SOME ASPECTS OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATONAL GROUPS IN WORLD WAR II

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3
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• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2002
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• Content Type: PAPER

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ASnCTS OF THE A TMTIES OF THE O MC
VTCZ3 P O,?AL GROUPS
II. OPE ,TIONTAL MOMS IN THE ? fA T ATEt, 105.
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II. 0 ATI0 tAL GROUPS IN THE CHINA THEA`i t, 19Ia5
Your factors led to the decision to employ the OSS Operational
Groups in Central and South China in 1945 and helped to determine the
way In which they were ultimately used in the field. First was the
general strategic problem faced by the Allies after the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor? Second was the political and diplomatic relationship
between the Western powers and the Chinese govsrnrent. Third was the
military position of the Japanese forces in China, Fourth was the
concept of the role of psychological warfare which was decided upon
lean entry into the war there arose the question of how
o practice in the European campaigns.
utilize available forces to defeat the Axle powers. Allied
leers decided, after considerable discussion. to concentrate the
ards Europe and then following the conquest of 0
turn to the problem of defeating Japan. In the meantime, forces in the
Far East would attempt to stem Japanese advances and prepare the ground
for the later campaigns* The military reasons for this decision wer
that the regular Allied military forces were unable to mount major
operations simultaneously against both Oermany and Japan,
were militarily stronger in China than the Chinese and ab
them in the field* but were not powerful enough to achieve
Japanese
success and remove them from the war. A stalemate ensued, brought about
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by Japanese weaknesses as by any particular Allied military
. The Allies therefore selected psychological warfare as the
interim means of attacking the Japanese.
The political and diplomatic problem differed vast
encountered in Europe. In Europe the major Allied powers had to deal.
with refugees
to did not control any part of their home
territories and consequently were dependent on British and Li -..r. ican
policy decisions and on British and American supplies for what small
rmed forces they were able to maintain in exile. Therefore,
political and diplorisatic problems did have influence, they were of
secondary importance.I In China, however, th
The Chinese government remained in control of a substantial portion of
ory. It was maintaining in the field a large zero in,. active
operations against the Japanese. Since the Chinese gove.z nt and
military forces did represent a potential, if i t actual., =ream
pressure against the Japanese,
must be given to Chinese sensibilities. In other words., therefore,
were able to exercise a greater influence on American and
British military policy than did the views of the refugee TeNropean
goveralrnents. The Chinese were also particularly sensitive regarding
their treatment by the Western poweers.2 All these facts
problem of organizing Allied intelligence services and guerrilla. warfare
operations in China far ro re complex than had been 4t he case in trope.
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been a that a major Allied mistake was to sub.
ito poli~ and diplomatic factors in Europe to the
aim of defeating Geraaasaa r. The me ricer of this argu-
reaee status their mdepenace on the United
the United tingdoaa these stover cents-in-Mle
sable to exercise any aaa ar' inf .uence on policy daai-
ovsttnt in control of the honer territory under
regarded as a puppet of the Germane and, of
d no influence.
a have been written about the Chinese problem since these
`heso have been notable as s ch for etr beat an for
It is not the purpose of this study to discuss
cniaaae-for treating the Chinese gent as aqua;I or
al rdinate. Suffice it to say that the Western powers did
troot it no an equal and that that decision inf.uencrd greatly
*9 use made of unorthodox warfare in general and the Operational
in paarti+cnlar during l91145. An exaaale of the extremes
writers have gone in their treatment of the Chinese
to be found in Naar Rouortp " `olt a IT, 'F9. Writing
.
ulties of mounting 053 operations in E: na,
of the Chinese gover at as follower
t activity in China suffered from the
Laa atmosphere pervading Chinese officialdom.
a'1f4nterea t and corruption
.san rather than nationaaa, policy evidenced
s of the Chinese Nationalist Uove.ent,,
negated any efficient conduct of active Warfare against
Japan. The American prograaa received Chinese coopera-
tion ierever it entailed supping or expanding
agendles. Thus the activities of Naval Imoup,
in building up China' as internal
sled ample cooperation from the Chinese.
r WOO the OSS plan for an Independent Amaerican
l ,igence sowriae in ns, even though this
d at Japan and Japanese, activities, was
at at every turn.*
ssible to raise the question of whe a: ,
in China, the treatment of the Chinese gave
rdinate d the establishment of a t y iudep
intelligence service would have produced better results.
f Course assuming that the picture drawn by t
t,
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The military position of the Japanese in China in the spring of
195 was In general term as follows. The invaders held Manchuria and
the bulk of China proper north of the Y
ver. South o
Yangtze they hold the major ports, such as Canton and
major rail lines and ran j tions, the bigger cities, and the r* jor
river valleys. They had, as a result of their 19I offensive, succeeded
in establishing themselves in force and to controlling the rajor rail and
road system from the Indo-Chinese border north
chow, Kweilin, Hong-yarn ,sand Chang-shat to the Yangtze valley. Pro
Nanning and Liuc
they held the so-called
River" valley
as far as their coastal holdings in and around Canton and Hong-Kong-
The region was otherwise. in Chinese hands.
mpossible for the
or but poorly-equipped Chinese forces to expel the
invaders unaided. On the other hasnd,, the Japanese were -unable to
their ? ontrol beyond the areas mentioned and to gain a decisive victo
.l' It
evident that the: situation was ripe for
the development Of psychological, warfare operations, in particular those
In warfare.
Lion and
discussed above, the
Allies had reached a major decision in 1943. This was to keep Ch
forces in action 'with as small an expenditure of American personnel and
equipment as possible."' In February and )larch, 193,
OSS Planning
Group, the Joint Staff Planers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned
their attention to the problem of Asia and warfare against Japan. The
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for asap shown g Japanese and Chinese held areas
oath of eTan,tse River. Situation as of March,
e Chinese Ccando project was in its early
1 A& A for nap showing estimated dispositions of Japanese
Owzd Teresa in Chins* Situation as of 11 February 19k5.
It stU be noted that estimated Japanese strength in central
M uth China was 13 divisions and U Brigades, with a total
of 1,C00, men. these units ware distributed from
;gland and the 1 ido?nese frontier in the south to
160 mass north of the !aagtse River in the north and
"Ooosbr4ad in the zdors already mentioned in the t xt.
2
*5, the SOM0
is we the military situation as of early 19
teristics were present in 1943, when J.C.S. 2b$ was
Ooluae I , ' 9?
ad in this discussion Gill be to
Washington.
Haar 2. JCS 145.
eo adns studies,,, recommendationsf a the directive. The
Cn 31 March j 1943 capta Forrest Be
a eMrandia too The Assistant Chief of
.` der in Chiefs 3. 8. Flooti flirectm' of str
kr teee.,x The subject of t ra t a mass * pectaa Military
nax for ? 1,o Psychological Warfare Operations Against tree
within the Asiatic Theater.* paragraph 1 states:
be Joint Deputy Chiefs of Staff have approved the,
1 ~ .t Ong of the Joint'. Staffs Planners as contained
J.C,S, 9415: paragraphs 23 to 31, 1w :ve s
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-n of this arrangement, see War ltep4rt, ?olm e
passino The present di ssion Is intended
a iwa of the basic problems to indicate
,aut ri*ation under which the Operational Groups
was the abbreviation for ino4 ir& Special _Tech cal
ate. This organisation preceded proper
discussion of it# see War Report,
' F III ~~111711~I~~I~f
_
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.C.8. Directive 2k5, March 31, 1943.- The staff study
led to this Directive departed from the basic promise that since
ted States military effort was to be in the European Theater
warfare offers a most effective mans for leading
na." Japan, declared the study, had penetrated so far into
China, had "so widely and thinly spread her forces, that on all Ades the
Japanese are vastly outnumbered by hostile Chinese. The Japanese inva-
has been cruel. Chinese hatred is bitter. All the i nple-
polo ?...cal warfare,, especially sabotage, subversion, and
guerrilla activities, will find the world's richest field in the Chia,
Theater." It
it
here was a situation which offered the
return on minima investme
,weer Americ
d
2
A cooperative working arrangement be
n in the peyd' ological warfare field. This
to be continued on the same principles as before, which were to
rican equipment and training to enable Chinese "agents, forces
and bas
warfare,
and black propaganda against the Japanese."
effort was to win furtherance of actual or planned mi.litery opera
tionsc" and was
wonder." go
coordinated "by close cooperation with the theater
;ontrol was to rest in the hands o
Chinese government,, since the chief of OSS activities in the China
Theater was to prosecute psychological warfare "in cooperation with
under the direction of" the Director of SACQ,
d of the Generalissimo,, Chiang Kai-Shek."- All C ersonne;
conduct every foxn of sabotage, secret
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activities win or concerned with China, Bore
na, and Thailand
to be placed under the command of the Chief of O.S.S. .Activities,
eater."
it has already been shown abo
ad States psychological
operations had been subordinated to regular military operations,
operational control vested in the theater cow under. This individual
had the right to employ it or not, as he saw fit. Pl nin;
had been vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the O35 Planning group,
with the OS! having the responsibility for conducting psychological
operations, To this rather complex picture was added in
the factor of subordination to control by SACC and ultimately by the
Chinese government, with the 0SS still charged with the responsibility
of actually aprosecuting's psychological warfare operations. Once again,
ore, the OSS was given responsibility without authori
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-E.
B. OSS ORGANIZATION IN CHINA FOR OPERATIONAL COUP ACTIVITIES
A revised OSS General Order, effective December 26, 19W4, set forth
the principal parts of the organization, following the proscriptions of
earlier OSS orders and J.C.S. Directives.I This order reveals that for
the first time there was set up within the OSS an "Operational Group
Command," with functions separate and distinct from those of the Special
Operations Branch. These functions were described In the following
terms:
"The 0
up Command shall be responsible fort
1) The selection and training of operational nuclei for
otivaticn of resistance groups in carrying out
guerrilla operations.
Furnishing fighting officer patrols to invasion
commanders.
3) Coup de main.
.) Attacking selected targets."
be admitted that interest in this particu
nical, since these activities had been going on for some time
under the Special. Operations Branch. It does, however, mark a further
development of the organization conceived by Donovan back in 191L1. and
the grant of
pendent existence to the Operational Groups.
On March 16, l94li, an OS8 General Order set forth the "Organization
and Duties of Principal Officers of OSS Theater Establi shm,
illustrates again the basic concept of psychological warfare operations
and provides the actual theater organization for is
conduct of such operations.
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OSS Washington, t feral Order Number 9. !e ed.
Utfective on December 26 1914..
of of this order will be found in
war ms, volume no 142944O.
03$ Was in rn, General Order Winer 37.
Issued 16 Bch,, 1944, effective 14 Harsh, 1944,
A copy of this order will be found in
0 Archives -
Reg. OP s1.
055 : GE L (to 1 Oct 1945)
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order snakes the point that the authority and responsibility of
the Strategic Services Officers who is described as the officer in
command of each OSS Theater Ustablish rent, "is subject to the limita-
tions i osed by the fact that the 0SS theater establishment is not an
independent and isolated unit but is part of an organization conducting
coordinated operations in all theaters." Conseouentl j the organization
as a whole must function so as to discharge simultaneously its it nediate
responsibility to the individual Theater Commander and to the broader
requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to who
gency is
responsible." This is of course a restatement of the principles
laid down: by the Joint Chiefs as far back as 190. It should be remembered,
too,
he situation in China was further complicated by the delicate
question of Sino-American relations and its effect on military operations.
The Strategic Services Officer was to make recommendations for plans
and policies to the Director of CSS and carry out recommended p
ct to the control of the Theater Commander, He was to "carry on
all essentisi liaison with the U.S. Commanding Cenral of his Theater
end the Allied High Command thereof (if any and procure from them what-
ever approvals are necessary for 085 activities within the 'heater."
WWithin 0SS he was to exercise comrd and in particular was directed
to '#make final decision as to the activities of each branch in his
theater," with the proviso that in case of a disagreement r ith "a prin.
cipal, officer on matters of policy" the Director in Washington was to
have the final power of decision. The complexity and delicacy of this
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task is self-evident and illustrates the difficulty of waging warfare
by coalition and of trying to combine under one military z ender bath
regular and unorthodox operations.
,hose who were to assist him in the discharge of these and
arts %mve an operations Officer and a Training Officer. -'These
of particular interest in connection with the Operational Group
activities. The Operations officer had the duty to "'supervise and coor-
dinate strategic services operations including specifically the operations
of SO, MOO 00 and 4U and any special operations not assigned to one of the
foregoing branches or offices."' This officer was to prepare recommenda-
tions g'concernin current and proposed operations." He was to have charge
of establishing requirements and raking recommendations regarding the
personnel, s plies,,, and of ui.pment needed for operations. He was also
to maintain liaison with similar Allied agencies, arrange for interchan e
of information with Washington headquarters and "other theater establish-
"tents concerning subversive operations," determine training questions,
and consult with the Training Officer concerning training programs. The
Training Officer was responsible for liaison with the Operations Officer
concerning courses and qualifications of recruits. He was to "obtain
from field agents advice and suggestions concerning t
liaison, for the purpose of exchanging information, with other ti.S. and the
appropriate Allied agencies, and keep in touch for the same purpose with
the Schools and Training Branch of OS5 in Washington. On Dece her 2 6.,
194, an 055 Special Order designated Colonel Richard P. fleppner, FA,,
as Chief of 0, China Theater. 2
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The above abbreviations stay for the following activities
and for the sake of convenience id.U henceforth be used.
60 - Special Operations.
NO - Morale Opera ions.
of, - operational Groups..
1 Maritime Unit.
2. O Washington Revised Special Order r 26.,
issued 26 giber., 19414 effective 9 Decesber,
Heppner succeeded Col.. John M. Ooughlia., lni`,., as 055/china
Commander. A copy of this order id U be -found in 055 Archives ?
lunsd.
Reg. OP.1..
058 CTs mmn (to 1 Oct 1945) 6A,
a, Office of Strategic Services, China Theatre,:
Order N er 5, 2 March 1945,
copy of this order and an O85 argeitteation
03S Archives - Kunming.
08$ Fs GE. R L (To 1 Oct 1945) #,
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March, 1945, while planning for 00 activities
earlier stages, OS Headquarters in the China Theater tasued, over the
1
signature of the Strategic Services Officer, General Order dumber 5,
This order elaborated the organization envisaged in the earlier documents.
set up as a separate component of the organization an Operational
Grou Command. It was to organize and train such Operational Groups (not
further defined or described) "as may be specified by the Chief, OSS,
China Theatre." Decision concerning the employment of the 00s woul
of course, lie with the Strategic Services Officers depending on the
needs and desires of the Theater Corn ander and, more remotely, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Operational Planni Board mould have n-
siderable influence over QS9 decisions and planning for 00 activity,
for it was given the responsibility for "integrating major operational
projects and plans for strategic services with Ar and Navy agencies,"
initiating" and "developing, in conjunction with all operating branches
concerned, all plans, programs, and doctrines pertaining to strategic
services activities originating from'' CUSS China Theater Headquarters.
Final decision, insofar as OSS was concerned, would of course rest with
the 3trate?ic Services officer in his capacity of holding "command of
CSS functions and operations in the China Theatre," Such was the
rather brief description of 0Q functions and of the machinery for puttin
into operation ? 0 activities. It will be noticed that within
lines of comr;;:and and responsibility concerning CS matters are c
and simple. Tt was to trove otherwise concerning other aspects of the
00 operation in China.
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'0MPTS A! PLANS: .HEATER, ()Ss
On January , 194.5, the cormandor of U. S. Forces t n the China Theater,
C. 'edemeyer, wrote to Colonel Heppner that 055/China would be
under the direct control of himself and
follow the C
.aff channel for information, recomrendation, coordination, and
cooperation
This decision followed considerable discussion concerning
the proper place for 0 in the Theater organizational structure. There
had been a recom iendation that the Office be placed under the Assistant
chief of Staff, O-5. Others had felt that 0 5 should be under G4, and
re that it be made a separate staff section. 2 The difficulty
se, caused by the variety and complexity of O SS opera.tions*
The final decision was in harmony with the principles laid down in earlier
J.C.S. directives, since Wedemeyer could best control O SS operations if
he were its immediate commander,
On January A. 1945, Wedemeyer presided over an inter-allied con-
ference on clandestine and quasi-military activities.
five British representatives there were present General Chang kai-Ming,
Chinese Director of Military Intelligence, and four of his colleaues,
Donovan, Heppner, and various others represented the United States. The
purpose of the conference was to lay down principles for the conduct of
clan estine and quasi-military activities against the Japanese in China.3
? edemeyer spoke as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek' a Chief of Staff rather
than in his capacity as Commander of the United States Vices In the China
Theater, His -position with regard to clandestine activities had been
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A coy of this letter will be found in
0 Archives - iunmirg.
QS8 C2t .-SAL (to 1 Oct 1945) l.,
on March 1, 19 5, however, Theater Headquarters directed that
, '..
Theater 0-5 assume the responsibility of coordna
clandestine operations in the China Theater. In
he was specifically ordered tat
Receive and disseminate the weekly reports
qqxsi?e f ltar and clandestine or an sati ns o
nationals operating in the China Theater,
(2) Deal directly with all agencies under the operational
control of the Le nding General, C. S. ?carceaa,,
China Theater, and in a liaison capacity with such
other argenisations -Adch are nr t. directly under the
operational.. control of the Camandi General, U. S.
Forces. China Theater,
ectly 11 General Cheat kei-$ing, the 0-2
the National Military Council, on all matters
relating to quasi-military or clandestine activities
of other nationals.
~( ) Continue the present procedure which requires the
submission of all quasi- litaerg and clandestine,
projects.
() Maintain closest possible coordination with Assistant
Chief of Staff, C-, because the greater proportion
of the activities concerned will be directly related
to Assistant Chief of Staff, tip.."
0 -5 vas also directed to coordinate "actions pertaining more
psrticul:azty to Assistant Chief of Staff, Q -3s and other staff
sectionv* In the normal military fashion.
Headquarters, United States Forces, China mater,
An 879, 1 march, 1945.
Memorandum Nor Ott 0Q l-rdlitary and Clandestine Organizations,
A copy of this naeaaoranda will be found in
/ARSES
Chungking - Rego OP.i.
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138 1945 Theater Headquarters charged the 0-3 sectio:
staff functions relating to 085 *training, operation plane, a
corbat operations' and provided for. datly liaison Visits between
and Q-3.
ds rters, United States Force., China Theater
APO 8?9, 13 dune, 1945
rioranihni Sher it, Change lumber 1 "Qa i-mtii
atins Organisatione*
A copy of this chare will be :found in
088 Archives - Xuni tng.
Reg. QP.1,.
085 CT, GENERAL (to 1 Oct 1945) 16*.
3. A transcript of this conference for which the mate
this part of this paper is taken, will be found' in
Archives - naming.
Reg, ?#P.1.
083 CT i 4 SAL (to 1.. Oct 1945) f6A
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deters fined the previous afternoon in a meeting with Chi?
complained that on hia arrival in the Theater he had found a complete
lack of coordination in clandestine not
Chiang. and he were ctete mined to remedy'.
a the Chinese
were willing to allow continuation of activities already under way and
to honor agreements already a xa.de,
the Generalissimo waa Pill& to in;
ties we
designated rener.
as his depn
a situation wKeh both
or stated, that in the future
knowing s ecifical:ly what a
giving authorization for them. Cliiang had
Chem kai. -Minn
,is Director of l Military. Intelligence,
such matters. Anyone desiring to begin an activity,
or to bring into China ac:diti
sonnel or supplies# was to apply
either to Wedeneyer or to (.,hen;,. They in turn uld :oorelinete the re-
quests with each other. Any unauthorized activities uld be expelled
the China Theater.
The factors upon which clandestine activities would be dependent
reflected the complexity of the th .nese situation in its various aspects.
Foremost was the necessity of being able to support zuch operati
the logistical point of view. The Japanese controlled all major Chinese
ports, as wail as Fr, ench In:o- air. . Owing to the cow secuent distances
An d trans,aortat.ion difficulties j_nvuly :d in China opcrations,such a
sideration therefore iooned large in the thinking of both Chian
' eders y*er. Clandestine activities were., after all, in their vir i, but
a part of the total 1il.itary effort against the Japanese invaders. Of
equal. it nortance in the view of the high command way the *ay- in which
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unorthodox warfare operations were to be mounted. !-ere the prima
was that such operations must be used against the Japanese. 'cede
emphasized this severaal times. He asked that the organizations represented
at the meeting not "perxdit your agencies to become involved in discussing
Central Government policies or Communist policies" and that they not "make
available to indivi duaals,, for example separate provincial governors or
Chinese war lords or special political parties, any assistance or materiel,"
He warned that "such action would be dangerous to you and . your organization.
You must not become involved in politics and local matters. I emphasized
at the beginning of our conference that the Generalissimo wants your
activities to be employed against the common enemy, the Jap,"
final point was that he insisted that regular reparts of activities be
tiled at Headquarters by all organizations. This was insisted on apparently
for two reasons. First,,, was the requirement that all operations be con-
ducted only against the Japanese. Allied to this was Wedemeeyera s insistence
on strictly controlling operations, such control extending to authorization
activities. For instance, the General dtated that "before
clandestine activities like guerrilla raids are undertaken against a
certain bridge,, for example, or operations against lines of communications
and important enemy installations,, all these mist be cleared through us,
through Generaal. Cheng kai.-Ming and myself." His insistence on control
was made clear at another point in the conference and re 'lected the basic
concept of unorthodox warfare as strictly subordinated to regular military
operations. Wedemeyer declared that until such time as definite military
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plans had been formulated, clandestine activities were to continue, subject
to the fbregoing limitations, r::nh as they had been doing in the past.
In other cords, more positive action would have to await military decd signs
on the highest levels in the China Theater. This was indeed a far cry
from the original concepts of guerrilla warfare. Wedemeyer expressed
these thoughts in these words;
"There are no definite plans of operations for the next three months.
There may not be. We are preparing fbr certain military action,
consequently we cannot give you directives indicating at this time
the contribution that you could make in coordination with military
operations. We are trying to formulate overall plans that we will
put into effect at times and places of our choosing not the enemy's.
That has not been accomplished yet and it is going to require a
little time. When we have a firm plan we will caalll you in and In-
dicate what we propose to do. We would request your recommendations
on the contribution that you could make. Until that happy situation
arrives, (I don't know whether it wi'al be a month or two months,
before we can formulate elan and call you in for such integration),
until that time sores I will ask each head of clandestine organiza-
tions operating in the China Theater to submit to not later than
Tuesday of each week a report of activities. 4 aat has been accomp-
lished, where, what personnel. and equipment were involved. That will
enable me to point your effort toward more remunerative targets. You
may get off the beam and if we know what you are doing we can better
effect coordination at least until that time arrives when we can
integrate the effort with a well qualified overall plan for the China
Theater."
therefore, unorthodox warfare operations,1
concepts, were restricted from the beginning in China by two basic forces,
the necessity of deferring, as a matter of policy, to the wishes of the
Chinese government; and the concept of unorthodox warfare as subordinate
to regular military operations and under the control of the Theater
Commaander.2
The duties of the OSS in the China Theater were zzsade more precise
by Wedemeyer in a directive dated February 6, 1945. This may be regarded
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--L),.
as the OSS charter for operations in China. The
graph reaffirmed
ar principle of control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and. the
Theater Coi ander by reference to J.C .S. l55/l1/d. and any and all amendments
thereto.I Wedemeyer directed that from the organizational point of view
OSS was to be a separate coz and. or coordination purposes,, S3 would
work with both r=-2 (Intelligence) and 0-3 (Operations) and would "have
the same status as a special staff section."
The directive defined the 035 mission in the China Theater precise
d thus limited it),, but left two familiar "escape clauses a which might
permit the mounting of operations not specified elsewhere In the directive.
The 0S8 was to coordinate with Wedemayer's appropriate staff section
conduct of all of its activities,, the more important of which ores..."2
The second "escape clause" is contained in the final paragraph of the
directive, which lists as a mission of the OSS "The performance of such
, activities or operations as may be required for the accomp-
lishment of the missions above described." Thus,, while in the other para-
graphs the OSS mission was spelled out in details tiers was authority for
other operations as yet undefined.
The "more important" OSS activities were precisely defined in the
other paragraphs and psaent at least one item of interest to the concept
of unorthodox warfare. These activities were: to develop and expand the
035 communications network; to accumulates evaluate,, analyze inftsrmatton
concerning the enemy and enemy-occupied territories and to prepare studies
on those subjects; to lower enemy morale and raise the morale of friendly
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"unorthodox warfare operations" as
neidered as applying only to the Operation"
ties, since this paper is not concerned with other
aspects of 055 operations in the general field of secret
intelligence and. psychological
ussion above (Section "Ae of this paper) come
at difference between the problem of dealing with
Allied forces representing occupied areas in Europe and that
of dealing with the Chinese Government..
Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theat
Operational Directive No. 4 "038 Operations," 6 February, 1945.
A copy of this directive will be found in
Archives ? Kunming.
Op.1.
085 C?s GEI RAL (to 1 Oct 1945
. See Paper No. 1 of this series for discussion of
earlier J.O.S. directives regarding the.fti
Emphasis supplied. The listing which follows cannot
view of these words, be a definitive one.
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elements in occupied territory; to collect secret intelligence by means
including both espionage and counterespionage. In addition, the followini
paragraphs are of interest:
The organization, supervision and direction of guerrilla
activities or #special operations' designed to effect the
physical subversion of the enemy including sabotage, the
organization, direction and conduct of guerrilla warfare,
direct contact with and support of resistance groups both
underground and open, and the equipping and training of
such personnel as may be required to carry out such
activities,
b. The delay and harass nt of the enemy, and the denial to
him of the use of lines of supply and, connunications and
strategic facilities wherever located. 11
f particular importance, because of the use, in
of the following clauses "including ... the organization,,
.on and conduct of guerrilla warfare,.." It will be recalled that
ctives In 19b2 and 191..3 had specified that the role of American
rrilia forces would be limited to support and training, and the fuurnish-
ing of "opera.
American
." ere, howeve,
open for
ally to conduct guerrilla warfare as units.
of the direct role ieh the ie 003 ,played in the European
ale
n seeming contravention of the "operational nuclei"
authorization for a departure from that former liad.ted authority
for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Furthermore, the second of the
phe quoted above includes no limitation at all on the
lean personnel. In abort, thereforev, the way is left open
of Amer-
conduct
of guerrilla warfare, insofar as this particular document is concerned,
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either by purely American units or by Chinese and American personnel in
some sort of cooperation. With the issuance of operational, Dire
No, , 083 had a firm basis of authority for the planning of oper
While the events discussed above were taking place the 036 was draw-
ing up plans for the ' ss or Chinese Cora andos, Donovan addressed on
February 2, 19h5, a memoranda to the OSS commander in the China The
in which he discussed what in his view were the nature ark. possibilit
of i orthodox warfare. l' This document is a re-statement of Donovan's
doctrtne of guerrilla. warfare.' He did not mention the question of control
of such forces, but confined his state e a to ratters of substance.
stated that in his opinion the chief wegkners of the Japanese in
was their dependence on long railroad lines and described this dependence
as their "weakest resistance link." Proper use of the cor andos would
enable them to combine w df. sper. sal along the line
ck and c one sitrati on
at selected points." Tfi , the Allies would be able to ""impose upon the
enemy a passive defense confined to that railway. This vi l give hix flanks
but no front." One advantage, anong others, of operation of that type, wo ld,,
van's opinion, be "to condition
paAholo .caally for the
operations to coact." Above all, stated the OSS Director, "unnecessary
battles with resultant casualties" must be avoi
of
irregular warfare" was summed up under three headingas
. To avoid attacking places because of their inabil
force a decd. lion.
h. To aid the defense of a tine or point for the : sm-
reason,
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11
Nemrandum, Director, O S4 to Chief of 03$, China .eater,,
2 February? 191. A copy of this a orondua mill be found in
OSS Archives - Kuz ink ..
R""* AP. 3.
Projects BOSON, Ad ietration,, etc. lLi9*.
Outline Plan for the I or tion, Training and Use of Chinese
Ar + zando Untta, (R.e sed) 3 ?ebra .ry 1945..
A c o p y o f this document will be fbuzid in
OSS Archives ? tmi ng.
.aP*2*
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Their value lies in their depth, in their ability to "lit
and get away, to sting and run."
h were ponovants ideas on irregul
19h5, to
rated in February,
the O G co hander in China subscribed. Those a of interest
ew of other contemporary concepts of such oper iitions and In iie*A of
the use actually made of the Chinese con nan.ios.
On February 3, 1914, the OSS addreaased to Wedemeyer an outline plan
for the use of "Chinese Army Commando Untts."I In its memorandum OSZ;
proposed the creation. of commando units from within the regUar Chinese
. These would number twenty in oil, with two hundred
nciuding American personnel, Only volunteers of "the highest possible
type of officers and men, both physically and mentally that are avallaLle"
would be accepted. The document stated that 11this personnel should be
of a calibre that the Generalissimo would be proud to ha
t!enerali.sstmt s Chm Comma:n - ." Each 11nit would be divided Into four
sections, of fifty man each, Chinese sources would provide uniform
erfbly w=ith a spent al insignia, while OSS would provide uniforms
for the training period. The Chinese would provide rations, while OSS
would supply the following equi.pT&ent (pending submission of a definitive
Table of Ecuip.
"Per man
1 rifle, Springfield - with sling
14
11
- I belt, web
"
11
section
- 1 first aid packet
- 2 la unc her a, rocket
a
n
- 2 mortars, 60 xsn.
n
n
2 i'ARts
? 4 BAR a nition clips"
In addition,, 053 undertook to provide ammunition for the above weaapons,
demolition, engineering, and Signal Corps supplies plus any required
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vehicles. These would be drawn 'either from 855 stocks in Calcutta or
theater stocks in Calcutta or China." A headquarters staff would handle
plannin , administration,, and supply. All operations would be directed
by the Theater Coriander. Detailed plans of field operations "pursuant
to these directives" would be submitted to Ora/U FCT for approval.
OSS would undertake to provide experienced American personnel to
administer training to the Chinese, to "assist Commando Units in conducting
their operations in the field.," and to assist with combat intelligence
and medical aid in the field, This American personnel would be under the
command of Lt, Colonel Alfred T. Cox, who will be rerbered as the
commander of one of the "French" G Gs already discussed,I
sld be to conduct the training program
provide personnel to
assist the Commandos in conducting their operations." 035 declare
self ready to make every effort to begin trrainIng within *,irty days of
Theater's approval of the above plan, This plan was approved by Wedemeyer
on 16 February 19I.5, in a letter to Heppner, thus reu ving the 'Last
obstacles to the establishment of the 0a program in China.2
Each of the four sections of each of the twenty commandos (or
eighty sections in all) would have assigned to it one American officer
and two enlisted men,, or a total of eighty officers and one hundred
sixty enlisted men, In addition, each of the twenty commandos would have
assigned to it one American officers, who would act as the commander of all
Am rican personnel In the commando, a minimum of one intelligence officer,
one medical technicians and one radio operator, These would total forty
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Letter, Wod yar to H*'Ppnar,, 16 Febr ry 1945#
ubiocta Corraando Units,
A copy of this letter will fond in
QSS Archives .. Turing.
OSS,OP.2.
outline Plan for the Fors tton, Training and Use of Chinese
Ar C o m r and Unite, (Revised) 3 F e b r u a r y 1 1 .
A copy of this : ocu,en't will be foui in
0,55 Archives - Iurwdng.
OSS.OP.2.
o, 421, Wsdereyar to Chiang, Chungking, 20 February, 1915.
f Archives - Kwrdng.
0090P# 449
O G,, SF, CT ? Letters.
Folder
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officers and forty enlisted men. The total of Ar rican personnel assigned
to commando .operations would. amount to one hundred twenty officers and
two hundred enlisted men. The total strength of the twenty corrxsando unite
would therefore be four thousand Chinese officers and enlisted men and
three hundred twenty American officers and enlisted ?en. this memorandum
cud not touch on the problems of corrui and, other than to
function of the American personnel
d be to train the Chinese and
assist them in their operations. The inference Is, of course, that command
I
-would be exclusively in Chinese hands.
On February 10' 1945, Wedemeyer addressed a
andum. to tie ne ral_
issimo Chiang Kai- hek, in which he outlined. briefly the commend :Lan
described in the 0SS memorandum and approved, by him. Fie then asked
Ghig four questions bearing on commando affairs, answers to which were
necessary "prior to any action leading to actual organization and train-
o queries concerned Chiang' s wishes regarding
possibility of giving the commandos a special name and special uniform.
These rather secondary ouestton_a were followed by two of ers of considerable
importance. First was the question of Chinese personnel. Wedem yer asked
whether Chian would "authorize the very highest t;:?:* of soldiers
be selected from the regular Chinese
now belonging to any special corps - such as parac utists?" These shr)uld.
be volunteers aands, since "in this ty ie of operation the individual must
be capable of acting independently at tins," of the highest type of
soldier. Second was the question of command. Wedemeyer asked whether
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uld aithorize the co*_~rsandos to troperate under The c:o
the Comnandor-in-Chief Chinese Ground Forces, Oenerr . ":=lo Tang-chin."
1L-,: of rc rr rtd -thin r i t e co ;rts.ndo 'had not fret been
3pecificali:Y ans,.aered, the forerotng
ion eliminated all doubt as
to who, Ch.T_neie r A ri.cans, -~=:auld hold overall ccnr:~and of the camando
operations.
A little ;more thsn one rrnth later, 1i tater. Chen Chen;
ese I4inistry of Or, trpnsmitt:sd to the ;fineriCa l 3
I
Gea eralissirt 's answers to Vede scyer's
principle to the
n proposals regarding
chi-an agreed in
t&ncdo OD fi?WO"'l ar3d
duties. In answer to t" four specific questions, the (hi.nese provided
a special Ch& ne ce name for each of the twenty units, but
the commandos should seer the ordinary Chinese,, uniform with special
r bti dges.2 In answer to Wederneyer' a other
acceded to the American request for partlcul
ons, Chi
a ty e personnel
and ,gge'ted th t when organtLed the comnandos should he plac
sole co #riafd of loneral 910 fln "chin.tt
Chinese personnel, who would be selected from the Chinese Alpha
and , ro 1 a rat.rc op a3iment in gfu
April 10 and April 20 respectively.
By the errs of February, 1945,P therefore,, the basic questions of
whether or not there would be any oon Eando operations had been s
by the Americans and the Chinese.
e in forthcoming operations
had been *enerelly determined and their basic organization and equipment
tentatively decided.
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%%011 NNIK
1.. (Translation) Ministry of War, Executive !'uan,, M riorand
Chen a eng, Minister, to Weedemeeyer, Chungking,, March 1S,, 1945.
A copy of this document will be found in
OSS Archives E ng.
3.
Pro jectsa BOSTON, Administration, etc. 149a.,
9 collar badge was described (in an annex to the r
Red sun stands for Japan,.
Blue back growwd stands for China,.
bite arrow stands for Commando Units,
Arrow shot through the am may be interpreted as mean-
in 'Piercing into the heart of Japan by Commando Units'
and indicates that the Japanese Empire is sure to be
crushed,
r badges of officers will bear a yeiow colored rim.
The collar badges as suggested is as bright in color as
it is clear in meaning.*
RANUt( OF THE ACR ~4M,
AND ALFRRD T. cox C CU 1(E EQUIPMENT, THE
AND THE EARME OF THE CHINESE PAR.ATPS,'" signed
"M&j. Gen. H. P, Lee Comer-ander of the let Pars. Ree 1mat.'
NO data.
and
Heacrtere,, Office of Strategic Services China
operations Office, A.P.O. 62?, 12 March 1945,
Approval of Agreement,, as Reviewed. Addressed to Goner
Copies of these doe uments will be found In
OSS Archives -
Reg, CP.3
Frojectes HSTON, Administration, etc. lb9a.
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2. The American comment on tide passage Wass
correct, bat feral No has indicated that
questions of *o and."
It .U be recalled (see above) that a few da
ski dad that Ho would everalse command
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A series of planning cretin *s between Cox and the Chinese culminated
onto in March between C3S and the Chinese
tli.tar r authr,ritie . This document waa ira
(also "Lill
Canardl lie Via. Lee
taammspndi.nq Cenerp-1. of the First Chtnase `'araehute
and on March 12 was approved with revisions by Colonel Williai P. ;laves,
ions (ffioer.l Just as Operational Y)trectivo No. may be
regarded as the "charter" for OS operations in China generally, so can
this . re?r nt be considered as the
Chinese mew : andurP ? these
sic principles regarding aai-istration, supply, trainin
r sr^et t was reached that a parachute schoo
Col. Lucius 0 ? Rucker, Jr., would be established, probably
nnin;. 1 er ?lition trairsirz , driving practice, tactic l oiler ti0 n al,
training, and so on r- ere to be handled by the A ricpxns, The Chinese
schute
~,r.. opera-
be good i
op s chosen !`r ox stry rsp, the soldiers who he
Ith and the vol=.unteers. Aim: n them, bhe medical technicians
orierators x'1.11 to chosen also."
Dbiem of corm a9.nd, which u
was discuaRed In the fbilowing terns:
y la
"As the U.S, officers and personn.el come to join the unit for
traini and operation, they will hays a 3i.Q. for cornding their
iro like an aeNisory
.awn r,en. But their organization is so vh~
group to the Chinese co an o, and attached to it also. They can 2
intervene neither the Chinese exe hive nor the Chinese 'o r?Tlnnnel,"
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cted as the recrui.ti, n7?-grornr'
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Thus,. in accordance with Theater policy,
basic question of who should command the
called that 088 had ori.ginaslly proposed to Theater to
A. Another thorny question was that of supplies and eoutpment,
supply weapons, as nttion, demolition equipment, and vehicles. The
Chinese memorandum had this to say on the question of aupplys
"As to the Droblen of subsistence, Lt. Cal, A, T. Car says that
to will like to solve it for us, At least U. S. Oov.
?itarmina, carts, etc.. to us."
ply to this statement b
e continued to feel that their
The Davis letter stated.
he official decision, although
ion was the correct one,
"fine U.S. will furnish arms, a nuaition, demolition, certain it
of fiend equipment, and vita mina, It cannot undertake to turn
rations., unifor , *to., which must be supplied by the Chinese
government."
Davis reiterated. that th
ad States would
"undertake to arm and equip th
which 4U be charged with the administration of t
Os."
document in this series concerned with basic plans
gyrational Directive No, 10, addressed to N ner by edemeyer.1
directive is dated April 27 and i_rAicates,,
headquarters
hree months after
the January, 19b5, "clandestine conference," that Theater planning for
s against th
advancing.
Wedemeyer directed that all twenty Commando
operations by August 1,, 1945, and ordered 038 to
by May
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adquertsrs, United States Forcess Chins, Tiasatsr,
A.P.O. 6790 27 April 16. Operational Dirseti,O Not
to C e a ndiM Office, 085, Mesdqu rtere, U.S. re",
China heater, APO 879.
A *e of this dac:nt sill f*A8$ Arabives X g
Beg* Opj
Pra,3 ctsa BOSMW, Administration, itc 1499
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a schedule showing in what way it was going to conduct the
program so as to meet the required deadline. +OSS, furthermore, was
adhere to the stipulations contained in Chiang's letter of larch 15
relative to the 00# (see above for discussion of this letter). The
key paragraphs of this directive deal with the problems of supply
command and are as followsa
# You will be in direct control of the training of these units
and will supervise and *exist in their organization and in
the supply of equipment to them. Upon their readiness for
combat they will be assigned to the Alpha Force and cams
under the operational control of that Fce, General Ho
Yfing?chin.
After these units have been assigned to the Alpha Force
all of your dealings with these units will be forwarded
through the Commanding General, Chinese Combat Command.
You will establish liaison with that officer in order to
facilitate administrative and supply procedures.
6. When each Com nd Unit has oorpleted its organisation
training and to ready for operations you will so noti
in writing, the Commander, Alpha Force through the Commanding
tleneral, Chinese Combat Comaand, with inforration copies
to this Headquarters."
It will be noted, in concluding this discussion of general plans
00 operations, that +OSS was removed from any control over them, beyond
supply matters, once they had been trained, for they were to come under
the operattional control of General Ho Ting-chin aid his Alpha Force.
By the end of April both Theater and 0SS plans for 00 operations
were well under waay, with the commandos being looked upon as adjuncts to
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C T .AnRrnAW . TION 4IPS R THE C IN S COMBAT C - N'
It is neceasavy, before dip-olassi actual.. 00 organ
t3 on,
s.o.d operations, to touch a an the matter of r latione between
ne ae o for they 'l.tsi ately, pr red to be a s onree off'
of .eid operations. Tt will be recalled
A, r vier to the control of large p
1' the country,
the et ,17 constituted ^hinese government and oaring to that
Ability to maintain a force In being against the invaders,, the Allied
vflitary problem had. _fer r ore sif;raificent diplomatic sepecte than
the cese in deal. n s with exftled rogimes in the Eu pean `heater.
The eaa? aa?fi aticn created to handle the military- relationship
Chinese was the Chinese Combat Co and.l Although
the 038 was not directly responsible to it# the principles aster which
It operated &td the ME obligation to It concerning the 00 operations
rake it necessary to diecuss it at least briefly.
r ni.zed to serve as the medium through which #rican
technical advice re ardtng operations, training, and other a
to be transmitted to the Chine e., The organization end it
d it r e length by Wedencyer in a letter to Al'
offic?a concerned, 2 This letter r by defi.nin the Ctr"C an
"The Chinese Combat Command (translated by Chinese as f Chinesc- ..can
Liaison Conaaandr) InnIudes all U. 3. personnel aeei. d to Chinese Combat
forces in the field." There were a headquarters at Chinese Supreme
Command Headquarters and complements of American officers and men assigned
Chinese army groups, aiiee9
ions. The individual cadres
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the make of come .ence, the sbbmiation *C
henceforth be used.
:dqssxterae United States Fo
18 ?bbruary !W, AG 353.02. Sub3e+
to Alt I.S. officers S fig with the Chimee
?o: Al U.. Officers Conc d.
A copy of this cdce>eeent will be 9but In
OSS Archives - ~ Kugrieing.
of the fe reeiping de nt will be
sion,, Other versions of the sere
Theater Directi .
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ware knom an HU. S. Combat Sections (translated by Chinese as ' A m
Liaison Section or Group')." Air-Ground Liaison Sections rounded out the
CCC organiz Lion.
The COC Mission was defined in, these terms: "to assist and advise
Chinese Commanders of each echelon to which assigned,, and to guide Chinese
training."
en officers, copse
specifically forbidden
to "exercise commend over Chinese forces. The degree of influence that
they may attain over the Chinese to whom they are associated is entirely
dependent upon each individual's tact, patience and professional knowled
American officers were consequently adjured to make suggestions which "will
be con t sctive in nature and will be made in a spirit of helpfulness and
cooperation."
Since the Asa rioans could under no conditions exercise command over
Chinese forces and since, on the other hand, they had a definite responsibil
advise and guide in training and operations and to ensure that
iced "against the enemy in the
most effective manner," there were bound to be problems of disagreement
over policy. These were foreseen in this letter end .the following solu-
tion provided.
"U.S. Officers will make specific recommendations to their
respective Chinese Commanders in important matters such as
those requiring definite decision on the part of the Chinese
Commander which will effect the ultimate combat efficiency
of the Chinese forest. If these aecommendatione are disre-
garded the U.S. officer concerned will submit within 24 hours
a complete and detailed report to his next senior U.S, officer.
in the same manner the Chinese Commander to required by
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directive from the Generalissimo to submit a detailed report
to his next senior Chinese Commander. The two individuals,
that is,* the next senior U.S. officer and the next senior.
Chinese Commander, will attempt to resolve the matter. If
no agreement is reached, it will be referred to the next U.S.
and Chinese command level and so on, if necessary, until it
reaches the Commanding feneral, China Theater and the General-
isei . It is of the utmost importance that this procedure
be strictly adhered to by all personnel both U.S. and Chinese."
A Chinese document accompanying the ' edeme r letter spelled out
the mission and position of the CCC in more detail, The Chinese version
of the CCC mission save to the Arnericsns a considerable number of duties
to perform. They were to advise the various Chinese commanders to whose
units they were to be assigned. More specifically, the CCC members we
charged with the following mission,
"(b) Guide, and make recommendations regarding, the wok
of equipment, training,, counicaation,, correspondenc
transportation, supplies, medical service o ordnance,
engineering, and all matters pertaining thereto. Approval
of the coma anding officer of the headquarters concerned
mast be obtained beforehand relative to the allocation
a and distribution of supplies."
They might "suggest" plans for operations, but in each case the final
decision was reserved for the Chinese. In case of isaagreement, the
Chinese document provided for the same system for resolving differences
as quoted above from the Wedemeyer letter. Although the American elemen
in the commandos were not apeci ficaally parader the direct command of
i
CCC+ they nevertheless, as shown &bore,
had a responsibility to it.
They were therefore governed by the general principles according to
which the CCC was bound to operate,,, since they,, too, were American
personnel operating in the China Theater and with the Chinese.
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26
;tern C. of this pepper.
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The conduct of warfare by coalition is, as has been remarked be-Ebro
difficult art at best, for the military and diplomatic interests
he parts are often as strong asp, or at ties stronger thanp the interests
coalition as a whole. The situation in China was a re rely compiexe
owing to four factors. First was the military situation in China,
which the Japanese invaders and Chinese defenders were about evenly
balanced as far as the question of a definitive military decision was
concerned. This made it necessary for the Chinese to call for outside
assistance. Second was the military situation in the world,
led to the Allied decision to concentrate the major effort ii
pending the defeat of the European and of the Axis. This i
late or the quasi-ind en tt war lords. The
led to the Allied decision to confine Allied (particularly American)
nee to the Chinese to a minimum of personnel,, a maximum
ndern weapons of war, and the teaching of modern tactical principles.
Third was the internal political situation in China. While the central
governr*nt of Chiang Kai- aek maintained nominal control over the
f Chinn, there were large parts of the country under the control
factiona were either covertly or openly resisting control by the central
government. Fourth was the force of Chinese nationalism, which had been
increased by the long years of war against the irrradere. While it may
be argued that the mass of the Chinese remained lukewarm
owing to central government weaknessses, there in little do
strong in governmental circles, with whom the western
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allies were daeaaaling. Consequently, insofar as the Westerners and Western
policy were concerned, this force of national, feeling was of considerable
importance.
These factors, taken together with the single-mined Allied deter.na-
tion to subordinate everything to the purely military aim of defeating the
both in China and elsewhere in the Orient, led to what some people
called undue deference to the wishes of Chiang Kai.-hek. Since this is
asv, the liaison agreement discussed above was a natural result. While such
e nt might have proven workable in political or diplomatic matters
it
olutely
operations were concerned. Problems of command require clearcut lines of
authority.
The principles of the Chinese-:ricaan liaison agreement and the
ent provides the manpower,, the other supplies weapons, train-
nation of the CCC are logical on the surfaace. One party to the
tag, advice, and assistance in operations. There were? however, serious
defects in the arrangement from the point of view of the human factor.
ct the Chinese admitted Implicitly,
their own weakness and the superiority of American methods. This was
however,, by the explicit statement that under no circumstances
could the Americans exercise command functions, either in training or
in operations. This negation was clearly illustrated in the history
of the 00 operations, as was almost bound to happen. In practice, either
the Chinese abdicated their command function or else there was mending
friction, stemming from the Chinese willingness to accept in principle
advice from a better-in, rmed party but their unwillingness in
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to fr it the advice. Thus., operations tended to result
in at best a qualified success or also ooawiand passed and by default
into Ar rican hands, with resulting dissatisfaction on both sides. 00
operations therefore had indeed a rocky road to travel, as
n the discussion of their actual deeds.
OPERATION "C OHWe AND 'M Pte' CTD
During the late winter a . early spring of 1945 the Allied high
command elaborated its military plan for
South China. This camp
a considered a necessary
operations against them. The operational plan,, known, by the code
proposed to drive the Japanese eastward from
on and capture the strongly-defended Canton - Hong Kong area. In
he high sand proposed to use the s to assist and supple.
ment the efforts of the regular Chinese armies and their Anx '.o advisers.
Before shin could be done, however,
and began a slow withdrawal eastward towards Canton and H
and northward from
Consequently
modifications, without, however, losing its essence.
cuated
various
1915, Headquarters, United States Forces, China Theater,
over Wes meyerts eigi tore, an operational directive
2
modified operation CAR8ONADO.
This stated that di f .catio e
, because the Japanese withdrawal from ft=
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29
1e Since this paper is concerned not so much with the regular
military campaign as with 00 activities in support of it,
it will suffice here to indicate the general features of
the CARBONADO plan and tat the high command felt it ree?
quired of the +Gs. This discussion will not, therefore,
undertake to analyse the various modifications in some
features of CARBWA which the march of events forced
upon the Allied high oo11and.
2. Headquarters, United States Forces,, China Theater, APO 879,
10 June 19451 MODIFIED OPERATION CARSOAC(?. ' This was ad-
dressed to s Commanding General,. Tactics% Headquarters3
VommodLng General, Services of Supply; Coxnnanding General,
Chinese Combat Ce nandi Commanding Gom*ral0 lburteenth Air
Force.
A copy of this documnt will be found in
038 Archives - Running.
Folder #84 - CAREONADO.
TOP SECRET. A. Reg,. Op,. 6.
30
1. See Tab *A* for four maps
The first of these maps is a situation map as indL sated, with the
Japanese-held areas shown in yellow, This .asp will also be
helpful for locating place-neea mentioned in the tesct, for follow-
ing the general lines of action envisaged in Operation CARSONADO,
and for obtaining a broad picture of the areas in which the 00
teams were to operate.
other three maps will be helpful in obtaining an appreciation
of the strength and disposition of the Japanese forces in 'China
in early 19!45,,
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cabin with tbs indication of
my-hold corridor North from WAN
as directed that a build-yap
RIVER to CANTON has virtually eliminated Phase I of Operation
ntlys
the :assault on CAN N/fl GKO ,"" the capture and consoli *
Nanning base ares be pursued quickly "to facilitate the earliest Possible
tion of which, "as a base for
id the final objective.
seguent operations against the Japanese,"
nery capabilities were estimated as
ed defense in the NNN?,#IN -LIMHO
force equ3.;
d forces in
He could put up
area by a a ximum
Combat Divisions." He could launch a lii.ted
objective attack against the south flank of an eastward Allied drive.
Flee could tandertaiee o ffent i ve action "with the equivalent
Divisions" against an Allied effort to setae Fort Bayard (on the Lu chow
Peninsula). He could, "at great effort and a ena
concentrate forces "for the purpose of reopening Corridor south of
and/or an offensive ag
ad plan developed
" And,, finallys h
judged capable of a "deterained and effective" defens,
aw
abandot of the entire
rG to HENOTA
Directive for the modified C ,R dA O opera,
nary atepe" to be taken "at on
to be the securing and consolidation of the Liuchow, Ki
areas eras bases for operations" against Canton and to render airfields
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DO."
mg these was
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in thkt general area "operationaal for air defense and for max
supply." Next in importance was the necessity for maintaining pressure
against the Japanese 1thdrawine towards Canton and the effective con-
tinuation of the aa.arericaan training and ecuipnrent program for the Chinese.
The first chase of the main effort had assignee to it the t
date of September I and was to comprise sn Advance on Canton aalor the
West River and an, effort to "aaoften-up principal ene strong] oint s'
Canton area by Air,, air, and pa ssibly sea, bombardment. Phase
had a
the 0
its target date November 1 and was to capture and consolidate
- Hong Kong at
At the same time, a "defensive and
was to be to *remain on the active defense in
PAO i r-CHA GT' -WIL rea by blocking apprcaaches from CH t SHA- ' O
Coupled with these was to be a "contributory ef'f:'ort,,I" to consist
fled guerrilla and aggressive commando operation
Cher desci'ibed at this tire*
logistical operations mere tied to the rabvve
of the forthcoming ewnpaigno
`ormer were to give tactical support
d troops, intain air superiority over the soma of opera-
tions, and to interdict the enemyte commrnications
lations. Te' latter were to include the "rapid develop a
able airfields
he t iNINC, L JCHJW,
they become a avaat1*ba*, to receive shipment of traopaa, equipment and
supplies." T nchu' 1 in psrticu *r was regarded as important, since it
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Lois" sps i of t* 'late varies covet
referesee is Invariably e
There imm several of these plans
poly with 00 operations a evLV ssaond 4
detailed discussion of acgea in operrti*nal PUMS
>ttedl~.
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was spedi,
d for d v.lopmefut "ae soon as possible to
pport as air supply to this oper
Such were the chief elements of the plan fav cleaar"i South Ching
apanese. The 00 role was contributory in cberacter and and was
to be in direct support of regular military operations. Of the twenty
d in Chin*, three were eventually used in the capture
of i*anchuk, a fourth to disrupt the enema in the Changsha aareaaa, and and a2
h for the same purposes In the West River v
The relationship
between their eventual use and the requirements of modif9 ed GARBONADO
is
d that one of the major themes of this series of
the question of how the 00s were to be used. There was a
fooling that in Europe they had perhaps not been used to best advantages
because their original purpose bad been chaa ed, and not for the bettere
it will be of interest to see in what way they were used
the 194e5 campaign in China.
058 had received noti fcstion that The?&
>loy the
Wit. Consequently, concurrently with the development of Theater plans
a opain, 088 begs
fontulate its own plans for subgission to Theater and particularly the
C ac. on April 10 appeared an "Outline Plan" drawn up by the 0 Opera-
tions Office to show in what way 055 proposed to use its facilities to
contribute to CARS. Part of this plan was devoted to the 008, 1
t point of interest is that there is envisaged on
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of the cone
e strategic" use of 00 operations in favor of the
about
.otical" use. While the mission of the s was stated about
had been earlier,
in the
OSS
fated the
&Met
important change foreshadowed in this
as contemplated
of opeeraation, "emphasis will be switched
from present strategic objectives to operations which will be of iaa ediste
advantage to the advancing pies." This represented in one
sense a fundamental change in the concept of the use of the 006s despite
nt that no "radical charge" was contemplated, because of the
enormous difference between "strategic objectives" and "i diiate tactical
advantage to the advancing armies." Ii
but "strategic" in Objectives, 2 since its very essence was
bear-red that Donovan
other early planners had never envisaged guorrill* warfare as
attack with lightning rapidity lightly-defended strategic installations
such as rail lines and power stations and then got *way with equal
rapidity. It had not been thought ofe. and,, given the basic premises,
could not be thought of,, as as tactical wreapon,, which Carrie
the necessity for assaults against regular enemy troops and for defense
of prepared positions* 3
On the other hands, hoaaevarra, it is clear that the original concept
erriUs warfare had rover really been put into practice by the
,ricans. It had long aims been eased in theory by the J.C.S.
directives already discussed and in practice the us* actually m de of
the 00* in the European mater in 1943 and l9W4,4 In addition, China
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Sperrias on
e r $ and delq the no
led. On t td
(Sea. Paper X
xrandw to flerpp r of Pebrn*r7
in Per
I of this ser,
Headquarters# Office of Strategic Saa vloos# Chin Theater, Al
21 April 1945. $ubjeott Tas :ca r
Ton Theater Planaing Staff, Kq.,,, per, (him Theater.
For the Strate a Services Of . cert I
PA. t rations Officer.
A copy of this newraMus will be f
tton
e-rsee r reserves WA to in
rise.
lines of co -c
diioueaton Don vanRa ideas in Per Nusber I of
the dtuation in lump prior
i stratedicsl r different
tier made no difference insofar as
OPSO.. folder ?.
Lrchinua - Zutsreds .
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'heater directives had, m de clear that 00 operations would be direr
subordinate to and controlled by the tactical situation and the regular
a"tlitary forces. From this point of view, therefore,
had already been made and the issue settled. `here could be no possibility
employing the ?s as Donovan had originally conceived of them.
discussed again in a memorandum
from the 0SS Operations Officer to the Theater Planning Staff,, in which
ted notes, among other subjects, on the
cal employment#
cialised training
to be received by the COs there should be established a set of princip
#coverir their tactical, emplWy ent,,- in order that they may not b
dissipated, nn -Assi.ons which could be accomplished by o
as special.
ized,, troops." The 055 then advanced as as its operating principle
cooendation that the SGs be in the field "prior to the juste-off
of any offensive," with the "initial mission" of %isolating the battlefield
by means of demolitions, road blocks, ambushes and general harassing action
energy routes of approach." F'oll:owing this they would employ
guerrilla tactics "against enes g of C, supply dumps, ccoa sand posts,
and exposed flanks." `While it was admitted that such activities would
be similar to those carried on by SO teams, it was pointed out that this
00# 'ould be "better organized and equipped and far more highly trained
than the -normal group of guerrillas with which SO team operate, and will
have a, much larger cadre of experion?ed Americans sole,
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and urgent, recoasendaation was that
as shock troops to spearhead an advance,,, ar to estee and hold areas
any protracted period of tics.
Thus far the "doctrine" is not too different in concept
Donovan* s original one. However
see. While
ndum contains a -.*at significant
at the OOs not be used as
of the line or as se shook troops, the remora d
contradicted itself and departed from Donovan in a highly
it will be recalled that the N orth odor doctrine
of unorthodox Warfare ea hani sod continually that guer
attempt defense of a position they ;might have attacked and seized. Purthe
ad been found in Europe that the
"held what they wa
had
* against guerrillas. This memorandum,, howeva
despite its repo endations against the use of 008 to "seize and hold
areas for any protracted period of time, 00 negated one of the bas
err l.a principles In the following mordst
o + COG*7 a be employed to seize as hold, for a short
prigs critical terrain features such as bridges or defiles.
The same considerations governing the employment of regular
airborne troops would of course apply in this case - the
Commandos would have to be relieved in a matter of days
r egulaar forces. Their light armaments and lack of aartf lleryr,
would preclude a prolonged defense of any position against
attack by superior forces."
by the and of April the t
on the subject of the OGa had evolved from the original concept of a
purely guerrilla, #hit-and-run," force to that of a combination of
guerrilla and specialized force,, a force which was at tines to rove
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behind enepy lines and spread destruction, but which at other tines
was to operate in much the same fashion as air-borne or other regular
forces, In other words, to the original principles of mobility* speed,
and constant attack with no defense,,, had been added some of those
overni: the use of regular line troops less mobility and more emphasis
on the defense.
of seriously codifying arm
An examination of ,
e,, however, there seemed to be no thought
to cope with new responsibilities.
"Draft 'Plan for OSS Operations" confir a
in more detail the fore o.iing general points.. 1 Under the heading *Corr ndo
Operations" a set of detailed Ott missions was outlined.
were to he assigned to the columns of the Chinese main attack and were
to be both infiltrated and ran-supplied by ground. rive were to be
held In reserve. Two were to be assigned the task of "die-
road and/or river traffic in various areas and were to be both
infiltrated and re-supplied by air. Two were not only, to disru a.
but were also to be prepared on call from the Supreme Commander to occupy
and hold towns and other fixed pointa,. One of these was to hold the town
in question for twenty-four hours, the other to hold it indefinitely!
Both of these unite were to be infiltrated by ground and re-supplied by
air, Three others were to disrupt traffic and occupy and hold various
e to be both infiltrated and re-supplied by air.,. One,
to be both infiltrated and rye-supplied by ground, was to operate against
highways and to hold a road junction for twenty-four hours, One,
to be both infiltrated and ren-supplied ground, was to "provide active
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main effort $"
She south blocking attack and the MA
l al detailed plan thus called for
loysaent in the field
on commandos immediately operations should have been begun, with
be held in reserve. Of these fifteen, given the concept of
unorthodox warfare and control of the 00s already discussed in considerable
detail# only two might be considered as true guerrillas or commandos*
'use two were to be both infiltrated a re-supplied by air# thus giving
more nobility. In addition, their mission was confined to
that of disrupting road an
river traffic. The mobility of the rest
was distinctly restricted by the proscribed methods of infiltration and
re-supply., one or both of which was to be by ground. It is difficult to
believe that they could operate at any great distance from the regular
a and therefore that they could avoid being tied closely to regular
operations. This impression is strengthened when it is realized
on of those thirteen commandos was to include the capture
and retention of towns and road junctions either for twenty-four hours,
or until relie ved# or with no limiting factor stated at all, i'hus,, it
is clear that all now fundamentally considered the OGs be
auxiliary troops with primarily an immediately tactical mission to perform
support of the regulaar Chinese forces and under the orders of the
There exist two, la'.
which resulted from a request for sub plans from the CM
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quarters, Office of Strategia S.rvicecc
a 627, Operations Office, 30 April 1945.
operations.:
A copy of this doh will be found is
080 Arohitas ~.5 .
OS40?, 2. RASME&$. OP$D
At law:
relieved,* was mentioned,
the (1i they war* cold b* moo rs varied
to an indefinite mod,
One of ose, dated 26 June 1945,
033 Archive* Rte.
00.4PJ. ? Molder #l.
other? dated 4 July 1945, viU
035 AraMv- Kunming.
.der + C A O.
TO . A. Rsg, +.6,
or, such
fwd
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While these later plans contain certain modifications in proposed assign-
r to from those discussed as Love, there are no changes in concept. The
chief points of Interest In connection with theme documents lie in two
subsequent efforts by Cox to impress upon both the CCC and the Chinese
Army Headquarters whet the CC.e were and what they were intended to accom-
plish. The first of these was contained in a letter of July from Cox
to the co anadi.ng Genera., Second Command, CCC.1 After discussing the
projected assignment
of the 00# to the Second Command Cox
discussed the question of their employment in the following terms,
These are of interest in view of the eventual use made in the Taanchuk
operation of the three units here under discussion,
"The most advantageous employment of these units lies in long-
range penetration, the harassing and cutting of en r communica-
tion lines, the furnishing of Intelligence,, and in being prepared
on call out le carry out such additional missions as the
Commaanding General may direct."
On July 12 Cox addressed another corvnunicaation to CCC, this time to the
2
C-3. Speaking of the same three commandos as in his earlier letter,
he adopts the ambivalent attitude towards co ando operations found in
the various OSS draft plans already discussed, He states that the pro-
posed directive should, when speaking of the use to be made of the three
that they should operate in advance of the di lane n.3 The
primary mission should include the furnishing of tactical intellig
one order of battle, dispositions, and a'ovements, rm ltion of roads
and bridges,, extent of river traffic, the food situation, and the attitude
of the local population, In addition, were included the usual "harassing
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to .... Gr s$ Office, of Strategic Services, l 621,.
Subjects Chinese Cc nndos. Addressed to
ng General, 2!! omwand,, CCC, to this letter cox
agreed n concerning the *esi in nts
ewt ntba. A copy of this doc t will be
6271 Operet# o , Oroups,,
Operation a of Three
G--, CCC,, F* T.
This ant elaborates seat
"do by in his letter of d
meetly the causation of the to
i dopted, the number of the
eaelsatLon#
and al eo dl scusses
ploy; t of the 00.
. as proposed directive ar
in t h e al Tanchuk. operation
the 89tho
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end ambush of enemy lines of c t
d the aa! wiping up of
enea installaation&," Finally, in accordance With the newer interpretation
,ctiona, the units were to set up "road and river blocks
brcement or withdrawal." Obviously, the last item would
Involve defense for unstated periods of fixed positions in opposition to
regular enemy troops. On the other hand, Cox stated in the same document
that "the Commandos are especially trained in the hit-and-run tactics of
Are, and their strength should wt be dissipated by
use as Shock troops leading an assault,, No ha aavy sup : o
tided in their T/0 or tra ini ."
it was Patently clear by the late spring of 1945 that while the
06 Cs would be used in the campaign there was little or no possibility
that they would employed primarily for the purposes of guerrilla war-
originally conceived by Donovan and the early OSS planners. The
J.C.S. directives had placed all such operations under the control of the
Theater oander, it was, furthermore,
proactive only of a o ontraa
prevailing concept
since the
rouge were to act simultaneously as . guerrillas and as regular troops
of the line. In view of these facts, therefore, there was left for OS
on the possibility of pointing out the inadvisability of utiliziN the
003 as shook troops and attempting to emphasize their true nature and
conseanently the way in which they could best be used. This atta pt not
with only limited success. Of the five commandos actuary in combat, one
attempted to perform guerrilla harassing Operations, a second was saddled
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task of attacking and holding fixed positions in addition to
Lion of harassment, and the three others were used exclusively
By March, 1945,* the act,
ire drawn
up and approved.- ,A. ric personnel had begun to arrive in the Thea
and included mostly officers and men who had had previous experience
in the field in the European Theater. They were to help train the
China" volunteers and then to accompany then on their operar'ions in the
field.
'omando unit had at the top a headquarters, with six ranches
, belo
these were Rifle Branches,
Mortar anch,, one an L Branch, and the sixth a Demolition Branch.
divided into Squads. Each Rifle Bra
tai .d two Sods. The Mortar Branch had three
two, and the Demolition Branch was a single Squad in itself.
organization was not too different in structure from a
regular line company.
sad of l Chinese officers, 13? Chinese
waisted men, 8 Chinese interpreters, 8 A m e r i c a n officers, and American
enlisted n, a total of 178. Two American officers and five American
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See Tab "Bit for copies of Tables of Organisation and Tables of
Equipment for the Chinese Cosa ndos, March,, 1945, Exhibits r
through V.
,
See the follow source for the OSS tashingt'on Special Orders,
lhbruary B, 1945, appointing Lt. blonel Alfred To. Co* the
Commanding. Officer of the 00 estsblishmint in China and dssig-
matirig the officers and men assigned to his o de
058 Archives- Sunning.
OGOP,4* ? Personnel
llder 021.
See the sews source for the OSS/iashington General Order, also
Psbruary 8? 19145,, activating the Operational Group Ceownd and
allotting to it a total of 1140 oftl eers and 535 enlisted men.
It was stated that this allotment was *Inclusive of all grades
heretofore sub-allotted to Operational Groups within the United
States or in Theaters of Operations.#0 Thus, Cox could not dispose
of this total in China,
Those interested may consult this source for personnel rosters
and other such material covering the period up to the cessation
of hostilities.;
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ad men were assigned to commando headquarterso
d one American officer and one American enlisted man. The Chinese
rsonre were assigned as follows: ti officers and four enlisted
commando headquarters; one officer and eleven enlisted man to each
Rifle Squad (or six of ficers and si ty-six enlisted men to the six Rifle
Squads); one officer and six enlisted men to the headquarters of e;
it (a total of three officers and eighteen enlisted men to
the three Rifle Branch headquarters); five enlisted men to each Mortar
Squad (a total of fifteen to the thre
enlisted men to Mortar Branch headquarters;
std (a total of twelve to the two Squa(
one officer and three
men to I G headquarters; and one officer ard sixteez
the Demolition Branch. Two of the eight interprets
assigned to commando headquarters? and one to each of the six Branch
heauarters.
il' en screened and even these are not so hot. Sole reason for
the many changes in training schedule has been failure on part
of Chinese to produce recruits."
Even allowing for exaggeration regarding the percentage of rejectio:
this radiogram clearly reflects the dtacouragenient which by now had
permeated rican 00 headquarters*2
Two more major attests were made before the surrender of Japan to
do something about the personnel situation. On July 23 Cox radioed Davis
now the Deputy Strategic Services Officer, as follows:3
ar very general g.e., Chinese genera wants at least three
commandos for his ova but no one gives me the men pd clenerel
Lee advises that minister of war promised him one thousae td of
cream of China within ten days fifteen days ago pd an you
know replacements needed immediately pd would it be possible
for you to contact minister of war and Jack him up pdw
On the following day Davis addressed a letter to WWedomeyeer, in which he
rtaed the situation. He pointed out that the Chinese First Para-
chute Regiment (which had been designated at the beginning as the chief
~cruit+a) had provided enough men only fo
commandos and that the remainder had been obtained "only through the
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OP to "Little { Ch,
033 Archives - at
Reg. a?.3. - Pr jectst
Administrations 4c. 1149x.
foUe #,ng day Cox
personas difficulties.
S zpr+ a Mdness Arnie
ficte nt recruits to staff his replace esnt
already *eked from General Tu on June 18.
See Cox to CO, luprems Chinese Andes, 3 J
0S3 Archives - rmeing.
.QP.4 - General Tn id Aug.
Fol4er
am, 0 to Davis, 23 July 1915,
453 Archives - funsing..
'Reg. OP.3. - P jects$
Adednietrstion,, etc. Us*.
66
NO
1916,
CQ/Mf C Attent .on AC of $, 0-5)s, 24 Julg 1915, in
sets: D0 iON,
AAtinistration. *to. 1149x.
to aG OC f 7 August
086 Archives - fem.
+.4P.4. Chtnese tact
Folder 2,
d.
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remitting efforts of Colonel Cox and his staff in screen'thg many
thousands of Chinese soldiers to obtain the required number." He
asserted that flC standards of selection wore not impossibly high, since
he and h1 a colleagues had personally seen m ^ Chinese units chose men
were of far Esher caliber than those provided for the commandos. Davis
summarized Cox's July 23 radiogram to himself and statedz "these soldiers
have still not materialized and if past experience is any criterion, it
be weeks or months before they will." Davis closed his letter with
an urgent request that "every possible effort be made to induce the
Ministry of War to fulfill tte promise and to make availab
soldiers i:ssenedietely."
, "h:at this a
highest headquarters fell at some point upon
is shown by the letter from Cox to the Chinese Combat Command,
August 7, in which he indicated that the personnel problem con-
tinned to be re serious than ever. In addition to the need for filling
usual vacancies created by_ rejections before and durirr training it was
now necessary to replaces the combat casualties incurred by Commandos
9, 10, which had meanwhile gone into action. The final
paragraph of this letter shows the stage which Cox's9 thinking had now
reached,2
at the CO, CCC seriously consider a
worth of the Commandos to the war effort, and that
indications show that they will furnish acceptable re
he CCC,, that everything possible be done to provide the nun
of personnel required as soon as possible,,*
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.An incor rlet?e series of weekly progress and efficiency reports on
the comndoe during their training period provides some clues to the
problem of how capable were the Chinese officers and soldiers. It should.
be recalled that the majority of the cnmpl
them concerned
those provided for Commandos 31 through 20, #1 through 10 being on the
whole sores apt better. The to-m. " sown at better"" is a relative one,,
however, and must be so understood. The reports in question deal with
the first four weeks of training of Cor r ando #8, the second and third
of #9, and the first four of #10. The reports on these three cor ndoe
are particularly interesting, because these units later formed the 0C
battalion which participated with the regular Chinese army in the opera
tion against the Japs se-held, Tan uk airfield, Commando 8 received
a unit efficiency rating of "Excellent" for each of the four weeks.
The individual ratings given the Chinese offie er 'vary from "Superior"
for all four weeks in the case of the Second Branch (Rifle) Leader,
who was described as the "beat all around officer in Ct
omresndo,e
to three officers who in the first weak, s report were deemed not of
Commando auslity. The Branch ratings, when given
stly "Excelien
The Chinese commanding officer received one "Superior" and three
"Excee lents." Most Branch and Sued leaders earned ratings from
to the one "Suaperl or" already mentioned.2
The two reports on Commando #9 give the unit as a whole a
of "Excellent." The first describes the commando's morales as "extreme,
high" and the condition of their weapons was "Excellent." Their physical
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T h e " or . American. Officer" of the. Oomahdo filled in the
weekly unit If 'ietency , report and issued the ratings for the
Cam-a:ndo as a holes, for the Branches, for the ndi da and Chinese officera. Fie did not rate the t t e enlisted; Pon
individually,, The 'Senior Aerioan Officer" co -ded the
A eric cadre assigned to the t o ands and acted as the
chief adviser to the Chinese co=ander and his aubordtn tes,
These reports will be found in
OSS Archives - Ewtn ,
t ,OP.5? .- 8th Contru*n4o (Combat). #12,
70
These reports vin be found In
OSS Archives .. P utsaine,
00,07.15o - 9th Commando (Co* a
These reports will be found in
038 Archives - juasi .
OG,!OP... - 10th mmado (Co*,
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condition had "improved considerably since arrival," The Executive
Officer of the eo sando was given a "Superior" rating for both weeks
and was commented. on in the i".i.:P-st re ort as follows: "This officer
is ?ivi.n cooperation toward training a Administrative natters in a
superior fashion. T to his efforts the Commando has a well above
average attendance and promptness record. It has become daily S.O.P.
him to account accurately for all absentees." The Commanding Officer
received an "Excellent" in both cases. The Branch Leaders varied from
"Satisfactory" to "Superior," with most of them being termed "Excellent."'
The Senior Arerican Officer of Commando #10 either was stricter than his
colleagues or had lees promising zsterie1 with which to word. In contrast
to the other two units,, #10 received for the four weeks a unit efficiency
rating of only "Very Satisfactory." The Branches and the Branch and Squad
Leaders in Commando #10 received more ratings
facto
their colleagues in #8 and 9. All snuad leaders "show Food
judgment and leadership." The Comm
for each of the four weeks, with the ac diit
comment on the first report
hat he sowed agetrese:iveness and on the fourth that he "demonstrates
excellent tactical knowl edge." He was described in the third report
"very capable,, efficient, strict disciplinarian" and as open to aug
gestion."2 It is per asible to speculate,, therefore=
reflect a gre
officer.
e of strictness on the part of
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions concern
effectiveness and capability of the Chinese officers and men once they
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had begun their con mando training. on the one hand,, there were the
continual pleas by Cox and others for mare ran and their complaints
the personnel pr?ovi ded was of inferior quality) On the other
hand, the reports just summarized indicate competent levels of perfhrr-
ance by most of the Chinese officers and men. Two factors, however,
reduce or eliminate entirely this meaning inconsistency. One is the
nature of the ratings given. It should be rems tiered that during orld
mi lltaTRf efficiency rating of anything below "Excellent" was,
to say the
clarntit with faint praise. With this in rind the
ratings given Conrnan
9' and 10 become more consistent with the
pleas and complaints continually voiced by the higher authorities.
More important then this, however,, is the ouestion of American as opposed
to Chinese standards of performance, it is to be doubted that the reting
officers applied to these Chinese trainees the sans standards which they
would have applied to American OFD trainees. Evidence of this is to be
found in the reports on Commandos #9 and 10 and in Cox's correspondence.
In this third report the Senior American officer of Cor dando 0 sayst
"The commando as a whole has shown an aptitude for learning
daily lesns. However, due to language difficulties it is
the opinion of this officer that mare demonstration be attempted
and less lecture time be devoted for instructional purposas."
This officer is of the opinion that the officers and in have done
exceedingly well in view of the many obstacles
that must be overcome daily."
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It may. be anted that these. coma,1attrtt ;
and, military circles to exaggerate deficiencies and re
quiramnents in order to be Mrs of a ettirg chat the tow
gcestora really mant. This in highly improbable A. this
case, however, since the requirements had *Ir*a0V'bew meet
forth hyr aeuthori ies higher then 08$ and si
commandos reap r for action t+' August 1e l9
Ccx to Tu Lei l tng, 1s duns 1945, iz
OSS Archives - Kunming.
CsxP.4 r - 0.n rol Tu Lei f ?
Folder .1,
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"The health of the corando is at present being Jeopardized 'by
the location of billets in an extremely filth village. This
accounts for the greater portion of our sick."
In the .fourth r?enort he co ents;
"The. r*ener ?1 condition of the com. oan.do at this ttre is quite
satisfactory. Baas:: ing minor deficiencies they -e as
for combat as they can be expected ever to be with the
ins background they" have."
The following comment appears in the second report of Commando #9:
"Due to his he Chinese Executive Off'icert efforts the
Commando has a well above average attendame and proomptne
record. It has become daily S.Q.P. for him to account
accurately for all absentees, 0
Cox wrote the following to General Tu Lei Hirst 1
generalip the training is progressing satisfactorily. In a
a
As a result of the G ieraVe .e., Tea Let Mingle. This letter
always refers to Tu in the th rd pereo recent visit, attendane
at classes has improved cconsiderably. The interest and attention
of the Chinese solder is almost always a reflection of the
ability of the Chinese officer over him. Every effort is being
lade to #.mnrove the quality of the officers, but there still
:remain a few who are not doing a good job."
standards and every effort is being made to improve our work,
These six comz ents are s gnt ficsnt and show that ratings of "Superior"
and "1xcellent" must not be taken to mean the same as when applied to
American units, They reveal that the Americans, whose role, it must con-
stantly be remembered, was confined to that of advice, had to contend with
various factors beyond their control. They had to contend with the
blem, which inevitably affected the quality of the instruction,
despite the use of interpreters. They continually faced "eat obstacles
& difficuities.tt There was a health problem. And Cox admits that the
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training Is progressing only "satisfactorily' and that "in a few instances
the instruction has not been up to beat American
ing,
t both the Senior American Officer of Commando 9 and Cox
feel called upon to point out as unusual and worthy of special
mention the improvement in promptness and in attendance at classes.
one case a Chinese officer is singled out for special commendation because
of his bringing his unit's attendance "well above the average attendance
and promptness record." And Con's remark. to Tu on the same subject to of
e. Perms the most important evidence of the standard
of peerfor:ancee is the remark that Commando d is "as ream for combat
they can be expected ever to be with the training background they
have"
In
of these Chinese units were applied with the same exactness as they a
have been applied to similar A rican. units. The difference in stan
background
,nditionas and performance is
bared that the Americans were very much hampered in their
task by the
they could
the absence of zealous Chinese of fl cars, therefo
virtually tied.
This account of personnel problems has been lon . It is perhaps too
cue to state that the success of a unit's operations depends on its
personnel. It remains -truss however,, that adequate weapons and supplies are
sd and competent officers and men. The OOaa were
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given a task o
us complexity. Their mission was f as has been
shown, a, dual one, in that they were to be prepared to function both as
true guerrillas and as regular troops of the line. The time allotted
for training was short at best. In view of these facts,, in view of the
awkward and. complex relationship between Americans and Chinese, which was
dictated by the diplomatic and political situation as much as by the
vilitary situation in China, and in view of the restrictions placed upon
the Americans, the quality of the personnel was even more important in
this Instance than perhaps in any other set of circumstances. In short,
everything depended upon it,, since the 00 authorities were given once more
sponsibility of producing results without adequate authority to enable
them to do so.l 'inhere can be little doubt that the quality of the Chinese
personnel was not equal to what were considered to be proper 00 standards.
it remains to be seen how these Chinese Os functioned under combat condi-
tions.
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fls
Another serious personnel problem
otficere. . These wave ChUmme. who we
drafted and ift tere assigned to the
is obviouus. During the tradni ,pert
proved to be a source of friction, part
had the honorary rink of of fl aers a si
more not under as strict military teci
This friction increased during April and May, 194 5.,
resulted in an 0 Zntez'preter Sum's s condue ed by ti
Counterespionage) Branch of a during which no evidence of
subversion or espionage was found. Consult the fob rg
r ocunsnts for infbmation concerning the interpr
this period.
cexa elated. April 5 191, addressed
airs ng the
raponeibilittes,, This will be
O Archive,
OQ.OP.L. - Personnel.
Folder 1.
A Chinese Coabat Coaa?iand inst
dated April 21?, 19 ,a dealing
This will be found in
OSS archives - fu ing.
OW.OP. ? V water Directives.
.1 Pei
use of interpreters.
An 05S Operations Coitittse Meeting ry, dated
1915, in %bich ox discusses briefly the probl+ of the
interpreters' behavior* This will be found
O SS Archives Pura ing.
00. 0P.6. OPWOK4 Felder .
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74
L. (Contd.)
5. The complete text of the "OQ Interpreter S v
above,, whit a cons ted bar invasti
'Branch (Counterespionage) of 4 , dated Key 2 191-145* The
covering letter Reppner is dated Way As 197t5. This
U. be found; in
$ Archives K
OG.OP.3. ? Folder
Since the interpreter problem presented no features essentially
different, Iran other aspects of Chinese rican relationships
already diet issed,, it is sufficient to sitit the
refer those interested in additional study of the s
above.z ationed dacntsr
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OG OPER:ATI "APPLE,
JUL! - ANUS', 19
Ghineee Commando #1 went b,
of 12 July 19ia5. a,1 OSS ordered APPLE to pay "particular attention* to
the "intelligence derived from the conduct of these operations" and gave
it six prinryr tanks:
d the operational plan for
ch was to parachute into
south of WEST RIVER. between WUC OW and L O TAO, on the
b.
one within the
area of operation as may be within the capabilities of the
Cor banth, as determined by the Com ando Leader.
Preparing a plan of attack and seizure of the key town of
4UCH( .., to hold 'IUCfOW until relieved by designated Chinese
forces or as directed by higher headquarters. Warning order
will be issued through this headquarters,.
Preparing a plan of attack and seizure of the key town of
gAO4AO ... to be executed on call from higher headquarters.
To hold KAO-TAO until relieved by designated Chinese forces
or as directed by higher headquarters. Warning order will
be issued through this headquarters.
Preparing a plan for the establishment of defended road blocks
at critical points in the enemy read net throughout the opera-
tional area and be prepared to estaabl i sh these road blocks on
call."
Attacktng and destroying such enemy
and places as may be selected by th
the code-name PPI . On July ., 19h ,#
iraee of comunication and destruction of
enemy river traffic along T RVER at such times and places
as may be selected by the Co ndo Leader.
Disrupting eneW lines of communication and destruction of
enemy supply columns using the area road net, at such times
Analysis of these mission* reveals a number of significant points,
warfare doctrine as enunciated by Donovan annd his
associates, the first three are true guerrilla operations. IPPtE was to
concentrate its efforts against enemy lines of coimntni cation, supply
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A copy of this docuasnt idli be found
O Archives . Ku sing.
OG.OP.S. let Co tando (Combat) ? #. .
See gab eM for maps to serve as an a=x to this etg4r of
00 Operation AP's.
76
Th* term "Commando Leader" refers to the Chinese comman
Officer. As motioned before, his American collesoe a
adviser was called the "Senior American Officer,
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and installations,. It was to attacks, disrupt,, and destroy,
der was left to his own devices in the matter
specific targets for attention and in the matter of determining whether
or not his unit was able to carry out a given task. He was thus not
governed in his every move and decision by orders from above, Success
or failure depended on the urAt itself and on its leader's judgment. 1
the obligation to attack *Installations" might be regarded as a
of the injunction in guerrilla doctrine against attack and
d installations and positions
necessarily
so, for in each case the operation was to be within the capability of
the commando, as determined by the Commando Leader.
The second three missions, on the other hand, show very clearly the
dual nature of the On operational concept long since decided upon in
on and more recently in China. The most obvious point is that
designed to give direct tactical support to regUar military
operations, APPLE was directed to prepare plans for the seizure and
retention until relieved, or otherwise ordered, of the "key" towns of
Wuchow and Kaoyao and for the "establishment of defended road blocks at
critical points in the enee road net throughout the operational area."
ended road blocks and the attacks on the two towns were to be
ared on call. These operations partook of the nature of regular
infantry assaults. APPLY? was both to attack and defend fixed positions
and was to do so when directed to do so by higher headquarters, regard-
he Corrsnando Leader's own Judgment concerning his unite s
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capabilities. finally, the two towns in question and the "operational
area" in which road blocks were to be set up and defended lay directly
in the path of the Allied advance envisaged by Operation ARBONA and
were iraportsnt to any West River operation, In sum, therefore, the mission
given to APPLt confoi ied in every detail with the difted concept of 00
operations,, with the principles enunciated at Wedemeyerts Clandestine
Conference No. I (January, 1945), with the mission of Operation CARBOWADO,
and with the type of training given to the Ws in consequence, The whole
mission, as defined, partook strongly of the combination in the same opera..
tion of both tactical and strategic aspects. It rust be adaatteed, .further-
r. rare,, that even the strategic objectives had much of the tactical about
then 9 since they lay within the area of tactical effort by regular mili-
tary forces. The isolation of the battlefield was the goal,
lnteellilence concerning the enev within the area of operations was
pleete.
the "Intelligence Annex rio, 1 to Operation 'APPLg',"
19h5, it was stated that "information co erntng eneaey
forces along the WEST RIVER (HSI CHIA1 ) is very limited, For general
I
locations and identifications see map overlay .,. Stuty of the map
yields no infbrmation concerning Japanese n,
ngth, but does
give an indication of the location of units. The bulk of Japanese strength
was concentrated in and around Canton and to the north and east of that
city, The enema had entrusted the defense of the West River area to the
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1 vaff of this dmua
will, be bouad
Jirahi
t.p,6, - Foil
1.
co nection with Li a his *P
the following aamm item is
2,954* isaa of the reek' a e ai
photograph with the f*11oviing caption under
oh*Lrmn Maw `ae-t, 'lad b7 five vie* deg"
parade from the gate of Heaavsn1,7 Peaom,
, Liu Shoo-chi,, 14w,, Clon, Chu T
a for
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13th Independent Infantry Brigade. Elements of this were in uchow, in
and around Xaoyao, in and around Canton, and near the coast due south of
Canton. The situation presents two factors of interest. Total Japanese
organized ground forces strength available for the defense of the West
River valley was not great, for the enemy had concentrated most of his
h In and around Canton. i1owever, it is of interest to note that
he had concentrated elements of what organized forces he had allotted
to the West River in or close to the towns of chow and Kaoyao, which
to be prepared to capture and defend.
The situation of friendly forces in the area was as fbUows. ' General
Tu 1{ansmou coraranded the Seventh War Area, in which were located troops
the Chinese 65th Army. Tu was reported to be hostile to the Chungking
government, to be a member of the South Chinese Secessionist "orerant,,
and closely allied with Marshal Li-chi-shen's "People's Mobilization
Commission," which the report described as "powerful" in the southern
Province.2 Yugo regular troops of the 65th Army in the
VII War Area were considered to be of "negligible" military value. Amer-
-observers considered that Yu would cor sit then "only in the
event of an Allied landing on the Coast," since they had refused battle
with any Japanese forces for the past year. A General. Fang,, whose
second-ins-command was Colonel Wat, was the commander of the "only known
reported organized guerrilla band to be operating west along the MST
MR." This group belonged to the "National Government Guerrilla Heaad-
ted at Shaping, Other irregular forces in the area were
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compooed of small groups looaely
led by the central gove
militia groups, and the river pirates.
generally anti-Japa se, while the
bidder. The West River area co=zld therefor
kind. Of no- .an'slann !, siace effective control really resided in the
hands of. irregular groups of uncertain temper,
hands of either the Japanese or the Chinese central governrW
The sa report gives a lengthy description of the terrains
and communications of the area. The terrain i~
hilly? with the river valley itself broken -yap by hill
width from about 10 miles to *narrow gorges.
are probably the worst in all of China. Although
aced, the vast
of lend ways are 04
oads are
paths.
In the lower areas they are paved with flag-sic nes and follow the paddy-
di.ke lines. in the uplands they normally follow the ridge lima and,
kved." An important feature of the area was that *due to the
density of the tau 't saw-grass covering tier hills" it w
difficult for foot-troops to move Off" the pa
Lion on co .cations was scanty. There was no info
nsidered an
we
to the
the
rying in
the existence of a telephone system. Information on telegraph lines was
meager and unreliable. One radio station was known to exist in Wudhow
d there is an unconfirmed report of a similar station in KAOYAO.
It Is evident from the information contained in these intelligence annexes
that APPLE would have to be prepared to operate pretty much on its own
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resources. While the Japanese forces it might have to face were not large,
uld expect no reliable assistance from Chinese groups already in the
area and would have to rely on its own equipment for coneraaunicetions.
ady in the area, was ordered to assist In
the arranmeaents for the reception
unit Of APPLE s dropped
convoys were usually guarded by two Japanese soldiers, traveled at
arranernts and to provide last-minute inforeration..I On July U. 19e,
GAZELLE radioed back to the base that there were 3,00 Japanese troops in
yao and that no Chinese troops were to be found south of the river.
Japanese gunboats were on the river. Japanese supplies were stored in
caves north of Kaoyao and were carried in barges towed by motor launches*
nigh,
APPLE would not. have to worry about food, since it was plentiful.
Yid made their stops at small villages along the north bank of the
Now would it have to concern itself with the attitude of the local popu
tion, which was said to look upon the Americans with favor. The r
exchange was about 40O Chinese dollars to 1 American.
urged that
d not to mention the rate prevailing in Kunninqw
. Also, a three-man advance
on July 10, to help with reception
rest, of course, of keepin
same day APPLE f as advance unit repor
Drop Zone was ready for the drop scheduled for the following day..'
July 12, 1945, APPL parachuted safely behind the Japanese lines near
aaoyao,
eported that all went well, except for the loss of one
hinese, who landed in a fish pond and drowns
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on mounting of A:
033 Archives ? ng,
4.0P 2 (Box 1)
00 .% APPLE, g' X,, CHMM.
R@&ograa,, Car e
14,t
083 Archives - going,.
81
K,r We* opera
tea' - gung*
Qrperet .on.i RAP
is
DetailAd Report on A,P Operation, dated 18 July 1916, signed
by Lb. Co1. Lucius 0. R cker, Jr., a d messed to the
Strategic Services Offi r/0 /C??. Col. Mu* was head of
the Parachute Thin ng 8Chool and Chief of d r Operations*
A copy of this repwt idII be found
035 Archives
so .OP.lt (Bo
00 - P ,
A copy of this schedule, dated July 120 194,5s will be fond in
OSS Archives - Nursing.
C .OP.5. - lot Co, nan (Combat) - #19.
The complete plane-load nanifests, personnel rosters
clcs. (with coder;
For Release 2002/07/30-
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Before beginning a discussion of APPL 's actual activities in the
field it is of importance and interest to note the transportation and
rachutin arrangements for the unit. This information will be found
l
a detailed report on the actual air transport operation.' The time
chedule which was carried out was as follows t
5 t - First aircraft took off. All take-offs were one (1)
o836 - Drop co eeted. All men am equip nt out.
08231- First aircraft passed directly aver target '`r; .
CLO
and I element of 2.
.
W
in formation 50 ft, outs Q ft. back, elements o
033: - Aircraft No. 5 landed to Zee load.
0345t- Aircraft No. 5 took off again.
do at MANN Pia. All fourteen
^XPLIN X red-svo+as
)1.11:. Aircraf't No. 5 developed engine trouble.
trip to CHE 01 t1WG. a2
First aircraft landed at G -..
The load to be airlifted consisted of 'i% Chinese and AvariMM
-achutists, 28 containers, and 30 packages o
,, and
requiring fourteen airplanes.* The 27th Troop Carrier Squadron
of Fourteenth Air Force handled 41
The chief loading principle 's that of keeping
gun squad:, rifle squad, mortar squad, or other unit
their equipment so that if an emergency arose necessitating
ng with
some unexpected place, they mould have a combat unit together With its
officers, personnel and equipment." The unit rods in trucks the 18 nail.
Commando cam to the Cheng1cung airdrome. Cox assigned one 2*-ton
truck to each of the fourteen planes and sent along an extra vehicle in
case of breeakdow s a routs. Per
and equipment were loaded in. the
rding to the plane to which the track a they rage assi ned.
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the actual lift.
otion, iaee., machine
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_R2..
the evening of July 11 all pin* crews and parachute school
briefing to cover the
dispatchers were
For security
reasons, they were not given the location of the exact Drop Zone until
ust prior to the actual departure time.
In addition to the fourteen C-
ort planes a
a the air fleet consisted of buy P-51 ft
them from Planning to the Drop Zone and back, and one B-2
"obtain aerial photographic coverage."
along to
The truck convoy arrived at Cbengkung Afr ro at 2200 hours on
Jul
A eaanwhile, the parachute school dispatchers had reported in
to the planes to which they had been assigned, and occupied tie selves
with taping the doors,, checking the anchor cables,, and seeing that their
plus were reedy for loading and taking off. The 00a were given
and hot drinks and spent the remaining time before loading in two rev
on the opposite side of the field from where
them. At X30 hours, July, 12,, the trucks were reloaded and crossed the
field to the parking tin
the truck assigned to Plans Thither 1h
in the lead and the others in reverse order. Each truck reported to the
plane b rim the number corresponding to its own. By 0200 the planes
were loaded and the men place. During the trip all the men were
airsick. Except for the mishap to Aircraft No, 5 reported above, the
trip to the Drop tone proceeded without other incident. The planes
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086 Archives -- EuI ,
00.AlD 1 - Operational, a,port
1.
Capt. Leopold. Jo 1Car skt,, Leader of T
July 19 5, in
- 5ft,
d that APP Is
ad dra i 1,
sated that tb paid 100 nes a collars
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traveled at 100 to 105 miles per hour at 500
chief difficulty occurred over the Drop Zone as follows.
"They arrived at tZ at 0825 hours and found the panels of the
reception committee with no difficulty. The original plan
was to rake one pass over the DZ with all equipment and per-
sonnel being dispatched. However, several of
were hampered in their dispatching by airsickness,
resulting weakening of the Jumpers and two passes were neces-
sary in order to clean, out the loads. The whole formation made
second Hess and the few planes that had been unable t
their loads on the first pass threw out the remaining equ
The drop was counted as successful, size the
one Chinese who landed in a fish pond and drowned and one whose arm became
entangled in the static line of another jumper and was broken as he Jumped.
All equipment landed safely, It is possible, however, that the broken
a could have been the only casualty on the drop, for the head of the
GAZED reported the following about APPLVe drop.1
"This kid that aimed was seen by a few Chinese paratroopers
but instead of going to gins assistance, they ran back one
thousand yards for an American, hot stuff,*
return to base the dispatchers
the follow i ng suggestions to improve caper
Da not make drop approaching water, even thou
craft cannot fly the direction of the panel on the .field.
All planes parked in line before taping doors and lo,
equipment to prevent confusion among the dispatchers In
they may load a plane other than that assigned to tb
lust have covers for trucks so that chutes dona't gat wet on
way to field. A wet chute may cause a malfunction and endanger
the jum?per's life.
d. Have cigarettes? candy, gam, etc., for the jumpers while flying,
and clothing or blankets to keep the men warm during flight.
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e. sire that all se fill their canteens befcer
f. Have a briefing of all dispatchers just prior to loa
case there has been a char a in plate after the preliminary
briefing of all dispatchers and ne bers of the air crews.
'The reconstruction of a F 's activities during the month between
its arrival in the West River area and the Japanese surren
August, is relatively easy from the strictly chronological point of view?
owing to the eodatence, of regular reports from Cox to his superiors,
However* it is permissible to wish to look somewhat beyond these routine
reports, for two reasons. First is their brevit
to obtain much aors, than the outline of events. econd, is their character,
Which# it
1945j, concerning the nature of reports.
emphasize accomplishments rather than difficulties., T
iney of radio silences trace :s on diffi lties't and the rapid
as at the and of the var
membered,, was governed the Directives of May
ated that reports must
difficulty o
After lending between Wuchow and !aoyao on July
to move to Loytinguyen2 The Demolition otion was
E a APL prepared
min
Taan-chiaarsien. The Wiese in the area #ae very cooperative
paartial to ?wericans.e3 Tar four days the Japanese chased APPLE,
high t
? -- --. The,
establish a base there from which they will begin operations.' At
to-ting radio trouble developed,, which meant that "way meagre information
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814
See Footnote f 2p page 57, of this paper,
It has been impossible for either the present writer
Library Dieion/ORR to locate this town.
Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Reports, dated 19 July 1945, in
OS5 Archives - l uiing.
oq.nr X' Operational Report.
14. Cox to OPSO, Weekly Operational Report, dated 26 July 1945,
OSS Archives ? 1Cuam' .
0O,Ap I ? Operational Report.
85
1. Cox to Heppner, CO Monthly Report? dated A July 1945, in
089 Archives ? luu tag.
OG.OP.3 ? Monthly Report, lbl
2. Coat to OPSO, Weakly Operational Report,, dated 2 August 1945, in
039 Archives -funning.
OO.AD I - Operational Report.
Cox to CG/ Reserve Command and to OD/O nose Ommondos,
6 August 1945, in
086 Archives - gunming.
oo,OP.4, Co nding General,
lot Parachute Regiment. Folder #13.
Cox to Heppaer, OD Monthly Report, dated 31 August 1945, in
OSS Archives - Kunming
OO.OP.1 - M IM (Co. "R") ? OPERATIONS.
No Nemkong river exists under this name. It is suggested that
the Junction of the Wont and Wan-Chiang Rivers may be the scene
of this'action. This Junction has been circled on the map.
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ntd.)
See also the following reference for Cox''s citations of various
American personnel of APPLE for their conddat diking this and
other activities of the unit.
OSS Archives ? Kunming.
O.OP.I, Citations. Folder #25,
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was obtained during the next few days, but some contact was maintained
ugh other OSS units operating in this area."' The same report states
that Lo-ting proved to be an excellent base for operations. There was in
the area a ieneral Tam, who had a force of about 6,000 guerrillas under
his co ard. "He displayed willingness to cooperate but he was initially
engage in decisive actions against the enemy,, fearing they
1ght ravagii the area. Vowever he was induced
an ca i-red: operations.
the same time APPLE set up an intell
net to cover both nantora and the West River area and carried out numerous
reconnaissance activities, on August 2 it was reported that APPLE and
Tam had dra up plans for a simultaneous attack on three villages on the
south bank of the West River.2 On August 4 APPLE reported that it was on
an operation and would report as soon as it returned.3 On August 9 the
report was that APPLE had. *attacked a Jap fortified position at the
_Junction of NAM KONG & WEST RIVERS on 5 August. The position had. 3-70
me, ortarsa, and machine guns. Jap casualties were 8 dead an
wounded. Commando casualties were 7 wounded and 3 missing believed dead,
Americans. 2.00 Jap reinforcements arrived from TAMING 2 hours after
attack began. The conduct and discipline of the commando under fire was
superior."4 This some report described this attack as APPT. ;s "initial
gyration.
two complete reports from the Senior Amer~icin
Officer of APPLE, Captain Vernon G. Hoppers, Inf.,, to Cox. These cover
the period from July 12 to the Unit a s arrival at sting on July 25. The
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a a "Rc?oort on Area" and provides some information. The second
Report of First Commando 12 to 25
supplementing the briefer official reports.
In the first of these docunenta Hoppers crrnfirrad t
l
of earlier intelligence reports.
The country was agricultural
, with a
plentiful. supply of food, The Americans were politic-ally popular, while
the British were ecua ly detested. The local officials more cool towards
the Chungking government., "because they have had no support from it."
military leaders maintained a sort of "gentleman's agree
the Japanese, with the result that a large smuggling trade flourished
throughoutt, the area. There were about 2,000 Communists
southwest of Lt,-tiro;, of whom all local military men were afraid. The
only regular Chinese division in the area, the 15th, was described as
having "done no fighting and evidently have no intentions of doing any."
Hoppers closed this report with a. few suggestions for the benefit of
future core andoQ in the field. He theug
each comendo a thorough briefing on the money s
his own unit, he confirmed Karwaski a s July 16 report of APPLE's behavior
in these wordst "The men of the first commando are actually by the
change here being paid better than 60 gold per L.I. a conseque
are spoiled. They have inflated the exchange in every town pass
through." Since the operations were financed byr the Americans
ntrusted to the Senior American Officer in the field, tb
was of considerable Importance. The lack of control of the Americana over
erlg important to give
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The handwritten report und and will, be found in
O chi s - u_
OG.OP.? - 1PPLI Opetration.
Folder 3.
In both of Hoppers' r po rta the sp*Uing and punt
bom correat.d: The wrde, home
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the Chinese personnel is graphically shown by this passage. Hoppe
second suggestion concerned the interpreter problem*
interpreters were hired at Chungking and that the table of organ-
isation aesignod eight of them to each commando. Hoppers makes what
should have from the beginning been an obvious point to higher headquarters
when he says: "Interpreters should be picked for the provincial langu
which they speak." He sa9ya, further:
I have only one interpreter who is worth a damn. Ali of then
are too young and have had no experience in handling cool es,
merchants or anyone else, Interpreters hired in the area In
which you operate are a great deal more useful. '*Men hired
through the magistrate they are thoroughly trustworthy and. can
save you a great deal of mney and time. Mr, o Mon bixang
1 453. has done a very good job. Int. Charlie Chan was an agi-
tator so we used him as a courier,"
The trouble with the interpreters which erupted during the training period
evidently because
In his report on the period July 12 ? 25 ?4oppersprovid.ed a rather
depressing picture of the activities of the First Con"Wndoe This report
is of such interest, owing to its frankness and to its authorship by
responsible position with APP;, that the significant portions
of it are herewith repro theed. The contrasts with the routine
arized above should be noted.
x' Jumped at Kai-Ping at approx. 9: 00 AN to well organized reception.
Sores of the jw p masters were poorly coordinated with pilots.
planes were stood up and hooked up one hour before using
height was from 250 to 300 feet. This was probably due to diffi.-
culty of getting bindles out of door. The planes d- 11-d not fly
across the T in the right direction. If they had, all of the
men would have landed on dry ground. As it was one nen landed in
a lake and was drowned, two more almost landed in it and the
greater maa; ority landed in wet rice paddies.
.a., the parachutists were stood up and hooked up7. The Jump -
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When we hit the grothe Commando personnel were physically
exhausted. A great many refused to help gather equipment. 1
d that they should carry their parachutes into town' about
imiles distant, they were very unhappy. All other equipment was
being moved by coolies. Some of them threw the parachutes in the
rice paddies on the way in,
we spent two days in lei-ping atheri ; information and waiting for
Lt. Frailer to return from the West river area. During these two
days the Chinese soldiers bought everything that was loose in the
town and prices went up over twice what they were, Colonel Ching
/the Chinese Commando LeadeEf promised to restrict them* to the area,
they were inflating the market. On the second day in Kai-ping i
sent Lt. Hudson with the Demo. Section on a riving and recon, mission
down the coast road, I had received rd that a Jap column was halted
near Tang.ichianm,-hsf en and there we right be able to booby-.trap some
empty hides. Also for a look at the road itself and the terrain
around It. The mission w?+s not atuccessfuul where the min
eo-"R ?. for the JapL- were on the ou.tskirtc ..#,# but they
7h-ting on the 15th. After the first day of marching not one
_
Chinese soldier was carrying his pack. All equip. was being carried
by coolies. After the first day rifles and belts gars to appear
on the coolies' loads. I went to Col, Ching and told him the mien
mint carry at least their are in case of attack. The men started
carrying them for about two days when they started to crop out again.
We corrected this again. on arrival at San-bin I decided to
base there, for the most narrow part of the West River is east of
Xao-yao about eight miles. The river narrows at some places to
200 or 300 yards which is ideal for ambush operations. 1 .9
to San-qui, which is located about 5 miles from the West River. , ..
When arrived at San-hing /T.e., returned from an-quip we found
the entire commando packed and ready to evacuate. We heard the
news that two Jap columns were moving from Kai-ping toward Sen hing
and were then about 30 kilometers southeast of San-ping. I insisted
to Col. Ching and Major Lo 5ne of the Chinese officers] that we
should take sampans down to San?quiv to. carry out,--out` ,original plan.
... There is a mountain range east of aan..qui, which we could have
ne into in case they cab after us# and there was a possibility
of hitting their flank as they came down ie river.
Their excuse for not wanting to go was that we could not get past
the Jap column, which was at that time still 16 riles away. When
I insisted that we still had our mission to accomplish they offered
no further excus e } but continued preparations f ar the move,
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Ban ring to Loh-ting we were really given a pict re of the First
(`o ando. No more then three miles out of San hing packs, am o,
and other equipment began to fall by the aside. Ow man tried
to throw away his tommy gun along with the rest of his equipment.
Sgt. BeCamp broke up a fight between the Col. Li.e., Col. Chin
and this man. The imerican personnel ran a scavenger unit be-
hind the commando picking up discarded equipment* one Chinese
soldier was restrained from throwing away a mortar at the point
of a gun. Mai. La & Col. Ching sulked along at the rear of the
column. I controlled, as best I could the march,, with a radio
in the font and one in the rear. At one point Wire crossed
a rivers I tried to leave a rear guard of one rifle branch, the
K. Go Branch, and a mortar squad, to ambush the Jape as they tried
to cruse the river. They refused to do so. The remainder of the
march to L -TIl was just a repetition of the same thing, We
are still. trim. There is still a chance of doing something. The
American personnel have really dose a good job, And for inset of
them it was quite a slap in the face to have their judgment go so
completely haywire. Most of the men have the patience of Confucius.
... The report of the Co;ando is as absolutely fair as I can make
it. ?ate' small things are not mentioneds bat it at least draws
a verbal picture of our straggle against the enemy behind the
lines (if we could get then near the one-my). I have checked this
over with every man for some things I did not see myself,
the other bogs making out?)el
The second principal primary source on
ntur s of APPLE in
the field is the series of radioed reports which APPLE ard i-A,MILE sent
back to headquarters and which have been preserved. These add no addition-
al material not found in either Cox's or Koppers' reports, but do furnish
illuminating details on some of the operations. On July 25 GAZELLE radioed
2
to Wa ler as folic ss
OUR GU RItLA , QUITTING US. NOT F CinH MONEY FOR MOD. WE PAT
OUR MEN 30 C.N. P BAY. APPLE CHINESE PAY 100 C.K. AND PE
PRICES RAISED giRE THEY CO.
P,ST SITUATION R!OA3 TO JAS` MOVE
ROTM AS APPLE. CRT" SE NOT PU.TTTINO STAND ANY PLACE.
RRTTS TN WANTU .f BIG LAR ' . REPORTS RE ,ATI 710 THEIR
EXTRE LT EXAGGERATED. M
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89
The carrsct identification of. "Bar hingf and *San-qui"" remains
in doubt, Maas neither the present writer nor the Map Library
Division/G has been able to locate any places by these names.
It is suggested that the correct rendering of "San-hlnr is.
"Hein-hsing." This city is therefore: underlined on the map.
Its location between Kai-paing and Luting NOW it possible
that it is the place which Hoppers had in mind, since he is
describing. the journey between Kai-p" ing and Lo?tng.
It is suggested tentatively, again on the basis 0'
that assn-qui"" may actually be "San-ho-hair"" which has
underlined on the map.
Radiogram, C LLE to 'ampler, 25 July 1945, in
CSS Archives ? gauming.
0G.oP. S ? 2nd Commando (Combat)
90
Radiogram, GAZEL to Wampler, 25 July 1945,, in
038 Archives - gumming.
0O.0P.5. - 2nd Commando (Combat) ? #18.
Radiogram, APPLE to Cox, 28 July 1915, in
ONS Archives - turning,*
00.0P.5. ? 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
Radiogram, APPIA to 'Coat, 30 July 1915, in
056 Archives - lunaaing.
OG.0P.5. - 2nd Comando (rCoaabat)
Radiogram, APPLE to Cox? to August M5. in
08$ Archives - running.
0G.OP.5, ? 2nd Commando (Combat) - #18.
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On the following, day GAS, :L3s radioed another report, which was uncompli-
rentary' to the Chinese and based on both APPLE's end GAZ E
"'ta'MESF S LEAST DESIROUS OF COMBAT. NOT O LY Tim OF APPLE
... Th LAST JAP PUSH HM NO RESISTANCE ?RFD
ANA ? Ai 3ICANS OPSWE WITH CHINS BUT 8 WNED OFF EE
TO i IR NONAO S"s ATTITUDE. ... PLENTY SPACE FOR FIGHT
T ?TS PROVI # IF CHINESE WO MM ONLY C OO E A' . IDEAL SITUATION
9ooPS DER DIRECT CC 4A'! OF AMERICAN:
PP TIVE THEY ARE. EERY
ON DOINO ST TO 0W AIM ?t!;StU TS. 1 JOOH SLEDDING AT PR S I T,a
The money situation was reflected on July 28 in APPIE's request for
2
e.
On July 30 APPLE reported that it had contacted General
Tan and had persuaded his to release 300 of his 6,000 troops to assist the
eo nendc in the attack on the three villages on the south bank of the
3
ity of any operations in China, and p,
behind the enemy lines, was Illustrated by Hio apera' adventures wit
he above-mentioned General Tam.
be recalled that Theater had
decreed that the A ricana should have nothing
political affairs, This plains Hoppers' attitude. The incident
which nothing eventually came, shows the difficulty of remaining aloof,
era radioed as follows:
"HAVE :RUN INTO POLITICAL TANGLE, OEN "L. TAM ... LOCATED TAKL
BATS GENERAL HO .. TO RE(MONIZE HIS TROOP,
AS SIX THOUSAND MEN WHO ARE PART OF T? F NINETEENTH ROUTE
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T. GE!ER
H i ANS'
I AM ACTING AS MIDDLE MAN, HAVE PTrMI T NOTRIIWC.
RECOGNIZE AND &UF`PL! HIM. CAN YOU CONTACT C
E WILL TM ORDERS M IF ME CI 'fIT
W ON OPERATION WITH PART OF 0WM . 4;t WLPC~>TP
WHO HAS 700, ALL A WWRILLAS. ... ALL
the Theater decree concerning involvement in political affairs was
undoubtedly inspired by the best of rrrrtive s, it is clear that such a
restriction,, given conditions in China genera3l r, a particularly ; very
those prevailing behind enemy lines, was too categorical at best and too
kginn
o and impossible at worst, Since guerrilla doctrine from the
h.+ssizeed that operations could not be mounted at all
without at the very least the tacit support of the local population, it
was demanding, too much to expect that the O'Oa could possibly completely
ignore local powers and strong men.
Thus far, the accounts of APPLE'a activities have emphasized the
difficulties, with particular emphasis, borne out by experience, on the
Chinese lack of discipline and aggressive spirit, The Ibllowing account
of the penultimate operation of APPLE serves,, on the other hand, to show
the American work was not a complete waste of time and at the
provides a clue to the rather sorry, performance during the
weeks of APPI.'s mission in the field.
"COINA JO ATTACH JAP FORTIFIED POST
BY ho JAPS AT
JTJMCTTON OF NAF N0 AND WEST RI R. JAP CASUALTIF R DEAD.. 4
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1. Ra ? APJIZ Cox, 7 A as t '19
?Wps5. r &A c
tat on
s r K,
.0P.7'+ - Citation*, Fbl
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4ANDO CAS uAT; IES
o 113VILUEVW KILLDT. LLT BRIDGES, LT CARPENTER
Sines
The ope3
V~RTOTt JOB OF TROOP LEADIN . PLCOWE CPT. CAHILL FOR
sTLVER STAR, HE C'RMsm 50 ThE OPEN FIEEL1) TO CARRY OUT UN DED
C~x R " a. 501;)T FR. NO Allk
%NS W,OOUNDiD, DISCIPLlN OF COMMANDO
DER FIRE SU?Lv.gjOR E '~. Y RESPECT, "FETE! w EN wl HT J O
HOUSES AFTER SAPS THEY PUSHED T':`1 ;WIT IN 20 YDS OF VP FORT.,
pane se reinforced their garrison, the Commando had to withdraw.
Lion in one sense could not be called a success. It is evident,
however, from this text that the Chinese soldiers behaved in an exemplary
that when the righting actually began the Aeerican officers
and enlisted amen took over the co bat leadership of AP :E. In other words,
under the conditions of stress it was the Chinese 04' cer who we
f'au t,, rather then the Chinese soldier. The latter
attack capable of fighting bravely and w
himself In this
en he received proper leader-
ship, This point is conArued in the citations of two Aa rican officers
and three A..rican en:Listed
or the Silver and Bronze
for their roles in the operation of Augus
net a Japanese-held
village. In each case, the citation speaks of the personal leadership
whih the Aricans exercised and the good response of the Chinese soldiers
to that leadership.I Ths attack of August 5 just described evidently
led to some reproaches from cox, who was known to be opposed In principle
to using 01a to attack fortified places. On August 11 VPLF explained
The reason was not that they ther?tselves had changed in any way.
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the reason for the attack and confirmed what has been said above con-
cerning the Chinese officers.
"ATTACK AGAINST POSITION AT NANXONF PLANNED AS SURPTIM DAWN
ATTACK. REASON FOR FiEN KILLED AND WOUND WAS LACK OF AGGRESSIVE
SPIRIT IN Vii. LO. REASON FOP. ATTACK ON POSITION: THERE ARE NO
COLI.1NWS AND VERY LITTLE TRAFFIC ON W S'T RIVER. WE HAD D TO ?IfHt
MME ONE.U
The final APPLE operation before the end of the war was an attack
its Machine Faun Section on a Japanese headquarters, in which it was re-
ported that four Japanese were killed and an unknown number sanded.
' question always arises of the ranner in which to Judge an opera-
tion. From one point: of view this project can be regarded as a failure.
In terms of concrete results achieved the unit accoaMlished little. During
the month it was in the field it attacked four Japanese-held or Japanese-
fortified villages and strong points and one Japanese headquarters of unde-
termined importance. None of these were apparently of any particular
tactical or strategic significance, their significance insofar as APPLE
was concerned being their role in accustoming the unit to combat operations.
There is no evidence that these attacks particularly hampered the Japanese.
That they did annoy them is certain, for the enemy did take the trouble
to reinforce one of his threatened garrisons and thereby caused APPLE
to withdraw. Concerning the tactical role of the 00a in support of
military operations, there is no evidence that APPLE was of any
particular assistance to Operation CARBf TA1O, since the above-mentioned
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93
1.. Rograoc, APPLE to cox, u August 19450, in
OS$ Archives - Iu.ng.
OO.OP.S. ? 2nd Commando (Combat) ? #1.8.
No locality exists under this name. See mote X,
F. 85.
Radiogram, APP to Cox,, 13 August 19h5, in
OSE Archives ? Kuns ng.
OG.OP.5. - 2nd Co ando ( bat) 8.
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attacks were made on APLE+s own initiative. The intelligence which the
unit sent back according to its secondary responsibility did not either
y to, or seriously modify, the information airs
from other sources. i'ro a this point of views therefore, it
results obtained in this case did not 3usti:f,
ical or the guerrilla warfare viewpoints, the time
effort which Cox and his associates put into the project.
To make the above one's definitive judgment ou the af
would be bath a gross oversimplification and an injustice. The judge
shnnld bear two things in Lind. One is that significant targets were few
and far between at this stage of the war. The Japanese had largely
plated their withdrawal from the area in which APPLE was to operate and
the field for the most part to local guerrilla groups. 1the only
ese forces left were the elements of the 13th Independent
infantry 3rigade, which was scattered piecemeal over tk area.
river end road traffic was correspondingly insignifican
radiograaa of August 11:
truly
As Toppers
had to fight someone." To expect
a in such a situation is therefore asking too much.
The second thing, the element which really hampered operations, was the
a1 )st Impossible arra nt for command and control of the unit. The
Aricans, as demonstrated earlier, had been put into the very difficult
position of possessing responsibility without authority, They were to
advise the Chinese, but were forbidden to oer !and them. Command of an
operation would therefore either not exist at all or would fail into the
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hands of those beet capable of exercising it, irr
rnertts and directives. The history of APPLE shows,
of report of the period July 12 ? 25 is an excellent illustration
of the situation in such the A ricans found themselves. In the absence
of Chinese will, there was little the Arricans could do. When an action
asctuzlly undertaken it was the A. ricsns vho really did the leading
and co]' mandinslr, as shorn in the accounts of and citations for the actions
against the four villages and the Japanese headquarters. Now, from this
two things haceaz; cleatr, tuna is that the Chinese officers
the caliber required for OG operations.
on their lack of aggressiveness. Hoppers, furthermore,, recounts
detail his adventures in trying to operate within the framework
of the `mater directive concerning command of field units and relations
between Chinese and Americans. CAMLE made the following point in its radio-
gram of July 2S, which has already been ouoteds
"IDEAL Sr'r"UATION IS T HAVE TROOPS UNDER DIRECT CA D OF
. ROUGHER TRE*T tiT CHINESE RECEIVE THE ?
A PPr CIA t I3 THL Y ARE."
the last sentence may be debatable,
little question
under the leadership of the A ricans the Chinese soldiers performed well,
as shown by the brief account of the action of August 5 and in the cita-
tions for the action of August 1.
In sum, therefore;, APT L33 operating order two great handicaps:
the lack of targets and an impossible command situation. The circ
stances were ,Auite beyond its control. Accordingly, it is too much
expect a record of startling results in the field.
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..96.
t of, Operation g gAW in the West Riser valley and
,on, the second 00 unit was preparing go into the field
around the area of Qheng-aha. It parachuted now Ching
of July 2?s, i9s!,1 and operated in the Chong-ssha - Shaoyang (Pao ) ,.
Hong-yam triangle from that date until the end of the war a little more
weeks later.
3 RRV ee mission was generally similar to that of APXS and was
set forth as ibUo z
$a. Disrupting enemy lines of oo cetioa
enemy river traffic along N SUNG such
pla,cesss as may be selected by the Commando Leader.
b. Disrupting enemy lines of coss cation and destruetto
enemy supply copes using the area read nets at such
and places as s be selected by the Owmnda Lauder.
Disrupting the flow of enemy rail traffic and the destruction
of railroad equipment and facilitiees in use by the es,
at such times and places as may be selected by the Connando,
Loader.
d. Preparing a plan for the establishment of defended road blocks
at critical points in the enemy road not throughout the sera.
tional area and be prepared to establish those road blocks
all.
?. Attacking and destroying? such enemy installations within the
ore" of operation as massy be within the capa3 .littees of the
C andos, as determined by the Comma' do Leader..
The undo Leader will establish friendly relations with
Military _ f ldak and Guerrilla Organizations in the area of
operation and cooperate with these a tivities wherever possible
for out: , benefit.*
d that URR!sss mission d`feee
several impo,
In contrast to the latter's mission, -
s enssibtli.ti.es included only one instance in which the control
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Cox to Reppner, 0G. Xon l7 Report! Jul 1915, dated .3. July 1945
OSS Art hf va8 - Kunming
00.6P.),, ? Monthly Report? Toldsr #3.
See Tab IT)" for naps to aer a as an annex to this stud
ration DLi BERRt.
085 Operational P1.an for BLUEHl6RRT, 22 July 19 5? in
088 Archives E_.
OO.0P.5o d C (eo bat) - #iB.
So* the 4jsouaston above of Operation CAR?ONADO and
083 pwtio pation therein, pp. 29-40 an especially pp,
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of the commando was out of the hands of the Commando Leader. This ex-
ception is to be found in the order to BLiEB: Y to be prepared on call
to establish "defended road blocky at critical points in the enemy road
rzet throughout the operational area." With the exception of the road
block mission the tacks given to BLUEBERRY were all in accord with the
traditional ='uerrllla doctrine. They were missions of attack rather than
of defense and were to be decided upon by the i
der and not by a
higher head'q?iar?ters romoved from the scene of operations. This practice
t leader is seen again in the
ragraph of
the mission directive. He was therein directed to es
ndlg
'!1S" with local military and guerrilla organizations and to "cooperate"
with them"fear Mutual benefit," whenever possible. There was thus provision
for cooperation with groups in the area on a military basis ("for mutual
benefit'') without violating the Theater injunctions against mixing in
political affairs. Since BLUEBERRY was to be in the area only for mili-
tary purposes
for mutual benefit" can have no other meaning.
gyration CAR8)MA)O provided for a "defensive and diversionary"
.n on the active; defense in the POKING - CHANQ?EN - SILT'
area by blocking approaches Zro C Al S- - H WLG area." This explains
the di lTerences between APP 's and E,0 RE '' a erissione. Whereas the
former envisaged offensive tactical operations in direct and i ae?ii.a
ar Chinese armies advancing eastward towards Canton
the latter clearly had the defensive ptarpoae of"isolating the battle
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Considerable Intelligence, on the area was available to BL BRY
before its departure. Of especial importance were sections on the enemy
strength an- situ tion, the topography, and the condition of comuni cat ions
routes.l T e to rraa? of both unan and 'ian si provinces was described as
ctiv ',.illy' or mountainou ." There was relatively little level la,
rttr~ .? a e. halls rose often to peaks of two to three
thousand feet, :pith an occs.si.: nal sumr'it up to five thousand feet. In
r the root part the area is a n
.mntaira with only limited
l 3vel land along the rivers. ... The hi ..l slopes are
steep, ar in many places the swift streams have cut picturesque gorges to
depths of severrl hundred feet." "The hillsides are a wilderness, covered
with natural vegetation. Forest at onetime covered the entire region,
but the trees have now been largely tut out near all .te
the higher peaks." 'either province was thickly settled,
and villages are located along river valleys and the upland regions, approx-
imately 75% of the total area, are almost completely unaettleed." It will
be obvious that such countryside offered
of uerrilla warfare.
The enemy controlled the principal cities,, rivers,, roads, and
railroads as had not been dismantled or destmyed during the course of the
Sino-Japanese struggle,
e gradual Japanese withdrawal to the
r dependence on the communications routes was of partl.cu-
aportance. The city of Heng-yang was an important railroad junction,
since tx,th the Hunan-Kwangsi and the Canton-Rankow lines set there and
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Ilse t, vsrioue Annexea,, Att chments# and ?ppsn ;x.s ,
Operational Plan ILMIMT1 22 dull 191 In
080 Archives ? il`tsmring
OO,OP.6 - Folder 0264. Xise q
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continued north through Chang-alas. "'Phis section consists of a
standard gauge track." The follow description of the manner in which
the Japanese operated the railroad shaws the potentia
r guerrilla
operations against it.
"Traffic over this section of the railroad is small due
damaged condition of the li, harassing tactics
forces? and 14th Air orce bombings. Present usage of the line
is limited to the operation of 'motor trucks'. "use nsi
of two trucks with tires replaced by flanged iron wheels an
pulling and pushing between then four cars. The Japanese
are using this section of the railroad for military tr rts-
tion, and operate care over the road only at night in order to
avoid. aerial bonbirzg Many of the bridges are make-shift affairs
Mace of railroad ties and during the day the Japanese camouflage
these bridges by placing straw huts on then.
atione are guarded by detachments of varyUg sties depending
on the importance of the station and the activity of guerrilla
forces. The Japanese operate patrols of 10-20 men along the
railroad. Japanese in civilian clothing are responsible for the
Reprisals are taken for acts of sabotage. It
was reported May of this year that the main snsmW garrisons
between CB' O- HA and HE *-TM are located at TMM-SHAW ...,
l- U-H0 ... , H I T' a N ... and d G TA `O."
Although the Japanese were able to use the roads,, their Control over
them was limited. The road between Chang-sha and Hong-yang s reported
to be a twenty-five-foot-wide ..veatbsr road in good condition. This
ad was important to the enemy,, for he used it for the rajor
of his traffic in the Chang-sha - Hang-yang corridor. Owing to
attacks by the With Air Force# the Japanese used it mostly at
night. Japanese convoy and protection. techniques were shown to be as
The Japanese maintain garrisons a
road for the protection and maintenance of the road.
garrisons include guard detachments, supply warehouses,
road maintenance crews. According to a Chinese source guard
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are small and avid interference with parties crossing
he road rather than risk a cash with guerrillas. Permanent
pillboxes are maintained at strategic points, ..e.,, br
fueling points.
Japanese convoy habits on the road very depends on tt
of guerrilla groups. Convoys usually rove between 2000 and
Duriiz the day the 4p ese send single trucks rather then con-
voys over the road. They pursue the following policy, (1)
Truck* "cod 25' or 50, apart. Guard consists of armed soldier
in each truck. (2) Convoy-preceded and followed by tanks. (3)
Squads of armed armed soldiers ride In first and last truck."
The local political situation presented its usual features of com-
plexity, jockeying for power? and indifference to the course of the ware
Political Son
1936=37 there has been no or n Communist In
:n and liangat provinces.. Pockets of ex- a :at guerrillas
exist in the se'areuntainous regions on the borders of i 'iaangai,
but their connection with the Tenan regime has long been severed
and their activities turned to banditry. Recant hupsia dis-
patches, however, publicise a Communist pocket on the borders of
Hunan, gweichow, and Seechuanj unconfirmmW reports speak of
Nationalist clashes with Communists in the region between Tung-
t'ing and Po-yang Lakes, near the Yangtze River; the Tenan regime
has called to the attention of Americans the possibility of re-
activating the gisngsi border Cole .st pockets left behind a att
the time of the tan iiaaa h and has recently indicated that both
Hunan and Kies si are potentiaal. &reas of expansion.
(2) Popular resistance to the Japanese invasion was not well
organised and local population, has remained larger apathetic
and indifferent to the course of the war. Chungking-appointed
s isstrat;es are in power In the occupied area and some Puppets
ha been used by the Japanese."
Precise information concerning the an
strength was
although there was considerable material concerning
d ;sc+aaa information concerning the direction of troop movements,
Area Army and Army headquarters,, six Infantry Divisions and two
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of the ' di1elopments in Chine Sims, the
,ton aad j Tiev of the heights to whit
note #2 Pa 78 obov.)i . ntu417 rose
xissibl* to q estion, deipite rishfa ins at the tiles,
the degree to Bch the Comet guerri l"I 'connection
with the Yemen resixe has long been "vered and their acti l.-
tiea turned to band trj." ' ' This doubt is strengthened by sA
ea ination of the letter part of the paragraph *bovo conesm
f ng the C niet guerrillas in 'fig ,e
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Independent Mixed Brigades had been identified in the Japanese corridor.
These forces, with which ii.B1RY would have reclkon, had a Table of
Organization strength of about lOO,t men. This figure was not definitive
however, since the strength of the 86th independent Mixed Brigade was
listed as ftt r nownn and since that of the 6th and 68th Infantry? Divisions
was about 91,000 and was no more definitive than their Table of Organ
Lion strenrt
The op. e.rationa . strength of these eight units
of the 86th Independent Mixed Brigade
was listed as 65,9000 (?)" and since that of the 64th and 68th, Infantry
. Even less was available concerning the
of these units. The only figures listed were "
each for the 6lath and 68th Infantry Divisions. Although these forces
ncentrated in the South - North. Japanese-hold corridor, their
general movements were north and east,, in accordance with the enemy wit
de Canton and other cities on or nearer the coast. trthereare,
on concerning the reads, rive
roaeds, some sizeable part of the personnel of these unite were being employed
in garrison and convoy duty along the lines of cormuni ation. The enemy
ly compelled to disperse some of his strength., thus confirming
ement about the Japanese having 91
description and analysis of the ssion with
I was charged and of the general situation in th,
- Hemp yang area has shown that it was an ideal area for the
of guerrilla operations and provides some idea of why LtBERRT's .mission
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differed from that of AT
in was rough and
the enemy was in a position of dependence on vulnerable lines o:
d;
tion and was engaged in withdrawing his iorcen the 1 1 political
sentisrnt, while not burning with hatred for the invaders, would in all
lity at the very least not Oppose ? C . RY; and there were already
sans and native irregular forces at work In the area.
she this territory was not in the line of advance slapped out for CARBONADO,
there was less reason than in the case of APPLE to tie the corando to
rt of regular military operations and consequently to &UbJ
to strict control of higher headquarte
was actually in the field and engaged in operations less
a month, Owing to this and to the relative scarcity of available
br otion from the field, a acco
of necessity be a brief one. Furthermore, LfJBFRRY' a activities present
no features essentially different from those of its. predecessor in the
1
field.
As they had done in APPLE r s case, the OG autho
to drop into the area and make contact with fore
there. In BLU? ! ' as case one an dropped in and made eontac,
Team MKINE which had been there for so;
. Together these poop
made the final arrangements for 3LFRR.YTr a reception and sent back the
2
latest available information. A radiogram from the field gave an optimistic
picture of the possibilities fbr good guea
operations. These
in the following terms, the principal points made in
3
d,
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A cow of this document will be found in
OSS Archives - Kunming.
oa.t}?.5. - 2nd Comando (Combat) - #18.
The couplets plane-load manifestas personnel rosters, financial
supply and re-supply packaging (with cods- rkings , co mi nna-
tions, and other administrative arrangements for BLTB ! will
also be found in this folder.
On to OPSO,0 Weekly Operational Report, 19 July 19h5, and
Cox to OPSO, i eek ,y Operational: Report* 26 July 19 -5, both in
083 Archives - Kam.
OG.AD 1 ? Operational Report.
Radiogram, Riokerson (81) to Oozq 20 July 19455,
088 chives a Kunming.
0000P.5. ? 2nd Oaem ndo (Combat)
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"4HHAVE MADE PER 7NAL CONTACT WITH ALL PRINCIPAL GVERP.SLLA L'AI'RS
R LA. ALL AGREE ON FULL s 0PEMTION. PLENTY FOOD AND H Lax
AVAILABLE. .., OUR TEAMS N ZDEB AS SOON AS POSSIBLE D TO HEAVY
NIP TRAFFIC ON MAIN HIGHWAY AT NIGHT BECAUSE OF RTREAT FROM
PP^CHING AND t WE TLING. JARS ARE D IN ALM PA0CHINO - EWOYANO
3 ~?AI3. HAVE R ACHED SEVERAL LILY BASES ONLY SHORT DISTANCE F
i , IA# HIGHWAYS, RAILROADS AND C0194UHI ATIoww5. NIPS VERT VERY SHORT
OF AI0, FOOD AM SUPPLI&S.u
message sent three days later added the information that the local
co riander was *completely loyal, oonscientious. Has complet
support of _s apulace." However, the same note of warning
capabilities, already shown to have been true in the case of
APPLE's operations, was added. The local soldiers were described as "mod,,
but officers lack training." Above all, the unit 'east avoid friction with
locals."' On July 3l Cox reported that the unit had been dropped success-
fully. Local guerrillas saved BLUEBERRY from an unpleasant tige, for the
Japanese were in the vicinity, observed the drop, and attempted to destroy
the commando. These local units beat off the enenr attacks.
The condo imaedistely established contact with the local guerrillas
and arranged for what proved to be its only major operation of record
before the and of hostilities.' Soon after
scene there took place a meeting with General Wang
General Chi aani the commander of the loth Army Guerrillas. .4
uerri llas..4 At this
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103
Radiogram, Rickarscn (31) to Cox, 23 July 1945,. in
085 Archives- Xunming.
OCI.dP.S. ? 2nd Coin nando (Combat) . #18.
0S3 Archives - 1[ufaing.
0.0P.3. - Monthly Report. ?older
Cox to Hsppner, 00 Monthly Report, dated 31 July 1945,
OG. P.5. - 2nd rands (Combat) X1.8.
and
03S Archives - punting.
. Radiogram, BLUSSE ! to Generatl Li., 1 A'i zst 19145,
Material for the account and discussion of this operation is
taken from the following sources:
Radiogram, B!LtJRH to Ccx,, 6 August 1.9 , in
085 Archives - Running.
.o ! 5. - Pad Commando ( bai) ? 5.
to Reppner, 00 Monthly Report, dated 3L August 19145, in
0BS Archives - Rurei.ng.
OG.OP.l - C I1A (Co "B") . OPZRATTOHS.
Rsacendatione for the award of the Silver Star Medaal to
one American officer and one American enlisted man for their
roles in this operation. These recomrendationa were addressed
by Cox to the Strategic Services Officer/Hg/08S/CT and dated
21 August 1945 and 25 August 1945. They will be found in
083 Archives - Kunsing.
00.0P.?. - Citatiions, ?older #25.
4. Chiang is not to be confused with Generalissimo
while a @ report to Reppner calls his " Gensril Chiang of the 10th
Guerrilla Are r.a He was probably the commander of the 10th Querrilla
There is some contradiction concerning his exac,
The radiogram refers to his troops as the "10th
Army, since the situation swp overlay neither lists nor *mw
Chinese 10th Army among the units of the regular Chinese forces
the area. This map overlay idn be found in
0S8 Archives .. Kunming.
OO.oP.h. - Folder #26. Misc.
The point is not, in any aase, a vital ogee, nine* there is no
question that the troops in question were guerrillas and that
they were under Chiang e s command.
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meeting it was decided to attack enemy installations in or near the
village of 'fsiyuaenehih.l The attacking forces, consisting of U BE tT
plus an assortment of Chinese guerrillas belonging to Wang,, Chiang, and
others, outnumbered the Japanese garrison by a ratio of more than two to
one. The ene> was entrenched behind permanent fortifications which
included a pillbox system and an outer and inner ring of defenses,
The attack was an unqualified failure. Although the attackers
inflicted casualties on the Japanese they themselves suffered 18 oaten
killed, 9 mounded,, i. ludIn two Americans, and one The fire.
fight lasted for five hours, after which the besiegers withdrew without
being pursued by the defenders. However., not only did the guerrillas
fail to capture the position,., but they either could not or would not
prevent the Japanese from sallying forth and burning s, houses in the
hills west of the town. At the conclusion of the engagement the
ammunition was about exhausted and they were being menaced by Japanese
reainforawement5.
The chief reasons advanced advanced for the failure were familiar ones. Some
of the Chinese would not fight. The radiogram stated: "10th Army fought
none, lousy," Coordination among the attackers was poor. And, insofar
as BLUEBERRY was concerned, the unites Chinese commending of. cer exhibited
the same lack of initiative and aggressiveness already noted in the case of
his APPLE colleague. Cox stated the matter thus: His
American bfficer7 only criticism was that the Chinese C.O. .was not capable
and had greatly hampered the employment of the Commando during the attack."
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Cox's report. to 'Heppner states that the attack was on Taiyuan:
not otherwise described. The radtagraa states that the .eaaton
was to take and hold Tom. One of the t citations states
that the *Cowmft atta&ed the Japanese garrison near the
village of TAI " TZE." The other sae that the " Coe endo
attacked eneaeey installations near the village of TAT TtMN' Tom:.
All Wes that the date of the operation was lugust 5, 1945.
CoT's report and the citations were in part based on the radio-
great Thera is no doubt that all refer to the same operation.
gee the intelhigeeioe reports discussed.anbow% whim describe
the types of Japanese installations in this area. Taiyuanshih
me *vIden ly one of these.
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The radioed report from the scene expressed it this way: "A rican Q.Q.'s
.fought very well, but are extremely displeased with Col. Chia;
O.C. commander. T think be spoils all." Tt concluded with the statement
that the chief value of all Chinese lay in "ambushes and smell operati, na."e
As a resfnit of the evident failure of the Chinese the coaand and control
of the unit tended, as in the case of APPLE, to fall by default into Am, scan
hands. This is shown by the two citations, both of which state specifically
that the ren cited had led frontal assaults on the Japanese positions and
emphatically that owing to the bravery of one of them "the American and
Chinese troops were inspired to follow him with the result that heavy
casualties were inflicted on the enemy."
It is unfortunate that in the cases of both AMP, and PILMERRY
there is no material available to indicate at they accomplished apart
from these fruitless attacks on Japanese nositinns. It is also unfortunate
to be compelled to judge their accomplishments on the basis of the relatively
brief tire they spent in the
be little questie
however that the attempt to have the Commandos operate in the manner
of regular infantry troops was a failure. In each case were the unit
attempted to attack a fortified position they were repulsed. The fault
lay not with the men, since testimony shows that they conducted themselves
very well. That much speaks well for the training which Cox and his
associates had given them. Part of the trouble was owing to the general
incompetence and lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Chinese officers.
A greater part was the impossible situation of having the Americans present
CI D
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-106-
forbidden to exercise oom nd of any sort. And by
greatest part of the trouble was that the uni
actically for which they were neither
ntical experiences of both APPLE and
the inherent
compelled to do some-
d nor ecoaippad. The
Y, which operated
in different areas and under different circumstances
general plan for the OGs, weaknesses for which OSS cannot
Id responsible.
00 OPE-qATTOt "3LAmmy,"
my - AmusT', 19L5.
In terms of concrete results achieved, OO Operati
of number
was the largest, including as it did, the full complement of three coean
of the information which is available concerning its activities,
any of the
do operations. And yet it presents no features not evident in the
other two unite. This fact is eloquent testimony to the
existence of certain basic problems and weaknesses in the 00 organisation
and in the methods which circumstances and higher
ertere forced upon
During the early part of July the Chinese Combat Viand regi assted
ore to be attached to C O' a
operations in the Vest River valley. The units were
ave eastwards and capture the laanchuk airfield, then held by the
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_107-
Japanese. They
continut to move eastwards and operate ahead
,he advancing Chinese armies engaged in putting into practice the plans
of operation CARBONADO. A provisional battalion headquarters was to be
attached to Chinese Headquarters and under Chinese orders maintain opera-
tional control of the three co an units.I The force consisted of the
8th, 9th, and 10th Commandos,, known respectively by
kde-nerves $PICCT
.AVOCADO, and BANANA. The provisional cowm aando battalion headquarters re
calved the code-name of BLACK T. The total battalion stre
Americans, 25 interpreters, and 500 Chinese. On
18 BLA R was
airlifted to Liiachow. The departure from Chengkung airdrome was hold
up for some tine on account of various avoidable administrative
cul.ties. A series of ccoraantaa on the a
following
a for the serious delays at
operations listed
2
"a. Furies t centrally located
b. Shortage of 2 ton -truce
c. Lack of Go aando Rosters
d. Issuing of a munition Brad equipment in dark
e. Each Commando wt having assigned area
f. Com rwndQs carrying too much heavy ea uipay nt"
The olasnning and execution of ?LACKB eas departure plan was avid
less well-massaged than A?PVs had been. From Lihi
:mans dothe river to Kwei -pingr ai ch they reached on July 23 and
where theRv remained for tx dams. On July 25 they resumed their voyage,
followed by the 255th Regiment of the 89th Chinese Infantry Division,
This regiment was to be the *striking force" of the attack on ' anch-
airfield and. was to receive the support in this endeavor of the 266th
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k OPSO, Weekly operational report, 19 July 1945, and
,o OPSO, weekly operational report, 26 July 1945, in
033 Archives Snnring,
OO,I 3 Operational Report,
A copy of this document will be
05$ Archives - Kurod ng.
OG.OP.S. Operation R?At RRT, Pblder
,O$
Letter, 'Dosce (M or John I. 8+eeblet, NO) to eColoneil (Ooz
dated 7 August 1, in
03$ Archives - funning.
OG.OP.?". ETA Operation. Folder #9..
The foregoing statements are borne out by the , fbl3 ng
dociaents and radiograms;, to be found in the folders indicated.
Conc1usionsw on Tanchuk Operation, undated, in
038 Archives ? Ewming.
00.OP.?. BANANA Operation. Folder .
Radiogram, Cox to APPLE and bL ERIT, 9 August 19)45,
Radiogram, Cos to BLACUIMT (fit), 13 August 1945,
088 ,archives - !un2I ing.
0Q.OP,5. Operation ELACKI$PRi. Foldw ,
Coot to Reppner, 00 Xonthly Report, 31 July 19
088 Archives - Kunming.
OOOP.3 Monthly Report. Folder
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Cox to Hepper, 00 monthly Report, . July 1'
088 Archives - g?
oG.OP.3 -. $onthlir Aepa 1 Voider #3.
Coac to C ding aaneral/Chinese C mbst mod: 10 A 19115,
in
050 Archives ?
oo.9P.1. g Chinese: Co*bat Cctmtrw-d. 14,10-Or
eec to ieppuer, 00) onthi7 Report, '.. Au 1916,
woo jw%;u&vvw tai l1 (Co R -~ 0P190.SIONS.
a" Tab 010 for peps and sketches to serve as 'en annex to
stuc of t operation ""UM'
Cox to Commending General/Reserve Cow and to -endi
in
t 1916
,
General/Chiness aandos, b Augus
OSS Archives ? R aceral,~ 1st parachute Re e~snt,
OG.OP.t4. a andif
#13.
inner. GG Monthly Rsport, 33 August 1916,
ing
i eS g
,,,~..
A&-ch
00.0p.1, - QI1 (Co "3" 'a QPRRIflOMS.
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 Approved For Release 2002/07/396 lA-RDP72-00121 A000100190001-3
or re age fro Liuchc w the TaT
at least
standards o *Ad was
the usual Chinese delays t
Join the 00s in the Tanobuk area
"the refusal of the reginent . coraa an
his was
the divi-
sion arrived. This despite orders from i'[arsharl Tang at Lf4 C '."2 the
Japanese strength at the airfield was from two to three hundred sawn,
d by artillery Pieces,* 2 anti-aircraft s
quzaantit.
in seal tnths ago.'
d had failed, owing to the lack of suppor
d mars. Large stores of sapliee had been brought
On August 6 it was reported that n roes co
The 00s had captured their objectives, buts in the
resistance had had to relinquish th.n.4 During the course of
,, however, the Japanese
opposition.4
on. The nese regiment thereupo
as, was a "corn
Lsturbed by say
265th did not
ks on the
the use re.at,
Tenobuk against
a attespt and the ass alt es suffered
"The 265th Regiment did not norea, and except for a oraadic fire,
they did not contribute any effort to the enc?aunt , notwith-
standing the fact that the re ntal 00mander had been in on
the planning of the attack. The failure of the 265th Regiment
to be cottted, allowed the Jape to turn *11 their attention
to the commandos and a five hour pitched battle took place,
during which the t ommandos were subjected to deadly mid accurate
mortar fire, and mach .ping. When this ammnition gave out,
the Coa ndos were forced to Withdraw to safer ground. They
had suffered casualties to the nwi*r of 22 killed, 31 wounded,
and one interpreting officer killed. some raacle., no
Averican casualties were sustained, even though they had been
in the thick of the fight, Daarin, the night of 3 A st$
the Japs withdrew fro* 'f CRUK and the 265th Regiment moved
into the town and the airfield."
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Japanese
the airfield in an easterly
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-109-
Following this action
RY remained at Tanchuk until the end of the
Z to mission, as defined by
conforms to the pattee already observed in the cases of
d BL1 'I RRT. The chief difference is that the tactical employment
of the unite in direct support of regular military
more important than the guerrilla activittes. The Operation plan, dated
July l5, 1945p spelled out BLAC 'RRYas anion in considerable detail and
attempted to resolve the problem of aho was to exercise cors> end. The
ton was as fol.iowas a
nFirast Battalion Chinese Commandos (Provissional), consisting
of provisional Battalion Headquaarters, eighth, Ninth and
Tenth Coos, will move via air transportation, on 1-19
July 1945, to LIt HOW ..., and will there be placed under
the commanding General., 89th Chinese Divi.ssion, for the purpose
of carrying out such missions as may be within their capabil-
ities. These missions may include:
a. ccnneiasance of the area of operation in advance of the
b.
0.
Leaders and as directed by the Division Oomsander.
Attack and destruction of such enemy garrisons and instal
latious along the route of advance, as may be within the
capabilities of the Commandos, as determined by their
and seizure of such key to or f'eaatass,
of advance,, an may be within the capabilities of the
Compaandos, as determined by their leaders and as ordered by
the Division Comander. Raiding of such points until re.
li.eved by elements of the Division or as directed by the
Division !Ceea:aaaxtr,
d. During coordinated attack of an enemy position by elements
of the Division, to establish such road blocks as may be
directed by the Division Commander for the purpose of
preventing withdrawal of enemy forces or their reenforce-
ment.
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109
tip ians~~~ ! ~ ~l~n APO *. ill be found in A copy t ~'n
15 July
Archives ? d n .
00.0p.. 5. operation WO Folder
The complete personnel rosters, financial, supply and z'e,supply
packagirg (with code markiiags),, communications,, and other admin-
istrative arrangements for SLACK RY will also be found in this
Folder,
120
l eratiorta~. Qroupst BLAC1 R , APO 62
15 July 195, in
038 Archiver. - gtiame ng..
06.OF.J, operation ffi.28-1- Folder
ration Plan,
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.410.
e, Disruption of snowy lines of con unicaation in the WSST
RIVER area, along the route of advance of the Division,
at such times and places as may be directed by the Division
Commander,
Seizure of enemy transportation equipment, land
which would assist the advance of the Division.
Particular attention will be paid. to the intelligence derived
from . the .conduct of these operations. A high priority will be
assigned to the transmission or forwarding of enemy information
to this headquarters,"
another
Additional material bearing on BL.ACICBERRT's mission was included in another
part of the Operation Plant1
1* 3.
MOVSKM M Ak OF OPERATION
L.
h. it is expected that the Battalion will be net at L tEROW
by representatives of Commanding Genera,. 89th Chinese
Division, who will be able to provide information as to
ration procurement# availability of coolie labor,
acceptable currency, etc."
Subject to orders, to be issued by representatives of
Commanding General 89th Chinese Division, at LIU'CFI1 ,
units will be held in readiness to r ve out along
route of advance within, first t my-four hour period
after arrival.
Decision as to employment of subordinate elements of
the Battalion or individual Commandos will rest with
the Battalion Commander or Commando Leaders concerned
as the situation requires.
This 00 mission coat clearly called for guerrilla units to operate
in direct support of regular military operations and under the, close
control of Division commanders. Excluding the missions concerning the
collection of intelligence information, it is at once evident that none
of BLUEBERRY's authorized authorised activities include true guerrilla operations,
For one thing, the units a area of operations was closely confined in every
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case to that lying athwart the Division's route of advance. In other
words, BLACKBERRY was to provide the closest of tactical suppo
ese 89th Division. There was no provision for the type of
harassing a
contemplated by Donovan and his associates. In
addition, all parts of the missions envisage regular infantry assaults
upon, and. defense of, prepared positions, rather than the hit-and-run
type of guerrilla attack, harassment, and destruction. BLACKBE R! was
k and destroy enerW garrisons} to attack, seize, and hold towns
and 'features" i to establish road blocks and defend them against advancing
or witrhdrawing regular enemy units; and to seize and hold enemy transports-
equipment and disrupt enemy lines of communication, Thaw was set
n concrete terms the Y aning of "direct tactical support o:.
advancing armies," which was quite a different resnsibilit
which both Cox and Do iavan had contmplated for the s.
had been directed from the beginning in China that control over the
the Theater Commander, who might delegate it to sub-
ordinate cam ande rs. In this case the commander of the 89th Chinese
Infantry Division had complete control of the unit, although he was com-
pelled, by the terms of this Operation Plan, to consult BLACKBERRY'*
Condo Leader. The directive stated that BLACK RRY was to "be placed
the Commanding Goneral, 89th Chinese Division, for the purpose of
carrying out such missions as may be within their capabilities." The
existence of this "capabilities" clause gives rise to an interesting
who. was to determine the capabilities? Tn two of the paragraphs
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which define the miset es in detail the following answers were provideds
"b. Attack and destruction of such eneiq garrisons and
lations, along the route of ad i e, as
capabilities of the Commandos, as determined '
Leaders and as directed by the Division Coxa sander.
c. Attack and seizure of such key to or features
Corerandoa,, as determined by their Leaders and as ordered b
the Division Commander."
_. route of advances, as maybe within the capabilities
a remaining paragraphs it was simply stated either that
ordered by the Divi
through the use of unusual powers of persuasion, be able to
The directive therefore provides on legal
job when
some possibility of the Commando Leader's being able to influence the
conduct of the operations of his unit. He was to determine caapabilit:
On practical grounds, however, this possibility seems rather remte.
BLACKBERRY was, after all, specifically pieced under the
an + rider to modify a ssion on the ground
accomplishment was not uLthin, the C' do''as c abilities. But
Division Corr=der nevertheless persisted in his decision there was, on
practical grounds, no option for the Cora endo Leader but to obey. In sun,
despite the existence of such q'.
no d,
Commander.
es as these, there can be
Cora ando was completely at the disposal of the Division
this case it rested completely
tiry organisation.
The point to
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g General of the 89th Division. It is possible that the Co sndD
b or that they were to do a
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413-w
there was a vast difference in this case between
what was "legally" possible and what was "practically" possible.
It is therefore clear that in term of mission and function the
ration bore no resemblance other than the most superficial
ila operation of the
ype originally
Some idea can be gained of conditions in the operational area
several intelligence reports drafted dsri the period from
BLA . T' a departure from Liuchow and
eneaa tea in the field.2
A venture into the West River
red. AV AD Oees team encountered no enemy units, since they were
either in the process of withdrawing eastwards or southwards or also were
installed in fortified village and hill positions. At Shilur , on July 23,
for instance, the toaadt hoard automatic rifle
Lion turned out to be the result of the atrug1
political
factions for vosseaaaion of the town. One of these factions was "opposed
to Central Oove:r ssamnt..e No Japanese were involved.
the tee interviewed a local b
been no Japanese in the area since the ddle of June, but that e
of regular Chinese units had passed through. From the same source they
heard a report that Jape se strength at Tanchuk was in the neighborhood
At Kweiping they interviewed the commander of the local defense
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213
The intelligence, available to BLACKBZRF ' before its departure
.
from Nursing did not differ materially fro* that supplied to
AM'P'LE. Bee, therefore, 'the appropriate part of the section
devoted to the activities of APPIL.
Then prat-departure intelligence reports for BLACKBMW All
be' four. in turning,
O&ST Archives -
OG.OP.5?. - Operation BLACI RRt. Folder fl.
mad in
O$S Archives - King.
00.bPeC - 8LACKBMY, etas, Polder #I.
following reportes
Report . from AV ADO intelligence t., dated 26 J'uly 1945, and
covering the period 23 - 25 July l945i
Report from AVON intelligence tease, dated 8 August 194,5;1 and
covering the period 25 July - 4 Asst 19451
Report from BANANAA, ' dated 7 July 19115 , aio. 7 August Is t ende ,,
and acivoring the period 26 July - 5 Asst 1945.
Copies of these reports will all be found in
Os8 Archives -? Ruasing.
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder ilk'.
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?l14'
tin. He informed them that the enemy had left Kt tpi.ng during the
third week in June and that Japanese strength at Tanchuk was in the neigh-
borhood of 1 Off?, euntorted by mortars and i.f ht and heavy machine guns. The
Tanchuk Japanese were said to be &.n "radio and steamboat co -: caationaa&
with their fellows down-river at Wuchow.
'Chinese Special Troops," o turned out to be U.
Navy-trained guerrillas.
From these and other sources tnfb r ti on was gat be red to indicate that
ene was preparing to evacuate Tanchuk, since on July 25 "at 0130 hours
more than eight (8) large boats left TANUE ? filled with equipment and
Jap soldiers. More boats are being prepared to move at the wharf in
TAAC . " 13~r July 2T the group had mved to the Tanchuk neighborhood,
where "the special Troop comaaander of this area was greatly pleased at
visiting his front lines and staged an attack on the village of WIILTNO
for my benefit." The attack was, ominous portent, repulsed. However,
the enemy evacuated Mehling shortly thereafter. ` enchu'k itself was found
to be under attack and harassment by an undetermined number of local
guerrillas. The nnrpose of these citations has been to show that the pre.
operational intelligence reports were substantially correct in their view
of the situation: the Japanese clinging to fortified positions and their
lines of coz unicaation; the open countryside under the control of uhatever
had been able to impose its will on the i abita nts; and the
fact that these local powers might or might not be particularly
the central Chinese government. Such was, the situation into Bch were
thrust the Chinese commandos.
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The `anchuk airfield operation was
one in which B AC RRY
participated before the end of the war. It is poeeit
rather fully, since three accounts and several field sketch maps have
been preserved. These include one report written by an officer in battalion
headquarters, which is usef;z. for gaining a general picture of the operation,,
two reports written by an American officer with the 8th Co ndo (A1. Ct r),
n by the 5arl A ericar Officer of the 10th Co aanciar (9k I' ,).
These are particularly valuable, because their authors all participated in
cording to the battalion report, the Chinese 265th Regiment, which
n assault on Tanchuk, left tiuchow ti
m the city, By the tip Fir -nam was reached,
however, the coa,*ndo was five days ahead of the regiment,, "despite orders
from CCC and Marshal fang of the 13 h Amy to the Co
sting him not to delay anywhere enroute." After further delay, again
attributed to the sloth of the Chinese cozen ander of the 265th, both
units assembled in the Tanchuk neighborhood.
The Tanchuk position was as follows .2 The air
?ia north of the West River, while Tanchuk village was on the ri
bank. About 500 yards east of the airfield was the village of To-Chung,
which served as a Japanese headquarters, To-chug nestled at the foot of
a ridge which ran generally in a north-south direction and which had several
h peaks. The village of Met-Lin lay at the root of the ridge a?
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Repot by APRICOT: an Tanahuk Operation, dated 7 August 1945;
Report by APRICOT on Tancheek Operation, datod 8 August 1945;
Report by ARARA on T*nehuk Operation, no date, signed Captain
George Ounderman, Jr., Senior American Officer;
Report by RLLC1 RRY on Tanchuk Operation, 10 August 1945.
These will all be found in
058 Archives - Kunming.
o4.OP.7. BANANA Operation. .Folder #9.
It will be recalled that "BLACKBRRr was the code-ems given
to the operation as a whole and that it also was the code-are e
given to the battalion headquarters. The battalion consisted
of the 8th, 9th, and 10th Contandosa whose code-sees were,
respectively, APRICOT,, AVOCADO, BABABl.
same folder for a complete list of American officers
sted son engaged in Operation ST A a.
Since the radiograms from the field do prat present any features
different from the written accounts of BL,AC RM e s part in
the Tanohuk operation,, they will not be included here. See the
following folders, horeve rs for copies of therm
088 Archives - Kunning.
MOM. ? Operation .CKZflRT.
and
chives ? frig.
Reg. OP.3. Proiectee 348108, Operational
149b.
. See Tab #B.ee.,s I for the sketch situation
this passage Is A copy of this map will be found in
065 Archives - Kunming.
OQ.OP.7. BANAMA Operation. Folder
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do north of To-Chung. At the southern end (and h
ridge were located one set o
and east. This ridge was known as 'Hill #5. Ab
000 yards east of
eneaey works on Hill 5 was another and more precipitous ri
had several peaks. The highest of these was approximately i
of the ridge and contained another and more formidable set 0
The enemy defenses were arranged so as to provide a field of fire in any
direction. This ridge also ran gem
and was known a
ill A, BLACKBERRY
on the extreme northerly slopes of Hill 4 during the action,
yards to the north of Bill , and not connected
AP TCOP occupied from July 28 to July 30 and
spectively. These Japanese positions
ugh terrain, partly to the fortification,
pill boxes, machine gun and mortar emplacements, and
and partly to the support which the enemy was able to give vith his 41m r
mortars and other light artillery pieces. Sore of these were located in
To-chin and. others on the hills themselves. Capture and retention of both
Hills 14 and # was essential to capture and control of the airfield.
After the arrival of the 265th and BLACKBERRY in the Teach* area the
Senior kaerican Officer of the undo battalion suggested that the 26th
the actual attacking
"be placed d unstre in an
of the airfield and that the ro an
Japs." The Chinese
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-117-
ad to agree to this plan,, which, incidentally, was far more
.sal concept of what the cox andos were
supposed to do than what was actually done. Since, however, the Chinese
colonel of the 265th would have nothing to with i RRMS plan, the
Americans could do nothing rther. This was the result of Theater
directives concerning Chinese - American relations in combat waits. Accord-
the following plan was adopted..I
shortly after midnight and contini
a, BIAMMRRZ's. This and the eucceeMng otation are
}n from the report by the battalion offs cerjmai.n attack
gaanchuk. At (300 PM the 8th Cos wando was to open its attack
on a high bill which had a strongly entrenched pill-box with
other gun a acenents. At the same time a barrage of
and 83 rt-ar fire was to be laid dos on two s ll er hills
which overlooked and surrounded the stall village containing
the Jap CP and their 70mm gm positions and an Rl mortar
position. Won that fire was lifted,, the 10th Co ndD, which
meanwhile was. to have crept up to the base of the two aaall
hills;, was to attack the bill and ire a yellow flare,. indicating
to the regiment that the line was taken by us and they would
send a battalion to take the stall town containing the Jaap CP.
The airport would than have been sure. This plan was accepted
and agreed upon by the 0 of the 26!;th and us,
Meanwhile# the 9th Commando less 2 sections, held back as reserve
for the main retail,, was to be on the river for an ambush against
any Japs es pinyg in boats.'
attack on the southwest end of the airstrip near the villa
was launched, the regiment was to create a sz ll. diversio
The dispatch of the 9th o cndo {A M. } for ambush preparations on the
river shows that at least part of the American officer's plan was adopted.
On the otter handy AP IC ` and BA A were given the uncongenial task of
reducing Hills 4 and / respectively, while the 26th was to create diversion
and to secure the airstrip once the vital hill positions bad been captured.
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117
1. The state rent 06too in in error and should read *600 AN,"
messing the moruing of Aug st 3.
The ?i mortare mentioned in the text oar s orting the core
mauddeas were not part of their table of equi ent, but belonged
to the wse. The only mortars ioh the om-*ndoa used were
the ones.
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'is scheme went awry, however, in that the Chinese gave no support.
and that the Americana In one case were unable to capture their objective
and in the other to hold it. Furthermore,, the 9th Co ando becaaae involved
in an unfortunate Incident on the river. In one sense the operation did
succeed,,, however, since the Chinese and Americans did ultimately get control
of the airport and village. The Japanese voluntarily evacuated Tanchuk during
the night of Au, st 3 - I. The brief account of these events followas
"The attack of the 8th and 10th Coe ndoa went off as planned
and the 10th Commando fired the yellow flare and kept the line
waiting for the 3n of the regiment to follow through on its
part of the agreed plan and take the ton. No activity was
noticed at all on the part of the regiment save a few shots at
the far other end of the field., instead of a. battalion to take
the town only a small party was sent and they were repulsed by
the Daps. After holding the two =all bills for about 6 hours
under murderous mortar fires! 70a fire,, 57 fire and snipers fire
and never receiving the expected and promised help from the
regiment, they were forced to withdraw because of high casualties
and a complete expending of all their ammunition. The 8th: CCo ando
ran into much heavier opposition than was expected and about Is
o'clock in the afternoon were given order to withdraw, for the awe
reasons as the 10th.
The 9th Conmaesndo at about 6:00 sighted 6 sampans floating down
the river toward their ambush. Mhan the boats were within range
of the =bush the Chinese CC gave orders to open fire on the boats.
When the ambush was over, it was discovered that the boats con-
tained Chinese civilians who had been carrying salt for the Jape
at Tanchuk and other dap points down the river. ?irat aid was
given the wounded by the Americans,
At about :2C the American CO requested permission ..* to with-
draw the Commando back to the base.
ht Jap sniper fire kept up on our positions on the high
ground and then about midnight stopped. The next morning observed Chinese of the regiment walking all over the hills we
had fought on and taken the deny previous. The renumts of the
Daps had withdrawn during the night after the attack in very
much of a hurry via the river and overland south of the Vast
River. "'
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The two APRICOT reports give a more detaileed account of the assaults
in rich that unit was engaged. The August 7 report speaks of the assault
on Hill ! as "the high point of Apricot's part in the operation." This
divided roughly into four phases, all on August 3, 1945t
to 0700, the approach # from 0700 to 0800, the assault attempt; from 0800
to 1500
o reduce eneny emplacements with z tar and bazooka
fire"; from 1500 to 1530, the withdrawal. The August 8 report goes into
1. AICtT'ar first objective was a ridge
on the approaches
Japanese positions on Hill #4. 1 This ridge was to be reached by dawn.
that point the attack on enemy positions at Z was to be launched with
support from 81= mortar on Hill 3 and from our own mortars and ligh
guns." Coincident with this assault, "a diversionary, attack against poss.
south slope at dawn." The 'First Branch
(Rifle) "provided security at eastern base of Rill h and provided squad
for the diversionary attack." Branches Twos Three (both Rifle), Four
(Mortar), and Five (TM) made up the force a
o the rain attack.
and Five were to support Two and Three. Branch Six (liti
was broken up into ammo bearing details." Coolies were to help with uni-
Lion bearing and general? resupply.
"lack of intellige
terrain and ene'r positions," no specific plans had been
decision to attack position Z from li
The approach to the jump-off pain
on the peak
of Hill #4 (position Z) was delayed by overcast weather and confusing
terrain. From this point the weaknesses in the command structure
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go* Tab *Z. f.,5 item II. This is the sketch > at Kill #l
on which this account based, The letters (Via,,* line IF*
etc.) .11 refer to this, sketch map. *A m III shows in more
detail the Japanese positions on Hi U ft,
1. The point 4 in blue is meant hero,
The point 0 in red reform to the second Japanese counter-attack.
The stteapt was certainly made to recognize this ails efforts?
since he was recommended for a battlefield commission, This
was denied his by higher headquarters,
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definition of what must be the relattonasbtp between Atr sricane and
Chinese ,nntnated the proceedings. Once position EF had been reached,
a delay occasioned by the Chinese reluctance to proceed. At
about 0630 the diversionary attack was la ached from the point G. The
squad came under Japanese fire when about 100 yards from position Z.
Thereupon ensued a remarkable incident. The American non-co atesioned
officer assigned to that squad was unable to -get the Chinese aqd. ldr.
to rave forward and attempted lead an assault on his own. But the squad
did not fallow him." This American thereupon aide sn ird vidual rush at
the Japanese position Z and came within 25 yards of It. Although this
0
attack accomplished little
Japanese fire (which it was intended to do), At this point ti> main attack
have seized the Japanese position on, the sumi
ailed in a masterpiece of under-statement wheel, he said
of the one-gran diversionary attack, that the Anarican's *efforts are
worthy of recognition"
these events were
t did have the result of drawing
their difficulties. When the diversionary attack opened t
commando mortars and machine guns opened fire on position
most of their anao firing blindly in the direction of Z befo
ted
Aneri?
cans could got them on the proper target." This was not easy* because
nod the crest of the hill was covered by a cloud bank and
ervation was poor." The two branches maneuvered back and f
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a time between positions E Ps CD, and A18, some of the movements being
out the knowledge of the Americans. Meanwhile the cloud bank
lifted. The enemy "with its excellent fields of :fire pinne
7d and 3d branches to the ground," Soon thereafter the Jap +aese made a
counter-attack at point , which failed to dislodge the corgi
which inflicted casualties on them. Japanese snipers also took tit
toll and s ~.cceedod in disrupting
accuracy of the commanadDs' a artar
and bazooka fire. This stalemate endured until mid-afternoon, at which
time, owing to a second Japanese counter-attack th time against point
r3, and to the withdrawal of BANANA from its positit on Hill #5
drawal was ordered. The enemy was left in possession of his position
The 10th Co ando (B, t eALA) received the mission of taki
1
in order to support the 26th Regiment a s assault on To-chung?
of this goal BANANA attacked the hill and had rapt red it
off in the process an estimated squad of Japanese soldiers. T
of the ti.m up to 1100 was spent in m changing fire with the an
9
n pursuit
, driving
latter returned BA `ANNA' a fire "and proceeded to lay, an 81 barrage on
our positions which was very effective and produced casualties," At
? 0 the Chinese unit (of the 26th), after neither giving nor receiving
much fire, began to withdraw. This withdrawal put BRA-'iii in a moat unco
fortable position,,, since 'both sniping &. artillery fire was being directed
at our rear and left fla.a' A good deal of this hostile fire was coatis
from the ener positions on Hill #ls, which APRICOT had been unable to
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See Tab Its, for a sketch map showing the area
general and the moaem is of the 10th Co' ndo (BANANA) in
Particular. Note ' that on this map tat Hill is mistakenly
labeled "Kill #Ox and that Hill #2 (or 13) is mistakenly
labeled *Hill A.* Us Items 1 - lIr for the enact version.
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Lnate. By noon the Chinese supporting unit had retreated to Net-tin
which action completely exposed BANANA a s
enemy to concentrate his entire volume of fire on our positions." With-
drawal was finally authorised and, after a 'Benzaat* attack b
Japanese had been repulsed with heavy casualties the attack
successfully completed 1a
As has been already stated, the Japanese voluntarily withdrew from
Tanohuk during the night, leavir both village and airfield in possession
of the 26th and BLA T. In. the sense of. results achieved, the opera-
tion was thus a success. However, the enemy had repulsed the Allied effort
to dislodge him by force, From the
attar,, therefore, the operation was a failure, This
even assuming that the Japanese withdrew because they feared that heavier
attacks would fallow;, This is only an assumptions however, since there is
no evidence available to prove it and s# the general Japanese policy
beginning early in 1945 had been to withdraw their forces gradually but
steadily towards Canton.
The Japanese hold their position on Hi
at between fifteen and thirty men. They
squad. The remainder of the total.
N with a sail force estimated
h an estimated
ted available Japanese strength
of three hundred at Tanchuk was in Taanchuk village, To?chung village,
and on the airfield, The A u 3P force allotted to the main attack on
Hill #4 comprised Branches Two and Three,. with a total strength of 6%
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supported by Branches Your and Fiv?a, with a total strength of Ia.- Thus,
if the four branches we lumped together, the attackers outnumbered the
defenders by between three and one-half and a bit more than seven to one,
depending upon the number of Japanese actually on the hill. If only the
fin assault force (Branches Two and Three) are considered, the ratio in
favor of the attackers was between a little more then tuo and a little less
than five to one. The First Branch, which had the responsibility for mount-
ing the diversionary attack, had at least a strength equal to that of the
defenders and at most an advantage of more than two to one. The ratio of
attackers to defenders on Hill # was equally favorable to the attackers.
The total strength of BLACkI:.R c?! Chinese, 60 Aericsns, and 2
Interpreters. And yet the operation failed. Despite the ene advantage
of hol dig. ng he ight s behind .fear ti fi cations it is difficult not to agree with
the statement of APRIC 's reporter in his August 8 report that *a bayonet
and grenade assault by thee 2d Branch under covering fire of the other branches
would have carried the hill with possibly medium casualties."
Various valid reasons were advanced for the failure. BANANA blamed
the supporting unit of the 26th Regiment, which withdrew and left the
co.wmndo wmyosed to unrestricted ens ;W fire, and the rest of the Regiment,
which failed completely to perform Its part in the operation. Both APRICOT
and BANANA attributed the failure to the conduct of the Chinese officers
in corn of their units and to the weaknesses in B C RRY battalion
headquarters. APRICOT' a reporter recommended in his August 8 report that
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123
See- Tab 'B" for the Commandasw Table of ,Organisation.. The
actual strength varied little from, the T/O strength. Toe
figures given In the text include Chinese# Americans, and
interpreters.
This tijpre includes AVOCADO# which did not take part in the
main attack. In addition, of course# there was the Mines.
265th - eRiUMt.
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Lneae coax rider be replaced and castigated his in these termst
The conduct of the Chinese C.Qo during the fight was
graceful. At no time would he saga out of his covered
sition to coordinate and direct the maneuvers of the two
Is branches. He never personally observed the forward
of his troops or .race any awe forward to do so.
In my opinion he was dared with fright and must be replaced
ere in the same document the reporting officer stated that there
for the failure,
3.
Poor resupply; 4.
Senior
in his
coaasn
2. Lack of coordination;
er," B ANA's
used towards the Chinese officers
the exception of the conirtander. Concerning the battalion
he reportede
"it is the opinion of this Officer that throughout the recent
action, the Bu co and was extremely weak and lacked aggres-
siveness. Too much indecision was evident where a quickly,
calculated decision at the propitious time would have had
more desirable effects and would have moat certainly assured
the annihilation of the Japanese ibroes."
"The failure of Chinese Officers to recognise iineent sits.
tons loses valuable time. Many occasions in the past few
weeks have proven the Chinese Officers unwilling to cooperate
to the point of uncalled for obstinacy."
There is no question but that the Theater Directives concerning the question
of coaand and the relstionaatp between americans and Chinese personnel
had created a situation wherein the conduct of the Chinese officers was
of paramount importance. There is a remarkable consist
at act of those Americans who served with 0PI . B P'
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r T. They all called attention to the unsatisfactory performance
of the Chinese condo officers*
such circumstances the burden of
command fell by default upon the shoulders of the i ricane assigned to the
tur of the reports of the Tanchuk action reveals that in most
the orders to advance, deploy, or retreat were given by the Americans.
This is particularly true in the case of A ICOTts diversionary attack.
Support for these statements is to be found in the citations fbr distinguished
performance by the A ricans. The recowrendations invariably erphasized
generally took the
on led thei
ive in action.I
ted fire' and
A third major reason for the failure of the operation was the generally
good use which the Japanese
.i erican Officer did not speak of them.
MINA' a Senior
reports A.P IC
reporting, officer spoke of Japanese tactics and bows they affected the
ie. in his August 7 report he states that the Japanese fortifications
re disappointingly fra :le# but praises the enernra s tactics$
"They pinned Apricot don with automatic weapons or sniper
fire from crest of hill.,. They infiltrated snipers around
Apricot's left flank, clear dozen to lower reaches of mountain,
and succeeded in pinning dog let Branch minus one squad at
back of hill. At same time snipers hold 'd. and 3d branches
static in their positions, precluding maneuver. counter-
attacks ... led by Nambu lights making lots of noise also
i bilised our force. Action of the Jap snipers, operating
individually was superior. The Jape amipere operating over the
mountain to our left and in the rear was extremely deceptive
and effective. We should have sent our counter snipers - also
operating an individuals, This would have allowed us to
maneuver.
His light counter attacks around Apricot's left flank were noisy.
Again their tactics were good, as it kept Apricot worried."
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See the Willa ng fbiders for the" citatif)
OS& Archives -, 1uuemi s..
OG.OP.7. BANANA Operation. Folder !.
OSS Archives - Euaing.
OG.OP.?. ? citations. Folder 02
o88 Archives lCvrAdng
Oo.Op.bs ? Promotions aM C.ttetiora$. Pol t
It should be remembered that BANANA pined its objective *
little difficulty.
1. "Conclusions" on the Tmchuk operations =&"d*
08$ Archives - tus arcing.
G.OP.7. UNA Operation. ?alder
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August 8 report he says t
"Five snipers (estimate) infiltrating behind Apricot forced
tvo, branches into bowl below ZF and discouraged - maneuver. Also
harried let Branch at base of hill pinnixg it dots.
he Jap use of individual snipers using their ova Initiative
waa clever.
The Jap proved resourceful as an ndivtdual and as a unit."
Clearly, Japanese skill combined * ith the inertia of AP ICOT t s Chinese
officers played an important part in the failure to take Hill e.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the conduct and quality of the
Chinese soldier. It has already been noted in the cases of APPLE and
that there is little information on this subject beyond general
to case likewise most attention was directed towards
the soldiers conducted themselves well or that they fought
the Chinese officers. However# the reports on the Tanchuk operation do
provide a few clues and permit the drawi
not too surprising con.
clusion that the Chinese soldiers for the most part behaved
ratio to the way in which their Chinese officers behaved.
the usual statement that "high praise must be
vex: to the Individual Chinese soldier who fought gallan'
While this may be true in general it is certainly not true in
all crises, since the comments of APRICOT's and HANA#s reporting officers
differ radar
headquat'te
e only in their unfavorable rents about battalion
oh contained very few Chinese
PICOT r a A ugu
8 report, in speaking of the approach novemen
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"Upon reaching initial objective 2d Branch thought that they
had reached the crest and that the positions Were unoccupied.
Immediately the Chinese began to rejoice and it took soar time
to convince them that the dep positions were beyond this point."
ionax ' attack on ,Hill #4 was carried out si te-handedly by an
because the squad refer:
o follow him. At the same time "the
tartars and machine guns went into position and, opened fire. They wasted
m
st of their a s.o firing blindly in the direction of Z before the ihneri.-
cans could met them on the proper target." The bazooka and mortar fire
from ArRTM ' during the stalemate around Hill # before the unit's wtth-
e "very, inaccurate due to accurate sn
ow the Jap positions.
The pill box was still in good condition at 1200."
On the other hands, RANA apparently c n ted itself in an eXe 1e '
canner, for their Arioan officer corimented as followst
"The 10th commando had trot aggressive assault spirit. They
deployed we3ll and held excellent fire discipline throughout
the entire action. A cool, well, aimed deliberate fire accounted
for many Japanese casualties. Excellent marksmanship was dis-
played by the BAR crews and LAS crews. The preparatory mortar
fire was excellent. Prior to the launching of the attack, it
was delivered at a range of 1500 yards and needed very little
adjustment, The American Senior Officer expresses the utmost
admiration for the Chinese personal of the 10th Commando and
the Chinese officers."
The evidence has made it clear that BMWs porfor
general superior to that of APRICOT. Not only did it take and hold its
objective until forced oft` by a combination of withering Japanese fire
and the failure of APRICOT and the Chinese supporting unit from the 265th
Regiment,, but also the comments of its Senior A ri.can Officer are far
favorable than are those of APRICOT's reporting officer.
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thus an uneven quality in the rfori
the tactical failure of the operation. Another reason for
lps to explain
huk is therefore that .APRICOT'a men,, probably owing the inferior
quality of their Chinese officers, proved, on the whole, wanting
had. been described as the requisite coerrrerdo qualities of initiative,
iveness. That PAUAJA's personnel apparently Possessed these
qualities in greater a re was insufficient to co ?ensate for P ICOTOm
shcrteo .inr;s.
Finally, it must be reared that the co dos were not desied
ed an rea .ar assault troops. In particular they did
cessary effectively to carry- out attacks on prepared osi.-
such as those of 8anchuk. When their support failed to materialise,
as it did at Tanch , they were exposed to mot unpleasant consequences,
Such were some of the results of the Theater cl.ic, governing the organise-
tion,, use, and control of the OSS Operational Groups units.
AND CONCLUSION
The Operational Group effort during World War
extent in Europe, was influenced by three
The first was what role should gmrrills warfare play in the Allied
effort against the Axis? This question was never "ally answered In a
r. Two schools of thought put fortis their ideas on the
subject. The first school, identified with Donova., Car, and their seso_
rri]le warfare should be waged and should be essentially
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in nature. Their basic promise was that
where he was the most vulnerable
ability to defeat the enemy in battle Allied
guea
by their very nature, could not without support hops to meet
the enemy troops on equal ter was they should concentrate on hit-an
attacks. These advocates felt that the cumulati offset of guerrilla
activity could be tremendous, in that it mould diminish the one
capabilities by attacking and destroying them and by compelling
him to divert raga and acre troops to the task of protecting them. In
a warfare represented the Allied capability of in
eraey pending an increase in their taut regular
power. Such a situation pertained in Eux pe prior to the IM invasions.
In China? the Chinese armies remained in being,
completely
incapable of inflicting decisive defeats on the Japanese invaders. This
school of thought therefore considered the situation as ideal for laarx
scale guerrilla warfare operations. They felt that to be
or the strategic point of view t
a should be centrally
controlled from highest headquarters in Washington and relatively free
from local control by the Theater Commanders, Thus, they would devote
themselves exclusively to strategic objectives as indicated.
The second school of thought felt that under no circumstances should
any military units, including guerrilla unite, operate in a Theater of era;
without being controlled by the Theater
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of co d sprint i,ple. thex x , as s by 00 activities
both in Europe and in China, this school of the ht Undid to consider
arfare as an activity which test be directly co-ordinated '~Ath
military operations. In other wards, they considered-it to
ctical in nature than did their opponents. It must tied very
regular military units.
in :th ry the hi It heeade .r
to t of guerrilla uni
never really settled and no clan
1 *117 in China, the OOs were
or the co lete control of th
d guerrilla
d then as advance regular infantry t
Their efficiency wa,
The second basic question was: shall the
g personnel
a question essentially of
d forces?
and foreign relations and
with along those lines. The bate decision was
participation to what was called the
bulk of the guerrillas to co from
the unit was to operate. It has
anal nuol.et 0"
as in the territory in ich
been ,teal that in
wee not too succeessf*ilj since the natives tented
in terms of poet-war politics an in terms of the varti military problems.
in China this policy led to the organization of the co r from among
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personnel# with the Americans limited to the role of advisers is
n combat operations. It cannot be considered
idea worked in practice.
The third basic question is related to the second one and like it
was a diplomatic rather
military or organizational matter. This wa
should the A ri.can "operational nuclei" exorcise command, or should the
indigenous elements in the units do so? It was finally decided in China
that, owing to Chinese sensitivity in the matter of sovereignty, command
would rest with the Chinese. They were to follow American advice, The
decision was unfortunate, strace instead of settling the
problem of command and control it merely complicated it. The Chinese
of American superiority in techniques and of the necessity to
o American advice, yet were usually unwilling to allow either
this superiority or this advice to influence their conduct o
operat;
Thus? of these three basic questions, the firs
tent problem
ntal philosophy or doctrine? while the last two represent one of
y kind. Rio
fields they refused to allow them to command guerrilla units. But at the
nature of this decision may be explained by remembering that the very idea
a warfare was not one which had gained
universal acceptance in higher or lower military circles.
ulties to be faced in w
as the highest beadctr
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eerning the
three basic questions,
hasees of 00 affairs. In the :tatter
d an unfortuna
d under a t rendous disadvantage, in that they
adequate n= rbers of ten or in the ratter of supplying man of the necessary
qualifications for 00 to rk# the'
nese promises cowsrni personnel pmcuremr t. When the minas
to bombard both Chinese and American headquarters
which grew
more desperate and pleea n as tip went on. Faced with a `haatar order
my corn andos ready for the .field by An gust 1 086 had to postpone
and charge training schedules a n ber of tinaz and had to a
sonnet who did not et r&n# 00 standards. Neither Chinese -war a
headquarters rave the project any
tactical infantry tasks .sq
being cowl; ed to operate as infant
ions,
The missions given the 04s, as has been mated, were actually chiefly
nothing for the ,ricans to
organization and w-mament, were
matter.
Despite their
tacking fixed pa
d accordingly.
art was either totally lacakir,, as in the cees of APPLE
units,
nothing the Americans could da aba
r oos tnents wither in the matter of auppl n
1upposed t
n the case of BU ".
Otis were compelled, totally unaided, to attack a etaa,barn
dl enemy. These attacks failed.
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The most dual failure was the twin attempt to combine for field
operations the use of American advisers with Chinese commanders and per-
tel. and to solve the language problem by the use of int eerpreters. The
ng excerpt from a letter to ax from one of the Americans in the
nstrates this point clearly, in the absence of authority there
Such understanding was totally lacking...
of view of language and from that of good relations
nese officers were usually t
cooperate;
the Americans were always forbidden to oorvAnd. Consequently
erloaaas diminished,
'Howaev.rs there are many thin s to be corrected. ... V.
relations of the first part of the boat trip
. KBMf a e trip by sampan from Lit; chow to ttae Taanoht
were changed when the Americans started talking in terms of ethese
Chinese',, ate. They understand that stuff Uk. we do
'Ding How#, only in the opposite sense. Then what was a comfortable
ride for the nese was so much more ainese
country for the Americans, Then a search among Chinese troops
individually to recover lost American property didalt help.
The val of the Chennault attitude cant be overemphasized. it
was suggested that there be fever Americans in csmbat. Here
very serious incidents occurred through: misunderstandings, avoid-
able by intimacy & friendship between Chinese officers & ny
by straightening out about who's to take commands from whom. The
Americans can't coed directly on the field - 1. Chinese officers
already have their orders. 2. The circuit American - interpreter -
Chinese officer interpreter - American is too easily broken In
combat. . The Ch. officers threaten to shoot the soldier who
follows the American rather than hi elf. My impression was that
the whole thing should be made clear before action & then cut the
a. This means that the Ch. officers have to be made
certain of, before they would take off completely on their
own. Again - the matter of th. & Am. not knowing each other.
Contrary to this is the isolated story a Chinese officer having
complete,%& lasting confidence in the American, but this is excep-
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Letter, w a $ r John Bt Hfeeh1ot,,, )
dated T August 19, 5, In
Archives - Kunming.
~e
00.0P.7;, 1*W A Operation. 7otdw # .
The foregoing etatereante borne out by the U
d*awu ets and radiogram,, to be found in the folders Indicated.
'CondIu o if on Tmchuk 'Operation, ui dated,, in
Archives - Xing.
OO.OP#?s SA ANA Operatio*# !bider #9.
Radiograms, Cox to APPS,R a ILZ R i,, 9 Avast 1945j
Radiogrn, Ccx to DL RR (REAR), 3,3 Avast IA5a in
085 Archives - Kung., r,
0G.0P.5o Operation ~ T. roIder .
AMcoT on Tanchu Operation, dated D mgt 1915, in
.7. ARA Operation.
an Tmn* k Operatio s
058 Archives - T to
.7. BAN"A Operation. bid.
Cox to APPs BLt
O51 wear - iuISInd?:
OO.0P. S,k Operation
DL
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Above,,
press for aove form of reoranis;
to of affairs
responsibility." FatlLa this lie =could "fir it American personnel
use the OSe according to v at was ostensibly their o
author of the August 8 APRICOT report on the Tenchuk operation re(
that the nu ;bc r of American and interpreter personnel be reduced "to two
veers onc?_ h EN, 2 interpreters."1 HARTAHA a Senior A rican Officer con-
sidered in his report that the ideal solution would be to re +ve all the
Chinese OS officers and replace then with Americans who would, "assume full
too *..
Chinese Officers to exert full co r d responsibility for
all actions."2 And Cox wrote what might well be considered a fitting epitaph
for the entire C project in China.
ndicated.
ON R IATTONS OF CHIN967 AND A3 ICANS PD TOTT M93T W? 1''!AT
SAPS MY) 7V AWE DAAS OUCH PD R CO W YOU 00 NOT ATTACK FORTI','M,
H'RAV`LY CMA COOPERATION OF CHH14 OFFICERS D
PH R 3ULTS THUS FAR t1 TAMED I ICATE C1TI! E
POSITIONS UNLESS YOU HAVE COMPLE S' P E OR 3 TO 1 tJ
PJ} CANCENTRATE ON PAT LS C 14A F Y (MUMS CMA SUPPLY L
FITC PS" 3
As it was the Chinese Combat Co and (CCU) and the Chinese thensely
ad the type of zdesion in which the OSs w
tions, it. is rather ironic that at the very end of the war they should have
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x
.hat the co operated best as guerrilla bands and that they
should concentrate on true guerrilla targets.
n i'dkt results that bought.
noes we
The pri is pal emphasis in this aeries of papers has been on the 01
in China. The 035 put a tremendous aseount of devotion and
effort into the project, but did not succeed in its ai as The Japanese
were not hampered particularly from either a strategic or a tactical point
of view. 00 attacks on Japanese positions failed. 00 attacks did not
disturb in any particular wad a Japanese withdrawal vh chi was being carried
out according to plan.
ust judge the results of the effort must do so only after
consideration the situation in China and the answers to the
three basic questions dtecuseed at the beginning of this section. The
OGs appeared on the scene late in ?~e war, too late,
and decisive effect on ter course of operations or, as has been indicated,
th act-ow.," shnent the Japanese of their withdrawals to the
east and north, T*t the OOs did appear so late s not their fault, since
higher adquarters la d for so long
on to employ them. The
fail a to answer the first of the three basic < ueattons causedthe OGs to
have to operate under a vast handicap, The unrealistic answers givm to
t?,ao basic questions made it impossible for the commandos to perform
efficiently under arm situation hatsoever. Basic al 1, , therefore
was given a large responsibility, but waz denied the freedom and authority
necessary to fulfil that responsibility and was saddled with unrealistic
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36-
restrictions on the activities of its ( u
of modern rfasre, with its combination of regular
and guerrilla operations
difficult art, and while it is true that
the waging of warfare by, coalition presents nany complex probleea s
planners ignored, either partially or completely, the
realities and tended to give half-answers to very important ' estionse
it in regrettable that the industry
the training camps, and his ran ii
utilized. it is indeed doubly ,#brtu
in cause.
old ayhoul8 not have been better
that none of then were killed in
3LiOAPCAL NOTE
The study of the OSS rratio
pa activities
World War ii is easy In some respects and hard in others.
readily available in abundance on some topics
'ce and incomplete. It is difficult for the pu
to classify this material fro
point., since the contents of the
sly correspond exact
at
with their titles. For example,* attho
folder deals with
on various other subj
Baader will find
must therefore be inventoried with
rtant documents be overlooked. The topical titles oar
d as anything re than incomplete and tentative.
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th
oral, the most coa 'rlete documentary materi;
and ope
ational field* while the topics
isfactorily covered are those of administration, supply,, finance? and
other such amtters. It has been fortunate,, therefore, that the emphasis
of the present series of papers has been on precisely those aspects for
the study of which the most documents are availa e. It would be ideal
to have the entire supply of documents on the OQ project in China com-
pletely reclassified in a more rations]. manner, according to sub ec?.
and to have it competently cross-indexes.
The following is a lists with notations,, of the material used in this
1. War i ce , Office of Strategic se=gga (O& )s, Prepared by
cry Project, Strategi rvicos U t,, Office of the
taut Secretary of War, War Department. Washington,
ted by .5. Government Printing Office, Department of
Service office, July, 191L9, Two Volumes. (Volume I:
Washington Organization; Volume II: Operations in the Field)
These well-known volumes give a comprehensive account of both
the Washington and overseas activities of 05S. The first
volume contains many transcripts of important cu ats, etch
are vital for any a nslyssis of planning for unorthodox warfare.
This work was used extensively in the preparation of Paper
Number I of this series, in particular Volume I. Study of
Volume IT is essential, for an introduction to OSS overseas
operations,. rims it gives brief accounts of planning and
operations In all the fields in which 068 was active.
tions of space prevent any extended treatment of selected
operations. It is unfortunate that the wait as a whole
tends to lay stress upon the positive and successful accompl
ments of OSS? while glowing over.,, although admitting the
existence of, problems and failures. It in equally unfortunate
than no indication of sources is given, In sums while this
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book is extremely useful, and while its character and appr
should wt be equated with Parson mat life of George
Waashington,* it is essentially an uncritical piece of work.
Its internal organisation has led to a certain amount of
repetitiousness.
This is a fairly long history, of the Operational Group osnd
from its origins to the conclusion of operations in lurope* 'It
appears to be among the meterial from *:Leh the sections in the
Mar Re rt on 00 activities were written. Contains a few refer-
ace documents. Devotes cce t derable space to early plane
and decisions end to accounbaaa of oper?atloas in B e. Particu-
larly valuable as an extended intro duct ion to the subject,
C ti caal as well as chronologica . .
OSS Archives - 11.
.0P.2. O ratio l Group t aaud,.
History of Operations in China.
This is a nine-page historical report cxa . tlac Chiataeee oa dos.
Written by the commanding officer at the 00sp Alfred T. Car, t...
061., Inf., and addressed to the. C ding General,, United States
Forces, Chins theater,, 7 October, 1944, in. respora a to a require-
that all branches submit historicaal reports of their activi-
ties. Contains no references to dos ant . Covers briefly an
phases of the 00 p jsst, A virtually am-ei-ItIcal... chronological
aaa :sry. Stuc ' of this report is essential as introduction
to 00 activities in China,
03S Archives - Washington.
218. CHINA - Chinese o to s.
Contains an 00 history similar to Cox's report
No original documents except a collection of pho
00 activities.
053 Archives ? Washington,
Dir. AD.. Baas 2. J. 2k.
Contains staff udiea, cam a n enee, 'a a a inn pa s,} And
the final text of J .2115, MSpeeiaal Military Plea for U. S.
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Psychological Warfare Operations Against th
the Asiatic Theater', March, l943 togeth4
088 operations in the Far i sst (two pages), writte
in 1944. Study of this folder is essential for information
on plans for the use of psychological warfare.
OS3 Arehivem - Tu ing.
Reg.OP.:3.
Subj z P6 HOLOOICAL WARFARE BOARD
(PW Inf or ation)) . 108.
Contains a limited number of radiograms and letters concerning
general psychological warfare In the Far East. Valuable chiefly
for the China Theater directives on the subject. Wile these
contain nothing on 00 matters, they do reveal the concepts
acescerdt to which unorthodox warfare was to organized and
waged in the China Theater. The value of this folder is thus
limited and lies chiefly in the realm of Obackgr+oundt i.nfores-
tion..
. 0S Archives - Kunming.
)SS.QP.1.
Contains an incomplete file of directives and letters issued
the following authorities in the China Theater dur'#
period February - September 1945-. U. S. Forces; Chinese Combat
Cormand; Tactical Headquarters, U,$,m Forces. Contain the
following documents important for a stue' of 00 (and 038)
plans and activities: Operations). Directive No. 10 (to
regarding the organization ofa authority for the 00 units);
eats concerning the organization aal role of the Chinese
Combat td; letters and directives governing American -
Chinese ralati ors and the role of interpreting officers.
033 Archives - Chungking.
teg.CP.l.
{1SF/CT. q. Directives. 019.
Contains United States Forces, China Theater,
PP"bruaxy to October,* 1945 (including one ,
Of partioalar i ortance is Operationeal. 'Directive No, is (to O$S'
authorizing and describing 083 operations. Not a complete file.
083 Archives -- Chungking.
*Opel*
/CT. Subject Directives.
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SE MT
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Contains United States rorces China mater directives
from late M4 to October, l9 S, a variety of subjects,
some of iddeh are of interest to the studontt of 085 activi-
ties. Not a complete file. i4 y documents governing lend-
lease and other aspects of Chinese - American relations.
Val bls for background and general authorizations. Also
contains mom intelligence directives.
6. 0S8 Archives - Knnatn .
ResT.C.?'.1..
OSS CT: Ca (to 1 Oct. 19145).
Contains A file of OS5 and Theater a other directives
I October 1945. This folder is essential to any study of 08S
activities in China during World War II. Of particular ia-
ne
portance is the transcript of the January 24, 19451, "Clandestine
Conference No. 1, at which the C di General of the U. S.
Forces in China laid down the principles by which such activi-
ties mould be Vverned.
7. 0SS Archives
C.C3P.a. Questions.
Folder 122.
Contains two sets of questions concerning 0
first set deals with questions arising concerning the CSC
project. The second deals with intelligence questions con-
cerning the Nanning and Linchow, areas. Valuable for any-
stu4 of the early phases of the 00 pro
OS S Archives King.
QSIO.2.
Contains material important for any onsideration of the early
planning for the CSC units, February s. 1945.
CSS Archives - PCian ,ng.
OO.0P.d7.
085, C: MKI ? LETTERS. l
contains various letters concerning 00 matter
191, 5. Of particular interest is the answer from Chiang to
'sdeeeyert s letter of February concerning C orgardsatioral
s.
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-la_i.
10. OBS Archives - Klat ain .
Co:andixag General - lst t*arachute Retnent.
Folder l3.
Contains correspondence between OG headquarters and the
Chinese authorities, arch - oust, 19145, chiefly concern-
inr s minjstrat :.ire matt rs. Of particular interest are the
text of the Sine-.!dean agreement co erntn the s and
vhe delineation of Chinese and Amrican responsibilities and
Cox's listing of 00 job qualifications for the information
of the Chinese authorities.
11. 053 Archives - Kuning.
o S.O1''. C. RASHNESS. GP& .
Contains draft plans and correspondence concernin
participation in Operation tAWWADO. Included are maps
show pha .ng, areas of responsibility, and co nntca-
tiana networks (for use during operations), a charts
hawing airlift requirements and schedules. Valuable for
any study of the role in Operation CARM04ADO assigned to
05 11%
S Archives - Kum ing.
Folder #8k - CA ONAD0.
TOP SEAT. A. Reg. Op. 6.
Contains, 0 Plans and General Correspondence; Sr Prnlett
"P ',r and 30 Project "COUGARffI Theater directives and cor-
respondence (including the Chinese Combat Con. xand, Tactical
q, and Rear Echelon)1 10th Air ice material. Invaluable
for any stut ' of Operation CA' B NAD0.
11. CAS Archives - Washington.
.ir. Files - 6,320.
i D&
fie - China.
Contains 0SS organization charts and some General Orders
particularly governing organizational matters, Theater
supply charts, co and charts, and organisation charts.
Important for any study of OSS activities in the China
Theater.
14. O SS Archives - Kunming.
ag.a .6.
Meetings, Coandere, through 15 tug, ( ). 141
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-1 2.
Contains agendas and minutes of the regular meting* of U.S.
`orcea authorities with the t sari organisation commanders
in the China Theater. Valuable for information concerning
all phase* of the American effort in China daring 1945 and
to an introduction to the abject. The minutes are,, how-
ever, merely recordings of decisions wend actions and are
are
correespongly brief.
088 Archives
~~tt~~-~I
'.O `.6. O SOOM.
?older 07.
Contains minutes of 055 *okly Operations Oowdttee Meetings*
March - Ray, 1945. Useful for a general picture of 088
operational activities and problem.
0S8 Archives - Kunming.
03.0?.7. Staff Meetings.
Folder #-1.
Oontaaiz oat minutes of 058 moldy Staff Meetings, J - August,
1945. Useful for information on various prof faced
088.
17. O Arrwhives - gin;.
O0.AD.1.
Op.raatiowl Report.
or taa, March - , 1945.
ral idea of events of
18. 053 Archives - Kunming.
Of.O?. 3.
Monthly Report. Folder #3.
Contains instructions for preparation of monthly reports
well as Ofd soutbly reports, March - Julys, 1945. VaaluNble
for obtaining a general Idea of the events of this period.
19. 088 Archives
00.0? . 1.
CRTNk (f aBe) - QPZ A?iOW .
stains 00 monthly reports, July - August., 19t 5, a ohs
photographs, and descriptive accounts co erning oo+er&
tions in China generally. Of general interest and value.
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20. OSS Archivos ? Awing.
OG.OD.l.
(Oo n ) - 'REPORTS.
la Of
and reportso
are of but
0 Arekivas - Kunnt .
.OP.4.. 0P?.
Folder .7.
Contains correspondence to and from the OSS operations Officer
on 00 matters, March - Kay, 1945j, chiefly concerning adminis-
trative matte",
22. 055 Archives - Anl
OG OOP. #
112.
Chinese Combat CDM nd. folds.
Contains correspondence betw,c 033 ate. the CCs, May - Asti
19)A5, concerning 00 administrative and $o r* operational
matters. lbs value of this folder is dWnisheds because very
few answers to 055 letters are included.
23. 03 ebi.vea - lut ing.
00.0p.Ii.
0#y, ifs - i,EZR i. Volt
#15 0
ence between Q35 a the United motes
he Chinos* Combat Co d, con-
(February, 194
corning O0 setters, Februarys - Maafn 1945- of patrt Ur
interest are the detailed command* training Schedule, a
lengthy progress rust (18 War 1-945),v and a s e rsn s fr=
United States Fore as Chiang co er .ng the 00 or ga satl of
24. 05$ Archive
ca .C w.6.
'Fable of OrgW.s.ation. Folder
:bls of Organization ani weapons charts,, with
ery - Marcha~ 19450
035 Archives - lamina.
oa,O .6.
Table of ipaasent. Folder A.
Contains undated tables
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1915.
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26. 088 Archives - FwMn '.
00 .0.4.
Table of Basic A1loimn tbs. Th1er 45.
containe undated tables of basic allowances for the 00s
lI?.
27. OSS Archives - K -.
00.Q! .7.
C - LETTERS. Folder 8.
carrespoz once within 063 nc.rning 00 attar ,
Faye copies of OSS Research and . De .opeerzt cosittee mac
s ariea personal histories of several officers,
and 00 tables of or anis ation (approved by Donovan), M5arch.
August* 2945.
28. o Archives - Kunming.
MOM,
co, H q.& Rq. diet.. Folder 122.
correspondence and reports on 00 administrative,
-
:r7, etc., matters, addressed by t
p col tinder to the Commanding Officer, ea
adquarters t*c ent,, , March - July, 191
29. 06S ~~ Archives - uit,
0G.An. .
Strength Reports.
Contains Option. Gmxps Noy
1945, 038 strength reports and rosters,
34. OSS Archives - Kaneaing.
t.op.Ic.
Person . Folder 21.
Contains personnel correspondences rosters, strength. repo s,
and some tentative 00 assignment lists for American personnel#
1ebruar Aug t, 1945. Of particular interest ;I a report
of information concerning the Chines ; `irst Parachute Kepi-
a ent, dated 5 bruax7 1945 (this regin nt was to supply the
Chinese personnel for the co ndoa).
L. S Archives - KmnMng.
Reg.OP.7.
US?/CT C (Chinese Oombat Command). 22.
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Contains correspondence, radiograms,
to and from the Chinese Combat- Coffin
and on 00 natters, (hinese-Arerican relations
tzation of the O CC, February - cen 9rr, 1945w-
OSS Archives - Kunming
Reg-OP. 3.
pies:ter: B0511%. Administration, etca 14yao
Contains a large amount of original documentary material on
the Chinese 00 projects train ?ng, pay and rations, tables
of organization,, tables of equipment., and press releases.
Invaluable for any etuc of the C0 protect.
33. osS Archives - Kunming,
Special Fuids. Folder 11.
i ce iflcations and other maternal concerning the use
., ?arch - August, 1945, Inasuf fi. c e material to be
more than little value.
OSS Archives ? 3x 1mmin .
oo.CP.6.
Detacmtt Letters. Folder #12-
Contains a few letters of general interest concerning 00
matters,, Mar, 1945. of very limited value,
35. 086 Archives - Kuning.
Aa.op.6.
Training. Folder #17.
Contains a miscellaneous collection of documents and proposals
concerning training, as well as items concerning tables of
equipment and other such matters. Little of this material
concerns the Est directly and much of It dates from 1944.
ao.0p.5.
9th Commando (.W
Contains AVO 's record of events (very brief), rosters of
Chinese personnel and progress and efficiency reports (incom-
plete).
37. 08S Archives - Kunming.
+0.Q?.5.
2nd Commando (Cbnbat). 018.
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-1,6.
Contains much information, in the form of the eeratia
, intelligence reports,, a progress report
rosters, and a large file of radiograms to and from
field, concerning BLS . ". ?alder also contains a file
of APPI1's radiograms to and from the fiend. Invaluable
for any study of 00 operations in China.
088 Archives - Kunming.
OG.OP.7.
BANANA Operation. Folder 09.
Contains sketch maps of the "I~anchuk area,, casualty li,
recommendations for awards and promotions. inteiligenc
al reports, and other documents coneerni9
he Tanchuk operation. Invaluable
Orl activities.
39. 088 Archives - Kunming.
00.0P.5.
10th Co ndo (Combat). #1!
a a few efficiency progress reports
period,,, personnel rosters, and vacancy list of h Corm Pndcl.
hO, 088 Archives - Kunming.
00.O?.?'.
APPLE Operation. Folder e11.
O ntains equipment packing list for re-supply, intellige
and operational reports concerning AP
Essential to any study of OG operations.
Archives - Kunming.
~;gp/~
000OP.6.
BLACK T, etc. Folder #1.
Contains communications and other maps,,, intel
and intelligence cff.reativea bearrix the We:
Valuable for obtaining data on this area prior to e s and
2. 0SS Archives ?
Reg.OP, 3.
BOSTON, Operations
Contains operational radiogr
tional plans for APPLS? CK P- Y
,
ligence material,, and maps of the area,
study of 00 operations.
the field, opera-
reports, Intel ?
1toany
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h3- CAS S Archives - Kurni
00.0p.4.
Folder #26, Misc.
Contains intelligence reports, e
tiont and maps of the Changsha area, in which
operated. Essentit?a for any study of 00 activities.
dal. OSS Archives - Kunming,
0o,op.6.
"older #3. Misc.
Contains city and area maps of West River valley, communica.a
bone ,ap overlay of the area, intelligence reports'. and
essential elements of information, Essential to any study
of 00 activities,
45. OSS Archives - Kunming.
0G.0P. t.
Oeneral ?u Lei Ming. Folder #11.
Contains progress reports and letters concerning the Chinese
commandos from Cox to the General, June - ,August,. 1916, and
to other Chinese authorities, Valuable for getting information
on commando problems during the training period an a general
sury of their activities in the field*
h6. OSS Archives - Kunming.
SQ.op:12.
a OCR - APPLE, BLACK RR!, CHEM.
Contains several copies of a report on the airlift phase of
APPLE operation, with coamRents and suggestions for
and several, air re-supply manifests and pilots' reports,
Augnett 1945. Invaluable for information on this phase of
00 activities.
7. 0SS Archives - Kunming.
00.0,P.5.
Om.ration "BLACI ERRYf . Folder
Contains radiograms to and from BLACKBERRY in the field? the
complete operation plan for BLACKBERRY, intelligence reports,
Communications diaggram, and notes on pla movement of BLACK-
BERRY from Chsngkung airdrome to Liuchow. Essential to any
study of this operation,
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h.B. 0SS Archives - Kuniz .
p.5.
Co tndo (Combat). #19.
Contains efficiency progress reports,. plane-loading rani;
oDeration plan, and loading schedules for APPLE. Essent:
to any, study of this operation.
h9. 058 Arebivee - Kunming.
0 .0P.3.
'old r 401,
ins a vast miscellany of documents concerning O&S
activities in general and the primarily administrative
aspects of the Operational pup Comand in particular.
There are several personnel. rosters, strength reports,,
co rendations,, correspondence, intelligence directives,,
etc. The chief value of this folder list in the adsainisstra-
ti a field.
co. aa"Archives - Kunming.
P.7.
Citations. ?older #25.
Conta.ina recos :e ndatione for awards for rican, 00 per-
sonnel, with description of deeds support the reco ends-
tions, July - August, 1945.
1. 055 Archives - Kunming.
.01.h.
'aromotiot s and Citations. Polder #25.
Contains reoo ndations for prrorotiona and for awards for
American 00 peraonnel1 with facts to substantiate the redo -
ssendatiom, March - Au tsst, 1945,
in. Y"s and Charts (Apperldixes)s
These maps will serve to illustrate the general situation in
China in 1954-1945, with particular reference to gyration
CARiNA, and should be used with Paper ber Zl an a whole,
particularly with Section "En (Operation ACt f ADO" and the
Projected OSS Role Therein) thereof.
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 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3
a. Na: p"Jap nese and Chinese Reld Areas in chirze, 1944-1945,
tion mad,; Ate' map service (First ation - AMS 2), 1913.
Scale 1i2, ,000.
h. Mao U5615): "Situation in China, 1 February 1945.1 Drawn
T" & A, OSS,, from & A, OSS, Map No. 5611. Scale Is
4,000,C . + ilod f ra information supplied by A.2, lhth
A.F., and R&
! (414539 H421-16) sbima d Dispositions of Japanese
Army ",round forces in (hina., 17 February 19,45."
d. 2 (#17805 H421,-16)s "China V,
scale is k,000#000.
Source for all of these raps:
These charts will se
and equipment of the
psrtt cular1y with Section- ,,,
of Paper Number IT. They vii
19450
w the +rgani action, personnel.,
ana1-ses of Operations kPPL1, TZBERRT, and WAc t!)
the same paper.
a. Chart: Exh hit i, "Natiai
T ani zatl.on of Chinese Cor ands s
march, 1945).
utoil Commando"
probably
Source. 088 Archives ? Kunming.
oci .OP.6. Table of organization.
?older L6.
b. Chart; Exhibit 11, "National Militate Council a.ndo"
rnerican Personnel): 3 March 19h5.
OSS Archives -- 1 ui in .
00.OP. ,. Table of Organisation.
Folder 16.
c. Chartt Tabibit III, "Organization o
h nese 'Personnel), 8 March 1945.
Sources 088 Archives ? gassing,
t .O?,6. Table of Or ardsation,
Folder #16.
the and should be used
,,fora. Group Organization
be of assistance in con-
the descriptions and
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 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3
d. Chart; xhibit IV, "Table of Organization and Table
a uiprn for C Oo and Hsi, Bn Hg, Co , Section
(Americ4m Personnel ), 19 March 1915.
Srsur+? es OS$ Archi. ee - I ur=in .
040P,7- O G - Letters.
Folder #8.
Charts xhibi t V, "Organization of Chinese Co ndos"
A .erican Peroonnel: Headquarters and Headquarters Co spar
no date (probably March, 194).
Sources OSS Archives Kunming.
oo.OP.6. Table of organization.
Folder #16.
Tab AC":
These maps will serve to ilinstrete the o:
rid should used in eDnj=ation with
r 11,, Section I (OG, Operation "APP *, 5
1935). Map "a9t.9 is ediately below U 3110v the Rene - ral area
of China in which all the 00 units operated. It should be
compared with the s in Tab 'All for assessment of Japanese
trength and disposition and for appreciation of the Japa
nd iae.aee held areas. On this mar are outlinod, for -purposes
or orientation) the areas covered, as indicated, by the larger
scale taps used in Tabs N PI, "DR., an ft t*. The purpose of the
laar ;e-:sea1e maps is -to show the type of terrain in which the
OOs operated and . to indicate the plates in Mich they were
found and the routes over which they traveled. Except where
they cannot be idtified, place-nos and routes of siifi-
canoe are, respectively, underlined and outlined in red.
Ins Ku ng. C ou (n n,, hina,, sheet ,, Asia Transporta.
Lion Map, Army Map Service (First edition: ? ANS ), 1943.
Scale, lt2,,O;OQ, .
b. M & 'fsea -wtat, China, Sheet, China Proper, SW (Sheet 9 ,
Series L582). Printed by Army Mop Service,, Corps of
ere {end Edition - AMS). Scale 1 2c0,OOO.
a. Main
nginea
ng, China, Sheet, China Proper, (Sheet F 49 J
L$82). Printed by Army Map Service, Corps of
Second Edition - MIS). Scale 10 50#000.
d. M s Tien pai.,, China, Sheet,, China Proper, (Sheet F 9 ',
b582) . Printed by Army Map Servi ces Corps of
!users (Second .tton - MIS). Seale is 5o, c .
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 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3
h ,, China, skeet, China Proper,
T...AXES eriee L58i). Printed by Army Map Servtc , Corps
of-Engineers (Third Edition - AN 3). Scale 1:250,
1. I4ar T'ai.-ehan, Chins, Sleet, China Wiper, (Sheet
A Series L581)., Printed, by Army ) Se ice, Corps
of r ineeers (Fifth Edition - A) S). Scale 1 254, .
g. i Ch+ih-Ch'i, Ana,, Sheet, China Px?oper, St (Sheet
:e9 L581). Printed ArAy Nap Service, Corp
Engimerv ( a.ir d Edition - AY-S). Scale It 25D, .
Source 'or 011 of these i apss CIA Yap Library.
3s. Tab "B': a
These > ps wIU serve to illustrate the operatio $ o;
unit B,' R Y. See comment under Tab "041, which applies
"DO.
ecually to the s deg Tab
a. See Tab "Ot, item a. above.
b. Map: Hang-yang ('en --c- ow) a China, Sheet,, China Proper,
(Sheet 53, ASS Series L581). Printed by Ate' Map
Service, Corps of ' n i ers (Third Edition - A N$). Scale
1.250,00,
c. Mapt Hsiang-tan (Siang-tan),, China, Sheet, China Proper,
(Sheet k3, AR C' Series L5B1). Printed by Arzzr Map
Service, Corps of Engineers (nUrd Edition - AMtS). Scale
1x250.. .
d. MDr Chtaug-ache, Chine, Sheet, China Prope
33, &MS Series L581), Printed by Aar
of Engineers (Third Edition - .W). Scale 1-.250#000.
-7azg (Paok .nso,), Chia, Sheet, China Prop
S4 (Sheet G 49 D, Abu Series L582)- Printed Army
tee, Carps of Engineers (Second Edition - ).
Scale 1. 250,4.
.nrce for all of these raps: CIA Nap Library.
5. Tab "Eaz
These maps and sketches mill serve to. illustrate the operations
of 00 unit P ACKBEI ! (.API` ICOT, AVOCADO, B , 1). Sees csaza ent
under Tab "C", which applies equally to the zaps aand sketches
under Tab "E".
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 Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP72-00121A000100190001-3
at
b,
a, above.
a-p'tn (Liuch a s), ina, et Mina rmper'.
Sc t1e 1, 25.
Sot rce for Naps a., b., c.,, and cd. immediately sere:
Library.
f. Detailed rdli.tary sketch rap of Fill As Tanch s, Tina,
Au ast, 1945 (Item II). APRICOT attack.
retailed military sketch Map Of the s it Of Hill. 11 and
the Japane a defenses thereon Tanchlk, Chatnas Lu ast, 1945
(Item: ITT). APRICOT attack.
h, Detailed military sketch map of the action of DANA at
:eet
a*
1 a2 ,{ 0.`
Detailed military and topographical situation sketch map
of the Ta nehuk, Tina, area, Au tst,, 1945 (Its T).
Approved For Release 2002/07/30: 0121A000100190001-3