FOREIGN POLICY -OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00149R000200930028-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: March 25, 1964
• Content Type: OPEN

6028
Approved For Release 2000/08 AVIDP75-00149ROOtr2b99300/8-1
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 25
FINDINGS OF ANDERSON REPORT HAVE BEEN
EXAGGERATED
The Anderson report compares coats in
Government-owned and private shipyards.
rt deals separately with conversion, repair,
alteration, and construction, using work on
specific ships as a basis of comparison. The
report concludes:
1. That in the area of conversions the cost
differential (in favor of private yards) was
a mere 1.2 percent based on cost to the De-
partment of Defense; and adds, "Since the
percentage differentials are small and the
adjustments required to establish compara-
bility were both large and unusual, we can
reach no conclusion with respect to the rel-
ative costs of these conversions;"
2. That in the field of ship repairs "costs
* * * are not reasonably comparable on a
ship-by-ship basis," but using this inade-
quate method of comparison anyhow, the
report indicates the costs to the Department
of Defense at private yards was only 8.4
percent lower than at naval yards;
3. That no significant difference in costs
exists in the matter of ship alterations; and
4. That the apparent cost gaps in new con-
struction are attributable principally to the
Indirect wages and fringe benefits of naval
shipyard workers.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE NAVAL
SHIPYARDS -
Gentlemen, I submit that if there is a
differential built into the operation of our
naval shipyards, it is the very security of
these United States. I need not explain to
the members of this subcommittee the ne-
cessity for maintaining a maximum degree
of readiness in our defense establishment,
nor must I dwell on the significant contri-
bution of Government-owned shipyards to
that need. One of the greatest stories of
World Wax II was the ability of our ship-
building and repair facilities, both private
and public, to meet and "to exceed the de-
mands imposed by a sudden global conflict.
It is this very balance, this complementary
coexistence which has enabled this Nation to
change from a peacetime to a wartime naval
establishment with a minimum of -head-
aches and a maximum of success. It is this
same coexistence which disproves and de-
stroys the arguments of those of our private
shipbuilders who would grab an even larger
Share , of Goverrnment work without regard
to the effects on our defense preparedness.
"ABUSING" THE YARDS FOR THE NATION'S
DEFENSE
The naval shipyards do not turn a profit
to stockholders. But rather than return to
the Treasury that part of present costs which
could be saved by paring our shipyards to
the bone, the public yards turn a profit for
the people of this country and their future.
The public yards have instituted new man-
agement and systems engineering procedures,
Which have been expensive, but which add to
the overall strength of our modern Navy.
The public yards have borne the cost of ad-
vances in technology. When the private
yards refuse to shave vital seconds off com-
bat operations, or install back-up safety de-
vices, or work to the most exacting specifica-
tions, such tasks are given to the public
yards. "Oh, yes," one naval official told me,
"we abuse the public yards, and it adds to
their expense." But such additions can be
the margin of victory, as they have certainly
been the thin ,edge of advancing progress in
naval design. The private yards have now
leveled charges of cost inflation against our
defense establishment for having pioneered
in marine technology and vessel construc-
tion techniques. We know from this Na-
tion's proud naval history that our ship-
yards are More than adequate to the chal-
lenges of our times: And we know 'as' well,
- from the inebillty of our private yards to win
construction awards for the world merchant
Marine fleet, that they' have priced them-
selves out of their natural market. By
skimping on military requirements the pri-
vets yards could continue to build ships,
but without the technical leadership of our
naval shipyards and their responsiveness to
the Navy command system, those vessels
wouldn't be the fighting ships that the times
may require.
ADVANTAGES OF MASS PRODUCTION GIVEN TO
PRIVATE YARDS
Presently, private shipyards are subsi-
dized to the tune of approximately 70 per-
cent of all Government work. They often
build and repair ships in groups of 10 or 12
at a time while the naval yards struggle
along with 1 or 2 contracts. Thus, the
private yards are not exposed to the normal
risks of private investors; but they continue
to cry socialism at naval yard proponents
while demanding a return to so-called pri-
vate enterprise in the awarding of Govern-
ment contracts. Of course, their costs are
lower?the advantages of mass production
are available to them but rarely to their
publicly owned competition. Considering
these advantages and the conclusions of the
Anderson report which establishes, I think,
that cost differentials are reasonably small,
I can't help wondering why the private yards
are unable to get their costs down substan-
tially from what they are now. / suspect
there is a real need for a thorough examina-
tion of the accounting procedures employed
at both private and naval shipyards to make
certain that private yard apples are not being
unfairly compared with public yard oranges.
PUBLIC YARDS ARE THE ONLY WAY TO HOLD
COSTS DOWN
I would like to ask this question: What
would hold down commercial shipbuilding
prices if the private yards ever succeeded in
their objective of eliminating their compe-
tition? The private yards are after a guaran-
teed, cost-plus, subsidized noncompetitive
cartelized construction program that would
open the public purse to their unquenchable
thirst for funds. I remind the members of
the subcommittee that this is an effort to
repair the loss of private merchant marine
construction markets with public funds, by
draining the national security strength of
our Government yards.
Gentlemen, there is no saving to the Gov-
ernment in allotting repair work to private
shipyards, for this is the area where the
Anderson report found the least difference.
Thus, for my part, I find no reason to retain
the guarantee of 35 percent of naval ship,
repairs for private yards in this year's defensd
appropriation bill. Although the Secretary
of Defense has said in the past that the 65--
35 percent provision allows a desirable de-
gree of flexibility in work assignments, I re-
spectfully suggest that the Secretary be
granted a fuller measure of flexibility by the
elimination of this legislative restriction
Which serves only to support private inter-
ests at the expense of the traditional role of
America's naval shipyards.
SUGAR LEGISLATION
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
Congress will be required to consider
sugar legislation again this session, and
there is little prospect that the bill this
year will be any less controversial than
the ones in the past. If anything, it ap-
pears that there will be more difficulty
than ever in reconciling the increasing
number of special interests involved in
sugar trade.
I ask unanimous consent to have
printed in the RECORD an editorial con-
cerning this matter which appeared in
the March 23 issue of the Wall Street
Journal.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STABILITY GONE SOUR
The Government annually divides up the
American sugar market among foreign and
domestic producers and, in the process, indi-
rectly controls U.S. sugfir prices. No one has
ever been completely happy with the process,
and things don't seem to be getting any
better.
For years foreign nations have fought for
the right to supply the United States; a cut
In one country's quota could touch off some-
thing of a diplomatic crisis. On one occasion
a Latin nation even threatened to turn
down U.S. foreign aid unless its sugar quota
was raised (it was).
American consumers have had no real rea-
son for happiness either. Though the Sugar
Act's elaborate quota system is supposed to
assure stable domestic prices, such stability
as has existed has usually been at levels
above those that would have prevailed in a
free market. In effect, U.S. sugar users have
been helping to subsidize the economies of a
sizable group of foreign nations among
which Cuba for a long time was prominent.
Now It's the domestic producers who are
dissatisfied. Because world sugar prices cur-
rently are high, the 'U.S. sugar growers would
like an increase in their allowable output.
Agriculture Secretary Freeman is planning
to permit the U.S. sugar men to increase
production by 500,000 tons a year, and bills
have been introduced in Congress to author-
ize an even bigger rise. But this would call
for a cut in the amount of sugar to be sup-
plied from abroad, and that prospect is stir-
ring discontent in another quarter.
The latest group to get upset about sugar
is composed of the dockworkers who belong
to the United Weighers' and Sugar Sam-
plers' Association, Local 3, and to the Scales-
men's Local 935. A cutback in imports could
mean less work for them on the docks; they
plan to urge Congress to stop the domestic
producers' raid on sugar imports.
So after years of international pulling and
hauling, the Government's sugar controllers
soon will be in the middle of a tug of war
between domestic producers and labor un-
ions. To some officials in Washington, the
id a of a free market should be growing
ester day by day.
FOREIGN POLICY?OLD MYTHS AND
NEW REALITIES
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President,
there is an inevitable divergence, attrib-
utable to the imperfections of the human
mind, between the world as it is and the
world as men perceive it. As long as our
perceptions are reasonably close to ob-
jective reality, it is possible for us to act
upon our problems in a rational and ap-
propriate manner. But when our per-
ceptions fail to keep pace with events,
when we refuse to believe something be-
cause it displeases or frightens us, or be-
cause it is simply startlingly unfamiliar,
then the gap between fact and perception
becomes a chasm, and action becomes
irrelevant and irrational.
There has always?and inevitably?
been some divergence between the reali-
ties of foreign policy and our ideas about
it. This divergence has in certain re-
spects been growing, rather than nar-
rowing; and we are handicapped, ac-
cordingly, by policies based on old myths,
rather than current realities. This di-
vergence is, in my opinion, dangerous
and unnecessary?dangerous, because
It can reduce foreign policy to a fraudu-
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19 4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE
"A freeze in strategic retaliatory weapons
'Would therefore pose a major problem for
tefense industry. If it tried to get into
existing civilian markets it simply couldn't
continue to do ,,he sort of thing that it is
particularly good at doing. Defense firms
have had relativel oor success at diversi-
fying into civilian ibustry, even when the
products were as muc alike as military and
civilian aircraft, though they have been
highly successful in changing over to new
types of defense products.N, If new markets
of a comparable type do floj appear, the
defense companies will in mcfy cases have
to abandon their relatively sp ialized de-
fense facilities and staffs and, l order to
protect the interests of their stdholders,
shift their capital into more rout indus-
tries. This may be clone by acqu tions,
Mergers, or new ventures?but in a,n case
the existing people and communities i e-
ferise Work will often be left high and c.
Moreover, the defense companies will ha
to act fast: they have enormous-overheads,
and they work on very slim operating mar-
gins. A delay of only a few weeks in taking
disagreeable steps may be enough to run a
a good year's profit into a loss.
This is one place where our semantics
could create a barrier to sensible solutions.
Defense industry constitutes today one of
the major concentrations of truly creative
and innovational brainpower in American
life. It obtains great dynamism by being
Operated for private profit by private man-
agenient, yet is almost wholly dependent on
non-private markets: It is important that
we understand why this is necessary. Most
of the benefits of its activities are too long
range, too fundamental or too diffuse to be
captured by market processes. Hence it
Mad not offer tangible, timely, and reliable
re-tarns to the private investor unless the
Government as trustee of the long-term in-
terests of the Nation stepped in and created
a Market for such activities.
It so happens that national defense is one
field where the long term national interest
is so clear, and the futility of expecting to
meet this need by spontaneously emerging
private demand is so obvious,, that there has
been almost no dissent in principle to such
Government expenditures.
It is important to recognize, however,
that there is nothing specifie to national
defense that makes this pattern of organiz-
ing and financing economic activities desir-
able and feasible. There is not, in,Principle,
any reason why such activities organized on
a similar private enterprise bags could not
be directed to other broad nstional objec-
aces such as basic resourc conservation
and development, including articularly our
dwindling water supply, w disposal, plan-
ning and implementing rban redevelop-
ment, commutation and her transport sys-
tems, weather control, proved aviation fa-
cilities and traffic cont , industrial develop-
? ment of the oceans, e blishment of world-
wide , communicatio networks, large-scale
production of teac ? g machines and pro-
grams for the era ation of illiteracy, and
the worldwide tra mission of development
skills, informatio systems, etc. If these
tasks were perfogned by the companies now
holding defense contracts this would be no
more "socialls4' than the defense program
is now.
Such programs would also have a secondary
i'unction of essential importance, closely re-
lated to their original goal of national de-
fense. They would provide what might be
called "standby capacity in defense R. & D.
and production capability." This function
would be especially important in the event
of a weapons freeze which might at some
stage break down, as did the moratorium on.
nuclear testing. It would be extremely im-
portant to preserve the Nation's capabilities
No. 56 -8
for resuming the weapons race if necessary?
and the retention of such capability might
help to prevent it from becoming necessary.
Even in the event of a properly enforced
agreement on general and complete disarm-
ament, it is likely that for a good many years
the Nation would, wish to maintain its cap-
ability to rebuild a well-rounded national
defense system in the event of some break-
down in the treaty's implementation. Such
capability would be best preserved by the
mounting of bold new programs of the type
here advocated which would not only pro-
vide continuing opportunity for the talents
and the organizations now employed in de-
fense industry but would also maintain a
continuing pressure on our educational in-
stitutions to develop a large number of able
and highly motivated people with the req-
uisite aptitudes and expertise.
It is hard to imagine the vast benefits
that the Nation and the world Might deni
from a program such. as suggested here, e
if only $5 billion a year were involved e
ualitative aspect here is enormousl ore
portant than the quantitative o The
5 Of $5 billion spread' among surners,
or ent for better State And 1 govern-
men ervice.s, or even put i more con-
ventio I industrial plant d equipment
would ye absolutely no s parable effect
in raisin he Nation's re elfare. There is
enormous verage for 'fare in applying
advanced s ? ems an s and utilizing the
fantastic ski of t odern computer?to
solve our mos as problems. In effect,
we would be ha a second space program,
but one tied fl to earth. If I see this
century arigh t on such great and am-
bitious pr. ch exhibit and con-
tinually ? c:. fy OUT apabilities to apply
science toj he achieve ent of men's 'goals
that our ation's presti ' and influence, as
well aa, s domestic living andards, will in-
creasigly depend.
111Alosing I should like avoid being
inietinderstood by making it ear what I
ant' not saying. First, I am n proposing
that all defense companies be ke.' :oing. I
realize that some are too inflexible d some
are too inefficient and high cost.kklaput I
think a lot of the criticism on thir core
overlooks the inherent expensiveness o-
ing such extensive innovation at such a r d
pace. When one looks at the miracle of
Polaris or Minuteman system, and the ord
of magnitude of improvement in efficacy over
earlier weapons systems that they achieved
in a few short years, and if one then com-
pares this with the failure, for example, of
the American automobile industry to put
into production a single significant innova-
tion for decades, then one suspects that some
of the griping about the wastefulness and
inefficiency of the defense and space pro-
grams is based on using inappropriate cri-
teria, if indeed it does not actually reflect a
certain amount of old-fashioned jealousy.
Second, I am not saying that the country
owes the defense industry a living. I am
saying .that the country needs the produc-
tive capabilities which defense industry has
nurtured, and which will largely be lost if
defense companies are allowed to wither on
the vine as soon as the need for new weapons
slackens.
Finally, I am not saying that any such pro-
posal as I have made would be politically
easy to nut over. Without the strong sup-
port of defense industry itself it would prob-
ably have little chance. Defense industry
will not support it so long as it continues
In the ostrichlike posture which it has so
often preferred?endlessly repeating to it-
self that the cold war would never end and
that the need for bigger and better atomic
weapons would go on and on and on. Such
a posture, I think, invites the booting which
the industry will surely receive the moment
the Defense Department feels it can cis-
6027
pense with its services. In any case, de-
fense industry could not back such a pro-
posal so long as its own thinking is still
dominated by the dogma that defense is the
only legitimate purpose for which public
funds, in large quantities, carght to be used
in mobilizing the activities' of private com-
panies. We have now .44 Imost got to the
point where we feel sujYl programs are legiti-
mate in space. H long do we have to
wait until we ea pply similar thinking to
our problems h on earth?
WHY MUST NO LONGER ASSIGN
A PERCENTAGE OF NAVAL
V'-SEL REPAIR WORK TO PRI-
ATE SHIPYARDS
Mr. McINTYRE. Mr. President, the
past two defense appropriation acts have
included provisions requiring the Navy
to allocate 35 percent of naval conversion
and repair work to private shipyards.
Such provisions represent an unwise
limitation on the discretion of the Secre-
tary of the Navy and give the commercial
shipyards an unwarranted subsidy of
guaranteed business. I strongly hope
that Congress will not perpetuate this
provision into fiscal year 1965. As an in-
dication of my position on this question
and with an eye to Senate consideration
of this question this year, I should like
to acquaint the Senate with arguments
against this provision I recently offered
in a statement for the Department of
Defense Subcommittee of the House Ap-
propriations Committee.
I therefore ask unanimous consent
that my statement before the House Ap-
propriations Committee be printed in the
RECORD at this point.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
MCGOVERN in the chair) . Is there ob-
jection?
There being no objection, the state-
ment was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
The ambitious propaganda and lobbying
activities of certain of our industrialists in
ecent years underscores the legitimacy of
esident Eisenhower's fears that the Na-
t 's "military-industrial complex" is being
m vated by other than strict military
nee "Convention," the current bestsell-
er b Fletcher Knebel and Charles Bailey
II, po ays in fiction what can happen in
reality those public officials (even presi-
dential didates) who have the courage to
oppose e ernment contracts which con-
tribute no ng at all to our defense posture,
but many liars to some of our private
"profiteers."
PRIVATE YARDS ANT PREFERENTIAL LAWS, NOT
MPETITION
Until World II, nearly all naval repair
work was perfor ed at naval shipyards.
Since then, howe the private shipbuild-
ing industry has m aged gradually to win
an ever increasing s re of this work, not
through competition ut anticompetitive
Government regulatio allotting work to
them. And still they s ch for more, and
more. The private shipbtilders point with
relish to the now famous ''Anderson report
to support their claim that private yards
can satisfy the Navy's needs at less cost to
the Government. Of course if the report
really showed the private yards were com-
petitive they wouldn't need the anticompeti-
tive regulations. I would like to address my-
self to that report for a few moments.
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c6N6REsSIONAt REcORD?stNATE
lent game of imagery and appearances;
unnecessary, because it can be overcome
by the determination of Men in high
office to dispel prevailing misconceptions
by the candid dissemination of unpleas-
ant, but inescapable, facts.
Before commenting on some of the spe-
cific areas where I believe our policies are
at least partially based on cherished
myths, rather than objective facts, I
should like to suggest two possible rea-
sons for the growing divergence between
the realities and our perceptions of cur-
rent world politics. The first is the radi-
cal change in relations between and.
within the Communist and the free
world; and the second is the tendency
of too many of us to confuse means with
ends and, accordingly, to adhere to pre-
vailing practices with a fervor befitting
immutable principles.
Although it is too soon to render a
definitive judgment, there is mounting
evidence That events of recent years have
wrought profound changes in the char-
acter of East-West relations. In the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, the
United States proved to the Soviet Union
that a policy of aggression and adven-
ture involved unacceptable risks. In the
signing of the test ban treaty, each side
in effect assured the other that it was
prepared to forego, at least for the pres-
ent, any bid for a decisive military or po-
litical breakthrough. These occurrences,
it should be added, took place against
the background of the clearly under-
stood strategic superiority?but not
supremacy?of the Ilnited States.
It seems reasonable, therefore, to sug-
gest that the character of the cold war
has, for the present, at least, been pro-
foundly altered: by the drawing back of
the Soviet Union from extremely aggres-
sive policies; by the implicit repudiation
by both sides of a policy of "total vic-
tory"; and by the establishment of an
American strategic superiority which the
Soviet Union appears to have tactly ac-
cepted because it has been accompanied
by assurances that it will be exercised by
the United States with responsibility and
restraint. These enormously important
changes may come to be regarded by his-
torians as the foremost achievements of
the Kennedy administration in the field
of foreign policy. Their effect has been
to commit us to a foreign policy which
can accurately?though perhaps not
prudently?be defined as one of "peace-
ful coexistence."
Another of the results of the lowering
of tensions between East and West is
that each is now free to enjoy the luxury
of accelerated strife and squabbling
within its own domain. The ideological
thunderbolts between Washington and
Moscow which until a few years ago
seefried a permanent part of our daily
lives have become a pale shadow of their
former Selves. Now instead the United
State& waits in _fascinated apprehension
for the Olympian pronouncements that
issue from Paris at 6-month intervals
while the Russians respond to the crude
epithets of Peiping with almost plaintive
rejoinders about "those who want to start
a war a,gitinst everybody."
Vuese,astonishing changes in the con-
figuration of the postwar world have had
,
an unsettling effect on both public and
official opinion in the United States. One
reason for this, I believe, lies in the fact
that we are a people used to looking at
the world, and indeed at ourselves, in
moralistic rather than empirical terms.
We are predisposed to regard any con-
flict as a clash between good and evil
rather than as simply a clash between
conflicting interests. We are inclined
to confuse freedom and democracy,
which we regard as moral principles,
with the way in which they are practiced
in America?with capitalism, federalism,
and the two-party system, which are not
moral principles but simply the preferred
and accepted practices of the American
people. There is much cant in American
moralism and not a little inconsistency.
It resembles in some ways the religious
faith of the many respectable people who,
in Samuel Butler's words, "would be
equally horrified to hear the Christian
religion doubted or to see it practiced."
Our national vocabulary is full of
"self-evident truths" not only about
"life, liberty, and happiness," but about
a vast number of personal and public
issues, including the cold war. It has
become one of the "self-evident truths"
of the postwar era that just as the Presi-
dent resides in Washington and the
Pope in Rome, the Devil resides immu-
tably in Moscow. We have come to re-
gard the Kremlin as the permanent seat
of his power and we have grown almost
comfortable with a menace which,
though unspeakably evil, has had the
redeeming virtues of constancy, predict-
ability, and familiarity. Now the Devil
has betrayed us by traveling abroad and,
worse still, by dispersing himself, turn-
ing up now here, now there, and in many
places at once, with a devlish disregard
for the laboriously constructed frontiers
of ideology.
We are confronted with a complex and
fluid world situation and we are not
adapting ourselves to it. We are cling-
ing to old myths in the face of new reali-
ties and we are seeking to escape the
contradictions by narrowing the per-
missible bounds of public discussion, by
relegating an increasing number of ideas
and viewpoints to a growing category
of "unthinkable thoughts." I believe
that this tendency can and should be
reversed, that it is within our ability,
and unquestionably in our interests, to
cut loose from established myths and
to start thinking some "unthinkable
thoughts"?about the cold war and
East-West relations, about the under-
developed countries and particularly
those in Latin America, about the
Changing nature of the Chinese Com-
munist threat in Asia and about the
festering war in Vietnam.
The master myth of the cold war is
that the Communist bloc is a monolith
composed of governments which are not
really governments at all but organized
conspiracies, divided itmong themselves
perhaps in Certain matters of tactics,
but all equally resolute and implacable
In their determination to destroy the
free world.
I believe that the Communist world
is indeed hostile to the free world in its
general" and lone-term intentions but
that the existence of this animosity in
principle is far less imporant for our
foreign policy than the great variations
In its intensity and character both in
time and among the individual members
of the Communist bloc. Only if we rec-
ognize these variations, ranging from
China, which poses immediate threats
to the free world, to Poland and Yugo-
slavia, which pose none, can we hope to
act effectively upon the bloc and to turn
its internal differences to our own ad-
vantage and to the advantage of those
bloc countries which wish to maximize
their independence. It is the responsi-
bility of our national leaders both in the
executive branch and in Congress, to
acknowledge and act upon these realities,
even at the cost of saying things which
will not win immediate widespread en-
thusiasm.
For a start, we can acknowledge the
fact that the Soviet Union, though still
a most formidable adversary, has ceased
to be totally and implacably hostile to
the West. It has shown a new willing-
ness to enter mutually advantageous
arrangements with the West and, thus
far at least, to honor them. It has there-
fore become possible to divert some of
our energies from the prosecution of the
cold war to the relaxation of the cold
war and to deal with the Soviet Union,
for certain purposes, as a normal state
with normal and traditional interests.
If we are to do these things effective-
ly, we must distinguish between com-
munism as an ideology and the power
and policy of the Soviet state. It is not
communism as a doctrine, or commu-
nism as it is practiced within the Soviet
Union or within any other country, that
threatens us. How the Soviet Union
organizes its internal life, the gods and
doctrines that it worships, are matters
for the Soviet Union to determine. It is
not Communist dogma as espoused with-
in Russia but Communist imperialism
that threatens us and other peoples of
the non-Communist world. Insofar as
a great nation mobilizes its power and
resources for aggressive purposes, that
nation, regardless of ideology, makes it-
self our enemy. Insofar as a nation is
Content to practice its doctrines within
its own frontiers, that nation, howevevi
repugnant its ideology, is one with which
we have no proper quarrel. We must
deal with the Soviet Union as a great
power, quite apart from differences of
ideology. To the extent that the Soviet
leaders abandon the global ambitions of
Marxist ideology, in fact if not in words,
it becomes possible for us to engage in
normal relations with them, relations
which probably cannot be close or trust-
ing for many years to come but which
can be gradually freed of the terror and
the tensions of the cold war.
In our relations with the Russians, and
Indeed in our relations with all nations,
we would do well to remember, and to
act upon, the words of Pope John in the
great Encyclical, Pacem in Terris:
"It must be borne in mind," said Pope
John, "that to proceed gradually is the law of
life in all its expressions, therefore, in human
Institutions, too, it is not possible t,45 reno-
vate for the better except by working from
within them, gradually. Violence has al-
ways achieved only destruction, not con-
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6030 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
_
, .
in the Communist bloc in a way favor-
able to the security of the free world.
It could well be argued * * *?
Writes George Kerman? ,
That if the major Western Powers had full
freedom of movement in devising their own
policies, it would be within their power to
determine whether the Chinese view, or the
Soviet view, or perhaps a view more liberal
than either would ultimately prevail within
the Communist camp?George Kennan,
"Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign
Affairs, January 1964, page 178.
There are numerous areas in which
we can seek to reduce_ the tensions of
the cold war and to bring a degree of
normalcy into our relations with the
Soviet Union and other Communist
countries?once we have resolved that
it is safe and wise to do so. We have
already taken important steps in this
direction: the Antarctic and Austrian
treaties and the nuclear test ban treaty,
the broadening of East-West cultural
and educational relations, and the ex-
pansion of trade.
On the basis of recent experience and
present economic needs, there seems lit-
tle likelihood of a spectacular increase in
trade between Communist arid Western
countries, even if existing restrictions
were to be relaxed. Free world trade
with Communist countries has been in-
creasing at a steady but unspectacular
rate, and it seems unlikely to be greatly
accelerated because of the limited ability
of the Communist countries to pay for
increased imports. A modest increase
in East-West trade may nonetheless
serve as a modest instrument of East-
West detente?provided that we are able
to overcome the myth that trade with
Communist countries is a compact with
the Devil and to recognize that, on the
contrary, trade can serve as an effective
and honorable means of advancing both
peace and human welfare.
Whether we are able to make these
philosophic adjustments or not, we can-
not escape the fact that our efforts to
devise a common Western trade policy
are a palpable failure and that our allies
are going to trade with the Communist
bloc whether we ., like it or not. The
world's major exporting nations are
slowly but steadily increasing their trade
with the Communist bloc and the bloc
countries are showing themselves to be
reliable customers. Since 1958 Western
Europe has been increasing its exports
to the East at the rate of about 7 percent
a year, which is nearly the same rate
at which its overall world sales have
been increasing.
West Germany?one of our close
friends?is by far the leading Western
nation in trade with the Sino-Soviet
bloc. West German experts to bloc
countries in 1962 were valued at $749.9
million. Britain was in second place?
although not a close second?with ex-
ports to Communist countries amounting
to $393 million in 1962. France followed
with exports worth $313.4 million, and
the figure for the United States?con-
sisting largely of surplus food sales to
Poland under Public LECW 480?stood far
below at $125.1 million.
Our allies have made it plain that they
propose to expand this trade, in non-
'
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-
,StruCtioh, the kindling of paisions, not their
? pacification, the accumulation of hate and
ruin, not the reconciliation of the contending
parties. And it has reduced men and parties
to the.41fficult task of rebuilding, after sad
exPerience, on the ruins of discord."
Important opportunities have been
created for Western policy by the de-
velopment of "polycentrism" in the Com-
munist bloc. The Communist nations?
as George Kennan has pointed out, are,,
like the Western nations, currently
caught up in a crisis of indecision about
their relations with countries outside
their own ideological bloc. The choices
open to the satellite states are limited but
by no means insignificant. They can
adhere slavishly to Soviet preferences or
they can strike out on their own, within
limits, to enter into mutually advantage-
ous relations with the West.
Whether they do so, and to what ex-
tent, is to some extent at least within
the power of the West to determine. If
we persist in the view that all Commu-
nist regimes are equally hostile and
eqUally threatening to the West, and
that we can have no policy toward the
captive nations except the eventual
overthrow of their Communist regimes?
then the West may enforce upon the
Communist bloc a degree of unity which
the Soviet 'Union has shown itself to be
quite incapable of imposing?just as
Stalin in the early postwar years fright-
ened the West into a degree of unity that
It almost certainly could not have at-
tained by its own unaided efforts. If, on
the other? hand, we are willing to re-
examine the view that all Communist
regimes are alike in the threat which
they pose for the West?a view which
had a certain validity in Stalin's time?
then we may be able to exert an impor-
tant influence on the course of events
within a divided Communist world.
We are to a great extent the victims?
and the Soviets the beneficiaries, of our
OW'n ideological convictions, and of the
curious contradictions which they in-
volve. We consider it a form of subver-
sion of the free world, for example, when
the Russians enter trade relations or
conclude a consular convention or estab-
lish airline connections with a free
country in Asia, Africa, or Latin Amer-
Ica--and to a certain extent we are right.
On the other hand, when it is proposed
that we adopt the same strategy in re-
verse?by extending commercial credits
to Poland or Yugoslavia, or by exchang-
ing Ambassadors with a Hungarian
regime which has changed considerably
in character since the revolution of
1956?then the same natriots who are so
alarmed by Soviet activities in the free
world charge our policymakers with
"giving aid and comfort to the enemy"
and with innumerable other categories.
of idiocy and immorality.
It is time that we resolved this, con-
tradiction and separated myth from
reality. The myth is that every Com-
munist state is an unmitigated evil and
a relentless enemy of the free world; the
reality is that some Communist regimes
pose a threat to the free, world while
others pose little or none, and that if
we will recognize these distinctions, we
oUrselves will be able to influence events
March 25
strategic goods, wherever possible.
West Germany, in the last 16 months,
has exchanged or agreed to exchange
trade missions with every country in
Eastern Europe except Albania. Britain
has indicated that she will soon extend
long-term credits to Communist coun-
tries, breaching the 5-year limit which
the Western allies have hitherto ob-
served. In the light of these facts, it is
difficult to see what . effect the tight
American trade restrictions have other
than to deny the United States a sub-
stantial share of a profitable market.
The inability of the United States to
prevent its partners from trading ex-
tensively with the Communist bloc is
one good reason for relaxing our own
restrictions, but there is a better reason:
the potential value of trade?a moderate
volume of trade in nonstrategic items?
as an instrument for reducing world
tensions and strengthening the founda-
tions of peace. I do not think that trade
or the nuclear test ban, or any other
prospective East-West accommodation,
will lead to a grand reconciliation that
will end the cold war and usher in the
brotherhood of man. At the most, the
cumulative effect of all the agreements
that are likely to be attainable in the
foreseeable future will be the alleviation
of the extreme tensions and animosities
that threaten the world with nuclear
devastation and the gradual conversion
of the struggle between communism and
the free world into a safer and more
tolerable international rivalry, one
which may be with us for years and
decades to come but which need not be
so terrifying and so costly as to distract
the nations of the world from the crea-
tive pursuits of civilized societies.
There is little in history to justify the
expectation that we can either win the
cold war or end it immediately and com-
pletely. These are favored myths, re-
spectively, of the American right and of
the American left. They are, I believe,
equal in their unreality and in their dis-
regard for the feasibilities of history.
We must disabuse ourselves of them and
come to terms, at last, with the realities
of a world in which neither good nor
evil is absolute and in which those who
move events and make history are those
who have understood not how much but
how little it is within our power to
change.
Mr. President, in an address on Feb-
ruary 18 at Bad Godesburg, the U.S.
Ambassador to Germany, 'Mr. George
McGhee, spoke eloquently and wisely
about the character and prospects
of relations between the Communist and
the free worlds. I ask unanimous con-
sent that Ambassador McGhee's address,
"East-West Relations Today," be in-
serted in the RECORD at the end of my
remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KEN-
NEDY in the chair). Without objection,
It is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Latin America is
one of the areas of the world in which
American policy is weakened by a grow-
ing divergency between old myths and
new realities.
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
The crisis over the Panama Canal has
been unnecessarily protracted for rea-
sons of domestic politics and national
pride and sensitivity on both sides?for
reasons, that is, of only marginal rele-
vance to the merits of the dispute. I
think the Panamanians have unques-
tionably been more emotional about the
dispute than has the United States. I
also think that there is less reason for
emotionalism on the part of the United
States than on the part of Panama. It
Is important for us to remember that the
Issue over the canal is only one of a
great many in which the United States
is involved, and by no means the most
important. For Panama, on the other
hand, a small nation with a weak econ-
omy and an unstable government, the
canal is the preeminent factor in the na-
tion's economy and in its foreign rela-
tions. Surely in a confrontation so un-
equal, it is not unreasonable to expect
the United States to go a little farther
than halfway in the search for a fair
settlement.
We Americans would do well, for a
start, to divest ourselves of the silly no-
tion that the issue with Panama is a test
of our courage and resolve. I believe
that the Cuban missile crisis of 1962,
involving a confrontation with nuclear
weapons and intercontinental missiles,
was indeed a test of our courage, and we
acquitted ourselves extremely well in
that instance. I am unable to under-
stand how a controversy with a small
and poor country, with virtually no mili-
tary capacity, can possibly be regarded
as a test of our bravery and will to defend
our interests. It takes stubbornness but
not courage to reject the entreaties of
the weak. The real test in Panama is
not of our valor but of our wisdom and
Judgment and commonsense.
We would also do well to disabuse our-
selves of the myth that there is some-
thing morally sacred about the treaty of
1903. The fact of the matter is that the
treaty was concluded under circum-
stances that reflect little credit on the
United States. It was made possible by
Panama's separation from Colombia,
which probably could not have occurred
at that time without the dispatch of U.S.
warships to prevent the landing of Co-
lombian troops on the isthmus to put
down the Panamanian rebellion. The
United States not only intervened in Co-
lombia's internal affairs but did so in
violation of a treaty concluded in 1846
under which the United States had guar-
anteed Colombian sovereignty over the
Isthmus. President Theodore Roosevelt,
as he boasted, "took Panama," and pro-
ceeded to negotiate the canal treaty with
a compliant Panamanian regime. Pana-
manians contend that they were "shot-
gunned" into the treaty of 1903 as the
price of U.S. protection against a possi-
ble effort by Colombia to recover the
isthmus. The contention is not without
substance.
It is not my purpose here to relate the
events of p0 years ago but only to suggest
that there is little basis for a posture of
Injured innocence and self-righteousness
by either side and that we would do much
better to resolve the issue on the basis of
present realities rather than old myths.
The central reality is that the treaty of
1903 is in certain respects obsolete. The
treaty has been revised only twice, in
1936 when the annual rental was raised
from $250,000 to $430,000 and other
modifications were made, and in 1955
when further changes were made, includ-*
mg an increase in the annual rental to
$1.9 million, where it now stands. The
canal, of course, contributes far more to
the Panamanian economy in the form
of wages paid to Panamanian workers
and purchases made in Panama. The
fact remains, nonetheless, that the an-
nual rental of $1.9 million is a modest
sum and should probably be increased.
There are other issues, relating to hiring
policies for Panamanian workers in the
zone, the flying of flags, and other sym-
bols of national pride and sovereignty.
The basic problem about the treaty, how-
ever, is the exercise of American control
over a part of the territory of Panama
in this age of intense nationalist and
anticolonialist feeling. Justly or not,
the Panamanians feel that they are being
treated as a colony, or a quasi-colony,
of the United States, and this feeling is
accentuated by the contrast between the
standard of living of the Panamanians,
with a per capita income of about $429
a year, and that of the Americans living
in the Canal Zone?immediately adja-
cent to Panama, of course, and within
it?with a per capita income of $4,228 a
year. That is approximately 10 times
greater. It is the profound social and
economic alienation between Panama
and the Canal Zone, and its impact on
the national feeling of the Panamanians,
that underlies the current crisis.
Under these circumstances, it seems
to me entirely proper and necessary for
the United States to take the initiative in
proposing new arrangements that would
redress some of Panama's grievances
against the treaty as it now stands. I
see no reason?certainly no reason of
"weakness" or "dishonor"?why the
United States cannot put an end to the
semantic debate over whether treaty re-
visions are to be "negotiated" or "dis-
cussed" by stating positively and clearly
that it is prepared to negotiate revisions
In the canal treaty and to submit such
changes as are made to the Senate for
its advice and consent.
I think it is necessary for the United
States to do this even though a commit-
ment to revise the treaty may be widely
criticized at home. It is the responsibil-
ity of the President and his advisers, in
situations of this sort, to exercise their
own best judgment as to where the na-
tional interest lies even though this may
necessitate unpopular decisions.
An agreement to "negotiate" revisions
is not an agreement to negotiate any
particular revision. It would leave us
completely free to determine what revi-
sions, and how many revisions, we would
be willing to accept. If there is any
doubt about this, one can find ample re-
assurance in the...proceedings at Geneva,
where saveral years of "negotiations" for
"general and complete disarmament"
still leave us with the greatest arsenal of
weapons in the history of the world.
The problem of Cuba is more difficult
than that of Panama, and far more
6031
heavily burdened with the deadweight
of old myths and prohibitions against
"unthinkable thoughts." I think the
time is overdue for a candid reevalua-
tion of our Cuban policy even though
It may also lead to distasteful conclu-
sions.
There are and have been three options
open to the United States with respect to
Cuba: first, the removal of the Castro
regime by invading and occupying the
island; second, an effort to weaken and
ultimately bring down the regime by a
policy of political and economic boycott;
and finally, acceptance of the Communist
regime as a disagreeable reality and an-
noyance but one which is not likely to
be removed in the near future because
of the unavailability of acceptable means
of removing it.
The first option, invasion, has been
tried in a halfhearted way and found
wanting. It is generally acknowledged
that the invasion and occupation of
Cuba, besides violating our obligations
as a member of the United Nations and
of the Organization of American States,
would have explosive consequences in
Latin America and elsewhere and might
precipitate a global nuclear war. I know
of no responsible statesman who advo-
cates this approach. It has been re-
jected by our Government and by public
opinion and I think that, barring some
grave provocation, it can be ruled out as
a feasible policy for the United States.
The approach which we have adopted
has been the second of those mentioned,
an effort to weaken and eventually bring
down the Castro regime by a policy of
political and economic boycott. This
policy has taken the form of extensive
restrictions against trade with Cuba by
United States citizens, of the exclusion
of Cuba from the inter-American sys-
tem and efforts to secure Latin American
support in isolating Cuba politically and
economically, and of diplomatic efforts,
backed by certain trade and aid sanc-
tions, to persuade other free world coun-
tries to maintain economic boycotts
against Cuba.
This policy, it now seems clear, has
been a failure, and there is no reason
to believe that it will succeed in the
future. Our efforts to persuade our al-
lies to terminate their trade with Cuba
have been generally rebuffed. The pre-
vailing attitude was perhaps best ex-
pressed by a British manufacturer who,
in response to American criticisms of the
sale of British buses to Cuba, said: "If
America has a surplus of wheat, we have
a surplus of buses."
In cutting off military assistance to
Great Britain, France, and Yugoslavia
under the provisions of Section 620 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, the
United States has wielded a stuffed club.
The amounts of aid involved are infini-
tesimal; the chances of gaining compli-
ance with our boycott policy are nil; and
the annoyance of the countries con-
cerned may be considerable. What we
terminated with respect to Britain and
France, in fact, can hardly be called aid;
it was more of a sales promotion Pro-
gram under which British and French
military leaders were brought to the
United States to see?and to buy?ad-
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? 032 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 25
ttneed American weapons. Terminating
this program was in itself of little im-
pOrtance; Britain and France do not
rwci our assistance. But terminating the
program as a sanction against their
trade ?with Cuba can have no real effect
other than to create an illusory image of
"toughness" for the benefit of our own
People.
Free world exports to Cuba have, on
the whole, been declining over recent
years, but overall imports have been ris-
ing since 1961.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that there be inserted in the RECORD
at the conclusion of my remarks two
tables provided by the Department of
State showing the trade of selected free
World countries with Cuba from 1958 to
1963.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 2).
Mr. FOLBRIGHT. Mr. President, the
figures shown in these tables provide lit-
tle basis for expecting the early termina-
tion of free world trade with Cuba. The
export table shows U.S. exports to Cuba
in both 1962 and 1963 exceeding those
of any other free world country. These
American exports consisted almost en-
tirely of ransom payments for the Bay
of Pigs prisoners and should not be con-
fused with normal trade.
There is an interesting feature to this
table, which may not be well known. It
is that the exports from Cuba to various
allies of ours, particularly Japan, the
United Kingdom, Morocco, and others,
have been going up, and have been very
substantial. This reflects, I believe, the
importation from Cuba of sugar to a
great extent, and also accounts for the
accumulation by Cuba of substantial for-
eign aid as a result of the dramatic In-
crease in the price of sugar during the
past couple of years.
The exports from the free world to
Cuba have been going up in similar in-
stances, in the case of Japan, but gen-
erally speaking they have not been in-
creasing. Of course, since 1958, when we
accounted for more than half of Cuba's
exports, they have gone down rather
dramatically. In any case, the tables
will 'speak for themselves.
I should like to make it very clear that
I am not arguing against the desirability
of an economic boycott against the
Castro regime but against its feasibility.
The effort has been made and all the ful-
minations we can utter about sanctions
and retaliation against free world coun-
tries that trade with Cuba cannot long
conceal the fact that the boycott policy
Is a failure.
The boycott policy has not failed be-
cause of any "weakness" or "timidity" on
the part of our Government. This
charge, so frequently heard, is one of
the most pernicious myths to have been
Inflicted on the American people, The
boycott policy has failed because the
United States is not omnipotent and
cannot be. The basic reality to be faced
is that it is simply not within our power
to compel our allies to cut off their trade
with Cuba, unless we are prepared to
take drastic sanctions against them,
Rich as closing our own markets to any
foreign company that does business in
Cuba, as proposed' by Mr. Nixon. We
can do this, of course, but if we do, we
ought first to be very sure as apparently
Mr. Nixon is, that the Cuban boycott
is more important than good relations
with our closest allies. In fact, even the
most drastic sanctions are as likely to
be rewarded with defiance as with com-
pliance. For practical purpose, all we
can do is to ask other countries to take
the measures with respect to Cuba which
we recommend. We have done so and in
some areas have been successful. In
other areas, notably that of the eco-
nomic boycott, we have asked for the
full cooperation of other free world
countries and it has been largely denied.
It remains for us to decide whether we
will respond with a sustained outburst
of hollow and ill-tempered threats, all
the while comforting ourselves with the
myth that we can get anything we want
if we only 'try hard enough?or, in this
case, shout loud enough?or we can ac-
knowledge the failure of our efforts and
proceed, coolly and rationally, to reex-
amine the policies which we now pursue
in relation to the interests they are in-
tended to serve.
The prospects of bringing down the
Castro regime by political and economic
boycott have never been very good. Even
if a general free world boycott were suc-
cessfully applied against Cuba, it is un-
likely that the Russians would refuse to
carry the extra, financial burden and
thereby permit the only Communist
regime in the Western Hemisphere to
collapse. We are thus compelled to rec-
ognize that there is probably no way of
bringing down the Castro regime by
means of economic pressures unless we
are prepared to impose a blockade
against nonmilitary shipments from the
Soviet Union. Exactly such a policy has
been recommended by some of our more
reckless politicians, but the preponder-
ance of informed opinion is that a block-
ade against Soviet shipments of non-
military supplies to Cuba would be ex-
travagantly dangerous, carrying the
strong possibility of a confrontation that
could explode into nuclear war.
Having ruled out military invasion and
blockade, and recognizing the failure of
the boycott policy, we are compelled to
consider the third of .the three options
open to us with respect to Cuba: the ac-
ceptance of the continued existence of
the Castro regime as a distasteful nui-
sance but not an intolerable danger so
long as the nations of the hemisphere
are prepared to meet their obligations
of collective defense under the Rio
Treaty.
In recent years we have become trans-
fixed with Cuba, making it far more im-
portant in both our foreign relations and
in our domestic life than its size and in-
fluence warrant. We have flattered a
noisy but minor demagog by treating
him as if he were a Napoleonic menace.
Communist Cuba has been a disruptive
and subversive influence in Venezuela
and other countries of the hemisphere,
and there is no doubt that both we and
our Latin American partners would be
better off if the Castro regime did not
exist. But it is important to bear in
mind that, despite their best efforts, the
Cuban Communists have not succeeded
in subverting the hemisphere and that
in Venezuela, for example, where com-
munism has made a major effort to gain
power through terrorism, it has been
repudiated by a people who in a free elec-
tion have committed themselves to the
course of liberal democracy. It is neces-
sary to weigh the desirability of an ob-
jective against the feasibility of its at-
tainment, and when we do this with re-
spect to Cuba, I think we are bound to
conclude that Castro is a nuisance but
not a grave threat to the United States
and that he cannot be gotten rid of ex-
cept by means that are wholly dispro-
portionate to the objective. Cuban com-
munism does pose a grave threat to other
Latin American countries, but this threat
can be dealt with by prompt and vigor-
ous use of the established procedures of
the inter-American system against any
act of aggression.
I think that we must abandon the
myth that Cuban communism is a transi-
tory menace that is going to collapse or
disappear in the immediate future and
face up to two basic realities about Cuba:
first, that the Castro regime is not on the
verge of collapse and is not likely to be
overthrown by any policies which we
are now pursuing or can reasonably un-
dertake; and second, that the continued
existence of the Castro regime, though
inimical to our interests and policies, is
not an insuperable obstacle to the attain-
ment of our objectives, unless we make
it so by permitting it to poison our poli-
tics at home and to divert us from more
important tasks in the hemisphere.
The policy of the United States with
respect to Latin America as a whole is
predicated on the assumption that social
revolution can be accomplished without
violent upheaval. This is the guiding
principle of the Alliance for Progress
and it may in time be vindicated. We
are entitled to hope so and it is wise and
necessary for us to do all that we can to
advance the prospects of peaceful and
orderly reform.
At the same time, we must be under
no illusions RS to the extreme difficulty
of uprooting long-established ruling
oligarchies without disruptions involving
lesser or greater degrees of violence. The
historical odds are probably against the
prospects of peaceful social revolution.
There are places, of course, where it has
occurred and others where it seems
likely to occur. In Latin America, the
chances for such basic change by peace-
ful means seem bright in Colombia and
Venezuela and certain other countries;
in Mexico, many basic changes have been
made by peaceful means, but these came
in the wake of a violent revolution. In
other Latin American countries, the
power of ruling oligarchies is so solidly
established and their ignorance so great
that there seems little prospect of ac-
complishing economic growth or social
reform by means short of the forcible
overthrow of established authorities.
I am not predicting violent revolutions
in Latin America or elsewhere. Still
less am I advocating them. I wish only
to suggest that violent social revolutions
are a possibility in countries where feu-
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
dal oligarchies resist all meaningful
change by peaceful means. We must
not, in our preference for the democratic
prooedures envisioned by the Charter of
Punta del Este, close our minds to the
possibility that democratic procedures
may fail in certain countries and that
where democracy does fail violent social
convulsions may occur.
We would do well, while continuing
our efforts to promote peaceful change
through the Alliance for Progress, to
consider what our reactions might be in
the event of the outbreak of genuine so-
cial revolution in one or more Latin
American countries. Such a revolution
did occur in Bolivia, and we accepted
it calmly and sensibly. But what if a
violent social revolution were to break
out in one of the larger Latin American
countries? Would we feel certain that
it was Cuban or Soviet inspired? Would
we wish to intervene on the side of
established authority? . Or would we be
willing to tolerate or even support a rev-
olution if it was seen to be not Commu-
nist but similar in nature to the Mexican
revolution or the Nasser revolution in
Egypt?
These are hypothetical questions and
there is no readily available set of an-
swers to them. But they are questions
which we should be thinking about be-
cause they have to do with problems that
could become real and urgent with great.
suddenness. We should be considering,
for example, what groups in particular
countries might conceivably lead revolu-
tionary movements, and if we can iden-
tify them, we should be considering hotv
we might communicate- with them and
influence them in such a way that their
movements, if successful, will not pursue
courses detrimental to our security and
our interests.
The Far East is another area of the
world in which American policy is handi-
capped by the divergence of old myths
and new realities. Particularly with re-
spect to China, an elaborate vocabulary
of make believe has become compulsory
in both official and public discussion.
We are committed, with respect to China
and other areas in Asia, to inflexible
policies of long standing from which we
hesitate to depart because of the attribu-
tion to these policies of an aura of mys-
tical sanctity. It may be that a thorough
reevaluation of our Far Eastern policies
? would lead us to the conclusion that
they are sound and wise, or at least that
they represent the best available options.
It may be, on the other hand, that a re-
evaluation would point up the need for
greater or lesser changes in our policies.
The point is that, whatever the outcome
of a rethinking of policy might be, we
have been unwilling to undertake it be-
cause of the fear of many Government
officials, nridoubtedly well founded, that
even the,. suggestion of new policies to-
ward China or Vietnam would provoke
a vehement public outcry.
I do not think the 'United States can,
or should, recognize Communist China,
or acquiesce in its admission to the
United Nations under present circum-
stances. It would be unwise to do so,
because there is nothing to be gained
by it so long as the Peiping regime main-
tains its attitude of implacable hostility
toward the United States. I do not be-
lieve, however, that this state of affairs
is necessarily permanent. As we have
seen in our relations with Germany and
Japan, hostility can give way in an
astonishingly short time to close friend-
ship; and, as we have seen in our rela-
tions with China, the reverse can occur
with equal speed. It is not impossible
that in time our relations with China
will change again?if not to friendship,
then perhaps to "competitive coexist-
ence." It would therefore be extremely
useful if we could introduce an element
of flexibility, or, more precisely, of the
capacity to be flexible, into our relations
with Communist China.
We would do well, as former Assistant
Secretary Hilsman has recommended,
to maintain an "open door" to the pos-
sibility of improved relations with Com-
munist China in the future. For a start,
we must jar open our minds to certain
realities about China, of which the fore-
most is that there really are not "two
Chinas," but only one?mainland China;
and that it is ruled by Communists, and
is likely to remain so for the indefinite
future. Once we accept this fact, it be-
comes possible to reflect on the condi-
tions under which it might be possible for
us to enter into relatively normal rela-
tions with mainland China. One condi-
tion, of course, must be the abandonment
by the Chinese Communists, tacitly, if
not explicitly, of their intention to con-
quer and incorporate Taiwan. This
seems unlikely now; but far more sur-
prising changes have occurred in politics,
and it is quite possible that a new genera-
tion of leaders in Peiping and Taipei may
put a quiet end to the Chinese civil war,
thus opening the possibility of entirely
new patterns of international relations
in the Far East.
Should such changes occur, they will
open important opportunities for Ameri-
can policy; and it is to be hoped that we
shall be able and willing to take ad-
vantage of them. It seems possible, for
instance, that an atmosphere of reduced
tensions in the Far East might make it
possible to strengthen world peace by
drawing mainland China into existing
East-West agreements in such fields as
disarmament, trade, and educational ex-
change.
These are long-range prospects, which
may or may not materialize. In the 1II1-
mediate future, we are confronted with
possible changes in the Far East re-
sulting from recent French diplomacy.
French recognition of Communist
China, although untimely and carried
out in a way that can hardly be consid-
ered friendly to the United States, may
nonetheless serve a constructive long-
term purpose, by unfreezing a situation
in which many_ countries, none more
than the United States, are committed
to inflexible policies by long-established
commitments and the pressures of do-
mestic public opinion. One way or an-
other, the French initiative may help
generate a new, situation in. which the
United States, as well as other countries,
will find it possible to reevaluate its basic
policies in the Far East.
6033
The situation in Vietnam poses a far
more pressing need for a reevaluation of
American policy. Other than withdraw-
al, which I do not think can be realis-
tically considered under present cir-
cumstances, three options are open to
us in Vietnam: First, continuation of
the antiguerrilla war within South
Vietnam, along with renewed American
efforts to increase the military effective-
ness of the South Vietnamese Army and
the political effectiveness of the South
Vietnamese Government; second, an at-
tempt to end the war, through negotia-
tions for the neutralization of South
Vietnam, or of both North and South
Vietnam; and, finally, the expansion of
the scale of the war, either by the direct
commitment of large numbers of Ameri-
can troops or by equipping the South
Vietnamese Army to attack North Viet-
namese territory, possibly by means of
commando-type operations from the sea
or the air.
It is difficult to see how a negotiation,
under present military circumstances,
could lead to termination of the war un-
der conditions that would preserve the
freedom of South Vietnam. It is ex-
tremely difficult for a party to a negotia-
tion to achieve by dipolmacy objectives
which it has conspicuously failed to win
by warfare. The hard fact of the matter
is that our bargaining position is at
present a weak one; and until the equa-
tion of advantages between the two
sides has been substantially altered in
our favor, there can be little prospect
of a negotiated settlement which would
secure the independence of a non-Com-
munist South Vietnam.
Recent initiatives by France, calling
for the neutralization of Vietnam, have
tended to confuse the situation, without
altering it in any fundamental way.
France could, perhaps, play a construc-
tive mediating role if she were willing to
consult and cooperate with the United
States. For somewhat obscure reasons,
however, France has chosen to take an
independent initiative. This is puzzling
to Americans, who recall that the United
States contributed $1.2 billion to France's
war in Indochina of a decade ago?which
was '70 percent of the total cost of the
conflict. Whatever its motivation, the
problem posed by French intervention in
southeast Asia is that while France may
set off an unforeseeable chain of events,
she is neither a major military force nor
a major economic force in the Far East,
and is therefore unlikely to be able to
control or greatly influence the events
which her initiative may precipitate.
It seems clear that only two realistic
options are open to us in Vietnam in the
Immediate future: the expansion of the
conflict in one way or another, or a re-
newed effort to bolster the capacity of
the South Vietnamese to prosecute the
war successfully on its present scale.
The matter calls for thorough examina-
tion by responsible officials in the execu-
tive branch; and until they have had an
opportunity to evaluate the con-
tingencies and feasibilities of the options
open to us, it seems to me that we have no
choice but to support the South Viet-
namese Government and Army by the
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toNCIIESSIORAL RECORD= SENATE I March 25
mOst effective means available. What-
ever' specific policy decisions are made,
4 should be clear to all concerned that
the United States will continue to meet
Its obligations and fulfill its commit-
Merits with respect to Vietnam.
These, I believe, are some, although
by no means all, of the issues of foreign
policy in which it IS essential to re-
evaluate longstanding ideas and com-
mitments in the light of new and chang-
ing realities. In all the issues which I
have discussed, American policy has to
one degree or another been less effective
than? it might have been because of our
national tendency to equate means with
ends and therefore to attach a mytho-
logical sanctity to policies and practices
Which In themselves have no moral con-
tent or value except insofar as they con-
tribute to the achievement of some valid
national objective. I believe that we
must try to overcome this excessive
moralism, which binds us to old myths
and blinds us to new realities and, worse
still, leads us to regard new and un-
familiar ideas with fear and mistrust.
We must dare to think about "un-
thinkable" things. We must learn to
explore all of the options and possibili-
ties that confront us in a complex and
rapidly changing world. We must learn
to welcome rather than fear the voices of
dissent and not to recoil in horror when-
ever some heretic suggests that Castro,
may surVive or that Ithrushchev is not as
bad a fellow as Stalin was. We must
overcome our susceptibility to "shock"?
a word which I wish could be banned
from our newspapers and magazines and
especially from the CONGRESSIONAL REC-
ORD.
If Congress and public opinion are
unduly susceptible to "shock," the ex-
ecutive branch, and particularly the
Department of State, is subject to the
malady of chronic and excessive cau-
tion. An effective foreign policy is one
which concerns Itself more with innova-
tion abroad than with concilliation at
home. A creative foreign policy?as
President Truman, for one, knew?is not
necessarily one which wins immediate
general approval. It is sometimes nec-
essary for leaders to do unpleasant and
unpopular things, because, as Burke
pointed out, the duty of the democratic
Politician to his constituents is not to
cbmply with their every wish and pref-
erence but to give them the benefit of,
and to be held responsible for, the exer-
cise of his own best judgment.
We must dare to think about "un-
thinkable things," because when things
become "unthinkable," thinking stops
and action becomes mindless. If we are
to disabuse ourselves of old myths and
to act wisely and creatively upon the new
realities of our time, we must think and
talk about our problems with perfect
freedom, remembering, as Woodrow
Wilson said, that "The greatest freedom
of speech is the greatest safety because,
If a-man is a fool, the best thing to do is
to encourage him to advertise the fact
by speaking."
ExH/EIT 1
pvEs4ssy OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
INFORMATION SERVICE, OFFICE OF THE
PRESS ATTACHE', BONN /BAD GODES73ERG
Ambassador George C. McGhee today
Urged a patient search for even limited
East-West agreements "in the belief that
the resolution of small differences is not only
worthwhile in itself but can prepare the
ground for an eventual resolution of greater
differences."
The Ambassador of the United States to
the Federal Republic of Germany spoke at
the Redoute in Bad Godesberg under the
auspices of the German Foreign Policy So-
ciety (Deutsche Gesellschaft feur Auswaer-
tige Politik e.V.)
His address was entitled "East-West Re-
lations Today." The text, as prepared for
delivery, is attached.
EAST-WEST RELATIONS TODAY
. It ia indeed an honor for me to have been
asked to appear before. you tonight. The
German Society for Foreign Policy is well-
known abroad as a group dedicated to pur-
poseftl and sober examination of the out-
standing international issues of the day.
In the United States we appreciate it as
a distinguished body of representative lead-
ers from the political, professional, and eco-
nomic mainstreams of German life, who
have consistently recognized and encouraged
the value of German-American friendship
within the framework of an Atlantic part-
nership.
The manifestations of the close under-
standing which exists between your country
and mine are many. It was my privilege
recently to accompany Chancellor Erhard
and Foreign Minister Schroeder on their
visit with President Johnson. The subject
on which I shall speak tonight figured
largely in their very fruitful discussions. I
Would like to begin my presentation by re-
minding you of a passage in the communique
issued at the conclusion of their talks:
"The President and the Chancellor had
an extended discussion of the current state
of East-West relations. They were deter-
mined that the basic rights and interests of
the free nations must be defended, and in
particular they agreed that there should be
no arrangement that would serve to per-
petuate the status quo of a divided Germany,
one part of which is deprived of elementary
rights and liberties. On this basis, the
President and the Chancellor agreed that it
is highly important to continue to explore
all opportunities for the improvement of
East-West relations, the -easing of, tensions,
and the enlargement of the prospects of a
peace that can be stable because it is just.
They continue to hope that this effort of
the Western powers will meet a constructive
response from the Soviet Union."
This statement, issued jointly by the lead-
ers of our two Governments, is, so to speak,
the text upon which I shall elaborate. Let
me at the outset, however, make an explana-
tory point. East-West policy is only one as-
pect of total foreign policy, just as the words
I have quoted are an excerpt from a longer
document which also covers many other mat-
ters. The subject of easing tensions and pro-
moting prospects of peace in East-West rela-
tions seems to me, however, particularly to
deserve our study. This is true not only be-
cause it is important, but because of all the
major components of foreign policy it is the
most complicated to manage and the most
likely to encounter public misunderstand-
ing.
Let me emphasize that in what I have to
say I shall not be delineating a new policy,
nor do my remarks presage any reconfigura-
tion of or shift of emphasis within total
U.S. policy. My aim is the more modest one
of presenting for your consideration the line
of reasoning which supports an approach to
East-West relations which has great con-
tinuity in American foreign policy, since it
traces back through the last four U.S. admin-
istrations,
My method will be to lay before you to-
night the arguments for and against two very
different approaches to Current problems of
East-West relations. One is to search pa-
tiently for possible areas of agreement, how-
ever small, in the belief, that the resolution
of small differences is not only worthwhile
in itself but can prepare the ground for an
eventual resolution of greater differences.
The other course is to refuse to seek accom-
modations on any matter in the absence
of progress toward solving the central issues
between East and West, in the belief that a
general state of tension in world affairs ex-
erts a useful pressure under which the East
eventually may yield on these large issues.
When I have done I hope you will agree with
me that the first alternative?which is the
policy_ of my country?is the course for the
North Atlantic nations to follow.
lVfy basic thesis will be that as East-West
tensions rise, positions tend to become more
inflexible both in terms of principle and in
terms of administration of policy. Oppor-
tunities for improving the situation conse-
?quently tend to become fewer and less prom-
ising. However, as these tensions decline,
positions can become less rigid and oppor-
tunities for improving the situation can be-
come greater in number and more promis-
ing. Even though we cannot hope to elim-
inate tension until we eliminate its causes,
the reduction of tensions can help achieve
the aims of the Western allies.
You will observe that, in these remarks, I
have adopted Horace's advice, drawn from the
example of Homer, to begin in mediae res.
There is at least one way in which you are
comparable to Homer's audience. There is
no need for me to remind you that long years
of struggle have preceded the present mo-
ment; there is no need to point out that the
issues we shall consider together are not the
end of the story, but represent only a short
period of history during which the final out-
come still hangs in the balance. The mem-
bers of this society require no instruction
in the history of the postwar period. I need,
however, to take only a moment to set the
scene, so to speak, with a brief description
of the situation between East and West
as it exists today.
II
In some respects the events of 1963, as
have the immediate prospects for 1964,
evolved in the shadow of the Soviet Union's
attempt to shift the balance of power in its
favor by the emplacement of offensive mis-
siles on Cuba. The Soviet plunge at Cuba
was sudden and reckless. This very reck-
lessness lent a concentrated and dramatic
quality to the Cuban denouement which
has, for example, not recently characterized
Soviet moves in Berlin. The gravity of the
challenge and the firmness with which it
was 'filet have led to a recognition of the
Cuban drama of 1962 as a watershed for sub-
sequent international affairs.
The Cuban crisis was the continuation of a
series of deliberate efforts to intrude Com-
munist power and influence into new areas.
Such attempts have been made since 1945 in
many areas, but most forcefully in Iran, Tur-
key, Greece, Berlin, Korea, Laos, and Vietnam.
In each case these efforts have been success-
fully countered by the West?although in
Laos and South Vietnam, as in Cuba, the task
is not yet completed. The special signifi-
cance of Cuba is that it presented not only
the sharpest, but perhaps also the terminal
episode of a menacing strategy of nuclear
threat which seems to have dated from the
Soviet orbiting of the first sputnik in 1957.
If the last 14 months have given evidence
of a new sobriety in the Soviet assessment,
this probably traces to the following factors:
1. Western military strength has greatly
increased. Even though the Soviet Union
since 1958 has overplayed its bid with too
weak a hand, the Western position has subse-
quently been greatly improved by a massive
mobilization of resources. As President
Johnson pointed out in his budget message
of January 21, the United States within the
past 3 years has increased by 100 percent the
nuclear weapons in our strategic forces, and
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by 60 percent the tactical nuclear forces de-
ployed in Western Europe. We have in-
creaSed by 45 percent the number of combat-
ready divisions, and by 35 percent the num-
ber of our taalcal fighter squadrons.
2. We have 'demonstrated both in Cuba
and in Berlin a firm will to commit these
forces where necessary. The Communists
can remain in no doubt on this point.
8. The Soviet Union. is now in deep eco-
nomie difficulties, as an outcome of the mis-
management of its economy and of excessive
diversion of resources to an inflexible military
and space budget. The consequences have
been a decline in absolute agricultural out-
put and an inability to maintain adequate
resource inputs into vital segments of in-
dustry.
4. The deepening Sino-Soviet split is an-
other major fact of life with which the
Soviets now must deal, although so far its
precise impact on Soviet policy toward the
West is hard to assess. Peiping has directly
challenged the authority of Moscow, and is
now engaged in a direct contest to assert its
leadership over the world Communist move-
ment and in the developing lands of Asia.
Africa, and Latin America.
With the doubtless unnecessary caution
that none of these considerations implies in
any Way a Soviet abandonment of the ulti-
mate goal of world domination, I now turn
to the specific topic I have suggested for your
consideration.
in
Let us begin by disposing of an argument
against seeking agreements with the East
Which is distinct from the argument already
introduced.
The 'Communists, it is often pointed Out,
cannot be trusted. The Soviet Union appears
to regard international agreements as valid
only so long as it is to its own Interests to
invoke their provisions. Communist China
is even blunter in its assertion of its own
interests against the rule of law and the
peace of the world community. In Berlin,
in southeast Asia, and elsewhere the Corn-
MuniSt record of disregard for their inter-
national obligations is too glaring to require
comment. This is, unfortnnatety, a fact of
International life with which Western states-
men must deal. It has led some observers
to view that there should. be no agreements,
since the Western signatories will regard
agreerrients as binding and therefore as limit-
ing their freedom of action, whereas the
Eastern Powers will not.
Furthermor e, it can be argued that the
Conununist notion of negotiation is such
that the very process of discussing possible
accommodation is dangerous. Often enough
their offers to talk with us are plainly
prompted, not by a desire to reach_ any
agreement but by a hope that they can,
without yielding from their own position,
pry concessions from the West. They at-
tempt to pocket without payment any con-
cessions put forth as part of a Western pro-
posal for a compromise. They are unembar-
rassed to suggest that the remedy for their
violation of an a:green-lent is a conference to
make a new agfeenient eying them what
they want. To them, what is negotiable at
any given time is not the difference between
the positions of the East and the West, but
de the difference between what they possess
and what they desire. If they had their way,
negotiation would be a sort of cattle chute
along which the unsuspecting nations of the
Welt wopld move under Communist prod-
ding?slowly, -perhaps, but toward an inevi-
table destination.
I have no quarrel With those who stress
that it is foolish to trust ComMunist profes-
sions of good faith in 'subscribing to an
agreement. It seems to me, however, that no
lOgi?C leads from this premise to the conclu-
sion that the West should hold no conversa-
No. 5t 9
tions and make no treaties with the East.
Such a conclusion reflects, not distrust of
the Communists, but distrust of ourselves.
It underestimates our resources of skill and
experience in conducting East-West talks,
and in devising means to ensure the enforce-
ment of agreements reached. It also fails
to allow for the fact that, in certain circum-
stances, the Soviets can be led by their own
interests to negotiate an agreement which is
also in our interest.
Iv
Before I elaborate this point I would like
to invite you to scrutinize the idea that at
least a certain degree of tension in East-
West relations is to the advantage of the
West. Here, I believe, we must first of all
be careful not to make the common error of
discussing tension as if it had an existence
of its own, independent of the real issues
and real events of our world. We must also
be sure to distinguish between the causes of
tension and its effects.
Tension between nations and groups of
nations arises when their major national and
joint objectives overlap and conflict, as now
is the case between East and West. There
is, first of all, the incompatibility of Com-
munist aims with the desire of other nations
to live undisturbed in peace. The dispute
over the means they will employ, in which
the Communist powers today are engaged,
has not shaken their continuing common
commitment to world revolution. I should
like to underline that point by quoting from
a statement by Chairman Khrushchev pub-
lished last month in the magazine Kom-
munist:
"It goes without saying that this does not
mean that under conditions of peaceful co-
existence the contest leisens between gov-
ernments of differing social structures. On
the contrary, peaceful coexistence stipulates
an economic fight in the form of economic
competition, and political and ideological
struggle."
A further source of tension is the fact that
the Communist leaders now control large
areas of the World, including the Eastern
Zone of Germany, in which the satisfaction
of legitimate national aspirations has been
denied.
The specific issues and situations from
which tension can spring are many and
varied. Unhealthy tension in an individual
frequently occurs in what in medical termi-
nology is called a syndrome, and the analogy
Is not without usefulness in considering the
kind of tension with which we are con-
cerned. A syndrome is a group of symptoms
produced by factors which may originally
have been unrelated, but which Interact to
produce a cumulative effect more harmful
than the mere sum of the influences each
exerts. Similarly, tension between nations
is aggravated by the fact that it takes many
forms, which can interact and reinforce each
other.
One of the most important causes of mili-
tary tension is the threat to Europe poted
by the presence of large-scale Communist
arms in the East. Ran ged against this is a
NATO establishment in Europe, which, what-
ever its need for improvement, possesses aWe-
some capabilities at every level of force. The
tensions arising from this confrontation in
Europe are heightened and complicated by
the fact that, in other areas of the world?
in Cuba, Laos, and South Vietnam?the Com-
munists are pursuing their objectives by
means of active subversion and terror. En-
compassing all this is the nuclear balance
pi terror between East and West, based on
a destructive capacity which, if employed,
would cost hundreds of millions of lives
within the space of hours. All these ele-
ments enter into the syndrome of world ten-
sion.
The fundamental issues between East and
. _
West flare into headlines when the Soviets
try to put missiles into Cuba, or stop allied
convoys on the autobahn to Berlin, or?as
happened late last month-L--wantonly shoot
down three American Air Force officers who
strayed over East Germany in an unarmed
training plane. It would, however, be a gross
oversimplification to say that there are no
tensions during periods in which the Com-
munist powers choose to refrain from such
acts. That the absence of a crisis is identical
with the presence of a detente is only some-
thing the Communists would like us to be-
lieve. It is not to our interest to talk or
behave as if it were true.
From that, however, it does not follow that
It is to our interest to have the tension be-
tween East and West reflect itself in dispute,
crisis or confrontation. Indeed, to adopt
that view would be to fall in with the Com-
munist argument that tension has no exist-
ence apart from its more acute manifesta-
tions. We must take the more responsible
course of trying to control such manifesta-
tions so that they do not lead to general con-
flict, while we search for a way to penetrate
to the real causes of tension.
Some claim that the pressure on the Com-
munist powers to yield gains to the West is
greatest when relations between East and
West are at their worst. I believe that this
view reflects a misappraisal of both the
origins and the angers of tension. The fact
of the matter is that the West exerts only a
peaceful pressure upon the East. Our mili-
tary might is essential to us as a deterrent
and in warding off military pressure from
the East; however, we have foresworn its use
save for defense, and this fact is known to
our adversary.
Thus a worsening of relations gives the
West no new lever to move the Eastern
powers from their entrenched positions. The
real instruments available to us to achieve
our own objectives are the resources and
the attractive power of our prospering free
societies, backed up by a united determina-
tion to press for the solution of problems
by all peaceful means. These instruments
are not more, but less effective in a time of
crisis than in a time of relative calm.
There is no reason to expect that the ad-
versary will, unless he is forced to do so,
obligingly offer unconditional surrender on
our terms. A state of heightened tension
and conflict charges the political atmosphere
with fear and suspicion. Aroused peoples
will not permit their political leaders to
make concessions?and even in Communist
states the leaders must take some account
of these pressures. All prospect that the
adversaries might meet each other half-
way in a peaceful settlement vanishes.
Minor problems, rather than being solved,
are aggravated and multiplied. Issues are
created which need never have existed.
Violence or even war could result from arti-
ficial challenges which were never part of the
basic conflict of vital interests.
There is another school of thought which
alleges that the reaching of minor agree-
ments will lull the West into a false feeling
of complacency, arising from an illusion of
detente?that the West will find the status
quo so acceptable that long-range goals will
be forgotten and central issues will be
allowed to remain unresolved. This could be
so, but it need not be so. National memories
are not so short as that. People who have
determination, and who take the long view,
will never cease trying to achieve their basic
aspirations or to regulate their basic prob-
lems.
I believe the nations of the West, includ-
ing both the United States and the Federal
Republic, have the necessary determination.
That we give each other the credit for hav-
ing it is the measure of our confidence in
each other. We have, atter all, labored to-
gether for almost a generation now with the
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*lents of East-West relations. I do not
kieste that our wisdom is so small, or our
x ty. of purpose so fragile, that we need
00fletiantly to be recalled to our duties
'through crises and clashes with the adver-
sary. We have our common goals clearly
in View, and we are not likely to lose sight
Of them.
The alternative we propose to a policy of
no Sgreements is a policy of search for agree-
ments Whenever and wherever possible. Al-
though in practical terms this search is more
likely to lead to limited agreements than
to major settlements, we do not just for that
reason Tule out the latter. The Austrian
treaty is an example of a major break-
through, made possible by prolonged and
patient exploration which led to an arrange-
ment consistent with the vital interests of
both sides.
Such a- course requires us patiently to
pursue a dialog with the adversary, seek-
ing both? to clarify issues and to identify the
relatively limited areas in which negotia-
tion may now be possible. The necessity
fokr patience has been recommended by
Many eminent counselors, including Wilhelm
Wolfgang Schuetz of the Kuratorium indivi-
tkible Germany. In speaking of the search
for Orerman reunification he said:
"We must have the courage to take the
long path, if no one can show us a short
path. That means, we must also have the
courage under given circumstances, to pro-
ceed in stages on this path to unity."
President Johnson, in addressing the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations, put the
thought in these words:
"Peace is a journey of a thousand miles,
and it must be taken one step at a time."
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 25
proves on careful analysis to be roughly
The process of differentiating between the
negotiable and the nonnegotiable differences
is itself a long and arduous one. However,
even at this stage it has not been without
result. Merely to achieve a clearer under-
standing of the hard core issues which divide
East and West is a gain for us. One of the
pressing dangers of our time is the possibility
that the Communist leaders will stumble into
war through failure to recognize what our
vital interests are. For example, the inter-
mittent discussions of Berlin which have
taken place for some time now between the
United States and the U.S.S.R. have thus far
not been successful. They have, however,
permitted us to make unmistakably clear
that the West has vital interests in Berlin
upon which the Soviet Union must not in-
fringe. To that extent the danger of war
by miscalculation has been reduced.
Most talks between East and West are not
negotiations at all in the sense in which we
use that term in the West, In certain cir-
cumstances, however, they can and do lead
to genuine and even successful bargaining?
even though these circumstances may be
limited. Since no person and no nation can
willingly concede interests which are vital,
real negotiations must be confined to mat-
ters which are not regarded by either party
as compromising such interests. In other
areas, however, discussions can lead to genu-
ine and even successful bargaining.
Patenthetically, I would like to make clear
what in the American view, East-West nego-
tiations are not. They are not an effort cal-
culated merely to produce a favorable atti-
tude on the part of the Soviets?or a super-
ficial detente unsubstantiated by concrete
evidence of progress. They are not based on
the vague hope that somehow, if we make
unilateral concessions to the Soviets, we will
thereby induce in them a feeling of good will
or a sense of obligation to make compensa-
tory voluntary concessions to us. The his-
tory of our relations with the Soviets pro-
vides no basis for assurance that such ex-
pectations would be justified.
Yet, even after the ground is narrowed by
prudent skepticism of Soviet intentions, ex-
perience has shown that some room for prog-
ress still remains. Not all agreements have
to be based on trust. The most common
transaction between individuals all over the
world?the exchange of goods over a counter
for cash?does not involve the element of
trust. In East-West relations, the doctrine
of caveat emptor must be applied with special
care. However, if each party has correctly
analyzed the advantages that an agreement
offers him, and if, as in the case of a pur-
chase, there is a simultaneous exchange ,of
considerations freely agreed upon, then a
basis can be provided for successful agree-
ments even in the absence of confidence.
Where an agreement requires a series of
actions to be undertaken over a period of
time, special safeguards are of course re-
quired. There must be some policing mech-
anism?some arrangement whereby consider-
ations flow equitably and concurrently be-
tween the parties, with either being able to
stop if at any time it should appear that the
other has ceased to fulfill his part of the
undertaking. Within these limitations, how-
ever?which are well understood by those
experienced in the process of negotiation?
the carrying out of agreements within well-
defined areas is entirely feasible.
The opposition of aims between East and
West is so great that areas in which the in-
terests of both coincide are hard to discern.
Nevertheless, certain areas have been found
and we believe others may exist. We did,
for example, find a common interest in end-
ing large-scale nuclear testing, and confirmed
it in the partial test ban treaty concluded
in 1963. I do not want to overstate the im-
portance of this development. It does illus-
trate, however, both the persistence and
continuity with which successive American
administrations have sought progress in this
field, and the slowness of progress with which
we have to reckon. The test ban treaty is
the fruition of ideas proposed by the United
States in April 1959, and elaborated by joint
British-American initiative in 1961 and 1962.
Other small steps have been taken by
mutual consent. The first was agreement
to install a "hot line" for direct communica-
tion between Washington and Moscow in
moments of crisis. This was a limited rec-
ognition by the Soviet of a mutual interest
in averting the outbreak of war through ac-
cident or miscalculation. The United States
and the U.S.S.R. jointly formulated the dec-
laration adopted by the United Nations
against placing weapons of mass destruc-
tion in orbit around the earth. A broad
agreement on principles of law for outer
space has been reached.
We are also discussing certain purely bi-
lateral agreements with the Soviet Union,
and are currently negotiating a consular
- convention and a new cultural exchange
program. Particularly in the exchange pro-
gram we seek to promote contacts with the
peoples of Eastern Europe. These contracts
are also multiplied by tourism and by in-
creased freedom of movement between East
and West. Such exchanges contribute di-
rectly to diversification and liberalization of
closed societies.
Thus there is some evidence that the So-
viet Union has come to perceive, in certain
very restricted fields, a mutuality of interest
with the West. You are doubtlesS familiar
with the message sent by President Johnson
to the opening session of the Geneva Dis-
armament Conference on January 20 of this
year. The five major proposals put forward
by President Johnson are an earnest of our
,belief that it may be possible further to
limit the arms race and the danger of war
by agreement.
The issues are too grave, and the dangers
too real, for us to dismiss the possibility of
more agreements with the facile assumption
that whatever the Soviet Union will accept
must be against our interests. The assump-
tion is not necessarily valid. If the margin
of advantage over disadvantage to each party
equal, an agreement can result in a net ad-
vantage to both. The essence of a normal
business transaction is that each party, from
his own point of view, makes a gain. There
is no reason why, with proper caution and
much patience, we cannot arrive at agree-
ments of this kind with the Soviet Union.
Nor does a prudent determination to
protect ourselves and our interests preclude
the possibility of independent, but recipro-
cally balanced actions being taken step-by-
step by both sides, even in the absence of
prior agreement. Indeed, unilateral actions
of this nature are in fact already taking
place. The United States has reduced its
military budget. It is closing certain plants
producing fissionable material, and has in-
vited the Soviet Union to follow suit. The
Soviet Union has announced a military bud-
get reduction whose real effect we are now
weighing. Real movement in direction of
the relaxation of tensions could result if
actions on the part of one side are balanced
by concurrent movement by the other. This
assumes, if balance is to be maintained, that
we do not pay for reversible actions on their
part with irreversible actions on our side.
VI
Unfortunately the possibilities for limited
agreement have not yet directly touched
upon the central matters of dispute between
East and West. In pursuing the resolution
of lesser matters through negotiation and
compromise, we must obviously weigh the
effect on larger issues in making them harder
or easier to settle at some future time.
I will offer two propositions. The first is
that history provides little encouragement
to believe that major differences between na-
tions can be overcome by peaceful negotia-
tion leading to one massive compromise.
Such differences usually persist either until
one party succeeds in imposing its will upon
the other, or until the passage of time and
the evolution of world affairs so change the
international environment that the issues
themselves are changed in nature or elimi-
nated.
I believe that, in the case of the hardcore
differences between East and West, agree-
ment will in most instances have to await
an alteration in world relationships suffi-
ciently drastic to remove the particular is-
sue in question from the vital interest cate-
gory. With respect to these problems, then,
we must exercise great restraint. We must
seek solutions by indirection?through the
promotion of evolutionary change in the
context in which the problems appear on
the world scene.
My second proposition is that, if the prin-
ciple of balance of advantage and disadvan-
tage can be achieved, there is no reason
why attempts to reach agreement with re-
spect to minor problems should wait upon
the solution of the vital ones. Let me again
suggest a medical analogy. A physician
may find that a patient is suffering, not only
from a serious and persistent malady, but
from minor ailments which complicate his
condition. If the physician cannot cure the
major malady at once, he will certainly not
for that reason fail to try to cure the minor
ones. In East-West relations, the clearing
away of minor differences can permit us
both to diagnose the major problems more
clearly and to eliminate the distractions
which hamper us in coming directly to grips
with them.
Moreover, the reaching of even a minor
agreement creates a confidence and an ex-
pectation that more will follow. It begins
to be felt that perhaps other differences of
a similar nature can be composed. Some
hope may even begin to dawn that even
larger issues can be attacked with some
prospect of success. A beginning of possible
movement is sensed in the polar ice pack of
opposing positions which had seemed frozen
into eternal immobility.
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE 607
There are dangers in this, of course. I do
not suggest that we should lose our caution
Or our sense of values. We must take great
care riOt to allow a current of 'optimism to
sweep Us into a trap of diunmunist devising.
/ do believe, however, that there is more pbs-
sibility for agreement to fdllow upon agree-
ment than to emerge from a situation in
which the two sides have drawn back from
meaningful contact in mutual suspicion-to
hurl recriminations at each other. Once a
sufficient number of minor tensions are re-
moved through isolated agreements, more-
over, it might be found that the remainfng
143sues are less formidable than was origini-
nally assumed.
Secretary of State Rusk has summed up
the prospect for the near future, in these
Words:
"I do not see on the immediate horizon
dramatis and sweeping solutions to diVisive
and dangerous problems. But we must work
at them steadily, patiently, and ceaselessly.
Small steps are worth taking because we May
find them to be the key to larger ones."
TrI
In conclusion, then, I submit that it is to
the advantage of the West to seek agree-
ments with the ;East where grounds for a
workable agreement in our mutual interests
may be found to exfst. -We should pursue
this endeavor without excessive expectations
or rapid or spectacular success, but also
without discouragement. It must go on at
all times, at many levels, and over all ques-
tions--including the minor ones but also the
.niost difacult ones.
It cannot be proven with mathematical
certainty that through a relief of tension re-
sultini from a succession of, minor agree-
ments, one can readh the ultimate goal of a
complete relaxation of tensions. I do be-
lieve, however, that one can prove thS' re-
verse-namely, that a policy of failing to seek
relief for such tensions will inevitably fore-
close the possibility of reaching this goal.
There are, I believe, agreements which
can be sought now in the field of disarma-
ment, in the prevention of war by miscalcu-
lation and in trade and cultural exchange-
both by nations and- by groups of nations.
'We Must always take into account, hoivever,
that where groups of nations are involved,
they must be in accord on the proposals to
put forward. No one nation can get too
far ahead of its allies.
At the same time we make proposals for
minor agreements we must continue to think
in terms of ultimate solutions for the major
probleins, no matter how remote the chances
for successful negotiation may be. The
West should always, for example, be in a
position of readiness to negotiate for Ger-
man reunification, in the context of the
security of Europe, just as we should be
in a position to discuss the nondissemination
of nuclear weapons.
Moreover, although necessarily such posi-
tions, on major issues do not start where
a negotiation might be expected to end, they
must be more than propaganda positions.
Insofar as. they can, they must take into
account not only the psychology but the
vital interests of, the adversary. Otherwise
the positions of both parties will always re-
main so far apart that one can never really
test whether or not they can be accom-
xnofinted.
In these remarks I have tried to present
-..r.ar-liorr 2
Trade of selected ree world countries with Cuba, 1958-62 and 1963 (data are as available)
[In millions of B. S . dollars]
in outline a coherent philosophy supporting
a positive -approach to East-West relatioris.
It seems to me that the formulation of such
a philOsophy" is essential at 'this time. I ex-
press 'this conch:Is-ion now, not With the feel-
ing that the last word has been said upon
this subject, but with the hope that many
others will be stimulated to speak and write
about it.
The stance that we adopt now in our re-
lations with the East will have an important
bearing on the future of mankind. We can-
not afford to let our posture be determined
by an instinctive reaction to a danger we per-
ceive, on the one hand, or to an impulsive
hope we might suddenly conceive, upon the
other. Neither provides adequate ground on
which to base a policy which must deal si-
multaneously with the dangers we face and
the hopes we cherish.
Our democratic nations can best reach a
consensus through free discussion and con-
sultation. Neither division of opinion nor
an unreasoned acquiescence in a certain
course is an adequate response to the prob-
lems with which we are confronted. Divi-
sion weakens us. Passive acceptance of a
certain policy robs us of the popular sup-
port, and the diverse resources of ideas and
diplomatic skills, which, when applied in
concert, are the special strength of the West.
In the final analysis, the West as a whole
must determine the course it will pursue in
its relations with the East. To all of us,
and to the generations which will follow
ours, nothing can be more important than
that we make our respective contributions
to the fateful joint decisions we face with
wisdom, courage and clear purpose.
Exports from free world countries, f.o.b.,-to Cuba
Exports from free world countries, Loh., to Cuba
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
,
Canada
United Kingdom
Race...,,anin
Italy
Republic of
Germany.
Netherlands
Belgium-Luxembourg _
MeSie0 t _
a:
igl
Iporgcur.Ipa 4.teorsito? 1
, copi,004, to IV 0 IA . 0 t?D
?
16.3
42.6
7.8
14.3
8.3
29.6
8.2
14. 9
2.8
10. 0
6. 6
13.9
20.5
9.8
10. 7
5.3
14. 6
6.7
8.8
1.6
6. 1
11. 6
31. 9
12.4
4.3
5.8
4.0
11. 8
10.3
4. 1
3.6
11.8
15. 1
10.7
7.2
1.4
1.8
1.4
5. 7
6.2
1. 3
.8
10. 6
7. 4
6.2 (Jan.-Sept.)
4.2 (Jan.-Aug.)
1.4 (Jan-June)
3. 7 (Jan.-Sept.)
.4 (Jan.-July)
3.2 (Jan.-Oct.)
9.0 (Jan.-Sept.)
2. 6 (Jan.-Sept.)
.2 (Jan.-June)
2.2 (Jan.-Sept.)
2. 5 (Jan.-Aug.)
Pakistan
United Arab Republic_ _
Morocco
Tunisia
Total, selected
countries.
United States
All other free world
Total, free world
exports to Cuba.4
.6
(1)
.1
(0
3. 1
(1)
.1
(0
2.4
9.3
(7)
(0
4. 7
9. 8
2.8
1. 1
I. 7
8.2
5.6
2, 7
None (Jan.-June)
(2)
.4 (Jan.-Tune)
(2)
147.2
546.9
93. 3
163.6
438.6
86. 0
121.2
223,7
43.9
133. 5
13.7
28.4
72. 7
13.4
20. 0
38. 0 (Partial year
only)
37.0 (Jan.-Sept.0)
(2)
787.4
688. 2
190.8
175.6
'106. I
(2)
Imports by free world countries from Cuba 7
Imports by free world countries from Cuba 7
1958
-,
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
Canada (Jo b)
United Kingdom
Franceain
Italy Republic of
Naherlrli. s
Belgium-Luxembourg
Mexico
Japan
India
Pakistan
19.4
49.8
19.4,
7. 6
2.3
71
16.5
4.7
48.1
(1)
1.2
?
12. 2
28. 5
7.3
8. 4
6
12.. 1
8. 3
3.2
35:71
7. 5
22. 2
10.3
11.0
6
9.. 4
11.9
5.3
171
.2
(8)
5. 1
15. 0
9.2
1.2
3
2.. 0
4.3
.8
241
(1)
2.3
2.6
19.9
8.5
2.3
5..
3.6
1.4
a 3,
None
(1)
2.7 (Rm.-June)
29. 8 (Jan.-Aug.)
3.5 (Jan -June)
3. 1 (Jan. Sept.)
311-. ganan..--tucl(.?
10.4 (Jan.-Sept.)
2.0 (Jan.-Sept.)
.10.1 ganan.luepnr.))
None (Jam-Aug.)
None (Jan.-June)
United Arab Republic_ _
Morocco
Tunisia
Total, selected
countries.
United States (f.o.b.)
All other free world
Total, free world
imports from
Cuba."
(0
16. 3
(0
(0
19.7
.2
1.8
19.4
2.0
10.2
6.9
1.0
8.8
22.4
4.6
(0
O. 1 (Jan.-June)
(2)
192.4
827.3
65.8
132.3
474.7
45.5
122.3
357.3
33.4
82.8
33.1
46.1
115.9
6.8
6. 4
95.3 (Partial year
only)
(7) (Jan.-Sept.')
(2)
786. 0
652.5
513.0
164.0
'129. 1
(2)
ot reported.
ot available,
egligible.
'Based on official foreign trade data of 77 free world countries.
Preliminary, based on incomplete data in some eases.
6 No United 8tates trade was reported in October 1963.
C .c.f. except as noted.
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6038 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 25
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. Presi-
dent, will the Senator yield?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.
Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Is the Sena-
tor familiar with the adage that, "A fool
can keep his mouth shut and pass for a
sage"?
Mr. PULBRIGHT. I am familiar with
that.
Mr. MILLER subsequently said: Mr.
President, I believe the distinguished
Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fuimmix]
is to be complimented for speaking his
views on the situation involving Cuba,
Panama, and the Soviet Union. In his
position as Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations it is desir-
able that his views be made clear. He
is possessed of a broad background of
experience, and I am sure his conclu-
sions have not hastily been arrived at.
But I think it would be most unfortu-
nate if members of the press and the
general public received the impression
that other and differing views are not
held by other Members of the Senate on
the basis of which conclusions of a dif-
ferent nature have been drawn with
equal deliberation.
The Senator from Arkansas suggests
that we have made the Cuban situation
far more important in our foreign rela-
tions and in our domestic life than its
size and influence warrant.
It is precisely this attitude which has
brought about such a sharp cleavage be-
tween the Democratic Party and the
Republican Party over the conduct of
foreign affairs.
Republicans remember that the 1960
Democratic Party platform promised the
people of the United States the follow-
ing:
The new Democratic administration will
also reaffirm our historic policy of opposi-
tion to the establishment anywhere in the
Americas of governments dominated by for-
eign powers, a policy now being undermined
by Soviet threats to the freedom and inde-
pendence of Cuba. The Government of the
United States under a Democratic adminis-
tration will not be deterred from fulfilling
its obligations and solemn responsibilities
under .its treaties and agreements with the
nations of the Western Hemisphere. Nor
will the United States * * * permit the
establishment of a regime dominated by
international, atheistic communism in the
Western Hemisphere.
This was a well-worded and carefully
reasoned statement. Unfortunately, as
too often has been the case with promises
of the Democratic Party, this pledge has
been thrown in the wastebasket. As a
result of the failure of this administra-
tion to fulfill its commitment to the
American people, the international Com-
munist conspiracy has firmly established
a government 90 miles off our shores.
Premier Khrushchev has declared that
the Monroe Doctrine is dead. Ever since
the blockade of Cuba, called by our late
President in 1962 for a short period, was
lifted, our prestige in Latin America has
steadily diminished.
Spokesmen for this administration
have uttered glittering generalities about
our hopes for freedom for the Cuban
people. Fine words have been said to
the effect that Cuba, as a base for sub-
version and overthrow of Latin Ameri-
can governments, is not acceptable to
the United States. But there has been
no meaningful followthrough, no action,
to reduce these glittering generalities
and fine words to deeds.
It is a little late now for leading
spokesmen for the Democratic Party,
such as the Senator from Arkansas, to
imply that the campaign promise of 1660
has not been carried out and should not
be carried out because the "size and in-
fluence" of the Communist government
in Cuba doesn't warrant the effort.
Let us not be so naive as to look upon
the situation in Cuba as that of an inde-
pendent, sovereign nation. The Govern-
ment of Cuba is under the control of
Moscow, because that is the way the in-
ternational Communist conspiracy oper-
ates. It is incorrect to refer to Castro
as a mere nuisance. It is more to the
point to say that the leaders in the
Kremlin and their puppet in Cuba rep-
resent a real menace to the Western
Hemisphere. This is no old myth. Nor
Is it a new reality. It is a continuing
reality.
I would agree with the Senator from
Arkansas that our political and economic
boycott, such as it has been, has been a
failure. The accommodation policy in
dealing with Communist aggression
which this administration has been fol-
lowing foredoomed any political and eco-
nomic blockade.
What is needed is a return to a policy
of firmness?the policy which character-
ized the 8 years of the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, and a resolve on the part
of the leaders of this administration to
fulfill the promise made to the American
people in 1960. If the proven export of
Communist subversives and war materiel
from Cuba to Latin America is to be
stopped, deeds?not words?will be re-
quired. The Organization of American
States looks to the United States for
leadership. If our Government takes a
firm position, I believe the OAS will fol-
low suit?just as occurred when our late
President imposed the blockade of Cuba.
And, to use his words, if the OAS does not
follow such leadership, then we must go
it alone.
For almost 4 years now, I have been
calling for a war materiel blockade of
Cuba. tinder such a blockade, we would
permit food, clothing, supplies, and even
buses into Cuba?and out of Cuba. But
no war materiel could come in, and none
could go out. Under such a blockade,
our allies could trade with Cuba, as they
now insist on doing, but Cuba as a base
for subversion and overthrow of Latin
American governments would end.
There will be some who will suggest that
this may mean war. They said the same
thing when President Kennedy ordered
the blockade of Cuba, but they were 100
percent wrong. We should not let their
timid and unrealistic suggestions hinder
us from carrying out our duty to main-
tain the security of the Western Hemis-
phere, because the security of the West-
ern Hemisphere is inseparable from our
own security.
I think it most unfortunate that the
Senator from Arkansas listed three
options in dealing with Cuba, and com-
pletely overlooked this obvious option.
Perhaps he deludes himself by listing
three options in such a fashion that two
of them seem to be obviously excluded,
leaving us to settle with an option of
inaction and a breaking of the promise
made by his party in the 1960 campaign.
Indeed, his suggestion that the option
of invading Cuba carries with it a threat
of a global nuclear war is poorly con-
ceived, because we know that Premier
Khrushchev is not about to commit sui-
cide?any more than he was at the time
of the Cuban confrontation. If, every
time our security is menaced by Commu-
nist aggression, we are supposed to stand
still and do nothing because someone
suggests that we might have a global
nuclear war, then the United States can
no longer claim to be the true leader
of the free world. This is a "peace at
any price" policy. It inevitably means
the loss of our self-respect and national
honor, both of which must be preserved
if a just and lasting peace is ever to be
attained.
In this connection, it could be ex-
ceedingly dangerous for our President
to say, as he did yesterday, that nuclear
war "is impossible." Does this mean
that we should forget about a nuclear
fallout shelter program? Has Premier
Khrushchev ever made such a statement?
Soviet military doctrine clearly envi-
sages the possibility of a nuclear war.
Why should not we? Is it because we
do not like to think about such a thing
that we hope the possibility will just go
away if we use the word "impossible"?
I think it would be much wiser and safer,
and infinitely more realistic, if our Pres-
ident and others waited until we had
nuclear disarmament, with effective in-
spection and controls, before talking
about the "impossibility" of nuclear war.
I believe that the Senator from Ar-
kansas, sincere as he is in his convictions,
has arrived at some very unrealistic con-
clusions for the simple reason that he
has proceeded from some very false
premises. I would suggest that he read
the campaign promise of his party in
1960 and bend his efforts toward ful-
filling it instead of thinking up reasons
why it should be repudiated.
Mr. JAvrrs subsequently said: Mr.
President, I wish to comment very briefly
on the speech delivered by the Senator
from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], which
I have had the pleasure of reading.
I make this statement because I am de-
voted to a bipartisan foreign policy and
believe that it consists of our contrib-
uting the very best thinking of which
we are capable on American foreign af-
fairs without any reference whatever to
party interest or party advantage. As
the late Senator Vandenberg said, poli-
tics stops at the water's edge.
It is for that reason, and in deference
to the very considered statements of the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, recognizing the importance
which it must assume in the policy of
the United States and in the eyes of our
allies all over the world, that I believe
people like myself, who have been iden-
tified with the concept of bipartisanship
in foreign policy for so long, ought to
make some comment on the Senator's
remarks.
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 6039
I shall reserve the right at another
time and on another occasion to deal
with the matter at greater length.
On the matter of East-West trade, I
find myself in substantial agrement with
the Senator from Arkansas. First, noth-
ing will stop our allies from engaging in
nonstrategic trade with the countries of
Eastern Europe, including the Soviet
Union. Of course they will deal with
Communist China, but we will not and
should not.
Second, this is a very disruptive factor
in the NATO alliance, and there is no
denying that it is a cause of tension and
difficulty between ourselves and our clos-
est allies.
The one condition that I do not find
in what the Senator said is that our allies
too must give something. I hope they
will be wise enough to see their own in-
terest as we see ours; and as we may
have to take a broader view of nonstra-
tegic trade with the eastern bloc, so I
believe they must at least agree to cer-
tain fundamental rules of trade, in light
of East European countries' constant
threat against the markets of the West-
ern World, which they have shown them-
selves able to push in matters like resid-
ual fuel oil, aluminum, linseed oil, and
other products, where their potential is
serious.
The Eastern bloc should give some as-
surance of fair trade practice with the
free world, if the United States is to take
a more liberal view with respect to trade
with them in nonstrategic goods, and to
bring them closer together with our allies
and in that way be more helpful for the
Atlantic Community.
On the matter of Panama, the Senator
from Arkansas recommends that we, with
all magnanimity, which is the greatest
power of the strong, show our willingness
to negotiate all questions, including the
1903 treaty with Panama.
I agree with the Senator, and I believe
that the President of the United States
now has done just that. Whether he has
done this later than he should have will
probably be debated in the next national
campaign. However, he has done it.
Now it is time to say to the Panaman-
ians themselves:
"Do not be guilty of the tyranny of
weakness by being unreasonable, even
though you are in an election campaign.
This is a moment when the people of the
United States are offering to be mag-
nanimous, openhanded, and just."
I strongly urge Panama to seize the
hand of friendship and clasp it for the
good promise which it gives.
This, too, I do not find in the Senator's
speech. It is no fault of his own. He
suggested the right course, and, I be-
lieve, on this he makes a useful state-
ment.
On the matter of Cuba, I find myself
in disagreement with the Senator from
Arkansas, and for this reason:
Even if we accept the thesis of the
Senator from Arkansas that Castro is
a nuisance but not a grave threat, and
that we cannot get rid of him except
by means wholly disproportionate to the
objective, Cuban communism?Castro-
ism, in fact?does pose a grave threat
to the other Latin American countries
because it gives them an object to which
they can be led by Communists in trying
to realize themselves.
I do not believe that we will get what
the Senator from Arkansas prescribed as
a prompt and vigorous use of the estab-
lished procedure of the Anter-American
system against any act of aggression,
which must include?and he does not in-
clude it?subversion and inflammatory
communism and Castroism, while we ac-
cept Castro as a fact. Whether or not
we may have failed with our methods of
blockade and boycott, we thoroughly
disapprove of Castro, and this fact that
we thoroughly disapprove of Castroism
is essential in American policy and must
be continued to be pressed home.
It is only our firm disapproval that
will stir the other American nations into
the feeling that Castroism is unaccept-
able; that it should not be accepted; and
that there should be a prompt and vig-
orous use of the procedures of the inter-
American system to give the people of
Cuba a chance through self-determina-
tion to assert themselves. So I do not
agree with the Senator from Arkansas
on that point. I state my disagreement
frankly because what I propose is a fun-
damental and important aspect of our
system.
I cannot go along with the feeling of
the Senator from Arkansas that we must
accept the idea of violent overthrows of
government in Latin America. I believe
we fail to understand the capabilities
and possibilities inherent in some recon-
ciliation of views with the private en-
terprise system of the United States and
Europe, which could have, in my judg-
ment, a strong impact upon that sys-
tem in Latin America and could create
conditions in which I believe, in many
countries, notwithstanding the vested
feudalism and oligarchies to which the
Senator refers, there would be much
benefit, and which could provide some
social justice and make violent upheavals
unnecessary.
On the subject of the Far East, I am
glad to observe that the Senator from
Arkansas, notwithstanding the new look
and the idea of dispelling myths, of
which he speaks, feels that we should
not recognize Communist China or ac-
quiesce in its admission to the United
Nations under present circumstances.
I agree with that view. I feel that that
is our best policy; that considering the
way the proposal has been advertised to
the world, the Communist Chinese
would take it as a complete cave-in by
the United States and the whole free
world if we now took a position analogous
to that of the French.
Finally, on the question of South Viet-
nam, whatever may be the interim com-
fort that the Senator from Arkansas
gives President de Gaulle in his sug-
gestions for a review of the/Far Eastern
situation, he ends with the view that
there is no course but to support Viet-
nam?both its government and its
army?by the most effective means
available. We must do that. We must
do the best we can to bring self-govern-
ment and just government to the people
of South Vietnam.
I do not believe in extending the was;
neither do I believe in pulling out. I
believe we must persevere. That is the
best course. So whatever may be the
interim reasoning, I feel that is the right
prescription.
In deference to an obviously massive
presentation by the Senator from Ar-
kansas, and speaking as one who has
been for so long devoted to a bipartisan
foreign policy, I felt I should make these
views a part of the RECORD contempo-
raneously with the Senator's speech.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I
am about to suggest the absence of a
quorum?
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, will the
Senator withhold his suggestion?
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I withhold it tem-
porarily. I yield the floor.
Mr. MORSE. I have an understand-
ing with the Senator from North Caro-
lina [Mr. Eaval] that I may make a few
remarks before the quorum call.
Mr. President, I express my apprecia-
tion to the Senator from Arkansas,
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, of which I have the honor to
be a member, for making the speech on
foreign policy that he has made this
afternoon. Although I disagree with
much of his speech, nevertheless it is of
very great importance that in the de-
bate which will be waged in this body
for the next few weeks and months on
foreign policy, one point of view be pre-
sented as cogently as the Senator from
Arkansas presented it this afternoon.
However, some of us hold different
points of view; and I propose to address
myself to some of those differences this
afternoon. I say to my chairman that
there are parts of his speech and some
concepts that he has expressed with
which I find myself in agreement. I
certainly find myself in complete agree-
ment that the time has come to puncture
many American myths with respect to
foreign policy. For several weeks and
months past I have been seeking to
puncture some of those myths.
One of the myths is that the United
States has a right to engage in unilateral
action in the field of foreign policy by
intervening in various parts of the world,
for determination by the United States
as to what policy shall prevail in those
parts of the world, while at the same
time we sign treaties, pacts, and inter-
national agreements in which we pledge,
pontifically, I am afraid?and I fear his-
tory will recall somewhat hypocritically,
too?our dedication to a substitution of
the rule of law for the rule of force.
The unfortunate ugly fact is that, too
frequently, American practice cannot be
squared with our professions in the field
of foreign policy. The Senator from
Arkansas has referred this afternoon to
some of the trouble spots of the world,
and has made certain suggestions as to
how American foreign policy in relation
to those trouble spots might be improved.
I agree with him that there is a sore need
for improving our policy. I do not agree
with some of his suggestions as to the
preferences we ought to follow by way
of new policy.
Underlying my criticism of much of
American foreign policy is my criticism
that we do not take the initiative in try-
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6040 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE march 25
ing to lead the factions of the world
which have likewise signed international
agreements, pacts and treaties to a settle-
ment of our disputes by the application
of the rules of reason and of law. For
example, I believe that the American
signature on the Acts of Bogota, Rio,
Caracas, Punta del Este and Havana and
the Organization of American States
Agreements imposes a solemn trust upon
our country. Yet we have been inclined
to honor those treaties too frequently in
the breach. We have an obligation in
regard to South Vietnam to exercise some
worldleadership in seeking to bring that
trouble spot, a threat to the peace in
Asia?and it can become a threat to the
Peace in the world?into the procedures
of the United Nations after we have first
tried to arrive at some accommodations
with our cosignatories to the SEATO
Pact.
The United States has not taken the
slightest initiative up to the hour in
which I speak to seek to bring this great
issue in southeast Asia into the proce-
dures of international law under the or-
ganizations created by treaties to which
we have affixed our signature. We have
followed a unilateral course of action in
South Vietnam.. I shall use it this after-
noon not as my only example, but as the
main example of the thesis that I pro-
pose to present and shall continue to
defend.
Yesterday President Johnson ad-
dressed some notable words of foreign
policy wisdom to the National Legisla-
tive Conference of the Building and Con-
struction Trades Council in downtown
Washington. His remarks cannot help
but impress the American people and the
world with his deep desire to deal with
world problems without resort to force
of arms.
Therefore it! is with great regret that
I read his comments about Vietnam. As
reported in the New York Times, he said:
In Vietnam, divergent voices cry out with
suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some
for more appeasement, some even for retreat.
We do not criticize or demean them. We
consider carefully their suggestions. But to-
day finds us where President Eisenhower
found himself 10 years ago. The position
he took with Vietnam then in a letter he
sent to the then President is one that I
could take in complete honesty today. And
that is that we stand ready to help the
Vietnamese preserve their independence and
retain their freedom and keep from being
enveloped by communism."
I ask unanimous consent that, at the
conclusion of my remarks, there be
printed in the RECORD the New York
Times report of the President's speech,
which sets forth the verbatim account
of what the President had to say about
foreign policy in his speech of yesterday.
The PRESIDING 0.101010ER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MORSE. Elsewhere, the Presi-
dent said something that I think he has
not applied to South Vietnam. He said:
The people in this country have more
blessed hopes than bitter victories. The
people of this country and the world expect
more from their leaders than just a show
of brute force. And so our hope and our
purpose is to employ reasoned agreement
instead of ready aggression; to preserve our
honor without a world in ruins; to substi-
tute, if we can, understanding for retalia-
tion. My most fervent prayer is to be a
President who can make it possible for every
boy in this land to grow to manhood by
loving his country instead of dying for it.
The President said yesterday that to-
day finds us just where we were 10 years
ago in South Vietnam. But that is not
quite true. We are $2 billion poorer for
the economic aid we have put into that
area of 14 million people, and we are, in
addition, an unknown amount poorer for
the military aid we have put in. We have
added 15,000 U.S. troops to the ante since
1954. Over 200 Americans have been
killed there.
Even so, the military and political sit-
uation in South Vietnam has deterio-
rated since 1954. That is, in fact, why
we have stepped up our rate of financial
aid and our rate of military participa-
tion. Our rate of aid is apparently well
over the mark of half a billion dollars
a year.
But certain other factors have changed
even more. First, the local government
we have been supporting there has
changed hands, not once, but twice. The
faction that has held power in South
Vietnam has, ever since 1954, done so
only through American financial and
military support. But the faction that
holds power now cannot be described as
anything but an American 'puppet.
The pretense of regional security has
been dropped long ago. The Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization has dropped
out of the picture, although it was on
the basis of our membership in that Or-
ganization that we went into South
Vietnam in 1954.
Let us never forget that the signa-
tories to the SEATO compact made a ref-
erence to South Vietnam only from the
standpooint that that area, which is not,
a member of SEATO, is an area of mu-
tual concern and interest to the signa-
tories. That is a pretty slender reed on
which to lean in order to justify Ameri-
can intervention in South Vietnam.
There is no multilateral policy of
SEATO signatories; there is no multi-
lateral action being taken by SEATO
to deal with the civil war in Vietnam.
I care not how others may describe
it?we cannot escape the realities. The
difficulty in South Vietnam is a difficulty
of the Vietnamese among themselves.
As I have said before on the floor of the
Senate and elsewhere, we should not
forget that families are split in South
Vietnam?fathers on one side, sons on
the other; uncles on one side, nephews
on the other.
I am at a loss to understand what we
are doing in South Vietnam. I under-
stand the alibis and rationalizations, but
I am satisfied history will record that the
facts do not support the alibis and ra-
tionalizations of the Government of the
United States vis-a-vis South Vietnam.
We are there, we say, at the invitation
of the South Vietnamese Government.
But that government is our own crea-
ture. We know it and the world knows
it. One might as well try to claim that
the Soviet army is in East Germany only
on the invitation of the East German
Government. A puppet is a puppet, and
South Vietnam has not had more than
a 'U.S. puppet government in its 10 years
of existence.
Freedom in South Vietnam? I do not
believe that more than the tiny fraction
of its 14 million people who have bene-
fited and prospered from American as-
sistance can be considered to be "free"
in any sense that Americans understand
the word. Let us keep in mind,.when we
hear that the United States is fighting
for "freedom" in South Vietnam, that
what is really meant is that we are try-
ing to preempt the area from what we
fear may be communism.
When one takes into consideration, the
large percent of ignorant and illiterate
people in South Vietnam, people who do
not understand the difference between
freedom. and enslavement, between
democracy and communism?and who
could not care less?one begins to under-
stand some of the operative facts that
must be considered as we come to reap-
praise and reevaluate our policies in
South Vietnam.
We think we are keeping Communists
out. That is why we are in South Viet-
nam.
FAILURE OF DOMINO THEORY
But look at something else that has
changed drastically since 1954. Ten
years ago we heard about the "domino"
theory. Indochina was divided up into
four parts?it was virtually quartered.
North and South Vietnam were created
in the eastern half of the country, both
bordering on the South China Sea. Laos
and Cambodia were created out of the
western half; Laos to the north and
Cambodia to the south.
South Vietnam was the first "domino"
In the line. Next to it was Cambodia and
Laos, then Thailand and Burma. Below
Thailand stretches the Malaysian Fed-
eration, and beyond that, Indonesia.
These were the row of "dominoes" all
of which were expected to drop into the
lap of communism if South Vietnam did
SO.
One of the greatest fallacies of the
"domino" theory was that any country
not in the Western camp was considered
to be in the Communist camp. That
was where the theory began to lead us
astray.
I shall always be proud of the fact
that I spoke out against the Dulles so-
called "domino' theory when he first sold
it to the American people and persuaded
the Government to go along with it. In
my judgment, it was a highly fallacious
theory when John Foster Dulles con-
cocted it; and it has been a highly falla-
cious theory ever since.
We convinced ourselves that any na-
tion not imbedded with American eco-
nomic and military aid programs, and all
their attendant advisers, was as good as
Communist.
But what has happened to the row of
"dominoes" since 1954? North Vietnam
has always been outside the scope of
American influence. Laos was neutral-
ized by agreement; Cambodia has re-
cently ousted all American aid missions
and declared herself neutral.
I digress to say that Cambodia was
right, and the United States was wrong,
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cONGItEssit? itEC0R1) sENATE-
in the recent Cambodia-linited?States
Issue.
When the facts are known about the
policy of the `United States and U.
S. advisers in South Vietnam, and
the activities of the CIA in that part of
the World, the Prince of Cambodia will
be sustained in the annals of history.
We had better face our mistakes. We
had better recognize that American for-
eign policy aboard is not always perfect
and right. We had better face the fact
that spine of those who implement, exe-
cute, and administer American foreign
policy abroad sometimes make "bloopers"
In administrative policy.
It is sad to find ourselves in the posi-
tion that a Prince of little Cambodia be-
opines so exasperated at American for-
eign policy that he says to the American
Government, "Get out." Ile made it
perfectly clear that he was going to put
1.1.8 out or We would have to fight to stay
In. He has not gone Communist. There
Is this assumption, in the "domino" the-
ory, that if U.S. influence, aid, and mili-
tary assistance were taken out of some
country it would be sure to go Commu-
nist. Cambodia has made the domino
thepry look absurd. The "domino" the-
ory became absurd when Cambodia elim-
inated American influence in the sense
that we like to exercise our influence in
that part of the world.
Long ago 'Burma put herself outside
the circle of American military protec-
tion, Indonesia certainly is neutral in-
sofar as her sympathies and 'policies to-
ward America and china are concerned.
The only countries left in the row of
dominoes, as we originally conceived it,
are South Vietnam, Thailand, and
MalaYsia. Vet none of the rest, except
North, Vietnam, which was never in the
row, has become a Communist state.
Undeinocratic and totalitarian, yes, but
' so are South Vietnam and Thailand.
Does anyone really believe that South
Vietnam and Thailand are great show-
cases 'of democracy?
Does anyone believe that South Viet-
nam and Thailand are great examples
of democratic self-government on the
part of the people?
Nonsense. They are not. I am not
one Who insists that they must be. I
would hope that voluntarily and by con-
viction, by recognition that after all,
economic freedom is for the mass of their
people and can be obtained and perpet-
uate4 only by realizing that economic
freedom will give them political free-
dom, they would come over, in the course
ef time, into the family of democratic
nations.
Please note my language, "in the
course of time." In my judgment, no
Senator will live long enough to see Po-
litical freedom?in the sense that we use
the term, somewhat loosely, I admit?
prevail in Asia. But, if we can be help-
ful, if in our generation we can help lay
the foundation for economic freedom of
choicp in Ktpie Of the underdeveloped
area Of the, world, we can leave a legacy
of inheritance Which will give future
generations of their people a better op-
portunity to develop political and eco-
noinie freedom.
? But it will never be done with Ameri--
cari bullets. It will never be done with
American military force. It will never
be -done with American military aid. It
will be done, as I have been heard to say
before, by using the descriptive term
"with American bread" as the symbol of
American economic freedom.
? The only countries left in the row of
dominoes, as we originially- conceived
it, are South Vietnam, Thailand, and
Malaysia.
Perhaps one can say that as South
Vietnam goes, so goes Thailand; but it
cannot be said that as goes South Viet-
nain so goes southeast Asia. South
Vietnam and Thailand are already sepa-
rated by the neutralist states of Laos and
Cambodia.
If any slogan is useful in this part of
the world, it would be that as the rest of
southeast Asia goes, South Vietnam will
go, too, no matter how much American
treasure and bloqd are spent to prevent
it.
The "dominoes" are taking themselves
out Of the Western lineup. We cannot
preserve even South Vietnam as an
American puppet for long.
The most optimistic American fore-
cast for South Vietnam was made by the
Secretary of Defense when he said that
we would aid that country "forever."
That is our outlook and our prospect,
Mr. President?"forever"?as much as
she needs, and as long as she needs it.
That is the announcedAmerican policy
of -recent days. It is a sad commentary
that we present that image of the United
States to the world, that we present the
image of the' United States on a unila-
teral basis, that we offer continuation
6f our program in South Vietnam "for-
ever," if we deem it necessary.
But I warn today that in due course
of time some other nations will have
something to say about it. I do not be-
lieve that is a myth. I agree that We had
better pierce some American myths of
American foreign policy. If anyone
holds to the mythical view that the
United States can continue unilateral
military action on a selective basis in
various parts of the world and not en-
couriter serious trouble with other na-
tions, he is mistaken. We had better re-
evaluate that myth, and promptly.
REASON SHOULD BE APPLIED TO SOUTHEAST ASIA
If the policy stated by the Secretary
of Defense * the policy of the Johnson
administration in South Vietnam, then
every President 10 years, 20 years, 50
years from now will find himself where
Eisenhower and Johnson found them-
selves. But the price will go up every
decade just to keep the United States in
the same place.
President Johnson is proud, and right-
fully so, that the United States has not
hastened to send marines into Cuba. He
rightfully- points to the activities of the
United Nations to keep the peace in
Cyprus, however belated was our support
for taking that issue to the U.N.
In regard to the Cyprus issue; for some
time the United States opposed taking
It to the United nations. One trial bal-
loon after another was sent up to find
out whether American public opinion
would accept sending American boys to
Cyprus -as a sort of peacekeeping force.
If there was ever an issue that should
have gone to the United Nations, it is
the issue of Cyprus. Cyprus is not a
member of NATO. Why the United
States and Great Britain in their first
proposal took it upon themselves to
decide that they were going to handle it
under NATO procedures, I could never
understand.
We must recognize that the signature
of our country on the United Nations
Charter has a solemn meaning. When
an area of the world begins to threaten
the peace of the world, and other coun-
tries follow the course of action that
Greece and Turkey were following, and
there is a country which is victimized of
its rights by their course of action under
the United Nations Charter, we should
be in the lead in urging that the dispute
be submitted to the United Nations. We
should never have permitted Khrushchev
to get ahead of us. Then when Khru-
shchev proceeded to announce that the _
matter ought to go to the United Nations,
that fact made it supposedly wrong.
We must pierce the myth that the
origin of an idea can necessarily make it
a bad idea. As educated men and wom-
en we should never forget that the origin
of an idea has nothing to do with the
merits Of the idea. The internal con-
tents of the idea determines its merits.
As the Senator from Arkansas [Mr.
FoLsaiorrl pointed out so clearly in his
speech this afternoon, we must face un-
popular ideas, too. We must be willing
to deal with ideas in the field of foreign
policy, and to weigh them and appraise
them and evaluate them on the basis of
their intrinsic merit.
We muffed it again in connection with
Cyprus by throwing away an opportunity
to say to the world that we join in urging
that the Cyprus issue be taken immedi-
ately to the United Nations because the
United Nations exists, supposedly at
least, to prevent a threat to the peace of -
the world.
I feel the same way, as Senators will
observe before I have finished, with re-
gard to southeast Asia.
I believe American unilateral action
in southeast Asia should stop now. It
should never have started. I opposed
going_into South Vietnam, I oppose stay-
ing in South Vietnam, and I favor get-
ting out of South Vietnam now. I also
favor making some proposals to the
peace-loving nations of the world for
handling the South Vietnam crisis with
honor. That is the greatest obligation
of statesmanship that confronts my
Government in this critical hour.
The President does not believe it nec-
essary to send Marines into Cuba.
Why, then, does the President believe
It necessary or desirable to send our
Special Forces to South Vietnam? What
American vital interest in South Viet-
nam deserves the presence of American
men in uniform?
Why, too, is not the United Nations
the place for the South Vietnam issue,
just as it is the place for the Cyprus
issue? Why, indeed, does not the Presi-
dent apply his prescription for "reasoned
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042 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 25
agreement" and understanding to South
Vietnam?
nen OBLIGATION TO ViETNANt IS THAT OP
SEATO
Neither the President's remarks of yes-
terday nor the speech today of the chair-
man a the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee gives any explanation of why
this country has not used the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization or the United
Nations for the South Vietnam issue. Is
it because pone of our treaty partners
thinks we are right in trying to hold it as
a U.S. area of influence? Is it because
the Asiatic members of SEATO do not
want to associate themselves with the
United States in its campaign to stay in
Asia? Is it because France, Britain,
Australia, and New Zealand know that
the white man is being thrown out of
nonwhite countries and that the effort
to stay will be increasingly costly?
As I have asked before, I ask again,
of the signatories to SEATO: Where is
Pakistan? Where is Australia? Where
are Thailand, the Philippines, Great
Britain, and France? Why should not
we take the lead in asking for an extra-
ordinary meeting of either the heads of
state or the foreign ministers of the
SEATO members and try, to use the
President's words, to "sit down and rea-
son together," to see what accommoda-
tions, if any, can be arrived at?
The mere fact that an idea comes from
De Gaulle should not cause us to reject
It. Let us look at the idea. Let us see
If we cannot reach an honorable accom-
modation through SEATO.
Does anyone argue that the difficulty
In South Vietnam does not threaten the
peace of Asia and could very well spread
Into a holocaust far beyond southeast
Asia? That danger exists.
What are our moral and legal commit-
ments under the United Nations Charter?
I believe that our obligations call upon
us to seek to exercise some leadership
among nations and to have the signa-
tories sit down and reason together, to
use the President's words, to see if there
cannot be worked out an accommodation
In connection with South Vietnam which
will preserve legitimate rights, preserve
the Peace, and relieve the United States
of conducting a unilateral military
course of action in South Vietnam which
I cannot reconcile with our obligations
under treaties to which we have already
affixed our signature.
Why is there no joint SEATO action in
South Vietnam? It is an area of mutual
interest to all SEATO partners under the
protocol to the SEATO treaty. Why are
we acting unilaterally there? The chair-
man of the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee declares that "it should be clear to
all concerned that the United States will
continue to meet its obligations and ful-
fill its commitments with respect to Viet-
nam." What obligations and commit-
ments do we have toward Vietnam that
are Elny more or less than those of every
other SEATO member?
None. But we have mistakenly built
up many emotional commitments to our-
selves. We took a tiger by the tail 10
years ago and no one in high office knows
how to let go of it. So we call that a
commitment. What is really meant is
face and prestige. We backed a puppet
there 10 years ago, and we are afraid the
world with laugh at us if we recognize
that it has been a flop. The government
to which we gave the backing in 1954 is
gone, and the U.S. Government was glad
to see it go.
I say that we have a greater commit-
ment to SEATO, to the United Nations,
and to world peace than we ever had to
any government of South Vietnam,
whichever one it may be at the moment.
When are we going to begin honoring
those obligations?
So long as the United States maintains
a unilateral intervention in South Viet-
nam it is going to cost ever more Ameri-
can money and American blood. There
are no Chinese soldiers fighting in South
Vietnam; there are no Russian soldiers.
The only foreign troops are Americans.
There are no Thais, or Australians, or
French, or Pakistanis, or Filipinos fight-
ing in South Vietnam. Why not?
They si?gned a treaty obligation in
which they joined the United States in
recording at least that this area of Asia
was an area of mutual concern and was
of interest to the signatories. They
walked out on us. We walked in. That
was a walk in the wrong direction.
Until there is an answer to that ques-
tion I shall continue to urge that Ameri-
can troops be brought home. Every time
an American dies in Vietnam, the flag
should be lowered to half mast over the
Capitol, over the White House, over the
State Department, and over the Penta-
gon, because those boys are dying in the
execution of a unilateral policy that no
longer has a direct bearing on the de-
fenses 61 the United States. They are
dying because civilian and military lead-
ers set us on this mistaken course 10
years ago and we have been unable and
unwilling to change it for domestic
political reasons.
We cannot justify this killing of Amer-
ican boys in South Vietnam. I think it
is important, unpleasant as it is, disrup-
tive as it may be to some people to dis-
cuss this issue openly and frankly with
the American people. The final decision
of this foreign policy does not rest with
the President. It rests with the Ameri-
can people. Foreign policy does not be-
long to the President of the United
States. It belongs to the American
people.
The American people are entitled to
know the facts about American foreign
policy in South Vietnam. I am satisfied
that once the American people obtain
the facts about American foreign policy
in South Vietnam, they will repudiate
the policy of this Government, which
policy has continued through a Repub-
lican and Democratic administration.
It is a wrong- policy. It can be righted
(Ally by ceasing to follow a course of
seeking to solve the problem by Ameri-
can military force, and resorting to the
laws of reason as they are epitomized in
the existing procedures of international
law.
? That must be the glorious objective of
this Republic. We must stop talking out
,of both sides of our national mouth in
regard to what our objectives are in
American foreign policy. We must stop
saying to great international conclaves
that we stand foursquare for the appli-
cation of the rule of law, while at the
same time using the rule of force in
South Vietnam.
France gave up this hopeless struggle
10 years ago. Yet, today it is France
that is offering political leadership to
this same part of the world. Our mili-
tary and economic leadership to which
the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FuL-
BRIGHT] accords so much credit, has not
kept Cambodia, Burma, Laos, or Indo-
nesia from neutralizing themselves. It is
time we provided some up-to-date politi-
cal leadership, too, and that means a
drastic change from the 10-year-old fail-
ure known as the domino policy.
"The people of the world, I think, pre-
fer reasoned agreement to ready attack,"
said President Johnson yesterday. "And
that is why we must follow the Prophet
Isaiah many, many times before we send
the marines, and say, 'Come now and let
us reason together.'"
Mr, President, when is the United
States going to apply your words to Viet-
nam?
When are we going to sit down and
offer to reason together with the nations
of SEATO and the nations of the United
Nations in respect to resolving the threat
to the peace in South Vietnam?
The same question might be put to the
chairman of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. Why are not the comments he
makes about Cuba and how we should
deal with it, generally applicable to Viet-
nam as well? Why is there one policy in
Cuba and another policy in South Viet-
nam?
In the Caribbean, we have the Rio
treaty, we have a hostile but not a
threatening government in Cuba, and
the committee chairman recommends
that we not proceed unilaterally to deal
with it. ,
In South Vietnam we have the South-
east Asia Treaty Organization, we have
the passibility of a government there
that could be neutral rather than Com-
munist, yet he proposes that we continue
a unilateral intervention in South Viet-
nam.
If I understood the Senator correctly,
he proposes a wait-and-see policy. He
suggests that we wait and see what our
leaders downtown decide as to what
should be the change in our foreign pol-
icy if any.
SENATE HAS ITS OWN FOREIGN POLICY DUTIES
That is not our obligation as Members
of the Senate. Our obligation as Mem-
bers of the Senate under the Constitution
is to exercise our checking power, for we
are a coordinate and coequal branch of
the Government with the executive.
When in our judgment the executive
branch of the Government is following
a mistake in foreign policy, it is our con-
stitutional duty to check the executive
branch of the Government by exercising
all the constitutional authority that the
Constitution gives us.
I have no intention of joining in any
policy to wait and see what the execu-
tive branch of the Government proposes.
To the contrary, I intend to continue
doing what I can to draw this issue, not
only in the Senate, but across this Na-
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CONGRESSIONAL .EC
tion. Our policy in South Vietnam must
be understood by the American people so
that they can render their final judg-
ment as to what it should be.
On March 4, I pointed out that we have
learned that a Communist government
In Cuba does not necessarily call for
military action by the United States
against it. It calls for U.S. military ac-
tion only when it undertakes some course
or policy that threatens the security of
the United_States.
I submit that the case for U.S. military
action in South Vietnam is infinitely
weaker than the case for it in Cuba, and
yet there is no good case for it in Cuba,
either.
ctrsA urn sz VIEWED 1I PERSPECTIVE
I find myself in agreement with much
that the Senator from Arkansas said in
regard to the problem of Cuba, in regard
to our trade policy, our embargo policy,
our quarantine policy, our attempt to get
our allies abroad to follow our wishes in
regard to Cuba. I believe he is quite
right. If will never work that way.
/ am perfectly willing to take Castro
on in any application -of the procedures
of the United $ations, in any dispute
that exists between the 'United states and
Cuba. As the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will
show, when I started the fight against
Castro in the Senate, I was the one to
start it, and it was some time before
other Senators spoke out against Castro.
Almost inimediately after Castro came
Into power and started his blood baths
arid placed under house arrest Judge
Urrutia, the first President of Cuba un-
der the Castro regime; I said that all we
had was a substitution of one totalitarian
regime for another. The CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD Will show that I said I did not
know whether he was a Communist, but
that he was following Communist pro-
cedure, and there is no more freedom
for the individual under a Pascist re-
gime?which was the 13atista regime?
than under a Communist regime, which
has come to be the procedure and, in
fact, the admitted policy of Castro.
I am not afraid to take on any of the
Communist leaders in an exchange of
proof with respect to the differences 'we
have with them, under the procedures of
the international law, as administered by
the United Nations and its agencies. If
that should become our policy, it would
take the world by stbrm; it would set an
example of seeking to substitute the rule
of law for the jungle law of force. What
have we to lose by that? Certainly we
are not afraid of our case, are we?
In the matter of international adjudi-
cation, one has to be willing to take the
decisions that go against him, as well as
the decisions that go for him. But if
one has a case, he does not have to worry
about the decision.
We should not become excited by the
nipping at our hind legs by Castro. Any
time Caitro'staits an aggreigive action
against the Itrrited States, the world
knows we will take the steps necessary
to defend our security. President 'gen-
nedy in his great; heroic course of action
in October, 1962, proved that to IKh.ru-
stichey and.to astro, and also to the
56?i0
4
-9pilE49Ft06-02013q30028-1 604_1,
world. The Communist world knows
that.
In my judgment, there is another myth
that we must pierce: We must pierce
the myth that we have something to
lose by a resort to international law
procedures for the settlement of dis-
putes between our country and other
nations. Ouite the contrary is the case,
Mr. President; I believe we shall do more
to promote the cause of peace in the
world by our being willing to adjudicate
such differences under existing proce-
dures and principles of international
law, than we shall accomplish by all the
military aid we are shipping around the
world on the pretext that we are con-
taining communism. That is a myth,
too.
As we come to examine the myths in
our foreign policy and as we come to
appraise our foreign policy in what I am
satisfied will be a debate on foreign pol-
icy in our country for months to come,
I hope that our decision will be to speak
out strongly in favor of using such in-
ternational law methods of settling the
disputes we have with Cuba. Most of
those disputes are economic; and Castro
cannot win, in my judgment, in any ad-
judication in regard to the economic
course Of action he has taken against
the United States and against United
States investors in Cuba.
So I ask this question: When are we
going to apply this great ideal of Presi-
dent Johnson's to actual, practical for-
eign policy problems and cases in the
world; when are we going to sit down
and reason together?
I am at a loss to understand why we
find ourselves able to accept a Commu-
nist-dominated Cuba 90 miles away,
while we send upward of 15,000 special
forces '7,000 miles away to Vietnam
*Where we have no vital interests at all.
The American people do not 'want the
Marines sent into Cuba. The President
is quite right about that. But neither
do the American people want to become
involved in a war on the Asiatic main-
land, either. The President will find
that out soon enough.
RELATIONS WITH PANAMA
The last point I wish to make involves
Panama. I am proud of the President
of the United States for the great state-
ment he issued recently in regard to
Panama. That statement pleases me
very much, and I congratulate the Presi-
dent of the United States. I believe he
is completely correct. In fact, Presi-
dent Johnson has been correct right
along in regard to Panama, for he has
made perfectly clear that the United
States stands ready and willing to dis-
cuss and negotiate with the President
of Panama* or with the diplomats whom
the President of Panama assigns to the
negotAtion, 9n pny subject matter that
has created misunderstandings between
Panama and :the ViikeTd States, after the
President of Panama reestablishes dip-
lomatic relations. But certainly the
Panamanians and their President have
no right to expect the United States to
go hat in hand to any bargaining table,
prior fo the_ restoration of diplomatic
.I.:1
relations, and 'to-sit" doivn and discuss
anything with the Panamanians under
those circumstances. President John-
son has made that very clear, and I
believe he has been completely correct
about that matter; in his last statement
he has- gone even further, by setting
forth 'thedetails, thus showing his good
will and his sincere desire to have the
United States -reach an understanding
with Panama, after diplomatic relations
have been restored.
But many persons have overlooked the
basis for a Settleinent of the Panamanian
dispute that President itennedy and
President Chiarclaid down in an official
communique they Jointly issued on July
13, 1961 r have it before me now. It -
will be recalled that a conference was
held in Washington, D.C., between the
two heads of state?between the Presi-
dent of the United States and the Presi-
dent of Panama?on June 12 and June
13, 1962, and that at the close of their
conference, the two Presidents issued a
joint communique. I ask unanimous
consent that the joint communique be
printed at this point in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the joint
communique was ordered to be printed
in the RECORD, as follows:
JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHN
F. KENNEDY AND PRESIDENT ROBERTO F.
CHIARI, OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, FOL-
LOWING MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JUNE 12-13,1962
The meetings of the President of the Re-
public of Panama and the President of the
United States of America during the past 2
days have been marked by a spirit of frank-
ness, understanding, and sincere friendship.
During their talks the two Presidents dis-
?Wised general relations and existing treaties
between their two countries, their mutual
interests in the Panama Canal, and topics of
worldwide and hemispheric concern. They
emphasized the close and friendly ties on
which have been established a mutually ad-
vantageous association through partnership
In a Panama Canal enterprise. On the con-
clusion of these talks, they agreed to publish
the following joint communique.
- They reaffirm the traditional friendship
between Panama and the United States?a
friendship based on their common devotion
to the ideals of representative democracy,
and to their determination that both nations
should work as equal partners in the cause
of peace, freedom, economic progress, and
social justice.
The Presidents recognize that their two
countries are bound together by a special re-
lationship arising from the location and op-
eration of the Panama Canal, which has
played such an important part in the history
of both their countries.
The President of Panama and the Presi-
dent of the United States agreed upon the
principle that when two friendly nations
are bound by treaty provision which are not
fully satisfactory to one of the parties, ar-
rangements should be made to permit both
nations to discuss these points of dissatis-
faction. Accordingly, the Presidents have
agre'ed to appoint hfgh level representatives
to carry on such discussions. These repre-
sentatives will start their work promptly.
As to some of these problems, it was agreed
that a basis for their solution can now be
stated. Accordingly, the two Presidents
further agreed to instruct their representa-
:tives to ,develop measures to assist the Re-
public of Panama to take advantage of the
commercial bpiiortunitles available through'
`;, -; ? - '
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6044 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
. . March
Increased participation by Panamanian pri-
vate enterprises in the market offered by the
Canal Zene, and to solve such labor ques-
tIonr3 in the Canal Zone as equal employment
Opportunities, wage matters and social
Oectirity coverage. -
? They also agreed that their representa-
tives will arrange for the flying of Pana-
manian flags in an appropriate way in the
Canal Zone.
In Order to support the efforts of the Gov-
ernMent of Panama to improve tax collec-
tions in order to meet better the needs of
the people of Panama, President Kennedy
agreed in principle to instruct his repre-
sentatives to work out in conjunction with
the Panamanian representatives arrange-
meats under which the 'U.S. Government
Will withhold the income taxes of those
Panamanian and non-U.S. citizen employees
in the Zone, who are liable for such taxes
wader existing treaties and the Panamanian
Income tax law.
? The President of Panama mentioned a
number of other practical problems in rela-
tion between the two countries of current
concern to his Government including the
need of Panama for pier facilities and the two
Presidents agreed that their representatives
would over the coming months discuss these
, problems as well as others that may arise.
The Presidents reffirnied their adherence
to the principles and commitments of the
Charter of Punta del Vete. They agreed on
the need to execute rapidly all steps neces-
sary to make the Alliance for Progress effec-?
tive; they recognized that the Alliance is a
joint effort calling for development pro-?
graining for effective use of national as well
as external resources, institutional reforms.,
tax reforms, vigorous application of existing
laws, and a just distribution of the fruits of
national development to all sectors of the
coramunity.
The two Presidents declared that political
democracy, national independence, and the
self-determination of peoples are the politi-?
cal principles which shape the national
policies of Panama and the United States.
Both countries are joined in a hemisphere-
Wide effort to accelerate economic progress
and social justice.
In conclusion the two Presidents expressed.
their gratification at this opportunity to ex-'
change views and to strengthen the friendly
and mutually beneficial relationship which
has long existed between Panama and the
United States. Their meeting was a demon-
stration of the understanding and reciprocal
cooperation of the two countries and
strengthened the bonds of common interests
and friendship between their respective
peoples.
Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I wish to
read three slort paragraphs from the
communique, because I believe they bear
out my statement that the joint com-
munique really laid down the guiding
principle which also is reaffirmed in the
statements by President Johnson. I now
read the three paragraphs:
They reaffirm the traditional friendship
between Panama and the United States?a
friendship based on their common devotion
to the ideals of representative democracy,
and to their determination that both na-
tions should work as equal partners in the
cause of peace, freedom, economic progress,
and social justice.
The Presidents recognized that their two
countries are bound together by a special
relationship arising from the location and
operation of the Panama Canal, which has
played such an important part in the his-
tory of both their countries.
? The President of Panama and the Presi-
dent of the United States agreed upon the
principle that when two friendly nations
are bound by treaty provisions which are not
fully satisfactory to one of the parties, ar-
rangements should be made to permit both
nations to discuss these points of dissatis-
faction. Accordingly, the Presidents have
agreed to appoint high-level representatives
to carry on such discussions. These repre-
sentatives will start their work promptly.
I repeat the key words:
The President of Panama and the Presi-
dent of the United States agreed upon the
principle that when two friendly nations
are bound by treaty provisions which are
not fully satisfactory to one of the parties,
arrangements should be made to permit both
nations to discuss these points of dissatis-
faction.
Does anyone believe for a moment that
when President Kennedy and President
Chiari issued that statement, in which
they made specific references to treaty
relationships with which one party dis-
agreed and with which one party had
found difficulty they did not need to dis-
cuss their differences? What an insult
to the memory of President Kennedy and
what an insult to our intelligence if such
an interpretation were to be placed upon
that language. It is perfectly clear?
as clear as the English language can
be?that what those two Presidents rec-
ognized in the conference that they had
in Washington, resulting in the joint
communique, that the Panamanians
were very much dissatisfied with the
treaty.
They have been dissatisfied with the
treaty for some years. That is as clear
as a bell. The two Presidents discussed
the fact that there was a disagreement
over the treaty. They agreed that the
differences ought to be talked out?which
means, of course, that the differences
ought to result in a modification that,..
would be fair and reasonable between
the parties.
As I said at the White House at a con-
ference on the Panama question?as the
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations and the .majority leader who
are present in the Chamber know?in
my judgment, President Kennedy on
June 13, 1962, laid down a pattern for
the resolution of the differences between
the United States and Panama over the
treaty. Of course, if Panama has a case
and can present the proof, we ought to
be willing to change the treaty in any
way warranted by the facts. That ques-
tion is for the negotiators. It is not
for the senior Senator from Oregon to
determine.
I have my own personal views. We
cannot possibly maintain a perpetuity
clause in any treaty in the year 1964.
Let us face it.
As the Senato:r from Arkansas pointed
out in his speech this afternoon, we must
not forget that Panama came into being
because the United States sent its war-
ships into the area at a time when the
Panamanians were revolting against
Colombia, which had jurisdiction over
what is now Panama. We sent in U.S.
warships, and we stopped the Colombians
from landing on what is now Pana-
manian soil.
Everyone who knows history knows
that. He knows also that following that
incident we negotiated the treaty of 1903
with the Panamanians. Whom do we
think we are kidding if we think that
25
the treaty negotiations were carried on
between parties of equal standing and
equal power? They were carried on be-
tween the United States and a new weak,
little country, that owed its very exist-
ence?its very birth?to the United
States. Does anyone think that who-
ever was in charge of the Panamanian
negotiations in 1903 could say to the
United States, "We will not grant you
an 'in perpetuity' clause"?
Of course they would grant it, because
we had the bargaining advantage. We
took advantage of that bargaining
advantage.
It has caught up with us. We no
longer have the advantage. The Pana-
manians now have tribunals to which
they can ultimately resort. I am per-
fectly willing to predict this afternoon
that, if we do not negotiate with the
Panamanians in regard to the treaty, it
will not be many years before they will
have us before an international tribunal.
I am perfectly willing to predict, too?
though honest and sincere people, equal
to me in honesty and sincerity can dis-
agree with my conclusion?that we will
lose the case. Certainly we are losing it
in the tribunal of public opinion in the
Western Hemisphere.
Therefore, though I cannot speak for
President Kennedy, I can read the great
Communique that President Johnson has
issued. President Kennedy saw the
handwriting on the wall; President
Johnson sees the handwriting on the
wall. We shall have to negotiate a new
treaty. As the President has rightfully
said, we cannot sit down and even start
negotiations until there is a restoration
of diplomatic relations.
I have finished my major remarks. I
shall be glad to yield to any Senator who
may wish to ask me questions. I have
presented my speech this afternoon in a
spirit of complete professionalism, with
no personal criticism of my President or
the chairman of my committee, having
but honest difference of opinion with
each. That is the way debate in the
Senate should be conducted; we have
some problems in foreign policy which
will call for further exchanges of points
of views such as have taken place this
afternoon between the Senator from Ar-
kansas and the Senator from Oregon.
I now yield to the Senator from
Arkansas.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I should like to
have the Senator clarify two points with
regard to the question of Panama which
he has discussed. I was under the im-
pression that at the very early stages
of the controversy, shortly after the dif-
ficulties arose, the President of Panama
was willing to resume diplomatic rela-
tions, and then presumably there were
to follow some negotiations. Then a dif-
ference arose as to the interpretation
of the words "discuss" and "negotiate."
Mr. MORSE. A semantic difference.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I had
reference to. I agree with the Senator.
I ?did not develop it fully. I do not
think we ought to negotiate without a re-
sumption of diplomatic relations with
Panama.
Mr. MORSE. I so assumed.
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1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECOltb ? SENATE 61:14
Mr. tiLBRIGHT. I believe I filed
to mention it.
Mr. MORSE. I took that for granted.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. But the point is
that at the beginning we were on the
verge of a resumption of relations, and
later negotiations, and then there arose
the unfortunate difference of view in re-
spect to the words "negotiate," and "dis-
cuss." Is the Senator in agreement with
that interpretation?
Mr. MORSE. I am in complete agree-
ment. But I would supplement it with
another incident involved in the early
negotiations which I think was most un-
fortunate. In the early exchanges of
notes between the official representatives
of Panama and the United States, it was
understood among them that the word
"discuss" had certain connotations in
the United States and the word "negoti-
ations" had certain connotations in Pan-
ama. It was most unfortunate that they
were willing to have individual inter-
pretations, but somewhat different in
meaning, to be circulated in each coun-
try, and that they were willing to have
the interpretation and understanding
of the word used to be interpreted in the
United States as meaning "discuss" and
In Panama meaning "negotiate." That
difference ought to have been scotched
right there. They should have reached
an agreement that they would use a
single word, and that it would have an
Identical meaning in the public infor-
mation media of each country.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I personally have
no knowledge about whether what the
Senator has said is accurate or not. I
was making the point that if the two
countries resumed relations and then sat
down to discuss the question, I could not
see any substantial difference whether
one word or the other were used, espe-
cially in view of our constitutional proc-
esses, which are well known to the Pan-
amanians, under which the Executive
could not give a firm commitment to do
anything without the advise and con-
sent of the Senate. The Panamanians
must have known that, and the pro-
ceedings would be in the nature of a dis-
cussion or negotiation subject to the pro-
vision of the Constitution that the re-
sulting understanding would have to be
approved by the Senate.
Mr. MORSE. I always thought this
particular controversy was a semantic
tempest in a teapot.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what I
mean.
I do not want to take too much time.
I know the Senator from Alaska [Mr.
GRUENING] is waiting to make a Com-
ment.
MY next question is about Vietnam,
which is a much more troublesome one.
What influences my views perhaps dif-
ferently from those of the Senator from
Oregon is that this matter has been pro-
ceeding for 10 years or longer, and we
cannot Judge it as if it were to be a new
involvement, and the question was
Whether we should become involved or
not become_ involved. Thai vestien
Might be a very different one from that
which faces us. Rightly or wrongly, we
are deeply involved.
The Senator mentioned unilateral ac-
tion. Both from personal discussions
and from public documents, and from
other sources that have been available
to others, I have no doubt that many of
our friends and allies, and even neutrals,
place great reliance on what we say we
are trying to bring about?a condition
in which some settlement might take
place.
No one suspects us of a wish to acquire
South Vietnam or of having any ambi-
tions of That sort. Our motives are quite
above reproach; namely, we would
like to see the people given an oppor-
tunity to obtain their independence and
make their own free choice.
If my memory of history is correct,
the South Vietnamese were proceeding
to do just that quite well until about 1957
or 1958. Then the guerrilla warfare was
inspired. Although these are matters on
which there can be a difference of opin-
ion as to fact, I believe that the guerrilla
warfare was initiated and supplied and
urged on dissident groups in South
Vietnam by the North Vietnamese.
They were jealous of the progress
being made. There was a pretty clear
case made to that effect. I believe there
have been findings to the effect that the
supplies for many of the guerillas came
from the North Vietnamese.
I agree that an element of civil war is
Involved, but a very strong element of
outside interference is also involved.
Such facts are difficult to document, but
studies have been made. A CIA com-
mission has made a study of the situa-
tion. It has been confirmed that the
source of much of the trouble is North
Vietnam.
I cannot go along with the suggestion
of the .Senator from Oregon that we
just withdraw, in view of the past his-
tory. If this country were considering
the question merely of whether or not
should go into South Vietnam at this
time, there might well be a different an-
swer; but I believe we are committed to
the point where it would be quite disas-
trous for this country to withdraw. I
am extremely reluctant to expand the
commitment.
The Senator from Oregon is not quite
correct in calling the present Govern-
ment a puppet government. If he
means that the Government is depend-
ent on the aid of this country to main-
tain itself, I think he is correct in that
sense; but if he means that this country
handpicked the head of the Government
and put him in power, that is a different
matter.
As I tried to say in my prepared re-
marks, in this situation we have little
choice but to try to Stabilize conditions
to see if we cannot help the present Gov-
ernment acquire, and I hope merit, the
support of the' people of that country
who are free to exercise any choice.
Then the question would be how long
this country should continue that kind
of support.
The administration itself has indi-
cated that it does not look at thiS in-
volvement as a permanent one, but as
one to provide an opportunity for the
Government and the people of South
Vietnam to maintain their independ-
ence.
Whether or not there will be negotia-
tions will be a matter for the future. I
confess that I believe an effort to bring
the United Nations into this situation
would be a futile one. I do not believe
the enemies of the South Vietnam Gov-
ernment would pay the slightest atten-
tion to the United Nations. With the
difficulty the United Nations has in main-
taining peacekeeping troops in other
areas?we are about to lose some of
them?I do not see that the suggestion
is a practical one. Therefore, as a prac-
tical matter, I do not see any alterna-
tive in this problem, with all due respect
to the Senator's sentiments about law.
I believe he and I are the only two
Members of the Senate at the present
time who , voted against the Connally
amendment, for whatever that is worth.
At the time we thought it worthwhile
to give the court some authority.
Mr. MORSE. And we were right.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. All other Senators
who supported us have either retired
or been defeated.
The Vietnamese situation is one in
which I do not see any feasible way in
which it will be possible to apply any
rules of law.
Mr. MORSE. I understand very
clearly the views of the Senator from
Arkansas with regard to this question.
I respect them. However, I disagree with
them.
. RIGHT. Will the Senator
elaborate as to how those rules could
be applied in South Vietnam?
Mr. MORSE. First let me make some
comments I wanted to make before the
last interjection. I suppose we ought
to have some appreciation of the British
viewpoint at the time of the American
Revolution, when the British did not
look with favor upon the French assist-
ing the American Colonies. We should
also recognize that at the time of the
War Between the States the Union Gov-
ernment was somewhat concerned about
some attempts on the part of the Con-
federacy to obtain support from England
and elsewhere.
The fact that one group in South Viet-
nam is obtaining assistance from North
Vietnam and another group is obtaining
assistance from the United States does
not change in the slightest degree the
fact that it is a civil war. It is a civil
war.
We do not like the sources from which
the Vietcong are obtaining assist-
ance, and the Vietcong do not like
the sources from which the South Viet-
namese are getting assistance. But it is
still a civil war, and I think we should
recognize that fact.
So the question goes back to our
entrance into that area. I see no rea-
son why we should continue a wrong
course of action. To the contrary, it is
important that we correct a mistake. A
horrendous mistake was made in this
country's going into South Vietnam. We
ought to get our troops out. I am not
saying we Ought to get out tonight, but
we should try to use procedures which
are available for us to arrive at an ac-
commodation.
otopi
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:The Senator from Arkansas is a little.
Concerned as to how those procedures
fire to, be devised. We never know until
.we'try. We should call for an extraordi-
nail? meeting of at least the foreign min-
isters of the SEATO nations to see what
they are willing to do, if anything. Does
the Senator know what I think it might
lead to? It, might lead to an imple-
mentation Of a neutralization prograni?
naughty as the word seems to be in some
quarters, it is, nevertheless, a meaning-
ful word.
There' are all kinds of neutralization
programs. I do not know what the em-
phasis would be. However, it might lead
to a neutralization program. It might
get France back into the picture. It
might get Great Britain back in. At
least, we should give our SEATO co-
members an opportunity to be of as-
sistance in trying to resolve the matter
and bring the shooting to an end.
France is a member of SEATO. Her
views on Vietnam have every bit as much
standing as ours do. SEATO was
created for the very purpose of handling
on a multilateral basis the kind of situa-
tion that developed in Vietnam. If it is
not going to be used to handle It,,
SEATO
should be dissolved officially, as well as
practically.
I do not agree with the Senator from
Arkansas that the United Nations has no
stake in the problem. I am surprised
that certain groups in the United Na-
tions have not been embarrassing us by
pressing for United Nations action. The
situation calls for United Nations ac-
tion. The Charter of the United Nations
provides that, whenever there is a situa-
tion which threatens the peace in any
area of the world, the -United Nations
cannot stand by and not take note of it.
Until we try, we shall never know what
can be done by the so-called procedural
approach that I, for what of a better
description, call a resort to the applica-
tion of the rules of law.
The United States is not trying. The
United States said to the world, as the
Secretary of Defense has said, "We are
going to do it forever if it is necessary
to carry out this policy." I am objecting
to the policy. I do not believe we should
do it forever. I do not believe it should
be done for the immediate future. We
Must make a choice and follow the proce-
dures.
Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Oregon yield?
Mr. MORSE. I am glad to yield to
the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLEN-
DER] and then I shall yield to the Senator
from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING].
Mg. ELLENDER. This discussion has
brought to mind my second visit to Sai-
gon in which I had the pleasure of meet-
ing President Diem. At that time we
were in the process of trying to rehabili-
Jate about 250,000 Vietnamese who vol-
untarily moved down from the north
after the partition was drawn.
We constructed a series of canals at
a distance of approximately 1 kilo-
meter apart and on those canals certain
sections were Measured off and given to
the newcomers. As it turned out, many
t)f the sections, or plots, were too small
for the earning of a good living. Many
Of the people were given land to farm
which was not suitable for farming in
the first place. As a result, many of
them became dissatisfied. Some of these
were located in, _the northern part of
South Vietnam wherein they could not
make a living and these grouped them-
selves in an area within 25 or 30 miles
northwest of Saigon. Another group of
these dissidents was in the delta.
When I last, saw President Diem, I
asked him to try and arrange some way
to get these dissidents together. I told
him I did not believe the newcomers
were being treated fairly by his Govern-
ment. They were not allowed to share
very much of our aid, for example. There
were other injustices also. I told Presi-
dent Diem that he should meet with
these people, who were even then begin-
ning to make trouble, and promise them
that justice would be done. I told him
then to follow up his promises.
This was never done. The situation
went from bad to worse, and I believe
this is the reason President Diem refused
to see me when I returned to his country
some years ago.
I am in complete agreement with what
the Senator has said that this is more
or less a civil war between the people
of South Vietnam and some of those
from North Vietnam who moved after
South Vietnam was declared independ-
ent.
Let us be truthful about it, that is just
what it is.
Mr. MORSE. I wish to thank the
Senator from Louisiana for his com-
ments. I completely agree with his ob-
servations and the observations he made
the last time I made a speech on the
floor of the Senate in opposition to the
United States Government policy in
South Vietnam.
I believe it has been helpful. I be-
lieve the Senators comments are unan-
swerably right.
I wish to apologize to the Senator from
Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]. I have been
keeping the Assistant Secretary of State
for Latin America, Mr. Mann, waiting
downstairs in the committee room for
35 minutes and I owe him an apology as
well; but I apologize to the Senator from
Alaska for leaving now when he is about
to speak.
Mr. GRUENING. Not at all.
Mr. MORSE. The Senator from Al-
aska will discuss this matter, as I know
he will, and then I shall come back to the
Chamber as soon as I can and read the
transcript of his speech, because the
Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING]
is my leader in regard to this question.
We have been standing shoulder-to-
shoulder in our objections to certain
phases of American foreign policy. I
know of no one for whom I have a higher
regard in his knowledge of foreign policy
than the Senator from Alaska. If he
will, therefore, accept my apologies for
leaving the Chamber at this time to go
down to the committee room to meet the
Assistant Secretary for Latin American
affairs, I shall return as soon as possible.
Mr. GRUENING. There is no need for
the Senator to apologize to me.
EXHIBIT 1
EXCERPTS ER0111 JOHNSON'S TALK TO LABOR
And before I conclude, for a moment, if
may. I would Just like to simply talk to you
about your family and mine, about their
future and their country.
Last Sunday?Palm Sunday?as I sat in
church I thought about all the problems that
face this world?ancient feuds and recent
quarrels that have disturbed widely sepa-
rated parts of the earth.
You have seen five or six different wars
appearing on the front page of your morn-
ing newspaper and you've heard about our
foreign policy.
The world has changed and so has the
method of dealing with disruptions of the
peace.
There may have been a time when a com-
mander in chief would order soldiers to
March the very moment a disturbance oc-
curred, although restraint and fairness are
not new to the American tradition.
As a matter of fact, some people urged me
to hurry in the Marines when the air be-
came a little hot on a particular occasion
recently.
But the world as it was and the world as
it is are not the same any more. Once--
once upon a time even large-scale wars
could be waged without risking the end of
civilization. But what was once upon a time
is no longer so, because general war is im-
possible. In a matter of moments you can
wipe out from 50 to 100 million of our ad-
versaries or they can, in the same amount of
time, wipe out 50 or 100 million of our peo-
ple, taking half of our land, half of our
population in a matter of an hour.
So general war is impossible and some al-
ternatives are essential.
The people of the world, I think, prefer
reasoned agreement to ready attack. And
that is why we must follow the Prophet
Isaiah many, many times before we send the
Marines, and say, "Come now and let us rea-
son together."
THE QUEST FOR PEACE
And this is our objective?the quest for
peace and not the quarrels of war.
In this nuclear world?in this world of
100 new nations?we must offer the out-
stretched arm that tries to help instead of
an arm-length sword that helps to kill.
In every trouble spot in the world this
hope for reasoned agreement instead of rash
retaliation can bear fruit. Agreement is be-
ing sought and we hope and believe will soon
be worked out with our Panamanian friends.
The United Nations peacekeeping machin-
ery is already on its merciful mission in Cy-
prus and a mediator Is being selected.
The water problem that disturbed us at
Guantanamo is solved not by a battalion of
marines, bayonetting in to turn on the water,
but we sent a single admiral over to cut it off.
And I can say to you that our base is self-
sufficient in lean readiness and a source of
danger and disagreement has been removed.
In Vietnam divergent voices cry out with
suggestions, some for a larger scale war, some
for more appeasement, some even for a re-
treat. We do not criticize or demean them.
We consider carefully their suggestions. But
today finds us where President Eisenhower
found himself 10 years ago. The position he
took with Vietnam then in a letter he sent
to the then President is one that I could take
In complete honesty today. And that is that
we stand ready to help the Vietnamese pre-
serve their independence and retain their
freedom and keep from being enveloped by
Communism.
We, the most powerful nation in the world,
can afford to be patient. Our ultimate
strength is clear and it's well known to those
who would be our adversaries. But let's be
reminded that power brings obligations.
The people in this country have more
blessed hopes than bitter victories. The peo-
ple of this country and the world expect
more from their leaders than just a show of
brute force. And so our hope and our pur-
pose is to employ reasoned agreement instead
of ready aggression, to preserve our honor
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1964, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
without a world in ruins, to substitute if we
can understanding for retaliation.
My most fervent prayer is to be a Presi-
dent who can make it possible fors every boy
in this land to grow to manhood by loving
his country?instead of dying for it.
ADJOURNMENT OF, HOUSE FROM
MARCH 26 TO APRIL 6, 1964
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that the Chair
lay before the Senate, House Concurrent
Resolution 284, and I ask for its immedi-
ate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
1VIcGovEim in the chair) . The concur-
rent resolution will be read for the in-
formation of the Senate.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
Resolved, That when the House adjourns
on Thursday, March 26, 1964, it stand ad-
journed until 12 o'clock meridian, Monday,
April 6, 1964.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the concurrent resolution?
There being no objection, the concur-
rent resolution was considered and
agreed to.
LET 1.7S MAKE THE "NEW' REAL-
ITIES" REAL REALITIES
Mr. GRUENING. Ur. President, the
distinguished junior Senator from Ar-
kansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT] , chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee, has
delivered a major address entitled, "Old
Myths and New Realities." It is a great
speech; it is a timely speech; and more
than that, it is a historic document. I
desire to congratulate him.
In essence the Senator from Arkansas
In a sense applies to our changing times
the unforgettable words of James Rus-
sell Lowell, in his poem, "The Present
Crisis," written over a century ago, when
he said:
New occasions teach new duties;
Time makes ancient good uncouth;
They must upward still, and onward,
Who would keep abreast of truth.
The Senator from Arkansas most
cogently points out that our foreign poli-
cies are rigidified by habit, timidity, and
fear, and that it is high time we re-
assessed them; that it is time that we
related them to deep-seated current
changes. I agree. This sound idea has
been expressed for particular areas;
namely, southeast Asia, by our distin-
guished majority leader, the Senator
from lVfontana [Mr. MANSFIELD], and by
my able colleague, the Senator from
Alaska [Mr. BialmErr], who gave a
masterly presentation on the subject, de-
livered on March 11.
The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Fol.-
ssAana] has included ,some memorable
ant happily phrased precepts, particu-
larly in his final paragraph, when he
saYs:
We must dare to think about unthinkable
things, because when things become un-
thinkabie, thinking stops and action becomes
111-1:4d1A4. We, are to,-clisabuSR ouraelves
of OA myths and to act wisely and creatively
1.10n1.14 new realities of our time, we must
think and talk about or problems with per-
fect freedom, remembering, as Woodrow Wil-
eon. said, that "The greatest freedom of
speech is the greatest safety because, if a
man is a fool, the best thing to do is to
encourage him to advertise the fact by
speaking."
I could not agree more fully with this
other, ptatement of his:
We must learn to welcome rather than to
fear the voices of dissent.
Was not our Nation born of dissent?
And finally, he states:
An effective foreign policy is one which
concerns itself more with innovation abroad
than with conciliation at home.
But, as to this, I wonder whether this
interjection of not seeking "conciliation
at home" does not run the risk of reject-
ing the importance of considering public
opinion in a country dedicated to?
maybe it is a myth but should not be?
rule by the people. It is certainly de-
sirable that our foreign policymakers not
shy away from innovating, especially
where old policies are manifestly obsolete
and ineffective. But should not they
likewise seek to find, out what the senti-
ments of the American people are, and
when they are strongly held, be in a large
degree guided by them?
I should like to think that such con-
sideration would be applicable to the war
we have been carrying on in South Viet-
nam for 10 years at the cost of billions
of dollars and with an increasing loss of
American lives, and with no evidence of
success?indeed with every evidence of
failure?despite the repeated optimistic
forecasts of those who made these dis-
astrous policies there, cannot bring
themselves to admit that they were
wrong, and propose, as the Senator from
Arkanosas does, to continue to give to the
patient more of the same medicine which
has failed to cure him.
While I find myself in agreement with
the general principles enunciated by the
Senator from Arkansas, as I have said I
do find myself in disagreement with his
conclusions about South Vietnam. He
says that?
It seems clear that there are only two
realistic options open to us in Vietnam in
?the immediate future?the extension of the
conflict in one way or another, or a renewed
effort to bolster the capacity of the South
Vietnamese to prosecute the war success-
fully on its present scale.
To me, the extension of our war there
is unthinkable, and this is one of the
"unthinkable things" that we should
think about and not only think about
but act upon. If by saying "we have no
choice but to support the South Viet-
namese Government and army by the
most effective means available" we can
interpret that as material assistance,
economic assistance, cooperation in ef-
forts at basic reform so that the tyran-
nies which have oppressed the people of
South Vietnam no less than they have
oppressed those in North Vietnam
may end, but not to the continuation of
our troops in combat, I would be inclined
to agree. But if the Senator feels?and
his speech is not quite clear to me at that
point?that we must continue to keep
Our -Men in combat, although the-
oretically they are only advisers and
technicians, I would disagree most em-
phatically, and I hope that in this case
6017
he would, as he says earlier, "welcome
rather than fear the voices of dissent."
Those voices of dissent have been heard
very emphatically in my office for the last
2 weeks from all parts of the country,
since I made a speech on the floor of the
Senate on March 10, urging that we
reverse our Vietnam policy?perhaps
"innovate" would be the Senator's
term?and pull our men out of the
firing line. I intend to put into the
RECORD the correspondence that I have
received on this subject. It is virtually
unanimous in support of the position
that I have taken and runs directly
counter to the Senator from Arkansas'
belief that "we have only two realistic
options in Vietnam in the immediate
future."
Maybe pulling our American boys out,
as I have suggested, is one, of the un-
thinkable things that the Senator prop-
erly says we must think about, and I feel
we need not only think about them but
act upon them.
As I have stated on this floor, President
Johnson inherited the mess in Vietnam.
It was not of his making. Now if ever
is the time to rethink our futile, costly,
tragic unilateral involvement begun 10
years ago. That involvement has been
perpetrated by the very weaknesses, by
the very myths in policymaking which
the able chairman of the Foreign Rela-
tions Committee has so eloquently de-
cried. Now is the time to put an end
to the lethal hypocrisy that our 15,000
Americans there are merely advisers.
They are instead, and have been, en-
gaged in combat?combat never author-
ized or approved by the Congress. They
have been sacrificed to a mistaken
policy. These sacrifices should cease at
once. They have been sacrificed to the
myths that the Senator from Arkansas
would replace by new realities. The
realities are that American boys in uni-
form have been sent into combat and
killed for an unknown and disastrous
concept which remains unchanged be-
cause the architects of these policies and
their successors cannot admit their
tragic errors and fit their reports and
optimistic forecasts to justify past error.
So I find myself in agreement with
the principles which the able Senator
from Arkansas has so eloquently ex-
pounded, but not with his application
of these principles in southeast Asia.
As to their application, I find myself
in full agreement with the views of the
senior Senator from Oregon [Mr.
MORSEL as he so forthrightly expressed
them in recent days in the Senate and
again earlier this afternoon.
MILDRED HERMANN
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, a
great woman, Mrs. Mildred Hermann, of
Juneau, Alaska, has died. To her, as to
few others, are applicable the words of
Paul to Timothy:
I have fought a good fight; I have finished
my course; I have kept the faith.
A valid and eloquent tribute to Mildred
Hermann was rendered her by a former
Alaska legislator, Vern Metcalfe, a
brilliant and enlightened journalist and
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now commentator and reporter for
station KJNO in Juneau. It tells much
and tells it well; but not all of Mildred
Hermann's achievements could be in-
cluded in any one tribute; as, for in-
stance, the organization of the women's
clubs throughout Alaska and her unceas-
ing efforts to raise funds for the anti-
cancer campaign. There was much else.
Vern Metcalfe's tribute so impressed
the Alaska State Legislature, now in ses-
sion in the State's capital, Juneau, that
the house membership had it spread on
the record. They fully appreciated
Mildred Hermann's great contribution
to good government, to civil morality, to
the basic essentials of responsible free-
dom in her part of America?Alaska?
that her life embodied.
? I ask unanimous consent that the edi-
torial obituary by Vern Metcalfe, as well
as Senate Concurrent Resolution 19
of the Alaska State Legislature, be print-
ed at this point in my remarks.
There being no objection, the editorial
and resolution were ordered to be print-
ed in the RECORD, as follows:
From the House Journal of the Alaska State
Legislature, Third Legislature, Second Ses-
sion, Mar. 20,1964]
EDITORIAL OBITUARY
(By Vern Metcalfe)
Mildred Hermann died Monday morning
and with her, in effect, came the passing of
an era. Mildred was a good friend of this
reporter and for that reason I feel that an
ordinary notice of death, or obituary, is not
Sufficient. I feel that way for many reasons
other than the friendship she extended to me.
Mildred Hermann, as anyone who knew
her can tell you, was not an ordinary woman.
She was many things to Alaska and her
death takes us back to Alaska's battle to gain
admission to the TJnion. It is not sufficient
for me to say that she was one of the fore-
most exponents of statehood. She was more
than that. She made statehood a personal
crusade, spent greatly of her time and money
in this struggle to make us, in her fre-
quently heard words, "first-class citizens."
I am not certain what inspired this zeal
but few people were in the vanguard any
longer than was Mildred Hermann. She was
the secretary of the Alaska Statehood Corn-
raittee and capped this long-range effort by
being elected a member of the Constitutional
Convention. Mrs. Hermann was an attorney
and had clerked for Alaska's great Delegate
to Congress, James Wickersham. She
learned both law and a passion for self-de-
termination from Wickersham and she was
one person that kept the late Delegate and
Federal judge's memory alive.
During the height of the statehood battle,
and it was just that, Mildred Hermann, in
the company of many other Alaskans, testi-
fied before Congress on the reasons we should
be admitted. A portion of her testimony was
used in an attempt to embarrass this fine
woman and to, in my opinion, degrade her
Intelligence. A hostile U.S. Senator asked if
Mrs. Hermann really believed that Alaska
could readily afford this luxury, particularly
Alaskan taxpayers. Mrs. Hermann, and I'm
not quoting exactly, replied in effect, "that
this might cause some belt tightening but
Alaskans have eaten beans before and can,
if necessary, eat beans again." When she
later sought election to the then Territorial
Senate opponents constantly taunted her
with "let them eat beans" but it did not de-
ter Mildred Hermann. Very little, if any-
,
thing, ever did,
was never afraid to express an
opinion and for several years right after
World War II she pioneered radio legislative
commentary. Her blasts at the canned salm-
on industry and others that she thought
were opposed to Alaska's best interests were
classics and she also left many a shattered
legislative ego as well.
Her interests in community affairs should
not be neglected since for many years she
was practically a one-woman crusade against
cancer. She also was active in the fight
against tuberculosis and heart disease. Her
other activities included the Soroptomists,
the Toast Mistress Club, Beta Sigma Phi,
Eastern Star, and membership in the Alaska
Bar Association.
I think the thing that most of us who
knew her will remember best was that Mrs.
Hermann wasn't just a "joiner." She was
a "doer", being a leader in everything she
became interested in. She was a close friend
of ERNEST GM/ENING, although they were of
opposite political faiths. This went for S.en-
ator Boa BARTLETT aa well and both men never
neglected to mention Mildred Hermann when
credit was being given to the really few of
those Who brought Statehood to Alaska.
Her two children, Russell R. Hermann and
Mrs. Barbara Ann Marshall, both knew of all
of this and we are certain their children will
be told of it as they grow older. The com-
ment today by myself is merely to inform
new residents that a great Alaskan died on
Monday. March 16th. Those who have been
here prior to statbhood know this and this,
in my own insufficient way, is my farewell
to her. We'll all miss her and remember the
good she did as she passed this way. Thank
you.
SENATE CONCTTRRENT RESOLUTION 19
Concurrent resolution relating to the late
Mildred R. Hermann -
Whereas with the death of Mildred R. Her-
mann the State has lost one of its most dedi-
cated and beloved citizens; and
Whereas the spirit and record of personal
and public service of Mildred Hermann es-
tablished her in the hearts of a generation
of Alaskans as a most remarkable woman;
and
Whereas as a young widow she managed to
raise a family, teach herself to qualify as
an attorney, and devote so much of her time
and energy to the public good; and
Whereas her enviable and prodigious rec-
ord as an attorney helping the underprivi-
leged would in itself qualify her for the high-
est expressions of esteem from her fellow
citizens; and
Whereas she served with spirit and out-
standing ability in the vanguard of the bat-
tle for statehood as the executive secretary
of the Alaska Statehood Committee and when
the battle was won she was accorded the
affectionate sobriquet of "the grand old
warhorse of the statehood movement" from
one editorialist; and
Whereas in 1955 she was one of the seven
delegates elected .at large from the Territory
to the Alaska Constitutional Convention of
1955-56, served with distinction at the con-
vention, and energetically and enthusiasti-
cally campaigned for the ratification of the
Constitution; and
Whereas she gave unstintingly of her time
and services to 'many worthy charitable
causes, serving as a director of the Alaska
Chapter of the American Cancer Society,
and as an active worker for and supporter
of the Alaska Tuberculosis Association and
the Alaska Heart Association: Be it
Resqlved. That the legislature joins with
the people of the State of Alaska in paying
homage to the memory of Mildred R. Her-
mann as a particularly outstanding Alaskan
woman, citizen and pioneer whose person-
ality, service, and accomplishments will long
be cherished as inspiring memories for those
who knew and worked with her, and to ex-
press and extend to her son and daughters
the heartfelt sympathy and condolences of
the people of Alaska on their loss, which is
shared in great part by the people them-
selves.
GREEK INDEPENDENCE DAY
Mr. HART. Mr. President, 143 years
ago on the 25th of March, the Greek na-
tion won its struggle against the Otto-
man Empire and achieved its independ-
ence.
The 25th of March again this year will
be marked by Greeks the world over with
joyous ceremony, and I today join all my
Greek friends in commemorating this
historical event.
Mr. President, throughout the centu-
ries the Greek people have been in the
forefront in the struggle for the liberty
of the individual. Western civilization
is founded on the principle that every in-
dividual is born free and, with his fel-
low man, to form a government to rule
over them reflecting the will of the in-
formed majority with protection for the
basic rights of minorities.
It can be said with historical accuracy
that this principle had its genesis in
ancient Greece and was among the most
glorious gifts bestowed by that civiliza-
tion upon Western Europe. On European
soil this principle was developed and per-
fected to the end that the benefits flow-
ing from it might reach all of mankind,
And indeed, the democratic form of free
society has been carried to all parts of
the world bringing civilization and the
good life to hundreds of millions of peo-
ple.
But this glorious principle from an-
cient times to the present has been
constantly threatened with annihilation
by an aberration which holds one indi-
vidual so supreme that his authority is
absolute and that all other individuals
in the realm are like chattel of the ruler.
This black principle has held sway in
the East for centuries and today sits like
a plague athwart almost the entire
Asiatic continent and has brought such
suffering and degradation to masses of
people as to reduce Medusa to tears.
In the very dawn of European history,
Greek city states began putting into prac-
tice the principles and theory of demo-
cratic government. But soon the Greek
people were called to defend their way
of life against the Persians who would
carry the Eastern principle of au-
tocracy to European soil. The heroic
Greeks met and repulsed the Persians
and thus saved Europe from domination
by the autocratic principle.
In the Christian era, the Greeks for
centuries opposed and stemmed the in-
cursions of the despotic Ottoman Turks
into Europe before being overwhelmed.
This calamity did not extinguish the
flaming spirit of the Greek people. They
resisted and fought the Ottoman with
all their might until they won their na-
tional freedom in 1821 and they estab-
lished the modern Greek state.
In the Second World War, the vastly
superior forces of the Axis Powers over-
came a valiant and heroically resisting
Greek Army. Throughout the dark days
of occupation, the Greek people strug-
gled against their oppressors until the
glorious day when the Nazis and Fascists
were defeated.
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