WHY CIA IS SECRET
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP75-00149R000100150039-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 17, 1999
Sequence Number:
39
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 21, 1963
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP75-00149R000100150039-6.pdf | 219.07 KB |
Body:
LINCOLN, NEB. ,NOV 4 ~ ~~ ,
STAR gpproved For Release 2001/0.8/01 ; CIA=RDP75~;~009491'~txOQ1
m. 26,159
c..~, Ei'a ati..
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~ ~ S~cr+
C YRGHT By 141LLiAM x,11_ i-nat;~o ~' ~t
ing .up its nose. It likes its overnment o "'??` ~"1?"`''~?""Iauure . Cama~'+?Itt
g p-?, ~ Aprtl
1961
~
h
F
?
,
,
t
en
idel Castro Cruabed an
erating out in the open and subject, to ~e .* agency-organized invasion of Cilba ,by rebel
close examination of all citizens. It,evett ,~. forces at tbe.Bay of pigs,
has a form of government not
d f
it
e
or ?
s ?~, The .CIA role in Viet Nam 8t' first .itX
checks and balances, worked Out so that ' :unnort of !hn n~o... _...,..._' ___ ~_ ..
...w, am nc:u,1 OL~[ne l:l:~
to another. It likes government kept withizt;. chief there, John A. Stchardson, reportedly:
easy reach of the people. at th
e request of U.S, Ambasaadar Ae.Wn~yy
Thus, when an organization such as Cabot Lodge; Rkh
d
'
ar
son, according bo
:lAi1
' the Central Intelligence Agency (CL4) be-, gon reports, worked closely on operatbbst ~'
come
s an important
matt
i
'
-
,
ers w
th Diem
s brother and Close ;add :,
VeM, f.{tfls 1 Part of our government viser_ Nvn nt~>. gyn... ?,.w.. --.__ u?_~ ..___
-
-- -" year, there is bound to la .~ ,~~? ? ?` `?" "" `'"'`
P yed iu that aprisiag but it is auape?ted
be controversy. It is bound to happen ~ be- that it bad a prominent part. ? { z-
cause the CIA is s
rround
d b
u
e
y secrecy. ~. ;
Not even CIA funds are clearly appropri- This unknown ataius of the_CIA in+in+ ',
ated, but rather
are scattered throughout i
,
ernational affairs is one~Of the things thif: ,
the budgets of other agencies. No one rui'fl
th
cs .
e Leathers of some members of ;"
knows exactly how many people the CIA
Con
res
'Th
`
.
g
s.
ey want to know if the>.CIA ,
:~~;;,
employs but estimates ~ to,s{qund ]8 t100: is making policy- for the ration :how matt~l :n,
A'o one knows exactly .wi~at the CIA ~nec_ .,e,,.,~~ ~~ .......,__._ __~_ ,~ ,
s ~ --- - __ ...? ~- . a:w,uu~ or arawing pians`ior agency:bpCi'a
ponsibili is the collection and evaluation ; ~t,.,,~ .,.,,,,._...,. ___.__ _ _
The short o! it b that terF ""` u w?,~r~eea in general,,:auew~?~
very much at all abeut the CIA ndPrab ~ `''answers to the estions it asica. b~ the
P CIA, the organizaRon would be lttt~el~'
no one but the Prealdert iruo~vs all there
t
s
royed. It would no longer bean [fit,
is to know about it. Natural; this runs i
t
ID
'
n
e
gence agency if all !ta
against the normal pattern of'our `jlovern~ ~ ? known, pace ezposed, the enemy '~
meat and raises the Ire
of Co
res
l~
hl
.
ng
s, w
c
; ret out its. agents and govcrnmeate toold
feels that it id entitled to a certain al~uni< ~.; take actions to meet aulypE the phiet?;~e
of information. ~ ~ ~~!
x
~,
~ ,, ? agency had. y
But a little examtnation~ wili show`.
that ~ 3 + u ~ `~ ~
L
sli
'R
.
ep.
e
e C' ~~ (R. I11:~ is ;fit
we either have the CIA ~aa it is rods on
Y member of the House CIA subcommitte~j.
we have none of it at ail. At the present"
I
u,r,e, me t;u~ communicates with.two cou,'''
firessional subcommittees, parts pf ..rho.;
House and Senate Armed Services Com ~;
mittees, But the cornrnunication ends there'. ~
as the -subcgnntnittees cartvtheir infermA.+s f~,..,, ~:.,;~ .,, .:..~_~~_s~operatIOns~an~yd;
~-...- yuaauv nn iuuepenQ~en[ IOr81gA p0$Cy, r~ ~ `
ing of the attack on South Korea in 1950 agency does not make policy. It simpt,V
or of Chinese intervention that fall
Later
ather
f
t
.
. g
s
ac
s upon which policy may be
CI.4 was credited with' a hand iu stmnlvino' hsanA T+ .:...,.,,.. ,..._._.__ ___. _
_~r~ ~.? ,..u..,,a ,u: oy ulose wno make policy:" - -
19x0-54; in bringing down Iran's Premier F
rom the subcommittee testimony a11?
2`4ossadegh in 1553 and the Arbenz regime the nature of the CIA, it would aeeni itri{
in Guatemala in 1954; and in supporfinC the, ?~~Q;h~o +? ...e;s~:., au_ _____,-_.. _
CIA's masts w? aau auuJ~Ci,1L to tine scrutiny of the~f~'
pectular success came to llghC H
ouse and .Senate. It may run in;some
as the result of a sensational failure. The respects, against our political grain but We
shooting down of Francis CAM, n?w.,.e ;., .. . ..
-
--- -~r-.--,.~, r~~ Qu ~?nn6e_wnen anti tf the facts o ,Iris wo
end to four years of aerial reconnaissance' ,~pA,,, s,...,_.,__... _ _t____ ., ..~; .x, a -_
Approved For Release 2001/08/01 :CIA-RDP75-00149F~b'001'0'0150039=6..''
na recent ststepaen~
on the floor, -l-e~" aaidt
'`Our Wicommittee has