A12 ACCIDENT REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 412
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

UACA, ,L.CdET
Cri"USAF Declass/Release Instructions On File*
Approved For Release 2001/0 -RDP71600590R000200090001-5
New
Reference A-12 Accident Report
With regard to the Board recommendations in reference report, request you
advise ASAP of your specific planned action on each of the items and
estimated completion dates.
For your guidance, our assessment of the recommendations is as follows:
1. Recommendations for Primary Causes:
a. Concur
b. Concur
2. Recommendations for Contributing Causes:
a. Concur
b. Even if la above results in an alternate pitot source,
the TDI must still be capable of a decision in case of
two different readings. This might require, for example,
that the TDI compare the angle of attack, if such an
indicator is installed, with the two airspeed readings
and accept the most reasonable combination.
c. Concur
d. Concur
e. This item is redundant and is covered in lb above.
f. Concur
3. Recommendations on Non-Contributory Findings:
a. Prior to installation of a crash resistant flight recorder,
an investigation should be conducted to determine what
parameters should be monitored to provide the necessary
data for any future investigations. Recorders with a
capability for monitoring at least the minimum number of
required data channels should then be installed.
Approved For Release 2001/0g/Ah94-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
1
''JW177.r
Approved For Release 200/464iitc1CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Ref: A-12 Accident Report
Page 2
b. Concur
c. An investigation should be conducted to determine the
best solution.
d. Concur
e. Concur
I'. Concur
g. Concur
h. Concur
i. Concur if what is meant is a self monitoring yarning
device to indicate that the TDI is giving erroneous
readings.
j. Concur
AiT
Approved For Release 20 . CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
AF FORM 711
B I AF FORM 711a
AF FORM 71Ib
Approved Foakelease 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP711300510R000200090001-5
=TART sEciin
_
USAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
CHECKLIST AND INDEX
AF FORM 711f
AF FORM 711g
UNSATISFACTORY REPORT
TEARDOWN DEFICIENCY REPORT seob
croup
LIST OF TECHNICAL ORDERS NOT COMPLIED WITH
AFTO FORMS 781 SERIES "-aa 'rob f444,ntorlanco and .;lecords
AF FORM 5
STATEMENTS
REBUTTALS
ORDERS APPOINTING INVESTIGATING BOARD
BOARD PROCEEDINGS . ab NA*
DD FORM 175 OR DD FORM 1080
-AM Tab Haim
DD FORM 365 (Weight and Balance Clearance Form F)
Astm+tla (Van:
Aagi,
STATEMENT OF DAMAGE TO PRIVATE PROPERTY
CERTIFICATE OF DAMAGE (List of Parts Damaged), MANHOURS REQUIRED TO REPAIR, AND COST
TRANSCRIPTS OF RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS
ANY ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIATING DATA REPORTS
X
X
AM ob
OTHER AF FORMS (Failure and Consumption Reports, Etc.) i;ainte-uulos and
;eCOT8 Crow
DIAGRAMS (Fall Out--Impact Area, Etc.)
PHOTOGRAPHS
Whenever "Applicable but not attached" column Is marked for any of the above items, information must be entered under remarks to Indicate what action has been taken or will be
taken to obtain the required attachment. Lettered tabs shown above will be inserted for corresponding attached items, IA.) Tab N will always be used for Statements, t ob P for
ruder' Appointing Investigating Board, etc. Tabs will be omitted on those items not applicable.
1.14011PAARKS,
OXCART SECRET ?
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
AF S'ecR":2 711 h
* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE tees QF ?669564
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R0002041)90001-5
XCAFU6ECRET
Approved For Releasw,4001/09/06:,CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved Folio Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71B00591111000200090001-5
, _uAcAci sk.eR ES 4
IUSAF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
Fill in all spaces applicable. If additional space is needed, use additional sheet(s).)
1. DATE OF OCCURRENCE (Year, month and day)
1963SKAT4-6
CifoO''
2. VEHICLE(S)/MATERIEL INVOLVED
(TMS & Serial Nr., if applicable)
.11-442
3. FOR GROUND ACCIDENTS ONLY
(Base Code and Report Serial Nr.)
,
4 PLACE OF OCCURRENCE: STATE, COUNTY; DISTANCE AND DIRECTION MIA NEAREST _; WN. IF ON t
BASE, IDENTIFY. IF OFF BASE GIVE DISTANCE FROM NEAREST BASE. .A4-jli, -
fourttmos * from --erx-qyver, Ash. 1C2r48
5. HOUR AND TIME ZONE LOCAL
144 ,T2T
6.
DAY NIGHT
DAWN DUSK
7. ORGANIZATION POSSESSING
Major Command
OWNING VEHICLE
Subcommand or AF
OR MATERIEL AT TIME OF MISHAP
Air Division
Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
Name and Base Code
8.
25X1A
(List organizations of second
vehicle, if they differ from
Item 7 above)
9. BASE AND COMMAND SUBMITTING REPORT (Do not Abbreviate)
10. LIST OF PERSONNEL DIRECTLY INVOLVED
For aircraft include operator and all other persons whether in plane or not. If more space is required to list all personnel, use additional sheet(s).)
Last Name First Name MI.
Grade
Service No.
Assigned Duty
Aero
Rating
Injury
to Individual '
C:T
T1
PXIAYrA
?
11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT: Give a detailed history of fight, or chrono ogical order of facts and circumstances leading to the mishap as applicable, the reSults of
investigation and analysis to include discussion of all cause factors listed, findings, and recommendations, and any corrective action taken. (Continue on reverse, if more space needed.)
,
*iinattq -.MP e4port (Tab 'VI t' ) i$ rs,LA *wet
Y t
1wt.itigttx_
iindings
.ireowastrldation
OM: *be fjj44 4t.flj
O*rtieu, Itosss -,7.
'
iv amriutiwa ..tn =si-t t: ?-._
Or t ?romi,
il s :-?,n6 Tr4rs-,
/ircrZt!ittrwet,t. ,r.ietric&i,--
:.'.. , . .
f ? .
25X1A
12. AUTHENTICATION
CERTIFIs..ATION BY (Title) . ATE
Apt
AC FORM 1 PREVIOUS
? DEC 62 711
-
OFFICE 1962 OF-660566
25X1A
-r
Approved For FteleiaeRa1109/g-caPRIDP71600590R000200090001-5
25X1A
ii1STUEI OF FLIGHT
i. A-12 aircraft, 5/N 60926, hind pilot, was sched-
uled for an Inertial Navigation System and V/H Sensor test mission. The
mission was to be flown along a pre-planned route, selected to fulfill equip-
ment test requirements. Originally scheduled for a 1030 PDT take-off but, due
to forecast weather, was re-scheduled for a 1000 PDT departure. The pilot
was briefed concerning primary purpose of the mission and was instructed to
abort the mission if cloud cover precluded visual fixing over planned turn
points and that flight altitude should be selected to remain above cloud
level. After checking weather and filing a 7FR local clearance,
arrived at the aircraft at 0925 PDT. Aircraft exterior inspection was
performed by qualified ground craw members in accordance with the Fllght
Handbook and established organizational procedures. The personal equipment
hook-up was performed by a qualified personal equipment technician. The
pilots cockpit check and engine start were accomplished with the left engine
exhibiting some flame from the tail pipe but indicating no hot start. This
was caused by the throttle being in the idle rather than the shut-off position
at engine start. Taxi and takeoff appeared normal, official takeoff time was
0957 PDT.
a. The aircraft gross weight was 85,000 pounds including 35,000 pounds
of fuel loaded in a manner to give an aircraft center of gravity of 19.8% MAC.:
The flight was normal and as briefed until Wendover was reached on the second
circuit of the course. At an INS indication of 33N14 to go to Wendover, the
following transmission was recorded: (Mach 0.84, 9.5. The 9.5 is assumed
to be 9,500 pounds of fuel remaining and is supported by the chase pilot's
statement). Time of this transmission is computed to be 1152 PDT.
noVa
Approved For Releae'_ L9/0b . _P71B00590R000200090001-5
.25X1A
Approved For Releas6i9i4/69/06:::6WDF;1600590R000200090001-5
b. No visual fix could be made over Wendover and the computed time of
the turn is 1156 PDT. During this turn, the pilot stated on the radio and
tape recorder, "Seams to be building up airspeed in the turn."
statement indicates that as altitude was gained to approximately 38,000 ft
mach number increased to 1.05.
c. The turn was continued to the desired true heading of 2000 where roll-
out occurred at approximately 1202 PDT and near latitude 41-00N and longitude
114-30W.
d. The next recorded transmission from the pilot was, "2000", which is
the desired rollout heading. The next transmission was, "I think my airspeed.
is fouled up"; however the time of this transmission is not accurately fixed..
e. The last recorded transmission by the pilot was: "I got troubles;
I'm in a spin
f. Course reconstruction places the aircraft at approximately 40-41N
and 114-19W at the ejection time of 1205 PDT.
2. Investigation and Analysis:
a. Aircraft SN 60926 first flew on 9 Oct 1962 and had accumulated 135:28
hours of flight time at the time of the accident.
b. The aircraft impacted 14NM south southwest of Wendover, Utah at 1205 PDT
on 24 May 1963. Initial impact was on a hill of approx 300 elope, with the air-
craft inverted and on an angle of apixoximately 200 to the terrain. The
aircraft therefore was at a dive angle of 500 relative to the horizontal and
inverted at the time of impact. Upon impact, the aircraft disintegrated with
resultant explosion and fire. The scatter pattern along the flight path from
the point of impact is shown on the map in Tab T.
Several small pieces of
aircraft were located back along the flight path. These pieces were identified
Approved For Releaw21*1109/p.9_?rQ1A-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
25X1A
Approved For ReleAse,
CRET
iv : -LAA-RDP71u00590R000200090001-5
and it was determined that upon impact tne resulting disintegration explosift
and fire caught small pieces of aircraft in the rising currents of air from
which they landed mostly forward but several landed aft. Atrned structural
parts found in the impact area were examined to determine whether or hot the.
burning took place prior to impact. All burning was determined to have taken
place after initial impact. All extremities of the aircraft and all doors
and hatches were accounted for in the impact area. This is positive evidence
the aircraft was structurally intact at the time of impact.
3. Phe flight control and hydraulic system components were examined in detail
and no indication of malfunction was found. All control cables including
elevons, rudders and throttle levers were connected at impact as evidenced
by the tension breaks in these cables. The "A" and "B" hydraulic systens
were operating as evidenced by the retraction of the rudder servo stops when
the control surface limiter handle was actuated which was below 147 knots
equivalent airspeed.
a. The elevon trim actuator was found extended to a position of 50 nose
down and the elevons were found in this position at impact.
b. The cockpit throttle levers were found jammed at 640 which corresponds
to an engine rpm of 93%. However, it could not be determined if this was the
throttle position at initial impact since the breaking of the cables could have
moved the throttles before the jamming took place.
c. The pilot reported no stability augmentation system force feed back
at anytime of the flight and did not report any unusual aircraft yawing or
pitching movements until the aircraft reached its stall speed, indicating the
stability augmentation system functioned properly throughout the flight.
3
Approved For Release 20)1iflipp : Q1A-IRDP71B00590R000200090001-5
(41E1
r?,:k-i C.. CR ET
Approved For Release'2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
4. All recovered oxygen system components were exam ed In detail. I. 1
components were broken loose from this location by un act and showed severe
impact danage. No evidence of functional system failure was found which
would indicate this system contributed to the accident. The oxygen remaining
in the cylinders used to fill the aircraft system prior to this flight was
checked for purity and moisture content. Both checks proved to be satisfactory.
During the ejection sec?uence the oxygen hosea pulled loose from the under
parachute leg straps. Although the pilot did not receive any injuries from I
the loose hose the possibility of injury does exist and a positive restraint
must be provided. A /mail pencil point hole was found in tne accordian hose
at the end where it attaches to the F2700 regulator. Evidence of dirt and
twigs found at the hole location indicates hole was caused at touch down and
roll over.
5. Ejection equipment worked satisfactorily with the following exceptions:
a. Pilot experienced singeing of hair on the back of his neck and on
his legs just above the top of his boots. The pilots visor was covered with
rocket powder residue.
b. The seat cushion/sleeping bag separated from the survival kit during
tho ejection process.
c. The left main parachute canopy release lock could not be released by
the pilot after touch down. Pilot stated the left riser was under full open
canopy strain at the time. The right side did release.
b. Weather in the area of the crash and for the flight path previous to the
crash was "as forecast". Tops of the overcast in the Wendover area at the
time of the crash was 34,000 ft MSL with scattered cirrus extending to 36,000
ft. There was a thunderstorm reported west thru northwest of Wendover on the
1200 PDT Wendover observation. Pilots reports located an area of thunderstorm
activity west of a line from Wendover to 40 miles north of Ely, Nevada.
4
Approved For Release 200,1/09/06 : CIA-RDP711300590R000200090001-5
"A,RT SECRET
Aq
Approved For Release 06: I - 711600590W:100200090001Z
.2&4\k9f Wg
emperatures and winds for the flight path are shown on the cross .a.ection
attached to the operations and witness group report.
7.taamination of the J75 enf:ines instal_Led in the aircraft at the time of
the accident reveaed that the left-hand engine was rotating at a substantial
RPM at impact where as the right-hand engine had flamed out as evidenced by
low RPM. tamination of all engine bearings on both engines revealed no
indication of failure and the bearings had been adequately lubricated.
a. At subsonic speed the engine inlet spikes are normally Puny extended
and locked and the bypass doors are normally closed. ;locamination of these
components revealed they were in the appropriate position at impact.
o. An attempt was made to establish the throttle lever position at the
time of impact. The following indications were found:
Cockpit throttles 64? corresponding to 93% of RPM.
ruel control throttle positions left-nand engine 450 or 97% PRMI
right-hand ervine 450 or 87% RPM.
(3) iuel flow indicator readings of 4600 pounds per hour and 2600
pounds per hour. It could not be determined which readings corresponded to
which engine. These /eadings correspond to 38? and 230 throttle angle. oince
none of the readings corresponded the throttle position at impact could not
be determined.
c. review of the aircraft fuel system revealed that in the inverted
position and within nose angles of 10 degrees above and 17 degrees below
horizontal, it is not possible to supply fuel to the engines. However with
roll and/or lateral "G" forces, it is possible to supply fuel to one of the
engines, within a narrower nose angle band. It is entirely conceivable that
the RH engine flamed out due to fuel flow interruption during aircraft maneuvers
between inversion and impact.
Approved For Rele.;se-2116VIIS1P6 :Rien1171B00590R000200090001-5
ACAII ..),E.CRET
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
.:-.;xamination of the electrical system components lid not eveal any
indication of malfunction and it was concluded that the electrical system
did not contribute to the accident. The air data computer and triple
11.
display indicator were subjected to an intensive investigation to determine
what if any malfunction could be induced in this system whicn would cause
erroneous airspeed indicritions reported by the pilot. It was determined that
blockage of the pitot total pressure line produced the most realistic TDI
readings that agree with :,he pilots observAtions. 3ench check of the air
111,
data computer and triple display indicator revealed that blockage of the pitot
total pressure port will result in the mach and Ktali readout on tne TDI
remaining constant as long as altitude is held opnstant, if the pitot system
is blocked as above and a climb is initiated as described in the accident to
approximately 38,000 ft the mach will increase to 1.05 and the airspeed to
310 KEA6 which are the conditions reported by the pilot. The auto trim function
of the air data computer would also receive the erroneous indication of increas-
ing mach and would take the appropriate corrective action of nose up trim.
This would add to the climb established by the pilot. (An aerodynamic analysijs
was made of the flight conditions as described by the pilot and chase pilot.
Based on their testimony and airplane performance parameters, it is not
possible that airplane 123 could have attained 1.05 mach for the fiiht
conditions immediately after passing over Wendover). The comoination of the
established climb plus that angle added by the erroneous mach trim increased
the climb and reduced the airspeed so that at approx 38,000 ft the aircraft
had slowed to the point that it could not maintain altitude. The drag
associated with the high angle of attack had put the aircraft on the back
side of the power curve. With no change in power setting the aircraft
6
Approved For Rei;ascatamaTo6senlyriB00590R000200090001-5
1,44A) oLCRET
Approved For Releast., 06 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
continued to settle at an increasing angle of attack and increasing drag,
leading to a further increase in angle of attack, further bleed off of
airspeed, and ultimate stall at approx 30,000 ft.
7
Approved For Releaie 26X1QAtig: Cakif111300590R000200090001-5
14,
_UACART :3EICRE1i 4
Approved For Release 201101$06$CIA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
1. Elk:N.7_9E421: The primary cause of this accident was materiel failure
in that the total pressure porta of the pitot system probably became
blocked by ice, which gave the pilot false increased airspeed and Mach
readings on both the TDI and conventional indicated airspeed system, this
was followed by unplugging which caused rapid rundown of Mach and KEAS bacic
to correct readings at approximately 160 KEAS, further confusing the pilot4
NCTE: This pitot heating system was designed and qualified in accordane
with MIL-P-25632A.
2. ContributinA Causes:
a. The pilot failed to comply with briefing instructions
that he abort
this mission if he encountered IFR conditions and/or any undercaat that
would prevent visual Observations for the INS and V/H sensor.
b. The Mich Trim subsystem of the AFCS, receiving the same erroneous "
Mach signals as the TDI, added nose up trim to the aircraft, thus further
increasing the angle of attack and increasing the rate of airspeed bleed
off which led to the stall.
c. Pilot failed to take adequate corrective action after evaluation
of instrument readings.
d. Weather contributed to this accident in that pitot icing most
probably occurred when flying thru visible moisture just prier to the tur4
at Wendover, and instrument conditions existed during the final phase of
flight.
e. There is no alternate pitot-static source which the pilot could
have used to check instrument readings.
f. The F-101B aircraft was unable to provide chase support during th
critical time the A-12 was experiencing pitot-static difficulty and
airspeed was bleeding down, due to the wide margin in sub-sonic flight
performance between the two aircraft.
Approved ForRelpasg29.01/09/06 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
\-.)CUAHT ECiEi
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
3. Non-contributory Findings:
a. Although this aircraft was designed for a relatively unexplored
flight envelop, there were no provisions for an inflight recorder. A
crash resistant flight recorder would have been invaluable in re-constructing
this accident.
b. A direct reading angle of attack indicator if available to the
pilot during this situation, would have provided him with a positive
indication of his true angle of attack and the approaching stall conditior4
c. Electrical distribution of AC power is unsatisfactory in that
there is no back up for inverter failure.
d. When operating on the TDI, at other than design cruise speed,
cross Checking of normal pressure indicators Would be emphasized.
e. Pilot did not follow check list on engine start this flight.
f. The left main parachute canopy release lock could not be
released by pilot after touch down.
g. Seat cushion was lost during ejection. Loss of the seat
cushion itself is not hazardous, but ordinarily the seat cushion is a
compact-light weight sleeping bag needed for cold weather survival.
h. Personal oxygen hoses were pulled loose from under parachute
leg straps. At ejection these lines pull from beneath the leg straps and
oould cause damage4to the suit.
No warning device is incorporated into the triple display indicat
j. No hypoxia warning device (a suitable cockpit gauge with red 1ighV
or horn is available) is installed in this type aircraft.
k. Sabotage was not a contributing factor in this accident.
Approved Fo;'"RiafreVftWq1/04tiffhtRy:14-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved For Relesietiata/b9/6dt:FtiANDP71600590R000200090001-5
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Recomendations for Primary Cause:
a. Further testing and/or evaluation of the A-12 pitot static
system for adequacy of heating and wirinp realiability, with appropriate
modifications if indicated, be accomplished prior to releasing the aircraft
from its present VFR restrictions.
b. A study to determine the feasibility of tYe installation of an
alternate pitot source and a cockpit warning device to indicate nitot
heat failure should be accomplished as soon as possible. If this study
indicates the practicability of these installations they should be accomp-
lished prior to release from VFR restrictions.
2. Recommendations for Contributing Causes:
a. The necessity of strict adherence to briefing instructions should
be stressed with all pilots.
b. None.
c. None.
d. All Al2 flights should be restricted to VFR conditions until the
pitot-static system has adequately been modified as outlined above.
e. An alternate pitot-static source should be installed in Al2 type
type aircraft to provide pilot the opportunity to switch to this source
to check his instruments should they appear strange at any time.
f. The problem of chase sapport of the Al2 aircraft should be
reviewed to determine the changing renuirements from here forward and to
suggest changes in the type or types of chase aircraft should such be
required.
Approved For Release 26M6gr: CIV-M411300590R000200090001-5
Approved For Reletee*1hiko6 : dEeCtiff1000590R000200090001-5
3. Hecommendations on Non-contributory Findings:
a. A crash resistent flight recorder should be installed in Al2 type
aircraft for all test and training missions.
b. A direct reading angle of attack indicator should be developed
for this aircraft capable of operation throughout the flight envelope.
c. A spare inverter should be provided with switching provisions to
any one of the three primary inverters.
d. Pilot training should emphasize that when operating at other than
design cruise speed cross checking of the normal pitot-static indicators
is required.
e. Pilot training will emphasize the importance of following the
check list.
f. Evaluate the present parachute canopy release for the nurpose of
making improvements which will make the release more compatible with the
parachute and full pressure suit.
g.
A nylon lanyard should be attached to the seat cushion to prevent
its loss during ejection.
h. Provide a hose restraint to prevent flaying of oxygen hoses during
ejection.
i. Evaluate, and if feasible, incorporate a self monitoring warning
device for the TDI.
j.
system.
Provide a hypoxia warning device to monitor pilots' oxygen supply
Approved For Re!Teat/M/46i :gitla711300590R000200090001-5
Approved For Release400106 L3eleRET71B00590R000200090001-5
The above findings and recommendations were drafted and approved by
the following uatabers of the board.
/
CHARLES E.
Colons19 USAF
Board President
JOHN R. KELLY,
Lt. Col, USAF
Coordinating
Approved For Release fg
Par :
lian T. MISCH
USAF
Coo mating Group
EDWARD f. URTIN,'JR
Coordinating Group
B00590R000200090001-5
Auroved For Release 2001/09/06 :rp,I,A7RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
?
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 :,CIA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT REPORT
To be filled out for principal aircraft involved. (Appropriate blocks only should be filled out on secondary aircraft.)
ACCIDENT/INCIDENT CLASSIFICATION ( Check one)
Major
Flight Accident Resulting in Aircraft Damage
Aircraft Non-flight Accident
Minor
L Accident Not Resulting in Aircraft Damage LIII
till LI] Air force Aircraft Incident
2. Aircraft/Serial Number
. J".6926
3. Type, Model, Series, Block No.
A..12
4. Assignment/Status Code (AFM 65-110)
Test
l'Asitqf aircraft was being ferried or delivered indicate gaining and losing organizations, dote of transfer, ultimate destination
N/A
25X1A
6
Fro o liound Robin
7 .
VFR X VER? ON TOP IFR Local X Other Direct Airways (Controlled)
8. Flight reference at time of accident
Instrument
Contact Actual X Sim. Other Unk
9. Duration of Flight
10. Mission of flight
quipment Test
Hrs.
2
Mins.
08
II, ALTITUDE
DATA
Cleared Alt. MSI.
vyft Fr
Altitude above terrain acdt se-
quence began301000 Ft.
Altitude MSL impac point
5,120 Ft
Highest altitude MSL flown
37,750 Ft.
Time flown highest alt.
Hrs 0 Min 07
12. Fire and explosion data
a. Fire:
Nene_ Inflight_ Ground_ I2L
Result of grd. impact? Yes?I_C. No._
b. Explosion:
None_ Inflight? Ground_ 2__C__
Result of grd. impact? YesANo.
13. Airfield data: Applicable to takeoff and landing accidents occurring within 2 miles of airfield
Field elevation in use N/A Ft Composition of rnwy. Asphalt Concrete
Length of runway in use Ft Other (Specify)
Length of overrun Ft Composition of overrun (Specify)
Distance of touchdown from runway Ft Surface condition. Dry Wet Icy
Heading of runway " Other (Specify)
Conditions affecting occurrence; e.g., type of instrument or lighting approach aid used, obstructions, barrier, airspeed, gross
weight, forced landing
14 (I/ answer is "Yes," to either
Violations 0 Yes
quest on, discuss under item 11, AF Form 711)
No Breaches of air discipline Yes No
15 PHASE OF OPERATION) e.g. take off roll, initial climb, normal flight, acrobatics,
landing approach, flareout
Normal Flight
16. TYPE OF ACCIDENT: e.g. gear-up landing, mid-air collision, abandoned aircraft,
fire or explosion in flight, undershoot, overshoot
Abandoned Aircraft
17. WEATHER AT TIME AND PLACE OF ACCIDENT: (If a factor in the accident, attach statement of weather officer)
Sky, conditions
-L.endover
450554111 40 0
Visibility
50
Wind direction and velocity
s5[n;7
Temperature
60
Dew point
48
Alt. setting
30.01 '-
Other weather conditions
lunderstoraW?NIR
PILOT(S) INVOLVED (FLIGHT CREW)
1B. OPERATOR (Person at controls at time o] accident)
a. LAST NAME (jr., //, etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME
25X1A
GRADE
CIV
COMPONENT
SERVICE NUMBER
NATIONALITY
US
YR. OF BIRTH
1929
b. POSITION IN AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
Front or Left Seat X Rear or Right Seat
c. ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER
AC IF p X
CP Other (Specify)
d. ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION
Major Command
Subcommand or AF
Air Division
N/A
Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
Base
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION
Major Command
FOR FLYING
Subcommand or AF
Air Division
N/A
Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
Base
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL
AND DATE RECEIVED
RATING
g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL
AND DATE RECEIVED
RATING
h. INSTRUMENT CARD
Type FAA Instrument
i AFSC
Primary
Pilot 9
Feb 52
Senior Pilot
9 Feb 59
Date of expiration
Duty
19. OTHER PILOT
a. LAST NAME (jr.,
N/A
II, etc.) FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME
GRADE
COMPONENT
SERVICE NUMBER
NATIONALITY
YR. OF BIRTH
b. POSITION IN
Front or Left Seat
AIRCRAFT AT TIME OF ACCIDENT
Rear or Right Seat Other
c. ASSIGNED
AC
DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDER
IF P
CP Other
(Specify)
ASSIGNED ORGANIZATION
-..rdbior Command
Subcommand or AF 1 Air Division
Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
Base
e. ATTACHED ORGANIZATION
Major Command
FOR FLYING
Subcommand or AF
Air Division
Wing
Group
Squadron or Unit
Base
f. ORIGINAL AERONAUTICAL RATING
g. PRESENT AERONAUTICAL RATING
h. INSTRUMENT CARD
Type
I. AFSC
Primary
Date of expiration
Duty
a -
.
NOTE: IF MORE THAN TWO PILAPPr ONtegiELF(QIED - . 9 11, .4..19.i 10-P6S-1-J 71? ; A' I it'. " i tr. "! .1 1 ? "
AF DEC 62 7'1 1b PREVIOIJS EDITION OF THIS FORM I
20.Ap entiigiqIiilogigikkkO
aPiritiggna 5 tlAiLfitriFirriEtteSeefttOdn/MtV001 -5
ASSIGNED DUTY ON FLIGHT ORDERS :
Pilot
Co-Pilot
Inst. Pilot
Ach, Cmdr.
Student Pilot
(Give last names only. List all flight times to nearest hour.)
25X1A
a. Total flying hours (Including AF time, student and other
accredited time):
3176:00
b. Total Jet Time:
2054:00
C. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours, all Aircraft:
2a1.6100
d. Total Weather Instrument Hours:
357:00
e. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours this Model:
24:00
i 1st Pilot/IP hours last 90 Days:
51:00
w
g. Total lst Pilot/IP hours last 90 Days this Model:
20:00
h. Total 1st Pilot/IF hours weather and hood last 90 Days:
5:00
i. Total Pilot hours night last 90 Days:
3100
j. Total Pilot hours last 30 Days:
,.__.
a s 00
k. Total 1st Pilot/IP hours last 30 Days:
19:00
1 I. Total 1st Pilot/IR hours last 30 Days this Model:
4:00
m. Date and Duration last previous flight this Model:
Ay2:00
n. Date of last proficiency flight check:
22tTan63
21 CAUSATIVE
AGENCY
Cause Factors (Check one primary and all applicable contributing and probable factors.)
Primary Contributing Probable
Operators
Primary Contributing Probable
Other Personnel
(Specify)
Pilot
____k_
Co-Pilot
--
Materiel Failure or Malfunction
--
Controller (Drones)
Engines
Crewmembers (Other than Operator)
Airframe
(Specify)
Landing Gear (Mach
Other (Specify)__Akna_ndark) X.
Supervisory Personnel
Pitot. System X
(Specify)
Airbase or Airways
.......__
Weather X
Maintenance Personnel
Misc. Unsafe Conditions
Type of pers. and orgn..level
(Specify)
.
Undetermined
22. DAMAGE
Damage
.3
to Aircraft
Destroyed Minor
Substantial None
Damage
Li
Beyond Economical Repair
Yes No
Manhours to Repair
Cost (Est.)
Description of Damage (Describe briefly extent of damage to aircraft and any property damage incus, ed)
Aircraft totally. destroyed (See Tab U)
No damage to property (See Tab T)
23. AUT ENTICATION (Signature and grade)
?
n
V t
Accident Investigation Officer
Mainteno e Officer
Medical Officer
AACS Representative
NA
AWS Representative
Member
Recor
6(9?'7
.-/-7f1
AF DF E?C 6 2 711b
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 19E3 OF-669740
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Page 2
?approved FocalItopp 209//09iGT: CIA-RDP711300590R0002(4090001-5
Approved For RefearT20(0/0eA01-:-CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved Forltelease 2001/09/06 : CiA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
/ l'A"T
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE/MATERIEL REPORT
Use this form when AF aircraft accident/incident involves inadequacy, malfunction or failure of AF materiel.
1. AIRCRAFT TM & SERIAL NUMBER
A.-12
AF 60-6926
i-rcxt Art 123
2, SPECIAL REPORTS DATA
a. Were Previous UR's Submitted on Factor(s)
Involved?
Yes I No
b No. and Date of UR's Submitted as Result of This Accident (Attach copy)
WA
c. Is TDR Requested?
LI Yes a No
d. No. of T.O.'s Not Complied With at Time of Accident (List T.O. Nos. and titles on
separate sheet(s)?Tab K)
606 maintenarme records report.
. AIRCRAFT HISTORICAL DATA
Item
Aircraft
Part, Component or Accessory
Identification of Aircraft/Pad, etc.
_AE__10-6 26
09-10-62
133 : 20
N/A
NA
Air Force Acceptance Date First Flight
Total Flight Hours
Last Overhaul Date
Overhauling Activity (Name and location)
WA
WA
_Iket20
08.'0343
Hours Since Overhaul
Hours Since Last Periodic Inspection
Date of Last Periodic Inspection
Type of Last Periodic Inspection
100 Hour
. ENGINE HISTORICAL DATA
(Complete a separate column for each engine involved. Also, complete a separate column for each power plant component involved.)
Installed Position
1
_2
WA
WA
Engine Model and Series
Engine Serial Number
P612091
P61211.,1
Total Engine Hours
31:04
Number of Major Overhauls
0
0
Hours Since Last Major Overhaul
N/A
WA
Date of Last Overhaul
N/A
N/A
Overhaul Activity
N/A
N/A
Date Last Installed
22-C4-63
26157
NA
22-04,---63
27 L.15
NiA
Hours Since Last Installed
Date of Last Periodic Inspection
Type of Last Periodic Inspection
NA
Fill 523E1
N/A
MA 523B
Fuel (Type and octane rating)
. FIRE DATA WA
(To be completed when fin: or chemical explosion occurs, not resulting from ground impact. Indicate P?Probable or K?Known, in squares below.
a. MATERIEL FAILURE CAUSING HE FIRE
b. IGNITION SOURCE
c. COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL
Electrical System
Propulsion System
Electrical System
Static Electricity/
Lightning
Cargo
Hydraulic Fluid
Fuel System
Other (Specify)
Pneumatic System
Other (Specify)
Electrical Insulation
Lubricating Oil
Hydraulic System
Propulsion System
Explosives
Other (Specify)
Pneumatic System
Unknown
Unknown
Fuel
Unknown
d. AIRCRAFT FIRE EXTINGUISHING SYSTEM
e. FIRE/OVERHEAT WARNING
Fixed
Portable
Fixed
Portable
Fire Detector
Overheat Indicator
?
Extinguished Fire
Not Activated and Not
Near Fire
Operated Properly
Reduced Fire
If Discharged, Chemical
Used
Not Operated, but Near Fire
No Effect When
Discharged
If Discharged, Amount
of Chemical Used
Not Operated and Not Near Fire
kct i voted but Did Not
"Discharge
Other Pertinent Info.
Not Installed
Not Activated but
Near Fire
Other (Specify)
f.
SHU r OFF PROCEDURE
RESULTS OF ALLOWING FIRE TO BURN OUT
g. EFFECT OF FIRE
MARK ONE
Extinguished Fire
Catastrophic
Reduced Fire
Increased Severity of Mishap
No Effect
No Change in Severity of Mishap
Not Accomplished
i im,, m. m . mak.?
Unknown
? M??? &&&&&&&
Unknown
Approved-PorRetease-2001-t09/06:-C-
? ...?.
.......??
AFFORM 71 1 c
PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE,
SECREi
. 'at
- e
Known
e
Probable
mnlai .1 cl h.. IL
L:46, L.,
Known
: 1144:
Probable
iliii 00190001-5
Known
orobable
Baggage Compartment
Aft of Firewall
Wheel Well
Bomb Bay
Forward of Firewall
Cargo-Passenger Compartment
Cockpit/Crew Quarters
Rocket Pod
Other (Specify)
Engine Section
Tire/Wheel/Brake
Unknown liii
7. MISCELLANEOUS CHEMICAL EXPLOSION DATA
WA
Known
Probable
Known
Probable
Initiol Ignition Occurred in an Explosive Manner Prior to Ground
Impact.
Intensity of Explosion Was Sufficient To Cause or Appreciably
Contribute to In-Flight Airframe Break-Up.
:?xplosion Occurred After Fire and Before Ground Impact.
Other Significant Data (Specify)
Explosion Occurred Subsequent to Ground Impact.
Unknown or Not Available.
8. AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE OFFICER'S ANALYSIS AND SPECIFIC ACTION TAKEN
Describe difficulties involved and relationship of the various components to the accident. Describe specific action taken. For Fire Data describe the fire and/or chemical explosion.
Cover in detail any noted deficiencies, malfunctions of fire detecting and extinguishing equipment, or questionable procedures. When discussing specific equipment, give the name of
manufacturer, part numbers, etc., and state whether or not a UR has been submitted. Include any additional information or opinion of possible value to future technical analysis of this report.
covered in other va eiali zed report.
* U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1963 OF-669569
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved For Release 2001/Q9106g. CIA-RDP71600590R0002011090001-5
?ftio,
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
r;;;',
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
? LIFE SCIENCES REPORT OF AN INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED IN AN AF ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
SECTION A. AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT/INCIDENT
GENERAL
. 25X1A
b. Assigned Base and Command
c. Aircraft Type, Model, Series as
applicable)
A-12
d. Primary AFSC
e. Duty Assignment
f. Current Rating
_
g. Age
34
h. Height
70"
i. Weight
154
j. Years of Educ.
14
k. Activity at time of Accident/Incident
Pilot
2 MEDICAL DATA
a. Degree of Injury:
X
None Minor Major _Fatal Missing._
b. Days Hospitalized
0
c. Days in Quarters
0
d. Total Days to be Lost
0
e. Waiver x
ef_____No _____ Specify
f. If Fatal: Was Autopsy Form Submitted to AFIP? Yes No
Were Specimens Submitted to AFIP? Yes No Frozen Fixed
. Die n is: DescriltMist, Intriktd Causes (Use Boksic,..Diagnoltic Nomenclolurec AFR 160-13). _S_eeci.5, Primary Injury in non-fatal or primary cause of death in fatal.
vertebral muscnieture, at T..-Iit level
3 PHYSIOLOGICAL INCIDENT (Complete Items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10 as applicable)
a. Type Mission
b. Duration of Flight 2105
c. Single Ship or liond. Ind. Alt at tirtle of inc. "..,"1:
e. Cabin Alt at time of inc.
f. Time at Alt e'" t ?Cihrs. Aircraft Pressurize ion
?round c ecked on fMlit ten/TAMA ".
g. Did you use 0, Preflight?
Yes No
h. Regulator Settingeth anLast Check on
pociii144!
Type Regulator
.
i. Oxygen System Pressure at takeoff :4-1850
at time of incdt_ ion Capacity hours
Check:
j. c m
k. Type of Mask ---r:-V decr-r?Jate Fit: Yes
No El
I. Time Lapse between incident and examination
on
Checked within 15 days n 30 days II
Over
30 jJ
5 hours
m. Specify Tests (Specify Type and Results): sio done (time lapse)
co Blood Sugar
High CO,
n. Attach a diagram of the flight profile involved, use additional sheet(s)
4 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL
Check only factors present. Explain the basis for your determination
FACTORS
in Item 10. Cite all clinical and lab evidence
Not
CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT
Not
CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT
FACTORFACTOR
Sig
Definite
Probable
Possible
Sig
Definite
Probable
Possible
Aging
Freoccupation anne ized
Attention
it
Alcohol
Other
Air Sickness
Fatigue
Auditory Interference
G-Forces
Body Build
Hyperventilation
Boredom
Hypoxia
Cardiovascular
Illness
Discipline
Language Barrier
Distraction
Missed Meals
Drugs and/or Self-Medication
Motivation/Morale
Dysbarism (Specify)
Spatial Disorientation
Emotional Disturbances
Task Over-saturation
Anxiety
Unconsciousness
Fear
Vertigo
Get-Homeitis
Visual Restriction
Irrational Behavior
Other Related Factors (Explain)
Over Confidence
it
No Factors Present
....
Panic
5 ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS (Check on y factors pre ens. Explain the basis for your determination in Itern 10
Cite all clinical and lab cviden,) ,
Not
CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT
Not
CONTRIBUTED TO ACCIDENT
FACTOR
-.-
Sig
Definite
Probable
Possible
FACTOR
Sig
Definite Pc-able
Possible
Air Pressure, i.e. Rapid
Decompression, Pressure Loss,
Etc., Specify
Smoke, fumes
Cold
Vibration
Deceleration Forces
Weather
it
Heat
Windblast
Light Intensity
Other Related Factors, Specify
Noise
No Factors Present
TRAINING RELATED TO THIS ACCIDENT/INCIDENT (Give Dates Accomplished)
nO
HOURS
a. Ejection Seat Training: Seat Simulator
Equotam with filiAtelagical training
Total Flying Time 3,175a5
Lectures/Demonstrations Other (Explain)
-76-Jan
This model 24 103
urvival Trainingft" slot -11 3Pp 62 Shaw API Special: 61 .14 Jan 63
AF School: Ground Jungle__ Lectures/Demonstrations Other
_WaterArctic
c. Parachute Trainiet ?0? with physiological training
Jump School: Nr Previous Jumps lectures/Demonstrations
d. Ph I Irci5a ,IS; ' :3. cie:.
Place
?el .., .
Last Chyb140Sight42 3haw AO'S
Date Place
f. Typlitrit or
Date
g. AFSC or Other Training
h. Name of Course or OJT
i Dates Attended
i. Aptitude Scores Applicable
/A
sr
?
t-62 - 12 oot 6?
proved For Release 2001/09/06
: CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
--
,
"Ac FORM 71 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.
4""" DEC. 62
7-?!-r
SECRET
7 i4.4 sJ 5 eersele SisiZ.:. P. il 1 it 1 s ? e s o
-Appcovael-FoF-143
Specify all applicable items of equipment on appropriate lino and specifically indicate all types of clothing worn and
NOT
AVAILABLE
any other equipment that influenced operation.
AVAILABLE
Not
Used .
ITEM
EXAMPLE
TYPE
Used
Functioned
, Failed
Head Protection
P-4B, FIGU-2/P, HGU-6/P
Eye Protection
Visor, Glasses
Ear Protection
Ear Plugs, Muff
-Visor
44Ammisme,---
X
Oxygen Mask
.?MBU-5/P MDU-3/P
Clothing Worn
K-211, A/P-22S-2
K-e2B
Clethi,ng, Survival
Sleeping Bag, Down-Filled Suit
B-3A, MG-1
1.3A
Footgear
Alert Boots, Combat Boots
gelFitady Restraints
Seat Belt, Shoulder Harness
_Theassal_hoots
- I I C
Ae eii,
-,-,
Life Vest
LPU-2/P
Life Raft
PK-2, E-2B
Survival Kit, Container
Global, MD-1
alotoPt
Communications
URC-11, SARAH
TTRael 1
Other Signaling Devices
Flares, Mirrors, Whistle
-7-3. . seneet
Rations
Food/Water, Provided/Forged
4:it a one
Survival Equipment
Rifle, Fishing Gear
Seat
Fwd/Rear Facing, Side, Fixed, Etc.
1
Other Equipment
Flashlight, etc. (Specify)
In
8 ESCAPE
a. General: (Check or fill in as appropriate)
Ejection Ground
E
Flat Mtns Ice/Snow Hilly X Desert -_,......_Wooded Swamp Other (Exp)
Landing Surface:
Bailout LJ Water El Cohn, Shallow . Deep Rough, Shallow Deep Unknown LI
b. Surface Winds, Knots _Clam_ (estimate if unk).
Dragged: Yes LI No
Difficulty releasing Chute Canopy: Yes
c. Reason for Jump (if more than one indicate):
Fuel Exhaustion ________ Fire__ Engine Failure_Mid-Air Collision _Loss of Control Z Other (Exp)
d. Attitude of Aircraft:
Level Inverted 2 Dive_ Bank Spin rie__ Spiral Other (Exp)
_Climb
e. Altitude above Surface 25,000 _ AS 1501 (if not known, approx.) Seat Catapult: Ballistic Rocket x
f. Difficulties Initiating Escape: IMO
Centrifugal Force Canopy/Hatch Failure Injury Controls (Specify) Other (Exp)
_Actuating
g. Difficulties During and After Escape:
Clothing/Equipment Interference__ Seat entangled in Shroud Lines_Logs/Arms entangled in Shroud Lines Automatic Lap Belt Malfunction
Held onto Seat Actuating Controls_Did not Separate_No DM-it?Other (Exp)
h. Seat Separation Device Installed: Yes _X_ No _ Functioned Properly: Yes No
___z____
Failed: Webbing Initiator _______ Other (Exp)
i. Type Parachute: Seat Back_st_
Parachute equipped with Zero Delay
Lanyard:
(speed sensor)
Yes? No -X?
Connected to D-ring:
N/A
Yes No
Automatic Lanyard Connected:
Yes eele__ No
i.
Canopy release: Single 0 Double gj
Canopy: NY__ 30' 35 'x
NOTE: A narrative statement will be prepared by each ejectee and/or survivor to include all information pertinent to escape and survival. The statement will be attached to thislforne In
the event of a fatality, the statement will be prepared by the Flight Surgeon.
9 RESCUE AND/OR SURVIVAL
a. Survival involved (Survival implies any water landing and anytime over 1 hour before rescue on land) Yes No Se__ 7
b. Distance nearest Rescue (military base) 102 NM
Time before Rescue ii Firs
Transmitted distress signal: Yes__X___ No
Transmitted position fix: Yes __X__ No ...;__
c. Effects of Exposure: Frostbite Immersion Sea Sickness Insect Bites Sunburn Dehydration Other (Explain) none
d. Primary Factor in Rescue: Radio/Beacon (Specify) Flares Mirror Flashlight
-,
Sea Marker Dye Position Fix Chaff Local Population ___Z____ Other (Specify)
e Type Rescue: None Required_ Ground Party, Military Local Population jr____ Helicopter/other Aircraft (Specify)
Boat Self Rescue (Walked Out) Other (Specify)
i
10 MEDICAL OFFICER'S RATIONALE, COMMENTS
This section is to include comment on medical, personal, social, family, industrial hygiene and allied factors in incident causation, and a description and analysis of the factors in injury
causation. Injuries should be correlated with the operations of personal equipment, mol functions and failures of structures, systems, etc. Pertinent contributing factors In Items 3
through 9 should be commented upon. Include X-ray and laboratory findings. Pertinent recommendations are encourcrged. Physical and mental
qualifications are high and Are not believed to have been contributing factors. The-
pilot rolatee an apparent malfunction of airspeed, initially reading too high, later
too low, uncorrelAed with attitude or altitude change. Apparently he did net cross,
e-ek other availlale inArumnts, or eld;e cannot recall their reading. Thinkin;7. he.
likoodastrummt failure, he made only 3:$7All pitch corrections &5 air speed steadily fell
to stall, spin and ejection. A probable factor WES weather, as he was on instrweate
during the final events ant had no visual attitude reference. Further, he was reluctant
to make a large pitch correction on instruments andialso because the aircraft is not
streesed for Ws which might L..,1 reouired in pull out. It may be argued that a) He showed
relative unconcern (overconfident) over airspeel - 11, and/Or b) averfixation on airspeed
instrument to detriment of cross checking and/or c) a cautious approach ontirued
Date
6 \WAJ 63
-
Typed Name, Grade and Title of Medical Officer
!t.41:Cer ':. l'77;'- 1 YA,>r, MC, 1iturgeon
Sig /ere
/'
e 1,,
AF DrEOC 62 711g
Approved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA04epA00590R000200090001-5
eAGE 2
Approved For Ret0Ase2001/901VETCIA-RDP71600590R00=0090001-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
?...//??,..q-11% I tr?o
PILOT INDIVIDU,-.1 FLIGHT RECORD
I. AF OR
7. BASE
.-TEr.'-:EfrIMIWAL
COMMAND 2. WING GROUP, AND SQUADRON
Vouved For Release 200;13/0c,th.`91RDP71EldOrAD
-
B. BIRTH (Day, month, year) 9 DUTY AITSC
1
, . , INSTRUMENT
CERTIFICATE
6
14.
sERVICE
GRADE AN!)
NUMBER
COMPONEN I-
IAND LOCATION
IIIAMIGYAND---DAili-
,
--
1 I
WHITE 1 GREEN
NONE
--m?etornmrwmTricrwrrtwnr?
?
- ot rE/E-
ICATE EXPIRES
SECTION
1 ____ ...
AND FIRST PILOT
_____
COMMAND
PILOT
TIME
L
CO-PILOT
TIME
U
OF COMMAND
AND/OR
_
NIGH
CO-PILOT
t
? --
WEATHER
0
DATE
TYPE
MODEL
SERI ES
8
MIB.
SION
SYMBOL
C
LAND,
INGS
0
INSTRUCTOR
PILOT TIME
5
FIRST
PILOT TIME
F
CLASSIFICATION OF INSTRUCTOR
-
CLASSIFICATION
DAY
' DAY
NIGHT
WE
G
WEATHER
H
VFR
I
WEATHER
J
HOOD
VFR
N
WEATHER
0
VP!!
P
7
ari.21 I C./Ijd,:a___LUL.
A -12 X-1
Iran -
3
kildiCH63.?
,
1:55
1;30
yoOT
2
A-12 5-8
2:55
1:50
1:15
2:00
2:55
:.'..: 15
1:.30.:30
1:20
1:50

2
1
A-12 X-1
F-10113 X-2
10
A-12 0 2
18
F-101B 3-7
1:20
0 3
F-101B 3-7
2:00
2:15
1:5
2:00
1:55
-
2:15
1
-
?
---
24 '
25
F-101B X-2 1
?..
?
,
2:15
,---
25
A-12 X-1
.2:15
L

TA-1.., X-1
2:25 -
1:40
1:35
2:00
'
2:25
1:4.0
:1:35
2:00
- : ?
..
F-10/f .X-2 1
r+-10113 5-7 1
_
f
F-1. X-2 . 1
r,
14
,
'it-12
3-7
1.-2
1:40
a. 2:00-:_.I.
1 1:55
1 .2:11
1 1:45
IN MAJ07. AIRMA,ELASX_II-OZT.
1:40
:40
1:55
:15
:20
1:00
. 1:30
:05
1.11c)...
F-1013
22
F-1013
X-2
."-7
4
22
F-101B
_
23
F-_-_101115-7
PILOT If'
1
24, -
,
,
- - --.-
15. TOTALS THIS SHEET .--, , :40
-4
25:35 2:50
4:10
]:10
:55
2:15
2:15
TOTALS BROUGHT
To FOPW, RD FROM 90 1156 714:50 2066:20
SHEI I NO
2201:25170:50
228:23
31:2) 149:10
50:40
41:55
5:25
3:43
L
17 TOTALS TO DATE 1180 714:50 2101:00
2227:00 173:40
232:30
32:35 150:05
52:35
44:10
5:05
3:40
T PO NAME AND GRADE OF OPERATIONS OFFICER OR AUTHORIZED A DEPUTv. pp roved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP7113t106Wiq
BL7ArS;,::, 0a1-,tain, ',---3; F ,),,,
tive.phrate!,
/** , .
PILOT jblVIDUAL FLIGHT RECOW6t,'/A1\ I 3r-LIRL I
,
25X1A
EE
[ATE m,..L EL ,tv,r-r ;C I
SEF.IES E? MECL
i,-- '4- --c-- ---
C
CCN-L E
FILOT CC.MM.,,,,EEN
7 IME TIME
---e? -1,
C LA . S I rr4,T,JZ C F ZIR C'Z..F..4' ZIZM.Tr1?V V R Yft"fe s'
''' y"o"ui--,
,
INSTRU- I-I...R-14T
1.-
Ts.mAEINNET,. i LSAI Mi,cIS
K 1 L. j I
,
I
G ' I , A
1' S
GAY VER
cAY WEATKIkR N ICH
- ?4
14-
NIGHT NIGHT WEATHER
- 1
CAFE TYPE
FACAR
_L_
NG N.RAGAK
14
?
/Si I`
I.
TA1
4,2 I'..; C.:-,DE i_,
29 Marl ,
_
.)
10 A pr I
22 1..-,,,I
22 yl i
1
1
1I
.
I i
23 Kay
1
1
1
I
,
i
I
i
-1
I
1
(
,
.
-
I
I.
i
ir
t
Tc-rAL4 THU- `II, 1-, E CIT
i
8
3
3
-?
I O2
TE TALE, 14,CUGHT I C 1,1PiAr ,
, FEW RH EF1 N , \A
?
I : - - ...; 0
z:
TC1AL.,- Tr I / TF
I
I
, "(I
I
SECTION III - Still/MARY OF PILOT EXrERIENCE
SINGLE
ENGINE
TW'S
EINGIN
; MCSE 71-4,AN I SINGLE JET j MULTI-JET
TV,IC ENGI t-,ES ERCF LILSICN I erscruLsicN
JET
F.CCKET
ECCE CT
RCTAEY
WING TYPE:
TUKIEC -F-CC
*TVec $11
ENG INEZ Tv,_ tNc11,t.'
T...1
INC I I .E.7.1",, FILCT
z-rP t- 7 I II
Nr rILIT
mSF11.11.
c' ?-- r -r
'if "AL LI FF Et,Er.: TIME
s
?
?I ? -1.?
77 " m!: 7 7'
r
L.C.1" 4.. IL 'A? LCHL 1 1,HC
C LI E E LC 7
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
Approved For Releng,RPAJM9/06.,LQA4-60P71600590R000200090001-5
TATEIVIENTS
Approved For Release '2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
OXCART qE.C-ZET
25X1A
25X1A OXCART
Approved For Release LUU1/09/AiL.CAUDP71600590R000200090001-5
This is an extract of tape4 interview discussing in detail the statement signed.!
br 24 MkY 63. Interview conducted by members of coordination
group. sash sentence was discussed individually to obtain additional information.
25X1A
I am going to read down your written statement sentence,
by sentence and then ask you the questions to try to obtain the information
that we are after and I'll ask you specific questions and hopefully you can
'give me the answers to the question and then any additional information that
you feel is pertinent to that particular point. I would like to have you just
go ahead and volunteer it at that time so that we canrecord it on tape. This
is your statement that you rendered on the 24th of May and I'll start by reading
the first sentence and asking the questions as we go. "At 33 nautical miles to
go, before turning at checkpoint Wendover, I asked what his fuel wee.
His reply was 9500 lb**. My first question Jack, is how did you know 33 miles
to go. Mad You obtained this from Ken?
25X1A
Yes sir, I had asked him just previous to this, in fact the
preedditg transmission was haw many miles have we got to go for the turnpoint.
25X1A
He cam bask with 33. .
Okay, and how did he reply to the fuel reading, did he sir 9500
Os' de you remember how it was given to you.
25X1A
As opposed to nine thousand five hundred?
Too.
25X1A 9500 lbs. (Ninety-firs hundred)
25X1A
9500 lbs. Thank you very much. At the time about 1150 local I wis
in dose formation and we were just above an overcast at 34,000 mean sea level!
Jaek, how far above? Are you able to estimate 2,000 feet above , or 200 feet
above, or what do you think it wee?
It was between 500 and a 1000 feet above.
Approved For ReleasViCOAR4/06SWAIXP71600590R000200090001-5
25X1A Abov the '1,1
d4:121 you define close formation
IMIP3proved For Release 2001/09/06: CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
for us, were you really in tight or how may widths?
I was within one wing span of the 101 and tucked in good.
Okay, and which side were you en, Jack?
I was on the right aide.
You were on his right?
On his right wing.
Did you by any chance, and I knew that you were real busy at t
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
time, notice Hach number, or true airspeed, or indicated, or altitude on yo!
panel?
I had looked at it within the last four minutes, or Last four or five
minutes just prior to that. We were, or I was, indicating .80. And this ill also
indicated altitude that I gave you, 34,000. So there would have to be a correction
put in.
Right.
This last paragraph we didn't talk over.
Okay, but you don't remember indicated airspeed.
having loAed at it at this ioint?
We sir, the needle was right around the 300 mark, but I don't
You don't Tail
25X1A remember exactly what it said.
Okay. And for the benefit of those of us who aren't familiar with
25X1A
25X1A
15X1A
25X1A
25X1A
the F-101. If read 'Ilion his sack, his true mach number was abtut
in that area. This jibes pretty well with what Ken we indica,ing
at this time in mack. You don't remember altitude do yeu Jack?
It was 34,000 even.
He was still at 34?
I don't know exactly what it equates out it was 34 indicated.
This equates to about 35 mean see level.
This would be about a
thousand and fifty feet error as I recall. Okay, next sentence. "Entry i#to
left turn at Wendcver, seemed normal except that at about 1/3 of the way Trough
Approved ForReleaset2h121(03/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
cAu.,AHT ECRE.-T4
OACA,:r ,SE.CRET
I 3 tart ed AIM_UelfFe?1;&1ffitge ?e9A4P.9/??EidCV09)PeNIMPRtCli9P2t9S19P9Pitlae cloudi
25X1A
yet at this point Jack?
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Yes sir, we had picked up one little puff, not puff but a little paich
of cirrus, we had or through this in the turn, and just prior to this point. It
was in and out, about one or two second diration at this stage.
In other words before you reached the 1/3 point. Wasn't this whe
this happened.
11111111111 It was very thin.
Now when you got the pitch of warning horn, Jack, did you lock at
that time at .r-our indicated air speed?
Yes air.
Do you remember what it said?
290.
290. How about angle of attack. Do you happen to remtunber that?
No sir, I just noticed that the alpha needle was sitting real close
to the warning needle.
7,dd you estimate the degree of separation?
It was right on it.
Were you getting any buffeting at this time?
Yes sir, I picked up the buffet and the warning horn about the same time.
: Did you, by dhance, check altitude or rate of climb at this time?
I remember looking at rate of climb and there wasn't any. I didn't
check the altitude.
Just prior to this, Jack, had you had to make any throttle change,
to stay with him, an increase or decrease?
1111111111111 No sir. a
He seemed to be at a constant velocity. What was your bank angle .
about this time, do you recall? a
I didn't look at the bank angle. a
25X1A
Approved For Releas2(0%61/06 F8Ri4D-071B00590R000200090001-5
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
Aii SECRET
3tilvJedfotditilleasee2001609/063NCIA9.1RD B001590ROOMIXO9tIOGILSY on h'
wing.
No sir, it didn't feel excessive, in fact I was just mildly surpri ?ed
that I got this, because I wasn't expecting it. This is my story, I rolled olp
sAlle of my bank and started separating.
Had there been any stick rate introduced by yourself, Jack, in t7ing
to stay in with him; was he tightening up the turn or did you get the feelingrthat
he was accelerating in the turn?
No sir, it wasn't noticeable.
And at this time then you were back in the tops of the cirrus, yOu say?
We were still on top, except there was an occasional little thin wIlsp
of cirrus clouds.
I see. Did you notice by any chance, jack, as you hit this puff[ of
cirrus whether there was any precip in it? IL
25X1A Oh, no sir, it was real thin.
25X1A : Okay next sentence. "I told that he was getting UN OLow
for me aid that I was sliding to the outside of the turn to gain airspeed". 'ould
you estimate the speed differential, Jack, were you over running him badly?
No sir. i was falling behind.
At this point you began to fall behind.
25X1A
25X1A
I began to fall behind and actually this reference to speed is noti
,x.a.ctly right in that i should have said bank angle in that I couldn't maint4n
his burn radius with him, and I remember looking at the airspeed and said welp
fm all right. So I just roiled out my bank angle to be able to turn with hit,
61Jt at a greater rate or I should say a Larger diameter or turn radius.
Ouestion: Have you had that trouble on any of the previous turns?
No, but on any of the previous turns i was not this close to him .14
was flying about a mile in trail. We had only made one other previous turn stid
that was over Austin.
OXCART -rertiT
Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71B00590R000200090001-5
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
.QACA,:f J,E.12:RET
25X1A Approved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
You hadn't been in close formation at any prior turns to this one?
No sir.
Did you crowd on any throttle at this point Jack, to try to stay
with him?
Yes sir, I put on throttle, I don't know how much. I didn't put on
full throttle.
1111 No sir, and
would be different. I
You didn't go to military?
I know that I would be separating since the radius of t
was slowly slipping behind at this point. I remeMber pipk-
ing up my Mach and lowering the nose just slightly.
Do you remember what the Mach nuMber was that you
Accelerated up to an indicated Mach of .84.
.84, this would put you at about .88. Did you
burner from Ken. Did you notice any afterburner puffs?
No sir.
Was he doing any gyrations at all?
read at this poi
t?
see any sign of after-
No sir. He looked completely normal, he looked like he was still iM
his level turn to me because I was slightly back and slightly separated. I pueihed
the power up and never did come up to him.
You got no feeling that his bank angle increased or that he nosed4
down or anything of this nature?
No sir.
: Next sentence then. "As the distance between us became greater
intermittently lost sight of him due to the cirrus overcast". What distance, Jack,
is this the distance separation, in other words, he was pulling away from you e.t
this point?
It's hard for me to say whether or not he was pulling away from mell he
was in front of me and I was sliding to the outside of the turn and the greatest
separation we had was when we both rolled out at the completion of the turn at an
Approved For Release 4ogl1tiopt9i. : c*-ppp7 B00590R000200090001-5
25X1A
?AGA,
Appr_oved For Release 2001/09/06 : CIA-RDP71600590R000200090001-5
estimated 4,IVUO feet separation.
turn?
Okay.
I was level with him at this time.
And there was some lateral separation because you slid out of the
Yes sir.
Jack, could you estimate the bank angle, 30 degrees, 45 or 20?
What do you think he had in this turn?
25X1A
This would be sheer speculation on my part, sir, I would say betwee
25X1A
30 and 40 degrees of bank and I thought level.
25X1A Was the horizon of the tops of the cirrus available to you
turn?
in thii
25X1A No sir.
In other words you were pretty much reference his airplane or the
gages, one or the other?
25X1A I was reference his aircraft or my gages because at that time I was
looking northwest and the background was ragged and it wasn't a good referencej
25X1A Okay. Now as the distance between us became greater, I intermittelhtly
lost sight of him due to the cirrus overcast. Here again Jack, now
in our minds I think is, what distance was becoming greater; was he
away or had you overtaken him or what had happened here?
25X1A It was just lateral separation becoming greater, but he was
taming his position in front of me as far as fore and aft separation.
Co]. Nelson: Now at this point do you recall your airspeed or Mach number, or
altitude?
the questia41
still pullJig
25X1A
still main-
No sir, other than just the .84 I knew. I pushed it up though.
: Were you still holding .84 do yolk suppose?
I
Nepoi As far as I know.
25X1A
R
And still no 401 of afterburner from Ken?
Itt0SvedForReleaseA2a0A/09/0_6:cIA-RDP711300590R000200090001-5
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
ijAL;J:ki.4
25X1A Approved For Releaee 2001/09/06 : CIA-RuP71600590R000200090001-5
As distance became greater were you botn in cirrus tops at teis ere?
Yes sir. Now I say cirrus evercast, but actually it was a real seeil
overcast below US and these were juet wisps of cirrus clouds that were above us
and one would COM between my line of s eht; none of them were very big or vere4e
thick.
Could you estimate the visibility whiee you were in the etuff?
you think yuu had a couple of miles, or could you guess at it?
Weil, the little wisp wasn't any bigger tnan this building.
Did you lose sight of him when you went tnrouge this little wisp
cloud?
Yes sir, but it wouldn't last a second or two.
I see, eo you, you wouldn't say that you were centinously in the
cirrus, you were just intermittently passing tnrough?
25X1A No sir. We had been in the cirrus where tne visibility was down to
maybe a mile prior to the turn, but as we turnea north we left most of this berind
UB. This was a fairly clear area that we were in except for these iittie
25X1A : Okay. "When we rolled out of the turn, I was slightly ahead and rbove
and advised him that i was crossing in front of him and was ciimbirig
higher to stay UR". Now Jack, at what point did you get ahead of him?
25X1A just prior to the roil out. Just a matter of guessing, 'd say t1t I
was slowly catching up to him because of my Mach, and I could see that by the time
that I could join up we would probably hit another littee puff. leather than ioin
25X1A
%IS
25X1A
up just at the most inopportune time I started a slight climb and started c oting
in and just about the time we were rolled out is when I passed by him. Weil ias
we roiled eut I was just slightly ahead of him, just completed passing him.
Did you overtake him rapedly? Did you eet the feeling that ne, pe Was
decelerating rapidly at this time or was it a normal closure that you'd plannrd?
Well, to me it didn't seem unusual in that i closea on him at about the
speed I expected to with the increased each that I had.
Approved ForReleaseyeM06 ?9IA-,RDP71600590R000200090001-5
25X1A
2,..(A4, . ..LCRET
1111111111111FprkMulnroc Releaset2130.1reete6 mallAtREIR741360.5961R8130200090001-5.t was
I'd say it was completely normal.
Now you say you went slightly above, Jack, you remember what alt
you were indicating during this closure?
nbrmal?
tude
- 25X1A The first time I looked at my altitude was after I passed him and had
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
rolled out.
Up to this time I'd been watching him and not my awn gages. I w4s
Indicating 36,000 feet.
: At the tine you checked it just after passing?
Just after passing and with wings level.
t You indicated 36, then your actual altitude was very near 37.
Question: Were you still in this little bit of cirrus at this time?
No. I was above it at this time because the last 45 degrees of tufn I'd
started climbing and figured that I couldn't join him in time to be VFR.
You were definitely above the cirrus then at this 36 indicated?
Yes sir.
Was there any turbulence Jack, or was it smooth?
It was very smooth.
Okay. "And at this time he said his heading was 2000 and he said he
saw men Haw did that statement of heading check out with what you thought heI, was
/7lying? In other words, were you near that sane heading to keep him in sightl
Yes sir. I checked it and it was normal and I don't remember anytding
unusual about it.
Question: When you checked your altitude and you said you were above him, howI high
above him. In otherwords when you were at say 37, where was he?
Not more th n 1,000 feet separation, if that much.
He looked to be in straight and level flight to you?
He looked normal,
No unusual angles of attack, or anytatng of that nature?
No sir.
OXCAR1r