CASTRO SHIFTS MISSILES TO WEST END OF CUBA
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2
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RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
6
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 30, 2000
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 28, 1971
Content Type:
NSPR
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SUNDAY STAR DATE '-I f f~'_ K - / I PAGE l
Castro Shifts Mi5;si 1es
To West End of ~C i.bJ
By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star Staff Writer
The government of Fidel Cas-
tro, for reasons that are unclear
to U.S. officials, recently fin-
ished removing all of its antiair-
craft missile batteries from
eastern Cuba.
American U2 jets, which have
maintained a regular surveil-
lance of Cuba since the 1962 mis-
sile crisis, began detecting the
shift in SAM sites from Oriente
and the eastern provinces a year
ago. Indications are that Cas-
tro's anti-aircraft missile
strength is now concentrated in
the western halt of the island
where Havana is located.
Officials of U.S. departments
that keep watch on Cuban mili-
tary and political developments
are unable to explain why Cas-
tro has elected to leave Santiago)
and the eastern areas undefend-
ed.
Some speculate that Castro
does not anticipate any attack
from the U.S. at all. Others say
he may not have enough mis-
siles to defend all of the island
and is simply concentrating
what he does have in the west.
It was U-2 photo reconnais-
sance that first detected the
ICBM buildup which led to the
1962 confrontation and subse-
quent Soviet removal of missiles
that could have reached almost
every American city.
There is nc~ longer any ques-
tion that Rassian submarine
crews intend to use the Cuban
harbor at Cienfuegos as a regu-
lar port and.for recreational fa-
cilities. Cienfuegos is still re-
garded by the United States as a
facility rather than a base, in
the full military sense, for sub-
marine use.
Up to now, the Russians have
not sent a Polaris-class subma-
rine to the harbor. The most
recent visitor was a nuclear
powered attack s u b m a r i n e
armed with torpedoes rather
than ballistic missiles.
The United States tracked the
sub there during the last three
weeks and at last report it was
still in the ':iarbor, lying along
side a Soviet tender. Two barges
and several barracks now ap-
pear to be permanent installa-
tions at Cienuegos.
Castro also has tightened the
defense rin around the U.S.
base at Guantanamo Bay on the
eastern tip of Cuba. However, it'.
appears that the ring `is more
devoted to keeping Cubans seek-
ing asylum at the U.S. base than
to protect against American at-
tack.
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NEW YORK TIMES
PRESIDENT TERMS
UBAjOFF LIMITS
FOR SOVIET SUBS
Says Use of Isle by `Nuclear'
graft Would Violate Pact
Reached Last October
DOUBTS SECOND CRISIS
Nixon Warns of Resumption
of Bombing if Hanoi Builds
Up Its Forces in South
By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 4-Pres-
ident Nixon said tonight that
he would regard the servicing
of Soviet "nuclear" submarines
"either in Cuba or from Cuba"
as a violation of it new under-
standing obtained from Moscow
last October.
Speaking out for the first
time on a subject that he had
hitherto treated as too delicate
and confidential, the President
said that he believed the Rus- I!
sians did not want a second I
crisis over Cuba.
For that reason, he added,
"I don't believe that one as go-
ing to occur, particularly since
the understanding has been so
clearly laid out and has been
so clearly relied on by us."
Mr. Nixon did not explain
the circumstances or detail of
,the agreement. He said it was
obtained Oct. 11, which was
two days before the Soviet
Union issued a public state-
ment on Cuba offering not so
much a new agreement as re-
assurance that it was doing i
nothing to "contradict" a 1962
agreement that concluded the.
first Cuban crisis over missiles.
Expanded Agreement
The President stated clearly
this evening, however, that l
barring offensive missiles to in-
clude a Soviet pledge not to
put a military naval base in!
Cuba. Mr. Nixon's further
statement that submarines!
could not therefore be serviced
in or from Cuba appeared to
be his own definition of what'i
was meant by a naval base.
In a 20-minute discussionu
of foreign affairs during a one-
hour television conversation in
the White House with four net-
work correspondents, Mr. Nixon
also made these other major
points:
4l"We now see the end of
Americans' combat rate in
Vietnam in sight " Mr. Nixon
presumably meant ground com-
bat and implied that the end
would come before 1972. He did
not say anything further, how-
ever, about troop withdrawal]
beyond the reduction to 280,-
000 scheduled for May 1.
qHe did not wish to resume
the bombing of North Vietnam
but was reiterating his own and
admittedly, new "understand-
ing" that he would order the
bombing of key areas if Hanoi
expanded its infiltration of the
south at a time when Ameri,
cans were moving out. Such a
move would be essential to pro-
tect American lives Mr. Nixon
said, acknowledging for the
first time that punishment for
such a build-up and not merely
retaliation for the loss of
reconnaissance planes was the
motive of a air strike against)
the north last November.
Any promise or formal com-
mitment to intervene to. pre-
vent the destructio not Israel
"would only tend to inflame
the situation" in the Middlel
East. But Israel and her Arab?
neighbors know how much help
the United States is providing.
They also know, Mr. Nixon
said, that Israel will continue
to receive the arms needed to'
defend herself against the su-
perior manpower of her neigh-
bors and Soviet forces in the
a "conciliatory, peace-r'naking
role."
A basic disagreement about
the definition of strategic
weapons will prevent a com-
prehensive agreement to limit
those weapons, but a limited
agreement should be possible
"eventually." Mr. Nixon praised
a recent Soviet decision to lim-
it the deployment of the S-9
and other big missiles and said
,that he sensed an overwhelm-
ing common interest by the
two powers to avoid a nuclear
c. ompetit.on and "the escalat-
ing burden of arms,"
JThe election in Chile of a
Marxist Government, with ma-
jor Communist support, was
corned," but relations with that
country will 'remain cordial so
long as Chile's foreign policy
is not "antagonistic to our in-
terests." In his first public com-
ment on the election of Dr. Sal-
vador Allende Gossens, which
is know to have deeply dis-
turbed him, Mr. Nixon said that
United States intervention in a
free election would have dis-
rupted relations with the rest
of A he hemisphere and been
"far worse." He said that he
would continue to watch for-
eign policy developments in
Santiago and said that he had
not "given up on Chile or on
1
it
the Chilean people" and would
The concern last fall about a
Soviet naval base in Cuba wasL,
exacerbated by fear of event;i,
in Chile and a suspicion that
Moscow was trying to capital-
ize on the election with a newt
show of military strength tb"
region. This is a time for pri-
vate negotiations on the Middle)
East, he added, saying that
peace depended upon the So-1
propel developments in its fa'
vor throughout Latin America.
In September, after watch;
Ing the construction of soma
port facilities in Cienfuegos, in
central Cuba, and the arrival
of two. service barges and a
submarine tender, Henry A,i
Kissinger, the President's fors
eign affairs aide, recalled the
agreement by which the United
States promised not to invade
Cuba in return for a Soviet
pledge never again to introduce
offensive strategic weapons on,-
to the island. He said' Wash-
ington would take a most serf=
ous view of the establishrnenit
of a naval base in Cuba.
In the maneuvering that fol-
lowed, . including some direct
conversations between Mr. Kis-
singer and Soviet diplomats, thg
Russians were said to have
agreed to an "understanding:'
that minimized the sense of
crisis. Yet the shore facilities
and the barges remained In
Cienfuegos: and the tender has
continued to cruise in Carib-
bean waters.
this understanding had beeni ;vi t Union' a fines to p1 i
"expanded'A-a-velriFei' ease-
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NEW YORK TIMES DATE
PAGE
White House Stand
On Soviet Tenders
Off uba larifiedr
Irc16 Nl 10 TO, New Ywk 1'I~1113
WASHINGTON, Jan. 5-=fhei
White House emphasized today]
that President Nixon would
consider it a violation of an
understanding with the Soviet
Union if her nuclear sub-
marines were serviced "amr-
where at sea" Iby submarine
tenders operating from Cuba.
An aide to Henry A.
Kissinger, assistant to the pre s- I
identfor national security laf-I
fairs, 'clarified the White Hou.me
attitude after Ronald L. Ziegler, I
the president's press secretary,;
told reporters the understand
ing ruled out servicing of sub-'
marines "in the immediate ar ~a
of the Caribbean."
The iaide said that Mr. Zie?g
ler had realized his -remark was;
too limited geographically a id!
had telephoned from the pla ne
as the President flew to San
Clemente, Calif., to ask tl-?at'
the matter be clarified.
The issue arose Mr. Ziegler
was asked what the President
had meant when he told ?fc ur
network television commenta-
tors in 'their interview last
night that it would be a vicla-
tion to service a submarne
"either in Cuba or from Cuba."
Mr. Ziegler said the Presi-
dent was not specifying any
geographic limit, but, urged to
identify a boundary outside a
Cuban harbor, be said that So-
viet submarines "with offen-
sivecapabilities" should not be
serviced "in the immediate
area of the Caribbean."
The aide said later that Mr.
Ziegler had drawn "a tighter
line than we would have liked."
Mr. Ziegler cleared up some
confusion as to the date the
Soviet Union pledged not to in-
stall a military or naval base
in Cuba. The President said
last night that the pledge was made on Oct. I1, but Mr. Zieg-
ler said be had meant to sayl
Oct. 13, the date that the So-~
viet Union issued 'a public
statement on Cuba.
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NEW YORK TIMES
Russian Sub Tender
That Stirred Capital
QuitCLubai Waters
By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, Jan. 8-Four
Soviet. naval vessels, including
a submarine tender whose ar-
rival at Cienfuegos, Cuba,.
alarmed official Washington last
fall, have reportedly left Cuba,
apparently on their way home.
The tender and a diesel-pow-
ered submarine were reported
in the mid-Atlantic today mov
ing northeast,' while a guided-
missile frigate and an oiler
were in the English Channel,
having left Cuba earlier this
week, Jerry W. Friedheim, a
Defense Department spokes-
man, announced.
Two Soviet barges and a tug
that arrived in Cuba last Sep-
tember, remained at Cienfue-
gos, he added.
The. importance of the ten-
der, a 9,000-ton vessel, is that
she is presumably equipped to
service Soviet nuclear-powered
missile-carrying submarines
with spare parts, and repairs.
Pentagon officials said pri-
vately that the tender's de
porture, along with the other
vessels, might signify that the!
basis was. disappearing for fear'
that the Soviet Union might be
DATE
Continued From Page 1, Col. 1
establishing a base for nuclear
submarines in Cuba.
They rerained, however,
from drawing any conclusions.
The State Department declined
disturbed United States offi-
cials arrived at Cienfuegos on
Sept. 25.
Previously two Soviet barges
of a type that could be used
for storing radioactive waste
had arrived at Cienfuegos,
comment, saying that it was where the Russians, or the
leaving the subject entirely tolCubans, have constructed twc
the Pentagon. barracks, each capable of ac-
Mr. Friedheim conceded thatI commodating about 100 men,
there had been a delay in mak-
ing public the departure of the
Soviet vessels from Cuba but
declined to explain it. It
seemed likely that Pentagon
plus a football field and a
communications center.
This information and sub-
sequent reports of the comings
~.nd goings of the Soviet vessels
officials wanted to be quite were obtained mainly from
U-2 reconnaissance fli
hts
ac-
,
g
sure the ships really were go- cording to the Pentagon.
ing home, and not just "harbor- On Sept. 25, the day the
hopping," as Defense Secretary :ender arrived, a White House
Melvin R. Laird put is recently. Spokesman said:
Soviet tactics in recent "The Soviet Union can be
months in the Carribbean, under no doubt that we would
where they have moved ships view the establishment of a
in and out of Cuban ports in strategic base in the Caribbean
what seemed an arbitrary with the ' utmost seriousness."
fashion, have been interpreted The spokesman later said
by some observers as an asser-.that the same view applied to
tion of the Soviet right to have "servicing of Soviet vessels
ships there, and a test of armed with offensive weapons
United States. determination to in or from bases in Cuba."
prevent establishment of a sub- The word "bases" was under-
marine base in Cuba. stood to include tenders in the
The submarine tender tha;Caribbean.
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- ;-IE WA SHINGT ON POST
The Washington Merry-Go-Ronnd
THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan; I8, 1971
i B7
6 Attempts to Kill Castro) Laid to CIA
By Jack Anderson
Locked in the darkest re-
cesses of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency is the story of
six assassination attempts
against Cuba's Fidel Castro.
For 10 years, only a few key
people have known the terri-
ble secret. They have sworn
never to talk. Yet we have
learned the details from
sources whose credentials are
beyond question.
We spoke to John McCone,
who headed the CIA at the
time of the assassination at-
tempts. He acknowledged the
idea had been discussed inside
the CIA but insisted it had
been "rejected immedi-
ately" He vigorously denied
that the CIA had ever partici-
pated in any plot on Castro's
life. Asked whether the at-
tempts could have been made
with his knowledge, he re-
plied: "It could not have hap-
pened."
We have complete confi-
dence, however, in our
sources.
The plot to knock off Castro
began as part of the Bay of
Pigs operation. The intent was
to eliminate the Cuban dicta
ers landed on the island. Their
arrival was expected to touch
off a general uprising, which
the Communist militia would
have had more trouble putting
down without the charismatic
Castro to lead them.
After the first attempt
failed, five more assassination
teams were sent to Cuba. The
last team reportedly made it
to a rooftop within shooting
distance of Castro before they
were apprehended. This hap-
pened around the last of Feb.
ruary or first of March, 1963.
Nine months later, Presi-
dent Kennedy was gunned
down in Dallas by Lee Harvey
Oswald, a fanatic who pre-
viously had agitated for Cas-
tro in New Orleans and had
made a mysterious trip to the
Cuban Embassy in Mexico
City.
Among those privy to the
CIA conspiracy, there is still a
n a g g i n g suspicion-unsup-
ported by the Warren Com-
mission's findings-that Cas-
tro became aware of the U.S.
plot upon his life and some-
how recruited Oswald to retal-
nedy.
To set up the Castro assassi-
nation, the CIA enlisted Rob-
ert Maheu, a :former FBI
agent with shadowy, contacts,
who had handled other under-
cover assignment.: for the CIA
out of his Washington public
relations office. He later
moved to Las Vegas to head
up billionaire Howard Hughes'
Nevada operations.
Maheu recruited John Ro-
sell!, a ruggedly handsome
gambler with contacts in both
the American ani Cuban un-
derworlds, to arrange the as-
sassination. The dapper, hawk-
faced Roselli, formerly mar-
ried to movie actress June
Lang, was a power in the
movie industry until his con-
viction with racketeer Willie
Bioff in a million-dollar Holly-
wood labor shakedown. The
CIA assigned two of its most
trusted operatives, William
Harvey and James (Big Jim)
O'Connell, to the hush-hush
murder mission. Using phony
names, they accompanied Ro-
selli on trips to Miami to line
up the assassination teams.
The full story reads like the
script of a James Bond movie,
complete with secret trysts at
glittering Miami Beach hotels
and midnight powerboat
dashes to secret landing spots
on the Cuban coast. Once, Ro-
selli's boat was shot out from
under him.
For the first try, the CIA
furnished Roselli with special
poison capsules to slip into
Castro's food. The poison was
supposed to take three days to
act. By the time Castro died,
his system would throw off all
traces of the poison, so he
would appear to be the victim
of a natural if mysterious ail-
ment.
Roselli arranged with a
Cuban, related to one of Cas-
tro's chefs, to plant the deadly
pellets in the dictator's food.
On March 13, 1961, Roselli de-
livered the capsules to his con-
tact at Miami Beach's glamor-
ous Fontainebleau Hotel.
A couple of weeks later, just
about the right time for the
plot to have been carried out,
a report out of Havana said
Castro was ill. But he re-
covered before the Bay of Pigs
invasion on April 17, 1961.
Four more attempts were
made on Castro's life,
? 1971, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.
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"-I 1 j?AG~1= UI(I
I The Washington. Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 19, 1991 D 15
Castro Plot Raises Ugjy Questions
_ _ ._ _ ~_.._...i.,.a +.. 1 --- &1,ara urac a whip snec-
By lack Anderson
The plot to kill Cuban dic-
tator Fidel Castro, hidden for
1.0 years from the public, raises
some ugly questions that high
officials would rather keep
buried deep inside the Central
Intelligence Agency.
1. Has the CIA tried to as-
sassinate any other leaders?
John McCone, who headed the
CIA during the six attempts
to knock off Castro, denied
emphatically that the CIA has
tried to kill anyone. But ex-
Sen. George Smathers, one of
John F. Kennedy's closest
friends, told us the late Presi-
dent suspected that the CIA
had arranged the shootings of
the Dominican Republic's Ra-
fael Trujillo in 1961 and South
Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in
1963.
2. Did President Kennedy
personally sanction the plot
against Castro? The prepara-
rations to assassinate the Cu-
ban dictator began during the
last months of the Eisenhower
administration as part of the
Bay of Pigs scheme. All six
attempts, however, were made
during 1961-63 when M.,. Ken-
nedy occupied the White
House. Smathers told us he
once spoke to the late Presi-
dent about assassinating Cas-
tro. Mr. Kennedy merely
rolled back his eyes, recalled
Smathers, as if to indicate the
idea was too wild to discuss.
ISubsequently, Mr. Kennedy
told Smathers of his suspicion
that the CIA may have been
assassinations.
3. Did the late Robert Ken-
nedy know about the assassina-
tion attempts? After the Bay
of Pigs fiasco, President Ken-
nedy swore to friends he
would like "to splinter the CIA
in a thousand pieces and scat.
ter it to the winds." He put
his brother, Robert, in charge
of the CIA with instructions
to shake it up. The CIA made
five attempts on Castro's life
after the Bay of Pigs while
Robert Kennedy was riding
herd on the agency.
4. Could the plot against
Castro have backfired against
President Kennedy? The late
President was murdered nine
months after the last assassi.
nation team was caught on a
Havana rooftop with high-
powered rifles. Presumably,
they were subjected to fiend-
ish tortures until they told all
Mexico to visit the Cuban tram of plans ranging irons
Embassy a few weeks before one e x t r e m e to another,"
the dreadful lay in Dallas. McCone admitted. "Whenever
Could Bob Kennedy have this subject (assassinating Cas-
been plagued by the terrible tro) was brought up-and it
thought that the CIA plot, was - it was rejected imme-
which he mus; at least have diately on two grounds. First,
condoned, put into motion would not be condoned by
forces that may have brought it
about his brother's martyr- anybody. Second, it wouldn't
dom? have achieved anything."
The last surviving brother, There was also talk in high
Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MassHis ), places, McCone acknowledged,
neevver insight. spoken to to of supporting a coup to oust
brothrothers give had us
brothers The former CIA di-
attempts about any assassination
, he rector said he had argued
attempts against Castro, i against this at a secret session
he volun-
e
,
said. He was awar
with both Kennedy brothers.
leered, only that Sen. Smash- He had contended that there
ers had talked to the late
no one strong enough to
Castro. President about eliminating was take Diem's place and that a
C
Smathers to:A us that Presi- coup, therefore, would bring
dent Kennedy seemed horril "political upheaval."
the idea of political "I told the President and
assassinations mer Bobby together," recalled Mc-
cI remember Cone, "that if I were running
him m saying," recalled Smat
Ily a baseball team and had only
things the he CIA frequently
did, "that
didn't t know nw one pitcher, I wouldn't take
dnoow him out of the game."
about, and he was unhappy The November, 1963, coup
about it. He complained that caught the United States com-
the CIA was almost autono- pletely by surprise, he said.
mods. While the plotters were mow
"He told me: he believed the ing on the palace, he said,
CIA and arranged t have then-Ambassador Henry Cabot
Diem and Trujillo bumped off. Lodge was visiting Diem.
He was pretty well shocked Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our
about that. Hs thought was Pacific commander, had also
a stupid thin; to do, and ht been present, but had left
wanted to get control of what early to go to the airport.
the CIA was doing." McCone said President
But McCone, disagreeing Diem escaped through atun-
piot was told
othat r or imple- nel but was caught in nearby
plot was authorized Cholon and "shot in a station
td" to Castro
a~sassinate
they knew. None of the assas-
sination teams, however, had
direct knowledge of the CIA
involvement. The CIA insti-
gators had represented them-
selves as oilmen seeking re-
venge against Castro for his
seizure of oil holdings.
PLOT BACKFIRE?
Former associates recall
that Robert Kennedy, deep-
ly despondent, went Into semi-
seclusion after his brother's
assassination. Could he have
been tormented by more than
natural grief? He certainly
men e ,
Harvey Oswald, had been ac- Trujillo, Diem or anyone else. wagon.
tive in the pro-Castro move-[ "During those days of ten-
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