ASSUMPTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE WORLD SITUATION UPON WHICH MIGHT BE RESTED A LONG-TERM PLAN FOR US INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00822R000100110008-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 20, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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20 Yay 1965
ASSt TIOITS WITH XCT TO UM WORLD SITUATION ON
WHICH Z4ImIT w RESTED A L G-TEm PIA ' FOR U8 I I
1. Giiveni The exercise involves planning for
fifteen years. Under the present terms of reference,
this period is divided into three sub-periods of five
years each, i.e., 1965-70, 1970-75, 1975-80-
2. The assumptions section-should probably begin
with a paragraph or a table which takes account oft
a) estimated US population in 1970, .75, and .30;
b) estimated US Q1P for these years; c) estimated
US budget for these years. With respect to the budget
estimates, some cognizance must be taken of the possi+
bility of wide swings in the overall, defense component
which in turn is likely to depend in large measure on
other ass=* tions relating to the degree of tension in
the world situation.
3.. The kind of world situation which the US must
confront and the US intelligence effort to be meshed into
it will probably be a function of various combinations at
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the following two factors: a) the number of power
centers of the first and perhaps second order of
i portance, and b) the degree of international tensions"
I? The moat
dangerous world situation would
be that characterized by many power centers and
a high order of ternaion between them.
II. Next leas dangerous, a few power centers
with a high level of tension.
III, Next less dangerous, many power centers 'With
a low level of tension.
IV. Least dangerous, few power centers with
low level of tension.
Power Cen~ t~ rs. Wo may asap with a fair degree
of confidence that the n=ber of power centers between now
and 1970 is moat likely to remain "a few." However, looking
ahead more than five years, our confidence factor begins to
decline. At this moment, the Chinese Communists seven the
likeliest ndidate to be joining the povcr center club.
Obviously we cannot exclude Ger any, or oven Japan for
.that matter. Less likely, but still to be taken into
account, are the UK, rx=ce; perhaps India and Indonesia.
There'are other potentials 'Which are -father far out.
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5. International Tenn. The rise and fell of
intercational tension is in itself a function of many
things, some of then wholly unpredictable. A principal
cause for heightoned tensions over the entire period
will inhere in the relationship between states cporatix
under one or another trnnifestation of Corsnunist ideology,
and those wanting no part of Csm. Second will be
the nationalistic initiatives undertaken by new and
backward states, often egged on by one or more Co mmn1 st
status. The above is the prescription for '% ars of
national liberation" which in the right circumstances
can bocome quite substential wars, bringing Stith them
dramatic rises in the level of international tensions.
Thirdly, there are in today's world a dozen, a score,
or a few score - depending on how you measure them ?-
of :Friction ~ points. Just for example, today we have,
Viet, Berlin, the Dominican Republic. '& morrow, we
=y have an ominous flash in Korea, in the Taiwan Strait,
on India's northern boundary, in Indian4'ak relations,
in Arab-Israeli relationts, and so on and so on.
6. AaGiurptiona for the period 1965n7 taw The most
valid assumptions for this period are 11 and IV.
With respect to II, the real power centers
for the next five years are most likely to remain
the US and USSR.
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For the short-term at least, there will
be a high degree of tension between the US
and Counist China and a growing tension
between the US and the USSR. However,, the
force of mutual deterrence will make the
comity ; of all-out war between the US and USSR
highly unlikely. Chinese nuclear capabilities
will almost certainly not have grown in the
five year period to the point where the Chinese
could contanDlate a nuclear attack on the US
or allies of the US. nevertheless., a substantial
non.nuolear armed conflict with the C nUUG ion
possible, Should this oEcur* world tensions
would r n high and the risks of general.
nuclear war by?sralculation would rise
appreciably.
70 We nay lik se assume that the Chine9e are
presently running coraothing of a bluff is the teeth of
over whc]ming tZ nuclear sugeriority and finding little
or no support from the Soviet 'Union will tezaporarily
knuckle under. Should this occur there wuuld be a period
again of only two power centers and a relatively low level,
of world tensions (IV) .
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$. Note that the above rests on still other
assu tioas, z mel.y no general war occasioned by
accident or niscalcul tion,'no universally recognized
disarrameat t- reemeut with sure-fire census and
verification procedures, no dremtie proliferation
of nuclear powers conscqueat to technological break-
throughs in the AR and delivery systems fields.
g. Assurrmtions for the c~ 1970. and on
to 1984. For this period ire must assume a growth in
the number of over centers.' Unless nascent Chinese
nuclear capabilities are destroyed .in the proceeding
period.. Peiping will be very much in the Big League
in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. As noted above,, the
Fc-deral Repubx,ic of Qeroany y have kicked over the
Maces and cone nuclear;; ss'runce'e force de fLaae
my have become a reality. There nay be other signi-
ficant emergent power centers. The most likd.y world
situation in these circumstances would be I. )1owever,
III is possible.
10. The above also rests on still other aesumptionz.
For ox le, subsunin3 I is China's achievement of a
considerable nuclear status -? so also with the FIG and
France. Subsuming III is the possibil ty that humanity?
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every day more acrd copra mare of the suicidal course
of events, will have frighteacd itself Into taking acme
sort of corrective action. Ziis will brave to involve
such startling developmenta as the voluu:tary acceptance
of limitations of sovereignty in behalf of collective
security.
11. Over-aU. Uhatevcr the status of the world
situation in the next fifteen years.. we may assume that
there will never be a coo cat when the US can be wholly,
certain of laic--guardizz itc national security by non-
military means. Whatever the degree of dotent a world
tensions will never drop to the vanishing, point.
~"urthermoro, whatever the crate and nature of a=ament
or diaaxament, there will have to be a large and'
cortinuin, national iate cnce effort to guide the
one and :police the other.
+ ~? ~.a:,..,y as ai9r,
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