C.I.A.: MAKER OF POLICY, OR TOOL?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP75-00001R000200520008-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2003
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: April 25, 1966
• Content Type: NSPR

APRIL 25,6proved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
C.I.A.: Maker of Policy, or Tool ?
The Central Intelligence Agency, which 'does not often
appear in the news, made headlines on two counts in recent
days. The agency was found to have interceded in the
slander trial of one of its agents in an effort to obtain his
exoneration without explanation except that he had done its
bidding in the interests of national security. And it was
reported to have planted at least five agents among Michi-
gan State University scholars engaged in a foreign aid
project some years ago in Vietnam. Although the specific
work of these agents and the circumstances of their em-
ployment are in dispute, reports of their activities have
raised many questions about the purposes and. methods of
the C.I.A., and about Its relationship to other parts of the
Government and nongovernmental institutions. Even larger
questions about control of the C.I.A. within the framework
of a free government and about its role In foreign affairs
are periodically brought up in Congress and among other
governments. To provide background for these questions,
and to determine what issues of public policy are posed by
the agency's work, The New York Times has spent several
months looking into its affairs. This series is the result.
opinicns'fram informed Ameri-
neighbors about the agency and ~ cans throughout the world.
Survey Finds Widely enhancing his own political po It has obtained reports from
'Ultimately, 20 foreign correspondents and
Feared Agency Is Ultimately, the incident led editors with recent service in
States Government more than 35 countries and
Tightly Controlled the United from reporters in Washington
to tell a lie in public and then who interviewed more than 50
kto admit the lie even more pub- present and former Govern-
Following Is the first of fivel, licly. ment officials, members of Con-
out
articles on the Central Intelli- The lie was no sooner dIs greys and militcarrieficers over
genre Agency. The articles arelfclosed than a world predisposed seveThis ral months, disclosed, for
by a team of New York Times to suspicion of the C.I.A. and instance, that the Singapore
f what really had ff Jr resulted not from a lack
was the cover for some C.I.A.
agents in South Vietnam durii)g
a multimillion-dollar technical
assistance program the univer-
! sity conducted for the regime of .
the late president Ngo Dinh
Diem.
Last week, it also became
known that an Estonian refugee
who was being sued for slander
in a Federal District Court In
Baltimore was resting his de-
fense on the fact that the al-
leged slander had been commit-
ted in the course of his duties
,as a C.I.A. agent.
In a public memorandum ad-
dressed to the court, the C.I.A.
stated that it had ordered the
agent, Juri Raus, to disclose no)
further details of the case, in
order to protect the nation's
correspondents consisting ofh pp happened oin Singapore five or political control or from reek-
ness by the C.I.A., but from
Finne
eat
e
W
h
t
p
less
.
o r
n
Tom Wicker, Jo
y, years earlier began
atic
Max Frankel, E. W. Kenworthy questions that have .dogged the bad fortune and diplom
and other members of the Times intelligence agency and the blundering.
It found that the C.I.A., for
staff. United States Government for all its fearsome reputation? is
special to The crew York Times years: under far more stringent pO~a !
etary
d
b
.
u
g
WASHINGTON, April 24- galas this secret body, which cal and
ofits critics know or con-
One day in 1960 an agent of the was known to have overthrown most
nd that since the Bay of
d
ce
e, a
Central Intelligence Agency governments and installed pigs' disaster in Cuba In 1961
caught a plane in Tokyo, flew others, raised armies, staged an th@ a controls have been tightly
to Singapore and checked into !invasion of Cuba, spied and exercised.
a hotel room in time to receive counterspied, established air-, The consensus of those inter-
that the critics'
viewed was
a visitor. The agent plugged a lines, radio stations and schools favorite recommendation for a
lie detector into an overloaded and supported books, magazines stronger rein on the agency-
electrical circuit and blew out and businesses, running out of a Congressional committee to
the lights in the building. the control of its supposed poll-'oversee the C.I.A.-would prob-
In the investigation that fol- tical master? .ably provide little more real
((control than now exists and
lowed, the agent and a C.I.A.; cWas it in fact dama ing,! s
g , might both restrict the agency'
it sought to advance, thel eff ectiveness and actually shield
colleague were arrested and,
jailed as American spies. (!;.national interest? Could it spendit from those who desire More
The result was an interna-$ huge sums for ransoms, bribes,knowledge about its operations.
tional incident that infuriated and subversion without check] A Matter of Will
London, not once but twice. Itior regard for the consequences?', other important conclusions
embarrassed an American Am- dDid it lie to or influence the; of the study include the f?llow-
bassador. It led an American political leaders of the UnitedangWhiletheinstitutional forms
Secretary of State to write a States to such an extent that i
rare letter of apology to a for-;ti really was an "invisible govern .fec the andl sufficient, control aitpis really
eign Chief of State. ment" more powerful than even. the will of the political officials
I h ust exert control that is
m
foreign intelligence apparatus.
Mr. Raus. is claiming complete
legal immunity from the suit on
the grounds - that,he had acted
as an official agent of the Fed-
eral Government.
Such incidents, bringing the
activities of the C.I.A. into, dim
and often dismaying public view,
have caused members of Con-
gress and- many publications, to
question ever more pers tently
'the role-and propriety
'Washington's most discussed
and least understood institu-
tions. Some of the misgivings
have been shared by
two American President, Harry
S. Truman and John -F. Ken-
nedy..
A Wide Examination
seek reliable answers to
To
.
these questions; to sift, where
possible, fact from fancy and
theory from condition; to deter-
mine what real questions of
public policy and international
relations are posed by the exist-
Five years later that foreign the President? W o
ortant leader was handed an opportu-' These are questions constant- l often been and that has most
Cnmel cEven when control is tight
pity to denounce the perfidy of -1- 4 aroun s the world
.
in particular, Appi-ci`lxv 9a*$ol?O#3dv'6,2/dc1
61
VOW
the apprehension of his Oriental that Michigan State Universit.y~ t? which C..A. n
,9,bp he New Y orx 'Mimes
o piled information and
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
THE C. I. A.-GOOD, BAD OR OTHERWISE? Drawing
1Vluch Alan
discussed 1965
the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has not escaped humorous treatment either. Its detractors
loudly condemn it, nearly everyone talks about it, but very few really understand it.
bassadors placing them in charge ers s flight over the Soviet Union and Albania, from the state of ! and moved closer to Peking. .
ofallAmericanactivitiesintheir in 1960,, just before a scheduled President Sukarno's health to Moreover, some of the Nation-
countries, he followed it with a summit conference. Not much is the meaning of Nlkita S.hru- alist Chinese are still in north-
secret letter specifically exempt- usually said of the incalculable shchev fall from power. ern Burma, lug the C.LA ; but when Presi-
trouble ater, and still
dent Kennedy value of the undis-I Yet the critics' favorite indict- fomenting troubland infuriat-.
y put the Ambassa turbed U-2 flights between 1956 ments -are spectacular enough ing governments in that area,
dors in command of all activi- and 1960 over the heartland of
ties, he sent a secret letter spe-Russia. I although they have not been
cifically including the C.I.A. It And when critics frequently to explain the world's suspicions supported
an by the C.I.A. or any
n
and fears of the C.I.A. and its is still In effect but, like all charge that C.I.A. operations operations. In 1958 agency for a depera* a
directives, variously interpreted. contrdict ,and sabotage official~I A sorry episode in Asia inE In 1volnn South Vietnamese
agents and South ion rebels Out of a Spy Novel American policy, they may not! thQ early ninteen-fifties is a fre-;agenis ts ad Cambodian rThe critics, to know that the C.I.A. is ofteniIquently cited example. C.I.A.;was interpreted
quick point to overruled in Its policy judg-I agents gathered remnants ofl by Prince over-
the agency's publicized blunders s meets: the defeated Chinese Nationalist throw s an attempt but drove
and setbacks,
and setbacks, are not mollifi I armies in th throhim. It failed boa dhve
ec} As an example the C.LA.I e jungles them orth- him farther down the road that
genuine achievements strongly
by precise prediction of the date urged the Kennedy Ad-j west Burma, supplied thwith ultimately led to his break in
its whichthe s ioso C elate ministration not to recognize: gold and arms and ncoura ed,, iplomatic relations with Wash-on mu- mists would explode a nuclear the Egyptian-backed Yemeni them to raid Communist China-,ington.
regime and warned that Presi- One aim was to harrass Pek-'
device; its fantastic world of dent Nasser would not quickly ing to a point where it might Indonesian Venture use of electronic devices; iy r each a pull his troops out of Yemen. I retaliate against Burma, forcingi In Indonesia In the same year,
spy, Oleg Penkovski Ambassador John Badreau
into the the Burmese to turn to the: Kremiin itself; its work against the advice of American
in keeping the Con out of thought otherwise His advic United States for protection. diplomats, the C.I.A. was au-
g was accepted, the republic was Actually, few raids occurred, thorized to fly in supplies from
Communist control; or the feat recognized, President Nasser's and the army became a trouble- Taiwan and the Philippines to
C straight from a spy novel- .oapsremained~andmuciimili-- some and costly burden. The:aid army officers ~ g
of arranging things so that tarn and political trouble fol-! C.I.A. had enlistd the help of against President Sukarnorin
when arranging l Abdel Nasser ca at to ed that the C.I.A. had fore- Gen. the
Phan Sriyanod, apolice
caSumatra n pilot Java. Amara
to power l1 Egypt the "manage-seen and the State Department chief of Thailand-and a leading can pilot was shat down on a
menu consultant" who had an "had not. narcotics dealer. The National- bombing mission and was re-
office next to the Arab leeader's Nor do critics always give the fsts, with the planes and gold Ieased only at the insistent urg-
and, who was one of his grin-l C.I.A. credit where it is due for furnished them by the agents, ing of the 2. Mr. y Administra-
advisers was a C.LA.~its vital and daily service as an, went into the o
operative. pium business.,tion In 1962. Mr. Sukarno, na-
When the U-2 incident is men- !A and encyclopedic source By the time the "anti-Coinmu- rurally enough, drew the aflous
tinned by critics, as it always Hof quick news, information, anal- ~mist" force could be disbanded,lconclusions; how much of his
the emphasis is usually it al ways is,'
ysis and deduction about every- and the C.I.A. could wash itsi fear and dislike of the United
C.LA.'s -,and the senhower+ thing from a new police chief in hands of it Bu
Administration's - 'roY ke~seiQO i/ ~h#1? ul, the osay. to those
permitting Francis Gary pow_ ent between Communist Chinal ened to quit the In 1960, C.I.A. agents In Laos,
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : Cl RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
disguised as "military advisers," nected with the agency recal' Thus, it is easy for sincere1 with no holds barred."
stuffed ballot boxes and engi- that pro-Chinese elements in men to believe deeply that thei Secretary Rusk has said pub-
neered local uprisings to help a East Africa once circulated a C.I.A. must be brought "to heel"',.licly that there is "a tough
hand-picked strongman,, Gen. document urging revolts against in the n lion's own interest. Yet. struggle going on in the back
American" Phoumi Nosovan, set up a "Pro- several governments. When this every w 11-informed official and alleys all over the world." "It's
American" government that was inflammatory message backfired former official with recent! a tough one, it's unpleasant, and
desired by President Eisenhower on its authors, they promptly, knowle ge of the. C.I.A. and its; no one likes it, but that is not
tivities who was interviewed; a field which can be leftentirely
oi! Sbate John
t
a
it
d
e
ary
was
c
cre
S
spread the word W.
an
Foster Dulles. a C.I.A. forgery designed to die confirmed what Secretary of the other side," he said.
This operation succeeded-so credit them-and so' believed State 1 tusk has said public- . The back-alley struggle, he
much so that it stimulated So the falsehood. ly the the CIA "does not i concluded, is "a never-ending
uarter
no
th
'
viet intervention on the side of
leftist Laotians, who counter- Obvious Deduction
attacked the Phoumi govern-
ment. When the Kennedy Ad-
ministration set out to reverse
the policy of the Eisenhower
Administration, it found the i
C.I.A. deeply committed to
Phoumi Nosovan and needed
two years of negotiations and
threats to restore the neutralist
regime of Prince Souvanna
Phouma.
Pro-Communist Laotians, how-
ever. were never again driven
.
.
.
dis
uted
t
ll
p
y un
ua
nom, and it is n 'WERILL South ut- When an embassy subordi- But hat vir
pion that the Vietcong in n ' note in Lagos, Nigria, known fact rises in- itself the centrall,formation, how far should the
political leaders of the United
th
e;
Vietnam have been supplied and , to be, the C.I.A. station chief questi s that emerge from
replenished in their war to de- It a fancier house than the survey. What is control? And States go in approving the clan-
stroy still another. C.I.A. aided United States Ambassador, Ni-Who guards the guards? !destine violation of treaties and
pon information ilborders, financing of coups, in-
v
t i
t
i
^ F
s u
s
go
or i
ject, the non-Commun
- deduc-
proernmerat in Saigon. gtioneriansaboutmade who the was in obvious charge. l provid(d by .the C.I.A. itself that ": fluencing of parties and govern
When President Jo:1o Goulart those I ho must approve its -ac-', ments, without tarnishing and
Catalogue of Charges _
of Brazil fell from power in 1964 tivities are usually required to retarding those ideas of freedom
it was the C.I.A. that built decide.; and self-government they pro-ana tip Ngo Dinh Diem as the pro- ofbeing ng among mong his most mast ener- accused It iS the C.I.A. that has the Claim to the world?
American g of'
head of South Viet- petit opponents, exaggerated money.(nbtunlimited bwtamiple) And aut. how autonomy necessary
Emperor Bao Dai, had found a enc) not onl to conceive ry out such acts can or should
him in a monaste cell in Bel- ed him were natural. but al yo to carry out projects be tolerated by a free society?
It t is not only abroad that such There are no certain or easy
glum and brought him back to C.I.A. involvements - real or "of pre t importance-and com- answers. But these questions
Saigon as Premier. And it was imaginary-have aroused dire men'su ate risk. nswe even be discussed known
the C.I.A. that helped persuade fears and suspicions. Theodore A lion, If Not Success cannot edgeably on the basis of the few
the Eisenhower and Kennedy C Sorensen has written, for in-
Administrations to ride out the stance, that the Peace Co It the C.I.A., unlike the glimpses - accidental or Vietnamese storm with Diem- Defe a Department with its tional-that-the public has so
its early days strove manfully, servic rivalries, budget .con-I'Ifar been giveh into the 'private
probably too long. and apparently successfully, to terns d political involvements, world of the C.I.A.
These recorded incidents not keep its ranks free of C.I.A. in- and nlike the State Depart-' That world is both dull and
only have prompted much soul- filtration.
searching about the influence ofl Other Government agencies, meat ith its international dip- lurid, often at the same time.
on American lomat c responsibilities and its A year ago, for instance, it
an instrument such as the C.I.A.! American newspapers and Vusi-
vuine ability to criticism, that was reported tht some of the
have given the but atsa nets concerns, earch charitable institutiorL5 foun- -is freest of all agencies to advo- anti-Castro Cuban survivors of
have given the C.I.A. repute and nsom cate is projects and press home the Bay of Pigs were flying in
lion. for deeds and misdeeds fa and universities have, in same- i its- views; the C.I.A. can prom-1 combat in deepest, darkest Af-
beyond its real intentions andg cases, been as as diligent as Soviet Ise scion, if not success. !rice. Any Madison Avenue pub-
trying to prefect An both the agency and, lisher would recognize that as
agents in capacities.
th
Through spurious reports, gos- themselves from C.I.A. pene a- those who must pass upon its right out of Ian Fleming and
sip, misunderstandings, deep- "boil. They have net always ays been plans are shielded by security James Bond.
bh
l
sf
Peace
,
as
e
u
But to the bookish and tweedy
seatelt 'fears and forgeries and so succes
from the outside oversight and
the agency lies Carps. review under which virtually all, men who labor in the pastoral
fals ications
,
beam accused of almost any- Some of their fear has been
other officials operate, at home setting of, the C.I.A.'s huge
road
it of. er so dependent on clandestine w- -
of: agents and other Institutions' This, while the survey left no Potomac River near Langley,
It has been accused s Va., the story was only a satis-
9Plottin the assassination of resources. Butas in the case of doubt that the C.I.A. operate
g under strict forms of control, it fying episode in the back-alley
Jawaharlal !Nehru of India. , its overseas reputation, its ac- raise the. more serious question version of "Struggle for Free-
the United
i
ti
vs
n
gProvokin the 1965 war be Mal ac
g States-for instance, its aid in whether there was always lrhe dom."
t q n India and Pakistan. substance of control.
En ineerin the "plot" that financing a center for interlia-
g g for tional studies at the Massachu- ! In many ways, moreover,
became the pretext for the mur- pun h discussion has become
setts Institute of Technology-
i
a pen- en-
der of leadin Indones
g g en- centered on the question of
erals last year. have made the fear of infiltra-
Y cootr 1. A, more disturbing mat-
gSupporting the rightist army lion r(ftl to many scholars and
p ter ay be whether the nation
lots in Algeria. businesses.
cMurdering Patrice- Lumum- The revelation that C.I.A.1has !lowed itself to go, too far
a grim and sometimes
Michi
d
t
among
s serve
ba in the Con o. I agen
g dead V business of espionage
r'-'
gKidnapping Moroccan ageritsi State University scholars I. and ecret operations.
in Paris. South Vietnam from 1955 to On? 3 of cr the best-Informed men
(Plotting the overthrow of 11959 has contributed to the fear.!,,
President Kwame Nkrumah of; The nature of the agents' workilon ?t is subject in Washington
'and the circumstances of their k b
t business as "ugl
d th
y,
e
a
Ghana.
All of these charges and many, employment are in dispute, butlmea and cruel." The agency
similar to them are fabrications, their very involvement, event loses (men and no one eveagenc s
has aroused!
relatively long ago
,
authoritative officials outside
the C.I.A. insist. concern that hundreds of schol- of em again, he said, and
The C.I.A.'s notoriety even. arly and charitable American who "we catch one of ,them"
enables some enemi?~ p e glb e ev/2O /tea; (~ ?-ft p ~ 00520008-1
from their own mistakes. A for-,and hampered by the suspicions' come necessary o get M, mar American official uncon-of other ,governments. i.thing out of them" and we do it
q
ere
s
initiate actions, unknown to thellwar, and
"
asked and none given.
rican leaders are ready to take 'rne qv ew x orx x Line -~ut v ?.r that struggle, Mr. Rusdc
forgeries at face value," one ob- left no doubt that, whatever its. s But Insisted, thatrule the s sk
server says, "because deep down miscalcl.ilations, blunders and',; in far frsepm "part they honestly fear the C.I.A. Its misfortunes, whatever may have gle s
its No one seriously disputes that
in
d
ur
g
image in this part of the world been tie situation
and dur- the effort to gain intelligence
bumptious early days
couldn't be worse." Y about. real or otenitial enemies,
The image feeds on the rank- ing its 'over-hasty expansion in p
and after the Korean War, the even about one's friends, is a
est of fabrications as well anon
the wildest of stories-for the agency acts today not on its vital part a any government's
simple reason that the wildest: own but with the approval and activities, particularly agovern-
olitical ment so burdened with responsi-
l of the
t
p
ro
of stories are not always false, under tie con
is often involvesleaders, of the United States,!bility aa s the United Se fury Gov-
?nd the C
I
A
prnmet the 20
.
 APRIL 26,
AQPC
How C.I.A. Put `InstantAzrForce' In to Congo
Intervention, Invasion, Spying All in a Day's Work
Following is the second of
five articles on the Central In-
telligence Agency. The articles
are by a team of New York
Times correspondents consist-
ing of Tom Wicker, John W.
Finney, Max Frankel, E. W.
Kenworthy and other members
of The Times staff.
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 25-
At the Ituri River, eight miles
south of Nia Nia in the north-
east Congo, a government col-
tunn of 600 Congolese troops
and 100 white mercenaries had
been ambushed by a rebel force
and was under heavy fire. Sud-
denly, three B-26's skimmed in
over the rain forest and bombed
and strafed a path through the
rebel ranks for the forces sup-
ported by the United States.
. At the controls of the Ameri-
can-made planes were anti-Cas-
tro Cubans, veterans of the Bay
Langley, Va. Its rapid and ef-
fective provision of an "instant
air force" in the Congo was the
climax of the agency's deep in-
volvement there.
The C.I.A.'s operation.in the
Congo was at all times respon-
sible to and welcomed by the
policy-makers of the United
States. iCommunist parties around thel The bipartisan group is made
It was tnese policy-makers world. I up of ranking members of the
who chose to make the agency Wlyen the Communist and f Armed Services Committee and
the instrument of political and Western worlds began to the Appropriations subcomthit-
the
military intervention in another wrestle for control of the vast,
nation's affairs, for in five years undeveloped Congo in 1960 after
of strenuous diplomatic effort it had gained independence from
it was only in Langley that the Belgium, a modest little C.I.A.
White House, the State Depart- office in Leopoldville mush-
ni.ent and the Pentagon" found roomed overnight into a virtual
the peculiar combination of embassy and miniature war de-
talents necessary to block the partment.
creation of a pro-Communist This was not to compete with
regime, recruit the leaders for a the real United States Embassy
pro-American government and and military attaches but to
apply the secret, or at least dis-
t t
supply the advice and suppor
o creet, capacities of the C.I.A.
enable that government to sur- to a seething contest among
vive. 1many conflicting forces.
From wire-tapping to influ- Starting almost from scratch,
Reins Weighed
By E. W. KENWORTHY
Special to The New York Times
/WASHINGTON, April 25-
A small group of Senators re-
sponsible for monitoring the
Central Intelligence Agency met
today to discuss whether their
"watchdog" committee should
be enlarged and its surveillance
thightened.
tee dealing with funds for
armed services.
For many years the Senate
group and a comparable group
in the House, also drawn from
the Armed Services and Ap-
propriations Committees, have
constituted the only "legislative
oversight" of the secret opera-
tions and the secret funds of the.
C.I.A..
For many years also a large
number of Senators and Repre-
sentatives have urged that these
two groups be expanded to in-
clude members of the Senate.
Foreign Relations and House'
Foreign Affairs Committees
so that the activities of the
agency would be subjected more
closely to political considera-,
tions.
Although Senator, Richard B.
Russell, chairman of the Armed
Services Committee and the
watchdog Committee, has
resisted these suggestions, in-
Cont. Page 9
of Pigs invasion of Cuba in
1961, three years before. They
had been recruited by a pur-
portedly private company ' in
Florida. Servicing their planes
were European mechanics so-
licited through advertisements
in London newspapers. Guiding
them into action were Ameri-
can "diplomats" and other
officials in apparently civilian
positions.
The sponsor, paymaster and
director of all of them, however,
Central intelligence
was the
encing elections, from bridge- because the Belgians had for-
blowing to armed invasions, in bidden Americans even to meet
the dark and in the light, the with Congolese officials, thel
Central Intelligence Agency has C.I.A. dispersed its agents to
become a vital instrument of learn Congolese politics from
American policy and a major the bush on up, to recruit likely
component of American govern- leaders and to finance their bids
meat. for power.
It not only gathers informal- Capable of quickly gathering
tion but also rebuts an ad-information from all sources, of
versary's information. It not buying informants and disburs-
far-
t
-----
s own
only organizes i
Agency, with headquarters in flung operations but also re-: Cont. Page 6
sists an adversary's operation.
Against the Soviet Union
alone, it performs not only cer-
tain of the services performed
in Moscow by the K.G.B., the
Committee for State Security,
but also -many of the political,
intelligence and military serv-
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
 ing funds without the pve FqGIfiZ@ gp ?9 tai. 4 n, C
cratic restraints imposed on mechanics without legal corn- forestati
other government agencies, the plications and- furnish the tae- agency
#PF45-Qi9cpOh1,Rvq 2Q st , physicists,
ranks or from Americans under' While he whitish-gray build-
butu, Victor Nendaka and ,
Albert Ndele. Their eventual
emergence as President of the
country, Minister of Transporta-
tion and head of the national
bank, respectively, proved a
tribute to the Americans' judg-
ment and tactics.
So pervasive was the C.I.A.
Influence that the agency was
widely accused of the assassina-
tion of Moscow's man, Premier
Patrice Lumumba. Correspond-
contract. ing . is i4ndoubtedly as secure
Moreover, some C.I.A. agents as fences, guards, safes and
eventually felt compelled to fly elaborate] electronic devices can
some combat missions them-;make it, the location is hardly
I selves in support of South Afri- a secret. A large sign on the
can and Rhodesian mercenaries. I George Washington Parkway
The State Department denied' pointing to "Central In-
this at first - then insisted telligenc Agency" has been re-
the Americans be kept out of i moved, bit thousands of people
combat. know you can still get to the
But it was pleased by the over- same buiding by turning off on
neers, psychiatrists and even
agronomists, geologists and
foresters.
Some of the achievements of
these experts are prodigious,
if reports filtering through the
secrecy screen are even half
accurate. For instance:
cFrom ordinarily available
information, reliable actuarial
and life-expectancy studies have
been prepared on major foreign
leaders.
In the case of one leader,
all success of the operation, in the same, road, now marked by;,from not-so-ordinarily available
which no planes were lost and the sign I "BPR" - - "Bureau of information, physicians gleaned
all civilian targets were avoided. Public Roods." important health data: They
d
i
'm
a
e a ur
nalysis from a speci-
Meanwhile, in Other Areas... There, beyond the affable
ents who were in the Congo' ?guaril at the gate, is the large,.Imen stolen from a hospital in
are convinced the C.I.A. had In the years of the Congo ;rectan ui r structure with four Vienna where the great man
to d
ith th
o
6
e rnWder, lip Tibetans in and out of ! cC I A shi n
thou h it did la major role g g doves bar ed. which stands a.s pp g experts.
g p y"
a maJ Communist China, drawing the visible symbol of what sJth"rough sheer expertise, spot-
in establishing Cyrille Adoula secrets from Col. Oleg Penkov- supposed ~o be an invisible oper- ted the first shipment of Soviet
as Mr. Lumumba's successor for sky of Soviet military intelli- ation k arms to Cuba before the vessels
ti
l
og?s
c wizardry of sangoria's press and radi oroaai
-' wo- telligence, science and technol- mnor - but strategically cru-
ley, are said to have been the casts, predicting the longevity ogY and . upport
cial - societies as those of the
.
deciding factors in the vote that of the world's major political Wha the Divisions Do hill tribes of Laos and Vietnam.
brought Mr. Adoula to power.; leaders, keeping track of the'- c'One woman has spent her
Russian, Czechslovak, Egyptian' world's arms traffic ands The Diyy~~ision of Science and professional lifetime in the
and Ghanaian agents were of many arms manufacturing Technology is responsible for agency doing nothing but col-
simply outbid where they could enterprises and supplying a keeping current on developinglecting, studying, collating,
not he outmaneuvered. staggering flow of information, technique in science and analyzing and reporting on
In one test after Mr. Adoula I rumor, gossip and analysis to weapons, including nuclear! everything that can be learned
had been elected, rival agents of the President and all major de--weapons, and for analyzing about President Sukarno of In-
mast and West almost stumbled! partments of government, photos taken by U-2 reconnais- I donesia -- "and I mean every-
over each other rushing in and! For all this, the C.I.A.: sance planes and by space satel-I thing," one official reported.
out of parliamentary delegates' employs about 15,000 persons ' liter. ! Heavy With Ph.D.'s
homes. On the day of the roll- and spends about a half billion The Division of Support Is
call, American and Czech re dollars a year. responsibl for procuring equip- It 'is the agency's boast that
pre- Its headquarters, the brain, ment and for logistics, coin- it could staff any college from
sentatives sat one seat apart in and nerve center
the informa-
':its anal
sts 50
r cent
ic
ti
f
d
it
i
,
y
pg
!mun
a
o s an
o
secur
y
n
,-, the gallery with lists of mem- tion repository of. this sprawl-,eluding the C.I.A. codes. lwhom have advanced degrees
bers winkin
at each other in
g
in Itllidti.d 30tfh h
,gnegence an operaons The, Division of Plans and the an per cen o womave
triumph whenever a man system, is a modern, eight-story Division of Intelligence per- I doctorates.
pledged to the one turned out buildin of recast concrete and form the basic functions of the 1! Sixty
to have been ;eked off b the g p per cent of the Intel-
p by inset windows - a somewhat' agency. They represent the Illigence Division personnel have
other. Ultimately Mr. Adoula superior example of the faceless alpha and Omega, the hand and~iserved 10 years. Twenty-five
won by four votes. Federal style - set in. 140 acres brain, the dagger and the lamp, per cent have been with the
More Than Money of lawn and woodland over-; the melodrama and the men-'C.I.A. since 1947, when the
By the Congo period. how- looking the south bank of the; ograph of the intelligence pro-!;agency was established.' The
they had learned that -their town vvashington? one roof ha caused much of the "during the Korean War -
thy earlier instincts to try to solve In this sylvan setting, some- .controversy that has swirled, primarily, but by no means
nasty political problems with What resembling an English' about the .LA. since the Bay : exclusively, among Ivy League
money alone had been overtaken deer park, about 8,000 C.I.A.: of Pigs. ! graduates.
the recognition of the need the - the top managers,: It is, the responsibility of the The Division of Plans is a
by for far more it ion oft sophisticated and the planners and the analysts i Intelligene Division to a s-1l cover title for what is actually
-live, if not a cloistered life,; semble, analyze and evaluate in- the diviion of secret opera-
enduring forms of influence. at least a kind of academic one' formation from all sources, and tions, or, "dirty tricks." It is
Purchased?" one American
commented. "You can't even with the materials they are to produce daily and periodical charged with all those strata-
strata-
rent these guys for the after- f studying or the plans they may, intelligence reports on any gems. and wiles - some as old
be hatching. country, pe son or situation for as those of Rahab and some as
noon." Formerly, the C.I.A. was scat- , the Preside it and the National. new as satellites - associated
And so the C.I.A. kept grow- tered through many buildings in'' Security Council, the President's with the black and despised arts
lag in size and scope. p
pense of security. - j; All infor,, nation - military, ~ go far beyond the hiring and
Congo - through American ~ 7?
it became apparent that-hastily a $30-million appropriation for Industrial -- is grist for this inforniers and defectors.
supplied arms and planes, as a new, unitary headquarters division's m ll. Perhaps no more It was the Plans Division that
well as dollars and cars, would ,:was inserted without identifi- than one-fifth - by volume and set up clandestine "black" radio
be needed to rotect the Ameri- not necessarily importance - stations in the Middle East to
p cation in the budget of another comes i from agents overseas counter the propaganda and the
can-sponsored government in, agency-and promptly knocked under varying depths of cover. open incitements to revolution
Leopoldville. out by a Congressional. Com Most' inf rniation is culled and murder b President Gamal
This, apparently, was a. job mittee so befuddled by ! Y
for the Defense Department, but, Y ,from fore; newspapers; sci- Abdel Nasser's Radio Cairo.
secrecy that it did not know ; entificour4ais, industry publi- It was the Plans Division that
to avoid a too obvious American I what the ite was for ..
ests of speed and efficient Government departments and A?rbenz government in Guate-
of
the yothr C.I+A.,ame intelligence ervices and foreign mold in 1954, the overthrow Of
Government again turned director
knew the Cubans in Miami and $46-millioon __._ He justified he 't-- All Sots of Experts ! successes) and the Bay of Pigs
their abilities as pilots. It had : invasion in 1961
bite that- he mrnnncerr t, kp T-he 7atpt i~,u.d Sll.,ir n _ rr_._ _ _ _._ _ _ _ _ _ _ (a resounding
_ g
a"'--._.,... a....b_.-r....,.... .... Among which they could. be recruited, ; reservation on the Potomac by Lions that ar served by resident plans Division the triumphs o the
develop-
paid and serviced. I saying the site with "its isola- specialists r~m almost every ment of the U-2 high-altitude
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
HOME OF THE C.I.A.: Central Intelligence Agency has its headquarters at Langley, Va., near the Potomac River
olitical officex.
May, 1960, when Francis Garyl One State Department officer aganda purposes. p Not Very SPowers was shot down by a said that "there are more liberal While such operatives may No official y Secret
e so thin
Soviet rocket, photographed intellectuals per square inch at be known to the chief of sta-,
cothe untry C.I.AheofficcTr as to This be meaningless cover sxsoptin
much of the Soviet Union; the 1 C.I.A. than anywhere else in t ion" --
digging of a tunnel Into East 'the government." any 5 are, as to embarrassment for the
Berlin from which C.I.A. agents The operators and agents of,rarely known to the American j host government. embarrassment for the
tapped telephone cables leading the Plans Division, on the otherlAmbassador, although he maylhost g are rfgents
to Soviet military headquarters hand, are described as more sometimes be aware of their The chief readily of dily recog-
as the f station is car as
in the acquisition of a copy of conservative in their economic, mission. In fact, these deep, The
Premier Khrushcev's secret, outlook and more single-minded'agents are not known to thekbig as the Ambassador's and
speech to the 20th party con- in their anti-Communism. This C.LA.'sgntelligence Division in a house that is sometimes - as'
gress in 1956 denouncing Stal- is particularly true of those ;Washin ton, and their reports i~ in a Lagos, Nip isisor better.
in's excesses and brutalities. engaged in deep-cover opera-' are not identified to it by name. In practically all the allied
Liberals in the C.I.A. military people orvmen formerl York r Timesensayoftheye haNew i ve.0ountries the C.I.A. agents ions, man of I; Y
t b identify themselves to host gov-
en able
i
t
I
ny, e
a
I
I
ernments, and actually worl~ in
The C.I.A. analysts of the I in the 'Office of Strategic Ser- never, with cer
f the Fade a; Bureau o~f'to identify one of these agents.,,,- cooperation with Cabinet
in
e',__:_.._
n;visi
o
ar
ex
isms and frustrglonsor ?pe1,E,icr that many of the agents
just emerging into nationhood. 1 -who are essentially information
Thus they are likely to be more gatherers and who work under
than the activists 1ni .
er are as so his-
ov
Lae X-lau. --
boyant nationalism and socialist home, and like them are sym- dents, missionaries or charity
orientation of the leaders. in athetic to the "anti-Conimu- workers.
ft" in underdeveloped Second, there are those
former colonies and more flex- n
i l
e
is
ibis than many of the State countries. agents, by, far the larger sum Isador, Sometimes he has been
Department's cautious and The C.I.A. agents abroad fall her, who operate under the in the country longer and Is
legalistic diplomats. ,.,,Tinto two groups - both under looser ^cover4C -of-, the tiuafficial'better informed than the Am-
bique, for example, the ana-
lysts are said to take the at-
titude that change is inevitable,
that the United States has to
deal with a pluralistic world.
The State Department, on the
other hand, tendR yt~o be d/ivve t
h.. Portuguese .SF!R:~1dIIil,lA
First, there are those engaged ~lWi -e.a-. ~-J w`? "" -- I r'or an mesa rennuun -~ +=..J?
business - political or economic officers, government especially In,
t
di
y
r
in the really
the spies and counterspies, the, Treasury representatives, con- underdeveloped areas of the
saboteurs, the leaders of para sular officers or employes of the world, may prefer to deal with
military operations, the suborn I Agency for International De- the chief of station rather than
~ers of revolution. Such agents velopment (the United States the Ambassador, believing him
operate under deepest. cover, andlforeign aid agency) or United to have readier access to top
i~,_~. .~..,mo. i,s,n,.a States Information Agency-The omit-L-making officials in
American of whom they have police In some embassies the C.I.A.
had their suspicions. In some
outnumber the regular
known' to each other, the d^. s- political and economic officers.
agents masquerade as busin 1. -I In a four they have made up as
much as o5 per cent. of wan
diplomatic mission.
The chief of station often has
more money than the Ambas-
LnB, i-. Vi l.ia -.a,....... ----- I - enough to oe caugm gnu aui- - -
ganization base in the Azores, (faced' for political or prop-I to the Ambassador or as the top
also a Portuguese territory.
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : PIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
obviously the number of Thir telephone numbers are
agents abroad is a closely held listed under "Central Intelli-
secret, kept from even such gerice Agency" or "United
close Presidential advisers in States Government," but no ad-
the past as the historian Arthur dre~s is given. Anyone wanting
M. Schlesinger Jr. In his book the''I address must know the
"A Thousand Days," Mr. nanke of the office director,
Schlesinger states that those wh se telephone number and
"under official cover overseas"addtess are listed.
number almost as many as' At one time these field of-
one we didn't know about! With
Mr. Schlesinger has written , For
This would be roughly 6,600.
The actual number, however,
is believed to be considerably
less, probably around 2,200.
The secrecy of identification
can lead to some amusing situa-
tions. Once when Allen Dulles,
then C.I.A. director, visited New
Delhi, every known "spook"
(C.I.A. man) was lined up in
an anteroom of the embassy to
greet him. At that moment a
newspaper correspondent who
had been interviewing Mr.
Dulles walked out of the inner
office. A look of bewilderment
crossed the faces of the C.I.A.
.mature person.
The greatest danger obvious-
ly lies in the area of special
operations. Although it is gen-
erally agreed that the agents
overt and covert - have
'been for the most part men of
competence and character, the
C.I.A. has also permitted some
of limited intelligence and of
emotional instability to get
through its screen and has even
assigned them to sensitive
tasks, with disastrous results.
One example was the assign-
ment of a man known as "Frank
Bender" as contact with Cuban
fice$ sought out scholars, busi-
nestmen, students and even
ordi}rary tourists whom they
kne4v v to be planning a trip be-
1-hind the Iron Curtain and asked
then7 to record their observa-
tion and report to the C.I.A.
on t eir return.
V ry little of this assertedly
is d ne any more, probably be-
caus of some embarrassing ar-
restsl and imprisonment of tour-
ists 'and students. While the
C.I. deals frankly with busi-
ness en, it reputedly does not
com romise their traveling
reprdsentatives.
agents involves contacts
industry and universities.
~xample, an agent, on in-
scholarly" and "generally some-~ In treater secrecy, the C.I.A.
what better than those in State subzes, in whole or in part, a
in work and dedication." wide range of 'enterprises -
But they also found that "private" foundations, book and
below the top njany C.I.A. maga ine publishers, schools of
people were "a little thin" and interntional studies in univer-
did not compare so favorably cities, law offices, "businesses"
with Foreign Service officers `of va loos kinds and foreign
on the same level. broadc sting stations. Some of
The G.I.A. screens and re- these perform real and valuable
screens applicants, because it is work or the C.I.A. Others ar
quite aware of the attraction not uch more than "mail
discipline, extremely know-
ing," "imaginative," "sharp and
had outstripped the State De- arv"A aicauquarLera,
partment in the quality of its will seek evaluation of captured
personnel." !equip ent, analysis of the color
Almost without exception, of fa tory smoke as a clue to
odl
et, an of ro-
correspondents of The Newt duct dnrcapac tystfromethe size
r
p
York Times reported that they of a I factory, or critiques of
men at the top overseas were articl s in technical and sci-
men of "high competence and entifi journals.
ties, al) the value received and
the da gers surmounted, all the
organi ation and secrecy, all the
trouble averted and all the set-
'backs ncountered, still do not
describ the work of the C.I.A.
For th most gifted of analysts,
the mot crafty of agents -
like all human beings - have
their 11 itations.
At the time when the Ameri-
cans w re successfully keeping
.the Co go out of the Commu-
operation. A German refugee' Men
with only a smattering of Span-!sand the(
ish and no understanding of; are alm
character, Bender antagonized
the more liberal of the leaders
by his bullying and his obvious
partiality for the Cuban right.
Offices In This Country
The C.I.A. maintains field of-I
re fallible and limited,
demands on the C.I.A.
at infinite; that is why,
.able spi s are not human and
some of the most omnipotent
agents hum through the,
~heavens, and above.
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
Cont. from Page 5
formed sources said he called Mr. McCarthy has introduced
today's meeting precisely to a resolution calling for a "full
ef-
cqnsider such an expansion. and complete" study of the ef-
fect of C.I.A. operations on
These sources said also that policymaking by a ,special sub-
two recent disclosures of C.I.A. committee of the Foreign Rela-
activities had apparently tions Committee. He also favors
brought the whole issue to a expanding the present oversight
head in the Senate watchdog group to include members of the
group. Foreign Relations Committee.
The first of these was the Responsibility Cited
revelation that at least five
C.I.A. agents operated in South, Today Mr. McCarthy said that,
Vietnam during the late 1950's:i in view of the Michigan State
under the cover of a multi-mil- -and Raus cases, Congress would
lion dollar technical assistance be rejecting "a very basic con-
program conducted for the gov- stitutional responsibility" if it
ernment of the late President' did not begin "to exercise some
Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan degree of jurisdiction beyond
State University. 1what it is exercising now."
Intercedes in Suit "Either the special group
!idoesn't know about these
The second was the disclosure., things and it should, or it does
that the C.I.A. interceded in the' know and tolerates them," Mr.
slander trial of one of its agents, McCarthy said.
Juri Raus, an Estonian refugee, Senator Mike Mansfield of
who was being sued by Eerik Montana, the Majority Leader,
Heine, another Estonian emi said with a smile that the pro-
gre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr.' !l to widen the watchdog
Raus had publicly called him; canuliittee was "not a bad
an agent of the K.G.B., thelidea.,,
Soviet intelligence agency. In 1954 Mr. Mansfield intro-
In a public memorandum ad-{i1cM W resolution to create a
dressed to the Federal Court in 12-man joint committee-six
Baltimore, the C.I.A. said it flym each house--to maintain
had ordered Mr. Raus to cease scrutiny on the C.I.A.
testifying in order to protects The resolution had 34 co-
the United States foreign intel-i'sponsors. However, much of the
ligence apparatus. Mr. Raus support evaporated under the
claimed immunity on the ground apposition of' Senator Russell
that the alleged slander had and Senator Leverett Salton-
been committed in the course stmt], Republican of Massaahu-
of his C.I.A. duties. setts, who agreed with the then
Several days ago Senator J. W. C.I.A. director, Allen W. Duties,
Fulbright, chairman of the For- IIthat the joint committee might
eign Relations Committee, wrote` jeopardize security.
to Senator Russell suggesting When the Mansfield resolu-
that they discuss the possibility 1tion finally came to a vote in
of having representatives from1956, 14 sponsors reversed
his committee on the watchdog ' them selves, and it was defeat-
group. It could not be learned`, 59 to 27.
whether Mr. Russell has replied Besides Mr. Russell and Mr.
to this letter. Saltonstall, the present watch-
Senator Eugene J. McCarthy,'dog committee is made up of
Democrat of Minnesota, and aiDemocrats John Stennis of Mis-
member of the Foreign Rela- sissippi, Carl Hayden of Ari-
tions Committee, has expressedlzona, Stuart Symington of Mis-
concern that the C.I.A. "is mak-,sours, and Republicans Milton R.
ing foreign policy and in so young of North Dakota and
doing is assuming the roles of Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.
President and Congress."
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA -RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
C.I.A. Is Child of Pearl
S
i
'arbor and Cold War
pec
al to The New York Time: Japanese Attack Led to Its Central Intelligence, and as such
WASHINGTON, April 25 -
The Central Intelligence Agency he is responsible for the whole
traces its beginnings to the in- Start - Problells With "intelligence community," which
telligence failure that made the encompasses nine other depart-
Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Soviet Made It Grow I ments and agencies.
Harbor possible. The agency Representatives of these
owes its phenomenal growth tol sit on a United States
the nion.ld war with the Soviet; of secrei'y was firmly buttonedl Intelligence Board, which is
U
As a consequence of Pearllup against inquiry by the stand-) chaired by the C.I.A. director.
Harbor. Pr, .gidp"r ;?;ing committees of Congress. In! The C.LA.'s representative on
"' the Central Intelli a ce A enc I tms board is the Deputy Direc-
June, 1942, established the Of- g g Y t
or now Richard M Helmsh
,., wo
fice of Strategic Services under Act, Congress allowed the was an O.S.S. officer during
Gen. William J. (Wild Bill) agency to do the:follo ing: World War II, stayed on in the
Donovan to supplement the in. cDisregard laws that re- C.I.A., and succeeded Richard
telligence-gathering of the mill- quired "disclosure of he organi-I M. Bissell as Deputy Director
tary services. But the O.S.S.,zation?functions, nazy. es, officiali'of Plans after the Bay of Pigs
from the outset, also involved (disaster.
itself in such special operations titles, salaries, or n bers of
o the C.I.A., the largest
as the parachuting of spies be- personnel employed by the and d most t important members s o of
hind enemy lines. agency."
gEx end funds without re- the intelligence community are
Soon after V. J. Day, Presi-', P the Security Agency
dent Truman abolished the: gard to laws and egulations and the Defense Intelligence
O.S.S. Four months later, in governing expenditures, and Agency. January. 1946, he created bYiwith no other accounting than
The National Security Agency
executive order the National In-! the director's voucher. which was established by Presi-
telligence Authority, composed cMake contracts and pur- dential directive in. 1952, is
of the Secretaries of State, War' chases without advertrising. 'charged chiefly with the con-
and Navy and his personal mill-I gTransfer funds to-and from struction of codes for the United
Lary adviser, Adrn. William D. other Government age Gies. States and the breaking of the
Leahy. At the same time the Contract for research outside codes of enemy, allied and neu-
President established a succes-1the Government. tral nations. Its headquarters at
sor to the O.S.S. under the in- cProvide special expense al- Fort Meade, Md., is stuffed with
telligence authority. The new lowances for staff abroad. electronic equipment and com-
organization was called the cAdmit up to 100 liens and puters, and it has radio inter-
Central Intelligence Group, I members of their families a cept stations throughout the
C.I.A. Created in 1947 Year, world.
Hillenkoetter Given Charge The operations, number of per-
Rear Adm. Sidney W. Souers' sonnel and budget of the Na-
was the first head of the Cen-' However, the egisi cs n the tional Security Agency are
tral Intelligence Group. He re- 1947 and 1949 legisl tio are secrets even more closely held
mained only five months. He not the only basis for the than those of the C.I.A. But
was succeeded by Gen. Hoyt S. agency's operations. U. der that
the
its expen-
Vandenberg of the Air Force legislation, the National Secur- ditures, code because agency's e of f its annual
Vandenberg costly
who gave way in May, 1947, to ity Council is permittefi to issue equipment, have been estimated
Rear Adm. Roscoe H. Hillen- directives to the C.I.A.; Director, at twice that of C.I.A., or
koetter. and it is under such $$$$ecret di- roughly $1-billion a year.
The C.I.A. was established by rectives-often proposed by the The Defense Intelligence
the National Security Act of Director himself - that the Agency, set up in October, 1961,
1947, which placed the armed ~ agency engages in many of its is responsible for coordinating
services under a new Depart- activities. conflicting intelligence of three
ment of Defense and created Admiral Hillenkoett r was di- services-Army G-2, the Office
the National Security Council. rector of the new agen y for its of Naval Intelligence and Air
The act gave the C.I.A. the first three years. Hi succes- ForceA-2. The Defense Intelli-
following five duties: sor was Gen. Walter Bedell gence Agency also produces for
To advise the National Se- Smith, World War II Chief of the (United States Intelligence
curity Council on Intelligence) Staff to Gen. Dwight D. Eisen- Board) the official intelligence
matters. 1hower. General Smith served estimate of the Department of
To make recommendations until Feb. 10, 1953, when Allen Defense.
for intelligence coordination. W. Dulles was made director. Representatives of the serv-
gTo correlate and evaluate In- Mr. Dulles remained u til Sep- ices sit on the Intelligence
telligence and disseminate it tember, 1961. Board. Also represented on the
within the Government. President Kennedy se ected as Board is the State Department's
gTo perform for the existing his successor John A. McCone, Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
intelligence agencies "such addi- who had been Under Secretary search. This is an analysis, and
tional services of common con- of the Air Force during the not a collecting agency, and is
cern as the National Security first two years of the! Korean principally concerned that for-
Council determines can be more War and the chairman of the eign policy considerations are
efficiently accomplished cen- Atomic Energy Commission given due weight. The State De-
trally." during the last three ears of partment bureau has about 300
gTo perform "such other the Eisenhower Administration. employes and a budget of about
functions and d
ti
l
t
t
u
es re
ed
a
o $45illi
Coordinating Agency e c.-mon.
intelligence" as the security g g y The Atomic Energy Commis-
council would direct. Mr. McCone served u til April sion, which is responsible for the
Congress also directed that 28, 1965, surrendering his re- various devices, including air
the other intelligence agencies sponsibilities to Adm. William sampling and seismic instru-
should remain in business, that F. Raborh on the day resident meats, for detecting nuclear
the C.I.A.-director should be re- Johnson decided to send Marines tests by other nations,. is also
sponsible for guarding secrets, into the Dominican Rep blic. on the Intelligence Board.
and that the agency should have The responsibilities aid pow- The final member of the coin-
"no police, subpoena, law-en- ers of the Director oft e C.I.A. munity is the Federal Bureau of
forcement powers, or internal reach far beyond thos of his investigation, whose Division 5
security functions." own agency. By statute he also! is res ons' 1 r
In ]A#pMve $'1aeW febt@G20(33/t12f02f : Lsk tl~Dk?]7fn 1A8
O ~1~~ ~ -1
 APRIL 2' p 1, d For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
C.I.A. Spies From 100 Miles Up;
Satellites Probe Secrets of Soviet
telescope designed to eavesdrop
on the Kremlin. It was to pick
M.LT Cuts Agency Ties
up radio signals, such as those. emitted when a Soviet Premier Spectral to The New York Times
called his chauffeur by radio- WASHINGTON, April 26
telephone, as they bounced off The Center of International
counterspy function. Secretary the moon. Studies at the Massachusetts
Electronic Prying Grows of Defense Robert S. McNamara The project turned into anlInstitute of Technology gave a Congressional committee engineering fiasco, but technol- Following is the third of five a strong hint about that last: ogy came to the rescue by pro-1closed today that it would "re-
articles on the Central 7ntelli-r year when he mentioned "in viding ferret" satellites thatluctantly" sever connections
spection of orbiting objects in' can tune in on the same short- with the Central Intelligence
gene Agency. The articles are; the satellite interceptor Thor range radio signals as they Agency at the end of June.
by a team of New York Times program as well as in the two move straight up to the icno- The agency helped to estab-
correspondents consisting of i large ground-based optical pro- sphere. lish the center with a
Tom Wicker, John W. Finney,i grams at Cloudcroft, N. M." Overlooking the rights of ter- $300,000
Max Frankel, E. W. Henworthy. His testimony suggested that rltorial sovereignty and na- grant in 1951 and since then
the United States could orbit a' gnat and human privacy, of- has supported much of its re-
and other Times staff members.' satellite capable of photograph-; ficials throughout the United search, mostly in Communist
Special to The New YorkThdes ing and otherwise inspecting", States Government praise the affairs.
WASHINGTON, April 26 -= Soviet space spies, while other C.I.A.'s gadgetry as nothing A spokesman for the center
To the men most privy to the, equipment could photograph short of "phenomenal." The at-. said it was decided a year ago
them from the ground with re-
secrets everywhere, they say, y of the Central in- markable detail. mosphere y y that, "for practical and not
telligence Agency, it sometimes, Such electronic eyes, ears, is full of information, and the moral reasons," no further con-
seems that the human spies, the noses and nerve ends - and objective of a technological in-.
telligence service is to gather tracts should be accepted
James Bonds and Mats Haris1, similar ones aboard ships and and translate it into knowledle.from the C.I.A. Although the
submarines - are among the
are obsolete. Like humans wdrk supported b funds.
nation's most vital secrets. TheyAt C.I.A. hedquarters in by agency
everywhere, they are no match are not exclusively the property Langley, Va., other intricate has done much good and has
for the computers, cameras, or inspiration of the C.I.A. machines, some unknown a dec- involved nothing improper, the
radars and other gadgets by C.T.A. cameras and otherwde or even a few years ago, relationship had been "misun-
which nations can now gather snooping equipment are riding read, translate, interpret, col- derstood" and has "caused suf-
the darkest secrets of bot in spacecraft that are otherwise [late, file and store the informa- ficient difficult " he
the responsibility of the Defense?tion. Sometimes months or
Department. , y. said.
friends and foes: years later, the data can be re Existing contracts are being
With complex machines cir-i No clear breakdown of1trieved from tens of millions allowed to run their course but
cling the earth at 17,000 miles' responsibilities and cost is avail-'of microfilmed categories. no further work will be per-
an hour, C.I.A. agents. are able, able, but, altogether, the an- This effort has paid off monu- formed with the agency's sup-
to relax in their carpeted offices, nual cost of the United States' mentally, according to those, port after July 1, the spokes-
intelligence effort exceeds $3- who know moat about it. I man the Potomac and count? billion a year - more than six It was aerial reconnaissa.ncefman said.
the intercontinental missiles times the amount specifically) by the U-2 spy plane - suc-~ In its early years, the cen-
poised in Soviet Kazakhstan,} allocated to the C.I.A. and morelIceeded in many ways by satel-ter performed a great deal of
monitor the conversations be-than 2 per cent of the total}lites in 1961 - that enabled, research work for the intelli-
trween Moscow and a Soviet sub- Federal budget. !Washington to anticipate and' gence agency, supplying
marine near Tahiti, follow the Bugging From Afar measure the Soviet Union's ca- analyses of events and trends
countdown of a sputnik launch- pacit;~ to produce missiles in in the Communist world but
Not all the gadgetry is cos-lithe nineteen-fifties. These esti-insisting upon the right to pub-
ing as easily as that of a, mic. The agency is now develop- mates, in turn, led to the so-,Ilish the results of the work.
Gemini capsule in Florida, track ing a highly sensitive device called "missile gap," which be-' In recent years, after faculty
the electronic imprint of an ad- that will pick up from afar in-came a prime political issue in members and others criticized
versa! s bombers and watchi door conversations, by record- the 1960 Presidential campaign.' the arrangement, the number
y Ing the window vibrations But it was also the U-2 thatlo_f C.I.A. projects is said to
for the heat traces of his mis-J caused by the speakers' voices. later produced proof that the' have been sharply restricted.
riles. This is only one of many. Russians were not turning out
In the last two or three years,
Only a half dozen years ago, I nefarious gadgets that have; missiles as fast _as they could, ithe spokesman said, the agency
at least one human pilot was made the -word, "privacy" an, thus dispelling the "missile gap contributed no more than 15
11
i
h
i
t
t
AV
equ
pmen
1JlstanceI W
U-2 jet across the Soviet Union tiny as to be all but invisible, jargon.
from Pakistan to Norway, or; y Still later, C.I.A. devices emplaced
to turn the whole electric wir- covered missiles being g emmplaced
over Cuba or Communist China; ing system of a building into a underground in the Soviet Un-
from bases in Florida and Tai-I quivering transmitter of con- ion. U-2's spotted the prep-
wan. , versation taking place any-,araticn of missile sites in Cuba
His cameras and listening de- where within. l in 1962. They also sampled the
able of picking out a Picking up information is one radioactive fallout of Soviet nu-
ca
vices
p
,
ow, w
a
er
ecame c
a
r-
o
chalk line or a radar station thing; getting it "home" and' clear tests in 1961. Highly se-~ man of the Policy Planning
from 15 miles up, were incredi-j doing .something with it is an-Lcret techniques, including aerialSCouncil at the St o Depart-
ble in their day, the product! other. Some satellites, for in reconnaissance, allowed then inert and is now a special as-
research! stance, are rigged to emit cap-C.I.A. to predict the Chinese nu-trio+.,,,t r o,~~;a~ 4 r J
of imaginative C
I
A
.
.
.
the sky now orbiting the earth
do almost as well from 100
miles up.
Cosmic Espionage
Prof. Max Millikan, an as-
by readings; parachute,,, float to air- mark able accuracy. sistant director of the in telli-
craft t dash , across old the C-130
Pacific Purloined Messages
d Bence agency in 1951-52, has
from Hawaii and snare Countless conversations and been director of the center
the parachutes with long, dang-;messages the world over have since 1952.
Already, the United States ling, trapeze-like cables. The been purloined; even subtler The authorities at M.I.T. have
and the. Soviet Union are vying f planes have a 70 per cent catch-, signals and indications, once tried in recent days to make
with each other in cosmic sav-I ing average. ddetected by the marvels of sci- clear that they have not con-
1. 1.
Cosmos satellites gather more, wizards get carried away by into information of a kind once and that the center's work in
exact amounts are classified as
secret by the agency, he said.
One early beneficiary of the
agency's support was a re-
search team on Soviet affairs
headed by Prof. Walt W. Ros-
t
h
l
t
b
h
i
an army of earthbound spies. 1 years ago they spent tens of~ The first duty of the C.I.A.~promote economic development
Other gadgets of the missile millions of dollars on the con is to collect, interpret and dis- has not been supported by the
age have taken over the struction of a 600-foot radio]seminate what it learns from~lintelligence agency.
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP79-%&O'FFt660i30520008-'IC?nt ? Page 15
 i
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : ~IA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
.its worldwide nerve system
weaving together, into the "in-i
tellligence" the government
needs, every electronic blip,:
squeak, and image and the mil-?;
lions of other items that reach
its headquarters from more con-
ventional, often public, sources:
random diplomatic contacts,
press clippings, radio monitor
reports, books and research proj-
ects and eyewitness evidence.
(Even some of these "open"j
sources, such as a regional news-
paper ` from Communist China, `
must be smuggled or bought at
a stiff price.)
Every hour of every day,
about 100 to 150 fresh items ofl
news, gossip and research reach
the C.I.A.'s busy headquarters
in Virginia and are poured into
t
t
h
d
the gigan
ec
ic human-an
-
no-
logical computer that its analy-
sis section. resembles.
Four of every five of these
items, -it is said, now come
either from "open" sources or
inanimate devices. But in many
,important instances it is still
the human agent, alerted to
make a particular arrangement
or to chase a specific piece of in-
formation, who provides the link
that makes all else meaningful
and significant; sometimes, now
as in the 18th century, it is
men alone who do the job in
danger and difficulty.
When it was discovered, for
instance, that Premier Khru-
shchev had shaken the Com-
munist world with a secret
speech denouncing Stalin in
1956, it was a C.T.A. agent
who finally came up with the
text, somewhere in Poland, and
other analysts who determined
that it was genuine.
A Rebellion Hastened
This feat of numan spying
in an electronic age yielded
vital information and, leaked tol
DURING THE CUBAN MISSILE C41SIS: This Soviet freighter was photographed after
leaving Cuba on Nov. 6, 1962, carrying on deck one of the missiles the Soviet Union
withdrew under intense pressure ffom the U.S. It was C.I.A. efforts that originally
uncovered the presence of Soviet mi siles on the island that led to diplomatic showdown.
The end product is a series 11intellia
maps to gain a bureaucratic] fleet t4 final judgment of the
advantage over rival pieces of Board of National Estimates, a
paper from other agencies. grcup ~f 14 analysts in the
where, hastened the anti-Stalini and sweeping summaries every
rebellions in many Communist!, day. It provides a special news
countries and probably contrib-;report for President Johnson's
uted to upheavals in Poland and] nightly bedtime reading, some-
rid
tiriies containin
such jui
til
'
Natioal estimate intelli-
gence i intended to reach a
definite conclusion to guide the
President. But as other depart-
ments are consulted and the
cy
g
various experts express their
l among
, that are s
Hungary
the heaviest liabilities of Com-bits as the most recent playboytviews, j their disagreements,
munist history. activities of the indefatigable I caveats and dissents are note 'I
It takqls a sub-agent in Tibet, President Sukarno of Indonesia. and recorded by footnotes in
personally recruited by a C.I.A. A C.I.A. Press Conference the fina document. These signs
man there and paid either a of dispute are likely to herald
retainer or by the piece, to de-; More elaborate reports and'importa t uncertainties, and
liver a sheaf of secret armyPr9jections are prepared on;some of icials believe the foot-
documents circulating among; such matters as the rate of So-notes to be the best-read lines
monist China's People's fiber-j The State Department has
a given subject and re- :ng information about Soviet
military capabilities and orders
of battle, about the Chinese
nuclear weapons program and,
after constant goading from the
White House, about the
progress of India, the United
Arab Republic, Israel and other
nations toward a capacity to
build nuclear weapons.
Reports from inside In-
donesia, Algeria and the Congo
during recent fast-moving situ-
ations are also said to have
been extremely good.
On the other hand, the C.I.A.
has been criticized for not hav-
ing known more in advance
about the construction of the
millions Governmentcommittedl e Berlin Wall in 1961, about the
]divorce of the United Arab Re-
every m
Only his counterpart in Al-jwiLnouL creuuL Lo Lnerr origin.; The U.I.A. also proauces raptu the political leanings of various
feria can provide some draw-; Piqued by these announcements, analyses land predictions on re- leaders in the Dominican Re-
inrrs of the design of the in-the C.I.A. called its first news quest say, about the likeli- public and about such relatively
terior of Peking's embassy (al-conference in 1964 to put out hood of tie Soviet Union's goinglpublic matters as party politics
though such designs can often the latest readings on Soviet to war dyer the Cuban missile in Italy.
be obtainod with no more effort'prosperzty. The idea of the crisis, or Pout the consequences Some - including Dwight D.
the spooks," as C.I.A. men are of different courses of action
called, summoning reportersicontempl ted at a p th articular tEisenhower e agency cy for or not have having recvriticized
than offices of asking the for them American at who
g-
t i
n
caused so much amusemen
constructed the building). moment y the United States in ognized in time Fidel Castro's
Washington-arid perhaps dis-~ Vietnam. i Communist leanings or the pos-
And beyond this large re- pleasure in other agencies-that
maining value of the human the C.I.A. has never held an- How God Are the Reports? sibility that the 1 Soviet C ba ion
s
r es o u
d
espionage,': it is also the humani Still more important subjects, have: beet, and how well they
brain in the C.I.A. that gives such as Soviet nuclear capabili- are heeded by the policy-mak-
information its real importance ]ties or Communist Chinese in-'ers, are uestions of lively de-
by supplying interpretations for;tentions in Southeast Asia, are 'bate in t he intelligence com-
s rp mJ
s
woo
Almost everyone, however,
generally concedes the neces-
sity for gathering intelligence
to guide the Government in its
worldwide involvements. Criti-
2'~D52o0Q8k a the value or
the President and his men.Approv~de -For Release 2mal 0057VD12' . 64-RDP75-00001 ROO0~
to pape
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
accuracy of C.I.A. repo.ts, For When it presented the U-2 Jobs for Refugees
Aswan Da.m,
information-gathering often program in 1956, fear of deter Besides entertaining and in- Some of these Egyptian ties
spills over at the scene of tion and diplomatic repercus- the re
action Into something else -tsions led the Eisenhower Ad-,'forming millions of listeners in lingered even through Communist nations, these cent years of strained relations.
subversion, roun ivity,tice" tration to run some "prat nominally "private" outlets pro- Through reputed informants
sabotage, political and d economic ti e' missions over Eastern vide employment for many like Mustafa Amin, a prominent
interveition and other kindsEurope. The first mission to
of dirty tricks." Often the in- the Soviet Union, in mid-1956, gifted and knowledgeable refu- Cairo editor, the C.I.A. is said
gees from Russia, Poland, Hun- in the United Arab Republic
tel' igence gatherer, by design detected and Leningrad ,~r,, and other countries. to have obtained the details of
or orce of circumstancee, b, be- ryas deitec~ted but not molested., g` I a Soviet-Egyptian arms deal
corn s an activist in the affairs It did, however, draw the first! They also solicit the services
he was set to watch, of a number of secret diplomatic; of informers Inside the Com- in 1964 and other similar in-
formation. Thus Amin's arrest
On-the-Scene Action
C.I.A. analysts reading the
puncheards of their computers
in Virginia can determine that
a new youth group in Bogota
protests: monist world, monitor Com-
munist broadcasts, underwrite last fail may have closed some
After six missions the Ad !nti Communist lectures and important channels and it gave.
l
ministration halted the flights, ` the United Arab. Republic the
but ministration
pressed for their by Western intellectu-
resumption, Doubts were finallyAls and distribute their research opportunity to demand greater
ur American aid in return for nlay-
d j
l
t
i
t
h
olars an
o
er
a
s
o sc
ma
nalists in all continents. ing down its "evidence" of C.I.A.
But there is said to be rela- activity in Cairo,
The C.I.A.'s talent for secret
tively little direct C.I.A. spying! warfare is known to have been
upon the United States' allies. 'tested twice in Latin America.
Even in such undemocraticIt successfully directed a battle
control of suspected Corn- Viet fighter planes in vain pur-~
munists, but it takes an agent su'iit of at least some of them,
on the spot to trade infornia The Powers plane is thought)
tion with the local police, col-Ito have been crippled by the
taps or those involved, organize
and finance a countermovement
of, say, young Christians or
democratic labor youth, and
help them erect billboards and
craft missile developed with theieortugai, where more maepena- 1st government of Col. J; tcobo
U-2's in mind. tent C.I.A. activity might be Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala
Risk and Often Profitable expected, the operation Is re-
Y n 1954, Seven years later, a
The simplest and most modest iably described as modest, i
+C.I.A.-sponsored army jumped
Hof these risky, often profitable, The American agency has aioff from secret bases in Guate-
turn mimeograph machines atisometimes disastrous human ef-special interest, for instance, in;mala and Nicaragua for the
the next election. forts are reported to b
carried keeping track in Spain of such' disastrous engagement at
e
Dozens - at times hundreds out in the friendly nations of refugees from Latin AmericalCuba's Bay of Pigs.
- of C.I.A. men have been Western Europe. as Juan Peron of Argentina.i Promoter of Fronts
employed on Taiwan to train: In Britain, for Instance, C.I.A. Nevertheless, it relies so heavily
men who will be smuggled intoiagents are said to be little more on the information of the Span-{ Not so melodramatically, the
Communist China and to inter-'than contact men with British ish police that American news-aagency runs dozens of other
view defectors and refugees 'intelligence, with British papermen are often a better operations throughout the
Who come out; to train Chinese Kremlinologists and other source for American Embassyihemisphere.
Nationalists to fly the U-2; to'scholars and experts. officials than the C.LA. office. It provides "technical assist-
identify and befriend those who! With MI-6, its London In much of Africa, too, despite ante" to most Latin nations by
will move into power after the', counterpart, the C.I.A. corn- the formidable reputation it has helping them establish anti-
departure of the Nationalists' 'pares notes and divides respon- among governments, the C.I.A. Communist police forces. It
President, Chiang Kai-shek; toisibilities on targets of mutual takes aback seat to the Intel-,promotes anti-Communist front
beam propaganda broadcasts at! interest, The agency, having ligence agencies of the former; organizations for students,
the mainland; to organize har-Icome a painful cropper in colonial nations, Britain and workers, professional and busi-
rassing operations on the is-:Singapore a few years ago, France, and concentrates on,ness men, farmers and political
lands just off the shore of thelnow leaves spying In Malaysia, gathering information about parties. It arranges for contact
mainland, and to provide logis-;for instance, to the old Corn- Soviet, Chinese and other Com-,between these groups and
tic support for other C.I.A,'monwealth sleuths while prob- munist efforts there. The Con- American labor organizations,
operations in Laos, Thailand, ably offering in return the. go has been the major excep- institutes and foundations.
Vietnam, the Philippines and tion. The agency compiles lists It has poured money into
Indonesia. C.I.A.'s copious material from I of travelers to Moscow, Prague; Latin-American election cam-
In these and dozens of other in. Indonesia, or Peking, attempts to infiltrate paigns in support of moderate
stances, an agent who is merely Generally cooperative ar-their embassies and checks on candidates and against leftist
ostensibly gathering Intel- rangements also prevail in1arms and aid shipments through leaders such as Cheddi Jagan of
attempting to create or resolve Italy and, An Eye on Potential Rebels It spies upon Soviet, Chinese
a situation: to a somewhat lesser and other Communist infiltra-
degree, in France. In West Ger The agency Is thought tors and diplomats and attempts
Because a great many such many, a major cold-war battle- to have attempted to infiltrate to subvert their programs. When
activists are a.Tso in the field ground, the C.I.A. Is much more the security services of some the C.I.A. learned last year that
for a variety of purposes other'active. African countries but Only la Brazilian youth had been kil-
than open or clandestine infor-; The C.I.A. runs an office in with ,mixed success. It gathers led in 1963, gathering, the involve- Bonn for general coordination. s ecial dossiers- on the activi- , ilegstud iyng an on auto
on ment of fallible human beings P scholarship what stud Lu a
in the most dangerous and Another in Berlin conducts spe- ties of various nationalist and scholarship at the Lumumba
murky areas of dangerous cial activities such as the liberation movements and be-University in Moscow, It
Lions causes most of opera- famous wiretap tunnel underfriends opposition leaders in mounted a massive publicity
East Berlin, a brilliant tech such countries as Algeria and campaign to discourage other
agency's failures and difficul-;!nical hookup that eavesdropped the United Arab Republic, in South American families from
ties and gives it its fearsome' on Soviet Army headquarters. the hope that it can predict sending their youngsters to the
reputation. ~It was exposed In 1956 when upheavals or at least be; Soviet Union.
Men, by and large, can con East German digging familiar with
In Southeast Asia over the
trol macines but not events, ,:on workmen, di n new rulers if their
and not always themselves, It' on another project, struck a bids for power are successful.; past decade, the C.I.A. has been
Tweak spot in the tunnel and The C.I.A., long in advance, so active that the agency in
was not, after all, the shooting i caused it to collapse, had information on the plan some countries has been the
down of a U-2 Inside the Soviet A C.I.A. office in Frankfurt by which Algerian Army of principal arm of American pol-
Union in 1960 that caused
ew Ahmed Ben
th
r
,ICY.
'supervises some of the United Bella over
last - but it did not
signs and a Soviet-American'4States' own espionage opera-+
crisis; each side could have ab-,tions against the Soviet Union,
sorbed that in some sort of 1 interviews defectors and re-
"cover." It was rather the So-;;cruits agents for service in
viet capture of a liying Ameri-Communist countries.
can pilot, Francis Gary Powers, In Munich, the C,I.A. sup-
that could not be explainedports a variety of research
away and that Russians did not groups land such major prop-
want explained away. aganda outlets as Radio Free
But the C.I.A. invariably de-IEurope, which broadcasts to
velops an interest in its prof- Eastern Europe, and Radio
eels and can be a formidable~Liberty, aimed at the Soviet
advocate in the Gov rnment Union.
Approved'For Release 2003/12/02 :~ IAI' -ftpf 5aU-0Oo db'1C(F UU `' the C.T.A. fronts O- I
and it had nothing to do with
plotting or carrying out the
coup,
Thanks to contacts with
Gamal Abdel Nasser before
~
seized power in Egypt, theand 1965. What was presented
C.I.A. had almost intimate! officially in Washington as
dealings with the Nasser gov- toleration of President Sukar-
ernment before the United Statesno's insults and provocations,
government and army that the
United States was reluctant to
disrupt C.I.A. covering opera-
tions by withdrawing aid and
information programs in 1964
13
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02: C
business as long as possible. i ties, the agency has used ltsl'stitu
i
n
Though it is not thought to'llinfluence *in+h Washington andJCent
President Sukarno's power in 11 sources of income. to to
well poised to follow events and rectors and stockholders of an 1emba
IA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
e of Technology opened a By its clandestine nature, the
r of International Studies C.I.A. has few opportunities to
a grant of $300,000 from explain, justify or defend itself.
anti-Communist maY approach the leading offi-lothericountries.
forces. ,
Links to Power cia.is of the company, explain1 Thd agency's support for
its problem and, tome away;M.I.T~ projects gradually dwin-
After helping to elect Ram6ri with some profitable air cargo died, but the fear of compro-
Magsaysay as president of the contracts. misin# publicity led the tmi-
o to
ear a
id
t
d
' a
it
Philippines in 1953, buttressing
the family government of Ngo
Dinh iDem and Ngo Dinh Nhu
in South Vietnam in 1954 and as-
sisting.in implanting the regime
of tho strong-man Phoumi
Nosavan in Laos in 1960, the
ously became for long periods `or United States Information contended that no secret inset- tainly not set at rest when they
much more. intimate advisers Agency, for example, may help ligence work was done by the! learn, for instance, that in 1962
and effective links to Washing-l finance a scholarly inquiry and agent, but it feared that alan outraged President Kennedy
ton than the formally desig-publication. Or the agency may dozen' other overseas projects- obviously differing with the
noted American Ambassadors i channel research and propa- now wider war, would be ham agency about the "national in-
And when the Kennedy au- tions-legitimate ones or dum-' Bove ments. undo a particularly clumsy
ministration came into office my fronts, The C.T.A. was among the piece of sabotage that might
in 1961, the President concluded The C.I.A. is said to be be-' first overnment agencies to tiave blackened the nation's
that the C.I.A. had so mort- hind the efforts of several foun-seek he valuable services of name all around the world.
gaged American interests to dations that sponsor the travelAmeri an scholars - an idea
Phoumi.Nosavan that there was of social scientists in the Com- now idely emulated. Many
at first: no alternative to deal- munist world. The vast major-(scholars continue to serve the
ing witl'i him. ity of independent foundations
Moreover, the C.I.A.'s skill at have warned that this practice agency as consultants, while
moving quickly and in reason- casts suspicion on all traveling others work on research proj-
able secrecy drew for it many scholars, and in the last yearIects, frankly presented to their
assignments in Southeast Asia the C.I.A. is said to have cur. isuperios as C.I.A. assignments.
that would normally be given tailed these activities somewhat., At a meeting of the American
to the .Defense Department. It $400,000 for Research Political Science Foundation
was able, for instance, to fly Congressional investigation of here lat fall, however, at least
supplies to the Meo tribesmen tax-exempt foundations in 1964!two speakers said too many
in Laos to help them fight showed that. the J. M. Kaplan scholars were still taking on
against the . pro-CommumstFund, Inc., among others, had full-ti 'e intelligence services.
Pathet Lao at a time when disbursed at least $400,000 for They also warned that the part-
treaty obligations forbade the the C.I.A. in a single year to a``time activities of others could
assignment of American mili- research institute This insti-
tary advisers to the task. tute, in turn, financed research
In South Vietnam, the C.I.A.'s centers in Latin America that
possession of energetic young drew other support from the
men with political and linguistic Agency for International De-
talents proved much more suc- veloment (the United States
cessful In wresting mountain foreign aid agency), the Ford
and jungle villages from Com-Foundation and such universi-
gon's special forces.
But the C.I.A. was also deeply
committed to the Ngo brothers
and was tricked by them into
supporting their private police
forces. These were eventually
employed against- the Buddhist
political opposition, thus pro-
voking the coup d"eta.t by mili-
tary leaders in 1963 that
brought down the Ngos.
In Thailand, the C.I.A. has
now begun a program of rural
defense against Communist sub-
version. Working through for-
eign aid offices and certain air-
lines, agents are working with
hill tribes along the Burmese
and Laos_ borders and helping
to build a provincial police net-
work along the borders of Laos
Government and among influen-
tial members of Congress and
with the President.
But a "national interest" that
is not a persuasive defense to
g
men who have their own ideas
o
ec
e
y
y
In other domestic offshoots vers
of the C.I.A.'s foreign dealings, accept no new C.I.A. contracts. of the "national interest" -
American i1iewspaper and maga- Similar embarrassment was, along with secrecy itself - has
tine publishers, authors and uni- felt at Michigan, State Univer- the inevitable effect of convinc-
versities are often the benefici- city e{fter the recent disclosureling critics that the agency has
arses of direct or indirect C.I.A. that C.I.A. agents had served plenty to hide besides Its code-
subsidies. on Its payroll in a foreign-aidl books.
other previous contributors public contributions without re-
there had been eight funds or vealing its ties to the United
foundations unknown to experts States overnment.
on tax-exempt charitable or- Radio Swan, a C.I.A. station
ganizations. Five of them were in the aribbean that was par-
not even listed on the Internal ticularl , active during the Bay
Revenue Service's list of foun- of Pigs !invasion, maintains un-
;dations entitled to tax exemp- publiciz4d contacts with private
tion, American broadcasters.
Through similar channels, The O.I.A. at times has ad-
the C.I.A. has supported groups dressed ' the American people
of exiles from Cuba and refu- directly through public re-
gees from Communism in lations ten and nominally in-
Europe, or anti-Communist but `dependeilt citizens committees,
liberal organizations of intellec- Many other C.I.A.-run fronts
tuals such as the Congress for and offi' cs, however, exist pri-
Cultural Freedom, and some of marily ti gather mail from and
their newspapers and maga- to provide credentials for its
zines. overseas! agents.
Encounter magazine, a well- Thus, 1 the ramifications of
and Cambodia. !.known anti-Communist intellec- C.I.A. activities, at home and
Furtive Operations 'tual monthly with editions in abroad, seem almost endless.
Few Americans realize how English, was for a long time - and gadgets have taken over
such operations as. these may' g
innocent domestic situa though it is not now - one ofI much of the sheer drudgery of
affect
aff ec the the indirect beneficiaries of espionag, there remains a.deep
Lions - the a extent tl planeload which rice C.I.A. funds. Through arrange- involvem nt of human beings,
by a subsidized carrier, Air ments that have never been who project the agency into
publicly explained, several awkward diplomatic situations,
America, in Laos causes the American book publishers have raising rhanissues of policy
_..._~_-. tO s
t f?rtive opera.-
e
h
i
n
tions in motion with
e An even greater amount of
United States. C.I.A. money apparently was
When Air America or any spent on direct, though often
t
other false-from orJXtt
~ For Role seDft08 /+6
has run trite financia tlii r?_
reputations,
Radi Free Europe and Radio
Liberty,provide cover for C.I.A.-
finance organizations that
draw upon the research talents
of Amc ican scholars and also
service cholars with invaluable
raw material. The Free Europe
That i why many persons
are convi ced that in the C.I.A.
a sort ol Frankenstein's mon-
2steClA.a 7& OOO0rhR0:9O200520008-1
Hone ran ally ennt.rnl
14
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
Cont. from Page 11
Some "confusion" was ca.ised,
the spokesman explained, by
the disclosure that at least five
C.I.A. agents worked among
Michigan State University
scholars on a foreign aid proj-
ect in South Vietnam from 1955
to 1959.
Some embarrassment is also
said to have been caused to
M.I.T. scholars earlier in their
dealings with foreign govern-
ments when it was disclosed
that the agency had helped to
create their center. Faculty
opinion about the link was de-
scribed as divided until Mr. Mil-
likan passed word of the deci-
sion to accept no more research
contracts with the agency.
The center's spokesman said
the university had always pro-
tected itself adequately against
direct involvement with or con-
trol of its work by the intel-
ligence agency. It considered
the research for the agency to
be. not only consistent with the
'traditions of academic freedom,
,he said, but also a fulfillment
of the university's duty to con-
itribute to the Government's
intelligence "with a sma 'i"'.
There has been a "rigid rule"
that no field work be under-
'taken with C.I.A. funds, he said.
When it was decided in Marc
1965, to sever all connections,
he added, there was thought
to be no reason to withdraw
abruptly. Thus, the last con-
tracts, running through June,
1966, were honored, he said.
Individual scholars will con-
tinue to have the right to act
as consultants to the agency or
to accept any other kind of
Government assignment. This
right has been enjoyed by most
American scholars, even those
at institutions, such as Harvard,
that have refused to accept
direct contracts from the ijitel-
ligence agency.
15
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
INVOLVED IN 1962 C.I.A. OPERATION: The S.S.
Streatham Hill, a British freighter under Soviet lease,
lying at anchor alongside two U.S. destroyers in San Juan,
Puerto Rico, late in 1962. Her cargo of sugar was con-
ties ----- ----
because, in the course of. does over the Atomic Energy lished by the National Security
their. own duties, they do note Commission. Council - which advises the
"need to know." ; Allen Dulles, who, was corn- President on defense and for-
It is now well established, for, pletely satisfied with the scru- eign policy (natters-what came
instance, that until the disaster tiny provided by four carefully to be known as "the special
unfolded, Adiat E. Stevenson, selected subcommittees of the group," or the 54-12 group,"
the United States representative Senate and House Armed Serv- after the date (December, 1954)
Dulles had the power to give it
the facts on which it had to
base its decisions, the 54-12
group during the Eisenhower
Administration is believed by
knowledgeable sources to have
exercised little real control.
United Press International
taminated by C.I.A. agents when the ship put up for
repairs en route from Cuba to the Soviet Union. The
incident, designed by the intelligence agency to injure
Cuban trade, instead incurred President Kennedy's wrath.
to the United Nations, knew ices and Appropriations Com- of the secret directive ordering) The Classic Disaster
nothing of the Bay of Pigs plan. mittees, went to work. He sue- its formation.
As a result, he and his Govern- ceeded in cutting away 14 of This directive also provided] At the Bay of Pigs, just after
meat suffered grievous humilia-.Mr. Mansfield's cosponsors, and the basic charter for the agen-' President Kennedy took office
tion after he publicly misstated; the bill was defeated, 59 to 27. Icy's countersubversive and coun- in 1961, the worst finally hap-
the facts. ter-Colnmunist activity. Until pened; all the fears expressed
In years past, C.I.A. secrecy Board Headed by Killian that time, these activities had, through the years came true.
reached some absurd proportions' A year later the second been undertaken under author-: The Bay of Pigs must. take its
-with high-level employes !den-1 Hoover Commission also recom- ity of a secret memorandum' place in history as a classic ex-
tifying themselves solemnly at' mended a Congressional joint from President Truman issued ample bf the disaster that can
cocktail parties as "librarians" committee, as well as a Presi- to 1947 and inspired principally )occur when a major interna-
and "clerks." In its early days, dentially appointed board of by the Italian, Czechoslovak and tional operation is undertaken
fors instance, C.I.A. employes consultants on intelligence ac- Berlin situations, then acute'in deepest secrecy, is politically
who in their private lives need-tivities. cold-war issues. , approved on the basis of "facts"
ed to apply for credit were in- To forestall, the first, Mr. The 54-12 group was-and still provided by those who most
strutted by the agency to say,.Dulles acquiesced in the second, is -- composed of the President's fervently advocated it, is car-
when asked for an employer's and in January, 1956, President special assistants for national Pied out by the same advocates,
reference: "Call Miss Bertha Eisenhower named a board of security affairs, the director of and ultimately acquires a mo-
Potts" at a certain number. consultants on foreign intelli- the C.I.A., the Deputy Secretary mentum of its own beyond any-
It was not long, of course, be gence activities, with James R. of Defense and the Under Secre- thing contemplated either by the
fore the lenders who were told Killian Jr., president of the tart' (or Deputy Under Secre- advocates or those who suppos-
to call Miss Potts would say Massachusetts Institute of Tech- tary) of State for Political Af-redly "controlled" them.
gleefully: "Oh, you work for the nology, as chairman, fairs, plus other officers con-i Responsible officials of the
C.I.A." Those familiar with the suited occasionally on particular' Eisenhower Administration re-
For many years nor to 1961, board's work in the Eisenhower proposals. 1port, for instance, that the in-
a good many critics had been years say it performed a useful The group seems to have been] xistnenceplan was not even in
aware of the control dangers function on the technical side, created, partly at least, in re-': existence, as such, when they
sponse to public concern over! went out of office on Jan. 19,
i
h
D
Killi
t i
h
li
i
t
h
A
'
f
ere
r.
ance,
eren
ar w
or
ns
n
n t
.
s pecu
an,
e C.L
the
roble
f
t
l
m o
con
ro
, and it
position. In 1954, Senator Mike.was a powerful advocate in the p
Mansfield, Democrat of Mon- development of the U-2. How- was given responsibility for
tana, obtained 34 cosponsors for, ever, it is generally agreed that passing on intelligence opera-
-
a bill to create a 12-member the board did not tions beforehand. However, begive very taus f th f
e
1961; there was nothing but a
Cuban refugee force, available
for whatever the Incoming Ad-
joint committee on intelligence critical attention to "black" op- shi
of Allen Dullesal nd loan Yet the testimony of Kennedy
to keep watch ~y 7 t~p~ r,2i t~,~ ,~O2 a ~
much as the CW o t 1`'JbilSttetS~ LOu3~1 ~7vL ' !close, relations officials-Theo-
close relations with President dore C. Sorensen and Arthur M.
Committee on Atomic Energy', In 1954 there was also estab- Eisenhower and because Allen! Schlesinger Jr., for instance--is
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : C14-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
that the matter was presented - The President followed this, that the Bay of Pigs i'as alWalt W. Rostow, who have re-
to Mr. Kennedy by the C.I.A. letter, which was made public, (watershed in the life of the placed McGeorge Bundy in rep-
advocates as if he were already with a secret communication,C.I.A. and its influence on pot-1 resenting the White House.
committed to it and would have saying he meant It and specifi- ioy-making. Before that, not This group meets once a
to cancel it rather than ,approve tally including C.I.A. menImatter iow much administrative week with a detailed agenda. It
it. Mr. Sorensen even wrote in among those responsible to the control and political approval concentrates almost exclusively
his book, "Kennedy," that Mr. Ambassador. there nay have been, Mr. Dulles on operations. It approves all
Kennedy had been subtly pushed ran the agency largely as he proposed operations and it
to be no less "hard" In his anti-' A Blow to Bundy saw fit. passes in great detail on ex-
Castroism than President Ei- Perhaps the most important He as able to do so because penditures as small as $10,000
senhower supposedly had been. It change in control procedures, I he tout almost always get "ap- that. have political implications
The ultimate disaster and its however, involved the 54-121 proval"-and thus .adhere to the or could prove embarrassing if
various causes need no retelling.,, group within the political ranks forms of control - from his discovered. Any differences are
Their effect was graphically de of the Administration, and it'! brother in the State Depart.- referred first to the Cabinet
scribed by an official who saw came without any Presidential ment or from President Eisen- level and then, if necessary, to
the shaken Mr. Kennedy imme initiative. hewer,, with both of whom he the, President.
diately afterward. The Presi-I The Bay of Pigs had dealt a had the closest relations of trust While the group approves
dent, he said, "wanted to splinter, severe psychological blow to and liking. every "black" operation, it does
the C.I.A. in a thousand pieces; McGeorge Bundy, who as the The effect of the Kennedy not necessarily clear all the
and scatter it to the winds." President's assistant for nation- shake-up was immediately ap-i routine intelligence -gathering
At the same time, to Clark M.ial security affairs was a morn- parent-f--on policy in Laos, for, activities of the agency. Nor,
Clifford, a Washington lawyerber of the group, and perhaps instance. W. Averell Harrim,an,l once approval has been given
and close friend, who had writ-,also to his self-esteem. There- then the Assistant Secretary of I for a "black" operation, does it
ten the legislation setting up the after he set about tightening up State Per Far Eastern Affairs,) maintain a running supervision
C.I.A. during the Truman Ad-; the surveillance of C.I.A. opera- wagiven a free hand in getting over every detail of its execu-
ministration, Mr. Kennedy said, tions, subjecting them to search-i rid of I +!u American puppet, tion.
flatly and poignantly: ing analysis before and not after Prem+ I h r,.ni' Nosavan - I Under a given policy decision
"I could not survive another the event. The hard-eyed Mr. who c bat king by the C.I.A. ~l approving a guerrilla operation
one of these." Bundy was notably relentless at Preside1r t Eisenhower had ape- in a certain country, for in-
An Inquiry Ordered that kind of administration. ~cilically approved - and rein- stance, the 54-12 group might
The President accepted the statin, Soua.nna_ Phoumo. at also have to approve something
But because he could not' advice of the Taylor and Killian the head of a neutralist govern- ; as specific and important as a
simply abolish the agency, much investigations on two important mciit? bridge-blowing. But the over-all
less its function, the President questions. By general agreement of vir-;program would go on by itself
decided he would "get it under; First, he decided not to limit; tually very official interviewed, under the direction of agents in
control." the C.I.A. to intelligence gather-i the C.I1A. does not now directly the field.
First,. he ordered a thorough` ing and not to shift clandestine, make policy, and its operations
investigation by a group headed; operations to the Pentagon, ors are under much more rigorous Bureau of the Budget
by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor and' to a special agency created for surveillance and control than Another form of control is
composed also of Allen Dulles, the purpose. ' before. Nevertheless, there con- that of the pursestring.
Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief i These ideas had found favor tinue to be-and probably al- The C.I.A.'s annual request
of Naval Operations, and At-among some sections of the state ways vill be--instances where for funds, which is hidden largely
torney General Robert F. i Department, among many public: the controls simply do not work. in the. Defense Department
Kennedy. !critics and even among some; 4 certain is the responsibility of
Second, on Mr. Clifford's ad- members and the staff of the) certain Boundaries the head of the Budget Bureau's
vice, the President recreated the advisory committee. But it was' Richard Bissell, who as deputy International Division. The' re-
old board of consultants under) stoutly opposed by Allen Dulles,' directo , for plans was largely quest has usually fared well, but
the title of the Foreign Intelli- iwho argued that this would re- 1 respon ible for the U-2 recon in the fiscal year 1965, for the
gence Committee and ,asked Dr.;,sult in duplication and rivalry,( naissa ce triumph and for the first time in several years, it
Killian to resume the chairman-'1, and that the two functions were I Bay o Pigs disaster, has ex- was cut back sharply by the
ship. (Mr. Clifford became a (interdependent, though he ad- plaine why this must be. bureau.
member and later succeeded Dr.: mitted that they had not been. "Yo can't take on operations Another form of budgetary
Killian as chairman.) The Pres-(working in harness on the Bay of this scope," he has said,! control centers on the agency's
ident directed the committee to; of Pigs operation. "draw Lnarrow boundaries ofd "slush fund," which used to be
investigate the whole intelli-I The two committees of inquiry policy .round them and be ab about $100-million a year and
gence community from "stem to agreed with Mr. Dulles, and so, solute) sure that those bounda-1 is now in "the tens of millions."
stern," recommend changes and finally, did the President. ries wi 1 never be overstepped."' One, official has said that "the
see that they were carried out. I Second, the committees recom- Recently, for instance, the! C.I.A. can't spend a dollar with-
Third, after a decent interval, I mended, and the President en-C.I.A. was accused of sup-' ~ out Bureau of Budget approval."
the President replaced Allen I thusiastically agreed, that the 1 porting Cambodian rebels who! But another official put a some-
Dulles with John A. McCone, a;C.LA. should leave sizable mill-l oppose Prince Norodom Siha-what different light on how the
former chairman of the Atomic tary operations to the Pentagon; nouk, the head of state. Even "slush fund" is handled.
Energy Commission. He told the and henceforth limit itself to some s nior United States For Suppose, he said, that Country
new director that he was not to, operations of a kind in which eign S rvice officers said they X is having an election and the
be simply the director of the United States involvement wouldIwere n t sure that the agency'& candidates backed by the Unit-
C.I.A. but should regard his be "plausibly deniable." This, firm d ials meant no agent in;ed States Government seem
primary task as "the coordina- however, has proved to be a: the fie d, no obscure planner in headed for defeat. The Ambas-
tion and effective guidance of rule of thumb in which it is the hue C.I.A. building in Vir-,sailor and the C.I.A. station
the total United States intelli- often difficult to hide the thumb. ginia, had strayed from the: chief-the agency's chief in that
gence effort." Mr. Dulles's key strict boundaries of policy. country-may forward a re-
assistants were also removed. Something Like Secrecy A hi ,,h degree of control of quest for some fast money to
Fourth, the President sent a For instance, the later crea-! C.I.A. ctivities exists, however, spread around.
letter to every Ambassador ,tell- tion of an air force of anti- and in uiry produced this plc- ! The request, when reviewed
ing him he was "in charge of 1 Castro Cubans to fly for the: to ?e of the controlling agencies and cleared by the middle levels
the entire diplomatic mission" Congolese Government was car-'and ho well the control works: of the State Department and the
at his post, including not only ried out and managed by the i C.I.A., goes to the 54-12 group
foreign service personnel but C.I.A., not by the Pentagon, de he 54-12 Group 'for review.
"also the representatives of all spite the recommendation. I The 4-12 group is the heart' This group will first decide
other United States agencies. The obvious reason was thati of the dontrol system. Its mem-. whether the money should be
These representatives of other the agency could do the job inllnembe s now are Admiral Wil- spent, how the C.I.A. should
agencies were to keep the Am-,something like secrecy, while liam F Raborn, the C.I.A. di-!spend it and how much should
bassador "fully informed of their'Defense Department involve-!rector; IU. Alexis Johnson, Dep- be made available. Then the re-
views and activities" and would ment would have been neces-~uty Under Secretary of State quest goes to the Budget Bureau
abide by the Ambassador's de-sarily more open, advertising for Political Affairs; Cyrus R, to be justified in budget terms
cisions "unless in some particu-the backing of the United States iVance, Deputy Secretary of De-)against other needs.
lar instance you and they are for the "instant air force." fense,_ nd two Presidential as-
notified to the contrary." It is beyond dispute. however, sistant, . Bill D. Moyers and
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CI -RDP75-OOOO1ROOO2OO52OOO8-1
18
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
A Call Brings the Money 'Wore frequently. Individual.iDepartment and Ambassadors.1 of agents in each diplomatic
For example, this official said, members also take field inspec- ISecretary of State Rusk has'. mission.
one such project was recently tion trips. Mr. Clifford went re-]confided to his associates that In secret testimony before the
trimmed by the Budget Bureau Gently to South Vietnam; Mr. he is now quite certain the Senate Foreign Relations Corn-
from $3-million to $1.7-million.'] Gray has been on extensive trips 61A. is doing nothing affecting mittee in the summer of 1965,
But in the last week of the elec-, to the Middle East and South- lofficial policy he does not know( Under Secret%ry of State Thorn-
tion, the C.I.A. ran out of funds east Asia. about. But he added that he as C. Mann made plain that the
just as it needed some more bill- There is divergent opinion on was also sure he was the only: creation of the Imbert military
boards plastered, and it was] the control value of this board, one in the State Department, junta in the Dominican Reput-
able to get the money simply Some of its members are informed about some of the; lie in May was a State Depart-
by a phone call to the Budget! highly pleased with .their own things being done. I ment, and not a C.I.A., idea.
Bureau. This official explained work. They point out that over Despite this information gap? Asked whether the C.I.A.
that there had to be some way the last four and one-half years as high as the Under Secretary' would have set up the junta
of providing "quick-turn money" they have made some 200 recom-! and Assistant Secretary levels, j without orders from State, Mr,
under tight controls and audit. mendations, of which the Presi State Department officers with Mann replied:
It should also be noted that dent accepted 95 per cent. la need to know are far better "I will say that in the past.
this form of control is purely They take credit for persuad- informed about operations than; this may have been; I do not.
budgetary and not substantive. ing President Kennedy and Sec- before the Bay of Pigs. ]know. But since I arrived in
The Bureau of the Budget does retary of Defense Robert S. Mc Moreover, in the 54-12 group, January, 1964, I have had an
not interpose any policy judg- Namara to create the Defense and in interagency intelligence understanding first with Mr.
ment but simply weighs a pro-I Intelligence Agency, combining meetings, State Department of-] McCone and now with Admiral
posed operation against total the separate service intelligence fivers are now more ready to`,,Raborn, and I am sure the de-
money available and the outlays divisions. This had been recom-' speak out and more likely to bei' partment has, even more im-
for other projects. mended by Secretary of Defense:,, heeded on proposed intelligence, portantly, that the policy is
Gates and by Lyman Kirkpat-"++operations that they believe! made here [at State] and that
Foreign Intelligence rick, inspector general of the! would compromise larger policy,! nothing is done without our cone
Advisory Board C.I.A., as a result of the widely!!!! interests. sent."
differing estimates of the so-. President Kennedy's secret This "nothing" probably goes
Another control agency is the called "missile gap" in the late letter to the Ambassadors also:too far, since there remain areas,
Foreign ntelligence Advisory nineteen-fifties made by the in-]had some effect in changing a' of ambassadorial ignorance. An
Board. This group has nine telligence arms of the services. dangerous situation. . Ambassador is not always in-
members. Four have had ex- Another official in a position,', In 1954, William J. Sebald re- formed of "third-party" spying
tensive government experience, of autho}ity, however, believes; signed as Ambassador to Burma in his country --for example;
The chairman, Clark Clifford, that the board does little more because of continued C.I.A. sup-spying in France on the Chinese
was special counsel to President than provide a "nice audit" ofIport to Chinese Nationalists in Communists there. Nor is he
Truman from 1946 to 1950. C.I.A. operations and that any, northern Burma despite all his given specific' details on coun-
Among the other members, "control" it exercises is largely protests. In 1956, James B.terespionage and information
Robert D. Murphy, former car-. ex post facto. He asked what; Conant, Ambassador to West,gathering about which he may
eer Ambassador and former could be expected from a board Germany, was not told about be generally informed.
Under Secretary of State for that met only a few days a, the tunnel under East Berlin. If the C.I.A. has "bought the
Political Affairs, has had. per- month. I In 1960, in Laos, Ambassador madam," as one official put it,
sonal experience in clandestine "By 5 in the afternoon," he I Winthrop G. Brown was often of a house of ill fame patron-
operations, for he prepared thesaid, "the guys can't remember! bypassed as the C.I.A. helped 1ized by influential citizens o't
way for the American landing what they were told in the morn-]] prop up the American-backed officials of a host country, the
in North Africa in 11942. He is ing." Premier Phoumi Nosavan, Ambassador does not know it
now a director of Coming Glass. ' Even the members concede-against his advice. The same and probably doesn't want to.
Gordon Gray, a director of that their work has been aimed year, the Ambassador in Malay- He would, however, have the
the R. J. Reynolds Company and primarily at improving the of sia knew nothing of the Singa- dubious benefit of any informa-
a newspaper owner, was Secre- ficiency and methods of the pore operation that ultimately tion the madam might discloser
tary of the Army under Presi- C.I.A., rather than at control w; as to embarrass the State De- These are the four institution
dent Truman and later was of individual operations. Thus,] partment in 1965. ]!al forms of "control" of the
President Eisenhower's special if the board does investigate] It is doubtful whether such!IC.I.A. that now exist-save for
assistant for national security some "black" operations, its em- !things could happen today if Congressional oversight and the
affairs. Frank Pace Jr., chair-yphasis is placed on whether it, an Ambassador is forceful all-important role of the agen-
m.an of the Special Advisory', was done well or could have] enough in establishing his au-' cy's director. And The New
Board, Air Force Systems Com- been more successful, rather! thority. (York Times's survey for these
mand, was director of the Bur- than on the political question:' In the last four years the Am- articles left little doubt that the.
eau of the Budget in 1949-50 of whether it should have been , ; bassadors have been kept much ]newly vigorous functioning of
and Secretary of the Army from done at all. I better informed, and their rela-'these four groups has greatly
1950 to 1953. One member reported, how-,.tions with C.I.A. chiefs of sta-Iimproved coordination, more
Two members are scientists' ever, that the C.I.A. now brought! tion have been consequently ]nearly assured political ap-?
connected with industry - Wil-!some of its poposals to the com-more cordial. Ambassadorsproval and substantially re?,,
liam O. Baker, vice president inlImittee for prior discussion, if Clare Timberlake and Edward]]duced the hazards implicit in.
charge of research for the Bellh not specific approval. This is. Gullion were completely postedl!C.I.A. operations.
Telephone Laboratories, a mem not an unmixed blessing. on C.I.A. operations during the, Nevertheless, the agency still
ber for many years of the Sci While the board might advise] Congo crisis and worked closely
]remains the fount of information
ence Advisory Board of the Aix against some risky scheme, it' with the agency. So, apparently,', on which many policy decisions
Force, and Edwin H. Land, also might not; in the latter was Henry Cabot Lodge afterrest, and the source of facts,
chairman and president of the case its weight added to that,] he took over. the embassy in selected or otherwise, on which
Polaroid Corporation, a former of the C.I.A., would present the', Saigon in 1963. to justify its own projects.
adviser to the Navy on guided responsible political officials in While the Ambassador may Nevertheless, the C.I.A. en-
missiles and an expert on pho- the 54-12 group with an even not always be completely mas joys an inherent advantage in.
tography. more powerful advocacy than ter in his own house, neither , any conflict with the State or
There are two military repre-, usual. does it seem to be true-as a I Defense Departments because of
sentatives-General Taylor, for-, An advantage of the board i staff report of Senator Henry; its undeniable expertise-espe-
mer chairman of the Joint Chiefs! is its direct link to the Pres- M. Jackson's subcommittee on cially in economics and science
of Staff and former Ambassa-ident. Since this is augmented, 11 national security staffing and -and because it is free from,
dor to South Vietnam, and Ad-l at present, by Mr. Clifford'soperations said in 1962-that such political entanglements as
miral John H. Sides, commander-
personal and political ties!' the primacy of the Ambassador,) trying to build up. a missile
in chief of the Pacific Fleet, to President Johnson, any rec-I supposedly established by the budget (as in the case of the
from 1960 to 1963. Dr. William] ommendations the committee! Kennedy letter, was largely "a Air Force) or of having to jus7
L. Langer, the ninth member, is
Professor of History at Harvard
and a frequent government con-
sultant.
The hoard meets an aver-
age of one or one and one-half
days a month.
into twc-wan 1'till
makes carry great weight with polite fiction." tify the recognition of a foreign
the bureaucrats of the C.I.A., For example, Robert F. Wood-' leader (as in the case of State).
even before they appear in a ward, Ambassador to Spain. And nevertheless, in its legiti-
Presidential order. I vetoed a man chosen to be the mate need for secrecy, the
State Department C.I.A.'s Spanish station chief, C.I.A. simply cannot be sub-
State
~q And the State Department, while jected to as much public or even
r I e1e -r ,g j! Li~2 : Cj*ll gpa'PIRii Ig1i s rutiny as all other
rso c same contro `off ~sa'tS1~e'I b~ t agencies undergo.
i9
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : C14-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
A Call for More Control
For all these reasons, and be-,
cause of occasional blunders,
there has been no abatement In
the demand of critics for more
and stronger control. Inevi ably;
their call is for some fo m of'
increased supervision b the
people's representatives in Con-
gress, usually by a joint com-
mittee of the two houses.
The Times survey indicatc-d
a widespread feeling, that such
a, committee would do the agen-
cy's vital functions more harm
than good, and that it harm
provide little if any solution to
the central problem of control.
The history of the C ntr2.l
Intelligence Agency since 1947
makes one thing painfully clear
--that the control question.
while real and of the u most
importance, is one of I "not
measures but men." The forms
of control mean nothing if here
is no will to control, and if ere
is a will to control, the the
form of it is more or less ir-
relevant.
Such a will can only ome
from the high political off cials
of the Administration, and it
can best be inspired in the by
the direct example of the resi-
dent.
But even the President rob-
ably could not impose his will
on the agency in every case
without the understanding the
concurrence and the vig roes,
and efficient cooperation o th8"
second most important m n in
the matter of control--th di-
rector of the C.I.A.
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : C14-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : Cl
cisive questions to those pre-
paring formal analyses and
plans, forcing them to chal-
lenge and defend their own
judgments.
Above all, he set the hard.
example himself of putting
aside personal preference, in-
formed guesses and long gam-
bles in favor of realistic weigh-
ing of. availableL evidence wand
He brought, specialists and'
experts into conferences and de
cision.snaking at a much higher:
level of policy than before.'
Often he took such men with'
him to meetings at the Cabinet
level. This exposed their to ;
policy considemtlon.s as never
makers
and p Po y-
for
b
e
e
,more closely in touch with thel
" the
"
y
feats
experts on whose
States Intelligence Board - a'
group that brings together rep-
resentatives from the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the State;
Department's intelligence unit
and others-Mr. McCune won
a reputation for objectivity by
frequently overruling the pro-
posals of his own agency, the..
some Criticism, Too
His regime was not without
its critics. Many officials be-
lieve he narrowed the C.I.A.'s
range of interests, which was
,as wide as the horizons under
the imaginative Allen Dulles.
they say, he was
For Instance
,
slow to mobilize the b.LA- to
obtain information about nu-
clear programs In India, Israel
and other nations.
Mr. McCone also tried, but
failed, to end interagency rivj1n
ries. He spent much time bitter dispute with Secretary Defense Robert S. McNamabout divisions of labor acosts in technological prograand aboutchains of commin Vietnam. He is rerted have feared the groof
Defense Intelligence Agency a
an invasion of C.I.A. territory.
With the State Department,.
too, rivalry continued-and still
does. Much of this can be at
tributed, on the diplomats' side,
to the C.I.A: s readier access
to the upper levels of govern-
ment and to its financial abilit
to underwrite the kind of re
cently increased political con-, than mechanics-and in support!
trol of C.I.A. operations. Fo of the widespread opinion
Instance, until April 28, 1865, among present and former of-
he day president Johnson; facials that the problem of con-
ordered the Marines into Santo trolling the C.I.A. must begin
Domingo, the C.I.A. had re- with men inside the agency it-
ported the possibility of a re-; self.,
bellion and it knew of three; The far more general belief
Republic, T but the agency ha
not suggested an imminen
threat of a Communist tak
e
over. 'now exists _ is ill-informed, in
When the president and hisI he hands of a chosen few,
advisers !became p ~g 9
there was such a ea , wishes to- to even ~g~Y
ever, C.I.A. gents atupplied~.and occasionally. apathetic.
CHIEFS OF THE C.I.A.: Allen W. ul1es, left, was replaced by John A. McCone, center,
in 1961. Present director, Adm. Wi liam F. Raborn, right, has held the post for a year.
confirming intelligence - some
of it open to challenge by an
alert reader. C.I.A. officials
t
seem a little red-faced abou
and the intima-
this compliance
,
tion is that the C.I.A. may have
gone overboard in trying not
to undermine but to substanti-I
ate a political policy decision.
Within the Bounds of Policy
Mr. McCone's pride and the
fierce loyalty to the agency that
he developed made him -resent-
ful of Congressional and public
criticism, not always to his
own advantage. Nevertheless,
as a- result of his single-minded
Thee are our
matte s of the Senate and House the sensitive C.I.A. budget, as it
Arm Services and Appropria- comes to them, from the Con-
tions (Committees- to which the gressional economy bloc and
director reports. the agency's - more determined
Mr McCone met about once critics.
a m th with the subcommit-; As a result of this and other
tees. The present director, Congressional representations.
Adm. William F. Raborn, meets the C.I.A. "slush fund" for
with them somewhat more emergencies has been reduced
often below $100-million. And-much
Conflicting Views to Mr. McCone's annoyance-
President Johnson's economy
There are conflicting opin- drives resulted in an Adminis-
ions n the value of these sea- tration reduction in the agency's
sions~ Some who participate say general budget.
that rthey are "comprehensive," Three things, however, are
that the director holds back clear about this Congressional
nothlng in response to ques- oversight.
tions' that he goes into "great No heal Control
his agency, other former meal- -tidetai on budget and- opera- One is that. the subcommittee
'ons' and is "brutally frank."
real
hers of he Kennedy Admi
H
m
o
at "we
d
arenot in-
ose tration-
because they
it othe
trol
but a that re the
i
ed t n
f
fill
ind
tw
men nohis appont formed of all -covert operations,
hard to recall any time when subc, itteea get no precise eiherbefore or after they take
Mr. McCone of the C.I.A. In info nation on the-budget or lace.
$ i fimp overstepped the bounds :the number of employes and P The second Doint regarding 1-1
is that Congress ought to have
a anuch larger voice in th* con-
trol of the agency. This belief
t
is reinforced by the fact tha
Congressional contral that
th
said to be "lackadaisical" and
"a thetic," with some Sen-
ata ,ss not wanting to know too
much. The House suboommit
teed' are said to be "alert, in
beroand efficient," with
mei herstedinsisting an answers
to questions. _-- v
Mahon, Democrat of Texas,
cha rman of the House ]Aims
pro riations Com ittee,
warned the Administration it
shield it from Its critics.
Finally, even these e$tablish-
ment watchdogs can be told
just as much as the C.I.A.
director thinks they should
know. In fact, one or two of
the subcommittee members are
known to shy away from too
much secret information, - on
the ground that they do not
want either to know about
"black" operations or take the
chance of unwittingly disclos-
mu t itself police the C.I.A. log them.
+ 1nm-nihL -than _ For all - these reasons, there
cau he and other Congress- opinion-in and out of Congress
 Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1
who must be blamed if control
fails.
"Those who believe that the
United States Government on
occasion resorts to force when
it shouldn't," Richard Bissell,
the C.I.A.'s former deputy di-
rector, once said, "should in all
fairness and justice direct their
views to the question of national
policy and not hide behind the
criticism that whereas the Pres-
ident and Cabinet generally are
enlightened people, there is an
evil and ill-controlled agency
which imports this sinister ele-
ment."
The New York Times study
of the C.I.A. suggests that it is
not an invisible government but
the real government of the
United States upon which the
responsibility must lie whenever
the agency may be found "out
of control." For if that respon-
sibility is accepted, there can
.be no invisible government.
Approved For Release 2003/12/02 : CIA-RDP75-00001 R000200520008-1