CASTRO SHIFTS MISSILES TO WEST END OF CUBA

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CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2
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RIFPUB
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K
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6
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December 9, 2016
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August 30, 2000
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1
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Publication Date: 
February 28, 1971
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NSPR
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Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 SUNDAY STAR DATE '-I f f~'_ K - / I PAGE l Castro Shifts Mi5;si 1es To West End of ~C i.bJ By JEREMIAH O'LEARY Star Staff Writer The government of Fidel Cas- tro, for reasons that are unclear to U.S. officials, recently fin- ished removing all of its antiair- craft missile batteries from eastern Cuba. American U2 jets, which have maintained a regular surveil- lance of Cuba since the 1962 mis- sile crisis, began detecting the shift in SAM sites from Oriente and the eastern provinces a year ago. Indications are that Cas- tro's anti-aircraft missile strength is now concentrated in the western halt of the island where Havana is located. Officials of U.S. departments that keep watch on Cuban mili- tary and political developments are unable to explain why Cas- tro has elected to leave Santiago) and the eastern areas undefend- ed. Some speculate that Castro does not anticipate any attack from the U.S. at all. Others say he may not have enough mis- siles to defend all of the island and is simply concentrating what he does have in the west. It was U-2 photo reconnais- sance that first detected the ICBM buildup which led to the 1962 confrontation and subse- quent Soviet removal of missiles that could have reached almost every American city. There is nc~ longer any ques- tion that Rassian submarine crews intend to use the Cuban harbor at Cienfuegos as a regu- lar port and.for recreational fa- cilities. Cienfuegos is still re- garded by the United States as a facility rather than a base, in the full military sense, for sub- marine use. Up to now, the Russians have not sent a Polaris-class subma- rine to the harbor. The most recent visitor was a nuclear powered attack s u b m a r i n e armed with torpedoes rather than ballistic missiles. The United States tracked the sub there during the last three weeks and at last report it was still in the ':iarbor, lying along side a Soviet tender. Two barges and several barracks now ap- pear to be permanent installa- tions at Cienuegos. Castro also has tightened the defense rin around the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay on the eastern tip of Cuba. However, it'. appears that the ring `is more devoted to keeping Cubans seek- ing asylum at the U.S. base than to protect against American at- tack. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08: IATRBIPM00296R000200250OAI,2 NEW YORK TIMES PRESIDENT TERMS UBAjOFF LIMITS FOR SOVIET SUBS Says Use of Isle by `Nuclear' graft Would Violate Pact Reached Last October DOUBTS SECOND CRISIS Nixon Warns of Resumption of Bombing if Hanoi Builds Up Its Forces in South By MAX FRANKEL Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 4-Pres- ident Nixon said tonight that he would regard the servicing of Soviet "nuclear" submarines "either in Cuba or from Cuba" as a violation of it new under- standing obtained from Moscow last October. Speaking out for the first time on a subject that he had hitherto treated as too delicate and confidential, the President said that he believed the Rus- I! sians did not want a second I crisis over Cuba. For that reason, he added, "I don't believe that one as go- ing to occur, particularly since the understanding has been so clearly laid out and has been so clearly relied on by us." Mr. Nixon did not explain the circumstances or detail of ,the agreement. He said it was obtained Oct. 11, which was two days before the Soviet Union issued a public state- ment on Cuba offering not so much a new agreement as re- assurance that it was doing i nothing to "contradict" a 1962 agreement that concluded the. first Cuban crisis over missiles. Expanded Agreement The President stated clearly this evening, however, that l barring offensive missiles to in- clude a Soviet pledge not to put a military naval base in! Cuba. Mr. Nixon's further statement that submarines! could not therefore be serviced in or from Cuba appeared to be his own definition of what'i was meant by a naval base. In a 20-minute discussionu of foreign affairs during a one- hour television conversation in the White House with four net- work correspondents, Mr. Nixon also made these other major points: 4l"We now see the end of Americans' combat rate in Vietnam in sight " Mr. Nixon presumably meant ground com- bat and implied that the end would come before 1972. He did not say anything further, how- ever, about troop withdrawal] beyond the reduction to 280,- 000 scheduled for May 1. qHe did not wish to resume the bombing of North Vietnam but was reiterating his own and admittedly, new "understand- ing" that he would order the bombing of key areas if Hanoi expanded its infiltration of the south at a time when Ameri, cans were moving out. Such a move would be essential to pro- tect American lives Mr. Nixon said, acknowledging for the first time that punishment for such a build-up and not merely retaliation for the loss of reconnaissance planes was the motive of a air strike against) the north last November. Any promise or formal com- mitment to intervene to. pre- vent the destructio not Israel "would only tend to inflame the situation" in the Middlel East. But Israel and her Arab? neighbors know how much help the United States is providing. They also know, Mr. Nixon said, that Israel will continue to receive the arms needed to' defend herself against the su- perior manpower of her neigh- bors and Soviet forces in the a "conciliatory, peace-r'naking role." A basic disagreement about the definition of strategic weapons will prevent a com- prehensive agreement to limit those weapons, but a limited agreement should be possible "eventually." Mr. Nixon praised a recent Soviet decision to lim- it the deployment of the S-9 and other big missiles and said ,that he sensed an overwhelm- ing common interest by the two powers to avoid a nuclear c. ompetit.on and "the escalat- ing burden of arms," JThe election in Chile of a Marxist Government, with ma- jor Communist support, was corned," but relations with that country will 'remain cordial so long as Chile's foreign policy is not "antagonistic to our in- terests." In his first public com- ment on the election of Dr. Sal- vador Allende Gossens, which is know to have deeply dis- turbed him, Mr. Nixon said that United States intervention in a free election would have dis- rupted relations with the rest of A he hemisphere and been "far worse." He said that he would continue to watch for- eign policy developments in Santiago and said that he had not "given up on Chile or on 1 it the Chilean people" and would The concern last fall about a Soviet naval base in Cuba wasL, exacerbated by fear of event;i, in Chile and a suspicion that Moscow was trying to capital- ize on the election with a newt show of military strength tb" region. This is a time for pri- vate negotiations on the Middle) East, he added, saying that peace depended upon the So-1 propel developments in its fa' vor throughout Latin America. In September, after watch; Ing the construction of soma port facilities in Cienfuegos, in central Cuba, and the arrival of two. service barges and a submarine tender, Henry A,i Kissinger, the President's fors eign affairs aide, recalled the agreement by which the United States promised not to invade Cuba in return for a Soviet pledge never again to introduce offensive strategic weapons on,- to the island. He said' Wash- ington would take a most serf= ous view of the establishrnenit of a naval base in Cuba. In the maneuvering that fol- lowed, . including some direct conversations between Mr. Kis- singer and Soviet diplomats, thg Russians were said to have agreed to an "understanding:' that minimized the sense of crisis. Yet the shore facilities and the barges remained In Cienfuegos: and the tender has continued to cruise in Carib- bean waters. this understanding had beeni ;vi t Union' a fines to p1 i "expanded'A-a-velriFei' ease- 0010 IA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 Approved For Rel ,ease ,2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 NEW YORK TIMES DATE PAGE White House Stand On Soviet Tenders Off uba larifiedr Irc16 Nl 10 TO, New Ywk 1'I~1113 WASHINGTON, Jan. 5-=fhei White House emphasized today] that President Nixon would consider it a violation of an understanding with the Soviet Union if her nuclear sub- marines were serviced "amr- where at sea" Iby submarine tenders operating from Cuba. An aide to Henry A. Kissinger, assistant to the pre s- I identfor national security laf-I fairs, 'clarified the White Hou.me attitude after Ronald L. Ziegler, I the president's press secretary,; told reporters the understand ing ruled out servicing of sub-' marines "in the immediate ar ~a of the Caribbean." The iaide said that Mr. Zie?g ler had realized his -remark was; too limited geographically a id! had telephoned from the pla ne as the President flew to San Clemente, Calif., to ask tl-?at' the matter be clarified. The issue arose Mr. Ziegler was asked what the President had meant when he told ?fc ur network television commenta- tors in 'their interview last night that it would be a vicla- tion to service a submarne "either in Cuba or from Cuba." Mr. Ziegler said the Presi- dent was not specifying any geographic limit, but, urged to identify a boundary outside a Cuban harbor, be said that So- viet submarines "with offen- sivecapabilities" should not be serviced "in the immediate area of the Caribbean." The aide said later that Mr. Ziegler had drawn "a tighter line than we would have liked." Mr. Ziegler cleared up some confusion as to the date the Soviet Union pledged not to in- stall a military or naval base in Cuba. The President said last night that the pledge was made on Oct. I1, but Mr. Zieg- ler said be had meant to sayl Oct. 13, the date that the So-~ viet Union issued 'a public statement on Cuba. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 NEW YORK TIMES Russian Sub Tender That Stirred Capital QuitCLubai Waters By DANA ADAMS SCHMIDT Special to The New York Times WASHINGTON, Jan. 8-Four Soviet. naval vessels, including a submarine tender whose ar- rival at Cienfuegos, Cuba,. alarmed official Washington last fall, have reportedly left Cuba, apparently on their way home. The tender and a diesel-pow- ered submarine were reported in the mid-Atlantic today mov ing northeast,' while a guided- missile frigate and an oiler were in the English Channel, having left Cuba earlier this week, Jerry W. Friedheim, a Defense Department spokes- man, announced. Two Soviet barges and a tug that arrived in Cuba last Sep- tember, remained at Cienfue- gos, he added. The. importance of the ten- der, a 9,000-ton vessel, is that she is presumably equipped to service Soviet nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines with spare parts, and repairs. Pentagon officials said pri- vately that the tender's de porture, along with the other vessels, might signify that the! basis was. disappearing for fear' that the Soviet Union might be DATE Continued From Page 1, Col. 1 establishing a base for nuclear submarines in Cuba. They rerained, however, from drawing any conclusions. The State Department declined disturbed United States offi- cials arrived at Cienfuegos on Sept. 25. Previously two Soviet barges of a type that could be used for storing radioactive waste had arrived at Cienfuegos, comment, saying that it was where the Russians, or the leaving the subject entirely tolCubans, have constructed twc the Pentagon. barracks, each capable of ac- Mr. Friedheim conceded thatI commodating about 100 men, there had been a delay in mak- ing public the departure of the Soviet vessels from Cuba but declined to explain it. It seemed likely that Pentagon plus a football field and a communications center. This information and sub- sequent reports of the comings ~.nd goings of the Soviet vessels officials wanted to be quite were obtained mainly from U-2 reconnaissance fli hts ac- , g sure the ships really were go- cording to the Pentagon. ing home, and not just "harbor- On Sept. 25, the day the hopping," as Defense Secretary :ender arrived, a White House Melvin R. Laird put is recently. Spokesman said: Soviet tactics in recent "The Soviet Union can be months in the Carribbean, under no doubt that we would where they have moved ships view the establishment of a in and out of Cuban ports in strategic base in the Caribbean what seemed an arbitrary with the ' utmost seriousness." fashion, have been interpreted The spokesman later said by some observers as an asser-.that the same view applied to tion of the Soviet right to have "servicing of Soviet vessels ships there, and a test of armed with offensive weapons United States. determination to in or from bases in Cuba." prevent establishment of a sub- The word "bases" was under- marine base in Cuba. stood to include tenders in the The submarine tender tha;Caribbean. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 _- - ;-IE WA SHINGT ON POST The Washington Merry-Go-Ronnd THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan; I8, 1971 i B7 6 Attempts to Kill Castro) Laid to CIA By Jack Anderson Locked in the darkest re- cesses of the Central Intelli- gence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro. For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terri- ble secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question. We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination at- tempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immedi- ately" He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever partici- pated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the at- tempts could have been made with his knowledge, he re- plied: "It could not have hap- pened." We have complete confi- dence, however, in our sources. The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dicta ers landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them. After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This hap- pened around the last of Feb. ruary or first of March, 1963. Nine months later, Presi- dent Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who pre- viously had agitated for Cas- tro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a n a g g i n g suspicion-unsup- ported by the Warren Com- mission's findings-that Cas- tro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and some- how recruited Oswald to retal- nedy. To set up the Castro assassi- nation, the CIA enlisted Rob- ert Maheu, a :former FBI agent with shadowy, contacts, who had handled other under- cover assignment.: for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations. Maheu recruited John Ro- sell!, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American ani Cuban un- derworlds, to arrange the as- sassination. The dapper, hawk- faced Roselli, formerly mar- ried to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his con- viction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Holly- wood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Ro- selli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams. The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Ro- selli's boat was shot out from under him. For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ail- ment. Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Cas- tro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli de- livered the capsules to his con- tact at Miami Beach's glamor- ous Fontainebleau Hotel. A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he re- covered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961. Four more attempts were made on Castro's life, ? 1971, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc. Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2 "-I 1 j?AG~1= UI(I I The Washington. Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Jan. 19, 1991 D 15 Castro Plot Raises Ugjy Questions _ _ ._ _ ~_.._...i.,.a +.. 1 --- &1,ara urac a whip snec- By lack Anderson The plot to kill Cuban dic- tator Fidel Castro, hidden for 1.0 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency. 1. Has the CIA tried to as- sassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex- Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late Presi- dent suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Ra- fael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. 2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The prepara- rations to assassinate the Cu- ban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when M.,. Ken- nedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late Presi- dent about assassinating Cas- tro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. ISubsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been assassinations. 3. Did the late Robert Ken- nedy know about the assassina- tion attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Ken- nedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scat. ter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency. 4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassi. nation team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high- powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiend- ish tortures until they told all Mexico to visit the Cuban tram of plans ranging irons Embassy a few weeks before one e x t r e m e to another," the dreadful lay in Dallas. McCone admitted. "Whenever Could Bob Kennedy have this subject (assassinating Cas- been plagued by the terrible tro) was brought up-and it thought that the CIA plot, was - it was rejected imme- which he mus; at least have diately on two grounds. First, condoned, put into motion would not be condoned by forces that may have brought it about his brother's martyr- anybody. Second, it wouldn't dom? have achieved anything." The last surviving brother, There was also talk in high Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MassHis ), places, McCone acknowledged, neevver insight. spoken to to of supporting a coup to oust brothrothers give had us brothers The former CIA di- attempts about any assassination , he rector said he had argued attempts against Castro, i against this at a secret session he volun- e , said. He was awar with both Kennedy brothers. leered, only that Sen. Smash- He had contended that there ers had talked to the late no one strong enough to Castro. President about eliminating was take Diem's place and that a C Smathers to:A us that Presi- coup, therefore, would bring dent Kennedy seemed horril "political upheaval." the idea of political "I told the President and assassinations mer Bobby together," recalled Mc- cI remember Cone, "that if I were running him m saying," recalled Smat Ily a baseball team and had only things the he CIA frequently did, "that didn't t know nw one pitcher, I wouldn't take dnoow him out of the game." about, and he was unhappy The November, 1963, coup about it. He complained that caught the United States com- the CIA was almost autono- pletely by surprise, he said. mods. While the plotters were mow "He told me: he believed the ing on the palace, he said, CIA and arranged t have then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Diem and Trujillo bumped off. Lodge was visiting Diem. He was pretty well shocked Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our about that. Hs thought was Pacific commander, had also a stupid thin; to do, and ht been present, but had left wanted to get control of what early to go to the airport. the CIA was doing." McCone said President But McCone, disagreeing Diem escaped through atun- piot was told othat r or imple- nel but was caught in nearby plot was authorized Cholon and "shot in a station td" to Castro a~sassinate they knew. None of the assas- sination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA insti- gators had represented them- selves as oilmen seeking re- venge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings. PLOT BACKFIRE? Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deep- ly despondent, went Into semi- seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly men e , Harvey Oswald, had been ac- Trujillo, Diem or anyone else. wagon. tive in the pro-Castro move-[ "During those days of ten- Approved For Release 2000/09/08 : CIA-RDP73B00296R000200250001-2