THE SONTAY PRISON CAMP RAID

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 11, 1971
• Content Type: OPEN

oVe For Release 2IttiMaWaP
ity on the court was astounding. The lost 16 of 18 points in dropping four straight grandstand sits tornorrc ars Arthur Ashe, a
S 13 ityego __Twory oo 2-2
rt z .y 11, 1971
players were a credit to the game and
their countries.
Aside from Buddy Piintlac, Inc., the
organizations contributing to the tourne-
Merit were the VA. Lt ns
station, the Greater Washington Tennis
Association, the District of ,olumbia De-
partment of Recreation, the National
Capital Park Service, the bistria of Co-
lumbia Public Schools, 'Etna the District
of Columbia Youth Opportunity Services.
Assisting were the Courte "or Patrol, the
Metropolitan Boys Club, and the Police
Boys Club. The LOUrnanlerlf received
prominent coverage in the: Washington
newspapers, and Sunday's play was
Shown live on the Eastern Educational
Television Network?WLT4, channel 2?.
Thus, the tournament had official and
voluntary support from a variety of
sources.
? Mr. President, You and others in this
Chamber may be aware of my feelings
with respect to football and baseball,
especially if the competition involves
team from Minnesqta. I am certainly not
blind, however, to the civic conscious-
ness revealed in the account which I
have just given you of an attempt to en-
gage the interest of inner ,city youth in
a major sport which should be more arkd
More accessible to people in our crowded
cities. I hope that tournaments of this
kind will stimulate demand for tennis
courts and equipment throughout the
cities of this land. We can only applaud
the expressed wish of the tournament
planners that out of such eyents will one
day come "the Austin Carr, of tennis" in
Washington. For that matter, another
Arthur Ashe would do just fine.
Mr. President, I request unanimous
consent that certain items concerning
the inner city tennis tournament be
printed in the REcoap.
There being no objection, the material
Was Ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Washington Posti Feb. 8, 1971]
TizenzartER RULE BaINGIS Costgusiort: FILLQL
TURNS ASIDE KOCH IN FIVE-SET TENNIS
FINAL
(By Mark Asher)
Jaime Fillot of Chile continued his high
level of tennis and defeated Thomas Koch
of Brazil, 6-1, 3-6, 6-4, 6-T, 6-4, for the
Buddy Pontiac International, championship
yesterday at McKinley High School.
The even match between two South Ameri-
cans, who had split six previous encounters
in the past two years, turned on Koch's con-
fusion about the rule on who serves first fol-
lowing a best-of-nine-point tiebreaker game.
Koch served the final three points and
staved off a quadruple match point to win
the fourth-set tiebreaker, 5-4. The tiebreaker
? is counted as a single game and in this case
was counted as Fillol's service, game.
According to the rules Koch should serve
the next game. But Fillol was given the
balls and served the first point of the fifth set
before Haig Tufenk, the umpire, rectified the
situation. Koch had won the point, which
raid not cotipt.
"I was confused," the long-haired Brazilian
Said. "When I served, I really wasn't in it."
awnoz 1440BLEVIS HURT
, KOCh 1.0St hiS ARVApe and evil player then
proceeded thold serve for.the remaindqr
of the ins 331.4 Koch npted he nevey
should bays been An such a predicament
becauSe lie ;Qat 4-P advantage in the third
,aet when he ran into service,problems and
Tufenk explained the tiebreaker situation:
"The problem is that neither the players nor
the bellboys know the rules. It's the first
time the tiebreaker has been used in Wash-
ington."
The tiebreaker is newly implemented on
the indoor circuit this year as the game of
tennis reaches Streamlined proportions for
television and attempts to lose its country
club image.
EVERYBODY CONFUSED
Coincidentally, this player confusion arose
at the nation's first professional indoor tour-
nament at an indoor city facility. If the play-
ers were confused, imagine the confusion
of the inner-city youth to whom the tourna-
ment was directed as a pilot project to expose
them to the sport.
Following the match, one youngster turned
to a reporter and asked, "Hey, mister. Who
beat?"
In an informal survey, the youngsters in
the crowd of 1,200 were most confused by
tennis' traditional scoring system, which
scores four points as 15, 30, 40 and game.
They also wanted to know most about how
much money the players make.
The scoring 'sYstem made about as much
sense to most of the 400 youths as the scor-
ing in a cricket match does to the average
American.
Bill Gaskins. the tournament director, said
he would favor experimenting with a sim-
plified scoring ;system next year. In addition,
both he and the players did not object to
noise during the match.
Both Fuilol and Koch stopped play fre-
quently yesterday. But Koch noted this was
not because of the noise, but because of the
movement behind the court, making it diffi-
cult for the players to follow the flight of
the ball.
As for money, ,rinol won about $20,000 last
year. He is not considered among the world's
25 best players. The $1,500 he pocketed yes-
terday was the biggest payday of his career.
Koch won $1,000. The match was the first
loss in Washington by Koch, the winner of
the 1969 Washington Star International.
Jim Osborne and Jim McManus of the
United States defeated Alan Gdsbert and
Manuel Orantes of Spain, 3-6, 6-3, 6-3, for
the doubles title.
BUDDY PONTIAC INC. WELCOMES AMERICA'S
FIRST INNEIt-CY.CY TENNIS TOURAMENT
It is seldom that an individual or an in-
stitution is presented the opportunity to
make a major contribution to an important
cause. With this thought in mind, I should
Like to assure our honorary chairman, Mayon*
Walter Washington, our distinguished guests
and all of the students attending the
matches, that it Ls our sincere pleasure and
our privilege to be associated with this event.
We are extremely grateful to Mr. William
Riordan, player chairman for the U.S.L.T.A.
for bringing to us an outstanding field of
players; to the Greater Washington Tennis
Association for their fund raising support;
to Henry Kennedy our chairman for his ex-
pertise and general assistance; and certainly
to Dr. James Jones, Director of Youth Op-
portunity Services, and his competent staff,
who did so much to make ours a "first class"
tournament in every respect.
As one who was born, schooled and has
worked in the "inner city" during his en-
tire lifetime, I can speak from experience
regarding our progress to date and what still
lies ahead in order to make our city into a
model for the entire nation.
In receat years we have accomplished
much, primarily through the utilization of
government funding. In the future we may
accomplish much more through the involve-
ment of private' Industry in neighborhood
and youth projects throughout our city.
Our secret hope is that somewhere in the
boy who can go to the .?:?1 o of professional
tennis, but be that as it 'al -nr, we are certain
that our matches and c ir high school ten-
nis clinics will provide -rt artainment, chal-
lenge and personal fulfi n ent to the youth
of our Nation's Capital . . . none deserve
more.
Sincerely,
MORI. .1, W. COHEN,
President, Eta .a a Pontiac, Inc.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
I am happy to serve a honorary chair-
man of this Inner City er nnis Tournament
that will stimulate !rite] s in tennis among
inner-city residents.
We welcome to our cit t iese international
tennis stars?representii ;even countries?
who will participate. Thi ..1.? wide-range repre-
sentation and outstandisg skills will provide
an arena in which youni ninds can be chal-
lenged, international gi ici will fostered and
tennis promoted.
We are extremely grs _ined that our Na-
tion's Capital has been A.ected as the inau-
gural city for this event liopefully, as a re-
sult of our efforts in tt, s first "Inner-City"
Tennis Tournament, nt st year we will see
similar programs institi tc?I in other major
metropolitan areas tb o ,gh the nation.
Proceeds from this to ha iament will go to
the Washington Inters( iclastic Tennis As-
sociation to aid our on-i .a ig inner-city ten-
nis programs.
This tournament is m (.1,? possible through
the concerted efforts of 3t-5cly Pontiac, Inc.,
the United States Lawn T nnis Association,
the Greater Washington T nnis Association,
the D. C. Department of ucreation, National
Capital Park Service, D c. Public Schools
and the D. C. Youth 0 apartunity Services,
with the assistance of Courtesy Patrol,
the Metropolitan Boys aida and the Police
Boys Club.
This is another fine i ,laniple of business.
government, communit ,,rganizations and
individual citizens worki lg together to better
our community.
Mayor WALTE ! 4. WASHINGTON.
One of the more gratif. it g aspects of being
a professional tennis ?L?yer is watching
interested youths devei ,p .ng their athletic
talents in pursuit of I se,. oming top-notch
competitors.I ran conficfc at that seeing many
of the world's top tenn s players in action
during this tournament 1 not only provide
exciting sports enterta ,iinent for all but
will inspire many poten ally great athletes
living in the inner-city o become seriously
Interested in the game i" ? ennis as well.
Professional tennis, I] :e football, basket-
ball and baseball, now 1. rovides an excellent
living -for any underpr?v1(eged youth who
works hard and makes ?t to the top. But
more than that, the p 1y -deal demands of
tennis help develop a het, rt ,y mind and body
for every boy or girl whc D.iys the game.
I am very happy to w? [come the many
Washington area public a ?hool students to
this great new tournam( di You will be see-
ing outstanding champ ?Ths competing for
the title and prize mone none to compete
here next year and c1-11 enge this year's
winner. All of us owe r c:-:bt of thanks to
Buddy Pontiac, Inc., f??r their successful
effort to bring big-time es ids to the Wash-
ington inner-city.
Everyone cannot beco at a championship
tennis player, but each c is can be a cham-
pionship person?and I s's what it's all
about!
rey, ,
.????111MISION=.10/?
ARTHUR ACHE.
T SONTAY PRIS )lr CAMP RAID
Mr. FULBRIGHT.-_ I fr President, Mr.
Stuart H. Loory, one a tie mostpercep-
z,
Approved For Release 2000/09/08.: CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2
February 11, 1971
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
reality which the computer can deal with
4ust because the computer can do so. The
101adividual?the point off the curve?be-
=lee an annoyance."
slannetar ANS PRIVACY OF INFORMATION
Another area of critical concern to those
responsible for managing the massive ma-
chinery of our society relates to protecting
the privacy of the individual and the cor-
porate entity. The trend today is to gather
vast amounts of information so that certain
functions may be expedited. In government,
the handling of social security, census, and
economic data requires huge information
processing establishments. In the private
realm, hundreds of applications now involve
ADP, including such large volume areas as
payroll, credit checks, insurance, and indus-
trial inventory control. The need for?and
control of?these data are commencing to
receive, deservedly, a great deal of attention.
Some critics of large scale data collection
and computer manipulation speak in terms
of the Orwellian 1084 controlled state. Others
can accept the necessity of acquiring data
necessary for managing, through improved
planning, our society, but believe that the
present approach to the problem is not well
thought out, and should receive cognizance
at the highest level of government. Many
hard questions have been put to those de-
signing the census data collection forms,
and a second wave of concern now is evident
as summary data is being made available for
sale by franchised disseminators.
Where do we draw the line on what is
demanded of the private citizen, or the cor-
poration? Should not the individual be able
to refuse to answer certain questions about
his past, and do so without penalty or cen-
sure? In some instances, today, information
collected from citizens for one purpose is
then vended to others for completely differ-
ent purposes. The built-in protection inher-
ent in the decentralized, paper-oriented files
of the past now is being obliterated by the
capacities and capabilities of computer-
supported information systems. The ele-
ments of our society are entitled to privacy,
and the integrity of any files containing in-
formation on their past activities or present
status deserve the utmost protection.
It is not enough simply to indulge in fatu-
ous generalities about protecting the privacy
of the citizen. There are identifiable forms
of safeguards which can do much to guaran-
tee personal and corporate privacy. In a
study prepared for the Congress?entitled
"The Federal Data Center: Proposals and Re-
actions"?several such safeguards are noted:
1. Legislative and administrative regula-
tions, already in effect in some agencies,
could be augmented and strengthened.
2. Establishment of uniform, multi-agency
criteria controlling "need to know" both for
government and other data users.
8. More explicit explanation of the scope
and nature of the data available, thus re-
ducing the number of unnecessary or illogi-
cal requests by users.
4. Creation and uniform use of classifica-
tion and coding systems, to include the as-
signment of unique accession codes and in-
dicators to privileged data elements.
5. Establishment of an expert in-house
group for receiving, trabscribing, and refin-
ing the request for information from the sys-
tem according to the needs of the users and
existing regulations.
O. Employment of "a number of servicing
procedures based upon computer technology
that can satisfy the needs of the user in most
cases without violating disclosure regula-
tions.
7. In some lnatances, data' reduction by
design can be performed thus transforming
absolute figures to percentages, increments
to gross and vice versa.
S. Anonymous sampling, with the removal
of identifying data elements already has been
used; here again the need for a uniform Fed-
.
eral set of procedures and criteria is appar-
ent.
TSCI-INOLOSY BEGETS RESPONSIBILITY
The management of information and
knowledge is a selemn responsibility. The
mutual education of the lawmakers and
technologists during this forum must con-
tinue, for none can gainsay the crescendoing
effect of computers, communications and cy-
bernetics on this and succeeding genera-
tions. This must be a matter for all to ac-
quaint themselves with, for everyone is af-
fected. On some occasions in history man has
been called upon to answer a "call" largely
on faith, This led to the witticism that
"Man is ready to die for an idea, provided
that idea is not quite clear to him." Those
existing in our "one world" know without
question that empathetic interaction be-
tween individuals, groups, and nations is on
the upturn, and that the trend is irreversible.
Each new challenge requires a wrenching
change in our patterns of behavior or insti-
tutional modes of operation.
While none of us can sasess fully the im-
pact of this burgeoning technology on the
nation and its peoples, we must strive to
manage wisely. The ways in which we use the
atomic generator, the laser, the electronic
computer. will result in more than surface
reverberations. We are closer to manipulat-
ing our future than ever before, and there
must be a conscious connection in our lead-
ership actions between the thought, the de-
sire, and the end result. While most of our
national planning will and must be directed
toward tangible, material enda, there is a
greater responsibility. There is an overriding
Moral imperative to examine with excruciat-
ing-thoroughness the rationale for our tech-
nological programs, the direct and side effects
of their execution, and the imprint which
will be carried forward into the future. This
will require the finest effort on the part of
all facets of our society, and will result in
action based on reason, and not futility.
BUDDY PONTIAC INNER CITY IN-
TERNATIONAT., TENNIS 'IOURNA-
MENT IN WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, over
the weekend of Febr rary 5 through 7,
a notable event took place in Washington,
D.C. Twelve accomplished professional
tennis players, including the top-ranked
player in the United States, competed for
$10,000 in prize money on a synthetic
court laid over the basketball floor of
an inner city high school gymnasium.
This tournament, the Buddy Pontiac,
Inc., Inner City International Tennis
Classic, was designed to bring first-class
tennis to youngsters who may get no
closer to the game in their ordinary lives
than a blacktop playground or the side
wall of an apartment Wilding. A lot of
dedication and idealism went into this
tournament, and I believe that the re-
sults wore most encouraging.
Donald Dell, the 1968-69 Davis Cup
captain and a longtime Washington area
resident has often spoken of the need
to bring tennis to the ghetto instead of
waiting for the inner city black players
- and spectators to make their way out to
the suburbs. Until this was done, he felt,
tennis would remain a rich man's sport
in the eyes. of most blaelr citiz,ens. The
few, like Arthur Ashe, who overcome in-
numerable handicaps to rise to the top
in American tennis, would only prove
the rule that tennis is a country club
activity.
Bill Riordan, who did so much to make
Salisbury, Md., the. capital city of U.S.
indoor tennis, put his influence to work
as president of the International Players
Association and player coordinator for
the T.Y.S. tennis championship program.
He lined up the 12 ; layers who came to
Washington on February 5. Next year he
hopes to bring the inner city tennis tour-
nament concept to a total of 13 American
cities. This is a hopeful development,
among other things because it is not a
moneymaking venture for the promot-
ers..
McKinley Technical High School, at
Second and T Streets NE., is not the
kind of place where you expect to see a
tennis tournament. Although the court
surface was excellent, there was too
little room for the players along the
sidelines and behind the baselines. The
linesmen got in the way of sharply angled
shots. High lobs bounced off the over-
head lighting. Spectators constantly
moved back and forth and talked almost
incessantly. In other words, the audi-
ence treated this much as they Would a
baseball or basketball game, where for-
mal etiquette hardly exists.
The great thing about it, however, was
the attitude of both the players and the
spectators. Not a single player expressed
annoyance over crowd behavior or the
constricted space around the court. To
all appearances each of them realized
that sacrifices had to be made for the
purpose of' presenting the best image of
professional tennis to an audience which
was largely unfamiliar with it. Although
spectators had to be cautioned from
moving directly in the line of sight of
the players during the final singles
match, the general deportment of the
small crowd was excellent. When the
youngsters and their parents overcame
the mysteries of the scoring system, they
followed the play with intense interest
and genuine appreciation.
-Attenda:nce was sparse until the last
day even though most of the seats were
free of charge. On the first day, large
numbers of young people were bused in.
The audience was predominantly black,
which was just what the tournament or-
ganizers had intended. Mayor Walter
E. Washington, honorary chairman of
the event, was present for part of the
final match on Sunday.
The players came front Brazil, Chile.
the British West Indies, Canada, Paki-
stan, Spain, and the United States. The
best U.S. player was No. 1 ranking
Cliff Richey, who lost a hard-fought
semifinals match to the eventual winner,
Jaime Fillol of Chile. Two other U.S.
players included seventh-ranking Jim
Osborne of Honolulu and ninth-ranking
Jim McManus of Berkeley, Calif. The
high point of the weekend was the
five-set final between Fillol and
Brazil's "Tiny Tom" Koch--pronounced
"Kosh"--on Sunday. Koch, trailing two
sets to one, broke Fillol's serve in the
fourth set to set up a tiebreaker, which
he won by a single point to even up the
match. He was unable to hold off the
Chilean in the fifth and final set. The
crowd was treated to brilliant play. Both
players wanted badly to win, but they
never compromised their fine sportsman-
ship. They executed sharp volleys, crisp
overheads and passing shots; their agil-
.
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 ; CIA-RDF'731300296R000300050002-2
t ,
Arove For Releas' 20a0/09/08 CIA-RDP731300296R000300050002-2
February11, 1971
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
tec ing friendly goverilments against inclp- to contribute intelligence on t
tive journalists in Washington and a'rep-
resentative of the Los Angere,s
has written an excellent account of the
recent raid on the gbrit'437 PiisOnr
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
ticle he printed in the ItEcoRn.
There being no objection, the 'article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STORY BEHIND RAID ON SONTAY PRISON
(Stuart H. Loory) Blackburn was namedSAVSA.
WA_SHINGTON.?When Secretary of Defense
SACSA, the office, was created by President
Melvin R. Laird testified that the Adminis- John F. Kennedy early in hia administration
tration had no waY of knowing for 'certain to systematize the United States' role in deal-
that Ainerican prisoners Would be fciund at ing with insurgencies throughout the world.
Son Tay last November, he was understating
WAPPAar BIBLE
an Intelligence problem that gives American
military planners the shivers.
Afnoug all the other problems of fighting
the war in Indochina, the problem of divin-
ing the intentions; -plans and movenients of
the North Vietnamese has been the toughest.
That problem made the commando raid on
the small Compound only 23 miles west of
Hanoi one of the biggest gambles in Ameri-
can military history?a gamble decided on
by President Nixon for trying to get cap-
tured Americans out of North Vietnam but
also for what one high Administration
has'balled qranscendent reason."
Officially, the Son' Tay raid was conducted
for one reason only?to rescue American
prisoners. Transcendent reasons ale ad-
mitted only for the deepest background. But
since the Administration admitted they ex-
isted, others have been speculating on what
they might have been.
- Idea No. 1: The American military ma-
chine, caught in a "dirty, grubby war" that
no one wants, scarred by the tragedies at
My Lai and stOries of other atrocities, con-
demned at home and facing serious dissen-
sion in the fled, needed an act of heroism
to boost its morale.
Idea No. 2: the Nixori Administration,
having helped create a prisOner-of-war lobby
? since grown impressively Vocal, felt the po-
litical need ab respondto Its demands that
sornething be done for the 339 Americans
living under cruel conditions in North
Vietnam,,IdeaN: 3: The President had to show the
North Vietnamese that they could not count
on using the prisafiers as hostages for a po-
litical settlement embarrassing to the United
States, that he would take steps as drastic as
invading North Vietnam to secure their
freedom.
The President's gamble tailed. TO 'under-
atand why, follow It froth its inception late
last May in a little-known office on the ninth
corridor of the Pentagon's first floor.:
? Office 1E90 is marked ."SACSA." The acro-
nym stands for Special Assistance for Coun-
ter insurgency and Special Activities."
It was SACSA that conceived, planned, or-
ganized and oversaw the Son Tay operation.
SACSA is both a_ military ?Meer iind the
Office The directs : The officer, at the time the
Son TO raid was conceived, was Bri:g. Gen.
Donald DunwoodY Blackburn, a 54-year-old
. infantryman" whose career has such great
storybook qualities that it has been the sub-
-pat of a book and a movie?"Blackburn's
Headhunters?' . - "
As a first lieutenant, Blackburn arrived in
the Philippines in October, 1941, to become
an adviser to the Philippine army. The fol-
lowing April he evaded capture by the 'Ja-
panese' on Bataan Peninsula, disappeared
into the jungles of northern Luzon, organized
a small guerrilla force of primitive tribesmen
who were just beyond the practice of head-
hunting and fought a backwoods cainpaign
against the a:pane-de untilThe war ehded.
aBlaciabatan heeanae One cl,the recbgnlzed
experts in "special Warfare,' the nallitary's
euphemism for American involvementln pro-
lent revolution.
In 1957. when the 1954 Geneva accords
which settled the French Indochina war were
being honored mostly in the breach by all
involved. Blackburn joined the American
military assistance advisory group in South
Vietnam to help shore up the Saigon govern-
ment of Ngo Dinh Diem against the then-
budding Viet Cong insurgency.
In August, 1969, after a series of assign-
ments in the United states and Vietnam,
SACSA*s doctrine was originally set out in
a three-inch thick volume that became the
bible of special warfare. Originally that bible
dealt mostly with counterinsurgency.
The early cOurtterin-surgeoev doctrine was
based on the simple premise that American
technology?the same know-how that would
land a man on the Moen and create a ma-
chine-aided life of comfort for consumers?
would conquer insurgencies_
To gain superiority over a guerrilla who
has lived in a region for years, you need only
fight him in the dark, provided you can see
and he cannot, the doctrine said. So radios
were developed to penetrate the jungle
canopy, helicopters that fly 80 m.p.h. over
areas where guerrillas move on foot were
brought in. Heat-seeking infrared sensors for
detecting enemy campfires were' developed.
The enemy found it relatively simple to
deal with Western technology. Learning of
the campfire detectors, for example, he sim-
ply ordered no campfires could be built with-
in a mile of camp, and that rendered in-
frared sensors relatively useless.
So the insurgency in South Vietnam, in-
stead of being brought under control,- devel-
oped into the longest war the United States
has ever fought. The few thousand Ameri-
can advisers of the early 1960s grew into a
force of over half a million ground troops.
By the time Blackburn established him-
self in the Pentagon's Room 1E962. counter-
insurgency had passed its heyday.
THINKS ABOUT CONTRIBUTION
. .
Last May, as concern over the fate of
American war prisoners iii North Vietnam
was, rising throughout the country and the
military, Blackburn began to think about
what contribution of his office could. make.
Blackburn studied What was thelt thop
of Son Tay and the other known North Viet-
namese POW camps and decided that, if
prisoners were held at Son Tay. it was the
only location where a raiding party could
land. The other known prisons are all in
downtown Hanoi.
In June, he presented the idea of liberat-
ing some American prisoners to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and received permission to
conduct a "feasilaility study."
"The initial phase started in June," Blaciaa
burn told the Times. "We really wanted to
satisfy ourselves on the American prison-
ers. . . ."
Blackburn had consummate faith in the
ability of the military to do the job without
outside help. During the feasibility study,
he called on the Ventral Intelligence Agency
only minimally.
Working from reconnaissance photographs,
the DIA built a scale model of the tiny com-
pound, which was just over a half acre in
all, :the size of a medium-priced suburban
housing lot, measuring 185 feet from north
to south and 132 feet from east to west. The
model was accurate right down to the loca-
tion of branches on the trees.
"the CIA had a minimum participation in
It," Blackburn said.
But the agency was apparently not asked
e key ques-
tion: were there or were there (o prisoners
at Son Tay?
The feasibility study was ()doted in
July and submitted to the Jo. A Chiefs of
Staff and Laird, Mr. Nixon da 'it see it.
Neither did Henry A. Kissinger I r. Nixon's
chief foreign policy adviser, not a iyone else
on the National Security Coin' i staff.
Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, chit r an of the
Joint Chiefs, and Laird epprov the feasi-
bility study and gave the go-a e d for the
drafting of a plan sometime in
Blackburn's team wrote a 200 ae plan, a
second-by-second scenario for la attempt.
complete down to the assignma for each
person and each piece of equiprr aa involved.
It even included proposals or i ersionary
air strikes over a wide area of at n North
Vietnam.
"The further we got into tilt C.atails, the
more feasible the whole thi g became,'
Blackburn said. "We had the al ar broken
down second by second. It was - five sec-
onds from the time the choppe 3 (nded un-
til we entered the first building w lere there
were guards."
The detailed Son Tay plan v a? approved
by Moorer and Laird in early Ar st(ac and, on
Aug. 8, Air Force Brig. Gen. Le (a J. Manor
and Army Col. Arthur D. (Bull) nons were
selected as commander and aty com-
mander of Joint Contingency 7 vac Force
Ivory Coast, with orders to cart iit Black-
burn's plan.
Manor, 49, commander of th ,r Force's
Special Operations Force, head v irtered at
Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., was c o en by the
Air Force for the job. His a it 'bion was
natural. The SOF, formerly nar (e? the Spe-
cial Warfare Center, was estabh b in 1961
as the Air Force's contribution t ( carrying
out the original SACSA doctrin
Simons, 52, like Blackburn, Ind asperience
in small-force operations going I. to World
War II in the Pacific, where he ae ted as an
officer in the Rangers?the fo a 'inners of
the Green Berets.
In 1961, he went to Laos as p rt of the
White Star Mobile Training T a. . to help
shore up the anti-Communist a lian gov-
ernment in its civil war. In 1961 a went to
Vietnam where, according to son a (-ports, he
played a role in infiltrating i ielligence
teams into North Vietnam.
:Before Laird,and Moorer apprc( e the plan.
they presented it to the Presided who also
approved. There is some indicatt r Ihat Kis-
singer was not told of the plan E. 'sat point.
when all the momentum began U- the raid
three months later.
ASSEMBLED IN PANHAN
By Aug. 21, Joint Contingenc ?.(sk Force
Ivory Coast-101 men in all, It -I) of whom ?
would actually land at Son Ta issembled
at Eglin, an 800-square-mile n e vation in
Florida's panhandle.
The go-ahead for training thi- I ery Coast
task force was made on the ' as umption"
that prisoners would be found v Son Tay.
Actually, based on the record, I( e appears
to have been a far better chant hat there
would be no prisoners found.
"We've drilled a lot of dry .r 'Is there,"
Blackburn said, admitting Ci ally that
each time American authorial s 5taged a
rescue based on intelligence into :Lion they
had received, the raida 'came x late.
Blackburn lent credence to-tl _s judgment
when he told his interviewer _ 1 (;) several
rescue attempts had been ma e in South
Vietnam and none had been sue ea aul.
American prisoners were 5 -I-. at never
found where they were repor to have
been. The "almost" is sknifical]
In July, 1969, the South Vieti u tese army
learned from a defector, that Sps, Larry D.
Alke_n of New York City, an a if (ntryman,
who, had been captured two incarns earlier,
i$
Approved. For R le#se 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
?
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE February 11, 1971
S134
tvaa being, held by the North Vietnamese
:Wirth of the town of Tarriky in the northern
'part or South Vietnam. A joint South Viet-
namese-Arne11cm rescue attempt was or-
, garriZed. Aiken was rescued?unconscious.
The North Vietnamese had bashed his head
in when the rescuers approached.
The rescue was publicized; Aiken's death,
three weeks 'later, went unreported.
Several of the nine former American pris-
oners who? have been released by the North
Vietnamese, other militaly officials and some
who are knowledgeable about prisoner-of-
war procedures now privately predict that
future rescue attempts would result in grave
danger to captives in North Vietnam.
"It is a bunch of crap that the prisoners
would be shot up," Blackburn said. "I would
have bet a year's salary that, when we got in
there, not one would be hurt. There wasn't
any way those guys could have been hurt.
The enemy would have had to break into
those cell blocks just like we did. And he
wbuld have been worrying about his own
hide."
TOB HARDER IN NORTH VIETNAM
If gathering accurate intelligence about
the enemy in South Vietnam is impossible,
it is doubly so in North Vietnam.
One former general with long experience
in Vietnam said, "Every jot and title of in-
telligence we get out of there is stale. It
can't be fresh. If it is fresh you can be sure
it's been planted to deceive us."
Blackburn said intelligence for the mis-
sion came from three sources?interrogation
of captured North Vietnamese soldiers in
South Vietnam, captured documents and re-
connaissance flights by American aircraft.
Captured documents and the captured
North Vietnamese who carry them can
hardly give an up-to-date account of what
is happening in the north. It takes a mini-
mum of three months for the typical North
Vietnamese soldier to march down the Ho
Chi Minh trail.
Aerial reconnaissance is another matter.
The information that jet spy planes pick
up can be carried back to South Vietnam,
Thailand or some carrier at sea, processed
and transrnittea to Washington in hours.
Since World War II: American optical and
aeronautical technologists have worked mir-
acles with photography. Camera-carrying
aircraft can snap Stereo pictures from which
interpreters can later divine such minute
details as the size of bricks in a wall, vege-
tation on the ground, construction mate-
rials in a building.
DETERMINE BUILDING HEAT
From infrared scanners, they can deter-
min whether a building is heated.
Prom a series of pictures that would re-
veal traffic patterns, personnel movement,
even such items as how garbage is disposed
of, an experienced interpreter can make good
deductions about what is going on on the
ground.
There are two general hitches in aerial
reconnaissance, as far as North Vietnam is
concerned, and one particular hitch relating
to Son Tay.
First, like so much in the Vietnam war,
American reconnaissance technology was
simply too sophisticated.
"They have consistently underflown our
capability," Anirom H. Katz of Los Angeles,
formerly of the RAND Corp. and a specialist
in reconnaissance technology, said,
"For example, we are set up to spot trucks
and they use bicycles. They operate just be-
low our threshold."
After the Son Tay raid, Laird lamented
that the technological approach had indeed
not gone far enough. A camera that could
see through roofs, Laird told the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, could have indi-
cated for certain if there were prisoners at
Son Tay.
Laird's assertion is open to question Pie-
tui es are only as good as the men who read
them.
That is the second hitch. A see-through
camera might show people. Interpreters
would have to have enough experience in
studying North Vietnam to say whether the
human forms are American prisoners.
The reconnaissance photos of Son Tay
showed, according to Manor, that the topo-
graphical features of the courtyard were
changing but the interpreters guessed
wrong about the meaning of the change.
They assumed that the changes, which
showed a vegetable garden growing, were re-
lated to activities of the prisoners.
EXPERIENCE NECESSARY
To do a good job of interpreting photos of
North Vietnam, interpreters with experience
on the ground there are necessary. The
United States has few, if any, such men.
Patrick J. McGarvey, a former emplose of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the De-
fense Intelligence Agency tells the story of
how interpreters, in early 1966, were search-
ing pictures for targets of the American
bombing campaign against North Vietnam.
In one picture, they spotted a huge, heavily
guarded compound at a village called Clitynh
Los. The compound was isolated, ringed with
barbed wire and included a number of build-
ings. Inside the compound were areas shut
off from each other with more barbed wire.
The conclusion of the interpreters, McGar-
vey said, was that the installation was a di-
vision headquarters. And so, a bombing raid
was ordered against it on May 6, 1966.
A few days later the North Vietnamese
charged that the United States had bombed
a leper colony at Clayish Loc, killing 80 pa-
tients and wounding 34. Privately, according
to McGarvey, the Pentagon later conceded
the error.
The photo interpretation for the Son Tay
mission was done by Christopher R. Guen-
ther. For ,years Guenther has worked in DIA
as an air defense specialist, studying pictures
of the North Vietnamese countryside, pick-
ing out installations that would be of dan-
ger to American planes flying missions over
North Vietnam.
He would not consent to an interview, but
it is known from others that his work with
the pictures shed no light on the question
of whether there were prisoners at Son Tay.
It was more concerned with the operational
aspects of the raid--getting the commandos
in and out safely.
The particular reconnaissance problem of
Son Tay was that too many overflights would
have alerted the North Vietnamese to im-
pending danger.
Laird, however, testified that reconnais-
sance photos were the prime source of intel-
ligence for the mission.
Neither the White House nor the Penta-
gon has disclosed the latest date on which
the Administration knew for certain that
Americans were being held at Son Tay.
SPOTTED AS POW CAMP IN 1967
Defense officials have said that it was
spotted as a POW camp as far back as 1967.
There has been one published report that
last September a North Vietnamese defector,
Tran Thuai, told American psychological
wssrfare officials that in 1067 he was a prison
observer at Son Tay, which he knew as
Lamson I.
Actually Thuars account was given to
American intelligence experts earlier and
was part of the intelligence report Blackburn
received in May.
Officially, Pentagon spokesmen say they
cannot disclose the last date on which they
knew prisoners were at Son Tay because that,
in turn, would _compromise intelligence-
gathering procedures. It is not unfair to
speculate that it would prove a source of
embarrassment to the Pentagon as well.
The assumption can be made that the
last definite date was before 131ackburn even
started studying the feasibility of the raid.
In fact, it might have been the informa-
tion on which he originally began the study.
Once training began toward the end of
August, the matter of whether there were
prisoners at Son Tay became, in. a sense,
secondary. The operation had achieved a life
of its own.
The mission planners were aiming toward
two possible dates?they called them "win-
dows." One was in October and one in No-
vember, when a quarter moon would be
shining on Son Tay--a moon bright enough
to give some light but dim enough to cover
movements of the raiders.
The October date was scrubbed because of
weather forecasts. .At least, that is the of-
ficial version. The possibility must be raised,
however, that such matters as the impend-
ing congressional elections in the United
States played some role in putting the raid
off.
ABRAMS WAS NOT INFORMED
At that point, not even Gen. Creighton W.
Abrams, commander of all Americans in
Southeast Asia, had been informed that the
raid was in prospect.
In early November, Blackburn and Manor
flew to Saigon and briefed Abrams and Oen.
Lucius D. Clay Jr., commander of the Ameri-
can air forces in Southeast Asia, on the plans.
There has been one report that Abrams op-
posed the idea.
Blackburn said that is not so.
Abrams, he reported, listened to the brief-
ing, received the request for the accompany-
ing air support that Clay's men would have
to give, and then said: "You certainly seem
to have thought of everything."
Only a few days before the mission, the
raiders were moved from Eglin to Thailand.
At that point they still did not know they
were going to penetrate so deeply into North
Vietnam.
"Simons told them just a few hours before
they took off," Blackburn said, "and they
all stead up and cheered."
On Nov. 18, Mr. Nixon discussed the forth-
coming raid with Laird, Moorer, Kissinger
and William P. Rogers, secretary of state.
Only Rogers and U. Alexis Johnson, under-
secretary of state for political affairs, from
the State Department knew about the plan.
How, when or why Rogers and Johnson
were told is not known. Blackburn said the
planners deliberately tried to cut out civilian
agencies of government for security's sake?
not because they were not trusted, but just
to be extra careful.
? ADVISERS KEPT IN DARK
On Nov. 19, at a regular meeting of the
National Security Council, Mr. Nixon appar-
ently decided to keep even those most trusted
advisers in the dark. Instead of telling them
openly what would happen the next day, he
slipped Laird a note saying that, regardless
of the outcome, the operation had his whole-
hearted support.
The next clay, Friday morning in Washing-
ton and Friday night in Southeast Asia, the
troops were making ready to board their
large, jet-powered HH-53 helicopters.
At bases in Thailand and on carriers at
sea, the aircraft thas would provide the cover
and fly the diversionary strikes were ready to
go, And at still other air bases, about 250
American planes were getting ready to strike
a massive bombing attack on targets in
southern North Vietnam, allegedly in retali-
ation for the shooting down, the week before,
of an American reconnaissance plane by the
North Vietnamese.
At about the time Simons was briefing his
men in Thailand, Mr. Nixon was in the White
House reviewing a weather report from the
field. It was satisfactory anti, in a formality,
he gave the final "go" signal.
The raid itself is history. As American
planes flew the diversionary strikes over a
wide area of North Vietnam from Hanoi to
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300050002-2
ebruary for R6-leadip rgleiM-ilirof30290A9np0050002-2
?
China Sea, firing live missiles at radar
-tes AO well as lighting dummy flares, the
1.1cling party, protected. by fightei planes,
tcked its way down the upper 11.q 11.iver
and zoomed in on on Tay.
0- A chopper landed at '2':113 a.m. Saturday
(midafternoon in Washington), an& within
five seconds, the first empty cell was entered.
Ivory Coast task force knew in an !natant
that the camp had been empty for some
time?"probably three months" as Manor
said later.
The raiders had a high-level audience half
a world away. In the National Military Com-
mand Center in the Pentagon, a group of
men clustered -around a loudspeaker, Present
were Laird, Blackburn, his deputy, 'Col. Ed-
ward E. Mayer, Moorer and the other mem-
ber of the Joint Chiefs,
RUNNINO ACCOmIT GrvEF
About 11 a.m. Friday In Washington, a
12,000-mile direct line had been opened from
Manor's secret Ivory Coast headquarters in
Southeast Asia to the command cenfer in the
Pentagon's basement. And on that ;line,
Manor gave his superiors a running account
of the mission from takeofT to touchdown at
Son Tay, from expectation to disappoint-
ment,. from the first "zero-zero" reports to
the conclusion.
Manor thought those first reports iiro'm Son
Tay were garbled and refused to believe
them, He passed this disbelief on te Wash-
ington.
1Vioorer, at the Command center, in turn
gave periodic reports to, 'the White House.
It is uncertain whether he talked? directly
to the President, but most of his reports
were helleved made to Brig. Gen. Alexander
Haig of Kissinger's staff.
A controversy developed over how closely
Richard Helms, director Of the CIA, or his
organization wad' consulted on the /aid,
after The Times published the fact -that he
was not involved in the tInal consideration.
and Sen. J. William Fulbright, chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
complained to Laird about this at a -hearing.
Laird told the committee that he :liad ad-
vised Helms and consulted with hirn, on the
raid "four or five weeks" hefore it tock place.
(By that time, the training at Eglin was well
under way.)
Later Laird told newt-men, "I well remem-
ber sitting in my office with the director of
? the Central Inteligence Agency as we waited
for the helicoptersto take- off at Son Tay,'
as we waited for tiemto Cross the: border,
as we waited for our firit reports as to
whether or not POWs had been rescue il at Son
Tay. I can well remember listening to the
Clock tick as we waited for those messages."
Actually, according to one source, Helms
had One to Laird's office on a different matter
and Laird, after the first preliminary re-
ports indicating no prisoners had been found
at Son Tay, left the command canter in dis-
appointment, knowing no prisoners had been
rescued, and went back to his office -to meet
Helms.
And so the clock ticked away on the Son
Tay raid, leaving nothing to be done but to
bring home all the commandos and decorate
them fox their heroism?and to explain the
escapade to the American people and the
world.
What did it all mean?
"It certainly put the prisoner-of-war issue
on the ?rent pages," a senior military official
COrinnan,ted, ' nefgre tile raid, you could not
get any 'interest at all in POWs and now
everyone's talkinkabout them."
5 ?.0.r...poGgs
POWs. certainly, are on the front pages
I", IN( Whether that halp in securing
their release is problematic. One can argue
that. gro to such pressure only
lay Ina ing the prisoners a more important
bargaining counter in any negotiation to end
the war..
It showed Hanoi that no part of its ter-
ritory was invulnerable to American attacl;,"
another senior military. officer said.
However, it also revealed to Hanoi that
Atherican intelligence on what's going on in
the north is so poor , that, even Vth the
most careful planning and coordination and
most masterful execution, American mili-
tary operations in the north cannot achieve
their goals.
It showed the wives of the prisoners and
the prisoners themselves that we care, and
that will boost morale, Laird has said.
The wives have, for the time being, been
asSuaged. No one can say, however, whether
the prisoners have been given new hope.
Most of the nine Arrierican prisoners who
have been released so, far say North Viet-
namese security is eo, tight in the prisons
that the Americans there still know nothing
of The abortive rescue aitempt.
LITHUANIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY
Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, it is
only proper, considering the pride W3
all have of our own Nation as a symbol
of freedom and justice, that we com-
memorate the 53d anniversary of Lithu-
anian independence.
? Lithuanians have had a long and rich
hiitory in their continuing struggle for
freedom and independence. It was just
a half century ago that the courage and
determination of the Lithuanian people
were rewarded with the establishment
of independen3e for their homeland.
This achievement was realized after
many years of suffering at great human
costs?both in terms of body and spirit.
Once having achieved independence,
Lithuanians sei, up a constitutional gov-
ernment, a model of democratic ideals.
Freedom of speech, assembly, and re-
ligion were the foundations of free Lith-
uania. Yet, in only .a, few short years,
the hard-won freedom of the Lithuanian
people was brutally snuffed out by the
Stalinist government of the Soviet
Union. In the 26 years since the end of
World War II, Lithuania has remained
an imprisoned state, a satellite of the
SoViet Government, ,
We must all recognize, Mr. President,
that it is indeed a credit to the coura-
geous Lithuanian people, that after all
these years they have maintained their
freedom in mind and spirit. The con-
tinued determination of Lithuanians to
win back their freedom and independ-
enCe is an example for the entire world,
an, inspiring torch lighting the way for
all men in the unending struggle for the
freedom and the natural rights with
which every man has been endowed.
Today, all Americans join in the con-
tinuing hope and determination of the
Lithuanian people that someday soon
freedom and independence for Lithuania
wil) be more than the echo of an eternal
dream; that the dream will become a
long deserved reality.,
SENATOR SCHWV.K.ER' SUPPORTS
11QI13,CT EIACTIciN OF Tgg PA,Esz-
Dtrair.
Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, it is
a privilege for me again this year to join
the distinguished majority leader (Mr.
MANSFIELD), the distinguished Senator
from Indiana (Mr. HAYTI), and Many
other Senators, in ci,sponsoring Senate
S 1335
Joint Resolution 1, proposin : constitu-
tional amendment to provide for the di-
rect election of the President and Vice
President.
Last year, I testified be ni e Senator
BAYH'S Subcominittie on _C.-.0r:stitutional
Amendments in favor of t 2.iL proposed
constitutional amendment, tad I was
gratified with the thoroughi,e ,s and dis-
patch with which this subcommittee and
the entire Judiciary Commit e, were able
to report it to the Senate '(-) full con-
sideration. Unfortunately, . .through the
use of the Senate filibuster, N2 were un-
able to follow the Members the other
body and bring this propos :1 to a vote.
Thus it is heartening to ei that the
momentum will be maintain ef, this year.
In my testimony last year I stated my
beliefs, which I still strongly maintain,
that, first, a national Pres 4 mit should
be selected by the direct wL. of the peo-
ple of our Nation, that, secon,i, it is im-
perative for us to .change tip current
electoral college system to eiiminate the
possibility, which currently eq_ists, of a
candidate winning the popnlrr election
but losing the electoral colle re vote, and,
that, third, there is a neeo to increase
the sense of personal pirticiila, ion by the
voters in their role in selectilg the Presi-
dent of the United States.
There is one new factor in cow national
electoral system which, I i:&:ieve, adds
even more weight to these till ee consid-
erations: the lowering of the voting age
to 18 in Federal elections. i?lot, only are
there more voters who now w-11 partici-
pate in selecting the Preside It but there
will be thousands of new yen em s who will
want their individual vote t( c wectly in-
fluence the outcome of the p -esidential
election.
The fact remains thrt unrim' the exist-
ing electoral college unit ride whereby
the plurality winner in a Sa? e receives
all the electoral votes i)f the sitate each
voter who casts a brllot .: or someone
other than the plurality winner- is, in
effect, disfranchised, Although the pro-
portional plan, whereby the t ites' elec-
toral votes are cast in prop( non to the
number of votes each candir a e receives
in the election, and the d gi:let plan,
whereby the electoral vote f riach con-
gressional district is given to h.' plurality
winner in that district, are Ix tL improve-
ments over the current unit rule, I feel
strongly that if we are going,' to reform
our system, we ought to take :1 e full step
necessary.
I cannot stress enough that the elec-
toral college concept was cr. cc Led in an
era when travel and corn n inications
were in their infancy and v-thm such a
representative system was th ,rily feasi-
ble way to insure that the v Ill of the
people was being exercised. Jut today,
when Presidents can instanji, travel to
any section of the country ':nd when
the modern media allow a 'resident to
have an instant national c ir stituency,
the need for a two-stage el, CI on is re-
moved. The people of a congr ional dis-
trict directly elect their Rep!?e-,entative;
the people of a State directl Ilea their
Senators and Governor; the sante logic
that resulted in our Pound n. Fathers
Instituting these systems clic a es, in my
view, that the, people -of olx Nation
r
i!
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-14DP73B00296R000300050002-2
APProved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050002-2
6 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
should likewise be able to directly elect
their President.
The Joiht resolution has been changed
since it was originally introduced last
ear, and I commend the sponsors of the
resolution for making a number of im-
portant improvements and for building
upon the experience of last year's debate
to create a stronger measure, which I
hope will have a better chance for speedy
Pasage?
First of all, providing for an auto-
matic formula as a substitute for an ac-
tual runoff election, in case no one can-
didate receives 40 percent or more of the
popular vote, is a constructive change.
Under the revised amendment, the can-
didate who receives the largest vote, but
who does not receive 40 percent of the
popular vote, is still the winning candi-
date if he would have had a majority un-
der the electoral college system.
An important factor of this alternative
tabulation is that it does not apply to a
candidate who has received less than a
Plurality of the popular vote, and thus
the electoral college formula cannot be
applied to give the Presidency to a can-
didate who came in second in the popu-
lar vote.
A second important factor in this run-
off provision is that the electoral votes
of each State are applied automatically,
eliminating any "deals" or maneuver-
ing between candidates.
I feel this formula for a runoff is a
significant step toward meeting the ob-
jections of critics of the direct election
system, who feared chaos from the sit-
uation where a candidate did not receive
a clear majority of the vote. The combi-
nation of a plurality of the popular vote,
and a majority of the States, can help
insure that the Pr?dent-elect is truly
the choice of the majority of the people
in our Nation.
In addition, this resolution has been
strengthened this year by changing the
system by which a President is chosen
by the Congress When there is no clear
winner in the popular vote or electoral
college runoff formula. Rather than
having the choice made in the House of
Representatives alone, utilizing a unit
system by States, the final determination
will be made by all Senators and Repre-
sentatives, in joint session, voting indi-
vidually. / support this change.
Finally, the resolution is improved by
Providing for the elimination of some of
the most glaring inadequacies of the
electoral college, in case the direct elec-
tion proposal has been ratified by the
necessary three-fourths of the "States,
but has not taken effect at the time of a
presidential election. By binding each
elector of the electoral college, the "faith-
less elector" problem is eliminated. And
also, even with an electoral college sys-
tem, in this interim situation, a failure
to obtain an electoral college majority
would result in the election of the Presi-
dent by a joint session of Congress, with
each Senator and Representative voting
separately,
Mr. President, all elected officials must
do eVerything in their ability to restore
the confidence of the nubile in our gov-
ernmental Institutions, and to make our
electoral process fair and? representative
of the will of the people. In my judg-
ment, there is no step which can do'more
to accomplish this than eliminating the
archaic institution of the electoral col-
lege and approving the direct election of
the President. The issue has been thor-
oughly studied and debated in recent
years. Now is the time for action.
THE GREEK MILITARY
DICTATORSHIP
Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, for a long
time I have been concerned with our
policy toward the Greek military dicta-
torship, which in fact negates both the
spirit and the objectives of the Truman
Doctrine of 1947. That is why today I
would like to bring to the attention of
the senate two very interesting and use-
ful documents which I do hope President
Nixon and his foreign policy advisers will
have a chance to study: First, an article
written by the well-known syndicated
columnists Rowland Evans and Robert
lstovak, published in the Washington Post
of January 51, 1911, concerning- the
tragic but also most revealing Elias P.
nernetricopoulos affair. Second, a state-
ment addressed to the North Atlantic
Assembly signed by 21 distinguished for-
mer Greek cabinet ministers, both con-
servatives and liberals, and repreienting
a very wide spectrum of the political life
of Greece, which was brought to my at-
tention by my good friend Elias P.
Demetricapcados a leader of the Greek
resistance movement.
I ask unanimous consent that thcy be
printed in the REcoaa.
There' being no objection, the items
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
SENATOR FULBRIGHT VERSUS THE JUNTA
(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak)
Political reaction here against the dicta-
torial military regime in Greece has reached
such a peak that Sen. J. W. Fulbright of
Arkansas, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, is quietly sending two
committee investigators to Athens for an on-
the-spot probe of how U.S. policy is being
carried out.
What has moved Fulbright and other com-
mittee members is accumulating evidence
that the military junta show no intentton of
keeping its agreement with President Nixon
Of last Sept. 22. On that date, Mr. Nixon de-
cided to resume full-scale arms shipments to
Greece?a clear signal that the junta had
worked itself back into the good graces of
the United States. In return, the junta
pledged political reforms, including release
of political prisoners and a move toward
democratic elections.
That end of the bargain is not being kept.
Moreover, there is deepening suspicion on
Capitol Hill that U.S. Ambassador Henry
Tares, is too close to the colonels.
To make the committee's investigation,
Futbright has assigned two top investiga-
tors?Richard Moose and James Lowenstein,
both ex-Foreign Service officers, They will
proceed to Athens in the first on-the-spot
congressional inquiry since the military dic-
tatorship took power in a 'bloodless coup
d'etat almost four years ago. Their last as-
signment was U.S. policy in Cambodia
Although Fulbright has been brooding
about the junta for many months, the recent
tragedy involving the leading anti-junta
Greek exile, Elias Dernetracoaules, played a
significant part in the decision to dispatch
Moose and Lowenstein.
February 11, 19',
Despite direct intervention of the St
Department, Dernetracopoulos was unable
obtain an advance safe-conduct pledge fro,
the junta to visit his dying father in Decen
ber. One result of that was a letter to Fin
bright from three U.S. senators suggesting
that Tasca be summoned to Washington for
testimony before the Foreign Relations
Committee.
Fulbright's respo ase to the three Demo-
crats?Sens. Frank Moss of Utah, Mike Gravel
of Alaska and Quentin Burdick of North Da-
kota?stated that "the nature and conduct of
U.S. relations with she junta have long been
a source of consternation to me." He said
that the Densetracopoulos incident "is simi-
lar to many others in the past few years."
Fulbright's subsequent decision for a com-
mittee probe in Athens carries the most seri-
ous implications for the junta and its souring
relations with the Nixon administration.
anus' ALTERNATIVE
Despite veiled threats of retaliation against
congressmen who oppose President Nixon's
$5 billion revenue-sharing proposal, the
political prognosis today is that the plan will
die a slow and (in Congress) unlamented
death.
The veiled threats, emanating from ad-
ministration backers, hint that recalcitrant
members of Congress may get redistricted
by angry state legislatures into new and un-
friendly districts. Almost all congressmen
will be vulnerable to redistricting this year
or next to take account of the 1970 census.
But the chance of that actually happening
Is zero. In fact, even if proponents of the
plan could prove that it will happen, the op-
position of both Rep. Wilbur Mills of Ar-
kansas, powerful chairman of the Ways and
Means Committee that will handle the Pres-
ident's general resenue-sharing plan. and
Rep. John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, ranking
Republican member, assures the plan's de-
feat in the House.
Moreover, intimates of Mills predict that
he is moving toward a substitute plan that
would have roughly the same result as Mr.
Nixon's general revenue-sharing proposal:
gradual federalizing of the welfare program,
with Uncle Sam picking up most or all the
state' welfare bill, now running at $7.3 billion
a year.
Some governors have been lobbying for just
such a change for years. Switching from the
present welfare program to Mr. Nixon's Fam-
ily Assistance Plan, passed by the House but
not the Senate last year, would cost the fed-
eral government an estimated $4 billion ex-
tra in the first year?but would not reduce
state welfare costs more than $1300 million.
A footnote: The President's "special" reve-
nue-sharing plan?grouping present and nar-
row categorical grant programs into six broad
functions such as education and transporta-
tion?has a far better prospect in Congress.
I will not go to the Ways and Means Com-
mittee.
STATEMENT ADDRESS SD TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC
ASSEMBLY (THE HAGUE, 1970)
BY 21 FORMER GREEN MINISTERS
1. The undersigned Greek parliamentar-
ians, residents of Athens, who have been
ministers of Greek governments in the last
ten years, address themselves to the parlia-
mentarians of the NATO Assembly and in-
voke, on the occasion of the 1970 meeting in
The Hague, their moral support in the pur-
suit of the implementation in Greece?a
member of the Atlantic Alliance since 1952?
of the objectives proclaimed in the preamble
of the Treaty, namely the defence of Democ-
racy, Freedom and Human dignity, which
were all dismantled in Greece on 21 April
1967 by a coup of a small group of ambi-
tious army officers who, under the pretext of
a communist revolution, turned against the
King, the then legal government and the ex-
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000300050092-2
\-1)45214 .
pprovec*irror Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296RAO 00050002-2
THE EVENING STAR DATE eiort. 7/ PAGE
Son Tay Data Was 6 Months Old
By SEYMOUR M. HERSH
special to The Star
The White House relied on
basic military inteliigence that
was at least six months old in
approving the unsuccessful com-
mando raid in November on the
Son Tay prisoner of war camp
inside North Vietnam.
Interviews over the past two operation and construction of
months revealed that the Pen- the Son Tay prison. The detailed any further proof that Amen-
;agon's first information about information even included what cans were, in fact, being de-
the &xi Taz camp-23 miles kind of locks were on the cell tamed inside Son Tay.
#0:t citraboi?Wdsjfliect hi doors and where they were 10- In essence, the high-risk oper-
a irtigner hiorTE-Vietnarciese caled. tion was staged?with approval
prison guard who was captured' By July, the interrogation of
i
during the U.S.-South Viet- the prison guard had been corn-
namese invasion of Cambodia pleted and the Air Force was
in May, 1970. ordered to initiate a series of
The guard, whose capture was aerial overflights over the Son
considered highly classified in- Tay prison. At no time before
the actual invasion of the
prison?on Nov. 20, six months
after the guard's capture?was
the military able to establish
formation, provided military in-
telligence teams with invaluable
information about the location,
177. so). rervIrra-rriti r ,
c ro Ste - 1ed, the geog cliange-d
4
inteifsive investigation into 1141 sgirtn?rtinch to everyone's re.
on Tay raid is a serious indict-1 lief?and the courtyard suddenly
ingnt of the practices and opera- took on "that well-worn look,"
tlork of the Defense Intelligence as one analyst described it.
ency, which was in charge of By now it was August and the
elligence for the mission. , White House was approached.
The DIA's photo analysts Briefings were presented to
somehow interpreted what President Nixon and Henry Kis-
turned out to be a vegetable gar- 1singer, the President's adviser
:growing inside the Son Tay on national security affairs. The
found as evidence that !President was, according to la-
rican prisoners were inside , ter White House accounts, "en-
area. 1thusiastic" about the idea and
_ e is the story of the plan- !authorized full-scale planning
ning behind the Soli Tay opera-1and training for a search and
!rescue mission.
The cloak-and-dagger opera-
tion was code-named the Joint
Contingency Task Group Ivory
Coast, and training i
began in
Au-
tion:
olhe capture?or defection?of
tIle , North Vietnamese prison
- guard in May, 1970, was a
niajOr achievement; such men
were never sent by Hanoi into 1 gust at Eglin Air Force Base n
$euth Vietnam because of the Florida. Optimism was rising in-
higher risk of capture. At least side the government; it was the
!PW:e POW camps previously first time that the military had
vire? known to exist inside the established a n intelligence
limits of Hanoi, but the loca- I "book" on a POW camp not in-
of other facilities las not 'side the Hanoi city limits.
wn. Despite this, the military 1 But there were many basic
long been seeking pertnis- ' intelligence problems that were
to raid one of the known 1 never overcome. For one thing,
S. no one had established beyond a
!reasonable doubt that the Son
Clue to Inadequacy j Tay prison was holding Amen-
One clue to the inadequac3i of !cans.
tie 'over-all American intelli-
tice operation inside North
etnam emerged from the fact
at the Pentagon learned about
lie Son Tay camp from the cap
-
from President T b on?although
the only facts kLav, n were those
supplied by the former prison
camp guard.
Yet, there wi s no available
evidence indicati ig that the mili-
tary planners " al,!w" that the
Son Tay camp lid not contain
prisoners, as er. . J. W. Ful-
bright, of Arkant as chairman of
the Senate Fo eign Relations
Committee has publicly
charged.
What does e ,p Lge from an
See SON T V Page A-4 I
"We had a hypothesis based
on various sources of informa-
tion," said one analyst who
worked on the project, "but as
far as being able to say, 'Hey,
,b
tired guard. Son Tay area had, there go two more guys into the
In 'fact, tong been known to the !camp' ? well, we couldn't." The
telligenee community and ire- official added:
liefitIy photographed. 1 "Our situation was this ? so a
ccording to defense sourcs, river comes out and floods ?
4Ae
major military construction and so they (the North Vietnam-
program, manned by .a force
?i 1 ese) move the pilots out. The
i
estrnated 15,000 Chinese tom- ; place overgrows. It looks bad.
rimhists, got under way there In j Bingo. The grass starts to wear
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
19o5 or 1966. The area also OC-
dame the site of a MIG base
ly in the air war and was a
y target area during the
oui In)
The Central Intelligence Agen-
cr had been unable to de-
velop any solid information
al)out prisoner-of-war camps.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, it
had attempted unsuccessfully to
infiltrate highly trained teams of
South Vietnamese into North
Vietnam.
Most of the groups?known in
the intelligence community as
13611 Teams"?were dropped
by parachute in the Red River
Delta, northwest of Hanoi, but
quickly became, as a former
agent said, "ground up like
hamburger. They'd get wrapped
# in two or three days," he
added, largely due to the high
State of internal security in the
North.
l' In July 1970, the military
asked the Central Intelligence
Agency for any information it
had on the physical makeup of
Son Tay, but that apparently
as the extent of the CIA's in-
volvement.
:The raid on Son Tay was to be
an all-military affair, with
over-all direction and planning
from the Pentagon's counter-
insurgency office and intelli-
gence from photo interpretation
supplied by CIA.
Early Photographs
down again. Hey, it looks good.
It's a 50-50 chance they moved crowd on the -elipse during the I base this on."
them back." hlarch on Washington (the l In fact, the Pentagon had no
There were, apparently, only a ant-War demonstration in No-
few cautious doubts raised ? vertiber, 1969) ? it was an Air
largely because the high secrecy Force picture published in a lot
of the operation kept details of newspapers. Now, don't ask
away from many officials who ;'anybody to break down how
might have pointed out more many of the people were Ne-
vigorously the fact that the miliagrOes and how many were Cau-
tary was planning a high-risk ,casians. We just can't do it. But
raid on the basis of evidence after they left, you sure could
indicating that weeds and grass tell that they were there?the
had been trampled. grass would be all trampled."
,, .
A similarly trampled appear-
Previous Mistakes arte, was evident in what
There had been previous nais- searbed to be a grassy area in-
takes based on aerial photo- side the tiny Son Tay compound.
graphs. , ' Shock For Military
One former intelligence offi-
cial recalled the time that photo The aerial photographs also
interpreters spotted an enclosed established that the guard tow-
campand basic layout of Son Tay
area in North Veitnam er$
with a double barbed wire fence. were very similar in design to
After observing it for a while that of the POW camps inside
Hanoi. It was agreed?without;
they concluded it was a base
with some military significance ever seeing an identifiable pris-
and targeted it for a bombing oner?that the Son Tay facility
raid. was an active POW camp for
l_ ,era
"A few days later," the ee " :sArnicns.
ometime in the July-August
cial said, "North Vietnam began period, the military, got a shock
claiming we had bombed the when, during a period of heavy
death ward of a leper colony, flooding of the Red River Delta,
Intelligence got fooled." the camp suddenly was vacated.
The 101-man joint Air Force- The changing geography of the
Army commando team took off camp was apparent: the tram-
in helicopters from its base in pled look disappeared.
- The early reconnaissance pho-
tographs of the prison camp in-
dicated that it was still in heavy
use and were highly encouraging
te-the iliab $14-Eciatilgon-
Way skilled team was careful-
ly assembled; men were hand-
picked from offices throughout
the Pentagon and assigned to
the secret operation.
The planning was rigidly bur-
eaucraticized for security rea-
sobs: One group of men worked
oh means for getting the rescue
team safely in and out of North
Vietnam; another group did the
day-by-day analysis to deter-
Mine a crucial fact?were the
pilots there?
Jae evidence that the photo
interpreters viewed as encourag-
lag, however, was far from defi-
nite proof that the captured pi-
lets were at Son Tay.
One man who worked on the
Son' Tay project, attempting to
explain its failure, argued that
pleat? reconnaissance is not an
n
way of knowling if American
prisoners had been inside the
camp at all ? even before the
flooding -- since the captured :
guard last work there early in I
1970.
Intelligence men in the Penta-
gon later were able only to con-
clude that the base had either
been closed permanently or tem-
porarily. "Was it being refur-
bishe d? Was it being
disinfected? We didn't know,'
Said one of the men who took
part in the planning.
The Vietnamese guards in the
camp had AK-47 automatic ri-
fles, the standard Chinese weap-
on not usually given to local
troops in North Vietnam, a fact
that led many analysts to decide
that they were a small house-
keeping team, perhaps waiting
for the prisoners to return.
The last overflight of the pris-
on, concluded just hours before
the operation began, still showed
signs of occupation ? the
"well-worn look."
Despite the failure, most
member of the planning and in-
telligence teams took solace in
the demonstrated ability of
American commandoes to pene-
Thailand early on Nov. 20. Ac- When the flood waters reced- trate North Vietnam's air space
cording to many published ac-
counts, the team arrived unde-
tected and landed inside the
small Son Tay compound. No
prisoners were found, but the
men noticed that most of the
open space inside the prison was
being used by the North Viet-
name,se for a carefully cultivat-
ed vegetable garden.
'Well-Worn' Garden
Intelligence analysts later con-
cluded during post mortems on
the raid that the "Well-worn
look," which had become so
clearly discernible after the
July-August floodin g, might
have been a result of the garden-
ing efforts.
More disturbing was the possi-
bility that the prisoners could
have been transferred from Son
Tay in August, just after the
flooding began and just as the
commando team began its ar-
duous training for a mission al-
ready doomed.
During a little-noticed news
conference at Eglin Air Force
Base in early December, Brig.
science at all despite Gen. LeRoy Manor, head of the
commando team, told newsmen:
"We weren't able to tell exactly
when they moved the prisoners
of war . I say it could have
been about three months. And
this is a judgment, and I have
nothing absolutely definite to
-
pread beliefs of the gener-
blic so conditioned to de-
dons of miraculous close-
from "eye in the sky" cam-
ea 100 miles up. The source
added:
ake that hoto raph of the
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RIM7,3138S0&50002-2
NEW YORK TIMES
iXOn Sending British Exp) ert on New Saigon Study
,
stU'Lc.
je to T41 44e.ve Yoxlc 'Saks
',$HINGTON,. Jan:- 15 ?
?-410241,11k4ir
ish
' - . 0
- ? ? 0
on errill wa ?
? ? 'ext
? e ur en evaTuation
? :on ovemmen s
.1.0. ? e t. et. Nun s,
. pim.m.;747llit;r1 ? d
- ? -;
?1.
ants sard that tPritis qTert
*theta Ad4i1K5tiiiiiPlynforrn-
would also loote into e joint
Amerkan-SoUth YleZatnIse
lice _And. Pacification activities,
which range from efforts to
Wipe but the Communist politi-
cal organization in the South
to operation of South Vietnam-
ese prisons with United States
assistance.
State, _Department officials
said that the proposal for Sir
Robert to, accept another mis-
'slon
by the Sawn Government with
the conciirrence of the IJnitecl
,States,
' :They Said-tfie' request Was
forwarded_ by Ellsworth T.
Blinkt:', the American Ambas-
sador m:$aigon, in a message
to President -Nbcon earlier this
month;
Sir?Ito ert unertool? five-
week secret migsion fgr Presi-
se-nrt fxon last autumn 7? his
second vsit to south Vietnam
in a year?but it war not clear
for what specific reasons he
and his group of British police
specialists had been asked to
go back after so short an in-
terval.
There was strict secrecy here
surrounding Sir Robert's trip.
But the speculation in informed
rguarters is that both Mr.
Bunker and the Administration
were eager to have an up-to-
date independent evaluation of
the progress of pacification and
related public safety efforts. It
Is felt such an evaluation is
needed before decisions are
made on additional with-
drawals of American troops
from South Vietnam.
Another possible reason for
the mission is that the Civil
Operations and Rural Develop-
ment Support Program, which
is in over-air charge of pacifi-
cation, is to be reorganized,
effectiye March I, as the Com-
munity Defense and Local De-
,Olopment Program.
Other informed sources said
that both the Administration
and Ambassador Bunker still
appeared to be troubled by the
relative lack of success in the
destruction of the secret Com-
munist network in South Viet-
nam. This has a bearing on the
larger aspects of pacification
4nd on the Vietnamitation
gram, under which South Viet-
namese forces are gradually
replacing American combat
units.
The problem of the Com-
munist organization in South
Vietnam was reportedly a
principal theme of the report
Sir Robert presented to Presi-
dent Nixon at a secret con-
ference last Oct. 13.
The New York Times last
Dec. 2 reported that Sir Robert
had gone to South Vietnam on
a Presidential mission. The
Times article said Administra-
tion officials had asserted
that his report underlined the
failure to eradicate the Com-
munist network.
The next day, however, in
confirming the existence of the
Thioinpson report, the White
House press secretary, RonaTcl
L. Ziegler, said that "the over-
all thrust of the [New. 'York
Times] ,story, which leads to
the impression that the pacifi-
cation and Vietnamization
programs are not doing well,
Is an incorred impression."
Mr. Ziegler refused to de-
scribe the content of the re-
port on security grounds. In
an interview with the Asso-
ciated Press last Dec. 13, Sir
Robert declined to comment
maw on that part of the
T1f?earticle that dealt with
the failure to destn y Jie Com-
munist subversive o g nization.
He said, however, :hat the
Vietnamization an, pacifica-
tion policies were unassail-
able by the enemy.
In mid-December ;ecretary
of Defense Melvin R. Laird
summoned to Wasl r gton the
head of the Civil Operations
and Rural Developra.int Sup-
port Program, E. Col-
by, to discuss the la Ification
problems. According t ? Admin-
istration informant, this re-
view included ques 'cis about
the Communist network raised
in the Thompson tport.
Officials here said today that
Sir Robert's new mi si in would
deal with United q ites and
South Vietnamese ' 3 Bee and
public safety" prog a ns.
This appeared suggest
that Sir Robert a,,,d his ad-
visers?who were riot identi-
fied ? would cont prtrate on
pacification and, jii ticu1arly,
on the problems ai ne Com-
munist undergrounc
The allied progra 1 to eradi-
cate this organizat al4 is run
jointly under the nn-p of Op-
eration Phoenix 1:03 he Civil
Operations and Rur Develop-
ment Program and t. ie South
Vietnamese Nationa Police Di-
rectorate. Although the Civil
Operations group is h -iaded by
a tivillan, Arribass?dc,r Colby,
most of its personnel engaged
[11 Operation ?hoer': ;.s drawn
from the Defense pepartment
and the _ elligenie
Agency:
Officials inclicater,
tat the ThompHl. mission
would concern itself ith other
)hases of the Antri,an and
;south ,Vietnamese -olce and
mblic safety pragp rr s
Both the National tolice Di-
ectorate and the, .1 ohth Viet-
iamese prison sypt"'t m are ad-
rised and support, d by the
hiblic Safety Office o= the Ad-
ninistration. far. ,4!-e national
)evelopmental und aver-all
Lirection ,Mnliaisaior Col-
group..
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP731300296R000300059409-9
PliA477I ,-JAGED11
T HE WA SHINGT ON POST DATE
k
WAS
ashingion Merry.Go-Itound '141
pOST Monday, krtch 22. D11.
nt Data Cramps Parts Negotiators
Pia Anderson
pla Aegetiatorn In Paris
have been restricted to the
c,rie intelligence
t tiv war they are sup-
-i Oiling, This has
me grumping inside
a'e z,(4 ? ? a ion over the diffi-
o negotiating in the
,delegation re-
a routine intern-
-4=lil ' 114 dealing with the
I I! rh foks.:10,0
sbiammil- plans, Tos.ffican
? - ? ngencY plans and
--,I?jofriFelItie document's:?
_
-..paill7.714 ? aris.
_ %ILjii qS at1115
i-i.nm reraft remnlaqk
ppginApubo. ether tacVcal tar-
Vietnam in, late
Okt.11001.4 for example,
nii assatior 15avid X.
-TT -? nuiletely13r, sur-
? recelved h irst
attacks tkA1111Ei
tuamese.
'him poorly pre-
andle the Istorth ci-
egation's protests
? Cornmunipt nego-
a ors e oose a propaganda
blast, threatening to stonewall
the talks.
Ambassador Bruce asked Ur-
gently for more details about
the raids. He needed the back-
ground information to help
him respond to the Commu-
nist charges.
His request was forwarded
by his military liaison man,
Lt. Gen. Julian Ewell, in a
"flash" message to the I'enta-
gon.
Admiral Thomas Moorer,
the Joint Chiefs chairman,
sent back a detailed account
trary evidence from ex-CIA
men, State Department in-
formants and classified U.N.
dpeuments.
?
The poet's theory is that th
CIA has been compelled t
help the opium farmers in the
mountains of Northern Laos
in order to keep them fighting
the Communists.
The CIA has raised a 10,000.
man army from these Meo
of the raids from the Washing- tribesmen. With out their
ton Post. The reply was re- opium trade, they might re-
garded in Paris as an insulting quire massive U.S. economic
message to Bruce that he aid. ?
should be satisfied with what Informants have told Gins-
he reads in the newspapers. berg that the renegade
Chinese Nationalists in North-
ern Laos and Thailand also
make their living from opium
The CIA would like to keep
- Poet's New Quest
Beat poet Allen Ginsberg,
the unhappy hippie, his ern-
-barked upon the new role of these Chinese active, too,
investigative reporter in pur- against the Communists.
suit of evidence that the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency is Poet's Transformation
supporting the opium racket we discovered Ginsberg's
in Laos. , transformation from poet to
Ginsberg, sandalled and bald-i muckraker when he came to
ing, his long beacd streaked] our office, clad in his hippie
with white hairs, has even, garb, seeking proof of his own
managed to interview the se-1 opium story. To our surprise,
elusive CIA director, Richard I his detailed files and probing
Helms, about the CIA's sus-! questions were thoroughly
pected opium smuggling. professional.
Helms vigorously denied his He asked us for a copy of a
_
agents are 'ping opium out ofjetter that has disappeared
Laos. But tThsberct grail:IT-Om the files of Senate Gov-
lected a thick iaaciet. 61-514Crtunent Operations Subcorn-
1. ta.al ;Ij
mittee. The tette written by
a former CL ? employe*
named S. M. Mu; rd, charges
that South Vic tram's Vice
President Ngu r Coo Ky
once flew opium ?ur of Laos.
The New Yor. Times and
Ramparts magazi ic which are
also working oi the opium
story, had called u3 about the
letter. But Gins ie,-g came to
our office and p, e:?sed in per-
son for the miss n . evidence..
We dug a ph, tt Ad of the
letter, addressei? to former
Sen. Ernest Cri 47,ning CD-
Alaska) out of ou ?lea. It told
how Ky, during I is missions
as an Air Force .o onel, "took
advantage of thi z ituation to
fly opium from L aos to Sai-
gon."
My associate, I, -4 Whitten,
verified several lei ails in the
letter but could one up with
no additional evii eiwe that Ky
engaged in opiu ii smuggling.
The colorful So it Vietnam-
ese Vice Preside .t also denied
the charge.
But the rag, .e- i. bearded
Ginsberg tucked a ropy of tius
letter into his imptessive port-
folio and strode 0.,If for an in-
terview with Wa!tor Pincus, a
former Senate ?:-Ici;-eign Rela-
tions investigate- with inside
Information on Ii id, whine.
1971, Bell-MeClur 5 -ndicate, Ina.
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
S 7036Approved For Releasee
nerable to observation by other, intelligence
means at our disposal."
The Administration's sensitly4y in public
discussion of advances In seiswic research
was illustrated by the fact that the Penta-
gon, according to Senator Case, 'Iripped out"
a section summarizing the findings on the
Woods Hole conference from a report sub-
mitted to the Senator.
As a result, Senator Case said, he turned
to "nationally recognized authorities," many
of whom participated in the conference, for
a summary of the findings.
In their summary, they said, "The essence
of these findings is that there are two signifi-
cant developments which make it much more
feasible to distinguish between seismic dis-
turbances caused by earthquakes and those
caused by nuclear explosions.
"One of the developments noted was that
new technology has revealed that explosions
cause much smaller waves in the earth's
crust than do earthquakes. A complemen-
tary and equally important finding Is the
ability to detect smaller seismic disturbances
than had heretofore been possible."
THE WHALINQ INDUSTRY
Mr. HARRIS. Mr. President, many peo-
ple today believe that the whaling busi-
ness disappeared with the sailing ship.
This view is entirely wrong and unfortu-
nately is a tragic misconception. The
whaling industry has continued at such
a pace that whales are now, and have
been for some period of time, an endan-
gered species.
During the 1960's the total number of
whales killed was the greatest 10-year
kill ever made. In 1933 almost 29,000
whales were killed, yielding 2,606,201
barrels of oil. In 166 almost 58,000
whales were killed, yielding 1,546,904 bar-
rels of oil. While almost twice as many
whales were killed in 1966 as in 1933,
only half as much oil was gathered, which
obviously means that whale hunters are
killing smaller whales in larger numbers.
Scientists have predicted that main
herds of whales have been brought to
near extinction in the Antarctic. They
have further predicted that if a 5-year
moratorium on whaling had been estab-
lished in the Antarctic between 1962 and
1967, the industry could have been har-
vesting the maximum sustainable yield
from 1967 onward. But a moraterium was
not established arid it is now estimated
that it will take 50 to 100 years to bring
back the Antarctic whale stocks to the
same size that they might have reached
between 1962 and 1967,
In March of this year Secretary of
Commerce Maurice Stans announced
that he had ordered an end to American
participation in the destruction of the
great mammals. However, despite the
general recognition that all species of
whales are endangered, Secretary Stans
has now bactracked and issued a license
to Del-Monte Fishing Co. of Richmond,
a California firm, permitting the firm to
engage in the 6-month season on fin-
back whales and the 8-month season on
Sei and Sperm whales, The season be-
gan on April 1.
This is indeed a disappointing develop-
ment and I believe places in question the
ability ,of this administration to handle
the discretionary powers of the Endan-
gered 'Species Act,
On March 23 I introduced S. 1315, a
bill that would prohibit Americans kill-
ing ocean mammals, including seals,
apsesiWAIRR1312RgflA3jEl,N50002-2
Nay 17, 1971
walrus, polar bears, as well as whales.
Even though the total U.S. kill of whales
in 1970 came to only 125, the United
States lost the opportunity this year to
lead all other nations in stopping the
killing of this endangered species. Other
countries killed over 20,000 whales in
1970 and it is quite obvious that the pro-
tection of whales cannot be achieved
unilaterally, and that Russia, Japan,
and Norway, the major whalers, must
join in the endeavor. My bill attempts
to reach this problem by requiring the
State Department to initiate an inter-
national treaty halting the slaughter of
ocean mammals. Also my bill would help
to remove the economic incentive for
these other countries to continue the
needless slaughter of ocean mammals by
banning the importation of all products
of these animals.
Last month while in Eastern Europe
meeting with officials on East-West
trade, I met with high ranking Russian
officials in the Ministry of Fisheries on
the problems associated with the killing
of ocean mammals and the proposals in
my bill. They agreed that public opinion
requires more effective measures against
taking ocean mammals. They also in-
formed me that their ideas and the ideas
in my bill had much in common; how-
ever, they were insistent that any meas-
ure in this area must have the adherence
of all concerned nations. The Russians
have taken the lead in protecting the
polar bear since 1956.
I believe that it is essential that imme-
diate hearings be held on S. 1315, which
is cosponsored by 24 other Senators and
which has been introduced in the House
of Representatives by Congressman
DAVID PRYOR, Democrat of Arkansas, and
Is cosponsored by 20 House Members.
Stronger action than that taken by Sec-
retary Stans is certainly called for in
view of the growing threat of extinction
of all o an mammals.
\ITI'HE WAR IN INDOCHINA
Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, on
May 13, Robert Shaplen, one of the most
experienced and perceptive observers of
the war in Indochina, testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Be-
cause I agree completely with Mr. Shan-
len that "the Vietnam war, always essen-
tially a political one, is rapidly becoming
more political"; that "we do not under-
stand much about the Vietnamese"; and
that we should stay out of the process of
accommodation through which the Viet-
namese must work out their political dif-
ferences, I have introduced a Resolution
creating a congressional commission to
implement a policy of strict U.S. neu-
trality in the coming South Vietnamese
elections.
The purpose of this Commission is not
to tell the South Viet,namese how to run
their elections, but to keep us out of those
elections. Mr. Shaplen has pointed out
that many South Vietnamese believe that
the United States is backing the Thieu
government "to the hilt." Unless we act e
to dispel that impression, we will once
again have interfered with a political
event that is best left to the South Viet-
namese themselves.
I find Mr. Shaplen's testimony to be a
most constructive addition to the debate
over the future course o our Indochina
policy, and mask unanimai consent that
It be printed at this poin in the RECORD
?
There being no objec the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
STATEMENT OF ROBERT SHA N, BEFORE THE
SENATE COMMITTEE ON Fr .7S.ETGN RELATIONS,
MAY 13,1971
Mr. Chairman, members ), the Commit-
tee: I wish to thank you f( r ,-our invitation
to testify at these hearing,. f have been a
member of The New Yorke :raft since 1952
and the Far Eastern corn _ipondent of the
magazine for the past nine y-ars, but I am
appearing here today on a n. vate basis. My
experience in China and Southeast Asia
dates back to 1945. My visit to South
Vietnam was in June 1946. i was there most
recently, and in Laos an Cambodia, in
March and April of this year. I am the author
of The Lost Revolution, Ti ,o out of Hand,
and The Road From War.
I shall address myself firs. to the Vietnam
war, specifically to the subj( et of these hear-
ings?how to end it--and t ie-i to the prob-
lems of Southeast Asia in general. Ending
the war as soon as possible is only a neces-
sary first step to dealing wit he vital ques-
tion of re-formulating ou whole foreign
policy-making process, not 'my with regard
to Asia but to the rest of the world as well.
My own position on the vietnam war has
been as follows: I believed in the original
Vietnam commitment. and %lade I think we
have made many disastrou. mistakes since
we became involved in that :vi?going back
to 1945-46 but particularly s :14:e 1954?I still
feel we had a legitimate init al political con-
cern. But that concern Sb ruld have been
limited, in its expression a id implementa-
tion, to a military assistan -e and advisory
program, stressing u nconv .tVlonal rather
than conventional warfare 3.ei-hods, and to
programs of economic and 'a cial aid. The
continuation of these progr: collectively,
should have been predicated on the amount
and substance of political ad social reform
the Vietnamese undertook. Imfortunately,
we set no such standards aci went ahead
anyway, and once involved i was difficult to
avoid becoming more invc-/ved. Hindsight
criticism is easy, but this was our first big
mistake.
I was against the bombint c f North Viet-
nam and the overcommitment of American
forces in the South. It is pro; 'al?ly true, how-
ever, that had it not been fo the number of
American troops in the cons try in 1965 and
1966 it would have been in two, from
the highlands across to the oast, and most
of the northern half of South V'etnam would
have fallen to the Commums's. But after
that, strategically and tact ceily, we con-
tinued to rely far too much c irepcnver and
airpower, including indiscrin 'nate bombing.
If we helped save a series of 'is popular gov-
ernments, we increasingly all ,nated millions
of South Vietnamese by our overpowering
but invariably ineffective tt? inconclusive
military actions, despite th. act that we
killed several hundred thouseno North Viet-
namese and Vietcong. Simi -toreously, we
tried to ameliorate the destru ti 'n we caused
by constantly shifting progra o:. of so-called
pacification. Real social ant. ( conomic re-
form, including land reforn "thould have
been far better conceived an :mplemented
far sooner. Most importantl the task of
training the Vietnamese to th. alone, with
modern weapons including M-16 rifles,
should have been undertak( n immediately
after the military crisis of le 66, not sev-
ral years later, as happened. ter the 1963
Tel offensive. Nowadays, our otiated efforts
to bring about Improvements 'n security and
evelopment, and to turn Si e war over to
viethamese, are an part of what we call
Vietnamization. Because of 1 1.e, heritage of
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
May 17, 1971 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
none to Latin America, critics consider the
flame is not worth the candle.
NEW FLOW POSSIBLE
It is possible that the winding down of
the Vietnam war may produce new flows of
arms to Latin America. Certainly many Latin
nations have demonstrated that they will buy
arms elsewhere it they cannot get them from
the U.S. But this has not happened yet and
' it may never happen.
What of the defense of the Panama Canal
and of the hemisphere in general? CINC-
SOuTia has no role in the canal defense. The
small infantry units in the Canal Zone do
not need a Joint Staff to supervise them
and the brigade would not be affected by
departure of the Southern Command. Air
defense is handled by Strike Command in
the U.S. and there are no combat aircraft
stationed in Panama. The Navy command
for defense of the region is in Puerto Rico.
Similarly the training centers for Latin
officers and men would not be affected by
terminating the role of the CINCSO1TTII
staff. These could continue functioning with-
out the generals and admirals and so' could
the procedure of sending Latin officers to
school in the 'United States.
The armed forces have waged a strong bat-
tle to keep their Southern Command head-
quarters intact and have cut the milgroups
to half the strength of three years ago. But
it now appears that even though some of
the structure may remain, the unwieldly head
is doomed to go for much the same reasons
that the cavalry finally got rid of horses.
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON HUMAN
RIGHTS SUPPORTS GENOCIDE
CONVENTION
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, The
Ad Hoc Committee on the Human Rights
and Genocide Treaties has worked long
and hard in the fight to get the United
States to ratify the United Nations hu-
man rights and genocide treaties. I am
very pleased to be working with and sup-
ported by such a fine organization. Betty
Kaye Taylor, executive secretary of the
committee, wrote a letter which was
published in the New York Times Mag-
azine on Sunday, May 2, supporting my
efforts to get this country to ratify these
vital treaties.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that this letter and a correction,
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
AD HOC COIEMITTEE ON THE HUMAN
RIGHTS AND GENOCIDE TREATIES,
New York, N.Y., May 11, 1971.
Senator WILLIAM PROXMIRE,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR PROXIVIIRE: Thank you for
your letter of May 7th indicating that Martin
H. Webster's letter about the Beverly Hills
Bar Association plebiscite had been placed
In the Congressional Record. I was, of course,
delighted to see this.
I trust that you've already seen my letter
ila the New York Times Magazine Section of
May 2nd applauding your efforts on behalf
of the Genocide Convention. I regret that the
Times failed to correct the figure I submitted
on the number of times you had spoken on
the Human Rights Conventions. I called in a
correction as soon as this mistake was
brought to my attention but the Times failed
to take note of it. I hope we get the Treaty
ratified -before this "erratum" becomes fact.
Sincerely,
BETTY KATE TAYLOR,
Executive Secretary.
RE: PROX1VIIRE'S STUBBORNNESS
To THE EDITOR:
Sohn Herber's fine article on Senator Wil-
liam Proxmire ("What Makes Proxmire Run."
April 4) failed to mention one other out-
standing example of the Senator's reliance
"on the power of argument."
On Jan. 11, 1967, Senator Proxmire served
notice that he would remind the Senate
daily of its failure to approve U.S. ratifica-
tion of several U.N. human-rights treatie3,
notably the Genocide Convention. Since
making that pledge, he has spoken 5,520
times. And now, after 20 years of delay, the
Foreian Relations Committee voted recently
to send the Genocide Treaty to the Senate
for consent to ratify.
"More obdurate, more obstinate, more
stubborn"?yes! And right on!
BETTY KAYE TAYLOR,
Executive Secretary.
ATOM TESTS NOW IDENTIFIABLE
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, scien-
tists can now discriminate between
earthquakes and the smallest nuclear
tests conducted underground by the two
super nuclear powers, the United States
and the U.S.S.R. This important break-
through was discussed last summer in a
special meeting sponsored by the De-
partment of Defense at Woods Hole,
Mass.
Identifying atomic tests removes one
of the last obstacles to a ban on under-
ground testing of nuclear weapons, and
might very well lead to a comprehensive
nuclear test ban treaty. I have always
favored such a treaty, but only when
competent scientific opinion held that
underground explosions could be identi-
fied. With that possibility now here, I
earnestly hope that the United States
will take the lead toward negotiating a
comprehensive test ban. Such a treaty
would be a boon to the people of America
and of Russia as well as all of mankind.
I ask unanimous consent that a New
York Times news story on this matter
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
CASE CITES GAINS IN TEST DETECTION
(By John W. Finney)
WASHINGTON, May 6.?Senator Clifford P.
Case said today that scientists had made so
much progress in distinguishing earthquakes
from underground atomic explosions that it
should now be possible for the United States
to enter into a treaty prohibiting all nuclear
tests,
As the basis for his contention, the New
Jersey Republican cited unpublished conclu-
sions reached by seismic experts at a confer-
ence last summer at Woods Hole, Masa.,
sponsored by the Defense Department.
The conference, according to a summery
made public by the Senator, concluded that
the ability to identify seismic disturbances
had been tremendously increased as a result
of research during the nine years since the
limited test ban treaty was agreed upon by
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Implication he drew from these con-
clusions was that the problem of monitoring
underground nuclear tests had been solved
to the point where the United States could
consilder entering into a comprehensive test
ban.
Because of differences between the United
States and the Soviet Union over the inspec-
tion required to check on underground ex-
plosions, the 1963 test ban treaty excluded
S 7035
underground tests and was limited to ex-
plosions in the atmosphere, in space or un-
der water.
On the basis of the reported improvement
in detection and identification, Senator Case
concluded that it should now be possible to
monitor a ban on underground tests with
two or three on-site inspections a year.
This, he noted, was the number offered
at one point by the So viet Union in the ne-
gotiations in 1962. The offer was rejected by
the United States, which, on the ratio of
one inspection for every 10 unidentified seis-
mic events, demanded seven on-site inspec-
tions a year.
After the American rejection, the Soviet
Union withdrew its offer. In recent years
Moscow has taken the position that seismic
advances now permit an underground test
ban to be monitored wholly through national
detection systems operated by each country.
The Nixon Administration continues to
hold to the position of the Kennedy and
Johnson Administrations that on-site in-
spection is still necessary.
An official of the Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency said that there was "gen-
eral agreement" that there had been "sub-
stantial Improvement" in seismic detection
but not enough to warrant a change in the
American position.
Congressional pressure, however, now seems
to be mounting on the Administration to re-
examine the long dormant issue, which in re-
cent years has been overshadowed by a pre-
occupation within the Government with the
strategic-arms limitation talks with the So-
viet Union.
At the Geneva disarmament conference,
the United States and the Soviet Union are
coming under similar pressures from the
nonaligned states to re-examine their posi-
tions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.
The Case statement coincided with an
announcement by Senator Edmund S. Mus-
kie of Maine that the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Subcommittee on Disarmament would
hold hearings on various possible arms con-
trol steps, including a comprehensive test-
ban treaty. Senator Maskie is the chairman
of the subcommittee, and Senator Case is
the ranking Republican.
FIRST DETAILS ON CONFERENCE
Senator Case's statement provided the first
detailed disclosure of the results of the
Woods Hole conference, called by the Penta-
gon's Advanced Research Projects Agency to
review progress made in the seismic research
program known as Project Vela. About $300-
million has been spent on the project since
it was set up in 1963.
Senator Case said that "authoritative re-
ports" he had received about the seven-day
conference "indicate that our capacity to
distinguish between earthquakes and nu-
clear explosions has improved 10-fold since
1963."
As a result, he said, the time has come for
the Foreign Relations Committee to explore
"whether a comprehensive test-ban treaty
may now be possible."
According to Senator Case, the Woods Hole
conference concluded that the annual num-
ber of unidentifiable seismic disturbances
in the Soviet Union above 4.0 on the Richter
earthquake scale has been reduced from
about 75 in 1963 to 25 now.
A nuclear explosion producing 4.0 on the
Richter scale corresponds to an explosion
of one or two kilotons, equal to that of 1,000
to 2,000 tons of TNT, in granite.
In dry, porous soil, which tends to muffle
the shock waves, 4.0 on the Richter scale
would correspond to a 20-kiloton explosion?
the size of the Hiroshima bomb.
But a summary of the Woods Hole con-
ference presented to Senator Case pointed
out that such desert-like soil "to the depth
which Js necessary, is rare in the Soviet
Union and such testing would be very vul-
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
May 17'ed For ReleaseaffiffilnoRIARWM9296fflini3pp050002-2
confusion and experimentation, Vietnarniza-
.
tion remains a cloudy concept.
Politically, I think our efforts have also
been ineffective and often damaging. We
tried to force-feed the Vietnamese western-
style democracy far too quickly, before their
Institutions were able to cope with it. We
should have started creating the Conditions
for building traditional village democracy,
horizontally from the ground up, instead of
imposing a new system vertically, from the
top down. It is partly for this reason, and
becauee of the physical damage we have
wrought, that the good we have done social-
ly and economically has been more than off-
set by the bad. There is no political cohesion
and not enough comprehension and motiva-
tion for -Social and economic changes to be-
come sufficiently meaningful. This does not
mean that we will leave Vietnam without
some improvements and hopes for the future;
but for what we put in we are coming out
' with very little, including scant knowledge
of the mistakes we made. Few lessons have
been learned.
Two major events of the past year, name-
ly the invasion of the Cambodian sanctuaries
and the incursion into Laos, have not con-
tributed sufficient positive results to war-
rant the negative ones?of at this late junc-
ture taking the initiative in further widen-
ing what has always been an Indochina war,
long recognized by the Communists as such.
Once we were over committed, we would have
done far better to attack the sanctuaries
and the Ho Chi Minh Trail area much ear-
lier, in 1967 or 1968, perlaps even to have
risked blockading the ports of Haiphong and
Sihanoukville, instead of bombing the North.
We thus fought the wrong kind of war in
several ways. We have continued, all along
to teach the South Vietnamese to fight a
conventional War instead of a 'People's War
of counter-insurgency. This is another reason
I remain skeptical about the success of Viet-
namization. The only real and practical so-
lution in Vietnam is one of political accom-
modation. I shall come back to that later.
Your Committee is considering a number
Of bills and resolutions that deal both with
the question of ending the war and avoiding
overcomMitments in the future, partly by
limiting the prerogatives and powers of the
President and re-affirming the obligations of
Congress. There has been considerable de-
bate about establishing cut-off dates?that
Is, dates for the total removal of all Ameri-
can forces in Vietnam. ,1 can readily under-
stand the overwhelming desire of the Ameri-
can people to get out of Vietnam as soon as
possible. However, it is far easier to fan into
a quagmire than to get out of one. It is not
stmply a question of prolonging the agony,
ours and theirs. The basic question, even at
this eleventh hour of our misbegotten in-
volvement, is how to get out in such a way
as to preserve whatever chance there may be
for the Vietnamese to reach a political set-
tlement among themselves without either
permitting the Communists to take over the
country or having the war continue in-
definitely. The people of South Vietnam, for
the most part, are eager to have us leave.
But whatever the mistakes of the past, most
of the Vietnamese, like most of the re-
maining Americans in Vietnam, also feel that
the schedule of total withdrawal should and
cannot be too precipitately advanced. Im-
moral and distasteful as the war has become,
we cannot get out, lock, stock and barrel,
overnight. It is not just a matter of ad-
mitting our lack of success gracefully, of
atoning for disgraceful My Leis, Or of cut-
ting our losses. Beyond being physically im-
possible, overnight withdrawal would create
complete chaos in Vietnam. It would drop
cur prestige in the rest of Asia, as well as
elsewhere in the world, to a new low. Like
it or not, we cannot escape amount of rem-
nant responsibility, including the respon-
sibility to repair as much of the damage we
have done as possible, both physical and
One may still ask, however, if the pace of
withdrawal cannot be faster and if a reason-
able cut-off date cannot now be set. While
I have been critical of the Cambodia and
Laos operations, I feel that, by and large,
President Nixon's Withdrawal policy so far
has been reasonable. But it can at this junc-
ture be stepped up and it should be more
clearly defined. Although the most elite forces
in the Vietnamese army suffered severe losses
In the Laos operation, seven of the eleven
Vietnamese divisions are currently rated good
or better by our top American military ex-
perts. Having been taught to fight the wrong
way, they are at least now beginning to fight
the wrong way right, that is to say, conven-
tionally or quasi-conventionally. This may
not be much but it is all we can do at this
late date. Whether the Vietnamese can
change later is up to them?certainly the
vast majority of our military establishment
has proved itself incapable of changing its
theories and methods of indoctrination.
The President has recently announced an-
other reduction of 100,000 men, bringing the
total to 184,000 to be left in Vietnam by De-
cember 1st, 19'71. He has continued to link
the question of total withdrawal with the
prisoner issue, and he has said that some
American troops will remain in Vietnam un-
til the prisoners are released. While he has
refused to set a date for complete with-
drawal, on the grounds that this would play
into Hanoi's hands, it has been widely as-
sumed that there will be no more than about
twenty or thirty thousand troops in South
Vietnam by mid-1972, or certainly by the
time of our Presidential elections. Whatever
moral justification there is to the position
we have taken on prisoners, we cannot move
Hanoi by pleading or threatening or by mili-
tary action, such as the Son Tay raid, to
change its attitude on this matter. Hanoi
continues to maintain that the prisoner is-
sue, like others, has to be part of overall
negotiations to end the war and must be
preceded by our total withdrawal. But on
occasion, Hanoi has indicated a willingness
to accept the "principle" of complete with-
drawal, in other words, an announced sched-
ule pointing to a cut-off date.
I think it is illusory to suppose that we can
strike a bargain with Hanoi about mutual
troop withdrawals preceded by cease-fires.
What I have described elsewhere as the mi-
rage of "the wonderful world of cease-fire"
was based on my conviction that, even if there
should be a formal halt to the fighting, vio-
lence at varying levels will inevitably con-
tinue in Indochina for years to come, and no
one will ever collect all the guns there and
put them in nice little heaps. They will be
buried for use another day, as they were in
1954. It is illusory to believe that the Com-
munists do not still want to dominate all of
Vietnam, and most of Laos and Cambodia,
either through force or through political sub-
version, Furthermore. Hanoi knows pretty
well the number of troops, more or less,
we expect to have in Vietnam by mid-1972.
It is hard to keep secrets in America. There-
fore, I feel that the President could more
sharply define his schedule of withdrawal
at this point without giving too much
away. Or he could move secretly to deal
With Hanoi on this subject, and with the
prisoner issue very much in mind. Perhaps
he has already tried to do this. I do not
think that, at present, it would materially
help matters for Congress to interfere with
the President's activities in this respect. I
Would, however, favor a resolution calling
upon him to move in that direction as fast
as possible and requesting him to consult
at regular intervals and in confidence with
Congress, on a bi-partisan basis.
The Vietnam war, always essentially a
political one, is rapidly becoming more po-
litical. It is also at the moment reassuming
S7037
the shape and substance of guerrilla con-
flict, part of what the Cc o soloists call
protracted warfare, Including naditary, polit-
ical and diplomatic action. 7 as North Viet-
namese and the Vietcong trc with some
important exceptions, are breaking down into
small units of five to fifty n er The orders
have gone out to "legalize s t least fifty
percent of their political cad --that is, to
have them work their way is sc the govern-
ment system, including the lc :to self defense
forces, and to live openly while still deal-
ing covertly with one supe; on a city
block or in a rural hamlet. For the moment
anyway, Hanoi has determined to subvert
and control the South, or as much of it as
possible, by these slower me- iacds, although
eventually what is called the General Up-
rising and/or General Offensi,,e such as was
attempted, and failed, during Tst, 1968, may
again take place. The emph .s!s once more
Is on urban struggle, even shtle the rural
struggle also continues. I am lsy no means
sanguine about the prospecss of peace in
Indochina. A far-flung guerril a war may very
well continue between the Con munists and
the nationalists long after ws- t re gone, and
embrace Cambodia?Laos is scanewhat dif-
ferent because the frarnewora tor re-estab-
lishing a coalition governme rt exists there,
under the 1902 Geneva formula. However,
while we have always underes mated Hanoi's
threshold of pain?the Laos incursion and
the current level of activity ()I tie part of the
Communists in South Vietnam are the latest
examples?it is also true t Ito the North
Vietnamese are weary of thi oar and that
they have faced, and are Isms facing, by
their own admission, some ravea economic,
management and morale probket as. They, too,
are scraping the bottom of the manpower
barrel?seventy percent of these now work-
ing In the fields of North Vietnam are
women.
Therefore, I feel that Hanoi may in time
welcome at least a hiatus, or a truce, which
might, under the best condi tens, lead to a
process of accommodation in -h South. This
would not negate the protracsel war theory,
but it could alter its consequences. Because
of that possibility, I believe .h it the fewest
number of troops we leave m Vietnam the
soonest, the better it will la a small con-
tingent of American forces sl ould remain
long enough to protect the somber of Amer-
icans who stay in Vietnam in necessary tech-
nical and advisory roles, an'i o serve as a
rehabilitation and reconstru, = an corps, but
I see no need for American combat forces
beyond the end of this yeas: as ic combat
support elements as well she old be reduced
by then to an absolute mini: o in, perhaps a
few battalions. By the end CC 972, or early
1973, no more than a few thoossnd volunteer
advisers and technicians an ,ehabilitation
personnel should remain?ths f ,rmer will be
necessary to complete the t. sl of teaching
the Vietnamese to use what ae have given
them. The Vietnamese cannce . -a fact, afford
to pay for the kind of war oney are now
fighting. One would like to Is m that by that
time something more will ha e been learned
about People's War. Far nt rs Vietnamese
officers than most of the An eiscan military
establishment supposes are ncw ready, willing
and eager to re-organize and -li-n down their
army and auxiliary forces t sineet the de-
mands of People's War. If maommodation
and political solutions don't w ak, that will
be the only way the South a'S tnamese can
fight for their survival. Ho "ever, properly
executed, such a reorganizatie a muld in time
become part of the accomny cis tion process,
to include Vietcong elements.
Accommodation in Vietnem can be at-
tained in various ways. It c-an start at the
top, with an agreement between the Saigon
government and the Provisioaa_ Revolution-
ary Government of the Comb u mists, to start
negotiating. It can, and shot Id be preceded
by a serious attempt by whas er Saigon re-
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
Approved For Release Innninainst ? _ IMIQR50002-2
S 7038 CtigaMTOSMTPRI.1391
May 17, 1971
gime is in power to accommodate with the
heretofore neglected elements in Vietnamese
society?the Buddhists, the members of the
Coo Dal and lioa Hao sects, and the mon-
tagnards, which together comprise a major-
ley of the South Vietnamese population.
These are things we should have urged force-
fully long ago, applying our political lever-
age, instead of simply pouring aid into Viet-
nam unconditionally?I should add that I
s believe in aid without strings under certain
circumstances and in certain places, but
Vietnam was not one of them. We no longer
have much leverage left, but we can still try
the art of persuasion more subtly at all levels
instead of simply telling people in Independ-
ence Palace in Saigon, whoever they may be,
how well they are doing and what else they
ought to do, and then retiring, amid nod-
dings of Vietnamese and American heads, to
the embassy, believing we have accomplished
our objectives. This is part of the whole
American myth of diplomacy in Vietnam that
has led us to wear blinkers for fifteen years.
Considering how long we have been there,
we do not understand much about the Viet-
namese. One year or eighteen months tours
Of duty are not conducive to acquiring knowl-
edge or fostering patience.
Accommodation can also take place at the
village level, which I consider most impor-
tant. There Is no doubt thwt life for many
Vietnamese in the Delta, for example, has
improved materially in the past two years?
as I have said, not everything we have done,
not all aspects of pacification, have been
bad. Canals and roads are open, markets are
busy, because security in most places has
improved. But that doesn't mean most of the
population supports the government of Pres-
ident Nguyen Van Thieu. My own scorecard
would still read pro-Communist fifteen to
twenty percent, pro-Thieu fifteen to twenty
percent, and the rest generally uncommit-
ted. But if the government does something
about the everlasting and evermore deeply
imbeddel corruption, and ,implements land
reform properly, which so far is not the case,
and if it really sees to it that honest elections
are held at all levels, then accommodation
becomes possible, both with the uncommit-
ted and with those legal Communist cadres
who begin to see that life on the non-Com-
munist side of the fence is better for them
and their families. But that will take time,
and it is a Vietnamese problem, not ours,
though we have certainly abetted corruption.
However, it furnishes another reason for our
getting out as quickly as possible and letting
the Vietnamese solve their own problems in
their own way.
While the Communists have refused to
participate openly in the Vietnamese 'elec-
tions that have been held in the past and
are to be held this summer and fall, for a
new House of Representatives in August and
for the Presidency in early October, they will
Undoubtedly participate covertly. They will
try to get their sympathizers into the House
and, if he runs, they will most likely vote
for General Duong Van Minh for President,
even though he has abjured them and spoken
out against coalition government but in
favor of peace. Obviously, the Communists
would favor the strongest peace candidate.
I would like to express my approval of the
resolution introduced by Senator Stevenson
or for a similar version, for the establishment
of an American observation group from Con-
gress this year far more sophisticated and
knowledgeable than the groups that so cur-
sorily watched the elections of 1966 and 1967.
What is required is not only Congressional
observation but some tough professional ad-
vice and participation. It will still be im-
possible to avoid some rigging, but at least
this can be reduced. To inspect the elections
properly would require teams of experts in
each province down to the village level?a
costly undertaking. But having spent as
much as we have already in Vietnam, I think
we are justified in coming up with some
final appraisals of our 'own, however, incom-
plete though they may be. If we can obtain
evidence of rigging, then we will know how
and why we have failed in prematurely forc-
ing democracy on Vietnam, If Thieu is re-
elected and the election is judged reasonably
fair, then Hanoi's position in refusing to
deal with the Saigon regime is less tenable,
and the force of world eminton, including
Moscow's if not Peking's, assumes a new
perspective. If Thieu is defeated, by Minh
or by Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the
same would be true.
There are some recent signs that the Com-
munists may favor aegotiations next year,
perhaps even late this year, though there is
also doubt about how serious they would
want to be. But there is talk in Paris, as
well as elsewhere, of a new Geneva type con-
ference. The decision in Hanoi to eliminate
candidates previously chosen from the South,
in the elections held in North Vietnam in
April of this year for a new National Assem-
bly, was presaged on a desire to allow the Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government in the
South more leeway to talk with members of
the Saigon government. Hanoi would cer-
tainly maintain Its domination of the P.R.G.,
but even the semblance of independence,
and the indefinite postponement of the issue
of unification of the North and South, would
help. There is some continuing evidence that,
despite their adamant publiastand, the Com-
munists might talk secretly with Thieu, if he
is re-elected, probably with Minh, and even
with Vice President Ky, who often tendseto
fly like a hawk but also to coo like a dove.
All of this is further proof that the Vietna-
mese, all of them, are tired of the big war
and again underlines the advisability of our
getting out as soon as feasible. This does not
contradict my fears that violence will con-
tinue, for the Vietnamese seem to have a
self-destructive streak in them which defies
western comprehension, though we are self-
destructive enough in our own ways, too.
The North Vietnamese are like military lem-
things, willing to die to the last man down
the Trail; the South Vietnamese are political
lemmings, seemingly incapable of getting to-
gether and forming a truly representative
government. They might have done better if
we had left them alone In this regard and not
imposed our western ways upon them, there-
by inhibiting what might have been a more
natural political, even revolutionary devel-
opment in the South. Yet despite this lem-
ming concept, one must admit that the
Vietnamese have a tremendous capacity
for survival, contradictory as this may sound.
Vietnam is full of such contradictions.
In any event, I do not think we will easily
strike a bargain with Hanoi based on the
troop withdrawal question alone. It is better
to set a firmer timetable of our own and
then wait and see, and hope, letting internal
political-developments and the accommoda-
tion process take their course. Hanoi's de-
mand for a nrovesional coalition government
could still then shift to acceptance of a
mixed electoral commission in the South
which would be tantamount to temporary
coalition, if such a commission were given
broad quasi-legislative powers to determine,
for example, the bona fides of political
parties, including the Communist party. I
do not think we should concern ourselves
with this queseon, and similar ones, beyond
the use of persuasion, once we have nego-
tiated our own way out of Vietnam and
solved the Prisoner issue. I think Hanoi
means what it says about the prisoners -
that once we are definite in saying when
we'll leave, the issue can be negotiated, be-
fore others. This would then be a parallel
approach to the natural but slower accom-
modation process in the South. I doubt that
a residue of American advisers and tech-
nicians would be a stumbling block, not so
long as Peking and Moscow continue to play
such an obvious role in North Vietnam,
The question of our continued use of air
power must be settled, however. Here, I
think, we must be RS firm, as we can be in
making clear that we intend to stop the
bombing anywhere and everywhere. The
Vietnamese air force has improved rapidly,
though it has so far proved itself incapable
of waging sophisticated helicopter warfare.
It, too, must be left to fight on its own, if
necessary, certainly within one year, with
continued technical assistance, including
spare parts. But the bombing by Americans
of all areas of Vietnam, while it has staved
off defeat time after time through the years,
has become one of our principal national
disgraces. Ultimate defeat in an extended
guerrilla conflict will never be avoided that
way, no matter how many North Vietnamese
we kill, or how many South Vietnamese
civilians accidentally. The sporadic bombing
of North Vietnam at this late date, in re-
prisal for attacks on reconnaissance planes
or other pretexts, gains us very little and
merely stiffens morale in the North further.
Your chairman has aSked me to speak
about "the current situation in Southeast
Asia and the probable consequences of vari-
ous policy alternatives." I think we should
do all we can in Laos to further the possi-
bilities of re-establishing the 1962 coalition
and to bring an end to the separate war that
is being waged in that unfortunate country.
There are increasing signs that the North
Vietnamese want to colonize at least the
eastern half of Laos. The nation's de facto
partition under a coalition government in
Vientiane is probably both inevitable and de-
sirable, given the circumstances, and it seems
doubtful that the North Vietnamese will
withdraw their troops from the country be-
fore some sort of negotiations get underway.
They are now deadlocked because Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma demands such a
withdrawal first, and the Pathet Lao and
the North Vietnamese are equally adamant
in demanding a cessation of American, Lao,
and Thai bombing. The bombing in Northern
Laos should be stopped, even though it
would undoubtedly lead to some further mili-
tary expansion and consolidation by the
Communists, both in the north and south,
around the administrative capital of Vien-
tiane as well as the royal capital of Luang
Prabang and the entire area of the Bolovens
Plateau in the south. But, it could probably
be contained and negotiations could then
almost surely take place. The proferred good
offices of the International Control Commis-
sion have been all but rejected but there
remains a chance that they might at a cru-
cial moment be used. A new Geneva Confer-
ence that dealt with the Laos question first
could possibly pave the way for a Vietnam
solution.
Cambodia is more directly a part of the
Vietnam war. Nevertheless, a political resolu-
tion is possible there too, though its outlines
are fuzzier than in Laos. The Cambodians
can accommodate with each other, to include
the natave Cambodian Communists but prob-
ably not the Sihanoukists. At least one such
attempt was made a few months ago, in the
jungles of Pursat province, but it failed when
bombers attacked Communist elements near-
by, resulting in the assassination of tlre five
government representatives. Although I op-
posed the invasion, our role in Cambodia to-
day is justified, it seems to me, in that we are
helping the Cambodians help themselves
through a program of military and economic
assistance. However, there are signs already
that we wil make the same mistakes we made
in Vietnam?in emphasizing conventional
rather than unconventional methods of war-
fare and in not using our leverage of aid to
end or at least limit the amount of continu-
ing corruption and to encourage a quicker
pace of political re-organization and progress
in the formation of an efficient republican
form of government. The illness of Prime
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
May le,kpitipyed For ReleastRff69fteliltagilB235.gpftp3ii050002-2
Minister Lon ,No1, obviously regrettable,
nevertheless ha a offered a fresh otiportunity
to bring into ale government some of the
younger and more far-seeing political ele-
ments who have been Ignored so far or rele-
gated to minor roles. I is too soon to tell
if the new cabinet chosen last week is suffi-
ciently representative, but it would not ap-
pear to be so.
What is the importance of Southeast Asia
to the United States? This, of course, is some-
thing we have to determine generally before
we can be specific about programs and
policies. There are many pressure pointe in
the world and we cannot be equally concerned
about all of them, or be a policeman all over
the globe. I have always considered Southeast
Asia, along with the Middle East and Ger-
many, to be three top critical areal for us, as
Americans. It is part of our fundarhental his-
toric involvement in Asia, whieh is and
should continue to be concerned With China,
first .and forenaost. The recent events in-
dicating a relaxation of China's hostile
attitude are certainly encouraging, although
I do not think we should delude ourselves
about long-range Chinese intentions. By in-
viting some ping-pong teams and carefully
selected groups of western correspOndents to
China on guided tours, the Chinese have
gained a hundred Million dollars worth of
publicity, or more. One should not gainsay
that, but it remains to be seen how much
further they will go, and it remains to be seen
whether we will now be willing, as we should
have been before, to welcome China into the
United Nations and to work toward some
sort of solution to the knotty Taiwan prob-
lem that will relegate the Taiwanese govern-
ment to a necessary secondary role akin to
Byelorussia's thus still recognizing its right
to a seat in the General Assembly. Opening
up trade is the lesser part of the equation.
Taiwan may very well in the future be part of
a single China, as both Taipei and Peking
maintain, though they. naturally approach
the question from different viewpoints. The
essential fact remains that China is a great
nation and the Chinese are a magnificent
people who cannot be ostracized or ignored
no matter what form of goverment they have.
If this is true of the Russians, it is equally
true of the Chinese, and it has taken us far
too long to admit this blunt fact to ourselves.
Our relationship with Japan is next in
Importance. The Japanese economic thrust
into. Southeast Asia today is coniparable to
its military thrust thirty years ago. Tokyo's
relationship to Peking remains almost as un-
defined as ours. Our military alliance with
the Japanese is in the process of tenuous re-
adjustment. These are all factors that will
have a bearing on events in Southeast Asia
in the years ahead. The Nixon Doctrine, by
itself, is not clear enough to serve as a per-
manent guideline to policy. It is all well and
good to say that we will help these nations
that help themselves. There are many un-
certain factors and possibilities that remain.
What sort of permanent system Of bases are
we seeking, if any, on the Asian mainland,
or close to it? What sort of naval screen do
we want to maintain? Is there a need to
maintain a floating force of Marines or to
keep other elements stationed in or close to
-Asia which can be used in emergencies, as
President Kennedy did with the Marines in
Thailand ten years ago? The Kennedy ploy
worked at that time and might work again
under similar circumstances; but we cannot
foretell. That brings up the ticklish question
of insurgency. When does insurgency reach a
level' 'definable as invasion? Supixise North
Vietnam or China decides to give more sup-
port to the Thai Communist insurgents, now
Increasing their smallpox pattern of resist-
ance throughout Thailand. We will then be
up against some difficult decisions. Probably
we will maintain our agreements with Thai-
land affording us the use of the air bases we
built in that country, as well as retain our
options in the Philippines. But if the num-
ber of insurgents in Thailand doubles, and
includes elements of other nations, do we
put the bases to use again and start bombing
the rebels? There is nothing in the Nixon
Doctrine that indicates the answers. What
it comes down to, bluntly, is whether
we will decide that a specific nation is
'worth saving' in its own right, and
whether to act or not is in our national in-
terest. I personally feel that, in addition to
sustaining our diplomatic-political and eco-
nomic-social posture, we should maintain
some sort of military shield in and around
Asia, to include the Philippines and Thai-
land. In the interests of continuing to im-
prove our relations with China, I think we
khouId withdraw from our military position
In Taiwan, but maintain some naval forces
In the South China Sea. Our continuing
Partnership with Australia is essential. Our
relations with Indonesia, which comprises
half of Southeast Asia's total population of
a quarter of a billion people, are also impor-
tant, and what we nave done to spur In-
donesia's economic recovery, in concert with
eight other nations of the world, particu-
larly Japan, has been a significant contribu-
tion to Southeast Asia's well-being. The sta-
bility of Indonesia may well determine the
Stability of the rest of the region, and in
many respects Indonesia holds the key to
regional cooperation which is proceeding,
albeit slowly.
If we cannot definitely predict what we
might do if certain situations arise, in South-
east Asia or elsewhere, we can take steps to
clarify our policymaking methods and the
scope of our potential actions. I do not think
the President's hands can or should be tied
so firmly that he cannot move in emergen-
cies without Congressional approval. There
can, however, be limits set to what the Presi-
dent does on his own, limits as to time and
as to the extent of his initial commitment of
forces. Nothing as broad as the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution should again be passed, and I
doubt that it would. But we must do some-
thing to improve the poor relationship be-
tween the Executive and Congress, which has
acquired a guerilla warfare character of its
own. Further, there is a tremendous need to
redefine the role of various agencies in the
government. If the State Department should
make and execute foreign policy, what
should the role be of the National Security
Council and the President's personal advis-
ers? What should the role be of the CIA?
Should it be purely an intelligence gathering
agency, or should it also have operational
functions including counterinsurgency ones,
and should it play a part in building politi-
cal institutions in certain countries where
our interests are deemed at stake? We will
be faced with repeated conventional as well
as unconventional situations in the future,
and if we are to avoid more Vietnams we will
have to set our own institutional house in
order first. It seems to me that this commit-
tee, as well as the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, should jointly devote
-themselves to this task. The latter, some ten
years ago, held significant hearings and ob-
tained some highly enlightening testimony
on the subject of foreign policy making pro-
cedures. But little or nothing happened about
it all. As a nation, we have a deep self-
expiatory streak: we seem to think that the
mere process of laying our souls bare, of
spelling out what's wrong with the way we
do things, settles the matter. I would strongly
S 7039
recommend that the oreign R lations Com-
mittee consider seriously Si: .17, measures as
that introduced by Senate ,lagleton and
others and then go further a studying the
role of the dozen or so gove: lament agencies
and branches involved in I .e making and
execution of foreign policy. A careful con-
sideration of President Nixo new plan to
reorganize foreign aid would oe just one step
in this direction. There are many more
steps necessary. The alternat of just going
along as we have, depending .n the personal-
ties of Presidents and the wl--m is of Congress
reflecting the many moods o merica, could
be disastrous. We cannot re ,o once our role
in the world and retire, at t, of disillusion
over Vietnam and other issl,eE, to anything
approximating a Fortress An sine position?
there are, fortunately, few s),I.ps that we are
about to do this. But only i ?larifying our
purpose and intent and mak al a far greater
effort than we have so far to ,tel ermine which
agencies of government haw t e right to do
what, and what the extent a) ,d limit of those
obligations are, can we briog order out of
the embittered post-Vietna, a period.
Thank you.
THE KENNEDY PR} :S. DENCY
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on
March 30, I inserted in tie CONGRES-
SIONAL RECORD a book iew on the
White House relationsh p between a
President and his persc 121 staff. Mr.
Kenneth P. O'Donnell, a i ose adviser to
President Kennedy, tool ,'xception to
the review, feeling it did not accurately
reflect the Kennedy year
To make public Mr. O'Donnell's opin-
ion on this issue, I ask his corre-
spondence with me be rrinted at this
point in the RECORD.
There being no objector , the corre-
spondence was ordered tx i.e printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
KE,NNETH P. 0 D)NNELL,
Boston, Mass.. Adril .19, 1971.
HOC. FRANK CHURCH,
U.S. Senate, Senate Office Bu? ?cl
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: I have re. d the Congres-
sional Record of March 30, It 71 and, needless
to say, it very much disturk eel me.
Mr. Baker and Mr. Petal ire long-time
acquaintances of mine, bu ! am slightly
taken aback by the lack of pee oracy in their
statements. They quote Si great length
George Reedy who, in my o ii ion, discusses
a White House that never ex while John
Kennedy was President.
I and all of my colleagues recall hours
upon hours of debates, di aossions, argu-
ments and disagreements b. ween ourselves
and the President of the Dlited States out
of which emerged a policy. 1-,eard very few
"yes sirs" and the President s otld not have
tolerated them. Every Ti lay morning
President Kennedy met a the Congres-
sional Leadership and discu .5( .1 and argued
and debated the policies of t te United States
Government. John F. Kennely as you know,
was a oOnstitutionalist who Oneved totally
In the balance of powers bet ye =11 the Execu-
tive, Legislative and the C itrt. There are
those who have criticized h s legislative ac-
complishments without yak ci y but it was
because he always attemptec t.. reach an ac-
commodation with the legis l tve branch of
the United States.
The Life article described 3?,mns to me to
prove the President's oonsi le .ation of the
United States Senate, Senat Ar Mansfield; as
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2
s 7040 Approved For Releas0^^/
CONGRESSIONALRK
7c33310829601g02,N050002-2
/Our rtoreselatative, brilliantly presented
your views and brought great influence to
bear ttptin the -President of the United States.
it so happened that their views and almost
all of ne on he White House staff (or shall
We say, courtiers) were in total agreement
that we shotikt not involve ourselves in any
military contact in Viet Nam.
I am disappointed that Mr. Baker and
Mr. Peters used the word "war" because there
was no "war." There were 16,500 Americans
in Viet Nam as I recall, Prior to the Presi-
dent's assassination, Mr. 1VIcliamara had an-
nounced the withdrawal of 1000 American
Advisors, There had been 43 Americans who
had lost their lives in the years John P.
Kennedy had been President (which is 43
too many) but there was no war. He pro-
mised that there would be no war and I am
Shocked that two distinganshed journalists
would allow the Congressional Record to be
used to confuse history.
I have read George Reedy's book with great
interest, and he describes the Johnson Ad-
ministration but not the Kennedy Adinin-
istration. I have had the privilege of serving
with both, and one of George's points is quite
? important. Under the Johnson Administra-
tion, they did all "yes sir." That was not true
in the Kennedy Administration and obvi-
ously was not true in the Eisenhower Admin-
istration as witness the resignations of Gen-
eral Ridgeway and General Gavin.
As one who served in the White House un-
der two Presidents, I have one suggestion
. . . that those who disagree with their Chief
in matters of great public policy should have
the courage and do have the obligation to
resign and present their opposition to the
public. In this way, they truly serve this great
Republic.
Sincerely.
KENNETH P. O'DoNNELL.
APRIL 30, 1971.
MT. KENNETH P. ?DONNELL,
Boston, Mass.
DEAR KENNETH: I have read your letter in
which you take issue with the book review
by Mr. Baker and Mr. Peters which I in-
serted in the Congressional Record of
March 30, 1971.
I can understand why you feel that the
article may have had relevancy to the White
House under President Johnson, but that it
did not correctly describe the staff relation-
ship with President Kennedy,
As one who feels that the Kennedy Presi-
dency was a generally bright episode in an
otherwise dreadful decade, I would be happy
to insert your reply to the Baker-Peters ar-
ticle in the Congressional Record, along with
explanatory introductory remarks. I would
not do so, of course, without your permis-
sion, yours being a personal letter.
I shall await word from you.
Sincerely.
PRANK CHURCH.
Bosrou, Was., May 4, 1971.
Hon. Pawls Cnuacn,
U.S. Senate, Senate Office Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR: Thank you very much for
your reply, and I would be delighted if you
would be willing to place in the Congres-
sional Record a contrary viewpoint.
As I have simmered since reading the
article and well recall the violent discus-
sions on the Missile Crisis where Governor
Stevenson and some others were almost in-
volved In fisticuffs, I pall at this kind of dis-
tortion of history.
I remember the vigorous exchanges con-
cerning the use of American military power,
the' use of tactical air weapons and the al-
most violent responses of the civilian mem-
bers of our military establishment. I recall
vividly where the President, unlike some
of his successors, sought the advice and con-
sent of the Congressional leadership at meet-
hags in the White House where the argu-
ments and discussions were furious and, per-
haps never resolved.
In my four brief years in the White ITOU3O,
I again reiterate, the President made the
ultimate decisions but neither the Congress
nor his staff were subservient.
With my deepest respect.
Sincerely,
KENNETH P. O'DONNELL.
PAUL A. HOMO, JR., KNIGHT IN
THE ORDER OF ORANGE NASSAU
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, it Is a
source of pleasure and pride to me when
a fellow Alabamian is singled out for
honor in recognition of extraordinary
achievements. Recently, a distinguished
citizen of Mobile, Ala., received such
an honor from Queen Juliana of Holland
who, by royal decree, designated Paul
A. /Ratio a Knight in the Order of
Orange Nassau in recognition of his out-
standing services as an honorary consul
for the Netherlands at Mobile.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that an article which appeared in
the Mobile Press on Friday. May 7, 1971,
describing the circumstances of this
award be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
[From the Mobile Press, May 7, 1971]
MOBILIAN Now SIR PAUL ROIMO?NETHER-
* LANDS CONSUL KNIGHTED
He went to a birthday party in honor of the
queen, discovered he was the guest of honor
and emerged as a knight.
Paul A. Boulo Jr., honorary consul for the
Netherlands at Mobile, today proudly wears
the medal designating him, by royal decree
of Queen Juliana, a Knight in the Order of
Orange Nassau.
Boulo received the honor at a reception at
the World Trade Club in Houston, Tex., from
F. A. Hoeffer, consulate general of the Nether-
lands, before 300 applauding guests on
April 30. Boulo has been notified by Nether-
lands Ambassador R. B. Baron von Lyiaden
that the queen's decree bestowing knight-
hood upon him will be forwarded to Mobile.
The award is the highest civilian honor the
queen can bestow in recognition of services
to the crown and country.
Boulo's knighthood came from distin-
guished consular services at Mobile since
1953. He became honorary vice consul then,
succeeding his father in the position after his
death.
Boulo's friends say the queen could not
have honored a finer fellow. He suffered a
crippling automobile accident several years
ago, but declined to bow to fate and accept
the life of an invalid.
Today he gets about on a cane, continues
active direction of his company, Paul A.
Boulo, foreign freight broker and forwarding
agent. He pilots his 50-foot yacht, the Lyreb,
entertaining customers aboard, and inciden-
tally does a good job of selling the Port of
Mobile.
The Boulos have been associated with the
sea and the waterfront for generations. Boulo
has documentary evidence in his possession
indicating that one of his ancestors was in
the Holy Crusade to Siria Pulgline in 1250
A.D. and commandel a Geonese galley in the
Battle of Malonia.
The name originally was Ballo, but was
later changed to Boulo after his. great-grand-
father Philip Boole, a merchant seaman, emi-
grated from Italy to Mobile in 1825 and es,
tablished a ship chandlery and bar near the
waterfront. His grandfather owned sailing
ships that plied the coastal trade, and his
May 17, 1971
father carried on a freight forwarding busi-
ness, which Boulo continues to operate.
So now it's Sir Paul Boulo?and his friends
salute him with delight. Boulo has served in
numerous civic and sports organizations and
the queen's recognition adds new honors to
a distinguished career.
HARPER COLLEGE GRANTED UN-
QUALIFIED ACCREDITATION
Mr. STEVENSON. Mr. President, 6
years ago, the State of Illinois took a ma-
jor step to increase the availability of
higher education for Illinois citizens by
enacting the Illinois Public Junior Col-
lege Act of 1965. Since then, our State
system of community colleges has ex-
panded and improved at an impressive
rate.
One of the most brilliant examples of
what has been accomplished is the re-
cent accreditation granted to William
Rainey Harper College in Palatine, Ill.
Harper, established by voter referendum
in 1965, is the newest Illinois college to
be so honored. In January of this year,
the North Central Association of Colleges
and Secondary Schools granted full ac-
creditation without qualification to Har-
per.
Mr. President, at this point, I ask unan-
imous consent that the news release an-
nouncing the association's action be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the news re-
lease was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
COMMUNTTY COLLEGE PRESIDENT, ROBERT E.
LAHTI, ANNOUNCES THAT ACCREDITING
BODY'S ACTION IS "WITHOUT QUALIFICATION"
William Rainey Harper College in Palatine,
public community junior college (District
#512) established by voter referendum in
1965, has been granted full accreditation by
the North Central Association of Colleges
and Secondary Schools.
Harper is the "youngest" public two-year
Institution operating under the Illinois jun-
ior college act of 1965. Rock Valley College in
Rockford. (District #511), which also received
fun accrectition this week, was established
one year earlier than Harper.
In announcing the action by the accredit-
ing body, Robert E. Lahti, Harper's president,
stated "Harper has reached this important
milestone with .all due haste for a new in-
stitution which has taken on the challenge
of providing comprehensive community col-
lege services to its constituencies." He added
that the North Central Association had fully
accredited Harper "without qualification."
According to the Harper president, full ac-
creditation means that the college's credits
and quality of instruction have unquestioned
reciprocity among all Institutions of higher
education. "This is, of course, most impor-
tant to our students and their families while
at the same time it is a tribute to our faculty,"
at the same time it is a tribute to our fac-
ulty," he said. Dr. Lahti added that accredita-
tion also means that a faculty is "more free"
to pursue innovative approaches to the learn-
ing process.
The North Central Association based its
decision to accredit Harper partly upon the
report by a six-member examining team
which visited the college on January eighth
and ninth. "The decision was also based
upon an exhaustive self-study of Harper by
the college faculty last year and my own ap-
pearance before a final examining board in
Chicago earlier this week," Dr. Lahti ex-
plained.
Conclusions stated in the North Central
report of its January visit to Harper stated,
Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73600296R000300050002-2