THE OTEPKA APPOINTMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000500280005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: April 25, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

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April': 25 , 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
Of this shocking incident. I ask unani-
? Mons consent that my news release of
April 15, 1969 be printed in the Cox-
? GRESSIONAL RECOR9 taming my re-
marks.
There being no objection, the news re-
lease was ordered to be printed in the
? RECORD, as follows:
A NEWS RELEASE PROM THE OFFICE OF U.S.
SENATOR STROM THURMOND, REPUBLICAN OF
SOUTH CAROLINA, APRIL 15, 1969
WASHINGTON, D.C.?North Korea's destruc-
tion of a U.S. Navy unarmed _aircraft in the
free skies over international_ waters is an-
other act of dastardly aggression by the com-
munists. The military power of the U.S. can
no longer be made a mockery by North Ko-
rea, This malicious act in violatioh_of inter-
national la.tv cannot be accepted. It is time we
?
use our power to protect our men and our
national interests.
It is most disturbing to me that the 'United
States did not provide fighter aircraft to pro-
tect this reconnaissance flight in such a sen-
sitive area. Apparently, this Navy flight was a
"flying Pueblo." I would think by this time
that we would have learned a tragic lesson
In dealing with North Korea which has been
committing provocative acts of aggression for
years against our forces and South Korea. I
would like to know why this "flying Pueblo"
was not protected.
I am hopeful that currentsearch and res-
cue operations for the crew of 31 are suc-
cessful. However, it is most di,stressing to
learn that the U.S. is sending only one search
aircraft and two destroyers for the search.
? The U.S. Navy and Air Force should move
In appropriate strength to the Sea of Japan
in search of the crew. It should be an sn-
? out search with maximum combat forces. If
North Korea attack s this rescue force, then
our forces should be under orders to destroy
? all attackers.
THE DUBCEK 0USTF4R
Mr. THURMOND.. Mr. President, 2
? weeks ago I stood in the streets of Prague
--and WatohOd. the expressions on the faces
. of the Czechoslovak people, hungry, for
- freedom. Ifiald then that it was my _hope
that the Czechoslovak peoRle would ep.-
toy the same freedoms_ which we _enjoy
In the lJnited. Stales.
At that time, those of us in tho--dele-
gation did not know ;that First_ Party
, Secretary Alexander Dubcek had,alres,dy
'been designs.ted to be rernoiecl.frorn his
()Mee. That 'very day, Marshal" of the
Soviet Union, A. A. Oretehko, was in con-
ference with Dubcek, giving him his or-
des from Moscow. ,
Dubcek was out, Gustav Husak was
In. Stalin* Was 2nce more trinninhant
In Czechoslovakia, as it must be trium-
phant wherever cornmunism, exerts itS
rule. We did not know then nor did the
world until the following week that Dub-
-eek was being removed by Soviet orders,
but it was obvious that pu1c4? WQ1,1113
remain in _office only as_long as the 4:)-
? vietsAhougM it necessarY, to, exterminate
fl ,pposiffori.
'
. President the Stale pewsisper
? has ably summed- up the contrast be-
tween Dubcek and Tito in their editorial
"Goodbye to Dubcek." The State says:
Free inquiry must of necessity lead to re-
,jection 0f Communism as a system of eco-
?.,noinics and, it is this system_ on which the
-,state, is built. Tito, for allAis corruption of
:'Comanunist economies, hag -never been so
? foolish as to Suggest that dangerous ideas
__should not be suppressed and their propo- recent weeks, the New York Times has
nents punished, published three articles and editorial at- published testimony before the Senate
- --, , ? -
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This, in essence, sums up the meaning
of communism and Soviet rule.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD the
editorial entitled "Goodbye to Dubcek,"
published in The State for April 20,
1969.
There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
GOODBYE TO DUBCEFL
The Czech reformer, Mr. Alexander Dub-
cek, has been relieved of his public duties
and upw will have time, if he lives, to re-
flect on the error of his ways. Chief among
his missteps, as Dubcek must recognize bet-
ter than anyone else, was the attempt to
mix oil and water?that is to say, Com-
munism and freedom.
This is a nearly impossible task under the
best conditions, and it was Dubcek's mis-
calculation to attempt it under the worst.
Even had he been able to reconcile the con-
? tradictions at home, the Russians would
have prevented it. They understand what
? Dubcek allowed himself to forget: To cure
the disease of Communist totalitarianism is
to kill the doctor.
? Economists?even Communist econo-
? mists?long have recognized the fallacy of
_Marxism and its Labor Theory of Value. Pure
Marxism, which dismisses the function of
profit, is incapable of assigning priorities
to investment and disinvestment and conse-
quently cannot. work. But the pretense is
maintained. It has to be maintained, for
without the excuse of Marxist economics
the need for state management ceases to
exist.
? This is fundamental to an understanding
of why the most permissive Communist gov-
ernments require rigid censorship. They may
fudge on the economics of Comrimnism?
slyly instituting the profit motive by some
other name, as in the,
Romania and
even the Soviet Union. But they cannot al-
low the unfettered freedom of speech and
scholarship that free nations accept as a
matter of course.
Add to this the danger that nationalism
represents to Moscow's military complex in
Eastern Europe and it is easy to see why
Dubcek failed. He was doomed from the start.
As long as the Western nations keep hands
off the satellites?which is likely to be a
gocZ, long while?the Russians always will
snuff otif such rebellions as jeopardize the
purity of fictive Communism among the So-
viet dependents.
- Optimism was sustained in Dubcek's case
'only because of the failure in the West to
understand or accept the necessarily repres-
sive nature of Communism. It was thought
that Cech.COmmunism could be liberalized,
the press unshackled, scholars cut loose from
their straitjackets, critics set free to probe
the Marxist superstition. This appears to
have been Dubcek's misapprehension, too,
although in the early stages of reform he was
moved to warn against any attempt to chal-
-lenge the Communist theology.
- This very warning underscores the Dubcek
error. Free inquiry must of necessity lead
to rejection of Communism as a system of
economics, and it is this system on. which the
state -is-built. Tito, for all hie corruption
Of Communist economics, has never been so
foolish as to suggest that dangerous ideas
should not be suppressed and their propo-
nents punished.
.Tito has survived. _Dubeck hat not: And
free men will contemplate this lesson in sur-
vival without enjoyment.
THE Watlior4C APPOINTMENT
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, in
S 4101
tacking the judgment of President Nixon
in appointing Otto Otepka to the Sub-
versives Activities Control Board.
While everyone has a right to an
opinion on this topic, the New York
Times has been less than candid in ac-
knowledging its own conflict of interest
In this affair. Readers who read the re-
cent editorial attacking Mr. Otepka's
integrity would have found no clue indi-
cating that one of the principal names
in the Otepka case was printed at the top
of the newspaper masthead. I am refer-
ring, of course, to Mr. Harding F. Ban-
croft, executive vice president of the New
York Times.
Mr. Bancroft's name was one of six
individuals submitted to Mr. Otepka for
evaluation from a security and suitabil-
ity standpoint, His name was among
those who were judged to require further
investigation under law and regulations
before the appointment could be made.
In other words, because of certain mate-
rial of a security nature which Mr.
Otepka found in their files, the regula-
tions of the State Department under Ex-
ecutive Order No. 10450 required that a
full investigation would be necessary.
This is not to say that Mr. Otepka la-
beled Mr. Bancroft as a security risk or
made any allegations whatsoever about
his character. He merely said that the
same regulations should apply to Mr.
Bancroft as would apply to any other
citizen of the United States under such
circumstances.
Instead of accepting Mr. Otepka's
recommendation, the State Department
chose to appoint Mr. Bancroft on a
waiver, thereby taking the case out of
Mr. Otepka's hands. This action later be-
came a central issue in Mr. Otepka's tes-
timony before the Senate Internal Se-
curity Subcommittee when he cited it
as an example of declining respect for
security regulations. When his superiors
denied that this action had been taken,
Mr. Otepka furnished for the subcom-
mittee his memorandum protesting the
waivers as evidence that his superiors
had lied.
Today we find, then, that Mr. Ban-
croft is now the executive vice president
of the newspaper which is leading the
attack against Mr. Otepka. I repeat that
Mr. Otepka never attacked Mr. Bancroft
but merely said he should be subject to
the same security regulations as any
other U.S. citizen. Now, 8 years later,
Mr. Bancroft's newspaper is leading the
vendetta against Mr. Otepka. It is hard
to believe that there is not some element
of retaliation in this instance.
It is also interesting that Mr. Ban-
croft's expressed views on security were
contrary to the security policies under
which Mr. Otepka was operating. After
Mr. Bancroft was hired on the basis of
- a security waiver, he participated in a
report for the State Department, recom-
mending that U.S. citizens employed by
the United Nations should not be made
the subject of regular security precau-
tions. The report of this Commission
also became one of the cases investigated
by the Senate Internal Security Subcom-
mittee as evidence of the degenerating
security system at the State Department.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that pertinent excerpts from the
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S 4102 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 25f 1969
Internal Security Subcommittee be
printed in the RECORD at the conclusion
of my remarks. I also ask unanimous con-
sent that two columns by Paul Scott re-
porting on Mr. Bancroft and the New
York Times campaign be printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9.)
EXHIBIT 1
STATE DEPARTMENT INTERNAL CORRESPOND-
ENCE LEADING UP To ISSUANCE OF SECURITY
WAIVERS FOR HARDING BANCROFT, ET AL.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, REFERENCE SLIP,
FEBRUARY 4, 1963
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Security
Routing. Mr. Otepka.
Subject: Loyalty Investigation of U.S. Citi-
zens Employed by International Orga-
nizations.
Would you look into this please and may
I have your views by February 8?
Attachment: Copy of MEMO FOR OIA?
Mr. Hefner re sub] dtd 1-27-63.
From: John F. Reilly.
JANUARY 27, 1963.
Memorandum for: OIA?Mr, Hefner.
Subject: Loyalty Investigations of U.S. Citi-
zens Employed by International Orga-
nizations.
It seem to me the subcommittee has made
a sufficiently strong case for changing the
policy on loyalty investigations, to justify
our pushing right ahead with a recommend-
ation for the change.
I take it that the essential change (to pro-
vide that non-professional employees, em-
ployees in P-1 slots, and persons employed
for less than two years, should be cleared
on the basis of a check without full field in-
vestigation) could be accomplished through
a change in the Executive Order without a
change in basic legislation involved. This
would also be true of the other recommenda-
tion, that professional employees be cleared,
with a full field investigation after they have
been hired, could also be done by Executive
Order, but I doubt if we would want to do
this without full consultation on the Hill,
notably with Senator Stennis.
You already have the original of a mem-
orandum from the Legal Adviser. Would you
please work with L in developing a recom-
mendation to the Secretary, which should
also be cleared with Mr. Orrick and Mr.
Dutton?
IO?HARLAN CLEVELAND.
CC: Mr. Wanner
Mr. Gardner
Mr. Chayes
Mr. Orrick
Mr. Dutton
FEBRUARY 8, 1963.
Mr. RErux: As requested by you. I have
looked into this matter fully and have ob-
tained significant information which I am
ready to discuss with you today at your con-
venience. (I wil be at an ICES meeting in
Justice from approximately 1:45 p.m. to 4:00
Pin.)
OTTO F. OTEPKA.
Attachments:
1. Copy of Memorandum for OIA?Mr.
Hefner re Loyalty, Investigations by Inter-
national Organizations, dated January 27,
1963
2. Mr. Reilly's chit to Mr. Otepka of Feb.
4, 1963
[Confidential]
SEPTEMBER 17, 1962.
IO?Mr. George M. Czayo
0/SY?John F. Reilly [initialed J.F.R. in
ink].
Processing of Appointments of Members of
the Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Organization Staffing.
Reference your memorandum of July 6,
1962 which furnished a copy of Mr. Harlan
Cleveland's memorandum dated July 3, 1962
to Under Secretary Ball describing a pro-
posal to establish an advisory committee
that would undertake a study with respect
to fiscal policy and staffing of international
organizations. Mr. Cleveland's memorandum
expressed his concern that posts available to
the United States and to other non-Commu-
nist countries in the UN agencies be prop-
erly staffed in order to effectively combat
Soviet subversive designs on those agencies.
In a memorandum dated August 7, 1962
addressed to PER-EMD--Mr. Simpson (copy
to SY) you requested that the proposed
members of the Committee be entered on
duty as employees by a security waiver and
indicated that each proposed member would
comply with the Department's regulations
by supplying completed processing forms.
As of this date full security clearances
have been issued for Arthur Larson and
Francis 0. Wilcox. Mr. Sol Linowitz's will
also be issued shortly. As to the others, forms
have been received for all except Harding
Bancroft, Joseph Pois and Kerney Brasfield
which, it is understood, are forthcoming.
Mr. William II. Orrick, Jr., Deputy Under
Secretary for Administration, has issued a
memorandum expressing his reluctance to
recommend to the Secretary that he sign
any further waiver unless there was a gen-
uine urgency and an ample justification for
the person's services.
In view of the fact that the full Commit-
tee shall not meet again until sometime in
November and that five of the individuals
proposed for membership on the committee
have data in their files developed by prior
investigation that is not entirely favorable,
I am not recommending that waivers be
granted.
0/SY: DIBelisle [initialed in ink] : mc Dist.:
Orig & 1 addressee
cc subjectfile
cc chron cc OPO chron.
EXHIBIT NO. I?a
[Handwritten note at top of memo: "Sent to
Reilly for signature, 9/13/62.1
TO?Mr. George M. Czayo
0,/SY?John F. Reilly
Processing of Appointments of Members of
the Advisory Committee on International
Organization Staffing
Reference is made to your initial memo-
randum of July 6, 1962, addressed to SY?Mr.
Otepka with which you furnished a copy of
Mr. Harlan Cleveland's memorandum dated
July 3, 1962, to Under Secretary Ball describ-
ing a proposal to establish an advisory com-
mittee that would undertake a study extend-
ing over a period of about six months with
respect to fiscal policy and staffing of interna-
tional organizations. I have particularly
noted in Mr. Cleveland's memorandum his
concern that posts available to the United
States and to other non-Communist coun-
tries in the U.N. agencies be properly staffed
in order to effectively combat Soviet subver-
she designs on those agencies.
In your initial memorandum you indicated
that the members of the committee would
need to be appointed to the Department as
Consultants and each would require a secu-
rity clearance predicated on a full field in-
vestigation. Also, you requested a security
clearance to allow the proposed members to
participate in the first meeting of the com-
mittee to be held on July 25, 1962 in which
classified data would be discussed. With the
understanding that the participants (except
those who were already State Department
employees) would have controlled access to
classified data through Secret as necessary
for the meeting and with the further under-
standing that the services they contributed
would not then constitute employment by
the Department, BY granted an "access"
clearance to these participants. Subsequently,
these and other proposed members of the
committee were granted the same level of
clearance by SY for a second meeting in the
terms of the same understanding as for the
first meeting. Such clearances are permitted
by Section 7, E. 0. 10601 for persons not ac-
tually employed by the Federal Government
who may need to be consulted occasionally
in some specialized field.
In a second memorandum dated August 7,
1962 addressed by you to PER/EMD?Mr,
Simpson (copy to SY) you requested that the
proposed members of the committee be en-
tered on duty as employees by a security
waiver (i.e. an emergency clearance signed by
the Secretary pursuant to 3 FAM 1914.2) . You
indicated that each proposed member would
comply with the Department's regulations by
supplying completed processing forms (appli-
cations for employment, security question-
naires, fingerprint charts, etc.).
In resume, as of this date full security
clearances under E. 0. 10450 for employment
in sensitive positions have been issued by SY
to PER/EMD for Arthur Larson and Francis
0. Wilcox. Their security history satisfied the
requirements of E. 0, 10450 without the ne-
cessity of either person furnishing any proc-
essing forms for SY use and without resort-
ing to a waiver. As to the others, forms have
been received for all except Harding Bancraft,
Joseph Pols and Kerney Brasfield which, it
is'understood, are forthcoming.
I have been informed that the full com-
mittee shall not meet again until some time
in November. I share Mr. Cleveland's concern
with regard to one objective to be achieved
from the committee's study, namely, the de-
feat or minimising of Soviet subversive tac-
tics. For these and the following reasons I
would like to urge you to withdraw your
request for a security waiver :
1. An emergency clearance does not allow
SY to take the maximum precautions pre-
scribed by regulations for the security of the
Department's operations. When a person is
permitted to occupy a sensitive position be-
fore he is adequately investigated and where
he must have access to highly classified in-
formation in the course of his duties, post
appointment investigations may develop de-
rogatory information thereby creating a ques-
tion as to whether the Department's security
interests have been damaged by disclosing
vital data to a potentially undesirable person.
2. The frequent, and perhaps excessive use
in the recent past of emergency clearances for
officer personnel caused Mr. Orrick to issue a
memorandum clearly expressing his reluc-
tance to recommend to the Secretary that he
sign any further waiver unless there was a
genuine urgency and an ample justification
for the person's services.
3. Five of the individuals proposed for
membership on the committee have data in
their files developed by prior investigations,
-that is not entirely favorable. These in-
vestigations are either not current or are in-
complete, or both. On the basis of the provi-
sions in E. 0. 10450, some, if not all of this
information must be carefully reconsidered
under a broad security standard which can
hest be done if a supplementary and current
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Aprii'425, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
investigation is complete before those per-
sons alter on duty as erriployees.
4. SY 'believes that if the Meetings of the
Colnmittee are not to be'resurneifuntil No-
veMber we can provide the necessary investi-
gation of each case that should fully re-
solve any presently existing question. We
cannot, of course, predict the final outcome,
but we believe it is not in the Department's
best interest to "invite" any derogatory case
Into the Department before a full investiga-
tion has been completed and an impartial
and thorough assessment has been made
based on all of the facts.
5. SY is preps:red soon to add the full
clearance of Sol Linowitz to those granted to
Mr. Larson and Mr. Wilcox.
Distribution:
Orig and 1 addressee
cc?chron file
cc?subject file
cc?chron file (Mr. Reilly's)
0/SY/E:OFOtepka:ebp, 9-13-62.
EXHIBIT No. I-b
DEPARTIVIENT OF STATE REFERENCE SLIP,
? SEPTEMBER 13, 1962
To: Mr. Belisle [initial in ink].
Mr. Reilly.
[for] (X) Approval. (X) Signature.
Remarks or additional routing:
Dave, re your note appended to my merrio-
randuna of September 10, 1962 as result of my
conversation with Czayo who said commit-
tee would not meet again Until November, I
prepared a memorandum from JFR to Czayo
which I think will dispense with the neces-
sity of taking this up with Orrick along
the lines you suggested.
Attachment: Suggested memorandum to
Mr. Czayo drftd. by Mr. Otepka.
orro F. OTEPKA.
EXHIBIT NO. I-0
Handwritten memo to Mr. Otepka:
OTTO: Pls. prepare a memo for Mr. Or-
rick relating the reasons for our recommen-
dations that we not grant the waiver.
You will have to summarize the info rather
than referring to the Tabs.
Buggest you follow this procedure rather
'than the memo from SY/E to SY. This will
? eliminate Unnecessary typing and work on
your part.
/8/ BELISLE.
9-11-62.
Handwritten marginal note: "Not neces-
sary. See subsequent memo to IO. Czayo.
CFO 9/13762"
Miran No. I-d
Handwritten memo on margth of copy
sheet.
3x5 "chit," handwritten, from Belisle to
Reilly re Otepka's draft of 9/13/62.
JACK: I agree with the conclusions?how-
ever, we sure go thru a h-1 of a lot of
words. If you concur, Fin going to start
knocking these down?short and concise.
/s/ D.
Handwritten memo on bottom of copy
sheet: "Reilly's note said 'I agree. Let's start
with this one'."
?
Exiasrr No. I-e
_apartment of -State Washington.
?rap'f.G..partrient.aI Reference.
Ref erred' tO: "Otto, Office of Security, Division
of EvalUati-Ons, September 20, 1.964.
Comments: I aril retiiiiiing your orig along
with copy sent to rewrite.
Please make memos short?concise and to
the point, Your orig was too verbose and con-
? tained too much detail.
/s/ BELISLE
Exmarr No. I-f
[Confidential]
erk.MBER 10, 1962.
0/SY?Mr. Johq F. Reilly.
SY/E?Otto F. Otepka?F [initialed in ink]
Francis 0. Wilcox, Arthur Larson, Law-
rence Finkelstein, Marshall D. Shulman,
Andrew Cordier, Ernest Gross, Harding Ban-
croft, Sol Linowitz.
On August 7, 1962, IO?Mr. Czayo sub-
mitted a request to PER/EMD concerning
emergency clearance for each of the above
individuals pursuant to 3 FAM 1914.2 indi-
cating therein that immediate interim clear-
ance be processed for Shulman and Finkel-
stein and that subsequent requests for emer-
gency clearance would follow for the others.
pER/EMD forwarded Mr. Czayo's memoran-
dum to SY on August 8, 1962 accompanied
by a specific request for an immediate
"waiver" on Shulman and Finkelstein.
Acting on the basis of information pro-
vided by 10 that it was necessary for Assist-
ant Secretary Cleveland urgently to utilize
Wilcox, Larson, Finkelstein, Shulman, Cor-
dier, and Gross on the Advisory Committee
on International Organization Staffing with
the understanding that they (a) would have
only limited and controlled access to certain
data relating to these operations (b) would
not enter into any formal employment re-
lationship and (c) would not be compen-
sated for their services, SY granted those
six persons clearances for access to classified
data through Secret (as permitted by Sec-
tion 7, E. 0. 10501) to enable them to par-
ticipate in two initial meetings of the Com-
mittee. It was stated by 10 that formal em-
ployment of these persons would take place
at a later date.
In the meantime SY continued to process
the usual preliminary inquiries which are
conducted On proposed emergency appointees.
While these were in process Mr. Orrick issued
his memorandum of August 21, 1962 express-
ing his reluctance to further recommend any
emergency clearance to the Secretary unless
amply justified and also indicating that he
would insist on full field investigations, in-
cluding completion of processing forms and
personal interviews, before a clearance would
be granted for employment in a sensitive
position.
I have examined the Sy files and other
records on all of the eight individuals. I
found that the investigative and clearance
data in the cases of Wilcox and Larson is ade-
quate to issue a full security clearance with-
out further investigation and without these
persons having to submit SF-86 and SF-87.
/ am concerned, however, with the others on
whom I submit the following r?m?
LAWRENCE FINKELSTEIN
There was no pertinent derogatory infor-
mation developed in the preliminary checks.
However, it was revealed Finkelstein was a
research employee of the Institute of Pacific
Relations (1949-51) and a contributor to its
publications. At that time the IPR was un-
der active investigation by the Senate In-
ternal Security Subcommittee. Though not
a Communist organization, subject's activi-
ties on behalf of _the IPR should bear scru-
tiny before (not after) appointment to de-
termine if subject was under the influence
of the inner core directorate of 1PR whom
the Internal Security Subcommittee found
to be Communist or pro-Communist. [One
sentence deleted; reference to medical rec-
ord.]
? There is only meager investigative history
regarding Finkelstein.
?- MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Shulman was considered for an emergency
appointment in January 1958. Pertinent in-
S 4103
,
formation regarding this propbsal is set forth
In the underlying Tab A. Other significant
information appears as Tab B. SY was in-
formed by SCA in February 1958 that Mr.
Shulman "was not available for appoint-
ment." In November 1961 S/S reviewed Shul-
man's SY file following a request that an
inquiry be initiated by SY with respect to
the proposed appointment of Shulman as a
Consultant to Under Secretary Ball. On No-
vember 13, 1961 S/S informed SY it would
have no immediate use for Shulman's serv-
ices.
I do not recommend the emergency clear-
ance of Shulman. It is my view he should be
thoroughly investigated prior to appoint-
ment for the reasons indicated In Tab A.
ANDREW CORDIER
Cordier was employed by the UN from
1946 to 1961. He was Executive Assistant to
Secretary General of the UN, Dag Hammer-
skjold, from 1957 until the latters death In
1961. Cordier then retired from the UN.
Cordier was cleared by the Civil Service
Commission under E. 0. 10422 in 1953 after
appropriate investigation conducted under
the provisions of that Executive Order. A
summary of the investigative data developed
appears in underlying Tab C. Following
that investigation Povl Bang-Jensen, a Dan-
ish employee of the UN, accused Cordier of
pro-Soviet views and charged that Cordier
brought about his (Bang-Jensen's) dis-
missal by the UN because Bang Jensen re-
fused to turn over the names of Hungarian
Freedom Fighters to the UN where the So-
viets would have access to them. Bang-Jen-
sen later was found dead under mysterious
circumstances in Central Park, New York
City. In 1960 the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee published a report on the
Bang-Jensen case which prominently men-
tioned Cordier. Detailed information about
Cordier is in the Bang-Jensen file and this
data needs to be fully coordinated with the
SY file_ on Cordier.
I do not recommend the emergency clear-
ance of Cordier. His SY file together with
the findings of the Internal Security Sub-
committee reflects far too many unresolved
matters which in the best interests of the
Department should be clarified before his
appointment.
? ERNEST GROSS
' Gross is a former Presidential appointee
having served as a U.S. Delegate to UNGA,
successively in 1950-53. He served the De-
partment in other high capacities from 1946
to 1919. He was cleared for those appoint-
ments under the then existing standards.
He has not been investigated since 1953. In
1958 Gross became employed as a legal ad-
viser to Secretary General Dag Hammar-
skjold of the UN and reportedly represented
the Secretary General in the Bang-Jensen
matter. In 1958 Bang-Jensen asserted Gross
was friendly with Alger Hiss. There is no
pertinent data in SY files explaining the
significance of this information.
I recommend that the foregoing matters
reagrding Gross be clarified by investigation
before he re-enters on duty in the Depart-
ment of State in a sensitive position.
nAnnms 13ANCROFT
Bancroft is a former employee of the De-
partment. He left in 1953 when he accepted
an appointment in Geneva with the Interna-
tional Labor Organization. He was consid-
. erect. for reappointrridnt to the Department
in 1955 at which time his case came up for
? readjudication under the standard of E. 0.
10450 in connection with his re-employment
rights. The case was closed without decision
when Bancroft failed to exercise his re-em-
ployment rights. A rough draft summary
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S 4104 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
prepared at that time (Tab 1)) covers the
substantive data in his file. He has not been
Investigated since 1954.
On the basis of the above information I
recommend a supplementary investigation
under E. 0. 10450 before Bancroft is reem-
ployed by the Department.
SOL LINOWITZ
There is no previous investigative data on
Linovsitz in SY files. Preliminary record
checks in files of other agencies are pending.
Unless TO submits a justification indicat-
ing that Linowitz's services are essential to
the immediate needs of the Committee I
would feel that he should be investigated
before appointment and according to the
terms specified in Mr. Orrieks memorandum
of August 21, 1962.
I discussed with Mr. Czayo on September
6, 1962 the provisions in Mr. Orrick's memo-
randum of August 21, 1962 and also pointed
out to him generally the difficulty for SY
in rendering judgment for an interim secu-
rity clearance in the cases of Finkelstein,
Shulman, Cordier, Bancroft, and Gross where
there is unresolved derogatory information.
I said that in such cases there are far more
problems generated in attempting to clarify
the information after appointment than
there would occur if the Department carried
out the requirements prescribed by its regu-
lations, i.e., assuring the maximum security
of its operations and personnel by obtaining
current and satisfactory full field investiga-
tions before appointment.
I told Mr. Czayo that the substantive data
In the five eases (Finkelstein, Shulman,
Cordier, Gross and Bancroft) would be
brought to Mr. Orrick's attention and sug-
gested that perhaps Mr. Cleveland might
wish to discuss them with Mr. Orrick to de-
termine whether the investigations should
proceed on a preappointment or post ap-
pointment basis in the light of the urgency
of the needs of the Department in regard to
the functions of the Advisory Committee on
International Organization Staffing.
You may wish, therefore, to bring this mat-
ter to Mr. Orrick's attention orally. If More
written staffing data is desired please let me
know.
Attachments: A, B, C, and D.
(Eorroa's Norz.?Attachments not printed
because they were not furnished.)
AUGUST 7, 1962.
Memorandum: EMD?Mr. Simpson.
(Attention: Mrs. Selvig).
Subject: Request for Waiver, Advisory Com-
mittee on International Organization
Staffing: Ernest A. Gross, Marshall D.
Shulman, Andrew W. Cordier, Harding
Bancroft, Lawrence Finkelstein, Francis
0, Wilcox, Arthur Larson.
Assistant Secretary Harlan Cleveland, with
the concurrence of Mr. Ball and after general
discussion with the Bureau of the Budget
has initiated a management study on the
strengthening U.S. Influence in the financial
management and staffing policies of interna-
tional organizations. A survey staff, composed
of AID, Bureau of the Budget, and State
employees, headquartered in the New State
Building, are responsible for fact-finding, an-
alysis and preparation of recommendations.
An advisory group of private citizens will
come in from time to time for consultations
and meetings relative to United States strate-
gy in the United Nations.
The first meeting of the advisory group
took place on July 25, 1962, and access clear-
ance was granted for this meeting. It is Mr.
Cleveland's desire to employ the individuals
who comprise the advisory group as either
WOC or WAE consultants, depending on the
amount of the allocation the Department of
State will receive from the Management Im-
provement Appropriation. This will be deter-
mined when the position descriptions are
prepared and formal request for employment
made on Di3-j03j,
Approved For Release
Mr. Otepka's memorandum of August 1,
1962, a copy of which was sent to your office,
indicates that no investigation is required
of two of the members?Francis 0. Wilcox
and Arthur Larson.
I understand that security clearance is in
process on Marshall D. Shulman at the 're-
quest of INR, who intend to appoint Mr.
Shulman as Consultant. Completed employ-
ment forms are attached herewith for Law-
rence Finkelstein. I request that a security
waiver be processed for these two in order
that they may be cleared for a series of meet-
ings which are planned for early September.
We have sent employment forms to Ernest
Gross, Andrew Cordier and Harding Ban-
croft and will forward them to you as soon
as they are received with a similar request
for security waiver. Access clearance for the
July meeting was not granted Harding Ban-
croft because he was in Europe and was not
available for that meeting.
IO?GEORGE M. CZAYO.
EXHIBIT 2
EXCERPTS FROM REPORT PREPARED BY HARDING
BANCROFT, ET AL., RECOMMENDING REDUCED
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. CITIZENS
EMPLOYED AT U.N.
Senator DIRKSEN. Then without objection
and by agreement, this copy which has been
authenticated by Mr. Reilly will be made a
part of the record, as previously ordered.
Mr. Souswrem. Thank you, Senator.
(Editor's note: The document referred to
above is a report (with a foreword) of the
Advisory Committee on Management Im-
provement, dated March 1963, on the sub-
ject of "Staffing of International Organiza-
tions." which bears the date of February 19,
1963. At the beginning of this report is a
short "Foreword" apparently signed by 12
members of the Advisory _Committee. The
cover page bears the date of March 1963. On
top of this were three pages captioned "Staff-
ing International Organizations Summary of
Recommendations," and bearing the date
of February 25, 1963. All portions of the docu-
ment. in the order in which they were stapled
together when received by the subcommittee,
are reproduced here.)
STAFFING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Summary of recommendations
1. The United States should alter its atti-
tude toward the staffing of international or-
ganizations which has been, during a period
of time, somewhat laissez faire to one of
objective alertness. It has an obligation un-
der the U.N. Charter to seek to improve the
quality of personnel and of personnel admin-
istration in the international agencies.
2. The President should announce a policy
In respect to staffing of international orga-
nizations which envisions much fuller use
of all U.S. Government departments and pri-
vate organizations in this effort. The policy
statement should be accompanied by a move
to set up a U.S. Government Advisory Council
composed of representatives of private agen-
cies in the fields of international relations,
education, business, labor, and agriculture
to support Government efforts to nominate
highly qualified personnel for this purpose.
3. It is recommended that the position of
Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary
for International Organization Affairs be set
up with the function of developing and di-
recting the execution of a single U.S, recruit-
ing policy utilizing all appropriate Govern-
ment resources and available private re-
sources.The incumbent of this position would
serve as a central information and record
point, would evaluate the effectiveness of
U.S. recruiting efforts, and would coordinate
the efforts of U.S. missions abroad. Actual
recrui iment would be decentralized to U.S.
Government agencies which are counterparts
of the U.N. agencies. In those cases where
counterpart U.S. agencies do not exist, re-
sponsibility for recruitment should test with
2aolditioltThr.leirg551YebovedUkt 061%280005-8
April 25,1969
State Department. A. U.S. Government co-
ordinating committee for international re-
cruitment should be formed to facilitate ac-
cess to the total personnel operations of the
Government, as needed.
4. To serve total U.S. purposes, arrange-
ments should be made to facilitate the co-
operative use of AID and State of the U.S.
AID recruiting and placement mechanisms
for bilateral aid and the counterpart U.S.
mechanisms for multilateral aid. The needs
of both organizations can be met more expe-
ditiously by full cooperation and there should
be a? definite U.S. policy that promotes the
idea the service in either multilateral or bi-
lateral aid organizations is a part of the
career ladder for all U.S. technical assistance
personnel.
5. It is recommended that Executive Order
10422 be amended to eliminate the require-
ment for a f ul 1 field investigation for U.S.
citizens recommended for employment
through the' P-1 grade and for all persons of
any grade being considered for employment
for a period of 2 years or less and that only a
national agency check be used for those peo-
ple. A full field investigation after employ-
ment is recommended for those above the P-I
level being considered for extended employ-
ment. The national agency checks would be
completed, however, before U.S. citizens are
recommended for employment, by interna-
tional agencies. No clearance procedure
should be required for U.S. Federal Govern-
ment employees who have been cleared and
are in good standing in their aeencies. Funds
for all such checks and investigations should
be appropriated to the Department of State
and it should be permitted te use any investi-
gative agency it chooses.
6. The United States should sponsor a study
of emoluments for U.S. and U.N. personnel
serving in headquarters overseas and in tech-
nical assistance positions in order to establish
comparability of information for employment
purposes. In addition, the United States
should sponsor a coordinated policy for emol-
uments for all U.N. agency personnel, in-
cluding the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank.
7. In order to perform the job of staffing
international organizations more expedi-
tiously, the United States needs regular and
nearly uniform information on the vacancy
situation. The obtaining of vacancy informa-
tion should be incorporated in the reporting
instructions to be issued to U.S. missions to
international agency headquarters.
8. It is recommended that a current direc-
tory of U.S. personnel serving in international
organizations be maintained by the Inter-
national Recruitment Service in the Depart-
ment of State. The maintenance of such a
directory will serve a variety of useful pur-
poses.
9. In its general recruitment procedure the
U.S. Government should pay particular at-
tention to the recruitment of iunior officers
to the extent that career opportunities for
them in international service are known to
exist.
10. It is recommended that amendment to
Public Law 85-795 be sought to permit sec-
ondment of Foreign Service ?freers to inter-
national organizations when r.poropriate, and
that the necessary administrative steps be
taken to facilitate assignments
11. The United States should adopt a pro-
gram of orientation for U.S. personnel se-
lected for service in international organiza-
tions. This program should deal with the
importance which the United Sates attaches
to their assignments and with the favorable
influence which effective international serv-
ice can have on the 'U.S. posture in the inter-
national scene.
12. It is both desirable and proper that U.S.
missions overseas and in New York accord ap-'
propriate recognition to American nationals
who are' contributing to international amity
through service in international organiza-
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'4prit25, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 4105
- 13. There is need for all U.S. agencies con- available highly qualified candidates as they rather than relying solely on the Civil Service
Cerned with the activities of international may be required and to encourage specific Commission, and that the method of funding
organizations to contribute to the identifl- improvements in personnel administration, should be changed so that the State Depart-
cation of major posts. Those are not neces- The following report is directed toward these ment obtains funds and reimburses the in-
sarily the highest ranking positions but in.- ends. ' vestigative agency.
dude those posts which are concerned with Harding F. Bancroft, Karney Brasfield,
the development of policy and program, Andrew Cordier, Lawrence S. Finkel- EXHIBIT 3
which require superior technical capacity and stein, Ernest A. Gross, Arthur Larson, TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. REILLY, APRIL 30, 1963,
initiative, and which require ability to con- Sol M. Linowitz, Joseph Pois, Marshall RELATING TO PROPOSALS OF HARDING BAN-
tribute to the solution of complex problems D. Shulman, Francis 0. Wilcox, John CROFT, ET AL., To REDUCE SECURITY RE-
of general administration. A special respon- W. Macy, Jr., Robert Amory. QUIREMENTS FOR U.S. CITIZENS EMPLOYED
sibility devolves upon U.S. missions to head- ? AT U.N.
quarters of the U.N. agencies to give this STAFFING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Mr. SOURWINE. Are you familiar with the
advice on a continuing basis. * * * * demand for elimination of the United Na-
14. It is recommended that the Department 6. GOVERNMENT CLEARANCE OF CANDIDATES FOR tions clearance procedure that was made by
revise standing instructions to missions to INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION EMPLOYMENT Leonard Houdin in his capacity as counsel for
international organizations to include an as-
signment Of responsibility in the area of Under Executive orders a loyalty clearance the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.
on the basis of a full field investigation is Mr. REILLY. I have seen the?I believe there
staffing and personnel administration and to
provide that the responsibility be placed with required for all U.S. citizens considered for was a letter to the New York Times.
a single top level officer in the mission. In employment by international organizations. Mr. SOURWINE, Yes.
connection with this role, the U.S. mission Investigations are made by the Civil Service Mr. REILLY. Yes, I have seen this letter.
should be given the responsibility for identi- Commission with referral to the FBI when Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Chairman, I do not have
fying well-qualified foreign nationals for loyalty information is uncovered. Findings that letter with me but may I ask that a copy
service in international organizations. are reviewed by a loyalty board in the Com- of it go in the record at this point?
15. Appropriate efforts should be made mission and advisory opinions are furnished Senator DODD. Yes, without objection, so
the international organizations through the ordered.
from time to time to inform the American
public of the importance the U.S. Govern- State Department. Started in 1953 the pro- (The letter referred to follows:)
gram has cost $5.2 million. It has resulted in ,,
ment attaches to service in international [From the New York Times, July 30, 1962,
the denial of employment to 5 persons and in p. 22]
organizations, the termination of 11 persons employed at
.."SCREENING U.N. EMPLOYEES
- the outset of the program because of adverse
A REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT TO THE ASSIST-
loyalty findings. In addition, suitability in- "McCarran committee's authority over
formation secured during investigations Americans challenged
ANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL
which might affect employment is called to".,.o 4-1.-,.1- .....e EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, MARCH 1963 the attention of the organizations, although "In an otherwise excellent story published
FOREWORD this is not provided for by the Executive July 15, 'UN's Fiscal Plight,' Thomas J.
In his report of June 25, 1962, to the 87th order. The number of candidates not selected Hamilton seriously errs, in referring to '11
Congress on U.S. contributions to interna- for suitability reasons is unknown. American members of the United Nations
tional organizations, estimated at about $312 The Committe has taken note of the fact who had been dismissed on charges of dis-
million for the 1962 fiscal year, the Acting that this domestic clearance requirement is loyalty to the United States.'
Secretary of State pointed out that: operating to prevent the selection of well- "These staff officials, some of whom I repre-
"The United Nations and the other organi- qualified Americans for international orga- sented as counsel had been dismissed as a
zations and programs to which the "United nization posts. Time is the most important result of U.S. governmental pressure when
States contributes carry out activities which factor. Faced with a choice, for example, an. they declined, under the first and fifth
support one or both of the basic aims of U.S. international organization is likely to select amendments, to answer questions put by the
foreign policy: First, the promotion of peace an immediately available foreigner in prefer- McCarran Internal Security Subcommittee.
and security; second, the promotion of eco- ence to an American who perhaps will be "Both the validity and propriety of the
nomic and social growth, which may well be given a clearance by his Government after committee's authority were most doubtful in
one of the best ways to achieve peace and an investigation of several months. Many view of the independence of the international
security in the long run. Americans, moreover, cannot remain candi- Secretariat and the total lack of legislative
"The concept of multilateral cooperation dates for an Indefinite period while the clear- purpose. Nevertheless, yielding to manifest
and action has been actively supported by ance process takes place. The Committee be- political discretion, the first Secretary Gen-
the United States as one of several means lieves a screening program should be con- eral dismissed these staff officials and the
of achieving a better world in which to live. tin.ued, but that it should be put on a par second preferred to pay damages rather than
These international organizations, most of with that now in effect for Government em- comply with the U.N.'s administrative tri-
which were established after World War II, ployees. It must be recognized, moreover, that bunal's decision that the staff had been un-
are emerging from their infancy and are the sensitivity aspects of U.S. agencies are lawfully discharged.
gradually gaining the capability to handle not present in the case of international or-
international tasks of greater dimensions. ganizations, that international organizations "Loss of services
Their capacity to act benefits both the generally require a probationary period of "I write for two additional reasons:
United States and the rest of the world." service for extended appointments and that "First, the public is not aware that the
It is against this background of the tradi- employment may be terminated for cause, careers of many devoted and brilliant inter-
tional and whole-hearted U.S. support of in- The Committee recommends that the Ex- national civil servants were destroyed in the
ternational organizations and of the po-
ecutive order be amended to require a na- hysteria of the 1950's. The loss of their
tentiality of these organizations that the tional agency check only (not a full field services was also a grievous blow to the
Advisory Committee on Management im-
Investigation) for persons considered for non- United Nations.
provement makes this report on staffing.
professional employment, for the P-1 grade, "Second, your recent thoughtful editorial
and for persons at any grade being considered on Andrew Cordier's resignation should re-
As the responsibilities of the international
organizations increase in quantity, complex- for employment for a period of 2 years or mind us that the U.S. Government is still
less. enforcing President Truman's and Presi-
ity, and significance, the greater becomes the
need for an active concern about improving There would be a full investigation for dent Eisenhower's Executive orders which
the human resources which the organiza-
those in the 'professional categories above screen, on political grounds, American em-
tions require to carrY out their tasks. How considered for extended ployees of the United Nations and other
can the best qualified and best trained per- employment, but it could be made after em- itnernational organizations.
sons be obtained? How can the modt effec- ployment. The record checks, however, would "The expressed criteria include member-
tive personnel management be accomplished? be completed before the persons were recom- ship on the Attorney General's list; the
Such a concern, motivated by a genuine de-
mended for employment. No clearance proce- sources include derogatory information in
?dure should be required ?in the case of a congressional committee files; the procedures
sire for effective multilateral machinery,
must be worldwide, and those member states Federal Government employee who has been are based upon undisclosed evidence.
_ Which are committed in fact to making it investigated and cleared and is in good stand- "Such screening is inconsistent with the
hisin agency.
?possible for international organizations to ingcharter's principle in article 100 of the inde-
Meet the challenge they face, should lead The substantial savings that will result pendence of the organization. ? An Interna-
the way. The. Advisory Committee, therefore, from these modifications of the clearance tional Organizations' Employees Loyalty
belieyes that the United States must extend process should be used to permit advance Board in our Civil Service Commission makes
Its historic policy of political and financial national agency and reference checks of no sense. There is no security problem in em-
support to include support for improving the potential candidates. ployment by the United Nations. Hence, the
quality and management of the staffs of in- The Committee also believes that it should Association of the Bar's Special Committee
ternational organizations. It believes, also, be possible to use whatever Federal investiga- on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program
that this country can and should do more to tive agency can most expeditiously make a recommended in its 1956 report that this
discharge its own responsibility to make full field investigation at a particular time, Board and the program be terminated.
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S 4106 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE
"The U.S. Government to its credit has
sought in other respects to strengthen the
United Nations. The present administration
would now score a major achievement if it
were to adopt, although belatedly, the com-
mittee's advice to eliminate its so-called
loyalty program in the international field.
"LEONARD B. BOUDIN.
NEW Yoaar?fu/y 24, 1962."
Mr. Sovnavara. Do you know who drafted
the draft report or how it COMB to be drafted,
who had` responsibility for its drafting, the
February draft report, which was along the
lines of Mr. Boudin's recommendation?
Mr. Ritnma. No; I do not, sir. I have no
knowledge on that.
Senator Doan. Off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. SouftwINE. Did you recognize this
recommendation of the report with respect
to the elimination of the United Nations
clearance procedure for American nationals,
when you saw it in the report, as coinciding
with the demands which had been made by
Boudin?
Mr. REILLY. That was one of the things Mr.
Otepka, brought to my attention.
Mr. SOURWINE. Oh, you had not seen the
Boudin article before that time?
Mr. lanuax. No, I had not, I was not-we
were not at that time-1 was not personally
involved in the International Organizations'
Employees Loyalty Board, since that is out-
side the Department of State.
Senator DODD. Did I understand that you
did not know anything about Boudin? Did
Otepka call his name to your attention?
Mr. REILLY. Oh; I had known about
Boudin-----
Senator DODD. You have known about him
before?
Mr. REILLY. For a long period of time; yes,
sir.
Senator DODD. And you had read the draft
of the report before Otepka called your at-
tention to the Boudin recomendation?
Mr. REILLY. Yes; I read the draft report be-
fore I handed it to Mr. Otepka; yes, sir.
Senator DODD. My point is, did you notice it
yourself or didn't you notice it until Otepka
called it to your attention?
Mr. REILLY. Well, I was not familiar with
the position taken by Mr, 'Boudin in the
New York Times letter until Hr. Otepka
brought that article to my attention.
EXHIBIT 4
TESTIMONY OF OTTO OTEPKA WITH REGARD TO
MISSTATEMENTS OF JOHN F. REILLY CON-
CERNING OTEPKA'S HANDLING OF CASES OF
HARDING BANCROFT, ET AL.
TESTIMONY OF OTTO F. OTEPKA, CHIEF DIVISION
OF EVALUATIONS, OFFICE OF SECRETARY, DE-
PARTMENT OF STATE, MONDAY, AUGUST
12, 1963
Senator Hugh Scott presiding.
Also present: J. G. Sourwine, chief counsel,
and Frank W. Schroeder, chief investigator.
(Mr. Otepka was previously sworn.)
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Otepka, are you aware
that Mr. John Reilly, in his testimony be-
fore this committee, controverted many
statements previously made by you when
you testified?
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes; I was given to under-
stand that he did.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you have an oppor-
tunity to examine Mr. Reilly's testimony,
the transcript of his testimony?
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did I furnish you with a
copy of this testimony and ask you to prepare
a memorandum of reply covering point by
point all of those instances in which you
felt Mr. Reilly's testimony was inaccurate
or untrue?
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes, sir.
Mr. Soul/warm. Did you prepare such a
memorandum?
Mr. OTEPKA. I did, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. You prepared it yourself?
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes, sir; I did.
Mr. Soul/am/E. Is this it?
Mr. OTEPKA. That is the memorandum I
prepared.
Mr. SOURWINE. That memorandum is ac-
companied by certain exhibit's, Nos. 1 through
13?
Mr. OTEPKA. Yes, sir; which were intended
to be used by me.
Mr. Scrum/am The exhibits were furnished
by you in connection with the memorandum
for the records of this committee? '
Mr. OTEPKA. The exhibits were intended to
be used to refresh my recollection in connec-
tion with my forthcoming testimony before
this committee of which I have previously
been apprised.
Mr. SOURWINE. Mr. Otepka, are any of these
exhibits classified?
Mr. OTEPKA. There is one exhibit which
is-which bears a classification, but the clas-
sification was assigned to it only because it
was-there was an accompanying document
that was classified. However, that particular
exhibit which I have there does not have the
classified memorandum.
Mr. SOURWINE. Are you referring specifi-
cally to the exhibit No. 1-4 which deals-
which consists of a memorandum to Mr.
Reilly from you respecting emergency clear-
ance of eight named individuals?
Mr. OTEPKA. Could you give me the date
of that memorandum, !sir?
Mr. SOURWINE. This one?
OTEPKA. Yes, Sir.
Mr. S017RW/NE. And you say that, although
this memorandum has what appears to be
a "secret" classification, it also has a mark-
ing that upon removal of the attach-
ments it will be considered "confidential"
only.
Mr. OTEPKA. The marking on that docu-
ment was placed there by me as a classifying
officer. I am authorized to classify docu-
ments.
Mr. SOURWINE. Did you classify this docu-
ment initially as "secret" with the attach-
ments on it?
Mr. OTEPKA. That document is "secret"
only with the attachments.
Mr. SOVRWINE. But this was your classifi-
cation?
Mr. OTEPKA. That was my classification.'
Mr. Souroarara. And with the attachments
off it was no longer "secret"?
Mr. OTEPKA. That is correct.
Mr. SOURWINE. And you did not supply the
attachments to the committee?
Mr. OTEPKA. No, sir.
Mr. SOURWINE. There it no reason why,
then, all these exhibits should not go in our
record along with this memorandum, is
there?
Mr. OTEPKA. Based on my knowledge of the
contradictions of Mr. Reilly in his testimony,
I feel that I am entitled to submit that
material :for the record.
Mr. SOURW/NE. Mr. Chairman, I ask that
all of this material may be ordered into the
record at this point.
Senator SCOTT. Without objection it may
be so received.
Mr. SOURWINE. And I ask permission to re-
tain it temporarily in the counsel's files, be-
cause I propose to ask questions about some
of the points that are raised there.
Senator SCOTT. Very well.
CO NTS REGARDING TESTIMONY OF JOHN
REILLY ON MAY 21,22, AND 23, 1963
TESTIMONY OF MAY 21 , 1963
Pays 584-585 pencil mark 1 (ending with
line 13)
Otepka received from Reilly a note dated
February 4, 1963; with enclosure consisting
only of a copy of a memorandum dated Janu-
Footnotes at end of article.
April 25, 1969'
ary 27, 1963, from 102 Neaten Cleveland ad-
dressed to OIA 8 Mr. Hefner., Reilly's note to
Otepka included no report of the Advisory
Committee on International Organization
Staffing, Since Otepka realized immediately
that he did not have all the facts available
on which he could prepare an intelligent ap-
praisal of the proposal in the Cleveland
memorandum of January 27, 1963, Otepka
called Paul Byrnes in 10 and asked him what
additional information was available. Byrnes
advised Otepka that a report was being
drafted on which he, Byrnes, had already
prepared comments. Otepka asked for and
received from Byrnes the la tter's own corn-
merits which, in general, coincided with
Otepka's initial views. Otepka's views were
based then only on the meager data avail-
able. Otepka sent a note February 8, 1963; to
Reilly and advised Reilly orally that SY
should opposed any attempt to eliminate full
field investigation of UN personnel. Reilly
did not, on this occasion nor thereafter, in-
dicate to Otepka that he had known of or
received a copy of the February 19, 1963, re-
port of the Advisory Committee. The fact is
that Otepka, himself, after his discussion of
February 8, 1963, with Reilly, obtained copies
of the February 19, 1963, report from Byrnes.
Otepka sent a copy of the February 19, 1963,
report to Reilly under cover of Otepka's writ-
ten comments prepared on March 18, 1963, for
Reilly's signature.5
On several occasions after March 18, 1963.
Otepka inquired orally of Reilly as to whether
Reilly had had an opportunity to examine
these comments and whether he would ap-
prove them. On such occasions Reilly gave
Otepka the same answer: that he had not
had the opportunity to review Otepka's draft
comments. To this date, Reilly has not in-
dicated to Otepka his approval or disap-
proval of Otepka's draft of March 18, 1963.
On May 14, 1963, Otepka answered Belisle's
note of May 13, 1963, whereby Belisle had
attached a new report of the Advisory Corn-
tnittee (copies of pertinent correspondence
are attached and are self-explanatory').
The statement by Reilly (page 585) that
the February 19, 1963, report came down to
him from Orrick's office apparently is not
true.
Questions for Reilly
When did he receive the report of Febru-
ary 19, 1963, from Orrick's office? Did he see
it before Otepka sent it to him on March 18,
1963? Why did he not say he got it from
Otepka, who had hot obtained it from Or-
rick's office but was furnished it directly by
a member of Cleveland's staff?
(Page 585-pencil mark 2, see also pencil
mark 3, page 586 which is a contradictory
statement by Reilly)
Reilly's statement (2) is not correct. The
consultants were granted a clearance for ac-
cess to classified data by Otepka. This clear-
ance was limited only to each specific meet-
ing of the Committee. The clearances were
renewed upon requests made by 10 for every
auccessive meeting of the Committee. The
clearances were predicated upon the express
written statement of 10 that the Committee
members would see only a limited number of
documents as necessary for the meeting at-
tended. Also 10 specifically advised SF that
the information would be carefully con-
trolled and the consultants were not in am,
sense employees of the Federal Government.
They were merely contributing their special
talents and their time withou t compensation
on an ad hoc basis to study international
organization staffing problems. Their clear-
ances in his [this sense would not extend
beyond the stated purposes of the meeting.
TO was informed they would be given regu-
lar clearances permitting them more levity
(sic) only after they had been fully investi-
gated, fingerprinted and had completed all
required processing forms. None of the con-
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A 1 25, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
sultants was given building passes until after for the record that I am a member of he instances in which I felt Mr. Reilly's testi-
they had been fully cleared, classified or competitive Civil Service and many was inaccurate or untrue. After care-
Page 586-587?pencil mark 4 and 5 that I am now and have been a career mem- fully reading the transcripts of Mr. Reilly's
Reilly's statement is not true. Otepka fair- ber of that service for over 27 years. testimony I was both shocked and amazed.
The circumstances in regard to which I I therefore prepared a memorandum consist-
nished Reilly with a comprehensive sketch am alleged to have furnished documents or lug of 39 double-spaced pages annotated by
of the derogatory background data at the information to the said Chief Counsel re- exhibits which I shall identify below, and I
furnished a copy of this memorandum to
Mr. Sourwine together with copies of the ex-
hibits mentioned therein. This memorandum
was intended to serve as my reference in re-
buttal, explanation, or clarification of state-
ments made by Mr. Reilly in my future ap-
pearance before the Committee which had
already been made known to me.
At this point I would like to state for the
record that what particularly concerned me
in regard to Mr. Reilly's testimony was that
he made statements to the Subcommittee
concerning my personal character and per-
formance. As a knowledgeable and experi-
enced career civil servant, I know that one's
superior owes one primary duty especially
to his subordinate. That is: if the subordin-
ate's performance is or has been deficient
that subordinate should first be so told by
the superior. The superior should not dero-
gate the employe's performance before a
legislative body or any organization outside
the employee's place of employment without
fulfilling his first duty to his subordinate.
Mr. Reilly never expressed to me his dissatis-
faction with my performance nor did he ever
let me know that he had anything but a
favorable opinion concerning my character.
However, neither Mr. Reilly nor his predeces-
sor has given me an annual efficiency report
as required by the Department's regulations
since October, 1960, almost three years. Not
only did I request such efficiency reports from
Mr. Reilly but I succinctly informed his Ex-
ecutive Officer on several occasions that these
reports were long overdue. Mr. Reilly, of
course, is entitled to his explanations for this
delinquency. The fact is I still do not have
any efficiency reports for those three years.
Furthermore. I wish this record to bear out
that my whole history of performance in the
Department of State reflects not only the
most satisfactory comment by those officers
who have rated me but that prior to my
entering on duty in the Department of State
in June, 1953, I was the recipient for six suc-
cessive years preceding my appointment to
the Department of State of "EXcellent" ef-
ficiency ratings. Such an adjective rating
was the highest attainable.
In considering the request made to me by
Mr. Sourwine to identify inaccuracies or un-
true statements by Mr. Reilly, I was already
cognizant of the following provision in Sec-
tion 652, Title 5, of the United States Code.
This is a law enacted by the United States
Congress. It reads as follows:
"The right of persons employed in the
Civil Service of the United States, either indi-
vidually or collectively, to petition Congress
or any member thereof or to furnish infor-
mation to either house of Congress or to any
Committee or member thereof shall not be
denied or interfered with."
It was my honest belief and conviction in
the light of contradictions in the record of
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
that I should support my refutation of Mr.
the FBI was conducting an investigation with play as Chief of the Division of Evaluations Reilly's statements concerning me with such
respect to myself concerning an allegation in the Wieland case, necessary information as would establish that
that had been received that I had furnishedmy own statements were truthful and accu-
classified information to an unauthorized Following the conclusion of Mr. Reilly's rate. I carefully observed in the transcript
person. In the course of our discussion it was testimony, Mr. Julien Sourwine, the Chief of Mr. Reilly's testimony that he had entered
made known to me specifically that the al- Counsel of the Subcommittee, requested that selected documents into the record relating
leged unauthorized person was the Chief I come to see him, which I did, after work- to me.
Counsel of the United States Senate Com- ing hours on the day of his request. To the The documents herein involved which
Mittee on the' Judiciary. His name is Julien best of my recollection this was on May 23. were furnished by me to the Chief Counsel
G. Sourwine. I shall hereinafter for the pur- Mr. Sourwine voluntarily informed me that of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary as
poses of this inquiry identify such docu- there were contradictions in my testimony an appendage to my prepared written com-
ments which were furnished by me to the and the testimony of Mr. Reilly. He offered ments are as follows:
Chief Counsel of this Committee. It is lin- to let me read the stenographic transcripts
portant to me at the outset that it be known of Mr. Reilly's testimony and upon doing EXHIBIT 1
so he said I should give him a memorandum (1) This included a memorandum dated
'
Footnotes at end of article, that would answer point by point all of the January 27, 1963, for Mr. Hefner, OIA, from
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S 4107
very outset of the initial request received late to an investigation which was being
from IO. Moreover, Otepka prepared a memo- conducted by the Internal Security Subcom-
randum addressed to the Executive Director, mittee of the Committee of the Judiciary
IO, in which Otepka detailed both the pro-
cedural problems involved as well as the beginning in November, 1961. I first appeared
substantive questions. Belisle returned the before that Committee at its request and
with the express permission of the Depart-
memorandum to Otepka with a terse note
ment of State together with two other mem-
saying Otepka's draft was verbose and that
bers of the Bureau of Security and Consular
Otepka used "a hell of a lot of words." Belisle
eliminated that part of Otepka's memoran-
Affairs, and I responded to the questions of
dum containing statements about the back-
its Chief Counsel frankly and truthfully
ground of the individuals, and prepared his to the best of my knowledge and ability.
own memorandum to 10 about the pro-
Subsequently I reappeared before that Sub-
committee once in April, 1962, also at the
cedural problem, showing only himself
(Belisle) as the drafting officer but using Committee's request and with the permission
Otepka's almost identical words., of my superiors. Also appearing at or about
Further, on the above point, after the full that time were my superiors. In November,
field investigations had been completed for 1962 the Committee publicly released the
the purpose of formally appointing the indi- transcripts of my testimony and that of other
viduals to the employment rolls and deter- Department of State personnel together with
mining at the same time if their clearancea report of the Committee containing the
for access to classified data could be ex- Committee's conclusions and recommenda-
tended, Otepka forwarded to Reilly before tions with respect to the security practices
the clearance notifications were sent to the and procedures of the Department of State.
Employment Division the cases of Ernest Beginning in March 1963, and during April
Gross, Harding Bancroft and Andrew Cordier. 1963, I appeared before the same subcommit-
In the case of Gross, Otepka said he would tee in accordance with its request and with
not object on security grounds to Gross' em- the knowledge of my superiors, for a total
ployment by the Department but he of four times. I was given to understand
(Otepka) felt the contents of the investi- that the Committee was seeking to ascertain
gative reports should be examined by the from the Department of State whether or
Employment Division under suitability
standards. Reilly approved the security clear-
ance but declined to send the reports to the
Employment Division. In the case of Ban-
croft, Otepka wrote a memorandum to Reilly
expressing Otepka's concern about the fact
that Loy Henderson had described Bancroft
as pro-Soviet and also Otepka's concern that
Bancroft long defended Alger Hiss and Ban-
croft relented (but not fully) only after
Hiss had been sent to jail. Otepka, indicated
not the Department of State had imple-
mented the Committee's recommendations
to improve certain security practices found
by the Committee to be deficient. During
May, 1963, my immediate superior, Mr. John
F. Reilly, also testified before the Commit-
tee on three separate days. Prior to his
appearances and at his own personal request
I obtained from the Chief Counsel of the
Committee, Mr. Sourwine, the stenographic
transcripts of my testimony, of March and
that he was clearing Bancroft with reserve- April, 1963, and furnished those transcripts
tions, saying that the clearance was being to Mr. Reilly. Mr. Reilly indicated to me he
granted based on Otepka's understanding had not read my transcripts before. I do
from I0 that these consultants dealt only not know the reason why.
with a limited number of classified docu- Following the first appearance of Mr.
ments which were described to Otepka as Reilly, which I believe was on May 21, Mr.
having no significant impact on the national Reilly personally came to my office and
security. informed me that Senator Thomas J. Dodd,
EXHIBIT 5 the presiding chairman of the Subcommittee,
had given him, Mr. Reilly, "a "bad time"
STATEMENT OP OTTO OTEPKA TO FBI DURING on that day. Mr. Reilly related to me that he
INTERROGATION ORDERED DY STATE DEPART- had told the Subcommittee that I had vol-
MENT, WITH EXCERPTS PROM DESCRIPTION OP untarily disqualified myself from the eval-
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SENATE INTERNAL uation of the case of William A. Wieland,
SECTJRITY SUBCOMNITI I zE ? Mr, Reilly asked if I could "straighten out"
WASHINGTON, D.C., August 15, 1963. Mr. Dodd on this matter. I said I did not
I, Otto F. Otepka, make the following vol- know Mr. Dodd but were I to be again ques-
Untary statement to Carl E. Graham and tioned by the Subcommittee I would be very
Robert C. Byrnes, who have identified them- happy to state for the record what had trans-
selves as Special Agents of the Federal Bu- pired between myself and Mr. Reilly when
reau of Investigation. No threats or promises on a prior occasion he discussed with me at
of any kind have been made to me to make his request my future role in the re-evalua-
this statement and I know it can be used tion of the Wieland case. I prepared for the
against me in a court of law. I have been record and have in my possession a memo-
advised of my right to have legal counsel be- randum indicating the exact nature of my
fore making any statement whatsoever, discussions with Mr. Reilly on any prior
Mr. Byrnes informed me in general that occasion concerning what function I should
S 4108 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Harland Cleveland, IO, on the subject of Exenerr 6
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"Loyalty Investigations of United States (1 t_
PROM Norma og PROPOSED ADVERSE
izens Employed by International Organizes AcTxmNp To OTTO ()TEMA DY STATE DE-
tions." PAMIENT, INCLUDING CHARGES THAT He
(2) Routing slip dated P'gbruvery 4, 1963, of HAD TRANSMPITED INFORMATION Cosrosvismaa
Department of State to Mr. Otepka from HARDING BANCROFT, ET AL., TO SENATE us-
Mr. John F, Reilly on the subject of "Loyalty TERNAL SECURITY Suscomearrane
Investigations of United States Citizens Em-
ployed by International Organizations" with DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
the notation "Would you look into this please Washington, September 23, 1963.
and may I have your views by Feb. 8?" Mr. Ow? F. &reams,
(3) One page memorahdum to Mr. Reilly office of Security,
from Mr. Otepka dated February 8, 1963. Department of State.
DEAR MR. OTEPICA: This is a notice of pro-
EXHIBIT 2
posed adverse action in accordance with the
(1) Thirty-two page document entitled regulations of the Civil Service Commission.
"staffing International Organizations, A Re- You are hereby notified that it is proposed
port of the Advisory Committee on Manage- to remove you from your appointment with
ment Improvement to the Assistant Secre- the Department of State, as Supervisory Per-
tary of State for International Organization sonnel Security Specialist, GS-15, in the Of -
Affairs" dated March, 1963. A three page cover lice of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
memorandurn to this document is also at- Security, thirty (30) days from the date of
ta,ched and which bears the title of "Staff- this letter.
ing International Organizations, Summary On August 16, 1963, at Washington, D.C.,
of Recommendations." you executed a voluntary sworn statement,
(2) Five page memorandum dated Sep- dated August 15, 1963, before Carl E. Graham
tember 10, 1962, from Mr. Otepka to Mr. and Robert C. Byrnes, Special Agents of the
Reilly on the subject of "Francis 0. Wilcox; Federal Bureau of Investigation. A copy of
Arthur Larson; Lawrence Finkelstein; Mar- this statement is attached as Exhibit A. In-
shall D. Shulman; Andrew Cordier; Ernest formation contained therein will be referred
Gross; Harding Bancroft; Sol Linowitz." to specifically in some of the charges listed
This document bears a classification of below.
"Secret" but with a stamped notation at
the bottom stating that the document would Furthermore, during the period March 13,
be considered "Confidential" upon removal 1963, to June 18, 1963, Mr. John F. Reilly,
of attachment. At the conclusion of the fifth
page there is a notation that the attach-
ments were "tabs A, B, C and D." These at-
tachments were not furnished to Sourwine.
Attached to this document at the conclu-
sion is a one page memorandum dated Sep-
tember 17, 1962, from Mr. Reilly to Mr. Czayo
on the subject "Processing of Appointments
of Members of the Advisory Committee on
International Organization Staffing" classi-
fied "Confidential."
EXHIBIT 3
(I) Thirty-SIX page document entitled
"Staffling International Organizations, A Re-
port of the Advisory Committee on Inter-
national Organizations", published by the
Department of State, Washington, D.C., April
22, 1963 (a public document) . Attached to
this document are Appendices I and II con-
sisting of six pages.
(2) Routing slip from Mr. Belisle to Otepka
dated May 13, 1963. Attached to this routing
slip is a one page memorandum dated May 6,
1963, to Mr. Reilly from Gladys P. Rogers on
the subject "Staffing International Organiza-
tions-A Report of the Advisory Committee
on International Organizations.'
(3) ?Undated routing slip from Belisle to
Otepka. Attached to this routing slip is a
three page memorandum from Mr. John F.
Reilly to Mr. George M. Czayo on the subject
"Processing of Appointments of Members of
Advisory Committee on International Or-
ganization Staffing." This three page memo-
randum bears a stamped security classifica-
tion of "Confidential".
(4) One page memorandum dated August 7,
1962, to M. Simpson, EMD, to attention of
Mrs. Solvig with copy for Mr. Otepka, cap-
tioned "Request for Waiver, Advisory Com-
mittee on International Staffing: Ernest A.
Gross, Marshall D. Shulman, Andrew W. Cor-
dier, Harding Bancroft, Lawrence Finkelstein,
Francis 0. Wilcox, Arthur Larson". This was a
nonclassified memorandum with two at-
tached routing slips; one dated September
13, 1962, from Otepka to Mr. Belisle and to Mr.
Reilly. The other routing slip was from Be-
lisle to Otepka, addressed to "Otto", dated
September 11, 1962.
(5) One page memorandum dated May 14,
1963, to Mr. Belisle from Mr. Otepka. The
memorandum indicates there is an attach-
ment of "Report of the Advisory Committee
on International Organizations."
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security,
caused the following procedures to be in-
stituted:
(a) Mrs. Joyce M. Schmelzer, Secretary to
Mr. Frederick W. Traband, Supervisory Per-
sonnel Security Specialist, periodically ob-
served your classified trash bag (hereinafter
referred to as "burn bag") which was in the
possession of your secretary, Mrs. Eunice
Powers. Mrs. Schmelzer and Mrs. Powers were
located in the same room and across from
one another.
(b) When Mrs. Schmelzer saw that your
burn bag was full, she would ask Mrs. Powers
if she wanted her (Mrs. Schmelzer) to take
your burn bag to a Department Mail Room
with Mr. Traband's.
(c) When Mrs. Powers accepted Mrs.
Schmelzer's offer, Mrs. Schmelzer would in-
form Mr. Trabarid of this fact. Mr. Traband
would then call Mr. Rosetti, Supervisory Se-
curity Specialist, or Mr. Shea, Supervisory
General Investigator, if Mr. Rosetti was not
available, and inform him that your burn
bag was being delivered to the Mail Room.
(di While carrying your burn bag and Mr.
Traband's to the Mail Room, Mrs. Schmelaer
would mark your burn bag with a red "X"
(with a crayon or pencil mark) and deposit
both burn bags in the Mail Room, ROOM. 3437.
(e) Mr. Rosetti or Mr. Shea, and on one
occasion Mr. Robert McCarthy, Supervisory
Security Specialist, would obtain your burn
bag from the Mail Room within five to ten
imputes after Mrs. Schmelzer left it there and
would turn it over to Mr. Reilly or Mr. Belisle
(Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Security), in their office, Room
3811. (On one occasion when Mrs. Powers
herself took your burn bag to the Mail Room,
Messrs. Rosetti and Shea picked it up from
the Mail Room immediately after Mrs. Powers
deposited it there.) Your burn bag was then
transferred to Mr. Reilly's brief case.
(f) Mr. Reilly's brief case was then taken
by Mr. Shea to BOOM 1410, 2612A or 3811 for
examination of its contents. Your burn bag
was inspected by Mr. Shea either alone or
with Mr. Belisle and/or Mr. Rosetti.
(g) The contents of your burn bags were
carefully examined. All carbon paper or copies
were read by turning the carbon side toward
the light thus allowing the paper to be read
from the back. Torn pieces of paper were
grouped together and then pieced together to
? April 25, '1969
make readable documents One-time type-
writer ribbons were also read on occasion,
During the course of inspecting the con-
tents of your burn bag on May 29, 1963. a
typewriter ribbon was retrieved. This ribbon
has been read and the contents are repro-
duced as Exhibit 73. Inforritatn contained
therein will be referred to specifically in some
of the charges listed below.
(1) You have conducted yourself in a man-
ner unbecoming an officer of the Department
of State.
Specifically: You furnished a copy of a
classified memorandum concerning the
processing of appointments of members of
the Advisory Committee on International
Organization Staffing to a person outside of
the Department without authority and in
violation of the Presidential Directive of
March 13, 1948 (13 Fed. Beg. 1359). This
Directive provides:
"* * * all reports, records, end ftlea relative
to the loyalty of employees or prospective'
employees (including reports of such investi-
gative agencies), shall be maintained in con-
fidence, and shall not be transmitted or dis-
closed except as required in the efficient con-
duct of business."
You were reminded of the prohibition con-
tained in this Directive on March 22, 1963,
when you received and noted a copy of a
letter from Mr. Dutton, Assistant Secretary
of State, to Senator Eastland, Chairman of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
dated March 20, 1963. A copy of this letter,
indicating that you "noted" it, is enclosed
as Exhibit C.
In your sworn statement, referred to above
and enclosed as Exhibit A, you stated on
pages 7 and 8 that you gave a copy of a
classified memorandum entitled "Francis 0.
Wilcox, Arthur Larson, Lawrence Finkelstein,
Marshall D. Shulman, Andrew Cavelier, Ernest
Gross, Harding Bancroft, Sol Linowitz", to
Mr. J. G. Sourwine, Chief Counsel, United
States Senate Subcommittee to Investigate
the Administration of the Internal Security
Act and Other Internal Securi ty Laws, of the
Committee on the Judiciary. This memo-
randum concerns "the loyalty of employees
or prospective employees" of the Department
within the meaning of the Presidential
Directive of March 13, 1948.
This is a breach of the standard of conduct
expected of an officer of the Department of
State.
(2) You have conducted yourself in a man-
ner unbecoming an officer of the Department
of State.
Specifically: You furnished a copy of a
classified memorandum concerning the
processing of appointments of members of
the Advisory Committee on International
Organizations Staffing to a person outside of
the Department without authority
violation of the Presidential Directive of
March 13, 1948 (13 Fed. Reg. 1359). This
Directive provides:
"* * * all reports, records, and files relative
to the loyalty of employees or prospective em-
ployees (including reports of such investiga-
tive agencies), shall be maintained in con-
fidence, and shall not be tra,nsinitted or dis-
closed except as required in the efficient con-
cha-it of business."
You were reminded of the prohibition con-
tained in this Directive on March 22, 1963,
when you received and noted a copy of a
letter from Mr. Dutton, to Senator Eastland,
dated March 20, 1963. A copy of this letter,
indicating that you "noted" it. is enclosed as
Exhibit C.
In your sworn statement, referred to above
and enclosed as Exhibit A. you stated on
page 9 that you gave a copy of a classified
memorandum entitled "Processing of Ap-
pointments of Members of the Advisory Com-
mittee on International Organizations
Staffing" to Mr. J. G. Sourwine. This memo-
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 4109
Tat:Id-um concerns "the loyalty of employees , However, until recently none of my supe- copies of the exhibits mentioned therein.
or prospective employees" of the Department riors ever com,plained to me about my per- This memorandum was furnished to Mr.
Within the meaning of the Presidential formance of duty, Sourwine as the chief counsel, and author-
Directive of March 13, 1948. Beginning In November 1961 an Invaatl- ized representatives of the subcommittee. It
This Ls a breach of the standard of conduct gation into certain? security practices of the was intended to serve as my reference in re-
-expected of an officer of the Department of Department of State was conducted by the buttal, explanation, or clarification of state- ,
State. Internal Security Subcommittee of the Coin.- meats made by Mr. Reilly, in any future
-inittee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate. appearance I made before the committee. I
? Exam= 7 I first appeared before that committee at its was told that I would be recalled to testify
EXCERPTS FROM RESFONSE OF OTTO ?TEMA.
request and with the express permission of again before the committee.
TO
CHARGES OF STATE DEPARTMENT THAT HIS the Department of State, together with two I was especially disturbed by two state-
CONDUCT WAS UNBECOMING OF A STATE DE- other members of the Bureau of Security aneate made by Mr. Reilly in his testimony
PARTMENT OFFICER and Consular Affairs. I responded to the which was shown to me by Mr. Sourwine.
qUestions of Mr. J. G. Sourwine, the sub- First, Mr. Reilly testified, concerning eight
(EDITOR'S NOTE.?Mr. Otepka's answer to committee's chief counsel, frankly and truth- prospective appointees to the Advisory Corn-
the charges preferred by the Department was sully to the best of my knowledge and mittee on International Organizations, that
ordered into the record at this point and
reads as follows:) ability. Subsequently, in April 1962 I re- there wer no substantial derogatory informa-
appeared before the subcommittee also at tion respecting any of the prospective ap-
WHDATON, Mn., October 14, 1963.
Hon. JOHN ORDWAY, the committee's request and with the per- pointees, and that the case of only one of
mission of my superiors. Also appearing at them had even been brought to his attention
? Chief, Personnel Operations Division, or about that time were my superiors. In prior to their appointment. This testimony I
? Department of State, October 1962 the committee publicly re- knew to be incorrect, for on September 10,
Washington, D.C. leased the transcripts of my testimony and 1962, before the appointments were made I
DEAR Ma. OnewAy: This is my answer to the that of other Department of State person- had submitted to him a memorandum with
charges preferred against me by your letter , nel, together with a report of the committee respect to each of the individuals in ques-
of September 23, 1963. containing the committee's conclusions and tion. This memorandum strongly recom-
CHARGE 1 AND c,HARGE 2 recommendations with respect to the se- mended that certain of the prospective ap-
Before turning to the specific charges, a curity practices and procedures of the De- pointees not be cleared without further
general statement of the background of this partment of State. Investigation. On September 17, 1962, Mr.
entire matter is in order. Beginning in February 1963, and during Reilly himself directed a memorandum to
I have been an employee of the U.S. Gov- March 1963, I appeared on four occasions Mr. George M. Czayo in the office of Mr.
ernment for 27 years. From 1936 until 1942 / before the same subcommittee in accord- Harlan Cleveland with respect to these cases.
occupied minor positions in the Farm Credit ance with its request and with the knowl- and this document reflected that Mr. Reilly
Administration and the Bureau of Internal edge- of my superiors. I was given to under- was familiar with my memorandum of Sep-
Revenue, and for 3 years during that period stand that the committee was seeking to tember 10. .
attended law school. In 1942 I was appointed ascertain from the Department of State I gave to Mr. Sourwine a copy of my mem-
an investigator and security Officer with the whether or not the Department had imple- orandum of September 10, 1962 and a copy
U.S. Civil Service Commission. I served in mented the committee's recommendations of Mr. Reilly's memorandum of September
that capacity until 1943, when I entered the to improve certain security practices found 17, 1962. While these documents were classi-
U.S. Navy as an apprentice seaman. I served by the committee to be deficient. During fled "Confidential"?the one of September
In the Navy from 1943 until 1946, being dis- April and May 1963 my immediate superior, 10 having been classified by me?they con-
charged with the grade of petty officer first Mr. John F. Reilly, testified before the tamed no investigative data. The only sub-
class. Returning to the Civil Service Com- committee on five occasions. Prior to his stantive data contained in my memorandum
mission in 1946, I served there as an investi- first appearance, and at his request, I ob- of September 10 consisted of references to
gator and security officer until 1953 when I tamed from Mr. Sourwine the stenographic certain matters which had been mentioned
came to the Department of State as a security transcripts of my testimony of February in published reports or hearings of the Sen-
officer. I have been with the Department ever and March 1963 and I furnished those ate Internal Security Subcommittee or
since 1953. transcripts to Mr. Reilly. Mr. Reilly indi- which were otherwise in the public domain.
lay efficiency ratings at the Civil Service cated to me he had not read my transcripts. The Reilly memorandum of September 17
Commission for the years 1948-53 were all before. I do not know the reason why, as contained no substantive data whatever with
"excen the transcripts had been available to him
ent," the highest ratings attainable respect to the prospective appointees, but
under the system then in effect. During my through regular Department channels, related for the most part to the procedural
Following the appearance of Mr. Reilly,
service In the Department of Mate, all of my steps involved in their clearance.
e he came to my office and informed me that
efficiency reports have been highly favorable. Charge 1 in your letter is based upon my
For example, for the year 1959-60, when I Senator Thomas J. Dodd, the presiding
? served
action in giving a copy of my memorandum
chairman of the subcommittee, had given
its Deputy Director of the Office of " "
Reilly,
'Mof September 10, 1962, to Mr. Sourwine,
? him, r. a bad time on that day.
Security, my efficiency report contained theCharge 2 relates to my action in giving Mr.
Mr. Reilly related to me that he had told
following comment by the Director of that
the subcommittee that I had voluntarily Sourwine a copy of Mr. Reilly's memorandum
office, Mr. Boswell:
of September 17, 1962. You allege that my
disqualified myself from the evaluation of
"He has had long experience with and has the case of William A. actions were in violation of the Presidential
,
acquired an extremely broad knowledge of asked if I could "straighten out" Wieland. Mr. Reilly Mr. Dodd directive of March 13, 1948 (12 Fed. Reg.
Jaws, regulations, rules, criteria, and proced- on this matter. I said I did not know Mr. 1359) which forbids the disclosure, except as
ures in the field of personnel security. He is Dodd but were I to be again questioned by required in the efficient conduct of business,
knowledgeable of communism and of its sub- of "reports, records, and files relative to the
the subcommittee I would be very happy to
versive efforts in the United States. To this,state for the record what had transpired loyalty of employees or prospective em-
he adds perspective, balance, and good judg- ployees."
between me and Mr. Reilly when on a prior
merit, presenting his recommendations and occasion he discussed with me, at his re- It is a familiar rule that regulations, like
decisions in clear, well reasoned, and metric- quest, my future role in the reevaluation of statutes, must be interpreted with common-
ulously drafted documents. He has brought the Wieland case, sense, that a thing may be within the letter
these attributes to bear during periods total-
- ing almost 4 months when he has been Act- Following the conclusion of Mr. Reilly's of a regulation and yet not within the regu-
testimony, Mr. J. G. Sourwine, the chief lation, because not within its spirit, nor
Mg Director in my absence and throughout
the rating counsel of the subcommittee, requested that within the intention of its makers. This has
period as the State Department
:representative on an intragovernmental corn- I come to see him, which I did, after working been the law for centuries. Poffendof men-
inittee concerned with. security matters." hours on the day of his request. To the best tions the judgment that the Bolognian law
of my recollection this was on May 23, 1963. which enacted "that whosever drew blood
'In April .1958 I received a Meritorious Serv- Mr. Sourwine voluntarily informed me that in the streets should be punished with the
ice Award signed ,hy Secretary of State John .there were conflicts between my testimony utmost severity," did not extend to the
Foster Dulles for sustained me.rItorious aer , .,and the testimony of Mr. Reilly. He offered surgeon who opened the vein of a person
complishment in the discharge of my as- to let me read the stenographic transcripts that fell down in a street in a fit. Plowden
signed duties. The justification for this of Mr. Reilly's testimony and said that when cites the ruling that the statute of 1st Ed-
award included the following statement: I had done so, I should give him a mernoran- ward II, which enacts "that a prisoner who
?He has shown himself consistently to be dum that would answer point by point all of breaks prison shall be guilty of a felony,"
_capable of sound independent judgment, those portions of Mr. Reilly's testimony does not extend to a prisoner who breaks
Creative work, and the acceptance of un- which conflicted with my testimony or which out of prison when the prison is on fire "for
Vsnal responsibility." . I found inaccurate or untrue. After carefully he is not to be hanged because he would not
It may be noted, that I haye received no reading the transcripts of Mr. Reilly's testi- stay to be burnt." See Church of the Holy
? efficiency report Since, September 1960, al- mony I was both shocked and amazed. I Trinity v. United States (143 U.S. 457).
hough he regulations_ require_ that eaCil therefore prepared a memorandum consist- Applying this doctrine to the present case,
p oyee receive such a report annually, ing of 39 double-spaced pages annotated by and assuming without conceding that the
and I have on several occasions requested my exhibits, and I furnished a copy of this memoranda of September 10 and Septem-
superiors to give me my efficiency reports. memorandum to Mr. Sow:wine together with ber 17, 1962, fell within the letter of the
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S 4110 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April 25, 1969
Presidential directive Of March 13, 1048, I
submit that those memorandums were not
within the spirit of the directive, nor within
the intention of its author. As President Tru-
man stated in. his letter to the Secretary of
State, dated April 2, 1952, the purpose of
the directive was "to preserve the confiden-
tial character and sources of information,
to protect Government personnel against the
dissemination of unfounded or disproved
allegations, and to insure the fair and just
disposition of loyalty cases." The memo-
randums of September 10 and September 17,
1962, referred to no confidential information,
disclosed no confidential sources, and made
no allegations. My memorandum of Septem-
ber 10, 1962, merely referred to matters of
public record and recommended that these
matters should be investigated. There was
no loyalty case, pending, or contemplated,
involving any of the individuals mentioned.
In short, in the context of the Presidential
directive of March 13, 1948, the two memo-
randums were completely innocuous and
clearly not the kind of papers that the direc-
tive Was designed to protect.
My interpretation of the Presidential di-
rective of March 13, 1948, is apparently in
harmony with the interpretation placed upon
the directive by Secretary of State Rusk.
Thus, the statement of Senator Thomas J.
Dodd, appended to the report of the Senate
Subcommittee on Internal Security in the
matter of State Department security, pub-
lished in 1962, contains the following:
"Subsequent to the preparation of this re-
port, I had occasion to discuss the Wieland
case with Secretary Rusk and to examine cer-
tain documents which he showed me in
confidence.
"On the basis of these conversations, I am
satisfied that, prior to September 15, 1961,
Secretary of State Rusk had examined the
material pertaining to the Wieland case in
considerable detail, including reports of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation * ? ?"
[Italic supplied.]
See Senate report, State Department secu-
rity, the case of William Wieland, etc., 87th
Congress 2d session?page 197. The intend-
ment of Senator Dodd's statement is that
Secretary Rusk disclosed to him documents
from the security file of Mr. Wieland, in order
to establish that the Secretary did examine
this material prior to September 15, 1961. It
seems obvious that, in the judgment of Sec-
retary Rusk, a reasonable and commonsense
interpretation of the Presidential directive
did not prevent the disclosure of the security
material tq Senator Dodd. If it was proper for
Secretary Husk to show such material to a
member of the Internal Security Subcom-
mittee, then it was proper for me to disclose
the innocuous memorandums of September
10 and September 17, 1962, to an authorized
agent of that subcommittee in order that the
committee might know the truth and to re-
fute unwarranted and scandalous charges
against me and my record.
Mr. Reilly's testimony that the cases of the
prospective appointees had not been brought
to his attention seriously disparaged my per-
formance of duty and impugned my integ-
rity. In other words, had I failed to bring
such matters to his attention. I would have
been guilty of a dereliction of duty. In this
context, I submit that I had not only the
right but the duty to defend myself, to cor-
rect the committee's record, and to support
my oral testimony by the memorandums of
September 10 and September 17, 1962.
The provisions of the United States Code,
title 5, section 652(d) plainly gave me the
right to respond to the request of the Senate
committee and to answer Mr. Reilly's attacks
upon me. That statute provides:
"(d) The right of persons employed in the
civil service of the United States, either indi-
vidually or collectively, to petition Congress,
or any Member thereof, or to furnish infor-
mation to either House of Congress Or to any
committee or member thereof, shall not be
denied or interferred with. As amended Juno
10. 1948, c. 447 62 Stat. 354; 1949 Reorg.
Plan No. 5, eff. Aug. 19, 1949, 14 F.R. 5227, 63
Stat. 1067".
If the provisions of the directive are con-
strued to prohibit the disclosure by me of the
memorandums here involved, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, then X submit the
directive is in violation of the statute.
It must be emphasized always that I gave
the memorandums in question to Mr. Sour-
wine, not as an individual, but as the au-
thorized agent of a committee of the U.S.
Senate; and I gave them to him only to he
used as exhibits in connection with my forth-
coming testimony before that committee in
executive session.
EXHIBIT 8
THE SCOTT REPORT
(By Paul Scott)
WASHINGTON, April 4.?A dramatic new
chapter, with far-reaching implications for
the future security of the U.S., is developing
in the Otto Otepka case.
Opponents of the former Deputy Chief of
Security at the State Department are prepar-
ing an all out campaign to block a Senate
vote on his nomination to the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board (SACB), an independ-
ent government seturity agency.
Otepka, after five years of persecution and
vilification by the State Department, was
nominated last month to the SACB by Presi-
dent Nixon.
The nomination, now pending before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, was a partial
victory for Otepka who had been stripped of
security duties and demoted by Dean Rusk,
former Secretary of State, for cooperating
with a Senate Committee exposing security
lapses in the State Department.
The nerve center for the new onslaught
against Otepka, scheduled to begin after the
Easter congressional recess, is the prestigious
New York Times Washington Bureau.
Neil Sheehan, the newspaper's controver-
sial Defense Department correspondent, has
been given the assignment to Write a series
of articles designed to indireetly link the
veteran security officer with right-wing
groups?none of which Otepka had ever been
a member or actively supported.
Significantly, Sheehan is the former bu-
reau ohief for the United Press International
in Saigon who openly worked during the
early '60s for the downfall of South Viet-
nam's anti-communist President Diem.
Pierre Solingen press secretary for both
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, assailed
Sheehan as one of a trio of American news-
men that "announced to one and all in
Saigon that one of the aims of their stories
.. was to bring down the Diem government."
More recently in a panel discussion in New
York on "The Peace in Asia," Sheehan pre-
sented the following view on communism;
"We might abandon the idea that commu-
nism is our enemy in Asia. We must be willing
to tolerate their enmity. I am suggesting that
in some countries a communist government
may be the best government."
CASTING THE SHADOW
Insiders at the New York Times say Shee-
han's anti-Otepka series was scheduled to
begin earlier this week but the death of
President Eisenhower and his state funeral
temporarily delayed their appearance.
Several of the persons involved in the vol-
unteer raising of funds for Otepka's costly
and long-drawn out legal battle for vindica-
tion report that they have already been
badgered by Sheehan about their political
affiliations.
In one case, Sheehan spent more than 45
minutes on long distance phone grilling
James Stewart, of Palatine, Ill., Director of
American Defense Fund which raised money
for Oteplca's legal defense, on whether he
was ever a member of the John Birch
Society,
When Stewart argued the question was
irrelevant and offered to discuss the issues of
the Otepka case with Sheehan, the corre-
spondent changed the subject, asking for the
names of all the contributors to Otepka's
defense fund.
On being told that more than 4,000 persons
had contributed, Sheehan said he wanted
"only the names of the big contributors."
This Stewart refused on the grounds he
needed approval of the individuals to give
out their names.
THE BOSTON RALLY
Sheehan also quizzed Stewart at length
about his group's fund-raising stand for
Otepka at the New England Rally for God;
Family, and Country, held in Boston in July,
1968, and attended by more than 1,000 per-
sons.
"I have reports that Otepka manned a
fund-raising booth at the Boston rally and
solicited funds for his case." stated Sheehan.
"Is not this true?"
"No, and you know it," replied Stewart.
"Otepka had nothing to do with that stand."
What Sheehan didn't mention to Stewart
was that another New York Times reporter
had turned in the same negative report
earlier. After spotting Otepka-and his wife
among the spectators at the Boston meeting,
the reporter kept a watch on Otepka only
to learn that he had nothing to do with the
fund-raising stand.
Other persons involved in the fund rais-
ing for Otepka's legal defense, which cost
the veteran security officer nearly $30,000,
have also been intensely questioned by
Sheehan.
Sheehan has been in contact with aides of
several Senators, including William Prox-
mire (D., Wis.) and Jacob Javits (le., N.Y.),
who plan to use his forthcoming stories to
try to block Otepka's nomination.
Several State Department officials, who
helped influence Secretary of State William
Rogers to bar Otepka's return to that Agency,
also have been in contact with Sheehan.
TRE BIGGER ISSUE
While Otepka will be the central target of
the coming attack, many congressional secu-
rity experts see the campaign as having a
much broader objective.
One memorandum being circulated among
these experts, warns:
"The coming campaign against Otepka is
designed to prevent, by smear and attack,
efforts to strengthen the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board, through the appointment
to it of strong, conscientious securities
specialists, and so bring about its destruc-
tion.
"The campaign will follow the pattern of
the highly successful one by which the
Eisenhower-Nixon program to train Ameri-
cans in red tactics through civilian-military
seminars was destroyed, through using Gen-
eral Walker as the target,
"Now, Otto Otepka is the target, and the
objective is the nipping in the bud of the
restoration of a strong security staff and
operation within the government."
Thus, the battle lines are being drawn for
a historic security showdown that could
rattle a lot of windows in the national
capital.
THE EsxcererroiTTiii:
PORT
(By Paul Scott)
WASHINGTON, April 11.? * * *
TIIE OTEPKA CASE
The New York Times campaign to block
Senate confirmation of Otto Otepka as a
member of the Subversive Activities Control
Board is being sparked by a former State
Department employee.
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April 25, 1969 - CONGRESSIONAL
' The anti-Otepka strategist is Harding A.
13ancroft, the Times' executive Vice Presi-
dent who once ,was under investigation by
Otepka for his close association with Alger
Hiss, the former high-ranking State Depart-
ment official convicted of perjury.
State Department insiders report that
Bancroft has actively opposed Otepka's re-
turn to government security work since the
veteran security officer was suspended in
1963. At that time, Otepka provided to docu-
ments to the Senate Internal Security Sub-
committe to support his testimony about lax
security in the handling of clearances for
several persons, including Bancroft, for im-
portant State Departinent posts.
Bancroft was being sponsored for a key
State Department position by Harlan Cleve-
land, then assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization, and former Sec-
retary of State Dean Rusk.
Otepka, the State Department's top au-
thority on government security regulations,
insisted that before Bancroft was given a
sentsitive State Department assignment that
"several matters" in his security file be re-
solved by a full-scale FBI investigation.
Instead, Bancroft's friends who were Otep-
ka's superiors in the State Department
waived the investigation. The Senate In-
ternal Security Subcommittee, which - was
conducting an inquiry into the Department's
lax security practices, quizzed Otepka about
the Bancroft matter.
OTEPKA'S TROITBLE BEGINS'
As a result of Otepka's cooperation with
the Senate Subcommittee, the veteran se-
curity official was suspended and charged
by the Department with giving classified in-
formation to the Senate probers.
Otepka, after five years of fighting the
charge, was nominated last month by Presi-
dent Nixon to the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Board, an independent government se-
curity agency.
Hearing on Otepka's nomination is now
scheduled for Tuesday, April 15 before a
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee. Since the
Otepka nomination was submitted to the
Senate, the New York Times under Bancroft's
direction has blasted the nomination edi-
torially.
Also, Neil Sheehan, the newspaper's con-
troversial Defense Department correspondent,
was given the assignment to try to link the
veteran security officer with extremist
, groups?none of which Otepka had ever been
a member or actively supported. One of Shee-
han's articles already has appeared.
EOM-TUE RECORD
Testimony and docUments gathered by
the Internal Security Subcommittee provide
an insight into Bancroft's opposition to
Otepka.
- These records show that Bancroft was first
employed' in the State Department in 1946
on the recommendation of Alger Hiss in the
office of Special Political Affairs *"later re-
named the Office of United Nations Affairs),
which Hiss headed.
While in the Department, Bancroft be-
carne Involved in a bitter dispute with Loy
Henderson, Director of the Office of Near
Eastern and African Affairs a veteran diplo-
mat and staunch anticommunist.
Bancroft insisted that the Soviets be per-
mitted to retain units of the Red Army in
Iran (Persia) beyond March 2, 1946, despite
the fact that this would be in violation of a
Treaty of Alliance to respect Iran's territorial
tntegritY. Great Britain and the U.S. already
' had withdrawn their forces after the end of
World War II.
In one of his great decisions, former Presi-
dent Truman disregarded the Bancroft rec-
ommendation, and ;decided to force the So-
viets to withdraw their troops immediately.
He did this by threatening ,strong U.S. action
RECORD ? SENATE S 4111
if there was no Russian pullout. The Rus-
sians Withdrew.
Bancroft also tried to get Robert Alexander,
a highly respected and knowledgeable official
in the State Department's Visa division, fired.
He recommended his ouster after Alexander
told a Congressional Committee that the
United Nations headquarters in New York
was a haven for alien communists and es-
pionage agents.
Although Alexander's testimony later was
confirmed publicly by statements of FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover, his career was
ruined by Department officials who entered
into his records a stiff reprimand for telling
the truth..
In the case of Cordier, Otepka recom-
mended to Reilly that additional investiga-
tion be conducted before further considera-
tion was given to the granting or denial
of a clearance. Belisle overruled Otepka and
Reilly concurred with Belisle. As the result,
Cordier wal granted a full clearance for ap-
pointment to the Department.
? FOOTNOTES ?
"Pages" cited throughout this document
refer to typed transcripts of Reilly testimony
before the Senate Internal Security Subcom-
mittee.
'See Exhibit I at p. 1721.
-210: Assistant Secretary for International
Organization Affairs.
OIA: Office of International Administra-
tion.
4SY: Office of Security.
Typed note at bottom of page: "Copy
given to Sourwine on May 23, 1963."
A typed line at the bottom of typed page
2 reads as follows: "Given to Sourwine on
May 23, 1963." (The correspondence referred
to read as f allows: )
MAY 14, 1963.
? Mr. BELISLE : Reference is made to your
handwritten note of May 13, 1963, on the sub-
ject "Staffing International Organizations,"
requesting my comments on the attachments
by noon, May 14.
Tlie report of the Advisory Committee on
International Organizations which is dated
April 22, 1963, and appended to 0M?Mrs.
Rogers' memorandum of May 8, 1963, was
given to the press about two weeks ago. A
brief account appeared in local newspapers.
I did not see the actual report itself until
you sent it to me yesterday.
The Advisory Committee on International
Organizations Staffing previously drafted a
report dated March 1963 on the staffing of
international organizations. I discussed with
Mr. ReillY'my views on the coritents of that
report-. Thereafter, on March 18, 1963, I sub-
mitted to Mr. Reilly for his signature a pro-
posed memorandum drafted by me personally
addressed to Mr. Orrick containing detailed
written comments with respect to Section 6
regarding "Loyalty Investigations of U.S. Cit-
izens Employed by International Organiza-
tions."
I note that the new report of the Com-
mittee has eliminated in its entirety the
Committee's previous comments and recom-
mendations that investigations of Americans
employed by UN agencies be conducted on a
post appointment rather than a preappoint-
merit basis. The new provisions, now desig-
nated -as Section 8 and captioned "Govern-
ment Clearance of Candidates for Interna-
tional Organization Employment" merely
contains an observation that the problem
clearance is a difficult one and should be
given careful consideration in the immediate
future. The present report advocates more
Simplified procedures to appoint qualified
Americans when they are needed but it does
Rot specify the types of procedures desirable.
I see no objection to the revised provi-
sion. However, any new procedures proposed
In the future should take into account the
matters which / discussed in detail In my
comprehensive comments of March 18, 1963.
I have received no indication as to the ap-
proval or disapproval of my previous ob-
servations and recommendations. I would ap-
preciate being informed of their disposition
for my future guidance.
OTTO P. OTEPKA.
[Pencilled note]
MAY 13, 1963.
Subject: Staffing Int'l Org.
To Mr. Otepka:
Please let me have any comments by noon
May 14.
Thanks.
BELISLE.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
May 6, 1963.
Subject: Staffing International Organiza-
tion?A Report of the Advisory Commit-
tee on International Organizations.
To: SY?Mr. John F. Reilly.
0 has asked OM (Office of Management)
to staff out the attached. Could we have any
SY views sonnest (by telephone?Extension
4381?if you prefer). The item you may be
most interested in is marked at pages 24 and
25.
0M?GLAuss P. ROGERS.
Attachment: A Report of the Advisory
Committee on International Organizations.
(The April 22, 1983, draft of the Report on
International Organizations *staffing accom-
panied the above request.)
Copies of pertinent memorandums sup-
plied by Mr. Otepka were marked "Exhibit
No. I" and are printed at p. 1721.
THE COURTS AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, ev-
ery Monday millions of Americans fear-
fully scan their newspapers to find the
latest edicts of the Supreme Court. The
Court has in recent years put its own
peculiar brand of sociology on many
facets of our daily lives, but there is no
more blatant example than its rulings
in the area of education.
Dr. Carl F. Hansen, former superin-
tendent of schools for Washington, D.C.,
has written an excellent article entitled
"When Courts Try To Run the Public
Schools," published in U.S. News &
World Report for April 21, 1969, which
should be read by all of us. It may be re-
called that Dr. Hansen was hailed by
many throughout the Nation for his pi-
oneer work in the city of Washington in
response to the 1954 Brown decision.
Mr. President, as an educator, Dr. Han-
sen is well qualified to illustrate the
dangers inherent in the Court's deci-
sions affecting education; and as one
who has been deeply involved in the is-
sue, he knows better than most lawyers
the effects of the Court's rulings on the
public school system.
Mr. President, with the hope that this
article may provide some much-needed
information in an area of vital concern
to all of us, I ask unanimous consent
that it be printed in the RECORD at the
conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
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S 4112 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
WHEN COURTS TRY To RUN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
(By Dr. Carl F. Hansen, former Superintend-
ent of Schools, Washington, 'D.C.)
(Nare.?Dr. Carl P. Hansen guided the in-
tegration of Washington, D.C., schools in
1954. His work in the transition drew wide
praise. In subsequent years, Negro enrollment
gained overwhelming predominance. A Negro
filed suit, charging "inequities." A federal
judge ordered changes considered dangerous
by Dr. Hansen, who chose to retire rather
than comply.)
If you live in a small Nevada town?or
in one in Iowa or Ohio, for that matter?
and your schools are mostly white, you may
actually be flouting a court ruling that says
that racially imbalanced schools run against
the Constitution of the United States.
If your Schools have all-white faculties,
you may someday be ordered to hire 13 per
cent black teachers to make the percentage
fit in with the ratio of blacks to whites in
the national population.
If you live in a city like Washington, D.C.,
or Chicago, you may someday have to see to
It that the proportion of the pour in any
school does not exceed the percentage of the
poor in the entire city.
If you refuse to attempt to get a balance
between the poor and the nonpoor in your
schools through voluntary exchanges across
school-district and even State lines, you may
find yourself in contempt of court.
You may find your own child someday in-
explicably "volunteering" to ride a bus out
of your neighborhood for the kind of social
and racial integration some of the nation's
leaders think is best for everybody?except
possibly for themselves.
If not already current realities, these re-
quirements may ultimately result from the
emergence of the doctrine of de jure inte-
gration.
A new and rather pervasive body of law
is being generated by the courts and a lim-
ited number of school boards and State leg-
islatures. The effect of this action is to make
homogeneous schools either illegal or uncon-
stitutionel. In order to reduce homogeneity
in school populations, school boards are being
required by law to produce plans for increas-
ing racial and social balance in their class-
rooms.
For much too long this nation lived with
de jure segregation. Under this immoral and
inhumane doctrine, children?and in some
cases teachers?were told: "You may not en-
ter this school or thin one because of your
race." The law stood guard at classroom doors,
sifting out blacks from whites and sending
each into prescribed educational areas.
Now conies a counterpart rule -that of
de jure integration. The effect is the same
as in the case of de jure segregation: The
law again stands guard, admonishing the
black child to enter a designated school be-
cause his dark skin will improve racial bal-
ance there, or instructing a white child to
transfer into a black school for the same
reason.
One of the more difficult problems about
assigning pupils to schools by race is deciding
who is white and who is black. For this,
someone ought to devise a skin scanner ca-
pable of computing racial dominance by
measuring skin shade.
In today's admonition against homogene-
ous schools, you have to think beyond simple
race differentials; you are required to weigh
the purses of schoolchildren to determine
whether they belong to the poor or to the
affluent segments of American society. If you
are going to enforce mixing of pupils by social
and income class, you must find out about
the financial condition of their families.
At the base of the doctrine of de fure
integration is the assumption that homoge-
neous schools are bad for children. If you
want to raise a nasty question, simply ask:
"What is the proof that schools with fairly
similar enrollments are inferior? Why is an
all-white school arbitrarily suspect, or an
all-black school written off as worse than
useless?"
The earliest example of de furs integration
is found in the 1954 action of the New York
City board of education when it declared
that "racially homogeneous public schools
are educationally undesirable," and then
placed upon itself the responsibility of
preventing "further development of enehe
schools" and achieving racial balanee lit all
of its schools.
The action was taken On the advice of
social theorists who reasoned that segrega-
tion by fact?that is, resulting from the free
choice of people,-was as bad as segregation
by law.
The actionaef the New York City board of
education was followed up in 1960 by the
New York .board of regents. On the premise
that homogeneous schools impair:the ability
to learns` the regents ordered the New York
State tpartment of education to seek solu-
tions the problem of racial imbalance. It
decia d:
"1V1 dem psychological knowledge indicates
that ischools enrolling students largely of
honngeneous ethnic origin may damage the
perscinality of the minority-group children.
. Public education in such a setting ha
social unrealistic, blocks the attainment of
the gAls of democratic education, and is
wastefu of manpower and talent, whether
this situ on occurs by law or fact."
Three yea later, the then New York State
commissioner education, Dr. James E.
Allen, Jr., now Lifted States Commisisoner
of Education, sent a snemorandum to all
State school officials requiring them to take
steps to bring about racial balance in their
schools. The commissioner defined racial im-
balance as existing where a school had 50 per
cent or more black children enrolled.
The legislative developmentOf the coneept
of de jure integration has continued: Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Wisconsin
and Connecticut have declared in executive
or judicial statements that raciA isolation
in the schools has a damaging effeet on the
educational opportunities of the Negre pupils.
In 1965, for example, the Massachusetts
legislature enacted a Racial Imbalande Act.
Schools with more than 50 per cent %non-
whites were required to file with the Mas-
sachusetts State board a plan for correc ing
the condition.
It would be a serious mistake to overl&mk
the role of the courts in establishingte
rule that homogeneousschools must e
abandoned.
The de facto school-segregation decision
in Hobson v. Hansen explicitly instructed the
Washington, D.C., board of education to sub-
mit plans for the reduction of imbalance In
the schools.
By clear definition, Judge J. Skelly Wright
included social class along with race as f -
tors of concern. For the first time a cqtmrt
spoke not only on the unconstitutional jt,i of
racial imbalance but of social imbalanee as
well:
"Racially and socially homogeneous spools
damage the minds and spirit of all children
who attend them?the Negro, the white, the
poor and the affluent?and block the/attain-
ment of the broader goals of democr4tic edu-
cation, whether the segregation oAcurs by
law or by fact."
Judge Wright overrode the contusions of
at least eight federal courts that had ruled
consistently that it is not the dut of a board
of educaion to eliminae de facto egregation,
provided there is no evidence sq4gesting the
maintenance of de jure segreg ion.
The sweeping Wright decision, however,
went far beyond the more common legislative
view in such States as New York and Mas-
sachusetts that blacks suffer from attendance
In predominantly black schools. The jurist in
Agril 25, 1969
Hobson V. Hansen added social-class homo-
geneity as a factor detrimental to democratic
education. In addition, he enunciated the
the opinion that all children are hurt by
homogeneity. In all-white, predominantly
affluent schools, therefore, the minds and
hearts of the pupils are being damaged for
about the same reasons that black children
suffer in schools peopled by their own race.
If the rule requiring integration by social
class prevails, every public school in the na-
tion is subject to its effect. Even predomi-
nantly Negro school systems like the Wash-
ington, D.C., unit will be confronted with a
redistribution of its pupils along social lines,
if the literal meaning Of the Wright opinion
is observed. In the nation's capital, with
about 94 per cent Negro public-school en-
rollment, more then 10,000 secondary-school
students were reassigned in one year to bring
about better social balance in the schools.
Thus, de jure integration by class as a doc-
trine is already in partial effect in at least one
major school system.
The conclusion that socially homogeneous
schools must be destroyed rises from an in-
creasing stress upon the theory that social
class determines the quality of education.
If the only way to improve achievement
among lower-social-class pupils is to inte-
grate them with higher-income pupils, a vast
manipulation of school populations is in
prospect. It would require a kind of despotism
the world has not yet experienced, for en-
forcement is inevitable where the people do
not volunteer.
It is difficult to believe that freedom can
survive when government seeks to control the
social and racial dispersement of the people--
speaking, as it does so, the line: "This may
hurt, but it will be good for you."
The judicial movement toward full devel-
opment of the de jure integration doctrine
was accelerated by the United States Supreme
Court in three decisions issued in May, 1968.
These are the Kent County. Va., the Gould,
Ark., and the Jackson City, Tenn., opinions
requiring the school boards in these com-
munities to abandon their freedom-of-choice
plans for desegregating their schools.
In these opinions, the Supreme Court de-
clared that, in States where the schools were
previously segregated by law, school boards
must assume an affirmative responsibility to
disestablish segregation.
In Jackson City, Tenn., for example, it was
not enough to set up school zones on the
neighborhood principle, at the same time
allowing pupils to choose to attend schools
outside those zones if space existed in them.
Under this plan, formerly all-white schools
received significant numbers of black stu-
dents. Because, however, white students re-
fused to attend or to elect to attend all-
Negro schools, the Court was dissatisfied with
the freedom-of-choice plan. The presence of
all-Negro schools became clear evidence of
intent to preserve segregation as it existed
before 1954.
Not only must the Jackson City school au-
thorities by the force of law require white
children to attend formerly all-Negro schools,
but they must also enforce faculty mixing
by arbitrary assignment of personnel on
racial lines.
The Supreme Court's disestablishment
doctrine is the principle of de jure integra-
tion applied to those States in which segre-
gation by law existed prior to the 1954 Brown
decisions. This position?quite heavily bur-
dened with patent discrimination against a
group of States?is after all only one step
removed from a decision requiring all States
to disestablish segregation, whether this
occurs by law or fact.
De jure integration, in summary, applies
currently in those States and in those school
districts where the local legislative bodies
have enacted legislation establishing the
new doctrine. It applies specifically to the
District of Columbia, where the Wright apin-
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-.A26rt-t2t 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE
are in favor of a convention like some
parts of the bill, and dislike others. Those
who are against the convention also favor
some of the bill and oppose other sec-
tions. But increasingly public opinion rec-
ognizes that the issues cannot be ignored.
As evidence of this feeling, the Washing-
ton Post of Saturday, April 12, called for
Senate action on S. 632. I ask unanimous
consent that the editorial be included in
? the RECORD at this point in my remarks.
There being no abjection, the editorial
referred to was ordered to be printed in
the RECORD, as follows:
CoNsrrrunoNet. CONVENTION BILL
The Iowa Senate did not create much of a
stir the other day when it passed a proposal
for a national constitutional convention, al-
though (if the House should concur) Iowa
would be the 33d state taking such action.
If 94 states join in this petition, it is widely
assumed that Congress would have to call
such a convention. And some people fear
that a convention initiated solely by the
states might abolish the Bill of Rights, create
an elected Supreme Court and critically curb
the powers of the Federal Government.
This venture aroused a great deal of alarm
two years ago when the 32d state resolu-
tion was passed. Since their much of the
steam has gone out of both the drive for a
constitutional convention and the opposition
to it. One reason for this is the careful work
done by Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., which makes
it evident that Congress would not need to
call a wide-open convention even if two-
thirds of the states should seek constitu-
tional changes under the unused portion of
Article V.
Another factor is the passage of time. The
first petitions to Congress to call a consti-
tutional convention came from 12 states in
1963. The purpose behind them was to deny
the Federal courts jurisdiction over state
legislative apportionment cases. Most of the
petitions since then have asked for a con-
vention to propose an amendment which
would permit one house of a state legislature
to be apportioned by some Standard other
than population. Are the two groups suffi-
ciently related to be joined together into a
single demand upon Congress? Another ques-
tion must be raised about the validity of four
petitions which apparently have not been
received by Congress. Then there is the ques-
tion as to whether the early petitions are still
valid six Years after they were voted. Under
the terms of the Ervin bill designed to guide
the submission of such petitions, they would
remain in effect only four years.
Whether or not 34 petitions are ultimately
received Congress ought to take up the Ervin
bill at the first opportunity. It would tell
the states how to proceed in petitioning for
a constitutional convention and how to elect
their delegates if such a convention should
be called. It would make Congress the sole
judge of whether the states had complied
with the requirements in any instance. More
important, it would confine the convention
to the specific problem raised in the state
petitions and the congressional call and give
Congress discretion to kill any proposed
amendment on other subjects by not sub-
mitting it to the states for final ratification.
In our view this safety valve is both proper
and essential. Senator Ervin has noted that
when the framers adopted two methods of
amending the Constitution, one to be in-
voked by Congress and the other by the
states, they did not intend to make one
superior to the other. They did not invite
the states to junk the Constitution and write
a new one in a convention called by them-
selves, Both Madison and Hamilton make
clear that the conventions which the states
might initiate were intended for the pro-
posal of specific amendments only.
'
We think Congress would be Well within
its rights in passing a law to implement this
understanding. If it does so, most of the fear
that has been associated with state-initiated
conventions will evaporate. As a matter of
policy it is infinitely better for constitutional
amendments to be approved first by Congress
and then ratified by the states, so that the
will of the Nation as well as that of the states
will be expressed. But as long as an alterna-
tive amendment procedure remains in the
Constitution, and it is not likely to be re-
pealed, Congress has an obligation to pro-
vide sensible guidelines for its use and not to
risk a constitutional crisis after petitions
from two-thirds of the states have been laid
at its door. This would be a good bill for
Congress to get to work on while It is com-
plaining that It has nothing to do.
Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, the differ-
ences of opinion over my bill should be
debated fully on the Senate floor. This
bill is too important to be dealt with by
ignoring it. I will spare no effort to get
this bill considered by the Senate, be-
cause I believe we cannot and should not
shut our eyes to the responsibilities the
Constitution has imposed on us.
CLARK MOLLENHOFF ON THE
=Elia CASE
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, Clark
Mollenhoff, of the Des Moines, Iowa,
Register, has been a very responsible re-
porter on the Washington beat for a
great many years, When the Internal
Security Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary got started
on the so-called Otepka case nearly 6
years ago, Mr. Mollenhoff gave a good
deal of attention to it, and, in fact, his
attention continued all through the
hearings. He was really one of the men
who stood by Otepka. He verified the
documentation and sources; therefore,
he was correct when he wrote and when
he spoke.
Clark Mollenhoff went to the Freedom
Foundation at Valley Forge on April 19
of this year and made a speech which
was devoted to the Otepka case. There
he set it out?line, page, and verse?in a
way that really nails the matter down.
I think it should be made a part of the
literature on the Otepka case. I ask
unanimous consent that the speech be
printed in the REbORD.
There being no objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ADDRESS BY CLARK MOLLENHOFF
I call attention to the case of Otto F.
Otepka and the case for moderation, pa-
tience and conscientious hard work on the
seemingly impossible problems that face our
society. I hope the six-year ordeal of Otto
Otepka is nearly over, and that within a few
weeks he will be busy at the Subversive Ac-
tivities Control Board, I hope his term on
the Subversive Activities Control Board will
be marked by the same thoughtful and bal-
anced actions that have characterized his
approach to his six years of trial.
I will not say that there were no moments
of anger and bitterness for Otepka in the
last six years, for I know there were many
in his long and often frustrating battle with
the big bureaucracy that is the State De-
partment. But, Otepka managed to keep the
bitterness to himself through most of the
time, and he avoided the temptation to en-
gage in a public name-calling contest that
could have seriously damaged his case.
S 4051
For the most part, Otepka confined him-
self to the recitation of the written record
of the Senate Internal Security Subcommit-
tee and the papers filed by his attorney, Ro-
ger Robb, in connection with his personnel
litigation. Because he confined himself to
the written reocrd he made it difficult for
critics in the State Department to twist or
distort his position by taking comments out
of proper context. Because he kept meticu-
lous records of his case and related matters,
Otepka has been in a position to document
the record of the activities of his tormentors.
Because of the care with which Otepka has
proceeded the issues in his case have re-
mained essentially the same as they were
when the case started six years ago.
The State Department press office and
other critics have found it difficult to create
new side issues to distract from the basic
case. /n its simplest form this is the case:
The State Department political arm was
trying to fire or demote Otepka because he
told the truth under oath and produced
three documents to prove he was truthful.
Otepka testified on lax security practices
at the State Department and his testimony
was flatly contradicted by a superior, John
F. Reilly. This created a serious problem for
someone had testified falsely under oath on
a material matter dealing with State Depart-
ment security,
Otepka was advised by the Senate subcom-
mittee of the conflict in testimony indicat-
ing that either Otepka or Reilly had lied
under oath.
Faced with that problem, Otepka said he
could prove he was truthful and that his
superior had told a false story. At the sub-
committee's request. Otepka produced three
documents:
1. A memorandum from Otepka to Reilly
setting out the facts as Otepka had testified
they were related to Reilly. It was initialed
by Reilly.
2. A memorandum from Reilly to others
setting out the information Otepka said he
had conveyed to Reilly. This was signed by
Reilly.
3. The personnel papers of a young wom-
an. They contained no derogatory infor-
mation. They were used to demonstrate how
a case would be handled under normal cir-
cumstances.
Those documents were necessary to prove
that Otepka was truthful. They dealt with a
subject matter within the jurisdiction of the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee.
None of those documents involved any na-
tional security secrets. Perhaps it would have
been possible for Otepka to take those docu-
ments to his superior, Reilly, and obtain ap-
proval for delivering them to the Senate
subcommittee for the purpose of proving
that Reilly had given false testimony.
However, I do not believe it was unrea-
sonable for Otepka to believe that he had a
right to respond to the Senate Subcommittee
_ request without clearing with Reilly. The
Senate Subcommittee had the responsibility
to find out who was telling the truth. Otepka
had the information necessary to establish
the truth and the right to prove his own
ver
John F. Reilly who filed the charges
it ac was ity.
of "insubordination" against Otepka for de-
livering the three documents to Congress.
He also flied ten other charges that had to
be dropped by the State Department after
Otepka and his lawyer said they had evidence
to prove that those charges were based on
rigged evidence.
Reilly was in the group of officials who
participated in the illegal and unauthorized
wiretapping of Otepka's office telephone and
the bugging of the State Department office.
Reilly had a role in entering Otepka's office
at night to ransack his desk and bore into
the security safes to try to find grounds for
firing Otepka.
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S 4052
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE April
This ?get Otepka" drive failed to produce
etridenee but the pattern of harasement was
the worst in police state tactics.
Reilly and others on two occasions lied to
the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee
in denying a knowledge of the eavesdropping
on Otepka before they finally admitted it.
It was Reilly who Tiled the "insubordina-
tion" charge against Otepka to try to fire
him. To me it was incredible that Secretary
Rusk and other officials would permit Reilly
to file the charges in the light of: his pattern
of "get Otepka" activity.
I started to work en the Otepka case in
1963 prior to the time Reilly filed the charges
of "insiebordination". I have followed it since
then.
When I started work on this matter, I
questioned Otepka extensively. I did not
know him well then. I did not know if the
facts he presented were accurate, nor did I
know if there were other facts that might
change the overall look -of the cate.
For weeks, and even for months, I was
cautious about drawing any more than a
fese of the most limited conclusions on the
Otepka ease. Every investigation I made of
Otepka's story demonstrated that he was
accurate on the facts*, and balanced in his
perspective. In many respects he understated
his case. Also, he was amszingly objective in
viewing his own case, and in judgment about
the men who were aligned against him. He
had the restraint and judgment to draw
lines between. those who were actively en-
gaged in illegal and improper efforts and
those who seemed to be simply trapped into
a position by carelessness or to present a
united political front.
Despite the care with which Otepka re-
lated his case, I had difficulty in believing it
was as one-sided as it appeared. I made
every effort I could to determine if the facts
were glossed over or omitted by Otepka or
the Senate subcommittee. I questioned
everyone I could at the State Department,
up to and including Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. Frankly, I did not want to believe the
Kennedy Administration was either as in-
competent or as cruel as it appeared to be.
In those first months, it was logical to ask
if there was something in Otepka's record
or his activities that in some manner justi-
fied the unusual methods used in the effort
to get him. What crimes or suspicions of
subversion could justify the use of wire-
tapping and eavesdropping on Otepka, the
tight surveillance kept on his activities, and
the ransacking of his office and security
safes?
There was no hint from his critics that
Otepke, was believed in either subversion or
crime.
Also, the other obvious question involved
Otepka's rulings on security cases. I asked
if there was any case showing that Otepka
had been irresponsible in branding someone
a security risk on the basis of flimsy or
rigged evidence? No one could or would cite
a case of irresponsibility or lack oi balance
in any Otepka evaluations.
Month after month I asked for the case
against Otepka. In the end I concluded that
there was nothing else against Otepka ex-
cept the so-called "Insubordination" In pro-
ducing the documents for the Senate Sub-
committee.
There were insinuations that Otepka was
a "right-winger" who deserved no defense.
At State officials hinted that Otepka was a
"MoCarthyite" but they shut this off fast
when I asked them for specific details after
explaining that Otepka did not know Mc-
Carthy, and recalling thas Otepka had rec-
ommended clearance of a number of persons
in controversial oases.
The undocumented State Department line
apparently went over with some reporters.
A few reporters wrote stories crediting the
Kennedy Administration with taking a nec-
essary step in disciplining Otepka to crush
out "the last vestiges of McCarthyism" at the
State Department. They gave no facts, but
with this broad smear engaged in the worst
type of MeCarthyism against Otepka. I asked
several if they had any tints linking Otepka
to McCarthy. They had none.
I asked several of my colleagues if they
knew that Otepka had recommended the
clearance of Wolf Ladejinsky in 1951 at a
time when Agriculture Secretary Benson was
ruling that Ladejinsky was a security rink.
Most of them did not.
I reviewed the Ladejinsky case in which
the Benson decision became e great cause for
liberals, and with good reason. Benson's de-
cision was an arbitrary and irresponsible one,
as was later established. I had a major news-
paper role in correcting the Ladejinsky deci-
sion, but I had many helpers and editorial
suppporters in the liberal press.
I tried to demonstrate that the Ladejin-
sky and Otepka cases were similar. Both, men
were career public officials Who were being
'persecuted by political decisions with all of
the power of a cabinet office being used to
enforce an unjust arbitrary decision.
The American Civil Liberties Union and
other liberal groups rejected my efforts to
stimulate their interest in the Otepka case.
argued that true liberalism demanded that
Otepka, a conservative, should be defended
as stoutly as La,dejinsky, a liberal, was
defended.
For the most part that plea was futile, even
-though the ACLU did enter the case briefly to
protest the proceedings in the State De-
partment appeal.
The State Department hearing was a rigged
political court to give Oteplta, a pro-forma
hearing before Rusk ruled against him and
demoted him from a $20,000 job to a $15,000
job.
Roger Robb, lawyer for Otepka, protested
the hearing form, and sought witnesses to
establishes frame-up of Otepka. His pleas
were rejected by the hearings officer, and by
Rusk.
My disappointment with the failure of
liberal organizations to came to Otepka's de-
fense has been matched by my disappoint-
ment in some of my liberal press colleagues.
We worked together on the Ladejinsky case,
and they were eager to help. No amount of
persuasion could move them to examine the
even greater injustice of the Otepka case.
I realize the record of the Otepka case is
voluminous and despite the reports of the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee has
remained oontroversial. This did make it a
difficult case to unwind, and it made it easy
for State Department spokesmen to distort
the record and to snip at Otepka from the
protecting cover of anonymity.
There may be some malicious and inten-
-Lionel distortions by some segments of the
press, but I prefer to hope that the mass
of distorted reporting on the Otepka case
was a result of carelessness and a lack of
dillgence on the part of overworked State De-
partment reporters. Certainly, the voltuni-
none record made reporters easy prey to the
distorted State Department backgrounders.
I realize the broad range of direct and
subtle pressures brought to discourage a de-
fense of Otepka, for I met most of them at
some stage from my friends in the Kennedy
Administration. One put It crudely: "What
are you lining up with Otepka and all those
far-right nuts for? Do you want to destroy
yourself?"
There were also the hints that I could be
cut off from White House contacts and other
high administration contacts if I continued
my- push for the facts in the Otepka matter.
When I tried to discuss the facts and the
unanswered questions, there was no interest
In either the facts or the merits. They simply
wanted to shut off reporting and comments
on an embarrassing subject.
Fortunately there have been a few people
who have continued to work on the case and
to report something besides the State Depart-
ment versien. I would pay special attention
to Holmes Alexander, Ed Hunter, Edith
Roosevelt, and Willard Edwards.
I want to pay special tribute to Willard
Edwards.- Ins Conversation with Richard M.
Nixon, the Republican candidate, set the
stage for the naming of Otepka to the Sub-
versive Activities Control Board. Edwards re-
ported that Nixon intended to see that justice
was done for Otepka, and I had a later con-
versation with the then Candidate Nixon in
which he confirmed his conversation with
Willard Edwards and again expressed his in-
terest in straightening out the Otepkii, case.
There was some disappeintment that Sec-
retary of State William P. Rogers did not take
direct action to reinstate Otepka as well
as several of Otepka's nipporters who were
victims of the political knife under the Ken-
nedy and Johnson Administration. But, since
there has been no change in the top legal,
personnel and press jobs at the State Depart-
ment, I guess it should not be surprising if
Rogers received one-Sided briefings and ac-
tions recommendations that represented any-
thing but justice for Otepka.
I had believed that Secretary Rogers---a
former congressional investigator of subver-
sion and a former Attorney General?should
be able to analyze the Otepka case. But, he
has been busy with the affairs of dozens of
alliances, and in the absence of other evi-
dence, I prefer to think his unfortunate let-
ter on the Otepka case was a result of the
work of holdover subordinates.
Fortunately, President Nixon stepped in to
make things right with a top level vindica-
tion of Otenka through the appointment to
the Subversive Activities Control Board.
There have been some efforts to stir an
anti-Otepka drive in the Senate on ground
that Otepka's association with some John
Birch Society members made him unworthy
of the SACB appointment. This guilt by as-
sociation technique ranks with the worst
"McCarthy-ism". There is the possibility that
some Senators may try to stimulate an anti-
Opteka move and acme will almost certainly
vote against his confirmation. This is their
right.
If any opposition Senators conduct the re-
search necessary to properly discuss this case,
I have an idea that they will back away from
any direct confrontation because it would
focus national attention on one of the most
serious black marks in the Kennedy Admin-
istration. Any discussion of the case is cer-
tain to point up more vividly than at any
time in the past the sordid story of eaves-
dropping, surveillance, safe-breaking and
other police state methods used by the Ken-
nedy administration in the "get Otepka"
drive.
I have been sorely disappointed over the
press handling of the Otepka case over the
period of the last few years. In seeking to
analyze the reasons, I have concluded that
much of the fault must be in the super-
ficiality of the news media in dealing with
complicated controversial tames.
The superficiality that marked the cover-
age of the Otepka case can also be found in
an examination of the rise of the late Sena-
tor Joseph McCarthy to a position of na-
tional prominence on a record that included
the wildest irresponsibility. The press made
Joe McCarthy through its initial superficial
and noncritical handling of his irresponsi-
bility. It was impossible for a reader to tell
fact from general smear. In the same man-
ner the press permitted anonymous State
Department people to smear Otepka.
Only when the newspapers became alarmed
and enraged in a careful Investigation and
study of the details of the McCarthy record
was there a public understanding of Mc-
Carthy as the irresponsible rogue he was.
Unfortunately, the press engaged in what
I am afraid is a characteristic over reaction
on the issue of loyalty and security. The fact
that Joe McCarthy was wrong in engaging in
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 4053
1
1969
a general smear of public employees on In. that connection, I ought to Call at-
charges they were disloyal or security risks tention to the distressing situation that
did not mean that there are no persons in the confronts the shoe industry of the coun-
t:rutted States Government who are disloyal. try. I have more than a casual interest in
Yet, much of the press reacted in a manner
that indicated there was no problem of it, because there are 42 shoe factories in
loyalty and secuhty and that anyone who the State of Illinois, they are located in
it was somehow off on a kick of 25 different cities, and, of course, their
0Oarth3Tism." progress and their prosperity are con-
This type of an attitude is as destructive tingent on the conditions that confront
as, are the equally irresponsible antics of a and beset the industry.
Joe McCarthy. If disregards the fact that In 1968 we lost 22 percent of our do-
there has been a constant problem of pro-
tecting national security interests. I assume
there will be a'problern until such time as the
United States the Soviet Union, and all of
the other nations of the world can give
effective guarantees that there will be no
more spying. It is hardly necessary to add that
I do not believe that there is any possibility
of such a condition arising in the near future.
In the meantime, the government must try
to manage a security program for the pro-
tection of our government and our people.
The press must recognize this as a difficult
problem with some inherent conflicts between
personal liberty and general welfare. The
system must be administered in a fair man-
ner rejecting pressures to disregard security
standards for political favorites and also the
temptation to bar persons with otherwise fine
records because of flimsy evidence or overly
suspicious reasoning.
Since the press is our life line of informa-
tion in a democracy, it is vital that news-
papers learn how to deal with the major
complex controversies of our age in a manner
that enlightens rather than enflames the
public. What I have said of this issue of
sedurity standards can also apply to our
other major problems?
Obtaining a reasonable balance between
the rights of defendants and the need for
an orderly society through firm law enforce-
ment.
Creating and maintaining the needed mili-
tary-industrial complex without letting it
control the nation or warp our institutions.
Establishing the rights of working men to
bargain for fair wages and working conditions
without permitting their leaders to destroy
businesses, the government, or other institu-
tions in our society.
These are only a few of the major problems
that face our society today, but they are large
enough and representative enough to demon-
strate that the newspapers have a large re-
sponsibility. I hope they will learn from the
past errors, and find a way out of the pattern
of superficiality that has marred the past. makes his recommendations, we can get
, There would be'no purpose in identifying our teeth into the problem and see what
those news organizations who through we can do about a domestic industry
negligence or incompetence did not come to grips with the enormous wrongs of the that is being ground to the wall.
Otepka case in the years that case has been
pending. / was pleased with the general fair-
ness of most of the coverage of the Judiciary
OomInittee hearing on the Otepka nomina-
tion to the Subversive Activities Control
Board. / hope that it means that there will
be more thought to depth investigation and
balanced coverage the next time such a case
conies on the horizon.
mestic market to imported shoes. The
shoe industry employes 230,000 people,
and there are 1,100 factories scattered in
some cities and towns in 40 States of
the Union. The early figures for 1969 will
indicate that 30 percent?which is get-
ting close to one-third?of our entire
domestic market is going to be surren-
dered to imported shoes unless something
is done.
The key factor in all this problem is, of
course, the wage scale. In the United
States, the hourly wage scale is $2.62. In
Japan, including fringes, it is $1.04. In
Italy, it is 57 cents. In-Spain, it is 55 cents.
In Taiwan it goes as low as 15 cents an
hour. These four countries sent 90 per-
cent of all footwear sent to the United
States last year.
Obviously, an industry which pays a
wage of $2.62 to employees working in
the domestic shoe industry cannot meet
that kind of competition. They use iden-
tical equipment and raw material costs
are not major cost items.
1968 imports amounted to 175 million
pairs of leather and vinyl shoes. That is
the equivalent of 64,200 jabs. Cut it as
thick or as thin as one will, we have just
exported over -64,000 jobs abroad. We get
to the wailing wall and make our lamen-
tations about the ghettos and the condi-
tions in the ghettos, and about the ab-
sence of work opportunity. This is the
type of work that can be done by un-
skilled and semiskilled people. We are
getting pretty close to the fringes of the
ghetto. Perhaps we ought to think about
doing something about it.
I earnestly hope that after Secretary
Stans gets back to this country and
THE SHOE rNousTRy
Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr.' President when
we contrived the Republican platform in
. 1968?and I had some hand in its prepa-
ration?we indicated that we would take
a sensible and forward-looking position
on the whole ,subject of foreign trade.
The Secretary of Commerce, the
Honorable Maurice Stans, is on a trade
mission to -Europe at the present time.
According to the reports Thave seen, he
Is consulting with leading trade figures
In various countries in Europe. I think
BASES IN SPAIN
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, one
of the most concise and perceptive analy-
ses of the Spanish base affair, which has
received much mention in the press re-
cently, was that written by Mr. Ward
Just and published in the Washington
Post on April 24, 1969, entitled "The
Bases Issue Seen From Spain." Mr. Just,
a member of the staff of the Washington
Post, is, as we all know, one of the most
experienced newsmen on the American
scene.
I ask unanimous consent that the arti-
cle to which I have referred be printed
in the RECORD. ?
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
THE BASES ISSUE SEEN FROM SPAIN
(By Ward Just)
call the Free World than Spain. Barred from
NATO, barred from the Common Market,
reviled by liberals everywhere for the endur-
ance of the Franco regime, Spain continues
to look inward. Spasms of political reforma-
tion are followed by suppressions. The Span-
ish, anarchists at heart, plot long in cafes
while the economy inches forward, the middle
class grows, and memories of the war recede,
She accommodates 19 million tourists a year
(not a misprint), yet remains on the outside
looking in?a condition which pleases many
Spanish. Habitually distrustful of outsiders,
Spain is now making her own evaluation of
the four obsolete and obsolescent bases she
leases to the United States. The lease, it
seems, is not a one-way street.
In Congress and in the American press, the
debate has centered around the Pentagon's
role in negotiating the renewal. A secondary
question has been the matter of alliance: do
the bases, either in fact or in theory, commit
the United States to Spain's defense? If they
do, Senator Fulbright and others are arguing,
then there ought to be a treaty. Treaties, as
all the world must know, are ratified by the
Senate. And no one here loves General Franco.
The quid pro quo most often mentioned is
$150 million or so in military hardware, dis-
tributed to Madrid over the next five years
in exchange for the leases. It is an old busi-
ness, the "lease," for it requires the Spanish
flag to fly over the bases and in language
quite vague commits the United States to
consult with the Franco regime if the bases
are ever used. In fact, in the Lebanese crisis
in 1958 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962,
the bases were "activated" with no prior
notice to Madrid. That, according to a Span-
ish official here.
The core of the opposition to the bases
(there are three Air Force bases, and one
Naval base) here rests on two points: the
first is that they are not militarily essential,
either to the defense of Europe or the de-
fense of the U.S., and the second is that
they have the effect of propping up the
Franco regime, now in its thirtieth year and
bound to yield sometime soon. All this has
had an extremely interesting effect in Ma-
drid, which has its own split between liberal
civilians and conservative generals. There is
also something known as Spanish pride,
which one trifles with at peril.
"We must not accept a `dictat,' " said one
recent editorial in Ya, a Madrid daily which
reflects General Franco pretty much as Ron-
ald Ziegler reflects President Nixon. "Any-
thing but that, including the complete
termination of the agreements renewed in
1963. Those agreements?as they were stipu-
lated?have become too burdensome for us.
Long range nuclear missiles have radically
changed the situation train what it was when
the agreements were subscribed. An alliance
on equal grounds may be appetizing, but not
the posture of an acolyte. We will not be-
come a satellite country."
Going further: "Without adequate coun-
ter-measures against the dangers involved"?
and here Ya means a signed treaty?"we
believe that Spain should not renew the
agreements with the United States. Analyz-
ing the pros and cons of 15 years of 'agree-
ments,' Spain has derived from them less
advantages?many less?than the other side."
That last is arguable, since the bases have
been at least one factor in the one-plus
billion dollars in aid that has gone from the
United States to Spain since 1950. But, as
Spanish here put it, what kind of arrange-
ment is It when the United States can rent
land on which to emplace its weapons.
Either there is a mutual security arrange-
ment or there is not. As a Spanish Embassy
official here puts it, it is-"inadmissible" to
lease the bases without regard "for the risks
the arrangements would entail for Spain."
Quite correct. It is not enough, as the Penta-
gon argues, that the mere presence of
this is a fine thing that the Secretary is No noncommunist country in Europe has American troops is an effective guarantee.
dC)ing,WeRreldePtSPR4ffaibett51/01rP2eq. le1ttlzbisrilebrittr4Klordubbbiliololi5is_ghe intent, then there ought to be
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S 4054 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD:? SENATE April 257-1g61
ary, 1967. He hoped it would provide an op- The letter was delivered by the American
portunity for him to step on to the world Charge d'Affaires in Moscow to the North
stage as a mediator between the Americans Vietnamese mission there on February 8.
and the North Vietnamese. He had known The idea, according to some, was to pre-empt
Kosygin for years, and felt-he had something the Wilson-Kosygin talks and to forestall the
of a special personal rapport with him, possibility, which the State Department sus-
In Washington President Johnson was not pected might be a probability, that Wilson
only tired of volunteer mediators, but ever would sign his name to Kosygin's formula?
since Mr. Wilson had dissociated himself the old theme song that there could be talks
from the bombing of oil installations near if only the U.S. stopped the bombing. Others
Hanoi seven months earlier, he had ceased to suggest a simpler motive. Negotiations by
be considered a robust ally. His self-appoint- proxy are not a practical proposition. If there
ad mission with Kosygin only aggravated the were to be negotiations, Johnson. wanted to
distrust,
be the one to conduct them.
Yet it was difficult for Johnson to say no The Prime Minister was full of high hopes
to Harold Wilson: it would have been very about his meeting with Kosygin. George
awkward if it had become known that the Brown was less so, and Wilson's hopes sank
United States would not try out such a spe- when the Russians announced their delega-
dal opportunity for peacemaking. tion. It did not include Foreign Minister
The chosen liaison man was Chester Gromyko nor a known Asian expert. It looked
er, a short, bushy-eyebrowed, slightly Chap- more like a goodwill than a business visit.
linesque member of Ambassador Averell Har- Undaunted, the Prime Minister asked the
riman'e staff. He had "low visibility': he would American Ambassador in London, David
not be spotted by the Press. Thanks to his Bruce, if Cooper could stay on for the dura-
dry humour and his easy way with the Brit- tion of the Russian visit. The White House
ish, he was well liked in London from his sceptically agreed. Walt Rostow, the Presi-
CIA days, between ten and twelve years ear- dent's Adviser for National Affairs, considered
lies. He had the subtle mind needed for this Cooper a dove and therefore an untrust-
task?yet, as it proved, he did not quite have worthy emissary.
the necessary White House influence. Kosygin arrived on Monday, February 6, on
Cooper had in fact Just visited London, the eve of the ceasefire in Vietnam over the
early in January, to brief the Prime Minis- Tet holidays: this gave special meaning to
ter and George Brown, the Foreign Secre- the timing of the visit. Wilson met him at
tary, about the 1/sunless Polish peace feeler, the airport and as they rode into London
"Marigold." On a Visit to Moscow the pre- Kosygin said that he wanted to discuss in-
vious November George Brown had trans- ternational problems including Vietnam. But,
mated, on behalf of the Americans, the so- and Kosygin put special emphasis on it?
called "Phase-A, Phase-B" proposal (which only in private, not in plenary session.
was to play such a pivotal part in the events Wilson was greatly encouraged. On Tues-
of the next few days) to Hanoi via Moscow; clay, when the talks began, he put forward
excitable as ever, he was infuriated to learn the ingenious "Phase A-Phase B" proposal,
from Cooper that he had not been the only under the impression, which Cooper shared,
one to do so.
that this was still Johnson's policy.
Wilson was also annoyed that the Amen- Kosygin at first countered by restating
cans had not informed them sooner of the Hanoi's known position. He suggested that an
Polish mission. The fact that the Americans interview given by Hanoi's Foreign Minister
were still not sure that the proposal had to the Australian journalist, Wilfred Burch-
reached Hanoi via Warsaw was no real corn- ett, was a genuine attempt by Hanoi to get
fort to Brown,
negotiations started, and that it represented
Shortly before Kosygin's arrival, Harold a major concession. Talks could begin three
Wilson asked Dean Rusk, the U.S. Secretary to four weeks after a bombing halt.
of State, whether Cooper could return to contrary to Washington's expectations, the
London to bring him fully up to date on the Prime Minister loyally insisted that the best
American negotiating position. Rusk agreed, approach to negotiation was the Phase A-
and Cooper flew back to London on February Phase B proposal and Kosygin reacted by say-
3. He was instructed to hold nothing back ing it was "a possibility." Wilson held to his
from the Prime Minister, and to provide a position until finally, on Friday, in private
channel of communications with Washing- session with only two aides on each side
ton.
present, Kosygin said, "You keep telling me
Before he left for London, Cooper had about this two-phased proposal?put it into
seen three drafts of a letter from Johnson writing." The proposal seemed new to him
to Ho Chi Minh, along the lines of the though it had already been given to the
Phase A-Phase B proposal. Phase A provided Russians by George Brown when he met Mr.
that under a prior secret agreement the US Gromyko in November,
would stop the bombing "unconditionally" For the first time the Hussiesie were show-
Phase 13 I) provided that the North Viet- tag a real interest in getting Involved in
namese would stop the infiltration of men; backstage peacemaking. Kosygin had also
Phase B (ii) that the US, as a corollary, told Wilson explicitly that he was in touch
would refrain from sending any additional with Hanoi, that he thought Hanoi was in
roops to Vietnam. It was also understood a receptive mood, and that he was worried
hat the US would agree to the first part of that if nothing happened the Chinese would
his agreement only if Phase B (i) was ac- again be able to assert their influence on the
cepted in advance. The key to this proposal, North Vietnamese.
he time lag between Phase A and Phase B, The Chinese, said Kosygin were itching to
was vaguely a "reasonable period," under- send volunteers following the declaration
tood to be from about ten days to no more agreed on in Bucharest the previous July and
he.n two weeks, in which Hanoi could de- they, the Russians, were doing their utmost
ermine that bombing had stopped under to prevent it. Kosygin also left the impres-
base A and not simply because of tech- sion with his hosts that he was taking cer-
ical or weather conditions tam n risks by facilitating communications
The President had not yet made up his with Hanoi because others in the Kremlin
hid to send this letter to Ho Chi Minh. were afraid that failure of such an initiative
t was a difficult decision: he had never be- Would give Peking an opportunity to at-
ore taken such an initiative. What Cooper tack the Soviet Union for disloyalty to the
id not know when he left was that a letter North Vietnamese ally.
ad finally been sent, but It was an uncom- After lunch on Friday Chester Cooper and
romising letter. It said the President would Donald Murray, then Asian expert in the
top both bombing and further build-up British Foreign Office, sat down together and
f US forces but only after being assured drafted a short memorandum setting out
hat infiltration into South Vietnam had how it was proposed to give Kosygin the
eased. Phase A-Phase B offer. Around 4 p.m. Cooper
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a treaty. "The 'era of rentals' has ended,"
Ya said, a bit pretentiously but accurately
enough.
There is probably no regime in the world
that provokes such passion as that of
General Franco. He is something of a retie,
With his civil guards and his censored press,
something of a sore thumb on the manicured
hand of Europe, and no matter that his re-
gime differs not a whit from some of the
most eminent of America's allies. The Span-
ish Civil War,, one 'of the great confused
ideological struggles of all time, is still the
benchmark of good guys versus bad for a
good many people, here as in Europe. A
number of Western observers in Spain have
argued that the American presence, symbo-
lized by the bases, has been helpful in nudg-
ing the regime from right to center. It is
argued that the modest liberalization that
has occurred is the result of American influ-
ence, and part of it the personal contact
between the American military and the
Spanish. Perhaps. It is a plausible argument.
With some heat, Spanish officials here and
in Madrid categorically reject the notion
that the bases, or the 10,000 Americans
which now reside on them, would ever be
used in the event of internal disorders in
Spain. "Gratuitously offens,tve," is the way
one Spassp, official here put it, "and detri-
mental to Spanish sovereignty."
One recalls the 1936 Spanish war, which
became a laboratory for experimentation by
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, among
other nations. The test for the bases ought
to be their use to,?the United States. If they
are found to have no use, then they should
be abandoned. If they are found to be essen-
tial to American or European security, then
they should be negotiated, and the negotia-
tions should be in the context of a treaty.
But the Senate ought to look very carefully
at the implications of a treaty now with
Spain, as the Franco era draws to a close
with no Certain successor. If any people in
the world have the right to work out their
own affairs without interference it is the
Spanish. It did not happen that way the
last time.
THE UNWINNABLE WAR
Mr. PULBRIGHT. Mr. President, Mr.
Henry Brandon has been for many years
Interpreting the American scene for the
Sunday Times of London. He is inti-
mately acquainted with the events and
personalities of recent years, and has the
advantage of greater objectivity about
our affairs than many of our own ob-
servers. I believe that his account of the
Wilson-Kosygin meeting and its signifi-
cance for us and for the war in Vietnam
is worthy of our attention.
I ask-unanimous consent to have print-
ed in the RECORD the article entitled "Hot
Words on the Hot Line?the Unwinnable
War, Part 2," written by Henry Brandon
and published in the London Sunday
Times Weekly Review of April 20, 1969. t
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
HOT WORDS ON THE HOT LINE?THE UNWIN
NABLE WAR, PART TWO
(By Henry Brandon)
(NOTE?Downstairs at Chequers, Wilson m
stalled for time with Kosygin. Upstairs an I
American envoy held the phone out of the f,
window so that Washington could hear the d
motor cycle escort preparing to take Kosygin h
away. It was a desperate last-minute bid for p
peace in Vietnam. It failed?with angry re- s
criminations between Wilson and Johnson.) 0
Harold Wilson had great expectations of t
Premier Kosygin's visit to London in Febru- c
is
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first announced Feb. 19, along with his plans
to move Head Start and the Job Corps from
the Office of Economic Opportunity on
July 1.
But he went further yesterday, saying
modern science has confirmed that the child
of impoverished parents can suffer "lasting
disabilities" and that this can lead "to the
transmission of poverty from one generation
to the next."
"It is no longer possible to deny that this
process is all too evidently at work in the
slums of America's cities and that it is a
most ominous asspect of the urban crisis,"
Nixon said.
"It is just as certain that we shall have
to invent new social institutions to respond
to this new knowledge."
Aside from indicating Head Start should
redirect its efforts from the preschool play-
ground to the crib, Nixon also struck a sec-
ond theme by stressing that many urban
problems, such as the process of child devel-
opment, defy quick remedies.
"America must learn to approach its prob-
lems in terms of the tine span those prob-
lems require," he said. "All problems are
pressing; all cry out for instant solutions;
but not all can be instantly solved.
"We must submit to the discipline of time
with respect to those issues which provide no
alternative."
Among a number of child experts and 0E0
officials canvassed today, there seemed to be
a consensus that the President is responding
to a growing view that what a poor child
really requires is the kind of environment a
financially secure home and community offer
oxer children from birth.
Head Start has been regarded as only a
small step in an effort to furnish constructive
educational experiences for all poor children
from birth.
Currently, 55 percent of the 218,000 chil-
dren enrolled in Head Start's full-year pro-
gram are 5 years of age or older. The average
age of 471,000 children in the summer pro-
gram is 5 years and 10 months.
Although Nixon did not specify a new tar-
get age yesterday, there has been some talk of
8 years.
Yesterday at the White House, Secretary
Finch outlined steps he intends to follow to
reorient Head Start next fall:
The number of parent-child centers for
Infants and toddlers 3 years and under will
be doubled from the present 36, increasing
the number of children involved in this pilot
program from around 3,000 to 6,000.
Communities will be asked to try out some
new test programs in infant education.
HEW will encourage communities to use
funds now spent on summer programs for
225,000 children?about half the total spend-
ing?for enrolling 50,000 to 60,000 children in
full-year programs.
Finch said many communities have re-
quested bigger full-year programs but that
Head Start's fiscal 1969 budget of $320,000
and a requested fitcal '70 budget of $338,000
would remain unchanged.
HEW will seek greater use of poverty funds
for elementary and secondary education for
Follow Through programs so children can
keep their head start.
The guidelines set by 0E0 for Head Start
will remain unchanged. These include insist-
ence on parent participation, comprehensive
services, the use of volunteers and the op-
portunity for local churches, schools or com-
munity action agencies to sponsor their own
programs.
Fears that Finch might rewrite the guide-
lines have been voiced by congressmen as
One ob)ection to Head Start's spinoff.
? One of the first things Dr. Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Nixon's chief urban adviser, did
in the White House was to telephone Joseph
Froomkin, a psychologist in HEW, to ask him
to jot down a summary of his well-known
criticism% of Head Start.
Froomkin wrote Moynihan a memorandum
saying Head Start's programs were too short,
placed too little emphasis on educational
content and needed to be targeted toward
much younger children.
Moynihan, an assistant secretary of labor
under President John P. Kennedy, is an ex-
pert on jobs, but not on child education.
At his first meeting with 0E0 officials Feb.
9, he pulled a sheet of paper out of his pocket
and read what has since become known at
the Froomkin evaluation.
Now, two months later, refined and but-
tressed by massive research, the outlines of
the Froomkin evaluation approach to Head
Start seem unchanged. The Nixon adminis-
tration's budget for jobs in the private sector
may go up three or four times this year,
while that for React, Start will remain the
same.
THE SCOTT REPORT
HON. JOEL T. BROYHILL
OF VIRGINIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, April 15, 1969
Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia. Mr.
Speaker, Mr. Edward J. Sloane, of
Springfield, Va., has called my attention
to "The Scott Report," by Columnist Paul
Scott, for April 4, 1969, describing a cam-
paign allegedly being mounted by certain
members of the press against the con-
firmation of former Deputy Chief of
Security at the Department of State, Mr.
Otto Otepka, for appointment to the
Subversive Activities Control Board.
Mr. Sloane feels, and I agree, that Mr.
Scott's discoveries and comments con-
cerning this anti-Otepka campaign, de-
serve the widest possible attention. I
therefore welcome this opportunity to
Insert the column in full at this point in
the RECORD:
[From the Washington News-Intelligence
Syndicate]
THE SCOTT REPORT
(By Paul Scott)
WASHINGTON, April 4.?A dramatic new
chapter, with far-reaching implications for
the future security of the U.S., is developing
in the Otto Otepka case.
Opponents of the former Deputy Chief of
Security at the State DepRrtment are pre-
paring an all out campaign to block a Sen-
ate vote on his nomination to the Subver-
sive Activities Control Board (SACB), an in-
dependent government security agency.
Otepka, after five years of persecution and
vilification by the State Department, was
nominated last month to the SACB by Presi-
dent Nixon.
The nomination, now pending before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, was a partial
victory of Otepka who had been stripped
of security duties and demoted by Dean
Rusk, former Secretafy of State, for cooper-
ating with a Senate Committee exposing se-
curity lapses in the State Department.
The nerve center for the new onslaught
against Otepka, scheduled to begin after the
Easter congressional recess, is the prestigi-
ous New York Time's Washington Bureau.
Neil Sheehan, the .newspaper's controver-
sial Defense Department correspondent, has
been given the assignment to write a series
of articles designed to indirectly link the
veteran security officer with right-wing
grotips?none of which Otepka had ever been
a member or actively supported.
Significantly, Sheehan is the former bureau
chief for -the United Press International in
.Saigon who openly worked during the early
60s,for the downfall of South Vietnam's anti-
65-mmunist President Diem.
Pierre Salinger, press secretary for both
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, assailed
Sheehan as one of a trio of American news-
men that "announced to one and all in
Saigon that one of the aims of their stories
was to bring down the Diem government."
More recently in a panel discussion in New
York on "The Peace in Asia", Sheehan pre-
sented the following view on communism:
"We might abandon the idea that com-
munism is our enemy in Asia. We must be
willing to tolerate their enmity. I am sug-
gesting that in some countries a communist
government may be the best government."
CASTING THE SHADOW
Insiders at the New York Times say
Sheehan's anti-Otepka series waa scheduled
to begin earlier this week but the death of
President Eisenhower and his state funeral
temporarily delayed their appearance.
Several of the persons involved in the
volunteer raising of funds for Otepka's costly
and long-drawn out legal battle for vindica-
tion report that they have already been
badgered by Sheehan about their political
affiliations.
In one case, Sheehan spent more than 45
minutes on long distance phone grilling
James Stewart, of Palatine, Ill., Director of
American Defense Fund which raised money
for Otepka's legal defense, on whether he
was ever a member of the John Birch Society.
When Stewart argued the question was ir-
relevant and offered to discuss the issues of
the Otepka case with Sheehan, the corres-
pondent changed the subject, asking for the
names of all the contributors to Otepka's
defense fund.
On being told that more than 4,000 persons
had contributed, Sheehan said he wanted
"only the names of the big contributors".
This Stewart refused on the grounds he
needed approval of the individuals to give
out their names.
THE BOSTON RALLY
Sheehan also quizzed Stewart at length
about his group's fund-raising stand for
Otepka at the New England Rally for God,
Family, and Country, held in Boston in
July, 1968 and attended by more than 1,000
persons.
"I have reports that Otepka manned a fund-
raising booth at the Boston rally and
solicited funds for his case," stated Sheehan.
"Is not this true?"
"No, and you know it," replied Stewart,
"Otepka had. nothing to do with that stand."
What Sheehan didn't mention to Stewart
was that another New York Times reporter
had turned in the same negative report
earlier. After spotting Otepka and his wif a
among the spectators at the Boston meeting,
the reporter kept a watch on Otepka only
to learn that he had nothing to do with
the fund raising stand.
Other persons involved in the fund rais-
ing for Otepka's legal defense which cost
the veteran security officer nearly $30,000,
have also been intensely questioned by
Sheehan.
Sheehan has been in contact with aides
of several Senators, including William
Proxmire, (D. Wis.) and Jacob Javits (R.
N.Y.) , who :flan to use his forthcoming
stories to try to block Otepka's nomination.
Several State Department officials, who
helped influence Secretary of State William
Rogers to bar Otepka's return to that
Agency, also have been in contact with
Sheehan.
THE BIGGER ISSUE
While Otepka will be the central tar-
get of the coming attack, many congressional
security experts see the campaign as having
a much broader objective.
One memorandum being circulated among
these experts, warns:
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E 2978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? Extensions of Remarks
"The coming campaign against Otepka is
designed to prevent, by smear and attack,
efforts to strengthen the Subversive Activi-
ties Control Board, through the appointment
to it of strong, conscientious securities
specialists, and so bring about its destruc-
tion.
"The campaign will. follow the pattern of
the highly successful one by which the
Eisenhower-Nixon program to train Ameri-
cans in red tactics through civilian-military
seminars was destroyed, through using Gen-
eral Walker as the target.
"Now, Otto Otepka is the target, and the
objective is the nipping in the bud of the
restoration of a strong security staff and
operation within the government."
Thus, the battle lines are being drawn for
a historic security showdown that could
rattle a lot of windows in the national
capital.
CONVOY TO MURMANSK
HON. EDWARD J. DERWINSKI
OP ELE/NOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, April 15, 1969
Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, for-
eign affairs debates constantly revolve
around the question of a "detente" with
the Soviet Union. A realistic appraisal
reveals the fact that the constant bel-
ligerence, deceitfulness, and continued
efforts toward global control by the rul-
ers of the Kremlin make a "detente"
under present circumstances a difficult
and dangerous situation.
An interesting insight into Soviet atti-
tudes and manipulations of history is
dramatized in an editorial carried by the
Chicago Tribune, Wednesday, April 9.
This commentary dwelling on a major
World Wax II effort speaks for itself;
CONVOY TO MURMANSK
Anyone around during World War II knew
the meaning of the words "Murmansk run."
They conjured up the chilling spectacle of
allied convoys running the gauntlet of Ger-
man planes and warships to Murmansk, 170
miles above the Arctic circle, the main center
of western aid to the Soviet Union during
the war.
From August, 1942, when the British navy
escorted the first convoys fat Russia, the
"Murmansk run" became the Kremlin's life-
line for survival. Thru icy waters and storms,
battling continuous attack by enemy sub-
marines and planes based in Norway, the
convoys struggled north with their precious
cargo of tanks, trucks, guns, and other sup-
plies?at fearful cost. Thousands of British,
American, and Canadian sailors lost their
lives in this desperate effort to save their
Soviet ally.
A westerner might think that, in the nor-
mal course of events, "Murmansk run" might
have some meaning to the Russians - -at least
to those who live in northern Russia's only
ice-free port. But they don't. A reporter vis-
iting Murmansk found that no one there had
ever heard of the war time convoys which
saved Russia.
There is no -memorial, no plaque, to com-
memorate the almost incredible efforts of
the convoys and their naval escorts which
fought their way around Norway's dreaded
North cape. The section of the city museum
in Murmansk dealing with the war ignores
completely the effort of the western allies.
It is as if Russia had fought the war in a
vacuum.
Today the Russian port on the Barents sea
Is busier than ever, with almost double ita
pre-war population. All the old men who un-
loaded the war time convoys have died or
moved away. No one is left to remember what
the words "Murmansk run" meant to a na-
tion fighting for its life. Today that nation's
masters would rather look to its missiles
pointed at the nations that once Made the
run to Murmansk to save Russia.
TAX LOOPHOLES
HON. ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER
OF WISCONSIN
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Tuesday, April 15, 1969
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I
think it is particularly appropriate today,
April 15, to underscore the almost des-
perate need for tax reform. The blatant
inequities of our present tax system and
the all too ready availability of means
of avoiding income taxation by the rich,
have created indignation throughout our
Nation. The "Page of Opinion" of the
Wisconsin State Journal on April 7 posed
the question whether tax reform would
come this year, as it highlighted the need
to eliminate the numerous loopholes in
our tax laws.
This editorial also cited the excellent
piece on taxes done by my esteemed col-
league and good friend, the senior Sena-
tor from Wisconsin, Bru. PROXMIRE. Sen-
ator PROXMIRE has consistently been at
the forefront of the battle for meaningful
tax reform I commend highly his ex-
cellent article "The Tax Loophole Scan-
dal," which appeared in the April 1969
edition of the Progressive magazine and
which was reprinted in the Journal.
Mr. Speaker, I insert the editorial
and Senator PROXMIRE'S article in the
RECORD:
[From the Wisconsin State Journal,
Apr. 7, 19691
WILL REFORM COME THIS YEAR? REMEMBER
LOOPHOLES ON T-DAY
As Apr. 15 draws near, the agonies of the
income tax become intensified.
It's little comfort to realize that while the
average citizen pays hundreds of dollars iu
federal taxes, some Americans with fantastic
incomes are liable for no tax at all,
For instance, extreme cases are 155 tax
returns from 1967 with adjusted gross in-,
comes above $200,000 on which no federal
taxes were paid; 21 of those had incomes
over $1 million,
And from the tens of millions of middle-
class families and individuals with incomes
from $7,000 to $20,000?who pay taxes on full
ordinary rates?come more than one half of
the individual taxes in the United States.
The evidence is massive that tax loopholes
not only cost the federal government billions
in revenue, but are grossly unfair to the
average American taxpayer.
Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) outlines
the shocking inequities in a story reprinted
on today's Page of Opinion. Just as shock-
ing as the loopholes is the lethargy of the
Congress in correcting the problems.
In this 91st session of Congress is the first
real sign that maybe something will be done,
maybe. The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee began hearings on Feb. 27 which are
still going on.
The spotlight is focused on the tax reform
recommendations issued early this year by
the Treasury Department which deal with
nusst of the cumbersome jumble of personal
income tax laws.
Unfortunately, the treasury's recommenda-
April 16, 1969
tion is minus a proposal to correct one of
the biggest loop-holes going: the mineral
depletion allowance which permits the oil in-
dustry to pay only a fraction of what most
corporations must fork out.
It is this type of loophole, so carefully pro-
tected by industry lobbyists, which stands in
the way of congressional action?the law-
makers in control of tax committees have
close ties to these special interests.
Surely high on the list of reforms should
be a realistic deduction for dependents?
the present $600 deduotion bears no relation-
ship to the actual cost per dependent. Dou-
bling that figure would be a start.
The fact that some wealthy individuals
pay no tax is another must area; there should
be a minimum even for those with the ability
to sink all their funds in "low-interest," tax-
free municipal bonds.
There are hundreds of other loop-holes
that need attention and many of them are
described on this page, but the problem is
winning change and not recognizing the
faults.
The Apr. 15 deadline also should be a dead-
line for all taxpayers to notify immediately
their representatives and senators of their
desire for tax reform now.
[From the Progressive magazine]
HARD-TO-CHANGE REVENUE LAWS?THE TAX
LOOPHOLE SCANDAL
(By Senator WILL/AM Pecenviiae)
As the average taxpayer fills in line 12a
of his Federal Income Tax Form 1040, he
must wonder why he pays so much while
others, more favored economically than he,
pays so little.
If he is a middle income taxpayer with a
wife and two children and $12,000 of taxable
income after taking his ordinary deductions,
he pays almost 20 percent of it directly to the
federal government. This year, as recorded on
line 12b, he must pay, in addition, 7.5 per
cent of his regular income tax payment,
which is the equivalent of 10 per cent of the
tax liability he has inctirred since the surtax
went into effect last April.
Piled on top of the federal income tax bill
of our middle income family are the federal
excise taxes, such as on gasoline; Social Se-
curity payments, and state and local income,
real estate, sales, personal property, and gas-
oline taxes. As he signs his name to the tax
form this year, more likely than not the tax-
payer will also have to dip into his savings
and write out a check for an amount beyond
that withheld.
These are heavy burdens. In the past they
have been borne out of a deep sense of re-
sponsibility and loyalty to the country. But
this year, if our taxpayer is reasonably well
informed, he also knows that many far
wealthier than he bear a much lighter bur-
den. In 1967 some 155 individuals with in-
comes of more than $200,000 each paid no
federal income tax at all. Twenty-one of these
had incomes of more than $1 million but paid
nothing.
HOW COME?
If our taxpayer's indignation continues to
grow it could lead to a breakdown of the
present tax system.
The first question our irate taxpayer may
ask is "How is it done? How can a man with
a million dollars in income pay no federal
income taxes when I pay 20 per cent?"
The loopholes are legion. Among them are
the depletion allowances for virtually every
mineral, especially oil, the tax shelters for real
estate investment, the capital gains treat-
ment for stock options, the dividend exclu-
sion, the special tax breaks for conglom-
erates, the no-tax status of foundations, the
exemption accorded municipal bonds and es-
pecially municipal industrial bonds, farm
losses used by hobby farmers to offset other
income, and the gimmick by which depletion
allowances can be used to offset taxes owed
on other income.
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the lot of the average peasant is better than
ever.
Said Newsweek: "While the quality of life
in Cuban towns has plummeted in the past
10 years, the lot of the campesino in the Cu-
ban countryside has unquestionably im-
proved. If nothing else, the country's small
farmers and cane cutters are h6althier to-
day than ever before."
lilchoed the New York Times Magazine:
"Outside Havana everyone eats better and
the students and farm workers are well fed."
The fact of the matter is that this is
simply not so.
Writing in the Jan. 6, 1969, issue of the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's periodical
"Foreign Agriculture," food expert Wilbur
P. Buck Says: "When the Castro regime came
^to power in 1959 the Cubans were one of
the best-fed peoples in Latin America. Ex-
cessive and indiscriminate livestock slough,
ter in 1959 and early 1960, however, caused
a sharp drop in meat supplies. A decline in
the out-put of food crops, especially rice,
tluring Castro's early years in, office was pre-
cipitated" by rapid nationalization of farm
properties and the shift in direction of trade.
"The past decade has witnessed a deterio-
ration in the average Cuban's diet, particu-
larly in its quality, as grain protein has re-
placed much of the animal protein.
"Food production in 1968 is estimatecUto
have been about 10 percent less than the
1957-59 average. But food production per
capita has declined some 25 to 30 per cent
from that of a decade earlier, necessitating
heavy imports of food products, such as
wheat and wheat flour from Canada on So-
viet account."
Castro's troubles at home, however, are
not solely economic. For quite some time
there have been indications of social and
domestic discontent in Cuba. Castro him-
Aelf confirmed these rumors in a speech last
year marking the eighth anniversary of the
establishment of his committees for the
Defense of the Revolution. In this talk he
spoke of a wave of sabotage and of the ris-
ing rate of prostitution among girls in the
14 and 15-year-old age bracket.
He spoke of the opposition of many Cu-
ban university students to his policies, spe-
cifically his backing of the Russian invasion
of Czechoslovakia. He cited their destruction
of photographs of Che Guevara and their
burning of the Cuban flag.
And although the Cuban government offi-
cially announced only four acts of sabotage
-during the six-month period prior to Castro's
speech, Castro himself admitted in this
speech that there had been more than 70.
Is true that under Castro, illiteracy has
been reduced. But what good will it door
one to learn' how to read, then die of starva-
tion or malnutrition?
This point_ was made most succinctly on
a radio show in the Dominican Republic,
"You Be the Jury," in which a Cuban ex-
ile asked about life under Castro replied:
"Under Fidel's regime, despite what he says
about the peasants, it is not so. Things are
not the same as he tells the peasants. There
Is no clothing, no shoes, no nutrition, no
entertainment. Then what does it matter if
the literacy rate is increased? There is no
freedom, no money to spend and nothing to
read but Communist propaganda."
OTTO OTEPKA
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, it has
come to my attention that a major
newspaper is in the process of writing
a lengthy article or articles on the nomi-
nation of Otto Otepka to the Subversive
Activities Control Board. According to
reports which have reached me from
Many sections of the country, it is obvi-
ous that this newspaper is leaving no
Stone unturned in a fruitless endeavor
to find material which could be twisted
somehow so as to reflect adversely upon
Mr. Otepka's character and judgment.
The scope of this effort, the length of
time which the newspaper has allotted
to it, and the number of reporters in-
volved all suggest that this newspaper
suddenly is attaching great importance
to the Otepka case.
This same newspaper recently de-
scribed the Otepka appointment edi-
torially as "revolting," and said that his
name "recalls immediately some of the
worst abuses of the Joseph R. McCarthy
era?particularly the reckless use of raw
security files." This is a most remark-
able statement from a supposedly re-
sponsible newspaper. Mr. Otepka was
never in any sense an associate of the
late Senator McCarthy, whatever one's
opinion of that Senator's goals and
methods. Furthermore, Mr. Otepka is
the last person who might be charged
with the reckless use of raw security
files, since he was precisely the person
In the State Department who was
charged with the statutory responsibility
of evaluating raw security files?which
he did entirely within the closed confi-
dentiality of the security system. Mr.
Otepka has never at any time discussed
security cases in public, nor did he ever
testify or transmit information concern-
ing specific cases to any unauthorized
agency.
If anything, Mr. Otepka's name recalls
another era and the problems associated
with security in that period. Certainly
no one would sanction calling our late
colleague, Senator Robert Kennedy, a
McCarthyite when, as is well known, he
was a longtime associate and prominent
staff member of the McCarthy investi-
gating committee? Yet, how much more
plausible it would be to refer to someone
as an associate of Senator McCarthy
who was actually an associate of Sena-
tor McCarthy, rather than someone like
Mr. Otepka who never had any connec-
tion with Senator McCarthy in any re-
spect whatsoever. There are some who
define "McCarthyism" as "guilt by asso-
ciation," yet this newspaper finds Mr.
Otepka guilty without any association
whatsoever.
It is, therefore, disturbing when a
newspaper that lacks common decency
and truthfulness suddenly awakens to
the need for "in depth" coverage of Mr.
Otepka, and at the very moment when
Mr. Otepka's actions have been vindi-
cated by appointment to one of the high-
est security posts in the Government.
This same newspaper never showed great
interest when the substantive matters of
the Otepka case were being played out
In the drama before the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee. At that time, its
coverage was perfunctory, or nonexist-
ent, when matters of great concern to
this Nation's security were being re-
vealed. Instead of spending its money in
transcontinental telephone calls and
putting a crew of reporters to work, this
newspaper would be better off examining
the printed hearings of the Senate In-
ternal Security Subcommittee, and mak-
ing up for lost ground.
In these hearings, this newspaper
would find much which should be of
great concern to a newspaper winch pro-
S 3559
fesses liberal attitudes. This newspaper
'would find there documented cases of
wiretapping and eavesdropping, a prac-
tice which has been roundly condemned
in its editorial columns on nearly any
other occasion.
This newspaper would find document-
ed cases of the statutory rights of civil
service workers abrogated contrary to
law, a practice which I doubt would find
editorial approval.
This newspaper would find document-
ed cases of apparent perjury by high
Government officials, another situation
which should raise its journalistic ire.
This newspaper would find documented
cases of denial of due process, and other
fundamental constitutional rights, a
subject which has always caused its edi-
torial writers to whet their lips.
This newspaper would also find docu-
mented cases of the collapse of the State
Department's security system. However,
judging from its recent editorial, the
newspaper could not be better pleased.
Its unreasonable prejudice on this issue
seems to have caused blindness on every
other aspect of the case.
Mr. President, Mr. Otepka has long
suffered at the hands of those who be-
lieve our security systems should be de-
stroyed, and it is time that he received
the justice due to him as a faithful civil
servant and loyal patriot. It is time also
that his country makes good use of the
special talents and loyalty which he has
brought to Government service in the
past. I am confident that, whatever at-
tacks are made upon him now by irre-
sponsible journalism, the Senate will
speedily confirm him when his nomi-
nation is brought to the floor.
AMERICAN CASUALTY FIGURES IN
VIETNAM
Mr. BYRD of Virginia. Mr. President,
it was 1 year ago this week that Presi-
dent Johnson ordered a halt in all bomb-
ing north of the 19th parallel in North
Vietnam. In October he eliminated all
bombing of North Vietnam.
President Johnson's reasoning for his
April restrictions and his October pro-
hibition was the hope that this would
result in a negotiated peace.
Peace talks began in Paris in early
May. It was only recently that the con-
ferees came to agreement on the shape
of the table. So far as is known, no other
conclusions have been reached. There is
no evidence that peace is any nearer
today than it was a year ago.
Yet while this country has eliminated
all aerial action against North Vietnam,
American casualties continue to mount.
It has been my belief for some months
that the Paris talks have lulled the
American people into a false sense of
security?and have caused our troops to
become the forgotten men.
Let us look at the facts.
During the 1-year period beginning
last April, the United States has suf-
fered 95,879 casualties in Vietnam, of
which 12,866 were killed.
This is 39 percent of all the casualties
the United States has suffered during
its long involvement in Vietnam.
To state it another way, of the total
casualties suffered in Vietnam, 39 per-
.
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S 3560 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
cent occurred during the past 12 months.
Of the 33,641 who have been killed in
Vietnam, 38.2 percent met their death
during the past year.
During the first 3 weeks of the last
month?as recently as that?the United
States had more men killed in Vietnam,
and more men wounded in Vietnam, than
In any 3-week period during the history
of the war.
From the beginning, I have felt that
U.S. involvement in a ground war in
Asia was a great error of judgment. But
since our Government decided to draft
men and send them to Asia to fight, I
feel we must give them full support.
That is why I want to emphasize and
reemphasize the severe casualty figures
In the hope that this will focus attention
on the difficulties facing our troops in
Vietnam.
NATIONAL GOALS AND THE
MILITARY
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, on,
Tuesday of this week, the Joint Eco
nomic Committee filed its report. I thl,rlk
it was a good report, One which has e-
ceived substantial consideration by the
press.
There is one segment of the repo es-
pecially significant, which may easi be
overlooked, because it was not emp
sized in the releases, and because it is
long report and the segment appears
back in the body of the report. I am re-
ferring to the defense-related recommen-
dations in the committee's report which
I think are the toughest in this field in
the committee's entire 23-year history.
I rise today, Mr. President, to urge Con-
gress to give special attention to those
recommendations. The committee has
called for a substantial increase in the
critical scrutiny gvien the defense budget
both within the executive branch and in
Congress.
In our annual report, we urged the
Council of Economic Advisers and the
Bureau of the Budget increase substan-
tially their efforts to analyze and evalu-
ate issues related to defense spending.
And we urged that the Executive Office
of the President undertake ongoing and
comprehensive investigations of defense
procurement matters and submit their
findings to the Joint Economic Commit-
tee as part of the annual economic re-
port.
As our report states:
The Bureau of the Budget should
strengthen its defense review capacity so
that it Can adequately scrutinize Defense
Department budget requests. The Council
of Economic Advisers should focus its at-
tention on defense expenditures and their
impact on the economy. Agencies such as
the Department of Labor and the Depart-
ment of Commerce should begin studying
the effects that defense spending is having
on wages and prices. The annual economic
reports to Congress should present the re-
sults of these analyses.
There is now substantial evidence that
improved efficiency in defense spending
could free much needed resources for
reallocation to higher priority civilian
programs.
In developing policy to resolve in a
satisfactory way the collision of demands
for investment in education, cities, labor
retraining, and the elimination of pov-
erty as against the unquenchable desire
of the military establishment for more
weapons systems and more sophisticated
armaments, it is necessary that the Fed-
eral Government establish a meaningful
set of national priorities. To do this Con-
gress must have an explicit set of pri-
orities and objectives to guide it in shap-
ing new legislation and making appro-
priations.
That means Congress must have im-
proved information on the economic ef-
fects of both existing programs and new
proposals. Data on both benefits and
costs and the distribution of these among
groups in our society is now_being-gen-
crated on an ongoing bast( by the plan-
ning-programing-budgeting system. But
so far the Congress has not obtained
access to this information.
It is obvious that this data is essen-
tial tea-Congress for distinguishing pro-
ductive expenditures from those of little
worth when all agencies and interests
claim that their programs and projects
are essential to the Nation and of high-
est priority.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that excerpts from the report on
National Goals and Priorities be printed
in the RECORD at this point.
There being no objection, the excerpts
were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
IV?NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND EFFECTIVE
Potato POLICY
NAYS. GOALS AND PRIORITIES
The budget o
accounts for over 20
total output of final go
allocation of this nearly $2
among the multitude of Federa
an enormous influence on both t
of outputs produced by the U.S. eco
the distribution of the Nation's inco
cause of this impact of Federal revenu
expenditures on the society, it is ease
that allocation decisions be based on a c
statement Of national goal and prioriti
This necessity is reinforced by the rapli
growth in Federal expenditures over the past
several years.
We urge that the Congress, with guidance
from its leadership, and the administration
undertake a formal and comprehensive study
of national goals and priorities with a view
to establishing guidelines for legislation and
expenditure policy.
We recognize the serious difficulties which
plague efforts to seek, general agreemenif on
these basic questions of national dire ion.
Indeed, the vitality of this Nation's p?itical
system stems from the diversity of inions
and values held by the populace e have,
however, recently witnessed a piOd of in-
tensive study of a large i3,nIber of issues
which pertain to nationalsgoals. While many
of these issues were related, the task forces
which were responsible for the analysis and
recommendations properly viewed their man-
date as being limited in scope. It is now time
to seek a broader perspective: an overview
in which the urgency of the individual de-
mands generated by these reports can be
subjected to a comprehensive appraisal. We
believe that the following considerations are
basic to any serious discussion of national
priorities.
1. The study of goals and priorities should
determine the dollar costs required to at-
tain each of the substantial number of ob-
jectives which are often cited as being pri-
mary social goals. It is important that pub-.
lice decisionmakers have before them an esti-
e Federal Government
cent of the Nation's
and services. The
billion budget
rograms has
structure
my and
e. Be-
and
tial
ar
April 3, 1969
mate of the costs of each item in the array
of social objectives, all of which would be
chosen if they could be afforded. This in-
formation, by demonstrating that the devo-
tion of resources to (me objective implies
a foregone opportunity to support another,
leads to improved public decisions by clarify-
ing the real costs associa ted with any deci-
sion.
2. The study of goals and priorities should
evaluate the output and financial resources
which the economy and the Federal Gov-
ernment can call upon in attaining social ob-
jectives. It is now possible to project with
some accuracy the future output of the econ-
omy and, given the existing tax structure,
the budgetary resources which will become
available to the Federal Government. More-
,.?,..over, it is possible to estimate confidently the
?Alive expenditures in a substantial number
of Federal governmental programs which, for
all intents and purposes, are beyond the an-
nual control of the appropriations process.
By ascertaining the difference between these
two flows?projected revenue increases and
increases in unavoidable Federal outlays?we
obtain what is sometimes called the fiscal
dividend. This figure provides both the Con-
gress and the executive branch with mean-
ingful information on the future availabil-
ity of resources which can be allocated
among the various social objectives. Such
estimates should be developed for a range of
plausible assumptions and should be updated
and published on an ongoing basis. This in-
formation, it should be noted, is the comple-
ment of the data on the total costs required
for attainment of each of the objectives.
3. The study of goals and priorities should
focus on the allocation of Federal revenues
between the military and civilian budgets.
Because the defense budget is substantially
less visible than budgets for civilian pro-
grams and because of our past experience
with national security costs which have sub-
stantially exceeded initial estimates, this al-
location question should not be neglected in
an analysis of national priorities. Informa-
tion concerning the budgetary implications
of a number of possible national security
postures is essential to meaningful public
policy decisions and a rational allocation of
the Federal budget among its competing
claims.
THE ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS
Quantitative information of the economic
effects of the expenditures which we are now
making is as essential to an effective and
efficient government..as a clear sense of pri-
orities and objectives for future action. Be-
cause, of the rapid rise in Federal expendi-
tures in the last decade, the experimental
nature of newly legislated social programs,
and the current period of budget stringency,
implementation of procedures for the ac-
curate economic analysis of spending pro- -
grams is most urgent. It is also essential that
information on program effectiveness now
possessed by the administration be trans-
mitted to the Congress.
This committee welcomed President John-
son's Executive Order issued in August of
1965, establishing the Pia rifling-Programing-
Budgeting System. In our judgment, the
PPB System provides a meaningful frame-
work for improved policy analysis and pro-
gram evaluation. From information pre-
sented to the committee's Subcommittee on
Economy in Government, we judge that a
substantial amount of valuable economic
analysis and information has been generated
by the operation of the system in the execu-
tive branch. Many expenditure programs can
now be evaluated by decisionmakers in terms
of the relationship between social benefits
and social costs. Moreover, the social char-
acteristics (race, income level, age) of the
people who receive the benefits of Govern-
ment programs are now known by decision-
makers in the administration In substantial
detail. As President Johnson stated in his
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