BOARD ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00590R000100050032-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 18, 1966
• Content Type: CABLE

O P S E C R E T
IINITIACT INFO
IN 65 169
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T 0 P S E C R E T060623Z CITE 8193
PRIORITY
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HOLD FOR
FILE
IDEALIST
THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE ACCIDENT BOARDS ANALYSIS,
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE LOSS OF ART 384
BOARD ANALYSIS OF THE ACCIDENT
1. HAD ACCUMULATED 3240 HOURS TOTAL FLYING
TIME; 2956) JET WITH 230 HOURS IN THE U-2. OF HIS TOTAL U?2 TIME, 172
HOURS WERE FLOWN IN THE J-75 MODEL. HE HAD FLOWN THE ARTICLE 1313a
IN THE PAST 30 DAYS. ANALYSIS OF HIS TRAINING AND FLIGHT ACTIVITY
REVEALED HE WAS QUALIFIED TO MAKE THE FLIGHT.
2. RECEIVED ADEQUATE REST ON THE EVENING PRIOR TO
THE FLIGHT. HIS FOOD INTAKE AND PREPARATION FOR THE FLIGHT FROM A
PHYSIOLOGICAL STANDPOINT WAS SATISFACTORY AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ESTABLISHED PROCEDURES. THE AUTOPSY REVEALED NO DEVIATIONS FROM
THE NORM WHICH COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT0
3. ARTICLE 384 WAS PREPARED FOR THE FLIGHT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
STANDARD OPERATING PROCED Bit F.S. THE MAINTENANCE CREW WAS WELL QUALI-
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAI THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. NO,
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FIFD TO PERFORM THEIR TASKS. A REVIEW OF AIRCRAFT RECORDS AND. ANALY-
SIS OF PAST MAINTENANCE REVEALED NO DFFICIFNCIF S CONTRIBUTORY TO
THIS ACCIDENT., ANALYSIS OF FUEL AND OXYGEN SAMPLES REVEALED NO
DISCREPANCIES.
4. WAS SCHEDULED FOR A MODIFIED STANDARD TRAINING FLIGHT
NUMBER 106. MODIFICATION OF THE FLIGHT PLAN CONSISTED OF ELIMINATING
THE LAST LFG OF THE STANDARD PLAN. ESSENTIALLY FLIGHT PLAN 106
EXISTING PROCEDURES AND WAS ADEQUATE IN THE OPINION OF THE BOARD
WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE FOLLOWING:
Ae THE PILOT WAS NOT BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ALL AIRFIELDS
ALONG HIS ROUTE CONSIDERED USEABLE AS EMERGENCY ALTFRNATES.
Be THE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES PORTION OF THE BRIEFING DID NOT
EMPHASIZE PROCEDURES. RATHER IT SIMPLY ELICITED A YFS OP NO ANSWER
FROM THE PILOT AS TO WHETHER HE UNDERSTOOD CERTAIN EtMERGF.NCY
PROCFDURES.
C. THE WEATHER PORTION OF THE RRIFFIN'G DID NOT PROVIDE THE
PILOT WITH A CROSS SECTIONAL VIEW OF THE WEATHER NOR DID IT INCLUDE
SUCH ITEMS AS SEA STATE, WATER TEMPERATURE AND SURFACE WIND
CONDITIONS,
Os D. THE PILOTS ROUTE 1AP ANNOTATIONS DID NOT INCLUDE A GO-
NO-CO POINT ON THE CROSS WATER LEGS TO ASSIST THE PILOT IN MAKING HIS
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8193 CIN 65169) PAGE 3
DECISION PF.FFRENCE CONTINUING ON COURSE OR TURNING PACK.
E. THE MAINTENANCE BRIEFER NOTED THAT PILOTS HAD REPORTED.
THE AIRCRAFT AS SLIGHTLY NOSE HEAVY ON TAKE OFF BUT DID NOT EXPAND
ON THE SUBJECT OR GIVE THE. PILOT A REASON FOR THE CONDITION. THIS
CONDITION WAS FOUND TO RE NON-CONTRIBUTORY.
5, ARTICLF 384 WAS LAUNCHED AT :200 HOURS Z AS SCHEDULED.
THE TAKE-OFF CLIMB TO ALTITUDE VAS NORMAL. ONLY ONE DISCREPANCY VAS
NOTED: SHORTLY AFTER TAVE-OFF A "DC GENERATOR OFF THE LINE" CHIRP
WAS PFCFIVFD, IT WAS NOT REPFATED AND AS NOT CONSIDERED CAUSE FOR
25X1A
ALARM. AN "A OK" CHIRP WAS RECEIVED ON SCHEDULE AT 02202,
THE FLIGHT PROGRESSED NORMALLY WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A REQUFST BY THE
PILOT FOP RADAR FOLLOWING DUE TO A "LOUSY" RADIO COMPASS, THE.
25X1 C
RFCUIRFMENT WAS PASSED TO AT 05232 AN OS WAS RECF IVFD
INSTEAD OF AN "A OK". (ON ONF PREVIOUS OCCASION WHEN THE A-OK SYSTEM
HAD MALFUNCTIONED, WAS INSTRUCTED TO AND DID USE THE OS TEST
LIGHT FOR ACTIVATION), A SECOND OS CHIRP WAS HEARD
AT 0614 JUST PRIOR TO THE NEXT SCHEDULED "A OK" TIME OF 0616, THIS
WAS THE LAST NORMAL TRANSMISSION RECEIVED FROM THE AIRCRAFT. AT
0638:20Z A SIXTEEN SECOND
SERIES OF CHIRPS BEGAN. THESE INDICATED ENGINE FAILURE.
COMMAND POST ACTIONS PROCEEDED IN ACCORDANCE, WITH STANDING OPERATING
PROCEDURES, ATTEMPTED TO
CONTACT ARTICLE 384 ON HIGH FREQUENCY RADIO AND UHF. CONTACT WAS NOT
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AIRCRAFT AFTER 06.42Z. (THE INSTALLED IFF TRANSPONDER HAS A CUT-OFF
SWITCH WHICH DEACTIVATES IT AT CABIN ALTITUDES ABOVE 34 THOUSAND FEET
AND REACTIVATES THE EQUIPMENT BELOW 31 THOUSAND FFET). NO FURTHER
CONTACT WAS MADE WITH THE AIRCRAFT DURING THE TERMINAL PHASE OF FLIGHT.
THE PILOTS COCKPIT RECORDER WAS RECOVERED PUT CONTAINED NO RECORDED
TRANSMISSIONS SUBSEQUENT TO 0409Z AT WHICH TIME THE PILOT HAD REQUESTED
RADAR FOLLOWING DUE TO RADIO COMPASS TROUBLE. THE BOARD CONCLUDED THAT
THE PILOT HAD NOT ATTEMPTED CONTACT PRIOR TO BATTERY 25X1C
FAILURE. THE AIRCRAFT IMPACTED IN A RIGHT TURN AT 25X1C
THE PILOT EJECTED AT 240 FEET AND WAS KILLED UPON IMPACT, AT
APPROXIMATELY 0746Z (IMPACT TIME IS BASED ON PROBABLE GLIDE PATH AND
DISTANCE COVERED).
6. UPON TV-PACT WITH THE WATER IN A NOSE LOW, RIGHT WING DOWN
SPIRAL THE AIRCRAFT FRAGMENTED. THE LARGEST SINGLE REMAINING PIECE 25X1C
WAS THE LEFT WING. VILLAGERS FROM THE RECOVERED
THE PILOT?S BODY FROM THE WATER. THE AIRCRAFT W'RFCKAGF WAS RFCOVFREP
AND TRANSPORTED FOR EXAMINATION BY THE 25X1C
ACCIDENT BOARD. EXAMINATION OF THE WRECKAGE AND ANALYSIS LED TO THE
FOLLOWING BOARD CONCLUSIONS:
A. THE AIRCRAFT WAS AT AN ALTITUDE OF BASF PLUS 21 AT THE
TIME OF FNGINF FAILURE.
Be ENGINE EXHAUST GAS TEMPERATURE ESTIMATED AT 615 DEGREES
C. WHICH IS NORMAL FOR THIS FLIGHT CONDITION.
C. ENGINE FAILURE WAS DUE TO THE SEPARATION OF FIVE TURBINE
PLADES AND FOUR DISC FIR TREE SEGMENTS FROM THE NUMBER ONF (N-2)
T(~R Ev~IIF, -.Relr~~ ~j'16P .C~~,F.R[~FIj Q ~ Qf 1Q OPA2-6OMPLFTF. REMOVAL
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OF THE FIRST STAGE TURBINE GUIDE VANES AND TO STOPPAGE OF ENGINE
ROTATION. NONE OF THE TURBINE BLADES OR GUIDE VANES PENETRATED THE
ENGINE CASE, THE BOARD OPINED THAT TOTAL ENGINE RUNDOWN TIME WAS LESS
THAN THIRTY SECONDS. THIS SUBSTANTIATED BY READINGS,
DAMAGE TO THE TURBINE WAS TYPICAL OF THAT ASSOCTATFD WITH DISC 25X1A
FAILURE SUBSEQUENT TO TURBINE SHINGLING, THE ENGINE DID NOT BREAK
LOOSE FROM ITS ATTACHING POINTS AND WAS FOUND TO BE PROPERLY
RESTRAINED AT IMPACT.
D. SUBSEQUENT TO ENGINE FAILURE THE PILOT EXECUTED A RIGHT
TURN OF 190 DFGREFS TO PLACE HIMSELF ON A COURSE OF 70 DEGREES
MAGNETIC FOR A BRIEFED EMERGENCY ALTERNATE.
F. THE POSITION OF COCKPIT SWITCHES INDICATED THAT THE PILOT
CLEANED UP THE COCKPIT FOR A FLAME OUT SITUATION AND ATTEMPTED TO
CONSERVE HIS BATTERY, RECONSTRUCTION OF HIS ACTIONS REVEALED THAT
HE WOULD HAVE LOST HIS PATTERY 35 MINUTES AFTER ENGINE FAILURE AT
24,000 FEET.
F. RECONSTRUCTION OF EXISTING WEATHER REVEALED THAT THE
PILOT PROBABLY PENETRATED A BROKEN TO OVERCAST LAYER AT 33,000 AND
ENCOUNTERED BROKEN TO SCATTERED CLOUDS AT 23,000 AND SCATTERED
CLOUDS AT 1200 FEET,
G, THE AIRCRAFT GLIDED A TOTAL OF 2 69 NM ASSISTED BY A
TAILWIND AVERAGING 25 KNOTS. THIS DISTANCE COMPARES FAVORABLY
WITH BOOK VALUES.
25X1 C
H. THE PILOT APPROACHED FROM THE WEST ACROSS
A LOW HEAD LAND AS IF ATTEMPTING TO EFFECT A CRASH LANDING ON THE
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BEACH WHICH MEASURES APPROXIMATELY 2.000 FEET IN A STRAIGHT LINE. IT
IS POSSIBLE THAT THE PILOT MAY HAVE BEEN DFCFIVFD AS TO ITS LENGTH DUE
TO ITS NARROW WIDTH AND ITS CURVATURE TOWARD THE NORTH. WITNESSES
STATED THE AIRCRAFT APPEARED TO RE UNDER CONTROL. THE PILOT APPARENTLY
MADE A LAST MINUTE DECISION TO EJECT AFTER TRAVERSING APPROXIMATELY
1500 FEET OF THE REACHES LENGTH AT 300-4P0 FEET ALTITUDE.
I, A NORMAL EJECTION WAS EFFECTED. THE CANOPY STRUCK THE
VERTICAL FIN OF THE AIRCRAFT RFSULTING IN IMPACT DAMAGE TO THE
LEADING EDGE, RREAKAGF OF THE CANOPY GLASS AND FAILURE OF THE FRONT
CANOPY BOW FRAME. THIS LEAD WITNESSES ON THE BEACH TO BELIEVE THAT
THE PILOT HAD EITHER EJECTED THROUGH THE CANOPY OR HAD STRUCK IT AFTER
EJECTION, THERE' WAS NO EVIDENCE OF SUCH CONTACT. THE PILOT?S
TARDY EJECTION DID NOT PERMIT THE CHUTE TO COMPLETELY DEPLOY. TIME
OF FALL IS ESTIMATED AT 4 SECONDS. THE ZERO LANYARD WAS NOT ATTACHED
TO THE PARACHUTE D RING. THE PARACHUTE WAS APPROXIMATELY THREE FOURTHS
DEPLOYED WHEN THE PILOT STRUCK THE WATER. HE WAS KILLED UPON
IMPACT DUE TO MASSIVE INTERNAL INJURIES.
J. EXAMINATION OF THE PILOTS LIFE SUPPORT AND SURVIVAL
GEAR REVEALED NO MALFUNCTION WHICH COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO
THE ACCIDENT OR HIS DEMISE. SEVERAL PIECES OF NON-CONTRIBUTORY
SURVIVAL GEAR WFRF FOUND TO BE UNSATISFACTORY AS A RESULT OF THIS
ACCIDENT.
K. AFTER THE PILOT?S EJECTION THE AIRCRAFT CONTINUED ON AN
EASTERLY HEADING FOR APPROXIMATELY 3800 FEET AFTER WHICH IT ENTERED
A RIGHT SPIRAL AND CONTACTED THE WATER IN A NOSE LOW ATTITUDE ON
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A HEADING OF ?.541 DEGREES. BREAK-UP OF THE AIRCRAFT WAS COMPLETE.
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF FIRE OR FXPLOSION. DIVERS RECOVFRED AN
ESTIMATED 59000 SEPARATE PIECES FOR EXAMINATION.
L. EXAMINATION OF THE AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE REVEALED THE AIR-
CRAFT TO HAVE BEEN IN A "CLEAN" CONFIGURATION AT IMPACT WITH GEAR
UP9 SPEED BRAKES RETRACTED, WING FLAPS RETRACTED AND NOT IN GUST,
AND STALL STRIPS RETRACTED.
M. THE IFF BEACON WAS SET TO CODE 77 AND THE UHF RADIO WAS
TUNED TO GUARD CHANNEL. BOTH POWER SW ITCHES WERE "OFF". THE
BOARD CONCLUDED THAT THE PILOT HAD SET THIS EQUIPMENT FOR EMERGENCY
OPERATION BUT HAD TURNED IT OFF TO CONSERVE BATTERY POWER0 IF A
UHF OR HF TRANSMISSION WAS ATTEMPTED BY THE PILOT IT WAS NOT RECORDED
NOR WAS IT HEARD BY ANY OF THE FACILITIES IN THE AREA. IT
IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE PILOT DELAYED HIS ATTEMPTED TRANSMISSION
UNTIL AFTER DEPLETION OF THE BATTERY. 25X1C
N. THE LACK OF RESPONSIVENFSS BY THE
NET IS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN. THE U-2 HAS A LARGE RADAR CROSS SECTION
AND SHOULD BF EASILY IDF.NTIFIABLE WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE
TRANSPONDER, IF RADAR FOLLOWING OF THE AIRCRAFT IN ITS EMERGENCY HAD
BEEN PROVIDED, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT AIR DEFENSE FIGHTERS COULD HAVE
BEEN VECTORED TO ITS ASSISTANCE. HEADQUARTERS USAF WAS QUERIED FOR
AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAILURE TO TRACK THE AIRCRAFT PUT NONE HAD PFFN
RECEIVED AS OF THE TIME OF REPORT COMPLETION OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT
THE WAS DOWN FOR MAINTENANCF AT THE TIME OF THE
25X1 C
INCIDENT. ANALYSIS OF TPACKING INFORMATION PASSED TO
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REVEALED MUCH OF IT TO BE IN ERROR IN THAT PLOTTED POINTS WOULD
HAVE REQUIRED A GROUND SPEED IN EXCESS OF THE AIRCRAFTS CAPABILITY,
0. SABOTAGE WAS RULED OUT AS A POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR.
THE MOST CONVINCING WAY TO ELIMINATE SABOTAGE AS A CONSIDERATION IN
AN ACCIDENT IS TO ESTABLISH THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT AS MECHANICAL
AND OF SUCH A NATURE THAT FAILURE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN INDUCED PY
HUMAN INTERVENTION. IN THE CASE OF ARTICLE 354, THIS HAS BEEN DONE
TO THE BOARDS SATISFACTION. CONCURRENT WITH THE BOARD?S INQUIRIES
INTO THE MECHANICAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE FLIGHT, AN
EXAMINATION WAS MADE IN THE PERSONNEL AND PHYSICAL SECURITY AREAS OF
CONCERN. NOTHING WAS FOUND WHICH WOULD HAVE A BEARING ON THE FLIGHT
IN QUESTION.
PRIMARY CAUSE
MATERIAL FAILURE OF THE NUMBER ONE TURBINE DISC WHICH
RESULTED IN STOPPAGE OF THE ENGINE. DEMISE OF THE PILOT IS
ATTRIBUTED TO FAILURE TO EJECT AT A SAFE. ALTITUDE.
DISCUSSION:
1. FAILURE OF THE TURBINE WHEEL WAS FOUND TO BE TYPICAL OF
THAT ASSOCIATED WITH A PHENOMENON KNOWN AS BLADE SHINGLING*
SHINGLING OF THE TURBINE BLADE TIP SHROUDS OF THE J?75 SERIES
OF ENGINES OCCURS WHEN THE TURBINE ASSEMBLY IS EXPOSED TO HIGH
TEMPERATURE TRANSIENTS SUCH AS MAY BE EXPERIENCED WHEN STARTING WITH A
MARGINAL POWER UNIT, STARTING WITH THE FUEL CONTROL SELECTOR
SWITCH IN EMERGENCY, PREMATURE MOVEMENT OF THE THROTTLE TC IDLE
BEFORE OBTAINING MINIMUM START RPM, FAILING TO ACTIVATE IGNITION
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TRANSIENTS MAY BE OF MUCH A SHORT DURATION THAT THEY APE
NOT INDICATED ON THE COCKPIT FGT GAGE. HISTORICALLY SUCH OCCURRENCES
HAVE EVIDENCED THEMSELVES BY AN OVERLAPPING OF THE TURBINE BLADE TIP
SHROUDS CALLED SHINGLING. CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE ENGINE AFTER
THIS SITUATION OCCURS LEADS TO IMPOSITION OF BENDING LOADS WHICH
ARE CONCENTRATED I N THE DISC AT THE "FIR TREE" ATTACHMENT POINTS.
FAILURE OF THE DISC ULTIMATELY OCCURS. INSPECTION PROCEDURES FOR
SHINGLING IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT CALLED FOR VISUAL
INSPECTION OF THE THIRD STAGE TURBINE DISC FROM OUTSIDE THE
AIRCRAFT WITH A STRONG LIGHT AND MONOCULAR EACH TWENTY-FIVE HOURS OF
ENGINE OPERATION. IN COGNIZANCE OF THE FACT THAT THIS INSPECTION
HAD BEEN COMPLETED WITHIN SIXTEEN HOURS OF THE FAILURE OF FNGINF
P611434, THE BOARD CONSIDERED THE EXISTING INSPECTION MARGINAL.
THE ONLY TWO FAILURES OF THIS TYPE TO OCCUR IN THE U-2 FLEET
HAVE OCCURRED IN P-17 CONVERSION ENGINES. THESE ENGINES WERE
INTRODUCED INTO THE FLEET FROM THE F-106 PROGRAM WHERE THEY WOULD
NORMALLY BE SUBJECTED TO HIGHER TEMPERATURES THAN ENCOUNTERED IN
THE U-2 INSTALLATION. THERE IS THEREFORE BASIS FOR FURTHER
INVESTIGATION OF HOT SECTION COMPONENTS OF THESE ENGINES TO
DFTEPMINE IF INCIPIENT STRESS CONCENTRATIONS OR OTHER MATERIAL DEFECTS
MAY HAVE PEEN CARRIED FORWARD DURING THE CONVERSION PROGRAM.
ENGINE P611434 IS BEING RETURNED TO THE MANUFACTURER FOR FURTHER
INVESITIGATION ALONG THESE LINES.
2. THE PILOTS EJECTION AT 240 FEET DID NOT ALLOW TIME FOR FULL
DEPLOYMFNT OF THE PARACHUTE. THE +J-2 FLIGHT HANDBOOK RECOMMENDS
EJECA4 vMd' F6r N ilgii$"WtiON069W IAF-fiBP74 M0P,WMb 2c& NP IT IONS AND
T 0 P S F C R E T
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10,000 FEET WHEN IN A SPIN OR DIVF. THE NO FLAP, FLAME OUT LANDING
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AIRCRAFT REQUIRES NEAR IDEAL CONDITIONS. TEST
FLIGHTS HAVE PROVEN THEM TO PE EXTREMELY TAXING ON THE PILOT?S
CAPARILITIFS. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD THFY BE ATTEMPTED
ON A REACH OTHER UNPREPARED TERRAIN EXCEPT AS A LAST RESORT.
RFCOMMENDATIONS:
1. REVIEW' ALL ENGINE TURBINE HISTORY RECORDS. REMOVE FROM
SERVICE ANY ENGINE WITH A RECORD OF OVERHAUL FOR POSSIBLE OVF.R-
TEMPFRATURE UNLESS TURBINE DISC REPLACEMENT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED.
2. PERFORM A COMPLETE METALLURGICAL REVIEW OF ALL HOT SECTION
COMPONENTS IN J-75-P13 ENGINES TO ASSURE THAT NO MATERIAL DEFECTS
HAVE BEEN CARRIED FORWARD DURING CONVERSION FROM OTHER MODELS.
A REVIEW OF MATERIAL INSPECTION PROCEDURES SHOULD ALSO BF
ACCOMPLISHED TO ASSURE THAT ONLY HIGHEST QUALITY MATERIALS ARE
BEING USED.
3. THE TURBINE INSPECTION FOR SHINGLED BLADES SHOULD FE
PERFORMED AT EACH POSTFLIGHT. INSPECTION PROCEDURES SHOULD RE
FXPANDFD TO ASSURE THAT A SHINGLED PLADF IN ANY TURRINF WHEFL
WILL BE DETECTED.
4. INCREASE MINIMUM GROUND START RPM TO 16 PERCENT.
5. LIMIT ALL TAKEOFFS TO GATE POWER.
6. REMOVE THE THREE POSITION FUEL CONTROL SELECT SWITCH FROM
THE COCKPIT AND REPLACE WITH A TWO POSITION SWITCH.
7. REBRIEF ALL PERSONNEL CONCERNED WITH ENGINE STARTING AND
OPERATION ON REVISED STARTING PROCEDURES AND PROPER SEQUENCE OF
STEPSAarA1" fpr a le@ ~4 / ~~IT~ RR~ 1~ ~~4 '10$~ l~:~NF55 OF
T 0 P S F C R E T
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TRANSITORY HIGH TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS,
S. REVIEW EXISTING RADAR FLIGHT FOLLOWING PROCEDURES AND
AGREFMFNTS APPLICABLE TO OPERATION OF THE U-2 IN THE FAR EAST AND
d
J REVISF TO ASSURE CONTINUOUS FOLLOWING AND CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE
ASSISTANCE IN EMFRGENCIFS.
9. REPLACE PRESENT IFF TRANSPONDER 47ITH ONE NOT REQUIRING
PRESSURIZATION.
10. REPLACF ARC-34 UHF EQUIPMENT WITH COMMUNICATIONS
CAPABILITY NOT REQUIRING PRESSURIZATIONo
a.` 1 ESTABLISH SOPS TO PROVIDE UPDATED WEATHER TO THE PILOT
DURING LONG TRAINING FLIGHTS.
I " REVIEW EXISTING SEARCH AND RESCUE PROCEDURES TO ASSURE
MAXIMUM ASSISTANCE TO PILOT.
13. EXPAND DEAD ENGINE GLIDE DATA IN THE FLIGHT HANDBOOK TO
INCLUDE NOTATIONS ON THE EFFECT OF FLAPS, SPEED PRAKES, GEAR AND
SLIPPERS. THE EFFECT OF WEIGHT AND THE ADVISEABILITY OF DUMPING FUEL
SHOO ALSO BE EXPANDED ON.
I EXPAND THE PILOT?S PRE-FLIGHT BRIEFING TO INCLUDE:
A WEATHER CROSS SECTION FOR LONG RANGE FLIGHTS.
STATUS OF ALL USEABLE AIRFIELDS ALONG THE FLIGHT PATH*
STATUS OF RADARS ALONG THE ROUTE.
MAP ANNOTATIONS TO SHOW POINT OF NO RETURN AND GO-NO-GO
INFORMATION IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.
SEA STATE, WATER TEMPERATURE. AND SPECIFIC WATER SURVIVAL
TFCHNIQUES TO RE EMPLOYED.
SPECIFIC EMERGENCY PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO THE MISSION.
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EXPFND PILOT TRAINING PROCEDURE TO REQUIRE MEMORY KNOWLEDGE
OF BOLD FACE ITEMS IN EMERGENCY CHECK LISTS.
16. MINIMUM SAFE EJECTION ALTITUDE OF 2,000 FEET WITH AIRCRAFT
UNDER CONTROL SHOULD RE STRESSED TO ALL DRIVERS AND BE A PART OF
EVERY BRIEFING.
pjt-0 Ts
{, Uj7 ALL rrtVMS SHOULD ATTEND FORMAL 4:ATER SURVIVAL TRAINING
TO BUILD UP CONFIDENCE. TRAINING MUST INCLUDE EXPERIENCE IN
BOARDING THE ONE MAN AND SIX MAN LIFE RAFTS IN A PRESSURE SUIT AND PROPER
EQUIPMFNT HANDLING PROCEDURES.
PILOTS SHOULD BE REBRIEFFD ON THE. CASE WITH WHICH SURVIVAL
ITEMS CAN BE LOST WHEN THEY ARE NOT KEPT IN THE "RUCK" SACK WHEN
ABOARD A RAFT.
1/19o ASR-100 RADIO IS UNSATISFACTORY IN ITS PRESENT CONFIGURATION.
IT RFQUIRES WATERPROOFING THAT WILL NOT BE. DESTROYED WHEN
SUBJECTED TO DECOMPRESSION.
20. A MAN SEAT SFPFRATOR SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO INSURE FASTFR
SEAT SEPARATION AND MORE RAPID PARACHUTE DEPLOYMENT.
21. AN EJECTION SFAT WITH A ZERO ALTITUDE CAPABILITY SHOULD
BF PROVIDED.
22 o URT?21 ON-OFF SWITCH CHECK PROCEDURE SHOULD BE EXPANDED
TO RFQUIRE A DOURLF CHECK JUST PRIOR TO THE PILOTS INSTALLATION
IN THE COCKPIT.
23. PROVIDE A TIF.?DOWN CAPABILITY IN THE "RUCK" SACK FOR
ALL SEAT KIT COMPONENTS.
T O P S F C R E T
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PACE 13
?A. IN THE MEDICAL FIRST AID KIT, REPLACE MORPHINE SYRETTES
WITH MFPFRDTNE TABLETS AND OINTMENT TUBES WITH OINTMENT TINS.
V VAC UM PACK ALL TABLETS TO PREVENT DESTRUCTION BY DECOMPRESSION,
25, RFPACYAGF. SUNBURN OINTMENT FROM PRESENT TUBE TO OINTMENT
BOX. IMPROVE VATEPPROOF PACKING FOR MATCHES.
0 P S F C R F T TOR: 0615262 JUL 66
T 0 P S E C R F T
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