THE CONTROVERSIAL OPERATION PHOENIX: HOW IT ROOTS OUT VIETCONG SUSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300060024-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 18, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

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Approved For Release 2001 /081M :F~A- 72-00337R000300060024-4
?.he Controversial Operation Phoenix:
How It Roots Out Vietconthey feel they spects~
it someone decided to make)
a movie about Phoenix, one enough eR evidence they attemptI
s
By JAMES P. STEIt6A
SpeelI to 71t New Yrrk Times
SAIGON, Soul 'etn i eb.
17---As a controversia opera-
tion known as Phoenix moves
into its third year and to center
stage today at Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearings
in Washington, American of-
ficals here privately continue
of the most im-
y
e arres
m
Somet
mes
to call it one
portant and least successful skilled political apparatus is involve a single local police-
programs in South Vietnam, destroyed, the Communist man. Other stimes, ingle it mayotake
Designed by the United States movement.. will continue to a combined police-military
Central Intelligence Agency to prosper regardless of how operation to go ito a hamlet
weed out an estimated 75,000 many guerrillas and enemy and find a suspect.
Vietcong political leaders and soldiers are killed. In many in the course normal mil[-
agents from the civilian popu contested areas, however, the tary he couoperations, some suspected
lotion, the program is not the local people appear hesitant to Vietcong agents may suspected
or
sinister, cloak-and-dagger, ter upset any informal accommo- Vietcong or captured. . When re-
ror operation that some critics, dations made for the sake of be killed of these a t operations When ire.
including the Vietcong, have survival. back to the Phoenix district
portrayed it to be, these of- "The local officials are per. hack tort the ohoenix simply
ficials insist. fectly capable of carrying out call out the numbers and add
"That's nonsense," one of this program if they thought them u tnscores. umbers s
them said. "Phoenix is just not they were winning," one Amer- them to their h quotas set This help
hhelps meet a killing organization. The lean said. headquarters.
kinds of things they [Foreign The Phoenix program, called ",'One thing about the Viet
Relations Committee members] Phung Hovng by the Vietnam- na ",'One thing ing abwill out the every
are probably looking for are ere, was established with the quota that's established for
not happening that much - money and organizational tal- them," said one critic of the
which is not to saythey are tents of the C.I.A. in late 1967. program. "That's what makes
not happening at all." It was officially sanctioned by t.heg head count so deceptive.
Sentence Without Trial (President Nguyen Van Thieu How do you know they are not
196$
l
1
Briefly, Phoenix works this
way: When local officials feel
they have enough evidence
against a person suspected of
being connected with the Viet-
cong, they arrest him. If he is
not released quickly--suspects
often vanish out the back doors
hours of their arrests-he isI masters. A large number were
taken to a province interroga-
tinn center.
then Ygiven to the Provincial
Security Counci, whose powers
are those of a ruling body, not
a judicial one. The council may,
however, free the suspect or
order him jailed for as long
as two years without trial.
Once the ' suspect has
served a term in jail he is
^onsidered to have been re-
Habilitated.
. Some officials concede that
many abuses have occurred
under Phoenix and that the
program has potential for seri-
ous harm if it were used, for
example, to harass legitimate
political. opposition. Yet in the
over-all ? portrait of Phoenix
painted here, the program ap-
pears more notorious for inef-
and bung-
ti
on
ficiency, corrup
ling than for terror. lieutenant - special ponce
Like many other programs: agents and local pacification of-
In Vietnam, Phoenix looks best I facials are supposed to pool in-
on paper. Officials here argue telligence' data and compile
that its controversial reputa- dossiers on suspectedd Viitettco4ngg
tiaft has been built mq~VW1.its nwathe 1UU'I/U/U
secrecy than on its a~Ettll iiI5i''
suspect talking about such and'
such."
t the suspect. 11~utal 'fGenear with proce-
critic joked, the lead wold be:to find and arre
more ore a Gomer? Pyle than a' "The trouble is that in many! y hesguY are
John Wayne. cases, there is a complete lack) pretty good and if the district
Differing Views of dossiers," said one civilian' people haven't. turned up
While both American and official. "You might have ' a, enough evidence, the suspect
South Vietnamese officials in'single sentence in a dossier say-: will be released."
Saigon believe the program to,ing that so and so heard the.: 20 Per Cent Jailed I
be vital, some local officials
are less than enthusiastic. Sai-
y
,
Ju
assigni> g.?names and titles to
Under the Ministry of the .dead 'bodies?"
Interior, administrative commit-
. In 1969, according to official;
i
tees and intelligence-gater
ng figures, 19,534 Vietcong were;
centers were set up in the 44 "neutralized." That number in-
province ,capitals and most of cluded. 8,515 reportedly cap-
the country's 242 districts. tured, 6,187 killed and 4,832
About 450 Americans were who defected.
sprinkled among. these groups Once a -suspect is captured,
C.I.A. agents or. military Intel-
ligence officers borrowed by
the agency.
Military Now, in Charge
Gradually, the C.I.A.'s role
was taken . over by United
States military men so that at
this moment according to offi-
cials, of the 441 Americans in-
volved in. Phoenix, all six are
military glen: Last July 1, over.
all authority' for American ad-
sorbed by.U.S. military head-
quarters here..
Finding the Suspects
a
t
i
th
he automatically becomes a?
"neutralized" Vietcong and part
"I've' never heard of 'anyone
having a defense," said an of-
if the ' council determines,
that the suspect is a Vietcong
agent, he can be "detained
without trial for up to two
years. But he usually isn't.
The program's American ad-
visers estimated recently that
about 20. per cent of the sus-
pects in 1969 were sentenced,
and that only a fraction of
those were imprisoned for the]
maximum two years. Most sen
tences were from three to Si
months.
Theoretically, those given the
maximum sentence are to be
sent to federal prisons, such as
the one on Conson Island. Some
provincial officials are reluc-
tant to do this, however, be-
cause by Imprisoning a man
in their own jails they receive
a prisoner-food allotment from
the Saigon Government.
After having. served a jail
sentence, the suspect is given
a Government identification
card and released on parole.
He is supposed to check in
from time to time with local
police officials.
Having to arrest or capture
the same suspect two: or three
times ds frustrating,' according
to some : local advisers in the l
program, and. may have some
effect on the statistics In the
column relating to slain sus-
of the offical tallies for the,ipects,
year. This is true despite the" Probably the'most controver-
fact that many suspects are 'sial arm of `the Phoenix pro-
released an hour or two later "gram in each province is a
through the backdoors of local group called the Provincial
police stations. Starting this
year, officials say, suspects will
have to be sentenced before
they will be counted as "neu-
tralized."
If the suspect is not released
at the local level, he is taken
to a province interrogation cen-
ter for questioning and then
confined until his dossier comes
before the Province Security
Council, composed of the prov-
ince chief, his deputy for Intel-
ligence, the top national police-
men in the province, and
usually two or three other
provincial officials. This may
take months.
The provincial council is a
ruling body, not a judicial body.
The evidence is examined, and
the suspect is either released or
sentenced, Of the suspects who
make it this far, an estimated
The program was set up to
operate at the local level,
where the problems-'begin.
At each "district intelligence
coordinating and: operations
center," as they are called,
teams usually consisting of a
South Vietnamese military intel-
ligence officer,, an American
lc 0161" 0
Reconnaissance Unit. It con-
sists of a dozen or more South
Vietnamese mercenaries, origi-
nally recruited and paid hand-
somely by the C.I.A. to serve
under the province chief as th
major "action arm" of th
hoodlums, soldiers of fortune.,
and draft-dodgers, receive 15,-
000 piasters a month. An ordi-
nary soldier gets 4,000 piasters.
Some Saigon officials con-
cede that these units have been
employed in extortion and ter,
ror. But the officials insist that
the units' foul reputations have
been exaggerated.
In October, after second
thoughts about the program's
secrecy, Premier Tran Thien
Aft agents among
 them. In many areas, jp 4 ed For Release 2001/08/07 CIA-RDP72-00337R000300060024-4
posters were distribu e .
In one. Mekong Delta town,
an American official said, Phoe-
nix operatives had worked for
months trying to find a Viet-
cong agent. Within an hour
after his "wanted" poster was
displayed, a woman appeared
at the police station and said
the agent lived next door.
Approved For Release 2001/08/07 : CIA-RDP72-00337R000300060024-4