's original promise to control in- the incoming Administration, its usefulness costs and prices. Where this ' -sure is ab-
flation without significantly increasing un- transcends partisan considerations, sent for want of competitive r Markets, the
in the Office of Budget and I-la-iagement, the
White House will collide wih a major un-
certainty, the willingness o -)r. Arthur F.
Burns and his Federal Ret.r"re Board col-
leagues to underwrite a new ;nriationary im-
petus by expanding the moo'y supply at the
minimum 6 per cent rate fa. at ad by Dr. Mc-
Cracken and his colleagues a- i he Council of
Economic Advisers. What is +r-happily quite
possible is a scenario of the f, 114 -wing variety:
an acceleration of price infla to i, a reduction
by the Federal Reserve in tie ate at which
it creates new money, and :ii pally either a
replay of the Treasury-Fede.:at Reserve con-
frontations of the Truman -~ri. or a retreat
by the White House from i meal expansion.
Either outcome is guaranieii to nip an
emerging recovery long be major unions
which face them across collet-i"e bargaining
tables, and the AMA-teachin;, hospital com-
plex which determines the 5trrc_ure of medi-
cal costs. The potentates who 'u ti these orga-
nizations are of course influe ic,-d by market
forces.
Nevertheless, typically the : xercise con-
siderable discretion fit thei - responses to
market exigencies. Thus it w s that Bethle-
hem Steel, in the middle of a pull of flagging
sales and fierce competitive . rom foreign
steelmakers, could propose o raise many
of its prices over 12 per cent :t was securely
protected from any unseemly price competi-
tion from its rivals in the American industry
and certain that these rivals ,v":uld speedily
follow Bethlehem's price 1 'aF i. Although
Presidential intervention ha v, d the pro-
jected price escalation, there renains some-
thing odd about increasing pi c( ; in the face
of declining sales, Equally ca from the
standpoint of competitive t.l ecy has been
the ability of construction n ons to bar-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
E 1646 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Extensions of Remarks March 9,49711-
argument is compelling either for militant it would cope with a component of unem- wages and prices, it is equally certain that the
anti-trust enforcement and consequently ployment peculiarly intractable to mono- public utilities and much of manufacturing
fragmenting of large corporations or for tary and. fiscal policies. are organized as monopolies or oligopolies.
vigorous incomes policy. Since I take public III And there are services, notably medicine,
support for radical anti-trust to be imper- Briefly to recapitulate my four recoil- whose cost and fee structure has been de-
ceptible but public approval of wage and mendations, I begin with the identification cisively shaped by the. professions capacity
price control to be substantial, I find eco- of a need for substantially more fiscal stimu- to regulate the training and inflow of new
nomic logic and political feasibility in har- lus from the federal budget than the Presi- entrants, influence the running of hospitals,
mony, contemplates. At a guess, a full-em- and determine the character of the medical
Effective incomes policy in 1971 implies dent dent ployment budget deficit of 810 billion would marketplace.
a good deal more than a revival of jawboning Free markets produce socially tolerable re-
make a proper target. After Congress has
or even a combination of jawboning with salts not because businessmen are ?particu-
the resurrection of the wage-price guide- done its work. I hope that Paul Samuelson will be moved to repeal the praise of your larly astute or exceptionally altruistic but
posts. Although there is growing evidence because the pressure of rivalry curbs avar'.ce
body which he expressed last year in the and promotes efficiency. Such was the wis-
that the guideposts did have a perceptible wake of Congressional additions to White d of Adam Smith Such is much political
om
their best in an era different from ours, a
period which trailed after eight years of
slow economic growth, three recessions, and
high average rates of unemployment. Al-
though the social costs of Eisenhower eco-
nomic policy were to high to encourage re-
petition of the experience, it must be con-
ceded that eight years of frugality certainly
did rid Americans of inflationary expecta-
tions.
However, inflationary expectations remain
a fact of life In the present. The need arises,
therefore, for stronger medicine, in the shape
of mandatory controls. My own preference
combines a dash of Robert Roosa with a
dram of J. K. Galbraith. Which is to say
that to me it makes sense to freeze wages
and prices for six months and employ the
time to design a set of selective wage and
price controls a la Galbraith. I share Gal-
braith's view that the place to impose. the
controls is where the markets are least free.
This is of course administratively conven-
ient: it is far easier to regulate Fortune's
elite list of the top 500 industrial corpora-
tions and the unions with which they deal
than it Is supervise -myriads of small busi-
nessmen and merchants.
if the economy in 1971 is to move into a
vigorous recovery, monetary and fiscal policy
must march in step. It is almost certain that
the prerequisite for such disciplined har-
mony of movement is administrative re-
straint of the key wage and price decisions.
Such restraint will allay the Inflationary
fears of the central bankers and encourage
the White House to persevere in its promise
of budgetary stimulation.
The final component of successful post-
Keynesian economic policy focuses upon em-
ployment. My co-panelist Dr. George Perry
has recently conducted an important inquiry
into recent changes in the Phillips curve
trade-off between unemployment and in-
flation. The labor force is now composed of a
growing percentage of female and young
ork rs Both oups suffer from higher than
wegr
House budget requests. and economic wisdom in 1971. A logical corol-
The rate of monetary expansion should lary is not always emphasized: in the many
rise to something over 6 per cent, possibly as instances where markets are not competi-
high as 8 per cent. tive, the checks to avarice and the stimuli
i
h
t
An incomes policy fully equipped w
sharp teeth is essential partly to mollify the
monetary authorities, but still more to miti-
gate the inequities which attend continued
inflation.
Finally, the assault upon unemployment
must contain structural as well as. aggrega-
tive elements, notably manpower training
and public sector employment. As a Demo-
crat I recall with a certain pleasure that the
1968 platform of my party incorporated a
pledge to move toward a condition in which
the federal government would. become the
employer of last resort. Even though the 1968
presidential race turned out badly, the voters
were prudent enough to retain Democratic
majorities in both houses.
It is something, I suppose, that that prac-
tical man, Mr. Nixon, has attached himself
to an economic policy which was quite up-
to-date two or three decade ago. This is not
enough. The post-Keynesian universe de-
mands attention to the facts of economic
power and the circumstances of groups un-
able to protect themselves in markets partly
free and partly privately dominated.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT LEKACHMAN, PROFESSOR
OF ECONOMICS, STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW
YORK AT STONY BROOK BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
FEBRUARY 26. 1971
In preparation for my appearance before
this Committee, I took the sensible precau-
tion of examining the record of your Hear-
ings on June and July of last year. As I sus-
pected, I discovered that I was in the sligitiy
embarrassing situation for an academic econ-
omist of finding myself in substantial agree-
ment with two of your earlier witnesses, Dr.
Robert Roosa and Professor J. K. Galbraith.
I am consoled by the reflection that they are
two of the wisest and most ingenious mem-
average unemployment rates. An implica- hers of my profession. package of lower prices and larger tonnage.
nden- Like them I judge that the beat feasible The construction unions exert similar pow-
th
t
if
i
s
e
e
t
f this demographic sh
tion ocy of prices to stir menacingly at overall incomes policy commences with a freeze of er to select fewer jobs at higher wage rates
rates of unemployment which are unaccept- wages, prices, and, I would add, dividends. In preference to more jobs at lower wages.
ably high, on the order of 5 per cent. A dec- While the freeze is in force, the President, One could very readily argue-indeed I do
ade or so ago, the danger point was 1 or even in consultation with leaders of the major so, that neither steel nor construction sup-
1 1Z per cent lower. private interests involved, should design a ports a public interest which is much bet-
What follows is not the counsel of despair workable scheme of wage, price, and divi- ter promoted by lower prices, larger output,
that we should give up on either employ- dend regulation. The President shall be re- higher employment, and greater economic
ment or inflation. The moral is different. So- quired to present his proposed plan of op- activity.
phisticated policy which successfully recon- eration to Congress for approval. After such I draw a simple moral. Wherever private
cites low rates of unemployment with suc- approval is registered, the President will be economic power threatens public policy, Con-
cessful price strategy requires attention to empowered to release from the freeze the gress and the President must take pains to
manpower as well as to incomes. Unfortu- vast majority of enterprises which operate regulate the people and the organizations
nately the President vetoed a promising Con- in competitive markets. Remaining ur:der which exert the power. The more concen-
gressional initiative, last session's attempt to control will be prices, wages, and dividends trated the power is, the greater is the men-
authorize a modest number of public serv- in industries dominated by large corpora- ace to public purpose and the more immedi-
ice jobs in hospitals, parks, museums, law tions engaged in bargaining with national ate is the necessity oi' plublic intervention.
enforcement agencies, and schools. Only a trade unions. n
Lew years ago, President Johnson's automa- Although I bring no new wisdom in sup-
tion commission estimated that there were port of these conclusions, old arguments rI- For the reasons that immediately follow,
over 5 million unfilled jobs in the public main persuasive. It is a hobby of conse-*va- I believe 1971 economic -policy to be threat-
sector at existing levels of staffing and ad- tive politicians and a majority of my pro- coed by the probable exercise of private eco-
ministration. In 1971 the number is unlikely fessional brethren to exaggerate the ex":ent nomic power.
to be smaller. A good public employment to which the American economy is direeted Let us consider the character of 1971 needs
program would serve two desirable ends. It by free market forces. Although there is ad- and the responses to them by the Admin-
would alleviate the chronic manpower short- mittedly a sphere in which competition or- istration. In one of the more remarkable
a es to which public agencies are prey and ganizes economic activity and generates conversions of our day, Mr. Nixon has de-
to efficiency operate with varying degrees of
imperfection. It follows also that the price
and wage policies which private market
power allow are notnecessarily in the pub-
lic interest. The Nixon Administrations al-
most theological reverence for free markets
leads its members to overlook the scarcity
of such markets and the determination of
many wage and prices by a comparatively
short list of quite identifiable corporations,
trade unions, and professional societies such
as the American Medical Association.
Although the men of power who manage
the affairs of such entities are less than to-
tally insulated from demand and supply
conditions in the markets where they hawk
their wares, it is simple common sense to
note that the price setters and the wage
negotiators enjoy considerable discretion
in the ways they choose to respond to their
economic environment. Two illustrations un-
derline the generalization. Bethlehem could
rationally propose to raise structural steel
prices over 12 per cent because it was pro-
tected by the knowledge that, faithful to
ancient practice, the remainder of the in-
dustry would follow the price leader. Al-
though the White House in what some sus-
pect to have been a Charade talked the in-
crease clown to 6 per cent or so, there re-
mains something odd about any increase
at all for an industry whose sales have been
:fiaggin and whose domestic markets have
been invaded by agile foreigners, from whom
the industry's leaderscry for protection. On
the wage side, there are as usual the con-
struction unions which, undeterred by 11
per cent unemployment among their mem-'
bers, have negotiated wage settlements in
the 25 per cent range. Such behavior is not
wicked. Market power enables the steel in-
dustry to choose a combination of higher
prices and lower tonnage rather than a
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
 Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
March 9, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
WHY WE FIGHT Inunist ag-
gression. There will be no mor S. combat
troops commitment in our figb r .
CoLLINGwooD. General Tri, n you think
that you'll ever see in your In- , ii -.ary region
a resumption of the big war, rr_'in force ele-
ments making another threat t - .i-aizon?
General Tax. Never it will ha'p=-n, because
I keep the enemy main forces u away now
from our border. How can th' Nome back
again once they have to fig] against us
where they are?
COLLINGWOOD. You mean you :cep them in
Cambodia?
General TeI. Quite sure.
COLalnewoOD. In any disci=s-on of the
widening war in Indochina, I., a and Cam-
bodia are now run together :r-ost as one
word. They're very different c. to itries with
different problems, but it was r senxilar mili-
tary logic which converted then :xto battle-
fields.
At the beginning, the Cam os ian opera-
tion was oversold as a brief s nrrical stroke
which would solve the problem ` 1 lie sanctu-
aries once and for all. Well, nnr rronths later
it's still going on. The South -V e! aamese are
back in Cambodia, scouring ti ?' sanctuaries
and keeping roads open. The: ire actually
more deeply involved in Cat b dia today
than they are in Laos. Nevertl - I -is, there is
no, doubt that the Cambodian ?n -uirsion did
greatly relieve the military pr ,ro:ire on the
southern part of South Vietna t. permitting
dramatic progress in ext.endin?7 overnment
control. It is hoped that Laos --p ,ration will
do the same thing for the cent:,-,l and north-
ern provinces. But whatever it alutary ef-
fects in South Vietnam, the w' "e-ling of the
war has made a shambles of C , o bodia.
The most important thing a out Cam-
bodia is that it has survived. It in 11 months
now since the overthrow of Sipe.s uk brought
the war to what was surely on : .f the most
unprepared countries on ear a. But with
American and South Vietnan.s.- help, the
Government of Lon Nol, hov 'cor precari-
ously, stayed in power under :c, easing en-
emy pressure. And there is ,o reason to
think, even in the light of is illness and
replacement by Sirik Mat ak, tL t niis govern-
ment will fall now. But the pr; e of survival
has been heavy.
Phnom Penh, once the nips agreeable of
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
 S 2170 Approved For Re~ZMKEAQ(3!`J-ALEBRI3BOgi~?AR,g0300090045-1 March 1, 1971
Southeast Asia capitals, now bears all the
familiar signs of a city under siege. Sand-
bags and barbed wire abound. Patriotic slo-
gans are flaunted to catch the eye and charge
the spirit. There is a prevalence of uniforms,
not only for those actually in the Army, but
for civilians as well, to whom even a quest-
uniform is worn as a sign of solidarity in
the struggle against the enemy.
If the fate of a peaceful people were not
at stake. some of the preparations for the
defense of the fatherland would be touch-
ingly funny. As it is, there is a certain air
of hasty improvisation about Cambodia's
defense preparations. The roadblocks that
ring the capital are even less effective than
they look. The Communists showed how
easily they could penetrate Phnom Penh's
defense perimeter by their devastating raid
on the capital's airport in which they blew
up most of Cambodia's fledging air force
and got away scot free. They also hit brutally
at a barracks compound.
These, and similar acts of terrorism are
reminiscent of the way the Viet Cong was
operating in Vietnam in the early 1960's. I
asked the U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia,
Emory Swank, about that.
SWANK, I'm not familiar with - all of the
situation in Vietnam in the early '60's, but I
can think off-hand of a very important dif-
ference. and that Is that this country really
is not in a state of civil war. This Is outside
aggression, unmistakably, from North Viet-
nam and from the Viet Cong.
COLLINGwooD. Are the people of Cambodia
behind the present government?
SWANK. My impression, certainly, from the
time that I've been here, since last Septem-
ber, is that the government enjoys the sup-
port of most of the important element of the
urban population. Quite frankly, concerning
the countryside, the returns are inconclu-
sive, and I don't think we have enough in-
formation to make a valid judgment.
COLLINGWOOD. How do you foresee the ene-
my's intentions toward Cambodia? Do they
want to take over the country?
SWANK. This is, of course, a very interest-
ing and difficult queston to answer, because
we can't probe the enemy's thinking, com-
pletely. But my own personal judgment is
that the enemy's prihcipal object of interest
remains South Vietnam, and that Laos and
Cambodia are both way stations along that
road.
COLLINGWOOD. Were the present govern-
ment in Cambodia to be seriously threatened,
could the United States really just stand
idly by?
SWANK. This is a bridge that I would rather
not cross right now, Mr. Collingwood. '
COLLINGWOOD. One of the ways In which
the enemy can easily produce a critical sit-
nation in Cambodia is to cut the main ar-
eries linking Phnom Penh with the rest
of the country. A regular object of his at-
tention is Route 4, which connects Phnom
Penh with its seaport of Kompong Som. Last
month the enemy closed the highway and it
took the Cambodians, plus a large South
Vietnamese task force, plus powerful U.S.
air support, to open it again.
Th Cambodians aren't cowards. They fight
and they take casualties, but compared to
.fie South Vietnamese, let alone the vet-
eransfrom North Vietnam, they are not im-
pressive soldiers and they are having to learn
the hard way. While they are learning, Cam-
bodia is clearly vulnerable to-a major North
Vietnamese attack with all the repercussions
that would have on the situation In South
Vietnam. I asked Fred Ladd, the U.S. official
charged with guiding the Cambodian Army,
how the enemy with only 6,000 effective fight-
ing troops could blow up the airfield, close
the roads and rivers, and what would hap-
pen if he poured more troops in?
L,kDD. Well, I think if he were to commit
more troops at that kind of an objective, the
airfield, or a road, or the river, it would be
easier for the Cambodians and their Viet-
namese allies to deal him rather severe blows.
And I feel that his strategy is to do these
attacks rather spectacularly, but do them
with very few people, and cause a sensational
environment, when really the military situa-
tion as such is not that critical.
COLLINGWOOD. To what degree hm the
Cambodian Army Improved?
LADD. Well, I think it's-I'm glad you
asked. It's one of those points that isn't
brought forward very often. They started in
June or July with about 30,000-40,000 men
in the army. This army was a rather make-
shift affair, poorly led. It wasn't a very in-
spired group of people. And in the eight - to
nine months that have passed since then,
the army has grown to about the strength of
200.000. So I think that, although It's still
an amateur army, it gets better every day,
and it Isn't evident unless you sit and watch
it over a period of months. But I do think:
they're much more effective today than they
were in Mai.
COLLINGWOOD. If the enemy did mount a
major attack against Cambodia, would the
United States, in its own interest, be able to
Just let it collapse?
LADD.-I really don't know, because I as-
sume, and I have-the guidance I have re-
ceived is that we would like a non-Commu-
nist government maintained in Cambodia.
And it would depend on when It would be,
I think. If it were right now, no. They want
the Vietnamization program and the troop
withdrawal--the United States does, in its
interests, to continue. And if Cambodia were
were to fall today, I think that this would
seriously jeopardize both the troop with-
drawals and the Vietnamization program.
COLLINGwooD_ The goal is for Cambodia
eventually to be able to defend itself by it-
se1f, a Cambodianization program, If you
will. To that end, thousands of Cambodians
are being trained in South Vietnam Don
Webster reports.
WEBSTER. The program began last July, if
not secretly, at least very quietly. It's esti-
mated 16,000 Cambodians will be trained
here this year. In the midst of a war which
is winding down, this program Is escalating
rapidly. The Cooper-Church amendment
prohibits any American ground troops or ad-
visers in Cambodia, but it doesn't prevent
Americans from advising the Cambodians by
bringing them across the border. However,
the Americans here deny that's happening.
They say they are merely advising the Viet-
namese. who in turn are Instructing the
Cambodians.
Vietnamese instructors here work through
interpreters to get their points across. Some
of thetCambodian pupils are just 15 years old.
Presumably, the young Cambodians are
learning more about Vietnam than just a
few words . "mot hat, sat sat" . . . "one,
two: kill, kill."
There's plenty of discussion whether the
Vietnamese Army is ready to fight alone, but
there seems general agreement the Cam-
bodian Army Is not ready.
How much longer do you think Cambodian
troops will come to Vietnam for training?
Major SALAT. I think it will be one or two
years more, sir.
WEBSTER. How long do you think it will
take the Cambodian Army to become as good
as the South Vietnamese is now?
Colonel BETTS. Well, by making a compari-
son with the Vietnamese Army, I would say
in the neighborhood of eight to ten years.
COLLINGWOOD. Despite all. the multina-
tional efforts to train and equip the Cam-
bodian forces, one thing is perfectly clear-
Cambodia cannot yet survive without some-
body's help. Right'now it is militarily de-
pendent upon South Vietnam. There are
more South Vietnamese troops fighting in
Cambodia now than there are in Laos-
16.000 going over the old sanctuary areas
of the Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook. The
South Vietnamese Economic Minister is
budgeting for a constant level of 20,000
troops operating across the border in Cam-
bodia. The Cambodians wish it were other-
wise. They have an ancient antipathy for
the Vietnamese, North and South alike, but
they are willing to take help where they can
get it now and are surprisingly confident
that they will be able to hold off the North
Vietnamese and still retain their independ-
ence and identity.
I asked Urn Sim, Cambodia's Minister of
Communications, if the enemy had any suc-
cess recruiting the people to their side.
UM Sim. It all depends upon the defini-
tion of the word "success." I think to a cer-
tain extent they succeed in recruiting some
of the Cambodian people, But this most
mainly is done by force, not by persuasion
or any other peaceful means.
COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Minister, is Cambodia
receiving the amount and degree of assist-
ance from the United States that is neces-
sary to permit it to continue the fight on
its own?
Use Sim. I think the American government
has helped Cambodia to survive by moving
into the sanctuary of the Viet Cong, North
Vietnamese and by clearing up all the area.
And later we have got some aid, but usually
the aid has not coin as fast as the situation
was getting-you know, worse.
COLLINGWOOD. Mr. Minister, do you foresee
any circumstances in which Cambodia might
ask the United States once again to intro-
duce ground forces. into the war here?
Us's Sim. This I am positively sure that the
Cambodian government never asked for, the
ground troops from the United States to help
in fighting this war. I'm positively sure.
COLLINGWOOD. DO you hope that the South
Vietnamese military operations in Cambodia
would be able to be decreased In the future
rather than increased?
Use Sim. I do hope-so, because as the num-
ber of our well-trained troops is increasing.
we will do our best in order to replace the
South Vietnamese troops in here. And both
parties agree to do so, because the presence
of South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia 1s
not doing any good to our policy.
CO:LLINGWOOD. Before Illness struck him
down last week, Cambodia's Prime Minister.
General Lon Not, was supremely optimistic,
many Americans thought too much so. He
even dismissed the blow at Phnom Penh's
airport as a mere incident and a sign of the
enemy's desperation. What he wanted most
was more American aid and equipment be-
fore his countrymen face the full brunt of a
North Vietnamese attack.
Low Not (through interpreter). I have re-
quested that delivery should be speeded up
in the program. As for the aid covered by
the program, we are holding meetings with
our American friends: in order to formulate
an effective program. with regard to both
planning and execution. We hope that this
will be done quickly'.
Cor,LiNOwooD. What do you think of the
enemy's intentions?
LoN Not, I think the intention for the
long run is as follows : The enemy, being un-
able to go straight into South Vietnam and
also because they row lack bases and sanc-
tuaries, is directing the whole effort against
us-the whole effort.
COLLINGWOOD. General, is there anything
that you would like to say to the American
people?
Low NOL. It gives us great moral encour-
agement to know that in the United States
of America thepeople are learning to under-
stand our problems more and more.
(Announcement).
COLLINGWOOD. It must have come as a re-
lief to the Administration, If not a surprise,
that the invasion of Laos did not provoke
the same public outcries and disturbances
which followed last year's entry into Cam-
bodia. The cynical say it's because the pub-
Approved For Release 2002/01/10 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300090045-1
 March 1, 1971 Approved Fc(5ig1i1 Wt@&WP-7?f~MPR000300090045-1
lie-even the young-have become so numb
about Indochina they won't get exercised
unless American ground troops are directly
engaged. Anyway, the kids stayed in school
this time and the protests have been muted.
Nevertheless, what is happening in Laos is,
in a real sense, only an extension of what
already happened in Cambodia-minus
Americans on the ground. The same basic
arguments pertain, for and against, and the
same arguments are being made. In Wash-
ington, Bob Schaeffer spoke to Secretary of
Defense Melvin Laird, and Marvin Kalb
talked with Senator Frank Church, still a
strong Administration critic.
KALB. Senator, its claimed by the Admin-
istration that the war has been fought in
this part of Laos for five years now, so it
really hasn't been widened, and that's what
they're saying.
CHURCH. It hasn't been fought with Amer-
ican helicopters in close tactical support,
hovering above the tree-tops and firing into
any enemy target of opportunity. It hasn't
been fought in the middle of Cambodia and
the western reaches of Cambodia. No, of
course the war has been widened. Why fool
the people?
KALB. Senator, why do you. feel that there
has been so little public outcry? There was
public outrage last year at the time of Cam-
bodia.
CHURCH. Because now we don't have an
American army on the ground. We don't
have thousands of American. troops moving
in on the ground to engage the enemy in
hand-to-hand combat. And I'm glad that we
were able to enact the Cooper-Church
Amendment, which restricts the introduc-
tion of American ground forces in Laos and
Cambodia. Otherwise, I think we'd have an
American army in there, just as we had an
American army in Cambodia eight or nine
months ago.
KALB. Is the difference in Climate, in your
judgment, limited solely to that one reason,
that there is not an American army in Laos?
CHURCH. No, The difference in climate is
partly due to the fact that this Is just more
bombing. And the country has long since
become accustomed to the bombing. Its been
one of the brutalizing effects of this war.
But there's another reason for the change
of climate. The President seems to be saying
that he's winding down the war and he has
withdrawn substantial -numbers of Ameri-
can troops. I give him credit for that. I don't
think that in that sense, his Vietnamization
program is a token program. If he continues
his present pace, if this is all the faster
he feels he can go, I'd be willing to settle for
that, as long as I knew that we're going to
continue to come out ... That we're not go-
ing to stop in May or August or In December
of this year, and leave a large American
military force. In Vietnam Indefinitely.
KALB. Come out lock, stock and barrel?
CHURCH. Come. out. The time has come.
We've equipped the Vietnamese, they have
the capability. After all, we didn't promise
to make that country the 51st American
state, or use American men indefinitely to
defend a government that South Vietnamese
men should be willing to defend. And now
that they have the capability the overriding:
objective in American policy should be to
come out.
KALB. Senator, have you heard about any
time limit on the use of American air power
in support of South Vietnamese units in
Cambodia or Laos?
CHURCH. No. No time limit at all. This is
part of the reason why long-time critics of
the war grow cynical when they hear about
Vietnamization. They're fearful that rather
than bringing us out of the war, it's just a
method for changing our method of warfare,
for converting our participation from ground
warfare to air warfare, logistical support and
artillery support, and that this Is just going
to go on endlessly.
There's going to come a time at the end
of the summer, or the fall of this year, when
the President will have to face :his moment
of truth on Vietnamization, when he's going
to have to take his chances with the Viet-
namese being able to do their job in their
country ... when he's going to have to turn
back the risk of the war. and the eventual
outcome of the war, to them.
SCHEIFFER. When the United States moved
into Cambodia, there was a great public out-
cry. And yet when the details of this opera-
tion into Laos became known there was not
really very much public criticism. Why do you
suppose that is?
LAIRD. Because the South Vietnamese are
handling this operation themselves as far as
the ground combat is concerned, not only in
the Cambodian situation but also in Laos. If
there's been any escalation in this war, it's
been the escalation in South Vietnam, giv-
ing South Vietnam a capability to defend it-
self and to carry on these combat respon-
sibilities.
SCHEIFFER. But the fact is that U.S. heli-
copters are going in there, ferrying the troops
directly into battle, as it were. They're -land-
ing, they're on the ground. Is that cutting
the line a little bit thin, by using this air
power for this close troop-lift as it's being
used?
LAIRD. Air support has not been prohibited
by the Congress. This was discussed at some
length, but air support is perfectly within
the letter of the law as well as the intent of
Congress.
SCHEIFFER. The question I think that
many critics are asking is this: How do you
shorten the war by widening It? Is that a
fair question?
LAIRD. Well, the important thing here is
to disrupt the supply routes that are going
to Cambodia and into South Vietnam from
the Cambodian sanctuaries. By any kind of
criteria you want to use on the success of
this operation, even if we were to withdraw
air support and the South Vietnamese were
to leave Laos at the present time, this opera-
tion is to disrupt the logistic supply route
so that we can reduce American casualties
as we withdraw American troops. We will be
withdrawing additional thousands of Amer-
icans, as a matter of fact while these opera-
tions are going on.
SCHEIFFER. Mr. Secretary, there will be an-
other dry season next year, just like there's
one this year. Will that require another
South Vietnamese operation into Laos to
interdict supplies?
LAIRD. Well, that would be a matter that
would certainly be up to the South Vietnam-
ese. I would-to be very frank with you they
will even have a greater capability to carry
on those kind of operations next year than
they have this year.
SCHEIFFER. AS I understand it there's no
plan now to train or equip the South Viet-
namese to handle this bombing of the. Ho
Chi Minh Trail in Laos once the United
States stops that. What do you do about
that? Does the United States just stay there?
Will we be required to stay there and bomb
as long as the North Vietnamese send sup-
plies-
LAIRD. I don't know whose plans you're
looking at. Our plans do give them very im-
portant gunship capability which is needed
and necessary to interdict supplies and logis-
tics on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. I don't know
where you got your information that they
weren't being prepared in this area, but we
are turning over the gunships, we also are
using the A-is and other types of aircraft
that can carry on a very effective interdic-
tion campaign as far as the South Viet-
namese are concerned.
SCHEIFFER. You're telling me that that
plan is already underway?
LAIRD. The plan is underway to give the
South Vietnamese Air Force an interdiction
capability.
(Announcement).
52171
COLLINGWOOD. Today Secret;.:; -y Laird told
the President the Laos opera o , Is "going
well." But even if it is a tnilita s .uccess this
time, it may have started son. _-C,ing we are
not prepared to finish. A precadait has now
been established which wou d allow the
South Vietnamese to push b evond their
borders whenever necessary :,c keep the
enemy off balance. But will ti _y he capable
of doing so, even ifit were de:.ar:_ble?
This time, the massive operai ton was heav-
ily dependent on U.S. air. S, .Ir ,,tary Laird
indicates that, in the future, e 'uth Vietnam
will be able to furnish its ow ;sir support.
But his air commander for In oa-hina, Gen-
eral Clay, indicated we are not te_Aving them
that kind of force.
Three hundred U.S. helicol ? e?s, just for
starters, are being used for th : I aos attack.
The entire projected South Vietn amese heli-
copter fleet is five hundred. : ,n