CONGRESSIONAL RECORD RE: ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP71B00364R000300090004-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 6, 1969
• Content Type: OPEN

rt4.11. 708 A p p ro velaCRICARdl ititgiN002/11530ORCIA-F/DIVABI*13 6i4RROOMIO 9 0 0 0 410arch
1
At San Francisco State he is credited with
organizing the Black Student Union?the
key organization in the months of violent
student protest there. Under his direction
the Student Union also began a tutorial
project in San Francisco high schools.
Last week Garrett said he had helped start
Black Student Unions throughout the West
Coast and has been a consultant to students
and college administrations nation-wide on
the development of black studies curricula.
"I get four offers a week for jobs; three
offers a week for traveling," he said.
During the mid-60s he worked for the
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Commit-
tee (SNCC) in Its voter registration project
In Mississippi.
He was accepted for a graduate program
at Harvard last fall. But he declined the
offer, in order to teach at Federal City.
One colleague at the college, skeptical of
the black studies program, described Garrett
nonetheless as "brilliant, shattering" and,
coming down hard on each syllable, "politi-
cally astute."
PROGRAMS VARY WIDELY
Black studies had been the ever-recurring
cry and demand of student protests across
the country this school year. Colleges and
universities in many cases have responded
hastily with programs that differ sharply.
At Harvard, before any significant student
demonstration, a scholarly program was
planned bringing history, sociology, econom-
ics, and other disciplines to focus on the
American Negro.
At the same time Harvard announced it
would expand an existing African studies pro-
gram. The two departments would not merge.
At San Francisco State College, a different
kind of program was envisioned. African and
Afro-American subjects would be in the
same black studies department, but the
courses themselves would be a supplement
to regular study.
DRASTIC DEPARTURE
At Federal City College, the black studies
program departs drastically from existing
academic traditions.
Conventional college courses are imbued
with white values, said Couch, head of the
humanities division?the largest instruc-
tional segment in the school.
"The British Empire in rhetoric becomes
an honorific term," he said. Actually, he
said, it meant in large measure going into
Africa and Asia and coercing people into
slavery.
? But the scope of the black studies program
extends beyond historical perspective and
Is pointedly aimed at structuring attitudes
and technical skills for the nascent "black
nation."
A position paper prepared by the black
studies program states:
"Whether the Nation is to be a collection
of enclaves or a geographical location, exist-
ing within or without the United States, is
a question we must ultimately answer as a
people. Yet, the Black Education Program
recognizes the necessity for Black People to
be prepared to face and decide that ques-
tion in the foreseeable future."
CURRICULUM SET
The first two years would be spent incul-
cating the revolutionary instinct and ide-
ology, according to the curriculum. Courses
In writing and composition would be stressed
as well as a historical, social and cultural
survey of Negroes in Africa, the Carribbean
and the Americas.
The scientific segment of the curricurum
would examine the principles of math, bio-
logical sciences and discuss their "practical
application . .. to the social life of the black
community."
Black physical education courses to
"strengthen the body and discipline the
mind" would include instruction in karate,
stick fighting, riflery, gymnastics and the
African hunt.
The curriculum described it as a "total
Immersion" program.
Students enrolled would be virtually un-
able to take other courses at Federal City.
Correspondingly, students not enrolled could
take only a few specially designated black
studies courses.
Specific problem-study outlined for the
final two years include "tropical disease in
Africa"; the development of a math cur-
riculum for African secondary schools; the
development of an independence movement
in Kenya, Mississippi or Washington; and, in
the cultural area, the question, "who is our
audience and how we reach them."
In the midst of confusion and clashing
struggles among faculty and administrators
most of the students at Federal City?whose
ages average 21?have dug in to studies that
they hope will earn a degree leading to a
good job.
About 5000 applications have been filed
for next year. There are still an ' additional
1500 applications remaining in the. lottery
from which students were selected this year.
Everett Watkins, a freshman, is taking one
black studies and two science courses this
quarter.
He said last week that he had found all of
them interesting, but would ultimately major
in engineering and not black studies.
The proposed engineering curriculum
"looks kind of rugged,," he said, and he
doubted that he would have the time to take
many more black studies courses.
t/g(til
ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILES
SPEECH OF
HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN
OF NEW YORK
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WednesdaV, February 26, 1969
Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, during the
90th Congress I was anxious to receive
the assistance of scientists familiar with
the military and strategic implications
of an anti-ballistic-missile system. Ac-
cordingly, in November 1967 I wrote let-
ters to several distinguished scientists
asking them to comment on the wisdom
of deploying an antiballistic system. My
colleague from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER)
also joined in these requests.
The answers received were most in-
formative and useful. Since this issue has
again come before the House during this
session of Congress, I would like to insert
these letters, along with the articles to
which several of the letters referred. I
commend the views expressed in these
letters to my colleagues and urge them
to heed the advice of these experts as
they consider this crucial issue.
I include at this point in the RECORD
letters from Prof. Jerome B. Wiesner,
former Science adviser to Presid,ent Ken-
nedy and President Johnson, Prof. Victor
F. Weisskopf, Department of Physics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Dr. Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, director,
Stanford University Linear Accelerator
Center; Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg, Insti-
tute for Policy Studies, Washington,
D.C.; and Prof. Betty Goetz Lall, New
York State School of Industrial and
Labor Relations, Cornell University:
6, 1969
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY,
Cambridge, Mass., November 28, 1967.
Hon. WILLIAM F. RYAN,
Hon. DONALD M. FRASER,
Members 01 Congress,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
D,EAR SIRS: I am writing in response to your
recent letter asking for my thoughts about
the antiballistic missile system deployment.
I have just recently published a statement
In Look magazine which sets forth my
strong feelings about the matter. I believe
that we are embarking on a course of action
which will lead to a new cycle in the arms
race, one which will ultimately result in a
new level of deterrents and which would
potentially be more destructive than the sit-
uation with which we are now living. I am
enclosing two copies of that piece for your
use. I wonder whether you have seen the
collection of papers on the antiballistic mis-
sile problem that were recently published by
the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. If not, I
Would suggest that you look at them for
these were interesting papers relating to
the ABM problem.
A number of persons in the United States
would, I'm sure, be willing to help you under-
stand the ABM issue. Professor Herbert York,
who is at the La Jolla campus of the Univer-
sity of California, has spent a good deal of
time on these matters, and would, I'm sure,
be pleased to have an opportunity to talk
to you. The same would apply to Professor
Jack Ruins on the M.I.T. faculty, Professor
George Kistiakowsky at Harvard University,
Professor Paul Doty at Harvard, Professor
Leonard Rodberg, Physics Department, the
University of Maryland, and Professor Frank
Long at Cornell University. I'm sure a short
note from you would solicit their views, and
I'm also certain that any one of them would
be willing to participate in more formal dis-
cussions with you.
Sincerely yours,
JEROME B. WIESNER.
THE CASE AGAINST AN ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE
SYSTEM
(By Dr. Jeroxne B. Wiesner)
When China exploded a hydrogen bomb,
waves of concern spread around the world.
Renewed calls were raised in the United
States for a defense that would protect us
from Chinese nuclear ballistic missiles. These
calls have now been heeded by President
Johnson. Scientists agree that neither the
United States nor the Soviet Union can pro-
tect itself completely from a nuclear attack
by the other. But as long as Communist
China's primitive missile force is very small,
some protection can be achieved?and this is
what the President has decided to buy. Be-
cause he couldn't persuade the Russians to
consider limitations on missile defenses, the
President has now ordered the building of a
"thin" defensive system to protect us from
the Chinese. The logic of the President's
decision seems mighty tortured.
The word in Washington is that President
Johnson was forced to bend under the pres-
sure of the military, congressional and In-
dustrial sponsors of the antiballistic-missile
system. Enormous pressure certainly existed,
but such pressure on a President to build a
missile-defense system is not new. Both Pres-
ident Eisenhower and President Kennedy
were exposed to it. One of the most difficult
decisions President Kennedy had -to make
concerned the Nike Zeus missile-defense sys-
tem. The pressures on him were tremendous,
but after long, careful study, he decided, on
technical grounds, not to build the Nike-
Zeus. Today, we know that to have built that
system would have wasted between $20 and
$30 billion. It would have been already ob-
solete. I am certain that the system we are
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
March 6, 196APProWOlgOliNISIONAMMAtIrdA-EPEWAXM941iPM9090004-2
establish a new Federal City College in
Washington, D.C., to providetmality edu-
cation to our many youth *ho want to
go to school in our, Nation'eXapital.
The university is halfway through its
first year in existence and already we
are told it is establishing a black studies
program working toward in emerging
and "wholly separate black?nation."
This can be but the lame black
secessionist movement being promoted
in absentia by Robert Williams of RAM,
the Black Panthers, and the New Africa.
The people at the Federal City College
must be naive if they feel the tax-
payers of the United State are going
to continue to fund a univ _ity special-
izing in teaching the catec m of revo-
lution, confiscation of lugs, and de-
struction of culture of the 'Milted States,
and as a base of operation -for a bunch
of loudmouthed anarchists.
Mr. Speaker, the report from the col-
lege indicates it will ask fora $11.4 mil-
lion appropriation this yeaic Until I haVe
written assurance that the college is
going to be used as an educational facil-
ity, I will never cast my people's vote for
any such funding.
I include the column by 1 lerbert H.
Denton from the March 6 Washington
Post:
BLACK STUDIES ISSUE SPLITS FEDERAL CITY
COLLEGE
Federal City College, more -than halfway
through its first year, is bitterW divided over
a black-studies program explicilly working
toward an emerging?and wholly separate?
"black nation."
The emergence of this political issue has
raised serious questions alactit the future
development of Wsshington'i lly public
college.
The immediate issue is sten-dards for hir-
ing the 174 new faculty now being sought
for next fall.
Separatists who have won Ascendancy in
the faculty hierarchy are pressing the college
administration to discount traditional aca-
demic credentials, like doctoral degrees, and
give weight to experience with black political
and social action organizations.
Last year, black studies were planned as
merely a group of courses in the humanities
and social sciences divisions.
Next year, after a series of bruising in-
ternal political fights over repent months,
black studies will be the second largest di-
vision of instruction at Federal City and will
approach the status of being a separate
college.
Courses will include not only black history
and black English but also black physical
education and black mathematics.
The proposed curriculum wortid devote the
first two years to the "decolonlZation of the
mind," described as the systematic eradica-
tion of "tvhite values" held- by entering
students.
The latter two?"or three"?years will con-
centrate on training an elite for what is be-
lieved to be the coming "black- nation," in-
cluding Negroes world-wide. _
But even before the program has got under
way, its planners have attempted to export
its message of "revolution": and "nation
building."
James Garrett, head of the 'City College's
black studies program, lectured students at
the University of Oregon on techniques of
making fire-bombs and hand grenades, on
the anniversary of the assassination of Mal-
colm X this year. A busload ofitudents from
,_-,
Federal City Went to assist msetesting stu-
-4,
dents at Cheyney State College in Pennsyl-
vania last fall.
RECRUITING CRITICIZED
The college has brought in many instruc-
tors of "dubious quality and competence"
and is recruiting more, said Margaret Just
Butcher, a former professor at Howard, and
now professor at Federal City College.
"I'm a little tired of this nonsense of black,
black, black," said Mrs. Butcher, a Negro.
Other faculty members expressed these
views:
William Couch, chairman of the humani-
ties division and also a Negro:- -"Isn't it con-
ceivable that (activists) would have some-
thing to offer that Ph.D's would not?"
One senior professor who preferred to re-
main anonymous: The college is in danger of
becoming a "glorified high school."
Joseph Brent, the faculty chairma . who is
white but sides with the separatTsts: The
"genteel tradition of scholazair6" might not
be effective at predontinantly black Federal
City. "Street educationifas produced a very
sophisticated individnal even if he can't
write well or add."
' STUDENTS- NOT CONCERNED
Separatism has been almost exclusively a
faculty issue.
Surveys of ti4e greater than 90 per cent
black student ibody last fall revealed that
most were int rested in pursuing queers in
business, teacllng and science-related fields.
Business and cience courses are always the
first to fill up quarterly registrations.
But the bla studies department will get
40 out of the 72 new faculty slots open for
next year for asa total of 54 teaching positions.
t will By contrast ere ll be 51 instructors in
-the natural sci ces and only 41 in the pro-
fesstional divis n, which includes teacher
training, and btisiness administration.
After a year of intramural battle within
the college faculty, the separatist influence
has prevailed in bther divisions, humanities
in particular. (Tls. current ratio of white to
black teachers is roughly 50-50) .
Some young Nkgroes without doctorate
degrees have been Imade department heads
while senior, more 'traditional-minded, fac-
ulty have, in severkl instances, been rele-
gated to positions of \little influence or con-
trol.
Kenneth Lynn, forlaer professor at Har-
vard and the collegk's most well-known
academician has said lie is "seriously con-
sidering" leaving.
It is also widely repted that both the
college president and t'he provost, Frank
Varner and David Dickson? are seeking posi-
tions elsewhere.
APPEAL TO FA ER
Some faculty members i4 the losing fac-
tion have appealed without uccess all school
year to Farrier, the presid t, and Charles
Horsky, Washington lawyer and chairman
of the board of trustees, to rksolve the situ-
ation.
Farner, who is white, was vi ibly distressed
last week by the developments at the col-
lege. He had not realized that the separatist
Impulse would be so strong an domineering,
he said.
"I have not made any polic decisions on
my own. That's probably to wrong style
of administration for this situ tion," he said.
Horsky said that he had en aware all
year that there was "argumen debate," but
had not taken it as a "sign o anything go-
ing wrong.
"We assumed that was a p rt of a normal
university atmosphere. I thihk we are be-
st
ginning to be aware that the e is a little bit
more to it than that," he s id.
But the issue soon will be Jout of the con-
trol of Farner and the trusties. This Spring
it will come to the congres , onal appropria-
E 1747'
tions committees, with highly inflammatory
racial overtones.
MORE FUNDS SOUGHT
The college will ask for $11s4raillion, about
$7 million more than last year, to double its
current enrollment of about_ 4000.
Problems at the college have been compli-
cated by its hasty organization last year and
the rapid growth planned. By 1975, the
school plans to have in excess of 17,000
students.
The school still is finding it difficult just
getting organized. Although negotiations are
under way, no buildings have-"teen acquired
to accommodate the increased enrollment
next school year. Fewer than 15 per cent of
new faculty needed for the fall had been
signed on at the end of last Week.
The school library Was one of the last
facilities to be completed in the remodeling
of the school's temporary building at 2d and
D Streets NW.
A truck load of books arrives each day
and the library still is not in full opera-
tion. For one reason or another, it is not
widely used by students.
Of the 30,000 books in the library now,
only about 60 to 75 circulate daily.
FACULTY ABSENTEEISM
And throughout this acadeMic year there
has been a problem of attendance at classes
by teachers.
Joseph L. Brent, chairman of the faculty,
said he was aware of the teacher problem
but had not yet made an investigation to
determine its extent.
But there are a "mixed-bag of non-attend-
ers," he said. "Patterns appear to be indi-
vidual rather than social," he added.
David Dickson, the college provost, said he
knew that there were "goof-offs" on the fac-
ulty. "The students are very outraged.
They will be the lever to detect this sloppi-
ness and also to cure it he said.
Dickson, who is Negro, told a national con-
vention of educators last fall that the col-
lege was wracked by "racial tensions . .. sus-
picions ... and polarization."
A "well-disciplined and intense cadre of
white radicals and black separatists (who)
neglect academic principles for revolutionary
ends" had almost taken over the 100-member
faculty, he said then.
His assessment of the state of the college
last week was, if anything, more dire. The
college had become a "permissive democ-
racy . . exploited by the politically astute,"
he said.
ROPES FOR "SOBRIETY"
He held hope, nonetheless, that an ele-
ment of "academic sobriety" might be
brought to the black studies program with
the addition of older academically qualified
professors.
Recruitment for the black studies pro-
gram, however, is almost completely in the
hands of James Garrett, 26,
He reCeired his bachelor's degree last
spring from San Francisco State College and
now is acting director of the Federal City
College's black studies program. ("I'm di-
rector but the administration calls me acting
director," Garrett puts it)
When hired last year, "he (Garrett) was
introduced to us as a teacher of creative
writing," Dickson remarked, with a note of
sarcasm,
SHUNS AFRICAN DRESS
Lean and soft-spoken in conversation, Gar-
rett shuns the hair-do and native dress af-
fected by many black militants.
"Blackness must change its emphasis from
that which is seen, such as Afros and
Dashikis, to that which is necessary, such
as living and working with Black People
to achieve our goal of liberation," states the
position paper outlining his program.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 ? CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
'Haft* 6, 1969 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks E 1709
now planning will be regarded as ineffective
before it is installed.
Secretary of Defense McNamara estimates
that the United States could build an ABM
system (for between $3 and $6 billion) that
would provide a reasonably effective defense
against Chinese ballistic missiles?for 10 to
15 years. But he concedes that such a system
would do us little good against an attack
by the Russians. Even if the thin ABM system
is as effective as the Secretary of Defense
says?and I strongly question this?should
we take the portentous step of deploying an
slog system for protection against Red China?
I think we should not.
In his long statement announcing the
President's decision to build an anti-Chinese
ABM system, Secretary McNamara concludes
that the arguments marginally support its
construction. This is obviously a matter of
judgment. I think the arguments are over-
whelmingly against building it. In fact, I
believe that this decision could be as wrong
and have as serious domestic and interna-
tional consequences as the disastrous con-
clusion six years ago that a few military
advisers and some weapons would lead to an
early victory for South Vietnam's forces.
In the late 1950's, the United States first
began to examine the problem of defense
against ballistic missiles. At that time, the
only useful concept involved low-altitude in-
terceptor missiles armed with nuclear
weapons. The idea was that radars would
track an incoming enemy missile and guide
our "antimissile missile" near enough so that
the nuclear warhead, exploded at the right
time, would destroy the enemy missile. One
defensive rocket would be fired against each
incoming object. But an enemy could easily
confuse the radars?by including along with
the real nuclear warheads high-altitude
"decoys," such as lightweight metallic hal-
Ions. Since decoys break up or slow down
when they hit the earth's atmosphere, we
hoped that by waiting, we could pick out the
real warheads agid launch a defensive attack.
The antimissile missiles would have to be
placed near each city to be defended, and the
tremendous heat and blast caused by the ex-
plosion of the defensive warheads, low over
the cities, could inflict terrible civilian cas-
ualties. It was possible that such a defensive
system would do as much damage as enemy
warheads. The Nike-Zeus plans, therefore,
Included a major fallout-shelter program.
During the past two years, it has appeared
feasible to build high-altitude defensive mis-
siles for use against small-scale attacks. The
nuclear warheads on the high-altitude mis-
siles would be exploded far out in space?in
an attempt to destroy both the decoys and
the real enemy warheads. In this way, some
defense of a much wider region, farther from
each antimissile site, Would be possible. The
proposal is that, with enough sites, the entire
United States can be protected. But this will
not work if an attacker staggers his decoys
and warheads in time and spreads them over
a large area, or precedes them by a nuclear
explosion of his own to "black out" our de-
fending radars. High-altitude defense repre-
sents an improved approach to the problem
of defense against ballistic missiles, but it is
by no means a solution.
The basic technical fact about an ABM de-
fense is that a sophisticated opponent can
overcome any defense currently possible. Of-
fense has all of the advantages; any defense
system can be overpowered.
Today, the nuclear- powers rely on the de-
terrent effect of their offensive missiles to
keep the peace, A powerful incentive, there-
fore, exists for either side to increase its of-
fensive-missile forces the moment the other
starts to build an ABM system.
The Russians appear to be building a sim-
ple ABM defense around Moscow, and pos-
sibly other areas, though it is yet unclear
that they have decided on a full-scale, anti-
Missile defense system. In response, the
United States has taken steps to add decoys
and multiple warheads to its own offensive-
missile force. These actions on our part are
still quite limited, but the steps we have al-
ready taken, especially the introduction of
multiple warheads on each missile to over-
whelm possible Soviet defenses, will greatly
increase the number of missile warheads in
our inventory. The Russians appear to have
been taking similar steps in anticipation of a
U.S. decision to build an ABM system. An Al3M
system in the U.S. will stimulate the Soviets
to increase the number of their offensive
warheads.
The United States is earnestly seeking some
agreement with the Soviet Union to limit the
deployment of ABM systems and missiles, in
order to forestall a new spiral in the arms
race. Unofficial conversations have been held
with individual Russians, but we have not
succeeeded in getting discussions started at
an official government level. In Glassboro,
President Johnson repeated to Mr. Kosygin
our willingness to explore the problem. The
Soviet Union does not seem ready to discuss
such questions?yet. But there is no need
for us to rush into an ABM deployment.
There is little relation between a Russian
decision to deploy an ABM system (if, indeed,
they have made a decision for more than an
experimental system) and such a decision
here. Our security would be seriously endan-
gered if the Russians installed an effective
ABM defense that could prevent our missile
force from reaching their territory and if
they simultaneously developed an effective
defense against our Strategic Air Force
bombers?something they have not been able
to do so far. Since it is obvious folly for us
to build a defense against missiles while we
also are so vulnerable to a bomber attack, the
Pentagon has quietly decided to spend four
billion more dollars improving our air-de-
fense system.
I do not believe that a really effective anti-
missile system is remotely possible for either
the U.S. or the Russians. And even if the
Russians could develop one, and a truly ef-
fective defense against our sac bombers as
well, our installing an sang system would
not restore our powers of deterrence. Only
improvements in our own offensive-missile
force, including "penetration aids" such as
decoys and electronic jammers to ensure that
our missiles could get through the Russian
defense, could achieve this. This is our De-
fense Department's basic strategy.
The United States has embarked on a large,
expensive program of outfitting ballistic mis-
siles with multiple warheads and other de-
vices to penetrate Russian defenses. We have
also started a $2 billion program to replace
our submarine-based Polaris missiles with
the larger Poseidon missiles, which can carry
more and better penetration aids. As long as
we continue to improve our missile forces
and maintain our B-52 bomber force, our
deterrent power will remain effective. An
ABM system is not required to preserve the
power and the effectiveness of our deter-
rents.
We should build an ABM system only if it
gives us greater security. And in deciding
this, we must assume that the Russians will
respond to our ABM system by upgrading
and enlarging their missile force?just as we
are doing in response to their ABM activities.
If the Russians were to do this, an American
ABM system would leave us with less security
and more vulnerable to destruction.
Secretary McNamara and many proponents
of an ABM system concede that an anti-
Soviet ABM defense would not be worth the
huge expense, because the Russians could
nullify its effectiveness at considerably lower
cost to themselves. So the proponents now
argue: We can at least provide ourselves with
protection against Red China at a more mod-
est cost and without starting a new Rus-
sian-American arms spiral. Is this so? Again,
I think not.
An ABM system would grant us some pro-
tection against China's missiles during the
early years of its missile buildup; but this
protection would not be complete, and it
would be short-lived, certainly, much shorter
than 15 years. Once the Chinese can build
intercontinental missiles, the cast to them
of producing additional missiles would be
relatively small (perhaps $5 to $10 million
per missile). Within a short time, they would
have enough missiles (say, 50 to 100) to
penetrate our "anti-Chinese" ABM system.
The Chinese would certainly build penetra-
tion aids into their missile force. The tech-
niques of designing such aids are neither
highly complex nor exceedingly costly (one
can learn all about them in American aero-
space journals). I do not believe, therefore,
that an ABM system will give us either com-
plete or lasting protection against Chinese
missiles. I am convinced we must rely instead
on the offensive deterrent, as we must with
the Russians; that is, we must rely on our
known ability to retaliate devastatingly in
case of a nuclear attack. Ten percent of our
SAC bomber force could kill 200 million
Chinese.
I am very skeptical that any ABM system
based on the present approach will ever work
at its calculated effectiveness. No one has
even succeeded in developing an antiaircraft
defense that is as much as ten percent effec-
tive (three percent is a more common actual
effectiveness). An ABM system that was only
this effective would be almost worthless. Even
if an ABM system were as much as 90 percent
effective, it could still not prevent an oppo-
nent from inflicting millions of fatalities on
US.
Besides, whenever an ABM system might be
installed, how could a realistic test be made?
We could not fire missiles at it (it would be
located within the continental United
States) , and from hard experience during
World War II, we know that far simpler de-
vices (such as submarine torpedoes) fail to
work the first time. I realize that a model
system is being tested on Kwajalein, but
these tests are under laboratory conditions
and cannot simulate a nationwide installa-
tion manned by GI's and technicians. Even
if we were willing to fire missiles at the sys-
tem, the test would not be completely realis-
tic, for we would be testing against our mis-
siles, not enemy warheads. Few competent
people expect the extremely complex ABM
system to work the first time; yet it must to
have any effect!
There will always remain a big chance that
even if the system is working as designed, it
will not intercept all of the enemy missiles.
They will obviously know how our ABM sys-
tem works; we will know little about their
offensive weapons. Imagine the advantage a
football team would have if It knew precisely
its opponents' defense on every play. Remem-
ber that if a single enemy nuclear weapon
leaks through the defense to a city, the city
will be destroyed.
Besides, the Chinese could bypass our ABM
system completely?either with low-altitude
missiles launched from submarines or with
aircraft, which, surprisingly enough, are more
difficult to intercept than intercontinental
ballistic missiles because they come in at
relatively low altitude and do not follow pre-
dictable projectories the way a missile does.
We simply cannot rely upon an ABM system
to give us a sure defense against a Chinese
attack.
Many people also fear that the deterrent
power on which we rely against the Soviet
Union will not be effective against China.
The exceptional anxiety expressed each time
the Chinese carry out a nuclear test seems
related not to their military potential but to
our view of them as irrational or unstable.
This anxiety rises more from Chinese rhetoric
than Chinese actions. Although the words of
China's leaders have been inflammatory in
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
E 1710 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?Extensions of Remarks March 6, 4169
the extreme, in action, they have been ex-
ceedingly cautious.
China's actual military_ capacity is, most
likely for decades to comeehardly comparable
to that of either the Urated States or the
Soviet Union. The ChineSehave an extremely
limited industrial capacity (until now, theY
have produced no aircraft, of their owni).
They also lack the broad base of technically
trained manpower that la absolutely neces-
sary for a modern military establishment.
Nonetheless, they have 'Made remarkable
progress in developing nuclear weaponry.
They took less time than-a:ay of the other
nuclear powers to carry out a thermonuclear
explosion. In this, they rectal, eel considerable
help from the Soviet Union, in the late
1960's, as well as a good clea of technological
information from open soultes and their own
intelligence network. And l,hey do appear to
be making progress on rale:ales capable of
carrying nuclear weapons.a4pparently, they
launched one of their newton weapons on a
short-range missile. Though we have no eel-
dence of a Chinese long-range ballistic mis-
sile, we know that their resources are ade-
quate to develop one and, / believe, prodnee
it in moderate numbers (100-200) in leas
than a decade.
During the late 1950's, many statements
by Chinese, leaders minimized the importance
of nuclear weapons, arguing that they ctici
not really change the relative power balance.
We heard boasts that China alone among the
great powers would be ablate survive a =-
clear war. All this has changed. The Chinese
now renounce any intention, al being the nett
to use their nuclear weapons, and they show
every sign of a growing sophistication in nil-
clear matters, which is to be expected as they
acquire knowledge of the terrible effects Of
nuclear explosions.
It Is China's neighbors, net we, who would
be most directly threatened by any Chinese
missile force, and an aura system in the 'U.S.
would be of little help to them. We could not
deploy an aim system in India and Japan;
they are to close to China, to permit the
system to weak effectively. What, then, must
the leaders and people of Japan and India
think as we make plans to hide under an
ABM umbrella while they have no way to de-
fend themselves? If the United States is se
fearful of China that it must create an ABM
defense, should not Japan and India con-
clude that it is time for them to make their
peace with the Chinese? There is no easier
way for us to build up China in Asian eyes.
No Asian can afford to belie that we are
prepared to lose New York- to counter a
Chinese nuclear attack against them. Some
Indian officials are already waking for a mis-
sile-defense system.
Can we build a limited ant system to pro-
tect us against China without stimulating
the Soviet Union to respond with an offen-
sive-force buildup of its own? I think not.
Just as we are enlarging our missile forces
because we cannot wait to see whether the
Soviet 'Union is building a limPed or an ex-
tensive ABM system, so the Ruesians could
not wait to see whether our system would be
-
a limited one before embarking on an offen-
sive-missile buildup. Even if... as the Presi-
dent proposes, we build a thin ABM system,
It would be unlikely to remain small; pres-
sures from the military and indue trial estab-
lishment to improve?and expend--it would
be irresistible. Most military planners expect
the system to expand rapidly, and in fact do -
not consider the initial systenato be of much
use. This is the reality of the president's de-
cision. I am convinced that on we decide to
take the ABM route, we cannot _avoid an en-
larged arms race.
Three other consequences alf the Presi-
dent's decision are not generally appreciated.
First, an expanded mita systeatwall be needed
eventually to Cope with decoy/Jerald multiple
warheads. It will almost certainly raise the
issue of fallout shelters to protect the popu-
lation both from Russian nuclear weapons
and our own protective system.
Secondly, no one has bothered to mention
the several hundred million dollars a year
that it Will cost to maintain and operate even
this thin system or the billions of dollars it
would take to run the final one.
Finally, our only substantial arms limita-
tion accomplishment, the limited test ban
treaty, is likely to be a victim of this step-up
in the arms race. The developers of the ABM
system will soon be telling us that they can-
not assure Its effectiveness without nuclear
tests in the atmosphere. The pressure on the
President to renounce the treaty in the inter-
est of national security and protecting our
multi-billion-dollar investment will be over-
whelming.
The United States and Russia are learning
to work together to create a more rational
world order. Gone are those deep fears of a
surprise attack that dominated the 1950's.
The best hope for the future lies in joint ef-
forts by the Soviet Union and the United
States to eliminate the arms race. Such ef-
forts will be impossible if each side is forced
to offset the defensive and offensive buildup
of the other.
Under the present circumstances, we are
going to have to accept and live with a "de-
terrent balance." We have clone it with the
Russians. We will have to with the Chinese.
There just is no way to avoid this; there is
no magical or technical escape from the di-
lemmas of the nuclear age through defense.
A sensible course would be to reduce greatly
the offensive-missile forces on both sides,
achieving the deterrence with much less dan-
ger to all of us.
Like most other scientists who have studied
its problems, I am convinced that much mu-
tually coordinated disarmament is techni-
cally achievable with considerably less risk,
effort and cost than is involved in our cur-
rent deterrent position. The blocks to dis-
armament are political and psychological, not
technical. Unfortunately, disarmament has
no effective political support, no vested in-
terests backing it, and no power base in the
Government bureaucracy or in the Congress.
Some of the same senators who have been
pressing the President to spend tens of bil-
lions of dollars on defense against a missile
attack have consistently tried to cut the tiny
budget of the Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency. Substantial balanced disarma-
ment is sensible, safe and technically achiev-
able, and even partial disarmament would
release many tens of billions of dollars for
constructive uses. But it is not coming very
fast. Until statesmen take disarmament ef-
forts seriously and fashion international
security arrangements more appropriate to
the nuclear age we all live in, the best we can
hope for is an increasingly nightmarish peace
insured by only a balance of terror.
A real defense against nuclear-armed mis-
siles is a mirage. Our only real security lies
in peace itself. Nuclear weapons are just too
potent for effective defense. The best defense
is to prevent a nuclear war.
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE or
TECHNOLOGY,
Cambridge, Mass., November 29, 1967.
Congressman WILLIAM RYAN,
Cannon Building,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR M. RYAN: I VMS very pleased to re-
ceive your letter in respect to the plans of
the Administration to deploy an anti-bal-
listic missile system. I am very strongly
against this measure, being both useless and
dangerous. My ideas are perhaps best ex-
pressed in an article which my friend and
collaborator, Provost Jerome Wiesner, has
written in Look Magazine a few weeks ago.
I am sure that you are in possession of this
valuable document. I also was deeply im-
pressed and convinced by the speech that
Mr. McNamara has given in respect to the
anti-ballistic deployment. In the first three-
fourths of his speech he is most cogently
against such a measure, but at the end he
was forced by the circumstances to subscribe
to the Administration's policy to begin with
such unnecessary and useless expenses. I
feel that the anti-ballistic issue is a most
dangerous one, and it is high time that the
public is informed of the dangers involved.
The fate of the United States and the whole
world are at stake, and r am greatly heart-
ened by the fact that congressmen like your-
self and Mrs Donald Fraser are taking up
this important issue. Please let me know
whenever I can be of help to you in this
matter. There is quite a -number of mem-
bers of the MIT. and Harvard community
who would be only too glad to help you
in your efforts.
Very sincerely yours,
Maros F. WEISSITOPF.
STANFORD UNIVERSITY,
Stanford, Calif., November 28, 1967.
Hon. WILLIAM F. RYAN,
Hon. DONALD M. FEASTS,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
MY DEAR MESSRS. RYAN AND FRASER: I have
your letter of November 17, 1957, asking for
my opinion of the recent decision on the part
of the Administration to proceed with the
development and deployment of a "thin"
anti-ballistic missile system. I are extremely
glad that you and other members of the
Congress are taking an interest in this vital
issue since it clearly represents a decision
which could have far-reaching consequences.
I should like to emphasise that I am re-
sponding to your request as an individual
and not as a member of some of the military -
and disarmament advisory groups in which
I am continuing to play a part.
It is clear that one can respond in reacting
to the deployment decision in two ways:
namely, one can take the decision at its face
value?that it represents "thin" deployment
to meet specified objectives, or one can as-
sume that it represents a "foot in the door"
to lead to a full deployment decision costing
many tens of billions of dollars, which is
aimed at a hopefully effective anti-ballistic
missile defense against thefl Soviet missile
force. In my reply to your letter I will not
deal with the merit or lack of merit of such
a full deployment; I continue to be opposed
to such a move since it clearly would signal
the initiation of another round of strategic
escalation with the Soviet Union without a
gain in security for either side. I believe that
Secretary McNarnara's San Francisco speech
Well documents the arguments against such
full deployment and I heartily concur with
these arguments. Whether it is politically
feasible to resist the pressure for such de-
ployment as a result of the "thin" deploy-
ment decision is a matter on which you and
other members of Congress are more qualified
to pass judgment. My comments are therefore
restricted to the deployment decision as it
relates to "thin coverage" only.
The dominant arguments now presented in
favor of a quick deployment decision for the
thin umbrella system are the following:
1. To give interim protection against the
Chinese threat.
2. To assure survival of an adequate frac-
tion of Minuteman ICBM's against a fully
coordinated first strike Soviet attack.
3. Protection of command and control and
protection against accidental attack.
I would like to comment in turn on these
three arguments,
I. CHINESE THREAT
The justification for the partial system is
presented in the context of a limited number
of ICB1VI's in the 1975 time period. It should
be made clear that there is rib quantitative
basis whatsoever for a specific projection. On
the one hand the Chinese may exploit their
ICBM potential for propaganda or political
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Mar.41.1, 6, 1969
purposes only and not make the major eco-
nomic sacrifice involved in an ICBM produc-
tion program; moreover, they may find them-
selves unable to sustain a major program as
a consequence of the chaos produced by the
cultural revolution. On the other hand, the
Chinese may give highest priority to the de-
velopment of an ICBM threat. It is then
technically feasible for them to reach num-
bers adequate to penetrate the thin shield.
The proposed defense is characterized by
the fact that its effectiveness is highly sen-
sitive both to the quantitative nature of the
threat and the specific level of defense.
Und,er all circumstances it is recognized by
even the most ardent advocates that the pro-
tection it can give us is of an interim nature,
i.e., that we cannot "win" a defense race
against the Chinese ICBM's any more than
we can "win" it against the Soviets. What
purpose does this interim protection serve?
It appears to me that such a system can pri-
marily permit us to implement a strategic
policy vis-a-vis the Chinese not unlike John
Foster Dulles' "massive retaliation" which
was invoked against the USSR during the
time when the Soviets did not have a nu-
clear delivery capability. Under this policy a
massive nuclear attack by the USA could be
threatened with impunity as a possible con-
sequence of unacceptable USSR military
moves, even of a minor nature, yet this policy
did not prevent the buildup of USSR strength
to a level which made complete defense
against nuclear attack infeasible, so that the
USA was forced to rely on an assured de-
struction capability as its primary means of
averting attack.
I see no reason why the outcome of such
a course should be fundamentally different
in Asia. At present we could, in principle, re-
spond by "massive retaliation" to unaccept-
able Chinese moves were it not for other
consequences (including Soviet response or
moral considerations). A limited ABM de-
ployment would extend this policy option
until we will once again have to rely 'on de-
terrence as our primary means of strategic
defense. Eventually a big enough buildup of
ICBM forces can always concentrate its fire
on sufficiently few targets and thereby pene-
trate the defense by sheer exhaustion if by
no other means.
An argument often cited in support of the
thin ABM defense against the Chinese threat
goes as follows: If we fail to deploy an ABM
system the Chinese can blackmail us by
threats to our cities and population and
thereby immobilize our willingness and
ability to resist her expansionist military
moves in Asia. This argument is recognized,
however, as no more than a restatement of
what I have said above and means only this:
We can threaten "massive retaliation" until
the Chinese buildup of their ICBM threat
forces us to rely on deterrence once again
rather than on an airtight ABM system for
strategic defense.
What price should we be willing to pay to
extend temporarily our present security from
Chinese threats?especially when we discern
little at present that serves to retard Chinese
military buildup and political intransigence?
Since the Chinese must realize fully that a
nuclear first strike against U.S. cities would
be suicidal for them, is not our deterrence
effective protection? There is no evidence
whatever that the Chinese are apt to be
irrational in military ventures. The Chinese
military action vis-a-vis Quemoy and Matsu
and other targets under U.S. protection has
been exceedingly cautious. I am therefore
talking only about temporary protection
against a totally irrational and Suicidal at-
tack by the Chinese which would result in
limited damage to the U.S. in comparison
with the tragic consequence for China. For
this reason I believe that by itself the Chi-
nese threat is a very weak argument for de-
ploying at this time the "thin" system.
ApprGakfOBIEVOM4-120tifi?N-P:-C1RVE01160therkfifth00090004-2
A further reason for questioning the "Chi-
nese" argument for the deployment decision
relates to the reaction of our Pacific allies.
On the one hand they might feel less secure
if the U.S. protected itself in order to avoid
pressure from potential nuclear attack by
China, while leaving them exposed and
vulnerable as hostages. On the other hand,
they might feel more secure in the knowledge
that the USA could protect them without
itself being exposed to nuclear attack. Given
the choice between these two arguments I
doubt that the Pacific allies of the U.S. would
take much comfort in this second argument
while fully realizing the first. At best this
reasoning must be considered to be a stand-
off unless the U.S. is willing to extend ABM
protection to its allies also.
2. PROTECTION OF MINUTEMAN
Although, historically, in the evolution of
the Army ABM proposals "hard point de-
fense" has not been a primary argument, I
feel that the evolving rationale for deploy-
ing the limited system for defense of the
Minuteman force has some justification.
However, it is difficult to make it a high
priority objective.
It is possible in principle that the Minute-
man force can in time be denied its second
strike effectiveness through increase in accu-
racy and numbers of the Soviet ICBM force
and through the development and deploy-
ment of sophisticated, multiple warhead de-
vices on the part of the Soviets. There is a
minimum time interval between first indi-
cations of such a threat to Minuteman
through new technical developments and a
full-scale Soviet deployment of new devices
endangering Minuteman. Should such a
threat occur, an over all challenge to our
deterrence would arise only if it were ac-
companied by the deployment of a truly
effective ABM on the part of the Soviets to
neutralize Polaris and Poseidon, and an air
defense considerably more impenetrable than
that now facing SAC bombers. Nevertheless,
one can argue that all these events may
happen with a lead time no longer than the
time required to deploy active defense for
the Minuteman force, or the time required
to proliferate our ICBM force to keep up
wth the threat. Under these highly strained
assumptions a case can therefore be made
for a decision to proceed now with active
defense of the Minuteman force.
Given such a decision there is still the
question of whether the present system ts
technically the best means to accomplish
this objective.
3. PROTECTION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL AND
PROTECTION AGAINST ACCIDENTAL ATTACK.
An argument for the "thin system" which
has some validity is that it protects vital
command and control points, in particular,
Washington, D.C., in case of an accidental
firing of a Soviet or Chinese ICBM, or in
case of other limited threats. This argument
in my view has considerable validity. It is
certainly imaginable that there can be an
accident of this nature and the chance of an
irrational or ill-informed response on our
part would be substantially reduced if the
lines of command were protected so that
meaningful investigations as to the source
of actual firing and possible discussions over
the "hot line" could take place before a
course of action is decided.
The question may naturally be raised as to
how ABM deployment, both in its present
"thin" context and a possible full deploy-
ment, relates to the prospects for arms limita-
tion or arms reduction. As you know, over-
tures have been made towards the Soviet
Union to forego ABM deployment and to con-
sider reduction of strategic weapons if the
USSR showed some interest in a reciprocal
arrangement. To the best of my knowledge
these moves have not been successful, par-
tially, of course, under the shadow of the
Viet Nam war. It is my belief that including
E1711
ABM in an arms limitation agreement with
the Soviets would be a very difficult negotia-
tion problem since, traditionally, the Soviet
Union has been more defense minded than
the USA: that is, the Soviet Union has always
spent a considerably larger fraction of its
strategic military budget on defensive, rather
than offensive weapons. quite apart from
these ongoing moves in relation to the Soviet
Union one can argue that the "thin" deploy-
ment would make it more feasible to reach
a disarmament agreement with the Soviet
Union in the field of long-range strategic mis-
siles. The argument is that should one reach
an agreement involving complete destruction
of long-range ICBM's, but if one lacked con-
fidence in an adequate inspection system,
then the thin ABM system would offer pro-
tection against residual, clandestine deploy-
ment. This argument is valid only provided
means are found to reach a point of total
elimination of strategic missiles without
passing through a strategically unstable situ-"
ation; I am not aware of any feasible pro-
posal to achieve such a reduction in the
presence of deployed ABM. If, on the other
hand, an arms reduction move is being nego-
tiated which would provide reduction of pres-
ent strategic forces to a minimum deterrence
level, then the presence of a limited ABM
would raise the level which each nation would
conclude to be required for minimum deter-
rence. In short, the relation of the limited
ABM deployment decision to the prospect for
arms limitations or arms reduction depends
on the particular scheme under discussion.
Since I consider the prospects for engaging
in a meaningful dialogue with the Soviets
aiming at complete elimination of long-range
strategic missiles to be considerably less hope-
ful than engaging a dialogue aiming at a sim-
ple reduction of strategic force missiles, I feel
that on balance the decision for limited de-
ployment is an impediment rather than a
help toward the prospect of arms reduction
agreements.
To summarize, I continue to be very much
opposed to full deployment of an ABM sys-
tem and I also feel that the "Chinese Argu-
ment" for deploying a thin system now lacks
validity. On the other hand, I feel that there
may be valid arguments, although not of high
priority, for deploying the thin system for
protection of Minuteman and thereby reduc-
ing the pressure for proliferating the Minute-
man force, and there are also valid arguments
for the thin system for protection of com-
mand and control, in case of accident or
otherwise limited attack. You will note that
the two arguments which I consider to be
valid for deployment of the "thin" system are
limited in scope and in themselves could not
be used as a basis for amplification of the
system. The "Chinese Argument" on the other
hand, which I do not consider to be valid,
also contains the implied threat of pressure
for the deployment of a vastly expanded
system.
I hope you will find these comments use-
ful; clearly a great deal more can be said on
this very complex question.
Sincerely yours,
WOLFGANG K. H. PANOFSKY,
Director.
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES,
Washington, D.C., December 1, 1967.
ROM WILLIAM F. RYAN,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Cannon Building, Washington, D.C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN RYAN: Thank you for
letter of November 16 regarding the anti-
ballistic missile problem. I am very much
concerned with this problem and will be
happy to provide whatever assistance I can
In your study of this most important ques-
tion.
The recent decision to deploy a "thin"
ABM system is of course most disturbing. I
believe it was a most unwise decision, lead-
ing us toward a much more dangerous fu-
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
E 1712 ApprovecrADWItaDAMIGWQM=R110740008644120/0
ture military position. It was clearly a deei-
sion impelled by the pressures of intenee
military-industrial (and Congressional)
lobbying, in the face of Administration re-
luctance to initiate such a large and momen-
tous new program at this time. The departure
of Secretary McNamara only adds to my con-
cern, since the forces resisting an all-out
arms race will be weakened thereby.
It is clear from the history of ABM discus-
sions that the "anti-Chinese" emphasis cur-
rently in vogue was developed to justify a
program whose prime initial justification, its
a defense against Soviet ICBMs, was not
"selling". The Administration now wants to
deploy such a system, directed against
China, while at the same time avoiding an
arms race with the Soviet Union. However, It
cannot have it both ways. LS-the system will
provide as effective a defense against the
Chinese as the Administration has claimed,
then it will also threaten the Soviet deter-
rent, and the Russians will have to expand
their missile forces to keep their deterrent
"credible". If the system is kept more lim-
ited, it will not work against the Chinese
missiles, and cannot even be justified on
those grounds.
This new program also refuses world at-
tention on nuclear weapons and will make
it difficult to stop the spread of these weap-
ons to other countries. This is perhaps the
most important consequence of this decision.
From the domestic political pint of view,
though, I do not see that ranch can be made
of this, since it is difficult to raise it dra-
matically before the public view.
I enclose several things I have written re-
cently on this subject, including an article
in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on the
arms control impact of ABM deployment,
and a letter I have written to the New York
Times on recent discussions of the deploy-
ment decision. I would also refer you to an
article by Jerome Wiesner in the Novem-
ber 28 issue of Look Magazine.
In addition, the Federation of American
Scientists has recently been in contact with
Congressman Cohelan, who- has also in-
dicated interest in investigating the ABM
question further. The Federation has
gathered some materials for Mr. Cohelan,
and I have asked Mr. Daniel Singer, its Gen-
eral Counsel, to make these Materials avail-
able to you also.
If there is any other way I can be of as-
sistance, please let me know.
Sincerely yours,
LEONARD S. RODBERG.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
New York, N.Y., February 29, 1968.
CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM F. RYAN,
CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. FEAsin,
Rouse of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR CONGRESSMAN RYAN and CONGRESS-
MAN FRASER: I am delinquent in respond-
ing to your request of last November to share
with you some thoughts about the decision
of the Secretary of Defense to develop and
deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. I am
enclosing some four articles that I have writ-
ten on this subject.
I would particularly like to stress the im-
portance of not separating the ABM ques-
tion from that of strategic offensive forces.
I believe that from the point of view of
domestic politics and with respect to negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union, as well as giv-
ing consideration to the prOblems of ob-
taining the signatures of non-nuclear coun-
tries to a non-proliferation treaty, we need
to proceed from the assumption that the
issue is now to halt the strategic arms race
in both offensive and defensive weapons. I
believe the Secretary of Defense in the past
has done a disservice in emphasizing only the
need to control the defensive aspects of the
strategic 9SMS race. I hope that your efforts
can be directed along lines to rectify this
lopsided way of looking at the question.
I think it would be very useful if mem-
bers of Congress could turn their attention
to means by which the U.S. could develop
a negotiating position on means to curb
the strategic arms race. I realize that the
Soviet Union has been resisting negotiations
on this question because of the Vietnam
War. At the same time you should know that
there have been several quiet discussions be-
tween U.S. and Soviet scientists on this
issue. They are planning to meet again. As
the Soviets move closer to more of a balance
with the U.S. in strategic forces, it is likely
that once again there may be interest in
serious negotiations on this question.
Obviously, it would be desirable for both
political parties to discuss this matter in a
constructive light during the campaign or at
least take the issue out of the campaign by
not having the parties use it as an area of
controversy.
In any case hearings to explore various
negotiating postures might be enormously
educational as a means of focusing Congres-
sional and public interest on the question.
This at least would help to indicate to the
Soviets that influential political leaders in
the U.S. took the issue seriously. Further-
more, this is one of the more important aseas
which could have some influence on non-nu-
clear powers to sign the non-proliferation
treaty. If such powers think the two super
powers are willing to curb their own arma-
ments, just as they are using the non-prolif-
eration treaty to prevent others from ob-
taining nuclear weapons, signatures may be
more forthcoming.
As to other sources you should consult,
you might want to talk with George Rath-
jens, Jack Ruins, Frank Long, and Paul
Doty.
Sincererly yours,
BETTY GOETZ LALL.
THE ABM DECISION: $40 BrsLioss roa Arm-
MISSILE-ESTABLISHMENTARIANISM
(By Betty Goetz Lall)
(Nors.?Betty Goetz Lall is on the staff
of Cornell University's State School of In-
dustrial and Labor Relations.)
When Secretary of Defense McNamara an-
nounced last November that he was stepping
up production of the newest U.S. strategic
missile, the sea-based Poseidon, because there
was increasing evidence that the Soviet
Union had begun to deploy an anti-ballistic
missile defense system around Moscow, he
may not have anticipated the storm of con-
troversy he was brewing up. His announce-
ment raised the pitch of the debate about
whether the United States should move from
the research and development stage to the
production and deployment stage of its anti-
ballistic missile, the Nike X. The Secretary
of Defense clearly does not favor spending
an estimated $40 billion over a ten-year
period for such a weapon of dubious effec-
tiveness. If the United States were to deploy
an ABM and the Soviets were then to act
to counter this with an improvement in their
own offensive capability, Mr. McNamara has
said: "In all probability, all we would accom-
plish would be to increase greatly both their
defense expenditures and ours without any
gain in real security to either side." But since
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some important
members of Congress favor early deployment
of an ABM system around 50 American cities,
along with a necessary accompanying large-
scale fall-out shelter program, it seems pru-
dent to examine the policy choices before the
American government and people at this
point in time.
What are the choices? 1. Produce and de-
ploy the currently developed Nike I system.
Enough research has been done on this sys-
tem to consider it deployable. If the Soviet
Union took no measures (a rather optimistic
assumption) to counteract the Nike X, de-
ployed both as an area defense and around
about 50 cities, it is estimated that the U.S.
BB0004-2/Iarch 6, 1969
fatalities from a Soviet strike might be se-
duced from 120 million to 30 million. If the
Soviets improve their offensive capability to
counteract the effect of the Nike X, which
they easily can do, then the U.S. fatalities
would remain at abOut 120 million.
The system itself would consist of three
parts: a long-range interceptor missile, the
Spartan, which would aim to detect and de-
stroy Soviet incoming missiles above the
atmosphere as much as 400 miles away; a
short-range interceptor missile, the Sprint,
which would attempt to destroy those at-
tacking missiles getting by the Spartan; and
a fall-out shelter program to protect people
from the inevitable fall-out which would
descend upon them by the detonation of the
U.S. and Soviet missiles Intercepting one
another with their respective large nuclear
warheads above large U.S. populations.
There are two main advantages in deploy-
ing such a system. One is the obvious sav-
ing of some 90 million lives in the event
of a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on
American cities and provided no measures
were subsequently taken to improve the
Soviet missile capability to counter the U.S.
deployment of Nike X. The second advantage
is the possible further deterrent effect on
the Soviet Union: it would not try to attack
the U.S. because with the Nike X the U.S.
would probably have the strength to count-
erattack and kill millions of Soviet citizens.
Another, rather weak, argument is that other
countries might be less likely to build their
own nuclear weapons. Instead they would
rely on a U.S. guarantee to come to their aid
in the event they were attacked with nuclear
weapons. It is contended that, if the U.S. had
an ABM system deployed, such a guarantee
would be more credible, i.e., the U.S. would
be more likely to risk attacking a nuclear
aggressor if it knew that its own population
was relatively more immune from nuclear
attack. A fourth possible argument is that
the U.S. should adopt the Soviet strategy,
spend money for an ABM system, and reduce
its concentration on offensive missiles. The
U.S. has been spending roughly $4 billion on
offensive missiles for every ffit billion spent
on defensive systems. If this ratio were re-
versed and the Soviets were also to rely pri-
marily on defensive strength, then the U.S.
offensive strength, which is considered four
times that of the Soviet Union, may become
less ominous to the Soviets and a reduction
in tensions between the two countries might
result.
SEVERAL ARGUMENTS
Arguments against ABM deployment in-
clude the following: First, the cost (esti-
mated by McNamara to be $40 billion for
defense of 50 cities and up to $100 billion
for all major cities) is not worth it since it is
unlikely that such a system would in fact
reduce U.S. fatalities. The Soviet Union would
surely counter U.S. deployment with stronger
offensive systems, thus completely nullifying
the U.S. effort. Such a large amount of money
is more usefully spent elsewhere, on better
offensive systems or on needed non-military
projects.
Second, if the Soviet Union reacted to
American Nike X deployment by improving
or enlarging its own defensive force, the U.S.
might then feel required to Increase its of-
fensive force, thereby reducing the possi-
bilities for de-escalation of the arms race,
improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, and further
arms control agreements. (In particular,
ABM deployment would diminish chances to
extend the partial test treaty to cover under-
ground tests, because such tests give infor-
mation on ABM effectiveness: it would re-
duce possibilities of an agreement to stop
production of fissionable material for weap-
ons purposes because the U.S. or the Soviet
Union may decide they need to continue
production for ABM nuclear Warheads.)
Third, U.S. allies may decide that if the
U.S. must have an ABM system, so must
they, thus further reducing the likelihood of
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Marck6, 1969 AppabiCAFFESISM
t Germany may have in the ABM a more impediment to an agreement not to deploy testing for the perfection of weapons, both
' been offensive and defensive, was one of the major
NA& Fikr-2ThtM77 8rAe-ik1iff 1 Anil 300090004-2
t/ob E 1713
containing the spread of nuclear weapons. lets offensive weapons stay intact is the main test ban. treaty in 1963, the importance of
effective argument for acquiring nuclear
weapons than she had in wanting to par-
ticipate in a NATO sea-based multilateral
nuclear force. Germans might claim, just as
the Russians do, that nuclear warheads for
an ABM system are only defensive and, there-
fore, cannot be a threat to any nation.
Fourth, an ABM system may cause the
American people and government to believe
themselves invulnerable to attack and con-
sequently to lose interest in further efforts
to reach arms control and disarmament
agreements; similarly, other countries would
note the lack of U.S. and Soviet restraint in
the arms race and conclude they should not
show restraint in arming themselves.
Fifth, the U.S. is not yet absolutely sure
what the Soviet Union is doing or is ulti-
mately intending to do regarding an ABM
system; a hasty U.S. decision to go ahead and
deploy an ABM system might destroy the
forces of restraint in the Soviet Union. (It
is known that some Soviet scientists have
urged their government to go slowly on de-
ployment; if they have had some measure
of success, a decision by the U.S. for major
deployment would certainly weaken their
position.)
Sixth, the U.S. deterrent posture should
not be determined by imitating precisely
whatever the Soviet Union chooses to do.
There is no necessary principle of defense
that states that because the Soviet Union
has a certain weapon or employs a particular
strategy the U.S. must follow willy-nilly. In
fact, when the Soviet Union spent for air de-
fense systems over twice what the U.S. was
spending, the U.S. reaction was not to ape
the Soviets in building more air defenses,
but rather to concentrate on offensive weap-
ons.
All this for and against argument, how-
ever, still leaves other choices to be consid-
ered:
? 2. Decide against deployment now and
concentrate on continuing to build offensive
strength to overcome the disadvantages of
any Soviet ABM system. The main argument
for this approach is that the deterrent to So- on U.S. and U.S.S.R. offensve and defensive
viet attack lies primarily in having a good strategic weapons would demonstrate that proposed a production freeze on offensive
offensive capability. Furthermore, the cost these nuclear powers were acting to control and defensive weapons which would cover not
of a given amount of offensive capability is their most important weapons. only a freeze on the number of strategic mis-
much less than the cost of a comparable ef- But when offensive weapons are added to siles produced, but also on all of their im-
fort in the defensive field. Offensive strength defensive as part of international arms con_ portant characteristics. This proposal had
gives, moreover, greater confidence to U.S. trol negotiations, there arise two added difft- attached to it an elaborate inspection proce-
allies that we have the wherewithal to pro- culties from the U.S. point of view. The U.S., dure requiring entry into all the known
tect them in the event war comes. since World War II (it did not take this posi- production plants for producing missiles as
Placing major emphasis on continued of- tion in the inter-war period) advocates rather well as spot checks into other plants to in-
tensive strength has its own disadvantage, complicated inspection procedures whenever sure that no missiles were being produced
however. This can pose as a threat to the So- it considers reducing an important part of surreptitiously. However, if the freeze did
so than defensive measures. its weapons arsenal, and these inspection not extend to the characteristics of missiles
t I to the rate at which existing mis-
an ABM. e Soviet
more defensive-minded and traditionally has concerns of those Senators who were skepti-
spent more money on defensive measures cal about the treaty. Additionally U.S. politi-
than has the United States. Therefore, Mos- cal leaders have convinced themselves that
cow would not feel that its security had been offensive strength is the key to security and
enhanced if the U.S. were free to improve and that the margin of superiority of U.S. to
enlarge its strategic offensive strength while Soviet strategic offensive strength must be
the Soviet Union was forbidden to undertake substantial (it is now between 3 or 4 to 1).
defensive measures. Any attempt, therefore, to limit strategic
A simple limitation on ABM deployment offensive weapons is likely to be regarded with
by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had been the hostility by some influential members of the
preference of the Secretary of Defense. In his Congress and many members of the military,
budget presentation earlier this year the especially the Air Force.
The crucial question is, what kind of an
agreement might be worked out. At the
outset it should be undertsood that serious
negotiations on what both sides regard as
the heart of their military strength will
necessarily be long and arduous. One of the
advantages of such negotiation is that it
would provide both sides with a reason to
defer further activity in the defensive area
and to slow down the pace of what they were
doing in the offensive area.
The precise nature of any agreement will
be delicate to work out. There are four as-
pects: deployment, reductions, production,
and research and development. No one ap-
pears to be advancing any scheme to curtail
research and development. This is difficult
to inspect, and although provocative in a
sense, not nearly as much so as either produc-
tion, deployment, or an unwillingness to re-
duce existing stockpiles. With respect to de-
ployment, it would probably not be a difficult
task for each side to ascertain through recon-
naissance satellites and other intelligence
techniques that the other side was not in-
creasing its deployment of either defensive
or offensive strategic weapons. Furthermore,
it would not be difficult to check on reduc-
tions of missiles, since this could be done
by a so-called bonfire approach; each side
Secretary said that, although the U.S. wou
continue to push ahead with its ABM devel-
opment program, the U.S. would "initiate
negotiations with the Soviet Union designed,
through formal or informal agreement, to
limit the deployment of anti-ballisitic missile
systems." But since the Soviet Premier, in a
recent letter to President Johnson, an-
nounced that he would not be content with
so restricted a proposal, this leads to a fourth
choice.
4. Negotiate an agreement to limit both
offensive and defensive weapons. President
Johnson apparently concurred in the Soviet
request mentioned above to consider limiting
both offensive and defensive missiles, and
has instructed his Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, Llewellyn Thompson, to pursue dis-
cussions. The principal advantage of this
move is that, if successful, it would achieve
a stability of the deterrent at no higher level
than exists today and possibly even at a
lower level. Money would be saved and valu-
able manpower released for other high pri-
ority projects. Non-nuclear powers would be
encouraged to sign a treaty preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons. Their chief com-
plaint about such a treaty at present is that
it would deny them a weapon which the two
but refused to limit in any way for them- would place its missiles in a given location
nuclear super powers had in great quantity"' y
selves?relegating non-nuclear powers to a for destruction, and destruction would be
permanent position of inferiority. Already observed by those from the other side or by
such a claim is being made among groups in an international inspection team.
West Germany India and Japan. Restrictions The more difficult question is that of pro-
-d tion controls.In 1964 the United States
Viet union, more Consequently the Soviet Uffion may feel cam- procedures are usually so elaborate a
pelled to continue its offensive buildup and unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The U.S.
to doubt the United States' interest in find- demand for inspection springs from a
ing ways to curtail armaments. profound distrust of the Soviet Union, a sue-
3. Seek agreement with true Soviets not to picion that it would not honor its commit-
deploy further any ABM system. This step meats; by the same token, the Soviet Union
would have the advantage of precluding vast has rejected most U.S. inspection demands
expenditures for defense on either side. The out of a profound distrust of the United
status quo of the existing deterrent would States, a suspicion that it would use inspec-
remain. Each side would know that the other tion as a means to carry out anti-Soviet ac-
possessed overwhelming power to deliver tivities in the Soviet Union. Whether this
deadly blows on its people causing 100 to mutual distrust has dissipated sufficiently
120 million fatalities to each side. Such an for the U.S. to moderate its inspection re-
agreement might be embodied in a formal quirements and for the Soviet Union to ac-
treaty or it might be an understanding or cept some inspection is unlikely; but since
declaration made by the two sides. The need relations between the two powers have ira-
to perfect further the offensive missiles of proved slightly (though they would probably
both sides would decrease; for example, the improve much more if the Vietnam war could
U.S. may find it unnecessary to replace the be brought to a satisfactory end), a serious
Polaris sea-based missiles with Poseidon, thus and sustained exploration of possible areas of
saving at least $1.9 billion, agreement is certainly justified.
An agreement not to deploy an ABM system This brings us to the other problem in
would not require inspection on the territory pursuing this choice, and that is the reluc-
of the two powers. Satellite reconnaissance tance of powerful U.S. political and military
can detect the large radars and other equip- leaders to see any diminution of the U.S.
ment related to an ABM system. offensive strategic strength regardless of what
Soviet unwillingness to negotiate any kind policy is pursued by the Soviet Union. Dur-
of an agreement on defensive weapons that lag the Senate consideration, of the partial
siles could be replaced, then the inspection
procedures might not be so onerous. This
might not even require inspection of produc-
tion plants, but rather, only inspection of
the replacement. Such a procedure might be
sufficiently unobtrusive to be acceptable to
Soviet leaders.
The possibilities for agreement may be de-
pendent on the course of the other areas
of Soviet-U.S. relationships, particularly
Vietnam. Any agreement may have to await
the outcome of that struggle, but if that
outcome can be mutually satisfactory, then
there is real hope that the perplexing ABM
problem can also be resolved.
[From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
September 1967]
CONGRESS DEBATES THE ABM
(By Betty Goetz Lail)
(NorE.?"On the ABM question . . . the
pattern of Congressional interest shows some
usual and unusual aspects. . . . They [Con-
gressmen] are pondering many of the conse-
quences of a decision to deploy or not to de-
ploy. There is no panic and little oratory.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
E1714
Approved 69iii2tUsV
They do not pretend to have pat solutions
to the problem and clearly most would like
to be confronted with a case of succeSsful
diplomacy to avoid a commitment to
deploy.")
It is a virtual certan4 that when Fzesi-
dent Johnson and Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara decide to undertake some degree of
production and deployment of an anti-
ballistic missile system for the United States,
Congress will not object. On major weapons
systems, especially those recommended
unanimously by the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Congress as a body does not usually try to
override the decisions of the military and its
civilian chiefs. The ABIrcsse is not likely
to be an exception. What Congress frequently
does is to recommend production of arms
before the Executive branOis has judged them
to be essential for the nation's security.
When this happens 'Me uncertainly is
whether or not the Executive branch-will
adhere to Congressional conclusions.
On the ABM question, which become a
major public issue in 1967, the pattern of
Congressional interest shows some usual and
and unusual aspects. It is the purpose of this
article to discuss pertinent Congressional
concerns as they have evolved by mid-I967.
HISTORY OF THE ABM AND CONGRESS
Research and development on the first 'U.S.
ABM system, the Nike Zeus, began in fiscal
1955; it grew out of the Nike Hercules and
Nike Ajax systems, the two surface-to-air
missiles designed to protect the population
from an attack by Soviet bombers. Congress
authorized and appropriated the funds re-
quested by the Executive branch for Nike
Zeus research and development, without
substantive comment, until 1959 when the
Army announced that the system was ready
for production and deployment. The U.S.
Secretary of Defense, Neil McElroy, rejected
the Army's request but the dispute precipi-
tated considerable Congressional discussion;
at that time the issue was resolved by Con-
gress adding to the defense budget $375 mil-
lion for the "acceleration of the Nike Zeus
and/or the modernization of Army fire-
power." Because of technical weaknesses in
the Nike Zeus, research and development be-
gan in 1963 on a new system, the Nike X.
Congressional interest remained minimal, a
technical question was asked now and then
during authorization or appropriation hear-
ings, but on the floor of the House or Sen-
ate no attention was given to the ultimate
and strategic implications for U.S. national
security policy.
Later in 1963, however, when the partial
test-ban treaty was before the Senate, in-
terest in ABM increased du., to opposition
to the treaty on grounds that it would pre-
clude perfection of an ABM. Once this op-
position was overcome and the treaty ratified,
Congress reverted in 1964 and 1965 to its
previous relative disinterest.
In 1966, as a result of a recommendation
by the Joint Chiefs that Nike X was ready
for production and deployment, the Senate
Armed Services Committee recommended an
additional $153.5 million for preproduction
of long leadtime items for the ABM and $14.4
million for additional developmental efforts.
The House Armed Services Committee, in
agreeing with the Senate, said in its report:
"Recent advances in technology and con-
cepts of deployment permit a blanket of pro-
tection for the whole United States against
a relatively small number Of attacking mis-
siles, and tighter protection against heavier
attacks for 25 major cities, at a five-year cost
of $8.5 to $10 billion. Because of its build-
ing block or modular design concept, the Nike
X system lends itself to the initial deploy-
ment of a light defense for a small number
of cities and a later addition of more exten-
sive and intensive coverage AS circumstances
capable of defending against not only inter-
continental ballistic missiles, but also mis-
iNti2)(15/13fctilAlitRocitcvoa1ao4
Ftgon000s0004-2 March 6', 196.2
until full deployment WRS reached covering
the entire country, Including prOtection of
Minuteman missile sites. On March 21, 1967
Senator Russell (D. Ga,), chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, presented
the Committee's views and added:
"It seems to me that the objective in de-
fense should be to prepare to save all that
you can, even if you are unable to save every-
thing and everyone. Fortunately, it is not
necessary to decide now what the ultimate
scope of the deployment need be, . . . The
Committee, of course, does not oppose nego-
tiations with the Soviet Union on an agree-
ment banning the deployment of compli-
cated, expensive, and extensive missile de-
fense systems. We believe, however, that
these negotiations should take into account
that a bilateral agreement would leave us
vulnerable to a passible nuclear attack from
Communist China, or even an accidental at-
tack. The Committee feels that full consid-
eration should be given to permitting -de-
ployment of at least the 'thin' ABM de-
fense...."
The Chairman's somewhat satirical re-
sponse to the arguments of Mr. McNamara--
that the Soviet Union would act to nullify
any ABM system installed by the United
States by improving its offensive systems.-.
was"in trying to support its conclusions that
It is expensively futile to build an ABM de-
fense against the Soviet Union, the Depart-
ment of Defense presented an involuted series
of assumption, hypotheses, and assumption
upon assumptions. In its latter stages, this ex-
ercise gets too esoteric -for me to follosv. If
one accepts every premise in this ssyllogism,
he will arrive at the conclusion the Depart-
ment desires. More seriously, the Depart-
ment's case is based more on ... the assump-
tion that the reaction of the Soviet Union to
our ABM deployment would be 'equal, op-
posite, feasible, and possible'."
The Committee did not appear to be pan-
icky about the need for haste to begin deploy-
ment (construction of a thin system would
require at /east four to five years) nor im-
pressed with arguments that the 'decision
should be postponed for an indefinite period.
Some members of Congress expressed greater
impatience. Senator Thurmond (It. S.C.), the
most vocal in favor of immediate deployment,
inserted into the Congressional Record sev-
eral articles and editorials supporting this
point of view and himself told the Senate:
"The most urgent task facing the 90th Con-
gress is to spur the Administration toward
immediate and decisive action in beginning
forthwith the preproduction engineering on
the Nike X system as authorized and funded
by Congress." Senator Fannin (R. Ariz.) ad-
dressed the Senate April 12 on "The ABM?
Let Us Begin." His case rested on the report
that the Soviets had begun deployment and
were increasing their offensive weapon
capability.
On the House side Representatives Ash-
brook (R. Ohio) , Evins (R. Tenn.) , Gross (R.
Iowa), Michel (R. Ill.), Rouslebush (R. Ind.),
Sikes (D. Fla.) , and Taylor (R. N.C.), publicly
indicated, through remarks in the House or
inserts in the Record, that they favored pro-
ceeding immediately with deployment. Rep-
resentative Berry (R. S.D.) porposed a radical
step in order to obtain a favorable decision
for deployment. On February 16, 1967, he
introduced a bill (H.R. 5586) "to provide that
no further appropriations for the purpose of
furnishing foreign aid shall be deemed to be
authorized by the Congress until an adequate
antimissile defense system for the U.S. has
been constructed." It is unlikely that the
House Foreign Affairs Committee seriously
considered such an extreme measure,
Is cost a factor? Although Secretary Mc-
Namara stated that cost was not a factor in
deferring a deployment decision, his em-
phasis on a $40 billion program led several
in Congress to evaluate the issue partly on
that basis. Senator Symington, not neces-
siles that might be launched from Polaris-
type submarines. Even a modest ballistic mis-
sile defense might save million of American
lives in the event of an enemy attack.
"The committee is not attempting to define
the ultimate type or scope of a ballistic mis-
sile defense deployment and It is not neces-
sary to make such a determination now. The
leadtime between a decision to proceed with
deployment and the attainment of an opera-
tional capability is so long, however, that the
committee considers the cost of buying a
saving of about one year in such a deploy-
ment as being reasonably priced insurance
When one considers the consequences of being
attacked without any protection."
The Senate and House accepted their
Armed Services Committees' recommenda-
tion with a modicum of debate -Represen-
tatives Bennett (D. Fla.), Sikes (D. Fla.),
and Younger (R. Calif.) were for deploy-
ment and Senators Clark (D. Pa.), Young (D.
Ohio) and Representative Cohelan (D.
Calif.) were opposed. The Secretary of De-
fense subsequently announced that we would
not spend the money at that time, on the
grounds that it would not add to U.S. se-
curity because the Soviet Union would act
to counter effectively any major deployment
effort and China would not have an intercon-
tinental ballistic missile capability before the
mid-1970s.
In late 1966, probably to justify accelerated
development and production of the ad-
vanced Poseidon missile-:-a substitute for
the Polaris missile?Secretary McNamara
announced that the Soviet Union had ac-
celerated its deployment of an ABM system
around Moscow. But the President and Sec-
retary McNamara, in presenting the defense
budget to Congress for fiscal 1968, continued
to hold the view that deployment of an
ABM system was not now desirable and that
any such decision should await the outcome
of proposed talks between the Soviet Union
and the United States on an agreement to
freeze ABM deployment on both sides. (The
Soviets requested, in February 1967, that
these talks be expanded to include strategic
offensive as well as defensive missiles.) The
major public Congressional reaction to the
McNamara announcement was a telegram
sent to the President by the Senate's Assist-
ant Minority Leader, Senator Kuchel (R.,
Calif.), a member of the Defense Subcom-
mittee of the Appropriations Committee, who
urged agreement to freeze ABM deployment
between the United States and the Soviet
Union as a means to forestall "a new and
ominous round in nuclear arms race" if both
sides deployed ABM systems. Not objecting
to this advice, the President nevertheless
requested $377 million for ABM of which $91
million was for contingent funding for the
initiation or procurement of an ABM system
if talks with the Soviets proved unsuccessful
Congress approved the Administration re-
quest.
SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST
In contrast to its posture on most defense
policy questions, Congress showed aroused
interest in whether and when the United
States should begin to produce and deploy
the Nike X system, which expressed itself
in the f 11 wi ?
What size system, when, and against whom.
The Joint Chiefs wanted deployment of an
extensive system around 25 cities, in addi-
tion to an area defense networks; but the
Secretary of Defense wanted to postpone
a decision about deploying any system. The
Senate Armed Services Committee took a
middle course and recommended considera-
tion, in the U.S. negotiations with the Soviet
Union, "of the desirability of our deploying
a 'thin' ABM defense against such threats
[as China, an accidental firing, or a form of
blackmail], or those that might be posed
by future nuclear powers." Such a system
could be expanded later, the Committee felt,
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Alciaret, 6, 1969 ApprWG?WOW -eikompipreoef3ARBOY000090004-2
sarily an opponent of "deploy now," re-
sponded to testimony by Secretary of the
Army Vance at hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Disarm-
ament by saying:
"You say $3.5 billion to defend against the
Chinese [referring to a 'thin' ABM system].
We had previous testimony on the Terrier,
Tabs, and Tartar. We used $3 billion alone
for those lost missiles. I do not know how
many billions were lost on Bomarc, but it was
plenty. I do not know how much was lost on
the Nike Ajax or Nike Hercules, or Atlas, but
it was plenty more. I would guess the overall
figure was $10 billion if it was a nickel. It
might be a good idea if you would at some
time get up a table for the record to show
what we have lost on missiles abandoned, as
one of the reasons for justifying not going
ahead with the ABM."
Senator Gore (D. Tenn.) , chairman of the
Disarmament Subcommittee, stressed that
cost was not a key consideration for him:
"This business of equating the possible kill-
ing of 80 million people, which is almost
half of our population, with a cost of $40
billion just would not appeal to me," he said.
"But if there are other and more compelling
reasons, then let us have them." Senator
Symington agreed with this view. Also dis-
counting cost an argument against deploy- .
ment was Senator Ervin (D. N.C.) who said:
"We scatter over the earth hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in foreign aid; certainly this
nation can afford to spend $40 billion for
such a program." Senator Young (D. Ohio),
opposed ABM deployment partially on cost.
It "would be a complete waste of taxpayers'
money," he asserted in the Senate, and ad-
vocated instead an overwhelming offensive as
the best defense.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union. Since
the Administration position was to postpone
a decision on deployment until determining
the outcome of negotiations with the Soviet
Union, some in Congress directed their at-
tention to the wisdom of this Presidential
decision and the likelihood of successful
negotiations. Senators Clark, Fulbright,
Javits, Proxmire, Symington, and Young sup-
ported the President on his decision and
Representatives Moss (D. Calif.) and Rosen-
thal (D. N.Y.) inserted editorials into the
RECORD urging negotiations with the Soviet
Union. This is probably the first time since
the Cold War began that so many in Congress
publicly urged the Administration to seek
negotiations with the Soviet Union on an
arms control measure. In the past Congress
has been skeptical or hostile and seldom so
willing to look to negotiations as an alter-
native to pursuing military strength.
Other Congressmen, however, expressed
concern that negotiations would drag on and
the Soviets might stall; meantime the United
States would be falling behind the Soviet
Union in proceeding with deployment. Some
tried to obtain a firm answer from Adminis-
tration spokesmen as' to what would be a
maximum time limit for negotiations. This
answer tended to be vague or classified, but
on one occasion a time limit of five or six
months was suggested. Senator Gore was one
who wanted a limit on negotiations. "This
time element," he claimed, "is something
about which I feel a sense of urgency that,
in all candor, I have not detected in the
President's statement." In a different tone,
Senator Sparkman (D. Ala.) offered the ad-
vice: "My impression has been that the mat-
ter was rather sensitive and that, perhaps,
it was felt that we would have a better
chance of making headway with the Russians-
if we went into it in a soft and quiet manner.
We ought to feel our way." Yet, Senator
Symington pursued the point: "I do think
here in Congress we ought to have some
idea as to how long we wait." The answer
from Secretary Vance: "I think it all de-
pends on how the discussions seem to pro-
ceed. If we are making progress then we
would be willing to wait longer than other-
wise. . . ."
The Senate Armed Services Committee
went on record as favoring negotiations but
added that funding for initial production
for deployment should be used "if an agree-
ment that fully protects the interest of the
United States cannot be consummated with-
in a reasonable period." Senator Javits de-
murred from such a view and told the Senate
that "even if the negotiations do not succeed,
I would wish to evaluate the strategic im-
plications involved in such an antiballistic
missile system at that -time." The New York
Senator also took exception to the proposal
in the Committee's report that negotiations
with the Seviet Union should explore the
desirability of deploying a thin system for
protection against any Chinese threat. He
said he felt this would not be "a proper ele-
ment of negotiations with the Soviet Un-
ion."
Few Senators evinced interest in the kind
of position being developed by the Executive
branch for presentation in negotiations with
the Soviet Union. Even after President John-
son announced on March 2 that he had ac-
cepted, at the Soviets' request, inclusion of
offensive as well as defensive missiles in
projected U.S.-USSR negotiations, Congress-
men did not inquire about the 13.5. nego-
tiating position. On one occasion during
Armed Services hearings, Senator Young (R.
ND.) asked Mr. McNamara whether an
agreement with the Soviets to freeze ABM
systems would require inspection. The an-
swer, oddly enough, was deleted as being
classified. Although the Secretary of Defense
suggested that an agreement with the So-
viets might be either formal or informal,
Congress did not pursue the meaning of in-
formal. Usually Senators in particular are
sensitive to any possibility of the Executive
branch circumventing use of the treaty pow-
er. In any event, without further inquiry
into the nature of the 'U.S. position, Congress
will not be knowledgeable enough to assess
cause if the negotiations fail.
Only Senator Gore seems to have advanced
a proposal for ABM agreement. He urged
the Secretary of State to suggest "to the
Soviets a willingness to discuss the feasi-
bility of an international agency, preferably
the U.N., deploying a thin ABM line. If you
will look at the world in terms of a sphere,
a thin line of defensive ABMs, running, say,
from Greenland to Kamchatka, would bisect
just about all fixed bases of missile trajec-
tories from the Soviet Union to the United
States. Has the administration given any
thought to utilizing an international agency
in this regard, to give some security, some
feeling of safety to both countries?" Sec-
retary Rusk promised to consider such a
proposal, although he noted that there were
problems of whb would pay the cost and
under what circumstances firing would take
place.
Impact on the economy. Of interest to
some in Congress is whether heavy defense
expenditures, such as those that would be
involved in an ABM production and deploy-
ment system, might have undesirable conse-
quences for the economy. Senator Aiken (R.
Vt.) expressed his apprehensions during the
Disarmament Subcommittee hearings:
, "I think we are overlooking one impor-
tant phase of this whole program. That is
the growing dependency of areas and States
on Government orders until they get to where
they are almost helpless. For example, for
the State of Washington over 50 per cent of
their gross national product is from Govern-
ment. California and Connecticut are also
highly dependent, and this will certainly
increase. It might be a mutual dependency
on the part of the Government and the
States on how the work is being done, but I
am wondering how far we want to go before
E 1715
we divert them back to something of a dif-
ferent nature. For instance, I believe the
Connecticut Brass Works are now offering 33
per cent of their facilities in the production
of shell casings. How far can they go in that
direction, and then say, 'We have to keep on
with this, we have got to look for uses for
this product we make because we cannot-
afford to stop business or readjust any.
thing.'"
On the same theme Senator Clark intro-
duced into the Record an article, "Thirty
Billion Dollars For Whom??Politics, Profits,
and the Antimissile Missile." The article by
Frederic Collins in The New Republic listed
some 20 companies as being important con-
tractors in ABM development and produc-
tion, and suggested that because the various
plants of these companies permeate most of
the states and a majority of Congression dis-
tricts, pressures may mount on Congress to
seek a positive decision on deployment.
Although he did not label it blackmail, or
any other opprobrious term, Senator Russell
referred to a speech by Dr. Harold Agnew,
head of the Scientific Laboratory Weapons
Division of the AEC Los Alamos Laboratory,
where Agnew said that "companies working
on the Nike X were now ready for the next
step but might disband their technical teams
and convert their facilities to other uses if
the system is kept in suspension another
year."
Effectiveness of the system. Administra-
tion spokesmen claim that the present effec-
tiveness of the Nike X in shooting down in-
coming missiles from Soviet territory would
reduce American fatalities by 90 million in an
, all-out nuclear exchange. McNamara would
deploy the system were it not for his con-
viction that the Soviets would act to counter
it and thus render it completely ineffective.
Not all Congressmen, however, have been
persuaded that the present system is ready
for deployment. When the Defense Depart-
ment's authorization bill for fiscal 1968 was
being discussed in the Senate, Senator Smith
(R. Me.) said:
"It was with considerable reluctance that
I joined in the committee's approval of the
authorization with respect to the deployment
of an antiballistic missile defense system. I
can give no assurance that I will do so again
next year. I am becoming more and more in-
clined to believe that the Secretary of De-
fense is right?but for the wrong reason?
on this issue. I am not convinced that the
state of the art on an anti-ballistic. missile
defense system has , reached a relatively
static status.... I am not convinced that the
ground placements of what may appear to be
Russia's anti-ballistic missile defense system
are what they seem but that rather they
may be decoys of classic deception designed
to motivate us to a very costly defense system
that may be obsolete or become obsolete in
the near future."
In a different way Representative Dorn
(D. S.C.) also objected to the system. Spcak-
ing on the theme, "$40 Billion Folly," and the
fact that the Joint Chiefs' proposal would
protect only 25 to 50 cities, he said: "What
then would happen to my constituents and
the millions of other patriotic Americans
in the thousands of cities and rural areas
throughout our country?" His answer?build
a strong offense everywhere including
space and under the sea. Representative
Fraser (D. Minn.), in inserting an article by
James Burnham against deploying ABM
and instead relying on offensive deterrent
power, was perhaps also indicating sympa-
thetic interest in this viewpoint.
Senator Clark questioned the whole con-
cept of relying so totally on either offensive
or defensive power. He exclaimed during a
Disarmament Subcommittee hearing:
"From where I sit there is a basic blind
spot in this whole discussion, not only phil-
osophically but logically. You gentlemen are,
of necessity, engaged in utilizing your mag-
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
E 1716 APProvestraNBANsioNgloftWo?15--RWLIAR164)1PRUM90004-karch 8?,/96.9-
nificent talents to attempt to defend the
United States as best you can against an
armed attack of any enemy nuclear forte.
You must, therefore, make the basic assump-
tion that there is and always will be an
enemy. But as politicians , we must de-
vote our best interests toward developing in-
ternational cooperation as opposed to Inter-
national conflict. Accordingly, when you tell
us what can and cannot be done with an an-
tiballistic missile system, you are, in effect,
merely giving us advice as to what we should
do in our efforts to persuade the Soviet Union
and China to substitute cooperation for con-
flict. Our task, therefore, is to try to bring
peace to the world not through deterrente,
but through disarmament. Your advice in
that regard is essential to us, so that We
should not take an undue risk."
Civilian versus military. Perhaps one of the
principal reasons why debate on the ABM
during 1967 blossomed into full controversy
is that expert opinion in the Executive
branch is divided. It would not be likely that
so many members of Congress would take
such an active part in diseussions if the re-
spective sides could not point to experts in
the Administration to support their points
of view. Most Congressmen consider them-
selves laymen, especially on military and
foreign policy questions, and in the absence
of expert advice tend to defer to those who
appear to have superior knowledge. With the
civilian chiefs, Defense Secret try McNamara
and Army Secretary Vance, on one side, and
the military Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
other, members of Congress could be com-
fortable and confident taking either position
publicly.
Senator Symington, however, expressed ap-
prehension about the possible effect of the
civilian-military division on the military. Be
felt there was too much anti-military feeling
being voiced in his state. "Doesn't it worry
you," he asked of the Defense Secretary, "to
make a civilian decision of this character
[not to deploy an ABM] against the unani-
mous opinion of the Joint Chiefs; and sec-
ond, don't you think, when you do that .
that it somewhat denigrates the position of
the military before the American people?"
The Secretary thought not.
Soviet intentions. Discussions of why the
Soviet Union had undertaken to deploy an
ABM system seemed to reveal an important
shift in attitudes toward the Soviet Union
on the part of some members of Congress.
As witness after witness in the Executive
branch explained Soviet behavior in de-
ploying an ABM on the ground that histor-
ically the Soviet Union is primarily defenee
minded, legislators appeared Dot to question
the conclusions held officially, though only
a few years back, the government's view was
that the Soviet Union was an offensive, ag-
gressive power. Senator Lausche (D. Ohio)
finally asked why the Soviets did not follow
our example: "Why haven't they gone for-
ward with the development of an offensive
system? Why have they gone forward with
this defensive system? If it is good for them
why isn:t it good for us?" The answer from
an Executive branch expert: "I can only
repeat because I have it from history and I
heard other people saying it. is that the
Russians are defensive-minded and, for a
country which has been throughout their
history defensive-minded, an ABM would
appeal to them." And Senator Case (R. N.J.),
after listening to Executive branch witnesses
discuss the fallout problem in an offensive-
defensive missile exchange, commented:
"This is leading toward the argument that
the present antiballistic missile systein
would be more valuable for us [deleted]
than to have our present and projected larger
numbers [meaning large numbers of offensive
missiles]."
These are the questions? comments, and
views of those in Congress who are begin-
ning to concern themselves with a majOr
issue in defense and foreign policy. They
are pondering many of the consequences of a
decision to deploy or not to deploy. There
is no panic and little oratory. They do not
pretend to have pat solutions to the problem
and clearly most would like to be con-
fronted with a case of successful diplomacy
to avoid a commitment to deploy. But they
have not yet looked closely enough to learn
in what manner the Executive branch is
pursuing the course of negotiation.
[From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientsts,
March 19671
SUPERIORITY AND INNOVATION IN U.S.
DEFENSE FORCES
(By Betty Goetz Lall)
Anyone who follows the H.S. defense pro-
gram is aware of the constant change taking
place as weapons conceived of yesterday, de-
veloped today, and produced tomorrow will
be labeled, by military planners, as obsolete
day after tomorrow. Those who are deeply
engrossed in the process of weapons build-
ing?in the Pentagon, defense companies,
and the committees of Congress that oversee
the Defense Department?are necessarily pre-
occupied with the goal of achieving the most
modern and advanced military force for the
U.S., within a politically acceptable cost
range. Most citizens shrink from any effort
to evaluate what should be the proper di-
mensions of the defense budget and the
principal factors determining the size and
quality of the 'U.S. military force. And yet
a growing question is: should not at least
some citizens be capable of and interested
in making competent judgments on how
much of the nation's resources should be
devoted to military activities? Is the matter
of defense policy so different from other
public issues that the ettizen should be
absolved of responsibility to inform himself
and enter into discUssions on the nature of
the defense establishment?
In the current fiscal year, U.S. offensive
and defensive strategic nuclear forces and
civil defense measures constitutes slightly
over 11 per cent of the total budget request.
This total includes funds for Vietnam except
for the supplemental requested by the Presi-
dent in December 1966. In fiscal 1061, the
last year before the build-up in Vietnam, the
strategic nuclear war forces amounted to
about 18 per cent of total defense expendi-
tures, $93 billion out of $51.7 billion. Of
total funds for offensive and defensive forces,
the offensive has since been absorbing about
80 per cent, an indication that the United
States believes that Offensive strength is bet-
ter protection from attack than defensive
strength.
The U.S. strategic offensive force began ex-
panding substantially in the first year of the
Kennedy administration. Although the Dem-
ocrats in 1960 had charged that there was a
deficiency in the number of 'U.S. intercon-
tinental missiles compared to those held by
the Soveit Union, this was found not to be
the case once the Democrats took control and
examined the evidence more closely. The
United States possessed over 100 ICBM's com-
pared to an estimated 25 for the Soviet
Union. U.S. long-range bomber forces also
exceeded by a considerable number those of
the Soviets. The United States nevertheless,
proceeded to build missiles at a fast pace
until the ratio of U.S. to USSR ICBMs by
1964 was over six to one-1,250 to 200 (see
the accompanying chart).
U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967-68
UNITED STATES
B-52 (long-range bomber) ? 630
B-58 (long-range bomber) 90
FB-111A (long-range fighter-bomber)
Atlas (ICBM-66 in soft sites) 90
Titan I (ICBM) 36
Titan II (ICBM)
Minuteman I (ICBM)._ 150
Minuteman II (ICBM)
Minuteman III (ICBM)
Polaris A-1 (sea-based missile) 80
Polaris A-2
Polaris A-3
630 630 630 600 600
90 90 80 80 80
210
126
"
108 N 2
54 54 54 54
180 600 800 800 (r)
50 1,054
80 80
80 208
128
SOVIET UNION
Bison (long-range bomber) 120
Blinder (long-range bomber)
ICBM's 75
120
(4) 100
80 (a)
208 208 208
208 448 448
120 120 120
300
200 270 300
- (a)
360
13-0 soft.
2 Phased out.
o Phasing out.
4 Coming into force.
6300 plus.
Sources: The Military Balance, published annually by the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, and statements of the U.S. Gene..
tory of Defense.
HOW MUCH SUPERIORITY?
Why is this level of superiority thought
to be necessary? The Secretary of Defense
has stated that the U.S. strategic forces "are
far more than adequate to inflict unaccept-
able damage on the Soviet Union even after
absorbing a well-coordinated Soviet first
strike against those forces." He has further
said: "It appears that even a relatively small
portion of these forces would furnish us with
a completely adequate deterrent to a delib-
erate Soviet nuclear attack on the United
States or its allies. . . . The effective delivery
of even one-fifth of the surviving weapons
on Soviet cities would destroy about one-
third of the total population and half of the
industrial capacity of the Soviet Union." (See
1966 Presentation of the Defense Budget
to the Congress.) The main reason advanced
thus far by military specialists is that it is
best to figure very conservatively when it
comes to national security; therefore, even
if only 300 missiles are necessary to assure
the mission of the force, it is best to be
cautious and procure five to six times that
number.
Perhaps this answer should suffice for the
citizen. He wants to feel his security is pro-
tected. But there are at least three other
questions that emerge. The first is whether
the country and its tax-paying citizens are
so well off that buying five times more 'se-
curity than is needed is an acceptable na-
tional policy. Can this money be better used?
Do we not face an unmet domestic threat of
equally serious proportions?the deteriora-
tion of our cities, the cancer of spreading
poverty, the stow rate of progress in achieving
full equality and employment for all citizens,
and the failure to raise appropriately the
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
gdrch, 6, 1969 APCOVISUPSSRANAle 13/331W9R17-: tift01145M1 ealialektb300090004-2
E1717
quality of educational and other social serv- another plane is alsci desirable and they are proceeding as a replacement for Polaris A-2
ices? Do we not face a foreign non-military pressing for full development and procure- and A-3. (In the fiscal 1967 budget $300 mil-
threat, potentially as great as the military, ment of the AMSA (advanced strategic air- lion was allocated for the Poseidon.) Also,
in the growing income gap between the so- craft) . Several members of Congress, espe- early developmental work is going forward
called developed and developing nations? daily in the various armed services commit- on an advanced or Improved Interconti-
A second question is how the Soviet Union tees, also believe the AMSA should be de- nental Missile as a possible replacement for
? not et convinced Secretary Minuteman II and III.
reacts to a U.S. strategic offensive m p
that is over four times superior to its own.
The Soviet Union decisions regarding the
adequacy of its strategic force, while influ-
enced by the parallel 'U.S. policies, apparently
do not aim at achieving full quantitative
or qualitative parity with the U.S. Its ICBM
force has evidently more than trebled in the
past four years. Qualitative improvements
appear to be primarily in some hardening
and increased mobility and in decreasing re-
action time for missile firing. The Soviets
have installed many second generation mis-
siles as opposed to the third and fourth gen-
eration missiles being developed and pro-
cured by the United States.
A third question relates to how the United
States can expect to achieve another na-
tional goal, presumably as important as mili-
tary strength?that of stopping the arms
race and mutual reduction of military
strength?if we insist that this level of su-
periority be maintained throughout the dis-
armament process. Which situation buys the
greatest security: a balanced reduction in
the strategic strength of both sides, or an
attempt to maintain current superiority and
increase the size of the force whenever the
Soviet Union attempts to reduce the gap? A
balanced reduction of strategic forces implies
a willingness to relinquish at least some of
the superiority that hat been achieved. To
suggest such a relinquishment draws sharp
criticism from most military officials. While
there is no stated doctrine that a particular
superiority ratio is essential to U.S. security,
suggesting that the United States would be pel the Soviets to maintain their present live review of executive agendes s o
neither has there been a policy statement
prepared under certain conditions to abandon antibomber defenses." most important functions of congressional
its present position of superiority. Yet, it is In the absence of any bomber agreements committees. Yet, committees most involved
difficult to comprehend how the United with the Soviet Union, matters for U.S. de- in military affairs tend to become friendly
States could realize its disarmament objec- fense policy consideration should include the spokesmen for the armed services. The
tives without such a willingness, criteria by which the United States should Chairman of the House Armed Services Com-
decide to retain through 1975 B-52 models mittee reminded Air Force witnesses before
RATE OF INNOVATION 0 and H by further modernization, at a cost his committee: "If you don't have any friends
The quantitative ratio of superiority we of $1.3 billion through 1972 and another $600 on this committee you don't have any friends.
have been discussing must be joined to the million through 1975; to initiate further pro- We are your voice in Congress. We are the
rate of qualitative change in 17.S. strategic curement of the FB-111; or to institute a $4 only official voice, there aren't any others."
forces. How much should be expended each or $5 billion program to build the AMSA. Committees with foreign policy functions
year on such change and what criteria should Similar questions can be raised about rates in general do not review defense policies and
be used to determine how much qualitative of innovation in the U.S. strategic nuclear their implications for foreign policies includ-
missile force. The first strategic ballistic mis- iiig disarmament. Nor do committees charged
ta. with the overall economic health of the na-
ve p
McNamara that such a plane is needed. One TO BE CONTINUED?
of the Secretary's argument is that there is
The story of the rate of innovation in the
no agreed purpose for such an aircraft. An-
strategic force is not unlike the story of
other is that since the Soviet Union has not
innovation in other weapons for tactical war-
given evidence it is building a new long-range
fare or for bomber or missile defense. In the
bomber, the United States should not proceed
absence of knowledgeable public opinion to
in such an endeavor. Some congressmen are
balance discussions on defense policy it is
not impressed with this argument and plead
almost inevitable that the momentum of
instead that it is simply time to have a new
defense innovation will continue. As the
plane. Vice-Commander of the Air Force Systems
An alternative to pursuing innovations in Command reported to an advanced planning
weapons at a rather rapid rate, one seldom session for defense industry officials: "The
discussed by those responsible for military task of the Air Force Systems Command is to
policy in Congress, is a simultaneous phasing provide qualitatively superior systems for the
out by the United States and the Soviet Air Force. In order to perform this mission,
Union of a given type of weapon. A few years we must advance aerospace technology as
th 'United States did offer to dismantle a idl as is practical and adapt it on a timely
its B-47s if the Soviet Union would also dis-
mantle its Badgers, the comparable Soviet
medium-range bomber. The Soviets coun-
tered that since the B-47s were being dis-
mantled anyway both countries should dis-
mantle all bembers. The United States never
agreed to this proposal, one likely reason
being that since it had such a ratio of su-
periority over the Soviets in long-range
bombers, 600 to 300-400, this was not a good
trade. Another possible reason for retain-
ing a U.S. force of long-range bombers, de-
spite what the Soviets do, is that this re-
quires the Soviet Union to spend money on
bomber defenses; without such expenditures are consultants to the Defense Department
the Soviet Union could divert funds to other and are reluctant to share with the public
purposes, military or civilian. As Secretary criticisms or alternative suggestions they may
McNamara said: ". . . a force of 255 opera- have. Ordinarily, a natural place for citizen
' 1 B-15 0-Hs would be sufficient to com- evaluation is in the Congress where legisla i of the
-
basis to the needs of our aerospace systems.
Although the Systems Command is expected
to relate its work to the military threat posed
to the United States, the momentum of the
activity in its own right is sufficiently strong
that the nature of the threat appears to
become less and less a factor in the analysis
and in subsequent decisions about building
new systems.
Few citizen groups concern themselves with
Department of Defense assertions about the
level of superiority or the rate of innovation
in military weapons procurement. Many of
those private citizens who are knowledgeable
change is necessary?
The American people seem to accept each
year, almost as a tradition, the need to mod-
ify every model of automobile, kitchen appli-
ance, and women's clothing produced. To
what extent has this cultural phenomenon
been transferred to the defense program? In
the early 1950s the United States built a large
force of B-47 medium jet bombers which
could attack the Soviet Union from overseas
bases. In 1960 the Defense Department began
phasing out these planes; they were to be re-
placed by a large force of over 600 B-52s and
a smaller force of 90 B-58 intercontinental
bombers. The B-52s were constantly being
modernized so that by 1963 the number of
models ranged from A through H and several
hundred million dollars had been spent. By
1967 models A and B had been phased out
and the Air Force was in the process of phas-
ing some of the planes of models C to F,
leaving a bomber force of 255 B-52 models 0
cl H 345 models C to F, and 80 B-58s. In
the late 1950s-the Defense Department began
developing a prototype for a new bomber, the A-2; in 1967 the
B-70, and spent $1.7 billion on development replacing Minuteman I and Polaris A-1. late concern.
before military decisionmakers decided that Additionally, about 448 Polaris A-3 and 1,054
it was not the plane they wanted as a replace- Minuteman III missiles will be installed as
ment for the B-52. Development then began replacements for many of the Minuteman I
on a combination fighter-bomber, the FE- and II and the Polaris A-2 missiles. The new
111A, and in 1966 the Secretary of Defense models generally have longer range, in-
agreed to recoMmend an initial procurement creased payload, and better accuracy than
of 210 of these airplanes to be fully opera- their predecessors. In December 1966, Secre-
tional by 1968 at an investment cost of $1.9 tary McNamara announced that accelerated
billion. But many in the Air Force believe development on the Poseidon missile was
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RoP71B00364R000300090004-2
sites were the Thors and Jupiters, su
short range so that they had to be stationed tion and the desirable allocation of resources
in Turkey, Italy, and England, and were vul- and division of government expenditures
nerable to Soviet attack. They were replaced challenge the absolute priority of defense
as soon as the United States had a fair-sized over other needs. An exception IS the work
ICBM missile force stationed on its tern- of Congressman Reuss' subcommittee hear.
tory: 90 Atlas missiles and 36 Titan missiles. ings on the decisionmaking process in federal
Since the Atlas missiles were also vulnerable research and development programs.
they too were replaced by a hardened force One possible conclusion is that unless more
of 108 Titans. The Titan I was fully produced citizens and citizen groups interest them-
and operational in 1963 but the next year selves in defense policy questions there will
saw the replacement of half the Titan I force be no effective challenge to the Defense De-
by Titan II, which had an increased pay- partment's budgetary requests and policy
'load. Today the remaining 54 Titan I missiles directives except from those groups with
have been phased out. Almost simulta- more narrow military interests which are
neously with the Titan the Defense Depart- usually after more, not less, defense outlay.
ment began deployment of Minuteman I, a If greater public discussion can take place
solid fuel missile with better hardening this surely will inspire Congress to carry out
qualities than the Titan, and the sea-based its supervisory functions more completely
missile, Polaris A-1. A force of 180 Minute- and comprehensively. And it will help pre-
man I and 80 Polaris A-1 missiles was opera- vent political parties and politicians from
tional by 1962. As they were being installed becoming demagogic about defense policies,
work proceeded on Minuteman II and Polaris which they are likely to do in the absence of
dels will be sufficient public enlightenment and articu-
[From the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
April 1967]
GAPS IN THE ABM DEBATE
(By Betty Goetz Lall)
There is one distressing aspect of the cur-
rent discussions ofl whether the United
States should now deploy an antiballistic
E1718 Approved FgAireASSMitriiia/alE431114.111DPEWAQUARg9ORP9fai9?4-2 March 6, 1961
when he said in answer to a question abo
missile system at a cost ranging from 44 to
S40 billion. The President, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, and other
government officials imply that if they can-
not persuade the Soviet 'Union to enter into
an agreement against-43M deployment the
United Stated may then feel compelled re-
luctantly to go into fulleproduction and de-
ployment of such a system either as an at-
tempt to protect some of the people living
in American cities or as protection against
our own land-based intercontinental ballistic
missiles. The President, in his State of the
Union message, in reference to his assertion
that the Soviet Union "has begun to place
near Moscow a limited antimissile defense,"
stated that "any additional race would im-
pose on our peoples, and on all mankind for
that matter, an additional waste of resources
with no gain in security to either side. And
I expect in the days ahead to closely con-
sult and seek the advise of the Congress
about the possibilities of international agree-
ments bearing directly upon this problem."
The main clues as to What kind of agree-
ments are being sought are contained in
statements by the Secretary of State at a
news conference on December 21, 1966 and
the Secretary of Defense in his annual
budget presentation to the Congress on
January 2, 1967. Mr. Rusk referred to the
earlier proposal of the United States that the
two major nuclear powers freeze their pro-
duction of offensive and defensive strategic
nuclear delivery systems. Ur. McNamara said
that the Executive branch proposes: "To in-
itiate negotiations with the Soviet Union de-
signed, through formal or informal agree-
ment, -to limit the deployment of antiballistic
missile systems" and "To reconsider the de-
ployment decision in the event these discus-
sions prove unsuccessful."
What is missing in this discussion is the
important point that in all previous arms
control discussions on ABM with the Soviet
Union the Soviets have indicated that the
way to make negotiable a proposal on re-
strictions against ABM deployment is to in-
clude reductions in offensive systems as well.
If Mr. McNamara and other officials of the
Administration lead people to think that the
only issue up for negotiation is antiballistic
missile deployment then when the negotia-
tions fail, as they are almost certainly likely
to do if they do not include limitations on
offensive strategic weapons, there will be the
inevitable pressure in the United States to
proceed with full productinn and deployment
of our own Nike-X antimissile system.
It is difficult to know whether Administra-
tion officials have convineed themselves that
e strongly held Soviet view that offensive
missiles must be part or, any ABM agree-
ment--has changed; or, that they know it
has not changed but still cs.nnot bring them-
selves to propose an agreement which in-
cludes reduction of part of the Soviet and
"U.S. land-based or sea-based intercontinental
ballistic missiles. With respect to the first
possibility there is little evidence in the pub-
lic domain that the Soviet Union has changed
its attitude. Soviet official t? both private
and official conferences have fiercely sup-
ported the concept that building defensive
systems is not as provocative as offensive sys-
tems. Soviet scientists privately have ac-
knowledged that ABM systems are not effec-
tive in shooting down incoming rockets,
particularly if they have multiple warheads,
but such scientists have also indicated they
have failed to convince their generals and
members of the Politburo at the undesirabil-
ity of installing an ABM system?such a view
has been well known to U.S. experts in the
arms control field for at lea* four years. The
need for defense of the "Motherland" can
arouse as much emotion in Many a Russian
as the need for anticommunist measures can
arouse in many Americans. When Soviet Pre-
mier Aleksei Kosygin was in London in Feb-
ruary he seemed to reconfiren the Soviet view
ut issue. One of the most vocal was the Repub-
p lican Whip in the Senate, Senator Kuchel,
- who called upon the President last December
d to initiate discussions with the Soviet Union
m "to seek common cause to reverse the trend
in in weaponry which Soviet actions [to deploy
tor an ABM system] may have started." The
- Secretary of Defense's view is: "The Soviets
halt? it within their technical and economic
e capacity to offset any further Damage
ing measures we might undertake, pro-
vided they are determined to maintain their
deterrent against us. It is the virtual cer-
tainty that the Soviets will act to maintain
their deterrent which casts such grave
doubts on the advisability of our deploying
the Nike X system for the protection of our
cities against the kind of heavy, sophisti-
cated missile attack they could launch in
the 19705. In all probability, all we could
accomplish would be to increase greatly both
their defense expenditures and ours without
any gain in real security to either side. . I
believe that, once started, an ABM system
deployed with the objective of protecting the
United States against the Soviet Union
would require an expenditure on the order of
$40 billion over a ten year period."
The probabilities for a satisfactory out-
come to the ABM debate are not great, And
the Soviet 'Union may just want the United
States to invest the kind of money in ABM
systems Mr. McNamara is talking about.
Since Soviet Leaders regard defensive sys-
tems as non-provocative and since they
would prefer to see the United States utilize
its resources in such an endeavor, rather
than to other endeavors which could be more
damaging to Soviet interests, the Soviet lead-
ers have every reason to encourage the
United States to decide to produce and em-
ploy an ABM system. This may explain why
the Soviet General Pavel A, Kuroclecin
claimed, as he did on February 20, that "de-
tecting missiles in time and destroying them
in flight is no problem." Such a statement
strengthens the argument that the United
States may be falling behind in ABM tech-
nology and, therefore, should proceed with
ABM deployment And it is this view that
is likely to prevail rather than the view
that the best interests of the United States
would be served by pouring our best diplo-
matic strength in an effort to negotiate an
agreement with the Soviet Union to limit
both offensive and defensive strategic weap-
ons systems.
ABM: "What would you say is mere of a ate
toward tension in the military field, an often
sive weapon or a defensive weapon?" An
his answer to his own question: "The syste
that warns of an attack is not a factor
the arms race. On the contrary, it is a fac
that reduces the possibility of the destruc
tion of people."
If the United States realizes there is littl
probability that the Soviet Union
interested in an agreement limited to ABM
systems alone what is the explanation for the
absence in the Executive branch of proposals
for reductions of ICBMs as part of an agree-
ment? The most apparent explanation is that
the United States is simply not interested in
reducing its own offensive strength. A U.S.
proposal to reduce a specific number of its
ICBMs in return for a similar reduction of
some of the Soviet ICBMs would substan-
tially increase prospects for agreement not to
deploy further ABM systems on both sides.
Along with such reductions it would be de-
sirable to freeze for several years the produc-
tion of new ICBM systems by the two coun-
tries. The United States proposed a produc-
tion freeze in 1964 but has yet to suggest an
agreement that would also include reduc-
tions in strategic offensive missiles. One can
almost predict that if the United States did
propose some scheme for reductions in offen-
8hre strength our policymakers would tie on
to the reductions an elaborate inspection
system that would almost certainly be un-
acceptable to the Soviet Union and whrch
would perhaps in some degree go beyond the
needs of the case. Given the knowledge we
now have about Soviet weapons develop-
ments in the strategic field would it not be
possible to check on reductions of missiles
by an inspection team witnessing their dis-
mantlement or destruction, an inspection
measure the Soviets in the past have stated
they would be willing to accept? Whether
further inspection of production facilities
would be necessary is a matter to be scruti-
nized carefully before decisions are taken to
elaborateseek inspection of them.
The probable reason why the most likely
course for the United States to follow is not
to seek agreement to limit offensive systems
is that the domestic pressures are almost
totally one-sided. Within the Executive
branch the Air Force and Navy argue
strongly for a continuation of development
of offensive systems because this is their mis-
sion. General John P. McConnell, Air Force
Chief of Staff, said November 11, 1966, that
"In the final analysis, this problem [whether
an effective antimissile system by a potential
enemy could lead to nuclear war] boils down
to the question as to which nation stays
ahead in the technological race for superior
aero-space power. . . . I am confident that
we can keep our deterrent strong enough by
maintaining a safe margin of strategic su-
periority." And General Bernard A. Schriever,
retired Air Force missile expert, said last No-
vember 27 that the United States should
concentrate on developing better missiles
rather than an antimissile defense system
because there was "a grave question with re-
spect to the effectiveness" of an antiballistic
system against Soviet missiles. The Army
which has the responsibility for an antibal-
listic missile defense takes a different view
and is in favor of deploying an ABM system.
This is the only important field for Army
strategic missile activity and the Arm
nat-
urally wants to preserve Ude mission. Chief
of Staff of the U.S. Army, General laarold K.
Johnson, told Congress last year: "I recom-
mended that the funds be granted in the
1967 budget for preproduction, toestoblish a
production base for the deployment_ of Nike
X with an initial operational date of
[deleted]."
Comparable pressures, other than the
Secretary of Defense himself, do not seem to
have come to light on the ether side of the
COMMUNAL LIVING
HON. JOHN R. RARICK
OF LOUISIANA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Thursday, March 6, 1969
Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, without
financial assistance from without, every
communal living attempt has failed.
Such has been the proven experience
of man. Question it, deny it, but the truth
haunts those who would hide it.
Socialistic living experiments were
conducted in 1825-27 at New Harmony,
Ind., and in 1841-46 at Brook Farm,
West Roxbury, Mass.?both failed.
Man has not changed except for tax
subsidies and tax-free grants. Some
must work if there is to be production,
and those who toil, tire of sustaining
those who refuse to produce.
Despite the planned contrivances of
the parasitical classes of society to con-
tinue to undermine the initiatives of
work, thrift, and morality, without these,
all is threatened to fail.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Mroved Forderift
V.sORWAT7lieesP71A9FMR000300090004-2 111263
'Febrvary 26,
rangements under which a great deal of use-
ful international business has been con-
ducted. We can draw at least a minimal les-
son from that experience: we are not
strangers any longer, and it is not ordained
that we must again become enemies.
Rpbert McNamara, who has been as close
to these matters as any man alive, ended his
long tour in the Defense Department con-
vinced that the most dangerous thing in the
world is a state of mind?the belief among
powerful men on both sides, in the face of
all the horrendous evidence to the contrary,
that somehow the scientists will yet find a
way to employ nuclear weapons so that mili-
tary men may again win a war. This is the
real issue in the ABM controversy; when na-
tions begin to accept the thesis that they
may be able to devise adequate protection
against nuclear attack they also raise the pos-
sibility that they may yet be able to use de-
cisively offensive missile force; and on the
basis of a mixture of unfounded hopes and
challenged assumptions they may turn away
from serious negotiation and the effort to find
a way to base international relations on
liberating reason rather than paralyzing fear.
I say the time has come when we should
take some risks in the name of peace, rather
than continue the great nuclear gamble in
the name of security. In this light ABM
might yet provide a great service in advanc-
ing the strategic arms negotiations, if, hav-
ing taken the system to this stage of devel-
opment, we set it aside as a symbol of our
determination to halt the arms race where
it is, and turn it back if we can. Let us cou-
ple this with passage of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty now pending in the Sen-
ate, and go back to the negotiating table
with the Russians. The application of as
much energy, imagination, and determina-
tion in an honest effort to find a formula
for arms control as we have invested in the
effort to ring our cities with ABM will, I
am confident, bring far greater rewards with
less risk.
Many wise and experienced men in Wash-
ington who agree that this is what we should
do insist that it cannot be done?that it is
a political impossibility to reverse the poli-
cies that have produced, and are now shaped
by, the military-industrial complex. It will
be difficult, yes, but it is not impossible. For
we cannot forget that our only chance of ob-
taining the huge volume of funds and talent
required to rebuild American society at
home lies in placing some limitation on the
arms spiral. If we fail to do this, urgent do-
mestic needs will go unmet. What is needed
now is a great expansion of the dialogue set
forth in this paper: let us get the issues out
In the open, and get them clear. The funda-
mentals of the missile controversy are not
beyond the comprehension of the American
people, and certainly no decision of the mag-
nitude of ABM should be taken on their be-
half without greater evidence of their in-
formed consent than can be said to exist
presently.
GENERAL LEAVE
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 days in which to extend their
remarks on the topic of this discussion.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentle-
man from California?
There was no objection.
GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that all Members
may revise and extend their remarks in
connection with the colloquy on the spe-
cial orders this afternoon.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentle-
man from Illinois?
There was no objection.
PROPOSED ABM SYSTEM
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
STRATTON) . Under a previous order of
the House, the gentleman from Wiscon-
sin (Mr. REuss) is recognized for 60 min-
utes.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, before recog-
nizing the gentleman from Connecticut
(Mr. GiArmo) , and the gentlewoman
from Hawaii (Mrs. MINE), and some
others who have been on their feet, I do
want to say to the gentleman from In-
diana (Mr. DENNIS) that I welcome his
transforming this monologue into a de-
bate, and during my time I shall attempt
to provide some additional answers to
the very legitimate question the gentle-
man raised.
I will now yield to the gentleman from
Connecticut (Mr. GrAnuo) .
Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman from Wisconsin for yield-
ing.
I would state that I rose for the pur-
pose of trying to address an answer to
the legitimate question of the gentleman
from Indiana who stated that he was
concerned that at some future date
there may be an attack by the Chinese,
and that we do not have an ABM system
to defend us against such an attack. He
properly asks, how would we feel then
had we taken this position today?
I believe the answer to the question is
that if we had an antiballistic missile
which was effective, if we were convinced
that it would provide an adequate de-
fense against an attacking Chinese mis-
sile, we know it will not provide a de-
fense against a Russian missile?if we
knew all that, then there would be all
reason and justification for deploying
this system today.
But the evidence seems to be clear
that we will be living under a false se-
curity if we deploy an ABM system which
will not be effective.
To date the evidence before this Con-
gress consistently has indicated on the
part of the military that the ABM mis-
sile would not be effective against an
attack because, although they say that
a thin system might be effective in what
they would call a small attack, they
clearly indicate that it would not be ef-
fective against a missive attack by the
Soviet Union.
But although they state it might be
effective against a small attack by the
Chinese, we must presume and assume
that if we deploy an ABM system, the
Chinese, who have not as yet deployed
an ICBM system, would develop a so-
phisticated attack system which would
be able to overcome the defense of an
ABM system.
What would that be? It might well
be an attack by submarine, in which
case an ABM system defense is clearly
not effective. It might be an attack with
deceptive devices which would negate the
effectiveness of such a defense. It might
be an attack by airplane, it might be
an attack by a bomb literally carried
into this country on board some surface
ship against which an ABM system would
not be effective.
It might even be an attack such as was
mentioned by the gentleman from Wash-
ington (Mr. ADAMS) which would be
preceded by a preliminary weapon which
would destroy our radar capability,
therefore, allowing the second and deadly
weapon to come in.
The fact of the matter is that the es-
sence of this debate both in this body and
in the other body has been that we are
being asked to deploy a system which
has not demonstrated its capability of
defense. Before we do that, before we
get involved into an expenditure which
can run into billions of dollars, and come
up with an ineffective system, we should
pause and we should hesitate.
There has been ample warning from
all sides that we should do this to deter-
mine just what we are doing and where
we are going before we foolishly rely on
an inadequate defensive system.
Mr. REUSS. The gentleman from
Connecticut, I think, has made a very
sincere attempt to provide an answer
to the question raised by the gentleman
from Indiana.
Just to summarize what the gentleman
from Connecticut has said in his answer
to the question put?What will happen
3 years from now if the Chinese lob a
thermonuclear device over the room in
which we are now speaking ??it seems to
me there are three answers. First, the
adoption of an ABM is not going to pre-
vent that. The ABM is $60 billion worth
of obsolescent hardware before it ever
gets off the ground. As Dr. Jerome
Weisner, former science adviser to Pres-
ident Kennedy and provost of MIT, re-
cently said:
Some weapons system are obsolete in the
conception, and I think this is probably
true for the anti-ballistic missile system be-
fore us. I have, in fact, come to the con-
clusion that any system that depends on
projectiles?rather than, say, nuclear rays
of electromagnetic beams or laser beams?
is futile.
So an ABM system now would be put-
ting all our eggs in one very leaky basket
and it would mean that we do not pro-
ceed with the research and development
of devices that are more promising ways
to achieve this miraculous bullet that
shoots the bullet.
If we could do this, then truly mankind
might rest relatively easy for the first
time since 1945.
The second answer to the question
raised by the gentleman is that, if we do
proceed to deploy the ABM in its pres-
ent conceptual form, it is a simple mat-
ter for a very primitive Red China, in-
stead of lobbing just one missile over us,
to lob two, the first one by its ionized
gases to immobilize our radar system and
the second one to do the business.
Third, and perhaps the most funda-
mental point, is simply this:
Since the fission of the atom, since
these terrible weapons were unleashed
on the world 24 years ago, the whole
science of warfare has changed. People
everywhere in the world are menaced by
sources of military power indescribably
far off.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
111264
Approved For ReJea,s,e 2_092/05/07 ? CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
(AANGKESSioNAL RECORD ? HOUSE February 26;01969'
In such a world, it is very easy for
anyone, including the sincere and well
meaning, to say, "Look, the device that
I propose, though it costs $100 billion,
could bring us a tiny fraction closer to
security."
Yet, as the world is new constructed,
there is no real security, and in the end
our security must come through a level-
ing off or deescalation of weapons of
destruction.
I want to thank the gentleman again
for posing the important question that
he did.
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speak.er, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. REUSS. I yield to the gentleman.
Mr. YATES. I think the gentleman
gave an excellent anSwer to the question
posed by the gentleman from Indiana.
I would just like to add this final
thought and that is that the thesis of our
defense today is our power to retaliate
with the basic offensive capability that
we have. There is no defense that we
have against the Russian power to un-
leash its missile might upon us except
our power to retaliate.
I have been unable to understand why
if we are satisfied, perhaps perforce, to
accept this position and this confronta-
tion with the Russians, the two missile
giants holding each other off by the
Power of their offensive might, why that
thesis is not equally valid against the
Chinese, who have no missile threat in
being, who will only have a primitive
missile threat in the foreseeable future,
and whose country and whose people can
be destroyed by our nuclear missiles as
well. Why if we are willing to have this
kind of confrontation with the Russians
with this powerful force, why is it not
equally and even more valid against the
Chinese?
Mr. REUSS. I believe even the Penta-
gon would concede that our current mis-
sile potential is greater than that of
Communist China, and under the cir-
cumstances we would be bargaining from
power. I think the gentleman has raised
a point so delicious in its simplicity as
so far to have escaped the powers of the
Pentagon.
Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. REUSS. I yield to the gentle-
woman from Hawaii.
Mrs. MINK. I would like to join my
colleagues in commending the gentle-
man from Wisconsin and his colleagues
for giving us this opportunity to hear this
very important debate, and also to make
our small contribution.
Hawaii was one of the recommended
locations for the ABM. Until this date a
specific site has not been selected. The
people of my State are quite concerned
about this issue. I have longed for an
opportunity to express myself.
I think that the most grdve fault in
this recommendation cornee from the
false sense of security that the people
would derive from the construction ot
such a system, the innocent belief that it
would provide them with protection from
a nuclear catastrophe.
I believe that everyone recognizes that
a nuclear war is unthinkable, and yet as
unthinking as it is, people naturally have
the feeling that they would want to sur-
vive if one should ever come.
On September 18, 1967, Robert Mc-
Namara announced plans for a limited,
ABM defense system called Sentinel, We
are told that he reached that decision
under intense political pressure against
his better judgment. His own words
seem to bear that out, for in announcing
the system, he made a better case against
it than for it.
He said:
There is a kind of mad momentum in the
development of nuclear weaponry. If a sys-
tem works, there is strong pressure to deploy
it out of all proportion to the prudent level
required.
Mr. McNamara feared that the con-
struction of a light ABM system would
lead at once to demands for a heavy
one; and he said we must firmly resist
those demands, because our greatest de-
terrent against attack is not a costly
defense system of questionable reliability,
but a fully credible, offensive, destruc-
tion capability.
It is an accepted fact that the one
thing which prevents any nuclear power
from attacking another, is the certain
knowledge that such an attack would be
suicidal. It is a situation which has been
properly described as "the balance of
terror," and it is the situation which now
prevails. It is certainly not a pleasant
situation, but it has worked. Now the
proponents of the ABM seek to disrupt
that balance of terror, and they tell us
that the deployment of the ABM will
make us a little safer, will give some as-
surance to our survival as a nation.
I think otherwise.
In the first place, any argument in
favor of the ABM system must be based
on a number of assumptions. It seems to
me that two of the most important as-
sumptions that must be made are: first,
that the system will work, not only under
laboratory conditions but under the un-
predictable conditions of an actual nu-
clear exchange. That is generally ac-
cepted as a rather questionable assump-
tion. Second, we must assume that the
Russians will do nothing to counter the
ABM. That is not even a questionable
assumption?it is innane.
I subscribe to Jerome Wiesner's view
of a high degree of unreliability in the
system and to the probability that we
shall never know about that unless the
system is employed under the actual
conditions of an attack, and such con-
ditions cannot be duplicated under any
controlled situation, nor can they even
be predicted. Who can say what will
happen in the environment when a hun-
dred or several hundred warheads are
exploded within minutes of each other
on both sides of the globe and through-
out the atmosphere? No one can.
But even if it would work?even if
we could be guaranteed that it would
work?the question would still remain,
"should we build it?"
What would be the effect of such a
system on present international rela-
tions? I think it would clearly exacer-
bate them. Could we really expect the
Russians or anybody else to improve
relations with us while we are at the
same time stripping them of their nu-
clear deterrent which they truly believe
to be necessary to their continuing ex-
istence? The idea is ridiculous. We are
completely convinced that our survival
depends entirely upon our nuclear capa-
bility, but we fail to understand how
the Russians or the Chinese might hold
the same conviction. Assuming that they
do hold that conviction, they could never
consider an American ABM as a purely
defensive system no matter what we
might say about it. And viewed in the
context of the theory of deterrence it
could not be a purely defensive system
since its mere existence would negate
some part of their deterrent system thus
giving us a greater offensive capability
as compared to theirs. That situation
would be intolerable for them, and the
arms race would run on at a new and
higher level.
So there can be no question about the
Russian response to an American ABM?
they would be compelled to counter it,
and we will be asked in turn to counter
their counter-measures, and so on with-
out end.
Another thing that is disturbing about
the question of an ABM system is this:
When the missile people talk about los-
ing. one-half of our population without
ABM, or losing something less than that
with ABM, they are talking only about
the number of people who will die in the
first few hours of a nuclear war?the tens
of millions who will die in the first great
exchange of warheads?they do not tell
us about the days that will follow. With
our cities burned and twisted, with tens
of millions dead, with untold millions of
others dying of burns and radiation dis-
ease, with millions paralyzed by fear and
panic, with the Nation completely de-
moralized, the enemy missile submarines
will rise from the bottom of the sea to
deliver the second blow. What will ABM
be worth at that point?
So as the debate over this vital issue
continues, let us not be caught up in
the grotesque numbers game played with
human lives and the very life of this
earth.
If we succumb to a debate only of al-
ternative levels of destruction, and what
degree of damage is acceptable and what
is not, then have we not already made
the psychological adjustment to the in-
evitability of nuclear war?
So let us not ask only how many mil-
lions of dead are we willing to accept, but
whether we must accept any at all.
The question we must decide Is not
how many lives will ABM save, but what
will be its effect on the likelihood of a
nuclear war.
The ABM?like every other weapon in
the history of man?may be a self-de-
feating device, it may save millions of
lives in a war that might not have oc-
curred save for the existence of the sys-
tem itself.
Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, I thank the
gentlewoman from Hawaii for her con-
tribution.
I would like to yield first to the gen-
tleman from Indiana, who has been on
his feet seeking recognition.
Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman from Wisconsin for yield-
ing.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
potd-oved ForatiqemEggcemtuRctibRpflifiK3?#R000300090004-2 H 1265
February 26,
I would like to say that, as I under-
stood the answer addressed by the gen-
tleman to my previous question, at least
the first part of it was that we were deal-
ing with an inadequate defense system.
I think I indicated previously I really
lacked the technical information on that
subject, and I am open-minded on the
question. It seems to me that it is basical-
ly a technical question on which it
should be possible to get a relatively ade-
quate technical answer. If I understand
the gentleman, if it were adequate, then
he would be for it. That seems to me an
appropriate position.
What I would perhaps differ with a
little more are some of the suggestions
I thought I heard here, that rather than
putting the energy and research and ef-
fort into answering that question, they
should go to certain social endeavors, and
so on, which, whatever their virtues, if
we had no country here in which to ex-
periment, would not amount to much.
Therefore, it seems to me, if we are in
accord, if we can get an adequate defense
that has to be the first thing.
I should like also to suggest to the
gentleman from Wisconsin that an in-
terest in acquiring such a defense, to my
thought, is not at all inconsistent with
exploring these great questions of war
and peace and accommodation. They
may have to go hand in hand.
Mr. REUSS. Certainly not. The pur-
pose of the conversation here this after-
noon is to bring to bear such informa-
tion as your colleagues in the House have
been able to obtain.
May I say this: When warriors from
the war on poverty come before us in the
Congress, we feel able to, and do, give
them the most rigorous going-over. That
is as it should be.
When warriors from the war against
crime appear for their appropriations,
they likewise are subjected to rigorous
analysis.
I see nothing in nature which should
Insulate the warriors of the military-
industrial complex from similarly pass-
ing muster before this, the elected body
of the people.
Mr. DENNIS. Neither do I.
Mr. REUSS. That is the purpose of
this afternoon's debate.
May I say, finally, that I am one of
those who are against the ABM, and for
two reasons. One is that it appears to
me not apt or adequate to do the job it
is asserted it will do; namely, bring us
true security. And I am against it sec-
ond, and in conjunction with the first
reason, because what this country needs,
is to focus some of its financial and sci-
entific power on the great issues of en-
abling mankind to live the good life here
on earth, and that includes massive at-
tacks upon our polluted environment and
our degraded cities, a goal which I am
sure the gentleman shares.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak-
er, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. REUSS. I yield to the gentleman
from California (Mr. BROWN).
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr.
Speaker, I also want to commend the
gentleman from Wisconsin and the gen-
tleman from California (Mr. COHELAN)
for stimulating this very interesting dis-
cussion.
It has not yet reached the point of de-
bate, because even despite the contribu-
tion of the previous speaker, who raised
the question about the Chinese ICBM,
the full presentation of the arguments in
favor of this system have yet to be made.
I think they need to be made.
I have been seeking to understand
them, in all good faith, because I do not
believe one can successfully rebut any
argument unless one understands that
argument.
The problem has been, as some of the
previous speakers have pointed out, that
there has been a little slipperiness with
regard to the reasons for this system. I
will get into that a little later.
There is also the very real question as
to whether some of these arguments can
ever be successfully met because at the
root?I doubt if we will get to the root
this afternoon or even during the course
of this session?there are certain articles
of faith with regard to the support of or
the opposition to the ABM system. There
is on the part of the proponents a faith,
for example, that the continued prolif-
eration of weapons, the continued de-
velopment of nuclear power or other
nonnuclear power, contributes to the
security of this Nation and of the world
in today's situation. That faith is hard
to reason with. For a Member of Con-
gress or a general who feels that any
military expenditure must contribute,
just because it is a military expenditure,
to the security of this country there is
very little that logic can do to persuade
him otherwise.
It is my own contention that the con-
tinued expansion of military expendi-
tures on the part of this country not only
does not contribute to the security of this
country but is actually weakening our
security in many, many ways. This point
has to be stressed over and over again
not only in view of what it deprives us
of in the way of resources for domestic
problems but, in fact, because it may be
leading us to a militarily less secure
position.
I think there are many sound technical
arguments that can be made on this
point. Obviously every large-scale mili-
tary system which has been proposed and
which was funded and then failed over
the last few years has been fervently
supported by the planners in the Pen-
tagon who proposed it, by supporters in
the Congress, and by many others.
Nevertheless, many of these systems have
f ailed.
Mr. Speaker, underlying the technical
arguments, which are too sophisticated
for most Members of Congress, there are
certain nontechnical arguments which
are articles of faith and which are dif-
ficult to rationalize. Some of it, also, in-
volves geopolitical considerations that
have not yet been expressed. For exam-
ple, our desire to feel that we have a cen-
tral or core interest as a nation that ex-
tends throughout the world. There are
many who honestly believe this. They
think our power and leadership role in
the world requires that we assert a core
interest in almost every part of the
world. Others assert this, and there is
no arguing with them that you assert it
through military means or at least the
potential of applying it in these areas for
they believe that America's role requires
it. You will not be able to argue with
them rationally on sophisticated tech-
nical grounds that a particular weapons
system will not work or something of that
sort.
Mr. Speaker, I want to make one ad-
ditional point. There has been, of course,
a fight over the ABM system that goes
back 15 years. There were proponents
who sought to have this system deployed
during the Eisenhower years. It was re-
jected by the President at that time on
sound grounds. It was sought to be de-
ployed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
many of their supporters in Congress.
The system was actually funded. For
several years the Secretary of Defense,
Mr. McNamara, refused to spend those
funds, which brought him into conflict
with certain very able Members of this
body. In late 1967 he changed his mind.
I am sure you are all familiar with the
history.. He acted to authorize funding
for the initial steps for the light system.
Now, it is my contention that the Secre-
tary of Defense did not make this deci-
sion because he had suddenly changed
his mind with regard to the technical
sufficiency of the system. I think?and
the evidence, I believe, will support this
beyond any question?that he was told
to change his mind and he did so with
reluctance. The reasons why he was told
to change his mind had to do with the
political realities of the time. There was
then developing a strong attack by many
Members of Congress and many political
figures, and it was not just confined to
the leaders of the opposition party but
included some in the Democratic Party.
There was the beginning of a large-scale
political attack on the wisdom of the
President and his subordinate, the Secre-
tary of Defense, for not deploying this
system. It was to be made an issue in the
1968 Presidential campaign just as the
so-called missile gap was made an issue
in the 1960 campaign. All of us recog-
nize that making an issue of this sort
bearing directly on the security of our
country can be a very telling political
thing to do in an election year.
In fact, there are some who ascribe the
victory of the late President John Ken-
nedy to his effective use of the "missile
gap" issue even though it was admitted
by all parties after the election that this
was a specious issue?that there was no
missile gap.
I think President Johnson feared this
particular sort of issue and that he was
not about to be trapped into being a vic-
tim of this kind of an issue.
I have here in my hand, as the late
Senator Joe McCarthy used to say, a little
booklet which was put out by the Repub-
lican National Committee which says:
The missile defense question. Is L. B. J.
right? Russia deploys antimissile network.
United States refuses to keep pace.
This lays the groundwork on the part
of the Republican committee for this
political attack about which I am speak-
ing. At that time the President was a
potential candidate for reelection and I
think did the smart political thing by
pulling the fuse on this issue by telling
Secretary of Defense McNamara, in ef-
fect, "I do not care what you think about
the system. You go ahead and say you
are going to deploy it." That is exactly
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
H 1266 Approved For ReisNseARROA il31139_9614E000300099996-2
ruary 26, 1969 .
what happened. I believe this accounts
for the fact that we are today fighting
the fact that the system is already au-
thorized and funded. And, I believe, as
with many other things that happen in
this great country, once yhu make a de-
cision, even though it is a mistake, it is
extremely hard to go badk and correct
it. I hope that will not be the case in this
instance because this decision not only
has its roots in a generation past, but it
has its fruition in a generation yet un-
born. If we do not corrent it today, we
may be storing up trouble, more trouble
than we can imagine, for the future.
One last item here. I understand that
our distinguished former colleague who
is now the present Secretary of Defense,
the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.
Laird, held a press conference last week
in which he made certain points. I do
not have the text but I have the article
which states:
Laird Taking Harder Line on Soviet Mili-
tary Threat.
In this article?and I do not vouch for
its accuracy or authenticity?the present
Secretary of Defense makes certain as-
sertions to this effect: "The Soviets are
testing a 'sophisticated new ABM sys-
tem,' and that construction of the
Galosh ABM around Moscow may have
been held up for this development."
Mr. Laird's statement tO the effect that
the Soviets are testing a new ABM sys-
tem came as a surprise here. Further
quoting from the article:
There was no mention of this possibility
in the annual posture statement submitted
to Congress by former Defense Secretary
Clark M. Clifford on January 15
And, here, I want to ask the Secretary
if he is prepared to present to us in-
formation?facts which indicate that
things have changed so much in the last
few weeks or if he has acquired additional
information?that would indicate a basis
for stating that the &adds are now de-
ploying at new sophisticated ABM system.
He makes a similar statement about
the FOBS system. Secretary Laird says
that the Soviets are deploying the FOBS
system at the present time. On the other
hand, just last year, it was stated that
we could not differentiate between the
FOBS system and other ICBM systems.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask Mr.
Laird what information he has upon
which he has suddenly decided 3 weeks
later that the Soviets are deploying the
FOBS system.
Third, he said that thel Sentinel could
act against Soviet sea-launched ballistic
missiles--SLEMS?the FOBS, and acci-
dentally launched ICBM's.
This brings in another argument?the
capability of defense against sea-
launched vehicles which only last year
was denied.
I would like to know what new capa-
bility of the system would now make it
effective against sea-lannehed systems
of any sort.
Fourth, there is this point: Mr. Laird
stated that the Soviets are now spending
$3 to every U.S. dollar for Arategic de-
fense, exclusive of research and develop-
ment and for Soviet defense needs.
This makes it look as if the United
States is not spending enough on the
ABM system. I have had other informa-
tion to the effect that a portion of these
dollars went into antiaircraft defense. I
would like to ask Mr. Laird what the
components of these figures are and if
he can in this way justify the position
which he has now taken.
It seems to me that this is the type of
presentation that we hear all too often
just before an appropriation bill is con-
sidered for discussion. If the Navy is
going to testify for their new antisub-
marine warfare vehicles, then just a few
days before that we always see a spate
Of stories about Soviet submarines off
our coasts. If the Air Force wants money
for their new advanced manned orbiting
platform, or whatever it is, they sud-
denly find out that the Russians have got
some new, fantastic, advanced bomber.
Now, I am questioning Secretary
Laird as to whether he has been using a
little psychology on the Congress.
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield at that point so that I
may advance some information on that
subject?
I too will have some things to say
about Mr. Laird when I make my corn-
'Mete statement later on.
Mr. REUSS. I will yield to the gentle-
man from Illinois for that purpose.
Mr. YATES. I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
In my version of the Laird statement
before the committee, which appeared in
the Chicago Sun-Times last Sunday, it
is stated this way, I will say to the gentle-
man from California:
Laird said that the Soviet Union has "al-
ready deployed an ABM system," but the
committee forced him to agree that the sys-
tem around Moscow is only half completed
and that it corresponds roughly to a system
the United States abandoned because it was
ineffective.
Laird stated this:
If the Soviet Union launched an attack,
the United States could retaliate devastat-
ingly. Then he downgraded the U.S. deter-
rent.
He asserted that the Soviet Union outstrips
the United States in megatonnage. But he
agreed when Senator STUART SYMINGTON said
that although some Russian rockets can
carry heavier warheads than some U.S. mis-
siles, the total power of U.S. bombs is greater
than the Russian total.
So I am inclined to agree with the
gentleman in the conclusion he draws
from the remarks that the Secretary
made.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr.
Speaker, will the gentleman yield further
so that I may continue for one more
moment?
Mr. REUSS. I yield further to the
gentleman from California.
Mr. BROWN of California. I thank
the gentleman very much for giving me
this extensive time.
Mr. Speaker, I have a longer state-
ment which I would ask unanimous con-
sent to insert in the RECORD at this point.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman
from California?
There was no objection.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak-
er, behind the debate over international
ramifications of ABM is a basic, yet gen-
erally ignored, factor: that the United
States decided to deploy this grossly
questionable system more from internal
pressures and fears than from any real
external threat.
Intricate political maneuvering played
a major role in the go-ahead on ABM.
Indeed, such maneuvering closely re-
sembles?and, of course, is related to?
the recently renewed missile gap contro-
versy. Whether or not an ABM gap ex-
ists?and despite all his purported facts,
figures and testimony, Defense Secretary
Laird cannot prove that there is such a
thing as an "ABM gap," it is less impor-
tant than the prospect raised that it
"might" exist.
As a perspective, we should look at the
history of the ABM concept and how it
relates to the recurring "missile gaps."
Contrary to arguments used by many
ABM proponents, it was the United
States, not Russia, which first undertook
extensive anti-missile-system research.
That was back in the mid-1950's when
Bell Telephone Laboratories made ini-
tial studies proposing the Nike-Zeus
system.
During the late Eisenhower years,
Nike-Zeus won Amity approval and tests
were made of prototype components. De-
ployment never was fully implemented,
but research efforts continued.
The first missile gap suddenly ap-
peared in 1960, largely fueled by Soviet
achievements in space and by American
military fears. Though the gap was
mainly on paper, it had important im-
pacts on both domestic and foreign af-
fairs. It created a new drive for increased
U.S. offensive weapons spending. Soviet
reaction to this move came when the
Russians announced that a Galosh ABM
had been deployed. The arms race began
to accelerate.
The Democratic Party used the missile
gap in 1960 as a lever in gaining national
control. Once in office, the Kennedy ad-
ministration quietly quashed the gap. As
a political tool of the military, it proved
significant; in reality the gap was a
sham, created by the military and
shunted aside by the military when its
usefulness was gone. But, it was only
shunted aside; as a tool it had proved
effective once, and its nature was such
that it could be used and reused with
frightening effectiveness:"
In practical terms, the missile gap up-
roar resulted in a restructuring of U.S.
military objectives. Since 1960 the arms
race has sped blindly ahead with few
hesitations. The military budget already
has bloated to over twice its 1960 level,
with most of the increment in sophisti-
cated electronic and missile systems. Ac-
cording to former Defense Secretary
Clifford, If there is a missile gap today,
the balance tips in our favor with the
United States holding at least a 3-to-1
advantage over the Soviet Union.
Measured against the early American
ABM efforts and the military philosophy
which has led to both the Soviet Union
and mainland China being virtually sur-
rounded by nuclear-equipped U.S.
forces, Soviet deployment of ABM does
not seem unrealistic. But, for the super-
hawks and militarists, such Soviet de-
ployment became another vehicle for
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
February 26 , Atiouved For
RigthIGER1362(919/A1 :Igt*MB7_1131:1ogig000300090004-2
promoting even more U.S. spending fo
weapons systems.
By 1967, missile gap tactics once again
reappeared, this time in the guise of an
ABM gap, and this time forwarded by
the Republican Party. A major Repub-
lican National Committee background
report on the subject summarized the
issue this way:
The question of an anti-ballistic missile
system for the U.S. has become a major issue
as a result of the deployment by Russia of
an ABM system.
This question achieves added significance
from the progress made by Red China in de-
veloping an offensive missile system. Evidence
indicates that China may test an ICBM this
year and may have ICBMs operational by
1975. But the Chinese are reported to be
making faster progress than was anticipated
sometime ago by Pentagon analysts. Red
China may develop medium-range ballistic
missiles this year.
An apparent difference of interpretation
exists as to the progress made by Russia
in developing an ABM system. President
Johnson has said Russia "has begun to place
near Moscow a limited anti-missile defense,"
and this low-key estimate is supported by
Defense Secretary McNamara. But other in-
terpretations, based on U.S. Intelligence re-
ports, are that Russia has made substantial
progress in laying out a sophisticated "area"
defense system which eventually may close
off the entire Soviet Union.
The U.S. is developing the Nike-X system
as an answer to the Soviet project, but has
kept this system in the research stage and
has made no move up to this time to
deploy the system. There are reports that,
despite marked improvements made in recent
years in the Nike-X system, It is still a
"point" defense system, or less sophisticated
than an "area" defense plan.
Deployment of the U.S. system, according
to reliable estimates, would require about five
years. This is because of the sheer physical
difficulty of translating research into actual
Installations.
Thus the Russians are years ahead of the
U.S. in actually laying down a missile de-
fense. How far the Russians are ahead of the
U.S. depends on the degree of progress made
by them in deploying their system and how
long they have been at it.
Evidence was developed four years ago
Indicating that the Russians had installed
anti-missile sites around Leningrad. The
Washington Star published a report to this
effect in March, 1963. If this evidence is well-
founded, the Russians may be further ad-
vanced in missile defense deployment that
the Administration seems willing to believe.
Establishment of an ABM system by the
U.S. would cost up to $40 billion, according
to present estimates, depending upon the
depth of the defense undertaken. Various
reports state that this huge cost would in-
clude collateral defense programs, including
fallout shelters, improved bombers against a
possible bomber attack, better defense
against missile-carrying submarines. The cost
would be spread over a number of years, since
even a "crash" program could not accomplish
the entire undertaking hurriedly.
Consideration is being given to a "modest"
missile defense, costing from $3 to $10 bil-
lion. Such a defense would be directed pri-
marily at the Chinese or similar threats not
expected to materialize for some years.
However, the Administration for six years
now has rejected repeated recommendations
that the 'U.S. move forward with a missile de-
fense. These recommendations, originally
made by the Arm-i: in recent years have been
supported unanimously by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
- In the face of now acimowleclged evidence
that the Russians are deploying an ABM sys-
tem, President Johnson and Secretary Mc-
r Namara continue to reject proposals for a
similar defense for the U.S.
Instead, the Administration is seeking
through negotiations with the Russians to
work out some kind of agreement to halt
further development of nuclear weapons.
Some reports have referred hopefully to a
possible "moratorium" on further develop-
ment of ABM systems.
Soviet Premier Kosygin, at a news confer-
ence in London, said that a missile defenes
would increase international tensions less
than an offensive missile system, and was
preferable. This was interpreted as indicat-
ing the Russians would reject the President's
overtures.
for the 1968 fiscal year that he would "re-
The President stated in his budget message
consider" his decision not to proceed with a
missile defense if efforts to negotiate with
the Russians fail. He earmarked $375 million
in the budget to start work on a missile de-
fense if this happened. This reportedly is
Intended to start work on a defense for U.S.
ICBM bases and not cities. There is still no
plan in the works to begin production of
a defense for cities.
Defense Secretary McNamara for years has
cited various reasons for not proceeding with
a ballistic missile defense, such as: the sys-
tem is imperfect, research has not been com-
pleted; the system would have to be com-
bined with a highly expensive fallout shelter
program. He has leaned strongly to the idea
that the best deterrent to nuclear war would
be a strong offensive missile or ICBM capa-
bility.
Recent reports state that improvements in
research on the Nike-X system reveal that a
relatively "modest" fallout shelter program
would suffice in combination with it, costing
half the previous $5 billion estimate for shel-
ters. This is said to be due to improvements
In the Nike-X defense mechanism.
In a "posture" statement issued in Janu-
ary, MoNamara argued that spending billions
of dollars now to build a missile defense sys-
tem would buy no real security for this coun-
try. His basic theme was that Russia would
improve its offensive missile capability to
erase any advantage from an ABM system.
Conversely, he argued that the U.S. would
maintain its ability to inflict unacceptable
damage on Russia through its offensive mis-
siles, regardless of Russia's missile defense.
However, apparently reliable reports state
that Russia has made vital breakthroughs
in developing offensive missiles as well as an
ABM system.
Some military men take issue with McNa-
mara, saying the time has come to cut metal
for an ABM system. Otherwise, they contend,
the situation could lead to nuclear black-
mail or to a nuclear war.
The Republican report put the John-
son administration into a quandary. Re-
fusal to deploy ABM became an increas-
ingly hot political issue. But deployment
would mean deferring vital domestic pro-
grams. And, in that situation, the politi-
cal forces favoring ABM heavily out-
weighed dissenting opinions.
Pressures came at many levels. Fear
tactics stemming from the Republican-
background paper grew steadily. Politi-
cians began to sense the immense pork-
barrel aspects of ABM. Potential con-
tractors saw ABM as a huge profitmak-
ing endeavor.
Yet, once the decision was made to
begin the "thin" ABM deployment, the
critics were quickly silenced. The com-
mitment had been made. The "gap"
closed again.
Internal forces were cruical in the
ABM deployment decision. Now, they are
working toward expanding the ABM sys-
H1267
tern. And, in the course of that expansion
drive, many unsettling points are be-
coming apparent.
Slowly, but surely, the main objective
of ABM. is shifting away from that of
protecting American cities and American .
citizens, and is becoming, instead, a
watchdog for U.S. military interests. Ac-
cording to the following article from the
February 13, 1969, Los Angeles Times,
one study already has asked that ABM
be limited only as a defense for offensive
missile sites:
SENTINEL DEFENSE URGED FOR ICBM SITES
ONLY?PRIVATE STUDY ASKS REORIENTATION
OF ABM SYSTEM TO OMIT PROTECT/ON OF
CITIES
(By Ted Sell and Ruby Abramson)
WASHINGTON.?A private study being cir-
culated on Capitol Hill urges that the con-
troversial Sentinel antiballistic missile sys-
tem be reoriented to protect 'U.S. Intercon-
tinental ballistic missile sites rather than
cities.
Such a move would completely reverse the
strategy conceived when then-Sceretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara ordered a go-
ahead on Sentinel deployment Sept. 18, 1967.
From sites near the remote ICBM nests in
Western states, the ABM network, with its
relatively shortrange missiles, would offer
little protection for population centers?the
mission for which the Sentinel system orig-
inally was conceived.
An ICBM-oriented ABM system might also
fit more closely into the ideas of President
Nixon and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.
Both have indicated they see an ABM sys-
tem more in terms of defending against Rus-
sian attack than against a lesser Red Chinese
threat.
LAIRD HALTS worm
Work on Sentinel deployment was halted
by Laird last week pending a review.
Laird lumped the Sentinel delay decision
with similar reviews on six other major weap-
ons systems which the Republicans also in-
herited from the Democratic Administration.
But the Pentagon conceded Wednesday that
no orders to halt the other programs have
gone out pending completion of the studies.
Identity of the author of the ABM study
now circulating cannot be disclosed, But
he is known to be an expert on nuclear weap-
ons, and his views are expected to carry sub-
stantial weight with legislators who question
the value of an ABM system around major
cities where some citizen groups have pro-
tested.
No action has yet been taken on the
study. It is certain to figure in congressional
hearings on ABM. The Senate and House
Armed Services committees and the House-
Senate Committee on Atomic Energy have
said they will hold hearings.
Adoption of the ICBM-oriented network
would be a victory for figures in Congress, the
Administration and the military who have
argued all along for an ABM defense against
Soviet attack.
KEEPS IT AL/VE
As far as military experts are concerned,
a principal benefit at the moment in such
a deployment would be to keep a part of the
ABM program alive during a period when it
otherwise is in trouble with Congress.
It would avoid for the moment the objec-
teas raised in major cities, perhaps until ,
residents could be "educated" to overcome
resistance, including fears of an accidental
explosion of nuclear-tipped missiles. It also
would keep scientists, engineers and mis-
silemen in the program and help develop
ABM technology.
Pentagon experts on antimissile research
and strategy, however, admit that a deploy-
ment designed solely to protect ICBMs would
be of marginal strategic value?and only then
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 CIA-RDP71130W000300090004-2
11 1268 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? r contacry 26, *1969
in what is considered the most unlikely form against Soviet missiles and he marshaled vast
of Communist attack, expert advice to the effect -that such protec-
This would be if an enemy? presumably _ tion was impossible against the type of heavy
Russia?chose to launch a limited number attack Russia could launch.
of ICBMs not at American cites but at U.S. --
missile bases as a form of international The Sentinel system manager, Gen.
blackmail, hoping to force the United states A. D. Starbird, in a briefing before House
to back down on some major issue. - Appropriations Committee members con-
Under past doctrine, any report of enemy firmed that the second of the three ob-
warheads heading toward the United States jectives of the authorized ABM system is
was to have resulted in a massive launch of. - ,tto provide an option for defending
American ICBMs so that the U.S missiles
Minutemen with Sprints."
could be out of their silos before the enemy
warheads streaked into targets. Traditional interservice competition is
There would be no question but that World now beginning to heat up over ABM. The
War III had started and that in its first hour following stories, from the February 21,
a major share of Russia's population and 1969, Los Angeles Times and from the
most of its industry would be pulverized. February 19, 1969, Washington Evening
Even if Russian ICBMs were targeted on Star indicate that both the Air Force and
AMeTiC9,11 ICBM fields, under this theory, the '
15 inute weaning time which U.S radar
the Navy are asking for ABM systems of
-m.-
would provide would mean that the Soviet their own:
nuclear warheads would strike only empty [From the Los Angeles (Calif.) Times,
silos. Feb. 21, 1969]
ANTIMISSILE FUNDS SOUGHT BY AIR FORCE
DIFFERENT ATTACK
On the other hand, the idea of placing the
first ABMs around U.S. ICBM fields carrell
tacit recognition that an altogether differ-
ent kind of nuclear exchange might occur
and that an attack by Russia with only a fevr
missiles might not be the signal for starting
World War UI.
"If we saw only two or three warlseadi
coming in," one Sentinel projeet figure said.
"what would the President do?
"Would we go to ware"
"If they were coming at our Minutemen
fields, and we were sure we could stop therm
it would buy more time for the President to
decide what to do?whether to destroy Rus-
sia or do something else."
Ironically, U.S. ICBM fields already are the
best-protected installations in the nation,
in terms of nuclear attack. The 1,000 Minute-
men are in hardened underground silos at
six bases in Wyoming, Montana, North and
South Dakota and Missouri.
DISTANCES A FACTOR
Because of the distances between silos and
the concrete hardening, experts calculate the
Russians would have to target at least two
ICBMs on each Minuteman to have a goad
chance of destroying it on the ground. With
15 or even fewer minutes warning, the mie-
slice could be fired before they were destroyed.
In terms of a possible Red Chinese attank
when China builds ICBMs, however, the
ICBM-oriented ABM makes almost no sense,
Pentagon leaders said. The Defense Depart-
ment expects China to have a small ICBM
.
Force sees an ABM system based on these
weapons as saving much of the cost other-
wise involved in buying new Spartan and
Sprint missiles.
The major modificatdon involved in the
Air Force plan would be to convert guidance
systems from the offensive mission?direct-
ing the Minuteman in en upward path that
would gut it on course to plunge onto within
about a quarter mile of a target in Russia?
to a defensive one.
The defensive mission. would involse plac-
ing the Minuteman warhead within a close
enough distance of an incoming Russian mis-
sile to destroy it either with blast effect or a
shower' of radiation to neutralize the nuclear
warhead.
Significantly, the Air Force thinks the
guidance might be made accurate enough to
get away from a nuclear warhead for the
ABM--that conventional explosives might do
the job.
(By Ted Sell)
WASHINGTON.?The Air Force is lobbying
behind the scenes to get money for its own
.antiballistic missile system, perhaps in com-
petition with the Army.
The Army has been assigned responsibility
for developing and deploying, as well as
operating, the controversial Sentinel ABM.
But the Air Force would like to get seine of
the action, too, partly out of concern that
continued Army work on ABMs would in time
put the Air Force out of the space-defense
business it was assigned after it became a
separate service.
Air Force officers are seeking about $15
million to test out their ideas that discarded
Minuteman intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles can be modified into ABMs.
APPROACH LEGISLATORS
Air Force officials have privately approached
key legislators on the project. The action has
the effect of encouraging delays in going
ahead with Sentinel on grbunds the Air
Force may be in the process of developing a
better and cheaper substitute.
How successful the Air Force effort will be
on Capitol Hill is open to question. The cur-
rent dispute in Congress is over whether the
Army's Sentinel will work and whether it will
be worth the $5 billion to $10 billion esti-
mated cost.
The Air Force already had started to ac-
quire the expertise it might need to operate
an ABM. At Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., it
built a $62 million one-of-a-kind advanced
the Air
radar installation in 1967. since then
[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star,
Feb. 19, 19691
PENTAGON EYES SENTINEL AS SUB idlEgTLE
Suntan
(By Orr Kelly)
The Defense DepartMent is considering a
significant new use for an anti-missile sys-
tem?protection against a possible Soviet
submarine missile attack?in its current re-
view of the Sentinel Idefense system.
Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird raised
the possibility that the components of the
Sentinel system might be arranged to
provide protection a,gstanst Soviet submarine-
launched missiles for the first time yesterday
in a Pentagon press conference.-
"I believe . . . the technology that is ready
now for deployment and could be deployed
if we were to go along with the Johnson-
Clifford budget proposal or a modification of
the Johnson-Clifford budget proposal, would
have certain side-defense capabilities as far
as Soviet-launched weapons from submar-
ines or from space platforms, or false
launches," Laird said.
Although Defense officials are convinced an
effective defense against the Soviet force of
nearly 1,000 land-based missiles is imprac-
tical now, it was learned that they are con-
sidering the possibility that a high degree of
protection could be provided against submar-
ine-launched missiles through much of the
1970s.
Defense experts, working under the direc-
tion of deputy defenee secretary David Pack-
ard, are considering about 10 possibilities in
their review of the Sentinel system, devel-
force in mid-19705
oped under the Johnson administration.
But with a small ICBM force, according to Force has trained technicians to operate the The possibilities being considered include
strategic planners, it would be highly un- unit in excess of the needs for simply one continued research and development, with
likely that China would tatrget on the hat- such radar, while admitting it did not plan no deployment at the present time, plus the
dened U.S. missiles in an effsat to force the to build others number of different ways of deploying the
United States to desist from any interim- The Eglin radar is of a type called phased- radars and missiles of the Sentinel system.
tional move. array, an advanced system fax beyond those Not under consideration is the so-called
It would not be profitable to target scarce now needed by the Air Force but similar in "thick" system designed to protect this eoun-
ICBMs on hard-to-damage targets, particu- principle to those to be used in the Army's try against a full-scale Soviet attack, accord-
larly when the American population would Sentinel system. ing to Pentagon sources.
lie open in whatplanners call soft cities._ One of the advantages the Air Force sees But an effective defense against submar-
Moreover, China would be immediately it in its proposal is that it would use hundreds' inc-launched missiles is considered a pos-
by American missiles from Polaris subrna- of Minuteman 1 missiles which otherwise sibility.
sines, from shorter range missiles on Oki- will become surplus as the new, multiwar- As presently planned, the Sentinel system
nawa and from bombers in tbe Pacific, which head Minuteman 3 missiles are produced would have only liMited capability to shoot
under current targeting theocy are more in- APPROVED 'IN 1957 down submari?ie-la,Unched missiles because
volved in retaliation against China than the The Minuteman program was approved in it is designed to detect and destroy missiles
U.S. ICBM fields. - 1957 as the first project to use solid-fuel coming in from the north. But it could be
The ICBM-oriented ABM evould reversethe missiles as ICBMs instead of the earlier redesigned to look seaward as well, probably
order of priority discussed by McNamar% in liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan missiles. Solid- at a significant increase in cost.
oalering Sentinel deployment. a fueled missiles can be stored longer and fired The Russians now have about 45 sub-
McNamara argued that it would be cheaper much faster than missiles which have to be marine-based missile launchers, compared
to build more ICBMs than to put ABMs fueled with the toxic and corrosive liquid with 656 launchers on American polaris nu-
ar :Lind them. In effect, this accepted some fuels immediately before firing, clear submarines.
ICBM loss in a sudden strike, but by proyid- By 1963, the Air Force had 800 Minuteman The Soviet Union deployed its first boat
nig for more ICBMs it was intended to inanre 1 missiles. The figure is down 'to 600, with comparable te the early Polaris type Amen-
that enough survived to maintain the margin the other 400 missiles ' in the 1,000-rocket can subraatines last year and is now esti-
needed to-inflict wide darriewe on Russia. force being later model Minuteman 2. mated to be building from one to two new
McNamara stressed fears that ABM might Each of the Minuteman 1 models cost on ballistic subra trines a year. Each is capable
come to be considered a potential defense the order of $7 million to $8 million. The Air of carrying 16 missiles.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
-February 26, ARPrc'ved FcTEPIRMAIWAV714Eq6101PETIIIMVAR000300090004-2 H 1269
At this rate of production the Russians
could have about 237 launchers on subma-
rines by the mid-1970's, of which about half
might be deployed at any one time. If, in the
event of war, two or three subs could be de-
stroyed before they launched their missiles,
an American missile defense system might
well be able to intercept most, if not all of
those remaining.
Whether the cost of checkmating the
Soviet ballistic missile submarine effort
through much of the next decade would be
worthwhile when the Russians would still
have enough land-based missiles to destroy
this country, is debatable.
But American defense planners consider
the 41 U.S. Polaris submarines this country's
most important means of preventing a nu-
clear war and would be greatly concerned
if the Russians found some way to nullify
this force. They could thus decide it would
be worth a great deal to prevent a similar
Soviet force from becoming an effective
threat.
The following three stories from the
February 15, 1969, Armed Forces Journal
show other directions that ABM sup-
porters are taking in order to expand the
system:
TESTIMONY FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Congress intends to ask Defense Secretary
Melvin Laird to advise it on the possibilities
of deploying an anti-ballistic missile system
that will "shoot down anything."
L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman of the House
Armed Services Committee, told the Journal
that the committee will ask Laird to testify
on the possibilities of:
Using non-nuclear ABM warheads.
The Air Force and Navy participating in
ABM defense.
The development and deployment of an
entirely new ABM system.
Laird will be asked to testify as part of the
hearings on the "412" military procurement
authorization bill. The hearings are due to be
held in the latter part of March.
Laird recently suspended all ABM site and
construction work. The move was coincident
with objections from some members of Con-
gress to the location of nuclear ABM war-
heads near cities.
Rivers explained that prior to the 1967
approval of the Sentinel system, the Armed
Services Committee did not "explore every
possible alternative for ABM deployment.
"In our eagerness to have an ABM system
to defend the country, we just assumed that
the problem had been worked out, and that
the Sentinel was the best thing we had."
Rivers said that this might not be the
case today. "We may have something that
will shoot down everything."
He suggested the possibility that the other
Services may not have been given an ade-
quate opportunity to participate in the plan-
ning of ABM deployment.
If the other Services have a system that
will aid the Sentinel, Rivers said, then the
mission should be "shared."
"If this is so, then we ought to be told."
The country should be defended with the
best possible ABM system, the pro-ABM
Chairman said.
Rivers strongly emphasized that the Com-
mittee action should in no way be inter-
preted as a criticism of Laird, whom he said
will be, in his opinion, a "wonderful Secre-
tary."
SENTINEL ADVANCES
(By Walter Andrews)
The Army now is evaluating Sentinel ABM
intercept improvements that, if proven feas-
ible, would permit the use of lower-yield nu-
clear warheads and possibly even the even-
tual use of conventional warheads.
Industry studies for greatly improving the
accuracy of the Sentinel system's Spartan
long-range, ICBM intercept missile are pres-
ently being evaluated by the Army's ABMDA
(Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Agency).
The studies are referred to as SIPS
(Spartan Improved Performance Study) and
center on the high performance third stage.
ABMDA is part of the Army's Office of Re-
search & Development (OCRD), and provides
long range R&D for the Sentinel system.
Nothing is officially firm on when the im-
proved Spartan missile would be incorpo-
rated in the Sentinel system.
However, indications exist that the Army
would ,like to have the improved missile in
the Sentinel system sometime during 1974.
As presently conceived, the Sentinel is slated
for operation in 1971.
The proposed improvements would give
the Sentinel a new deployment flexibility,
which could conceivably mitigate the effect
of recent objections to the location of nuclear
ABMs near cities.
Officials pointed out to the JOURNAL, how-
ever, that a "massive change" would not be
involved.
SIPS AND LOITER
SIPS, if proven, would give the Spartan
an in-flight "loiter" or "wait" capability,
which could possibly be measured in min-
utes or seconds.
It would permit the Spartan to be redi-
rected in flight, with all that capability im-
plies in terms of improved accuracy. With
a "loiter" capability, the Sentinel would not
have to commit a Spartan to intercept until
time had been allowed for the atmosphere
to separate the real warheads from decoys.
JANUARY PROPOSALS
Since the middle of January, ABMDA has
been evaluating studies by Boeing, McDon-
nell Douglas and Martin Marietta on the
feasibility of developing a new third, "loiter"
stage for the three-stage Spartan missile.
These funded efforts studidd the feasibility
of a new, third stage utilizing solid-propel-
lant.
A previous McDonnell Douglas effort con-
sidered the possibility of developing a new
third stage utilizing liquid rocket technol-
ogy.
SOLID VERSUS LIQUID
The usual advantage of liquid propulsion
over solid is that thrust and missile attitude
can be controlled and varied more. Once
ignited, it is difficult to control the burning
and vary the thrust of a solid rocket. This
is done in liquid rocket motors by controlling
the flow of fuel or oxidizers.
Solid motors, however, have the strategic
advantage of readiness.
The Army therefore is studying methods
to vary the pulse and attitude of solid motors.
RFP'S SOON
In the near future, it will request indus-
try proposals for the best method of building
such a controllable solid motor. The indus-
try "answer" could involve a near term solu-
tion of clustered motors or the development
of a new type of solid motor control nozzle.
Officials also told the Journal that tech-
nology has been postulated by industry (LTV
was mentioned as being in the forefront)
of "near-zero miss distances."
In its evaluation of technology the Army
would take into consideration work done by
the Air Force on satellite intercept by rocket.
The R & D job facing DoD and the Army's
ABMDA right now involves feasibility evalua-
tion of these postulated capabilities.
CONVENTIONAL WARHEAD?
Officials said that a successful SIPS effort
would permit the utilization of a much lower
yield nuclear warhead.
They added that the attainment of accura-
cies sufficient enough to permit the utiliza-
tion of conventional pellet or steel rod type
warheads "is still farther down the road.
"The people in DoD are as eager as anyone
to develop a non-nuclear warhead. It's a goal
we are shooting for?unfortunately it's not
easy. The probabilities involve distances of
a few feet."
SPARTAN AND SPARTANS
In ABM developmental language, officials
told the Journal "the proposed improved
third stage would let you wait until the
atmosphere has sorted out the ballistic coef-
ficients of all the things involved."
The 1967 approval of the Sentinel system
was predicated on the development of a new,
longer-range, "exoatm,ospheric" Spartan
missile.
This missile will use the radiation from a
high-yield nuclear warhead exploded outside
the atmosphere?the so-called "big bang ef-
fect"?to intercept and disarm incoming
ICBM warheads.
A NEW MISSILE?
Prior to the go-ahead for the Sentinel sys-
tem, the Spartan was called the Extended
Range Zeus (DM15X2), which was devel-
oped by McDonnell Douglas.
Except for the public relations/political
rationale for renaming the Extended Zeus
the Spartan, there would be a good possibil-
ity of the improved Spartan being given a
new name.
Officials said that such a missile would be
combined with the exoatinospheric Spartan
for the area defense of the country.
Presumably, the shorter range Sprint ABM
interceptor also would find a place in the new
scheme.
REMOTE SPRINT
Consideration also has been given to a
"Remote Sprint" Sentinel configuration, in
which the Sprint missiles would be placed
away from the detecting Perimeter Acquisi-
tion Radars (PAR) and the tracking Missile
Site Radars (MSR).
The benefit here would be that such a
Sprint configuration would better utilize the
"reach" of the longer range radars.
When positioned close to the radars, the
short range Sprint missiles only utilize a
fraction of the radar's range.
Officials told the JOURNAL that Remote
Sprint is considered a potential improve-
ment. However, no decision has been made
as yet, they said.
The obvious trade-offs are the cost of
new site acquisition and additional com-
mand and control installations.
In a possible new Sentinel configuration,
the exoatmospheric Spartan missiles con-
taining the high-yield nuclear warheads
could be positioned away from cities.
The SIPS version of the Spartan could be
emplaced nearer the cities for the "area de-
fense" of the population centers.
The Sprints, remote or otherwise, could be
used for the defense of radar sites and possi-
bly ICBM installations.
SABMIS AND SENTINEL
"Proven technically feasible" are the words
used by officials to describe the present status
of the Navy's Seaborne Anti-Ballistic Missile
Intercept System (SABMIS).
Officials told the Journal that concept for-
mulation of the system is "completed right
now" as far as the technical feasibility of
the system is concerned.
A SAMBIS would be a good system for
intercepting enemy ICBMs in the boost and
mid-course phase, officials said. As such it
would complement the Army's Sentinel sys-
tem.
SABMIS presently is funded at a low level,
officials said, but a lot depends on DoD de-
cisions made during the next month.
Industry feasibility studies on SABMIS
were completed last year. Companies partici-
pating were: Hughes, PRC, General Electric,
Northrop Nortronics, Sperry, Boeing, Mc-
Donnell Douglas, Martin Marietta and
Raytheon.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300090004-2
H 1270 Approved For RVemangicRXE ittffi31_13083M1200300090,1104-2
rebruary 26, 4969
Along with the superhawks and mili-
tarists there has been a third powerful
ally in the recent campaign for an ex-
panding ABM?the military-industrial
complex, that great aggregation of mili-
tary, corporate, and lobby power that
President Eisenhower warned us about,
but which too many persons have
shrugged off as being nonexistent or
unimportant.
By this time we should not be shocked
by the abject profiteering and corre-
spondingly low quality production which
has marked the- armaments industry
over the past decade. The complex has
been able to call all the shots without
much anxiety over being turned down.
I do not expect ABM to be much dif-
ferent from past weapons systems. Once
again, I foresee high profit margins, poor
reliability, and early obsolescence. Sey-
mour M. Hersh, in his article, "The ABU
Pork Barrel," published in the January
1968 War/Peace Report, presents a dis-
mal picture of the relationship between
the military-industrial complex and the
decision to deploy ABM:
THE GREAT ABM Poen. BARREL
(By Seymonr M. Hersh)
President Johnson's decision to begin de-
ployment of the Chinese-oriented Nike X
antiballistic missile defense ,ystem is the
biggest thing that's happened to the elec-
tronics incrustry since color television. Be-
yond that, it's impact drops off sharply.
Nike X won't stop the arms race, won't
hinder Russian second-strike capability,
won't prevent a Chinese nuclear attack, won't
protect our allies, won't add to the U.S.
deterrent, won't protect U.S. civilians?and
probably won't work.
The presidential decision to build the
ABM was announced by Defense Secretary
Robert S. McNamara last September 18, but
there is some evidence that it wasn't fresh
news to the electronics incitietry and the
brokers of Wall Street. Betveeen July 1 and
September 30 last year (the third quarter),
75 mutual funds sold other holdings and
invested nearly $90 mililoia in electronic
stock. Ten of the mutuals bought more than
250,000 shares of General Electric, expected
to be one of the big contractors for one of
the sophisticated radar unite of the Nike X
(renamed the Sentinel system ey the' Penta-
gon last winter). All told, tuoo companies
are expected to profit from the deployment
of the Nike X; 12,000 of theee are small
business firms ("Thin Nike, Fat Orders,"
said one trade magazine headline). A partial
list of the main contractors sounds like a
Who's Who of the military-industrial com-
plex: Douglas Aircraft, General Electric,
Bell Telephone, Martin-Orlando, Raytheon,
Western Electric, Thiokol ohemical, Sperry
Rand, Avco, Burroughs, Control Data, West-
inghouse, General Dynamics, 1.T.ReT., Lock-
heed and Aerojet.
One brokerage house described the then-
pending Nike X deployment last summer "as
the day they will shake the money tree for
electronic companies, All will stand to bene-
fit. The demands will be too high not to be
felt by all in the industry." Based on Penta-
gon estimates, it's probable that three con-
tractors?Douglas, Martin- and Raytheon?
each will receive more than $600 million in
Nike X funds over the next five years. Gen-
eral Electric could get nearly $400 minion.
All play major roles in the system. Western
Electric, another prime contractor, has re-
ceived more than $1.5 billion since 1963 for
its role in developing the inteelle system.
Is there really a military4ndustriai com-
plex? A repOrter for the National Observer,
the weekly Dow-Jones newspaper, randomly
surveyed six leading defense contractors re-
cently and found former Pentagon officials
and officers in all. "One office said its 30-man
staff included only two Pentagon retirees,"
the newspaper said in its November 6, 1967,
issue. "Further questioning brought out that
one?a two-star general?was the office di-
rector. He handles relations with the Penta-
gon. The other, a consultant, is a former
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." An
oft-cited 1959 congressional survey found
more than 1,400 ex-officers above the rank of
major working for the top 100 defense con-
tractors, including 261 generals and admirals.
The Survey, one index of the relationship
between big business and the military, sorely
needs updating.
MEANS BREAD AND JOBS
Frederic W. Collins 'noted in The New Re-
public last year that as few as 29 of the major
contractors for the Nike X employ as many
as one million persons in 300 plants located
in 172 congressional districts in 42 states.
To those 172 congressmen (and the 84 sen-
ators also affected) Nike X is a pork-barrel
issue?bread and jobs for constituents. May-
be that helps explain why McNamara was
not able to convince Congress of the folly
of a Russian-oriented ABM (antiballistic mis-
sile defense) during his many appearances
before committees in past years.
Critical to that failure has been the ad-
ministration' lack of success in persuading
Congress that the Russian deployment of an
ABM system around Moscow and elsewhere
poses no threat to U.S. security. In his speech
announcing U.S. ABM deployment, McNamara
noted that "the Soviets are now deploying
an antiballistic missile system. If we react
to this deployment intelligently," he said,
"we have no reason for alarm. The system
does not impose any threat to our ability to
penetrate and inflict massive and unaccept-
able damage on the Soviet Union. In other
words, it does not presently affect in any
significant manner our assured destruction
capability" because of the growing U.S. nu-
clear ICBM (intercontinental ballistic mis-
sile) arsenal.
McNamara's congressional sales job was
spelled out nearly four years ago in the Bul-
letin of the Atomic Scientists by Freeman J.
Dyson, a physicist at the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study: "The crucial problem that re-
mains is to convince the American Congress
and public that Soviet ABM systems are not
necessarily a deadly threat. The American
people must become accustomed to the idea
that they may be better off without an ABM
system, even if the Soviet people believe thy
are better off with one."
This sort of reasoning, however persuasively
presented by McNamara and others, leaves
the military buffs in Congress cold. Sen.
Henry M. Jackson, Washington Democrat, in
announcing a hearing on the Nike X last
fall, declared that "an ABM defense in Soviet
hands lends itself superbly to bluffing and
blackmail. Would an undefended U.S. main-
tain its resolve to act strongly if a defended
U.S.S.R. appeared willing to risk a move
against Berlin or any part of Western Eu-
rope?" Never mind that McNamara, has re-
peatedly said the answer is Yes. Jackson's
answer, as he told the Senate last November
30, is that the United States should begin
building a new generation of ICBMs and nu-
clear submarines "to maintain political sta-
bility" in the world.
Another example of the attitude toward
the Nike X on the part of that small, power-
ful clique who run the Senate and House
Armed Service Committees came from Sen.
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Republi-
can, shortly after McNamara's speech. Thur-
mond, a two-star general in the Army Re-
serve, wrote in the October issue of Data
Magazine that "the true significance of the
recent decision to deploy the ABM in the
United States is the production time ad-
vantage that we shall have in any future
confrontation with the real enemy?the
Soviet Union. We will have completed the
preproduction engineering, will have pro-
duction lines established and will have some
units installed. If we decide later that the
'thin' missile defense has to be thickened,
American industry, that once produced
miraculous numbers of Liberty Ships, planes
and tanks, can gear up for mass production
of ABM components as well.
The generals, the Congress and big busi-
ness all stl:k together from thin to thick.
GOING TO THE PEOPLE
Playing politics with the .ABM Is not only
a congressional game. During the savage in-
fighting between McNamara and the Joint
Chiefs prior to the Nike H go-ahead, both
took the issue, in effect, to the people. The
Joint Chiefs drew up a list of 50 cities late
In 1965 that would be given special protec-
tion under the ABM system envisioned; the
list was presented to congressional commit-
tees. Under the Joint Chiefs' recommenda-
tions, a thick defense of long-range Spartan
area defense missilek would be installed to
protect the United States, Including Hawaii
and Alaska, with 50 cities given the added
protection of short-range Sprint antiballis-
tic missiles. The military leaders planned to
press for the immediate protection of 25
cities at a total cost of $10 billion. On the
list of the first 25 cities to get protection was
Charleston, S.C., home of Rep. L. Mendel
Rivers, chairman of the House Armed
Services Committee and advocate of every-
thing military. McNamara argued vigorously
against the Joint Chiefs' approach, telling
them they would never be able to draw the
line between 50 cities and the rest of the
nation. To prove it, he eventually had some
details of the top-secret plan leaked to his
favorite Pentagon reporter, Richard Fryk-
lund of the Washington Star (now a deputy
assistant secretary of defense for public af-
fairs). The resulting protests from the cities
left off the list convinced the Joint Chiefs
that such a strategy would be politically
unfeasible.
After this clash, all signs pointed toward
the deployment of the light Chinese-oriented
ABM costing under $10 billion. In the spring
of 1967 the usually reliable DMS market in-
telligence report, a privately produced sur-
vey of future Pentagon research and devel-
opment prospects, noted that the Defense
Department's "procurement request for fis-
cal year 1968 is believed to provide for the
Initial funding of a $4 billion to $7 billion
system over five years." DMS, which is circu-
lated among 3,500 Pentagon contractors, is
staffed by many former Defense Intelligence
Agency (D.I.A.) officers. In his press confer-
ence of May 18, 1961, McNamara carefully
left the thin ABM door open. After explain-
ing once again that any U.S. ABM system
would not be capable of stopping a Soviet
missile attack but would stop a Chinese
ICBM attack, the defense chief testily added:
"I frequently read in the press discussions
of antiballistic missile systems which fail to
distinguish between these two types of sys-
tems and which, therefore, are quite mis-
leading in indicating the capability that we
have for protecting our people."
McNamara then was asked if "the fact that
we are asking the Russians to agree to a
limitation of ABMs leaves Open clearly the
possibility that both sides ettuld deploy this
limited system." "Yes, I think so," he an-
swered. "We haven't foreclosed any action by
our desire to engage in discussions with the
Soviet Union, but I think it definitely does
leave open the possibility."
Some sophisticated analysts saw other
signs of a favorable Nike X decision. A bro-
kerage house that closely watched the Nike X
debate reported in mid-1967 that research
funding for the system was remaining stable
but added however, that "all may not be
as it seems," It noted that "work on the new
Spartan missile appears to be accelerating"
and that "radar efforts have centered around
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Miggi64R000300090004-2 111271
Februairy 26, 19typroved Feb1Wchlsgs3eRtV/IFEMWIDP
the development and construction of a single
radar system for testing. Once the initial
model is fully completed and moved into
test stages, funding will drop off except for
'modifications and testing activities. If the
system is deployed, the contracting compa-
nies will then be characteristically told to go
back and build 25-50 more just like the first
one." The report concluded by urging inves-
tors to plow funds into the electronic compa-
nies and, indeed, most electronics stocks
have gained substantially since September.
A few weeks after the Nike X decision was
announced, the Washington Post added an
Illuminating, if little noted, sidelight. It
said it had learned that the United States
originally was headed toward a December
announcement of the thin ABM. President
Johnson, faced with strong congressional op-
position on all fronts, the newspaper said,
"suddenly accelerated the ABM timetable in
an effort to ease the political pressures on
him. Among the president's multiple objec-
tives," the Post said, was a desire to outflank
zealous pro-ABM forces in hearings planned
by Senator Jackson, plus an attempt to so-
licit support for the president's stymied tax
increase proposal from pro-ABM members
of Congress." It should be noted that, ac-
cording to the Post, political pressure was re-
sponsible only for moving up the date of
the announcement?and nothing more.
When McNamara quit his Pentagon job in
November and announced he would move
early this year to the World Bank, the New
York Times said that some sources believed
a key factor was his disagreement with John-
son over deployment of the ABM. The news-
paper added that McNamara's September 18
speech initially called for a restatement of
his policy against deployment of the anti-
ballistic missile defense system but had been
rewritten a few days earlier by presidential
flat. The evidence tends to suggest, however,
that McNamara's basic dispute was not over
the deployment per se of an ABM defense,
but over what kind of a defense was neces-
sary and how much to spend on it. By mid-
August he was circulating to key aides in
the Pentagon a draft recommendation to the
president calling for deployment of the thin
Nike X. His private beliefs notwithstanding,
it seems significant that publicly McNamara
did nothing to discourage the possibility of a
thin Nike X deployment.
A few days before the initial announce-
ment of the deployment of the thin Nike X,
the Pentagon's public relations office put out
an information sheet for the press. It in-
cluded a long series of hypothetical ques-
tions and answers and as could happen only
in the Pentagon, even its own questions
were not answered. For example:
"Q. Can this system be used as a first-step
towards large-scale system?"
"A. There is no plan or intention to ex-
pand the system."
In announcing the go-ahead for the Nike
X, McNamara explained there was a possibil-
ity that in the next decade China might "be-
come so incautious as to attempt a nuclear
attack on the United States or our allies."
Since it is the job of strategic planners to
always "take into consideration even the pos-
sible irrational behavior of potential adver-
saries," he said, "there are marginal grounds
[my emphasis] for concluding that a light
deployment of U.S. ABMs against this pos-
sibility is prudent."
In effect, the secretary was postulating that
the multi-megaton U.S. deterrent was capa-
ble only of preventing a Soviet missile attack
and not one from China, a rationale described
dryly by one expert as "indeed remarkable."
A more Soviet-oriented reason for the ABM
deployment, however, was given by McNa-
mara in a Life magazine interview shortly
after the Nike X decision was announced:
"Our deployment isn't designed to protect
the cities of America against a Soviet stra-
tegic attack, and thus it in no way threatens
the Soviet ability to deter an American at-
tack. The fact is, however, that they [the
Russians] have been building up their stra-
tegic missile forc-es. We had no choice but to
take additional steps to maintain the ade-
quacy of our own deterrent. We considered a
number of alternatives?adding more mis-
siles, a new manned bomber, or even a new
strategic missile system. We reached the con-
clusion that one of the most effective steps
we could take, and the one least likely to
force the Soviets into a counter-reaction, was
the deployment of an ABM system which
would protect our Minuteman [ICBM] sites,
so that our own deterrent is not diminished."
During the hearings last November on the
Nike X before Jackson's Military Applications
Subcommittee of the Joint Atomic Energy
Committee, this significant exchange took
place between John S. Foster, Jr., director of
Pentagon research, and Rep. Craig Roamer,
California Republican:
"FOSTER. The thin Nike X provides a cover
over all of the United States against ICBMs
launched from China.. the second capabil-
ity is being able to add additional Sprints
and radar necessary in order to provide still
additional coverage of the Minuteman silos
against attempts by the Soviet Union to
knock out those silos.
"HosDaza. That confirms the suspicion, of
some people at least, that this is really the
first stage of an anti-Soviet ?ABM as well as
an anti-Chinese ABM. Is that right?"
"FOSTER. It is certainly not . . . This is not
being deployed as a building block for some
heavier system."
Many sources disagree flatly with Foster's
assessment. In a special issue on the Nike X
system last October, the authoritative maga-
zine Aviation Week & Space Technology
noted: "A preponderance of opinion in Wash-
ington, however, appears to be that, once
a thin defense is in place, the American
predisposition to go 'all-out,' coupled with
the Nike X building-block concept, makes it
almost inevitable that the system will harden
and grow." Opinion aside, the incredibly
complex radars for the Nike X (estimated to
amount to between two-thirds and three-
fourths of the total cast) known as Perim-
eter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and the Mis-
sile-Site Radar (MSR) have been developed
in close coordination with two larger and
even more technically sophisticated radars,
known as the Multifunction Array Radar
(MAR) and a Tactical MAR (TACMAR). The
more complex radars will not be included in
the thin system largely because of their cost
but will continue to be developed by the
Pentagon. If a decision is made to install a
Russian-oriented heavy ABM, the more elab-
orate radars are capable of easily fitting
along with PAR and MSR into the larger
system. As one commentator has said, the
light ABM defense would be "like pregnancy,
hard to stop before full term." The line be-
tween Nike X/ No Nike X is much more
sharply fixed than the division between thin
Nike X/ thick Nike X.
J. I. Coffey, a former Army officer writing
in Foreign Affairs months before the ABM
decision was announced, argued similarly:
". . . as China's technology and industrial
capacity grow, so also will the sophistication
of its weapons. To counter this, we will prob-
ably find it necessary to extend, to deepen,
and perhaps to improve our antiballistic mis-
sile system and to build up our air defense
and antisubmarine warfare forces. Thus,
whatever the initial form of an ABM system
designed for use against Communist China,
it will ultimately become either largely in-
effective or little different from that required
to defend against Soviet forces. In the long
run, therefore, ballistic missile defenses ca-
pable of coping with a Chinese attack are
likely to increase markedly our capability to
limit damage by Soviet strategic forces?a
point which the U.S.S.R. is not likely to
miss."
Ironically, as many experts have pointed
out, the Nike X offers no assurance of doing
its primary job?defending the continental
United States from a Chinese nuclear attack.
Who's to say China won't forego the ICBMs,
if it irrationally decides to strike. It could
use airplanes launched from a ship or sub-
marines capable of firing nuclear-tipped
torpedoes or medium-range missiles.
COSTS UNDERESTIMATED
There is considerable evidence that Mc-
Namara has sharply underestimated the cost
of deploying the thin Nike X. Dr. Charles M.
Herzfeld, former director of the Pentagon's
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA),
told a House Defense Appropriations subcom-
mittee last March he would favor deployment
of a thin ballistic missile defense?"a high
altitude system to cover most of the United
States, and in particular to cover our bal-
listic missile sites"?in short, the Nike X.
Asked for a cost estimate, Herzfeld answered:
"I think one could do reasonably well with
$10 billion, maybe $12 or $14 billion. If you
stretch it over a period of five years, it isn't
all that much money, really."
Cost for the radars, computers and the
necessary underground sites for the Nike X
is estimated at $3.5 billion, with an addi-
tional $1.5 billion earmarked for the missiles
and their silos. Annual operating costs, an
expense rarely mentioned in the daily press,
will total about $500 million annually for the
system, with another $1 billion needed to
purchase the nuclear warheads for the
Spartan and Sprint missiles. Total research
and development Costs in connection with
the system are expected to reach about $500
million a year. One electronics trade mag-
azine wrote last October that "the figure of $5
billion spread over the next five to six years
has appeared frequently of late, but it ignores
annual support costs and research, engineer-
ing and facility costs that will push the figure
to a more realistic $11 billion by 1973." It
further should be added that roughly $4 bil-
lion has been spent on the Nike X and its
precursor, the Nike Zeus, since 1957?this is
more than was spent on the entire Man-
hattan Project in World War II. The Penta-
gon has acknowledged only that the $5 bil-
lion estimate does not include operating costs.
Another usually unmentioned Nike X cost
factor involves the equipment and manpower
needed to coordinate the new antimissile de-
fense with existing defense systems, such as
Over The Horizon Radar (OTHR) and the
Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
(BMEWS). DMS reports that the deploy-
ment of the Nike X "would not supercede
BMEWS since it would still be used to pro-
vide early warning against manned bombers."
OTHR could help detect a missile launched
from a Fractional Orbiting Bombardment
System (FOBS), which McNamara announced
last November is under development by the
Russians. (A FOBS missile is fired into a very
low orbit about 100 miles above the earth,
but could be dropped onto its target before
the first orbit is completed. The Nike X
would not be capable of stopping a de-
termined FOBS missile attack, Mr. Mc-
Namara said.) It is not known how much
money will be needed to interface the
Nike X with the older warning systems.
One brokerage house experienced in large-
scale federal research projects has estimated
for its clients that "the maximum expendi-
ture levels for any one year will be $2 billion"
for the Nike X, That figure might be reached
by 1969, a private analysis said, adding that
"1970 would almost certainly reach the $2
billion mark. The NASA (National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration) budget and
the trend of space expenditures have taught
us all a lesson in the unpredictability of
federal outlays in specific programs," the
analysis concluded.
McNamara himself has hedged his predic-
tion, telling the House Armed Services Corn-
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
H 1272 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD? HOUSE February 26, 190
mittee last March 2, for example, that the
Nike X costs, "if past experience is any guide,
may be understated by 50 to 100 per cent .. ."
Obsolescence is another potential cost fac-
tor. In an article for Locik last fall, Dr. Je-
rome B. Wiesner, former science adviser to
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, flatly de-
clared that he was "certain that the system
we are now planning will be regarded as
ineffective before it is installed." There is
much evidence to support this. Now under
development by AFtPA is a missile booster
called Hibex that accelerates many times fas-
ter than Sprint. The Hibex, slightly smaller
than the Sprint, is designed to be fired di-
rectly from its underground silos, while the
Sprint is ejected by a gas-propelled piston
and does not ignite until it is above ground.
Hibex could be the short-range interceptor
of the future. In addition, the Army now
is studying the possibility of developing an
improved third stage for the Spartan mis-
sile that would enable it to "loiter" in space,
and thus increase its capability to attack in-
coming ICBMs. With this added capability,
the Spartan would not have to be targeted
at the time of launching, which should be
a major help in sorting out decoys among
incoming missiles.
There are other potential costs. The John-
son administration's responsiveness to the
Army ABM proposals has encouraged the
Navy and Air Force to seek a piece of the
high-priced ABM pie. The Navy has been
pressing for a sea-based antiballistic missile
system (codenamed SABM1S) that wcaild
theoretically make the Nike X's job easier
by knocking down enemy ICBMs before they
reached the skies over the United States.
The Air Force is reported to be taking an-
other look at some of its earlier ABM pro-
posals, including the use of such airplanes as
the giant Lockheed C5A transport as a
launching platform for antiballistic missiles.
Studies also are under way of the concept
of using satellites to aid in the detection and
discrimination of ICBM targets, ARPA fur-
ther has told Congress it is investigating the
use of lasers as possible missile kill mecha-
nisms.
' AN AMBITIOUS SYSTEM
The Nike X is an ambitious system. It re-
quires radars and computers to detect and
track a decoy-accompanied warhead capable
of traveling more than 15,000 miles per hour,
and then to guide a Spartah missile to an In-
tercept point in outer space for area defense.
It requires similar capabilities for the Sprint
missile, which, is designed to destroy war-
heads after they re-enter lite earth's at-
mosphere.
Electronic reliability will be a major fac-
tor in the success or failure of the Nike X.
If a typical Nike X radar or computer uses
200,000 microcircuits, the Army expects itto
operate for approximately i,000 hours befOre
one circuit fails. "If home television re-
ceivers had this reliability level," Aviation
Week says, "a lone TV repairman operating
in a city of 150,000 persons would go bank-
rupt, because he could expect only a single
service call over an entire year, assuming that
each set was operated for an average of three
hours every day."
The system, expected to be in operation by
the early 1970s, has four main components:
Spartan?An advanced solid-fuel three-
stage version of the 5,000 m.p.h. Zeus missile
that is believed capable of traveling 600 miles
into the atmosphere with a large nuclear
warhead. It is now under development by
Douglas Aircraft, but has yet to undergo
testing. Estimated per unit cost is $1.25 mil-
lion, but no reliable estimate of annual op-
eration costs is available.
Sprint?A smaller high acceleration solid-
fuel missile that will be capable of meeting
targets 25 miles away in about five seconds.
Built by Martin-Orlando, it is now under-
IV:ling tests: Like the Spartan, the Sprints
will be housed in vertical missile silos. Esti-
mated unit cost is $1 million, with annual
operating costs set at about $700,000. Both
the Spartan and the Sprint are designed to
destroy or immobilize enemy' missiles by
thermal radiation, particle radiation, high-
intensity x-rays or combinations of these
effects. Pentagon officials have indicated that
the nuclear weapons used in both weapons
have low fallout, but the low-level use of
Sprint could present radiation hazards,
About 1,100 of the missiles will be produced,
according to DMS, with Sprints accounting
for 700-800.
Missile Site Radar (NISR)?A relatively
small radar complex basically designed to
track targets and control the Sprint inter-
ceptor missile, although it will have some
area defense (Spartan) responsibilities. To
be built underground along with the mis-
sile silos, a prototype MSR is now being con-
structed at the Nike X test site on Kwajalein
Atoll in the Western Test Range. It should
be operational by the end of this year. (Along
with the Kwajalein site, Nike X tests .are be-
ing conducted at Ascension Islaiad in the
Eastern Test Range and at the White Sands,
N.M., missile range. By December, working
models of the radars are expected to be avail-
able and the system will begin testing in
stages, starting with the Sprint and MSR.)
About 14 of the MSR radars are expected to
be incorporated into the thin Nike X.
Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR)?A
sophisticated phased-array radar designed for
very long-range search (up to 1,000 miles)
and the targeting functions needed for the
Spartan interceptor missile. While Par is un-
der developinent, the initial Nike X tests at
Kwajalein will be conducted with simulators.
According to DMS, about six PARs will be
installed near the Canadian border at an
average cost of $85 million each. (Some crit-
ics have claimed that if an enemy missile
ever is engaged by the Nike X system, the
contact and explosion probably will take
place over Canada.) Both PAR and MSR
are believed to be capable of picking up re-
liable target information when the enemy
missiles climb to 10-15 degrees above the
horizon. Aided by Univac digital computers,
the radars will be able to target search, iden-
tify, track and communicate data automati-
cally. (The heavy costs for this kind of
equipment have produced a side benefit for
the major contractors: the Pentagon is urg-
ing them to automate their electronic com-
ponent production lines in an effort to trim
costs. The industry has been slow to intro-
duce automation.)
HOW NIKE X WORKS
The Nike X system works this way: Once a
potential target is picked up by the radars,
the computers must determine if it is a mis-
sile or merely a satellite or meteorite by track-
ing the object long enough to determine its
trajectory. Should more targets appear, the
computers also must assess whether they are
warheads that should be tracked or decoys
that can be safely ignored. This is the crux
of the Nike X system. If the number of tar-
gets threatens to saturate the radars, the
computer must decide which should be
handled on the highest priority. If the poten-
tial target is maneuvering and not following
a simple trajectory, the computer will need
more time to predict its future operations.
Aviation Week has noted: "The operation
of an antiballistic phased-array radar has
been compared to man trying to juggle sev-
eral golf balls, a couple of basketballs and
one baseball bat simultaneously. Timing is
critical. The critically brief duration of a
mass missile attack can tolerate no computer
malfunction, and it leaves no time for hu-
man trouble-shooting and repair."
Many experts simply don't believe the Nike
X can .work without massive testing, which
Would violate the 1963 test ban treaty. Most
notable of these is Wiesner. In his Look
article, the scientist argued that "few com-
petent people expect the extremely complex
ABM system to 'work the first time; yet it
must to have any effect. There will always
remain a big chance that even if the system
is working as designed, it will not intercept
all of the enemy missies.... Remember that
if a single enemy nuclear weapon leaks
through the defense to a city, the city will
be destreyed."
A team of scientists headed by Dr. Ralph
E. Lapp and Leonard S. Rodberg 'also has
concluded that the Nike X could not be im-
mediately effective. Writing In Science and
Citizen last year, they noted that it is not
unusual for complex weapons to do poorly in
battle. Specifically cited was the low rate of
kill of the Russian-built surface-to-air
(SAM) missiles used against American fighter
planes in North Vietnam.
There already haVe been some ominous re-
ports of production complications. The Mar-
tin-Orlando company is said to be faced with
a number of operational and guidance prob-
lems due to. the extremely high velocity of
the Sprint missile. Electronic Design maga-
zine last October reported: "The rocket's
skin temperatures are reported to soar higher
than those in any other rocket. This has
raised serious thermal problems with the
on-board electronics," although the magazine
noted that the firm's engineers claim to have
solved them.
In addition, Aviation Week has reported
that the specially built computers for the
Nike X (expected to be able to handle more
than four million instructions a second with
a single processor) are creating staggering
programing problems. The magazine notes
that "there is relatively little experience in
programing for missile intercept and dis-
crimination, especially against massive at-
tacks involving decoys and other counter-
measures. . . . This does not mean that the
programing cannot be solved," the magazine
said, but it will take more time and more
money than many experts had expected.
These kinds of problems apparently
prompted Sen. Joseph Clark, Pennsylvania
Democrat, a harsh critic of the ABM, to tell
the Senate last July 27 that it "should know
that the United States has not yet experi-
mented with using the Sprint, the Spartan,
and the radars together and probably will
not be capable of doing SO for at least two
years. How can we consider deploying, at a
cost of some $5 billion, a system that has
never been fully teated? I personally think
that such an expenditure is outrageous, con-
sidering the crying need that this country
has for funds for domestic programs to alle-
viate poverty, to provide adequate education
for our youth, to rebuild our cities, to feed
the hungry and to eliminate air and water
pollution."
AN ABM FOR INDIA?
In his May, 1967, news conference, Mc-
Namara was asked this question: "If we em-
ployed an ABM system for defense against
a Chinese threat, do you think a country
such as India would lay claim to the need
for such a system?"
He gave this answer: "Whether or not India
would or would not wish to deploy an anti-
ballistic missile system to protect itself
against a potential attack from Red China,
assuming we did, I can't say. My guess is
that they would."
The defense chief had a different analysis
in his October interview with Life. Asked if
the U.S. deployment of the ABM wasn't a step
in the direction away from a nonproliferation
treaty, McNamara replied: "One of the as-
sumptions inherent in negotiations of the
nonproliferation treaty is that the real deter-
rent to China's use of nuclear weapons is
the overwhelming nuclear capability of the
United States . . . China's leaders know that
an attempt to attack the United States would
invite the utter devastation of urban China.
Our allies know that the same constraints
that prevent China from attacking the United
States prevent China from attacking
ApprOved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
4F'ebrwtry 26, 114519roved ForglaTtiCaRE2600705a7REITAADP7-1B013811R000300090004-2 H1273
them. . . . We firmly believe that it would
serve no useful purpose for nations in Asia
to acquire nuclear weapons of their own with
all the financial burden . . . that would en-
tail."
India, which is well within range of China's
present stock of intermediate-range ballistic
missiles, thus has its choice. On one hand,
it can go along with the belief that the United
States deterrent against China should suffice
(although it must be difficult to understand
why the United States itself doesn't trust
its own deterrent?hence the ABM) , or it
can begin laying out funds for missile de-
fense. Pressure has been growing inside the
country for the latter move. The United
States, by in effect voiding its own arguments
for nonproliferation, has escalated the arms
race.
Suspicious allies, and China, for that mat-
ter, can question whether the U.S. goal in
deploying the ABM is to eliminate a potential
source of what some senators call "nuclear
blackmail" in Asia and the subcontinent.
Instead, the ABM may assure American mili-
tary planners of free and easy intervention in
any part of the world (at least until the
1980s, when China is expected -to develop
ICBMs with sophisticated penetration de-
vices?a development Wiesner believes can be
accomplished with the aid of reports avail-
able in American aerospace journals).
McNamara's theory, as outlined in his San
Francisco speech, is that the light "Chinese-
oriented" ABM poses no challenge to Russia,
hence that country should not react by in-
creasing its offensive forces. That reason-
ing amounts to asking the other fellow to
exercise restraints that we are not willing
to accept ourselves. Although it is still un-
clear whether Russia is building a full-scale
ABM defense around Moscow and other
cities, the United States already has reacted
to the Soviet move by initiating steps to in-
crease its offensive striking force. A $2 billion
program to replace the submarine-based
Polaris missiles with larger Poseidons capable
of carrying improved penetration aids was
begun last year, along with a massive pro-
gram of adding multiple warheads (MIRV)
to the new, improved Minuteman HI.
RESPONDING IN TURN
Few of America's European allies believe
the United States will stop at the thin sys-
tem, although McNamara warned in his
speech that "The so-called heavy ABM shield
. . . would in effect be no adequate shield
at all against a Soviet attack, but rather a
strong inducement for the Soviets to vastly
increase their own offensive forces. That,
as I have pointed out, would make it neces-
sary for us to respond in turn?and so the
arms race would rush hopelessly on to no
sensible purpose on either side." Yet France
immediately seized on the U.S. ABM an-
nouncement to urge once again that a sepa-
rate French nuclear force is more necessary
than ever. "Some Frenchmen," Don Lauch-
heim of the Washington Post reported last
October, "have even suggested that by cre-
ating an antimissile barrier in the United
States, Washington has made Europe more
vulnerable, as a common enemy might pre-
fer to send its nuclear weapons toward un-
defended targets."
Victor Zorza of the Manchester Guardian,
considered a leading expert on Russian mili-
tary affairs, has reported that the U.S. ABM
will aid those Russians who are eager to get
a larger share of the nation's budget for mili-
tary spending. Noting also that there is no
proof that Russia has decided to go ahead
with a full-fledged ABM system, Zorza wrote
in the September 20 Washington Post that
the Soviet military-political lobby already
has won increased allotments of steel for
military use. The question being debated
now, he added, is whether the United States
can somehow allay the misgivings McNa-
mara's announcement "is bound to have
aroused in the Kremlin."
As Coffey presciently wrote in Foreign
Affairs, "At the very least . . . the deploy-
ment of antiballistic missiles would in all
probability lead to a hiatus in arms con-
trol negotiations, while both sides tried out
their new weapons, decided on counter-
measures to the other's deployment, and re-
established an effective and acceptable stra-
tegic balance. It could mean the loss of any
chance for an early agreement on a com-
prehensive test ban and on the nonprolifer-
ation of nuclear weapons, leading -to de-
cisions by countries such as Italy or India
to proceed with their own nuclear weapons
programs. And it could lead to a new arms
race with the U.S.S.R."
Even more significant to some will be the
increased pressure to break or void the exist-
ing nuclear test ban treaty because of the
need to test the ABM in the atmosphere.
"The developers of the ABM system will soon
be telling us that they cannot assure its
effectiveness without nuclear tests in the
atmosphere," Wiesner glumly wrote in Look.
"The pressure on the president to renounce
the treaty in the interest of national security
and protecting our multimillion dollar in-
vestment will be overwhelming."
Major strategic mistakes are not unknown
to McNamara. In his September 18 speech,
the defense chief revealed?apparently for
the first time?that he had seriously mis-
calculated soon after taking office in 1961
(a major election factor being Kennedy's
charge of a "missile gap") and helped pro-
mote the recent Russian build-up. Shortly
after taking office, Kennedy sent Congress a
supplementary military budget request for
$1.94 billion to bolster the farces above the
Eisenhower levels for fiscal 1962; included
was $1.48 billion? earmarked for strategic
deterrent forces, largely Polaris missile sub-
marines.
"In 1961, when I became secretary of de-
fense," McNamara explained, "the Soviet
Union possessed a very small operational
arsenal of intercontinental missiles. How-
ever, they did possess the technology and in-
dustrial capability to enlarge that arsenal
very substantially over the succeeding sev-
eral years. Now, we had no evidence that
the Soviets did in fact plan to fully use that
capability.
"Since we could not be certain of Soviet
intentions?since we could not be sure that
they would not undertake a massive build-
up?we had to insure against such an even-
tuality by undertaking ourselves a major
build-up of the Minuteman and Polaris
forces," McNamara added. ;'Thus, in the
course of hedging against what was then
only a theoretically possible Soviet build-up,
we took decisions which have resulted in our
current superiority in numbers of warheads
and deliverable megatons. But the blunt fact
remains that if we had more accurate in-
formation about planned Soviet strategic
forces, we simply would not have needed to
build as large a nuclear arsenal as we have
today." (My italics.)
It seems no one is immune from making
the same mistake twice.
While the ABM certainly represents a
profitable splurge for the military-indus-
trial complex, for the rest of the economy
it is a drag. Over the past 3 years, in-
creasing resource demands by the mili-
tary have been a leading factor in the
steady rise in wholesale and consumer
prices. Further ABM deployment will
exaggerate these serious inflationary
pressures. And we must remember that
each marginal dollar allocated to ABM
is one less dollar for better education, for
more livable cities, for a cleaner environ-
ment, for an equitable and just society.
Of course the ABM is not the only piece
of fat in the swollen defense budget, but
it does stand out as an overly visible ex-
ample of foolish spending. Both last year
and earlier in this congressional session,
I have argued that the defense budget
must be cut. I have pointed out where
the highly reputable Congressional Quar-
terly has shown areas in which over $10
billion could be sliced from the defense
budget?and instead, where those same
areas received a net increase of around
$1.75 billion for fiscal 1970.
In the March issue of the Washington
Monthly, Robert S. Benson, formerly a
member of the staff of the Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense, Comptroller, gives an-
other perceptive analysis showing where
$9 billion could be slashed from the de-
fense budget without reducing national
security:
HOW THE PENTAGON CAN SAVE $9 BILLION
(By Robert S. Benson)
I have a modest proposal.
I should like to demonstrate, in as brief
and as simple a way as the complexities per-
mit, how $9 billion can be cut from the Pen-
tagon budget without reducing our national
security or touching those funds earmarked
for the war in Vietnam.
Let me emphasize at the outset that this
is truly a modest proposal, offered from an
earnest belief in its practicality and with the
conviction that savings from its adoption
could be applied to our fiscally 'undernour-
ished concerns for human opportunity.
The process by which the Pentagon budg-
et?as well as the rest of the federal budget?
is- shaped and reviewed is a strange and not
always wonderful thing. Any new program
is usually given thorough scrutiny in Con-
gress: debate rages over the program's pur-
poses and over the level of funding required.
Once it is accepted, however, only the fund-
ing level is certain to receive continuing Con-
gressional attention. A nation's needs change,
but rarely is a program's reason for existence
ever challenged again, either in the execu-
tive branch or on Capitol Hill. On the con-
trary, its administering agency and its Con-
gressional advocates, cheered on by its bene-
ficiaries, strive to perpetuate or expand it,
seldam pausing to ponder whether it is still
worthwhile or whether something else is
needed more.
The process can be insidious. Man, the so-
cial animal, takes comfort from acting in ac-
cord with the wishes of friends and associ-
ates. But over years of advocacy he loses some
ability to discriminate, to relate the particu-
lar to the whole. In the case of Pentagon
outlays, the built-in protection inherent in
established programs often achieves invul-
nerability.
Because a mystique of secrecy and com-
plexity surrounds the Pentagon, most Ameri-
cans feel uncomfortable, or even vaguely un-
patriotic, if they question any part of the
military budget. But the fact is that the fed-
eral budget's provisions for defense far exceed
our national security requirements. Although
not many Americans realize it, a great deal
of information about the threats to our se-
curity (and the forces we procure to meet
them) can be gleaned from 'unclassified
papers: budget statements of the President
every January, annual posture statements by
the Secretary of Defense, transcripts of Con-
gressional hearings, and articles in the news-
papers. Any serious student will soon discover
that items in the defense budget, as in any
other, range from fundamental to marginal.
The difference is that in the Pentagon
budget (a) vastly larger sums are involved,
and (b) far less Congressional scrutiny is ap-
plied to them.
Using the sources above, my two years
of experience in the Comptroller's office of
the Department of Defense, and my awn
judgment of the issues, I hope first to out-
line how the budget can be trimmed by $9
billion and then proceed to a discussion of
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
111274 Approved For RcheirimitnagOlVALCkikeRIM-1300135613100300090179412itary 26,, 11)69,
the weaknesses in the system which allowed
this fat to survive even in the cost-conscious
regime of Robert S. McNamara.
In our budget-cutting exercise these
ground rules will apply: _
None of the cuts is related to the war In
Vietnam.
None of the cuts would impelr our national
security requirements.
All of the cuts are in what the Pentagon
calls ongoing core programa.,
All of the cuts could be effected within
the next 24 months, which ,would allow the
savings to be applied rather quickly to un-
filled domestic needs.
The focus is on areas where forces or
weapons systems are either duplicated or
outmoded, where an enenty threat is no
longer credible in today's pefitical and tech-
nological environment, or Where money is
being lost through grossly Inefficient per-
formance.
Perhaps the best place to begin is with the
Manned Orbiting Laboratory, which receives
half a billion dollars a year and ought to
rank dead last on any ratiOnal scale of na-
tional priorities. The MOL, jr. carbon copy of
the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration's spacecraft operition, is in the
budget because the Air Force wants_a piece
of the extraterrestrial actioa, with its glamor
and glory, and Congress has been only tap
happy to oblige.
Although there have been valiant attempts
to make the MOL seem different, Pentagon
space research is alarmingly similar to that
of NASA. Listen as Dr. Alex:nder H. Flax,
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Re-
search and Development, tiles to draw the
distinction for members of the "House Appro-
priations Committee:
'If you view the objectiges of these pro-
grams as being simply to get data on humans
exposed for some period of time, I think yOu
have to oonclude that there is a great deal
of duplication, but I tried tett' make the point
that our objective is primarily to test equip-
ment, not humans. The humans interact
with the equipment, of coarse."
True, there are potential military uses for
space vehicles. But little thought appears
to have been given to whether a separate
program was required or whether the same
results could have been achieved through
slight adjustments in the parallel NASA
activities. The MOL program is duplicative
and wasteful. Of the $600 million requested
for it last year, Congress ,Approved all but
$85 million. This year's bucket calls for $576
million. I would strike all or it.
As for grossly inefficient Pentagon perfor-
mance, the most obvious example is man-
power management and titilization. Man-
power is the single largest commodity the
Defense Department buys: this year, the
Pentagon will directly purdhase the services
of nearly five million Americans. Assuming
an average of $7,000 each U1 ply, allowances,
and supplementary benefits, the department
payroll is about $34 billion, of which about
$22 billion goes to military personnel and $12
billion to civilians.
The Pentagon has little direct control over
the costs Of its civilian personnel, who are
recruited mainly through a government-
wide civil-service pool. But its control over
military personnel is complete, covering not
only the $22 billion payroll but also about
$7 billion annually in training costs and
nearly $2 billion in moving expenses for men
changing assignments.
Most men enter the armed forces either
because they are drafted or because they en-
list in preference to being drafted. All en-
listed men entering the service receive basic
training, which in the Army takes eight
weeks and costs about $1,000 per head. After
advanced training in a specialty, these short-
term new servicemen generry spend the rest
of their hitches on assigAinents requiring
that specialty.
A more flexible training policy would not
employ such a lockstep approach. Some basic
training is needed for everyone, and combat
infantrymen certainly need the full eight
weeks. But not all of the Army's 535,000 new
soldiers this year will serve in combat, and
four weeks would suffice for the others. The
Navy and Air Force have already abbreviated
their basic training; for the Army to do
so would yield, in direct training savings
alone, $50 million.
Although the pattern of training and as-
signments for officers is far different, even
greater economies are possible?and with a
clear gain in individual job performance.
After initial training, which is more diverse
than it is for enlisted men, almost every
officer is shuttled around through an amaz-
ing variety of assignments and further train-
ing designed to give him _enough breadth of
experience to become Chief of Staff some day,
often at the sacrifice of obtaining no deep
experience in any one field. The expectation
Is that every seasoned officer can lead an
infantry battalion through a swamp on one
assignment, promulgate personnel promotion
policies behind a Pentagon desk on the next,
and discuss black separatism with Ethiopians
as military attache in Addis Ababa a year
later.
In this age of specialization, such a philos-
ophy is anachronistic and expensive. No
efficient business would move its men around
In so illogical a pattern. By perpetuating the
illusion that every officer can aspire to the
top organizational position, rather than
screening the candidates earlier in their
careers, the services suffer from having an
excessive number of men struggling to learn
totally unfamiliar jobs. Moreover, today's
technological and analytical complexities de-
mand the development of specialists whose
entire experience is focused on performing
one particular function well. By attempting
to fill the growing number of specialist slots
with generalists, job performance diminishes
for all.
If we were to reduce by a modest one-
fourth the present number of assignment
changes (whereby servicemen Move almost
once a year), the annual saving in trans-
portation and moving costs alone would be
slightly over $500 million, to say nothing of
the improvement in Work effectiveness.
A further saving can be accomplished by
changing the way the military calculates in-
dividual manpower requirements. Unlike
business, which requires work units to ab-
sorb the impact of absences, the Pentagon
includes a cushion to compensate for men
absent on leave, in the hospital, in school,
end en route to new assignments. And the
military's 30 days of annual leave?which all
servicemen get?is far more than the norm
for civilian work forces of comparable age
and experience, even acknowledging that the
30 days includes weekends. The military
argues that this amount of leave time is com-
pensation for being on duty 24 hours a day,
seven days a week?but this is a myth long
In need of explosion. Except for those at sea
and in Vietnam, most military men work
evenings or weekends no more and no less
than civilians do. Cutting leave time to 20
days a year?with the exception of men on
hardship duty overseas?would reduce the
total armed forces manpower requirements
enough to save $150 million annually.
Thanks to Beetle Bailey, Catch 22, and the
fact that so many Americans are veterans,
the supernumerary theory of military staff-
ing has had great visibility. But an area of
far greater inefficiency?supplier performance
on large weapons system contracts?draws
almost no attention at all. This is especi-
ally serious because the same contractor who
can be extremely efficient under the condi-
tions imposed by the private competitive
marketplace can waste millions when work-
ing under a government contract. Few Amer-
icans are aware that about 90 per cent of the
major weapons systems that the Defense De-
partment procures end up costing at least
twice as much as was originally estimated.
Some of this cost growth comes from Penta-
gon-ordered changes in design or configura-
tion, but much of it results from inefficient
contractor practices or from his knowledge
that the government will underwrite his ex-
cessive overhead.
It is up to the government, therefore, to
impose on a non-competitive defense con-
tractor the same cost discipline that the con-
tractor would be forced to impose on himself
in a competitive situation. Instead, the pres-
ent procurement system is geared almost ex-
clusively to securing timely delivery and good
technical performance. Cost comes last.
The engine contract for the controversial
F-111 fighter-bomber offers a classic illus-
tration of what happens to costs after a de-
cision is reached to proceed with procure-
ment.
An aircraft of this kind has three major
components: airframe (wings and fuselage),
avionics (electronic navigation and weap-
ons-guiding gear), and engines. For a tech-
nologically advanced fighter-bomber, the air-
frame Will account for about 55 per tent of
total cost, avionics 25 percent. and engines
20 per cent. The initial F-111 contract for
2,053 engines was awarded to Pratt & Whit-
ney on the basis of an estimated cost of $270,-
000 per engine. Today the engines are ex-
pected to cost more than $700,000 each.
In the F-111 case, and in general, four
major factors account for such cost escala-
tion:
1. The Buy-In: Our procurement system
encourages contractors to play the game
called "buy-in." The rules are simple. Con-
tracts are awarded to the company which
offers the lowest bid with a straight face.
Later cost overruns may bring a mild re-
proach or a stern reprimand, but they will
not prevent the contractor from getting
enough money to cover all his costs and
pocket a profit. A contractor rarely takes
these reprimands seriously; he knows that
his competitors have similar experiences.
Besides, the procurement officials have told
him to worry about performance and prompt
delivery, not about cost. So the buy-in game
produces initial cost estimates that every-
one knows are unrealistically low.
2. Design Changes: From the time bids
are requested on a new weapons system until
final delivery, a great many changes in de-
sign specification develop. These changes are
often initiated by the Defense Department,
although some reflect contractor production
problems. In either case, the costs change?
usually justifiably, but almost always up-
ward.
3. Volume: Changes in volume are even
farther beyond the contractor's control. In
large contracts, economies of scale are often
achievable; if a weapons system is found
highly useful, as was the F-4, fighter, and
more units are ordered than were initially
planned, the later unit costs are lower. In
the case of the Air Force F-111, however,
cancellation of British orders and the Con-
gressional decision to kill the Navy version
reduced the number of aircraft to be pur-
chased, thereby raising the unit cost.
4. Sheer Inefficiency: These costs arise be-
cause a contractor has slipshod purchasing
procedures, poor scheduling of men and ma-
chines, ineffective work standards, or other
managerial deficiencies. Such extra coats
would be a threat to a company's survival
In the competitive private marketplace; they
should not be tolerated in defense procUre-
ment.
In calculating how much of the F-111 en-
gine's cost growth was due to this intolerable
fourth factor, we need to begin by figuring
how much the first three factors cost.
We know that the original $270,000 esti-
mate was artificially low. Allowing for buy-
in fibbing and for some early required
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
February 26, /Apfiroved FolOWITOIRESZSIII27011107R103441)P7
changes in design, an initial figure of $450,-
000 would have been more realistic. -Later
design changes may have raised the allow-
able price to $500,000. But the contractor's
final estimate of $700,000-plus, made after
the British action but before the Congres-
sional cutback, probably should not be ad-
justed for volume changes, because the Brit-
ish buy was to have been proportionately
very small and there are good indications
that this actually enabled Pratt & Whitney
to disengage itself from some expensive sub-
contracts. So unjustifiable contractor ineffi-
ciency amounted to around $200,000 per
en e.
ould have been worse. Past practice in
such cases, where the goverrunent is dealing
with a single supplier rather than with sev-
eral competitors, has been to accept what-
ever price is commensurate with the costs
the supplier has incurred, regardless of how
efficient or inefficient he is. But, in an un-
precedented action, the Defense Department
ordered an investigation of Pratt & Whit-
ney operations to determine how much such
an engine ought to cost if produced under
efficient manufacturing procedures. After
that, the Navy?which had contract respon-
sibility for all F-111 engines?took the fur-
ther unprecedented step of unilaterally set-
ting the price it intended to pay. Indications
are that the Navy compromised its position
somewhat after some hard bargaining, but
the final contract did reduce by about 15
per cent the price proposed by the company,
which customary procedures would have ac-
cepted outright. This saved the government
roughly $200 million.
Two other good examples of spiraling costs
were described in recent hearings before the
Congressional Joint Economic Committee.
A. E. Fitzgerald of the Defense Department
reported that the C-5A transport may cost
$2 billion more than the original contract
ceiling of $3 billion; yet when Defense nego-
tiated the contract with Lockheed, then-
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
described it as "a model method of doing
Defense business . . . a damn good con-
tract." In another case, retired Air Force
Colonel Albert W. Buesking, a former finan-
cial officer for the Minuteman interconti-
nental ballistic missile, said the Minuteman
contractors received a 43 per cent pre-tax
profit based on net worth, or about twice the
normal industrial return; he estimated that
defense contract costs are 30-50 per cent "in "
excess of what they might have been under
conditions of competitive-type commercial
environment."
Conservatively assuming that aerospace
and shipbuilding contractors harbor an in-
efficiency of 15 per cent, and figuring that
the average annual amount provided for re-
search and procurement of such systems
over the past three years is about $17.9 bil-
lion, then wiping out the inefficiency would
annually save the government $2.7 billion.
This is no pipedream. It requires no dra-
matic breakthrough in management tech-
niques. Such savings could be achieved
quickly if the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretaries of the individual services resolved
to focus the energies of their top financial
and engineering, men on procurement of
these major weapons systems. What is
needed is some truly independent cost-
sleuthing into contractors' operations, with
firm backing from top Defense management
for appropriate follow-up efforts.
The most fruitful way of all for saving
defense dollars is to eliminate forces which
no longer pack a credible punch or which
were designed to meet a threat that is no
longer credible.
The Navy's Polaris/Poseidon fleet ballistic
missile program is vital to our national se-
curity. But the Navy's three primary and in-
dependent conventional warfare missions?
tactical air, amphibious operations, and ship-
ping protection?are overequipped, as are
IIDDMR000300090004-2 H 1275
their 'associated support units. Current force
levels cannot be justified by any potential
threats. In my view, President Nixon was
misguided when he decried America's loss of
sea power during the campaign last fall. He
made the mistake of applying the same
argument the admirals use when they at-
tempt to eternalize and expand their favorite
programs: that the United States must have
superiority in numbers, ship-type by ship-
type, over the Soviet Navy. This is a legacy
of late-1940's thinking, When it was assunied
that we must always be ready to fight and
win an extended war at sea. In the nuclear
age, such thinking is highly unrealistic.
Fifteen aircraft carriers
signed to the Navy's tactical air mission.
Since the wallop they pack is purely the fire-
power of their aircraft, they should be com-
pared with the alternative means of deliver-
ing that firepower?Air Force tactical air-
craft. Carriers can deploy quickly to areas
where we have no airfields, and they are
safe from insurgent attacks (though they
now appear to be vulnerable to Russian
Styx missiles) . But this flexibility comes at
a high price. Independent studies place the
cost of carrier-based tactical missions at
three to four times that of similar missions
flown from grbund fields. ,Because of the
many air bases we have built all over the
world, we can rapidly deploy land-based air-
craft to most areas. Carriers still play a
necessary role in providing the potential to
fight in a handful of otherwise inacces-
sible places and in meeting initial "surge"
requirements for a non-nuclear war. But
there is no justifiable reason to use them on
extended deployments in major wars as we
do now in Vietnam. Although the Defense
Department will neyer admit it, the only
reason we continue to employ carrier-based
air strikes there is that the jealous Navy
doesn't want to be shut out of some role in
the war.
Tactical aircraft carriers could be cut from
15 to 10 without risk to the country's secur-
ity. The average annual peacetime operating
and modernization/replacement cost per car-
rier appears to be about $120 million. As-
suming that the costs of expanding Air Force
tactical missions to take up the slack were
one-third as much, the net annual saving
from the elimination of five carriers would be
$400 million.
Marine Corps amphibious assault tactics
have been used in minor contingencies such
as Lebanon and the Dominican Republic,
but against a major power they would be
highly vulnerable to a tactical nuclear
weapon. Nor are Marine forces now struc-
tured logistically for sustained combat, the
type of war that Vietnam would suggest is
most probable. Without eliminating any Ma-
rine troops, we could?by restricting their
amphibious training and equipment and
phasing out a proportionate share of assault
ships?save $100 million annually.
A classic example of continued spending
for protection against a no longer important
threat is the third major area of Navy tacti-
cal forces?protection for shipping. The
structuring 9f our anti-submarine and sup-
porting antiaircraft and fleet escort forces
harks back to the post-World War II prospect
of a sea war with Russia. If we ever do begin
destroying each other's ships, there seems
little prospect of avoiding escalation to
nuclear war, which would make shipping
protection irrelevant. Further, as various
jumbo aircraft near production, the cost gap
between a ton-mile of plane transportation
and a ton-mile of ship transportation is nar-
rowing. Yet instead of scaling down our
protective forces, we are keeping them up and
even expanding them, through last year's im-
plausible decision to begin procuring VSX
anti-submarine aircraft. Killing this program
and reducing overall shipping defenses to a
sensible level?four anti-submarine carriers
and three air groups rather than the present
eight carriers?would save an annual $600
million.
Another major area in which our involve-
ment is unreasonably large is our troop com-
mitment in Europe. We have about 310,000
soldiers there now, accompanied by more than
200,000 dependents. Such a staggering share
of the NATO burden was appropriate while
our World War II allies struggled to get back
on their feet, but they can now afford a larger
load. Part of the thesis behind U.S. deploy-
ments is to make certain that any substantial
attack by Warsaw Pact forces would engage
American forces, thereby creating potential
consequences that the Soviet Union would
find untenable. But this could be assured
with far fewer than 310,000 U.S. troops. Says
Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), a former
Air Force Secretary recently assigned as chair-
man of a Foreign Relations subcommittee
that will investigate the involvement of U.S.
forces abroad: "Surely 50,000 American troops
would be sufficient to make sure that no
Soviet probe could succeed in Berlin or else-
where in Europe without a direct confronta-
tion with the United States."
In the event of a truly major Soviet at-
tack, not even 310,000 U.S. troops plus the
NATO allies' forces would be sufficient to
thwart it. But both sides recognize that an
assault of such proportions is likely to eyoke
a nuclear response.
Psychological reasons prevented us from
making a major cut in our European forces
close on the heels of the Russian takeover
In Czechoslovakia last year. But that should
not deter us from effecting the cut this year.
If anything, our non-response to the Czech
invasion simply reinforces the reality learned
in Hungary in 1956?that the United States
Is not about to send troops into Eastern Eu-
rope no matter what the Soviet provocation.
Realistically, we could cut back to a total
of 125,000 troops in Europe plus 50,000 at
home earmarked for NATO contingencies,
and cut by one-fourth the air power assigned
to the European theater (a McNamara com-
parison shows that NATO air forces can de-
liver a payloaa more than three times greater
than that of their Warsaw Pact counter-
parts). Altogether, these reductions would
annually save about $1.5 billion.
The final two programs of questionable
value--the SAGE-Air Defense Command sys-
tem and the Sentinel antiballistic missile
system share some common characteristics.
Both are defensive, in an age when the bal-
ance of terror rests on offensive missile
strength. Both encompass a detection func-
tion and an intercept- guidance function.
And numerous technical experts express
serious doubts about the potential opera-
tional effectiveness of either.
SAGE represents yesteryear's attempt to
defend against the Soviet version of our
Strategic Air Command. It is widely con-
ceded that the Soviets have grounded their
bomber development efforts and no longer
pose their primary strategic threat in this
area. Nonetheless we persist in trying to fur-
ther refine our bomber defenses, when in
fact we have already achieved a satisfac-
tory capability in the detection sphere.
Moreover, SAGE's role as a guide to inter-
ceptor pilots is rather superfluous, given
its imperfections and our primary reliance
on a strong offensive deterrent. Some reduc-
tions have already been effected in the Air
Defense Command, brit conversion from a
full defensive system to purely a warning
system ought to save $600 million annually.
If SAGE is intended to sustain a mostly
futile yesteryear system, the Sentinel ABM
represents a misguided attempt to provide
protection tomorrow. Against the destruc-
tive power of the missile, our best defense
is a good offense. Particularly tragic is the
staggering cost of a full-blown "thin" Sen-
tinel system. Because it is p expensive, and
the work is therefore parceled out to many
Congressional districts, many politicians
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDEZ1B0Q36LST0300090q04revraary 26, 1969
2 _
H 1276 CONGRESSIONAL itt,WKll ? Hu
have favored it. It therefore may be diffi-
cult to stop before we have spent $40 billion.
However, the Sentinel program faces in-
creasingly fervent opposition in the Senate
this year?partly because residents in Sour
cities where ABM sites are being developed -
have objected so loudly.
Sentinel would make some sense if it truly
promised blanket protection against stra-
tegic offensive missiles. But it doesn't. As
Secretary McNamara said in a speech in San
Francisco 18 months ago: "? . any anch Ms-
tern can rather obviously be defeated by: an
enemy simply sending more offensive war-
heads, or dummy warheads, than there_ are
defensive missiles capable of disposing- of
them."
Secretary McNamara imposed the Sen-
tinel, but President Johnkn overruled him
and decided to proceed With the program.
Today we are on the road toward building a
$5 billion ABM system, ostensibly for pro-
tection against Chinese missiles?as yet un-
developed?should Peking miscalculate Ilour
potential response and attack us.
It seems unrealistic not to expect the -So-
viets to perceive the $5 billion "thin" Sen-
tinel as a first stage in a $40 billion "thick"
defense against themselves. Senator Richard
B. Russell (D-Ga.) said as much last year
when he was chairman of the Senate Armed
Services Committee: ". . , there is no doubt
that this is a first step in a defense system
against an atomic attack from the Soviet
Union." Yet all seven of the men who have
served over the past decade in the jobs of
Science Adviser to the Preeistent or Director
of Research and Engineering in the Defense
Department have recommended against de-
ployment of a "thick" ABM system designed
to protect our population against a Soviet
attack.
By halting the Sentinel now, before it ac-
quires irreversiblesmomerdum, we could gave
$1.8 billion this year, not to mention vastly
larger sums during the next decade.
The items above do not exhaust the list of
things to cut?there are other savings to be
made in such areas as mapping operations,
the reserve forces, logistics?but the total
here will serve as a start, It amounts to a
total savings of $9,276,000,000.
vances, or a changing international political
environment. For example, the cturent struc-
turing of our programmed airlift/sealift
needs emanates from a carefully developed
linear programming model. This model at-
taches a high value to rapid deployment,
stemming from an early 1980's Europe-
oriented study which showed high benefits
in terms of political bargaining power and
casualty minimization. This analysis still
makes good sense in Europe, but now ap-
pears grossly misapplied in Asia. Yet nothing
has been done to revise the high :value placed
on rapid deployment. Such a change would
point to a different desired mix of airlift and
sealift.
Third, the Defense Department's budget
review process concedes too much at the
beginning. Last year's budgeted amounts are
generally taken by everyone as this year's
starting points. This practice ignores the
possibility that fat crept into preceding
budgets or that some of last year's activities
are now outmoded. Consider, for example,
the subject of training, in which the armed
services have been pioneering for years by
applying new technology to education. This
area should be a prime candidate for fre-
quent review from the ground up (what
the managers call "zero-base" budgeting).
Rather, the Defense Department budgeting
process virtually concedes last year's amount
and focuses on whatever, incremental phang-
es have been requested. The reSult, of course,
is higher budgets, with past errors com-
pounded year after year.
A fourth limitation also derives from the
planning and budgeting system. Discussions
about the desirable level of various forces
are conducted in terms of numbers of
things?missiles, carriers, fighter wings. This
flows naturally out of intelligence estimates
of enemy forces and subsequent analyses of
how much counterforce the 'United States
needs to nullify them. Approval is then given
to the Air Fore,e to buy 40 more-fighters or the
Navy to buy four more submarines, each
with specified capabilities. But carrying out
such purchases is not like walking into an
automobile showroom and asking for a yel-
low Plymouth Belvedere sedan with power
steering. As a submarine is built, many un-
anticipated choices present themselves; they
involve different levels of effectiveness or
convenience for different levelaof dollars. In-
evitably the generals and admirals want to
buy as much capability as poesible; it is al-
most always more than is required to meet
the threat. For want of adequate follow-up
by top procurement officials, the generals
often have their way.
Finally, the President and the Budget Bu-
reau have shied from making public any
meaningful comparisons between millitary
and domestic programs. Systems analysis, the
technique that aims to measure the relative
national worth of results obtained from
alternative programs, cannot precisely com-
pare the benefits to be gained from highly
diverse activities. Yet inexact as such com-
parisons may be, the Budget Bureau does
make them and present them to the Presi-
dent from time to time. If the President, for
his part, were to discuss national priorities
more frequently anti candidly' with the pub-
lic, then Congressmen might be less likely to
base their judgments on the only other
available view?that the present balance of
activities is about right.
The present balance of activities is any-
thing but right. Unmet national concerns for
human opportunity and the quality of life
require an investment even larger than the
amount that would be freed if all of the
Pentagon reforms outlined in this report
were carried out.
Perhaps the clearest, most thorough
delineation of these high-priority social
needs is found in the report of the National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. To
redress root causes of despair and frustra-
II
If all these Pentagon _budget cuts are so
obvious, why didn't the cost-conscious,-Mc-
Namara regime push them through? Did the
Whiz Kids fail? Were they really trying? I
think a fair assessment Would have to con-
clude that they were trying hard but were
only partly successful, for five basic reasons.
First, McNamara's Band was greatly out-
numbered by experienced adversaries bound
together by a shared goal- more and bigger
military programs. All the elements in this
military-industrial-Congressional complex
are served by an enlarged defense budget,
though their motivationS are different. In-
dustry wants greater sales and profits. The
military wants expanded power, plus the as-
surance that they will be On the forefroht of
technology. Congressmen respond to pres-
sure from contractors and military employees
in their districts, and those on the military
committees yearn for the prestige and power
that comes from presiding over a bigger slice
of the federal pie. The combination made life
difficult even for a man as strong and cour-
ageous as Robert McNamara.
Second, in selecting systems to analyze for
effectiveness, the Whiz Kids chose to con-
centrate on the relatively uncluttered stra-
tegic programs instead of digging into such
fat and messy activities, as we have cata-
logued here. Within their selected framework,
they generally performed technically seund,
objective initial analysm, Once they arrived
at a position, however, they too Often *ever
-
defended" their. CerlcliatoDs; that is, they
were tin:wining to reassta Ti tern against sub-
sequent cost experience, technological ad-
tion, the Commission recommended a long
series of measures which, if enacted in full,
would cost between $13 billion and $18 bil-
lion a year over their fuat several years.
The only way to begin addressing these
unfilled needs is to take money away from
Pentagon programs that must rank lower on
any rational national-priority scale. Exam-
ples provide compelling support for this argu-
ment. We have such choices as:
Funding the Manned Orbiting Labora-
tory?or providing Upward Bound summer
courses for the 600,000 additional ghetto
students who have the potential to go to
college:
Spending this year's Sentinel funds?or
training 510,000 more hard-core unemployed;
Continuing to operate one of the marginal
tactical aircraft carriers?or training and
supporting 20,000 more Teacher Corps mem-
bers,
Maintaining our full troop complement
in Europe?or diverting an additional $10
million to each of 150 Model Cities;
Permitting excessive contractor costs to
flourish unchecked?or providing Head Start
education for 2,250,000 more children, . plus
enough school lunches to feed 20 million
children for, a whole year.
These alternatives are real and immediate.
They do not represent wishful dreaming. The
choices are up to Mr. Nixon, to the Congress,
and ultimately to ourselves.
In real terms, no cost is too high for
true national security. Let there be no
doubt. I fully back any concept which
protects and advances the security of
this Nation. But I am unwilling to sup-
port fantasies of the military-industrial
complex in the quest for an ever-in-
creasing share of our national product.
It is absurd for Congress to authorize
a program which can cost up to $100
billion and which?even if it did work--
may concede the lives of up to 90 million
Persons. Other Members today are pre-
senting an overwhelming case document-
ing the sketchy premises upon which the
ABM system is being built. I shall not re-
peat those arguments. Justification for
ABM has yet to be proved, and it is non-
sense to continue to deploy the system
on the basis of the arguments brought
forth so far by its proponents.
Were scare merchants willing to put
as much effort into establishing a func-
tioning Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
and to seeking peaceful ways to end the
suicidal arms race, then I might hold a
different view of their judgment and
motives.
My own personal views on means of
achieving a secure and lasting peace are
best reflected by a major policy state-
ment recently released by the National
Council of Churches entitled "Defense
and Disarmament: New Requirements
for Security," which I would like to in-
sert in the RECORD at this point:
DEFENSE AND DISARmAmENT: NEW. REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR SECURITY
(NOTE.?fihis Background Paper is issued
by the Department of International Affairs of
the National Council of Churches for use in
connection with the NOC Policy Statement
on this same subject.)
/NTRODUCT1oN
It is the purpose of this statement to ad-
dress the issues of national defense and
security in Christian perspective in an effort
to provide a new concept of, and a new con-
text for, national security. We believe that a
new international community is coming into
being in the midst of the system of nation-
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
February 26, /450Wroved FoCIRAIORESSIMMPRECORFEDP-701110364R000300090004-2 H 1277
states, which for so long have been pre-
occupied with their own security?a security
understood largely in military terms. This
new system of increasingly global inter-
dependence is one in which security must be
seen more and more in its international
dimension?bound up with technology, inter-
national finance and trade, and cross-cul-
tural encounter. The world view that provides
the context for present United States defense
policies seems to be an inadequate reflection
of this reality.
One of the dominant elements of the post-
World War II period has been the "Cold War"
and the arms race that it has spawned and
on which it has fed. This phenomenon grew
largely out of the convergence of two his-
torical events?the development of atomic
and nuclear power and the ideological rivalry
between "the free world" and "Communism."
Enormous scientific and technological ad-
vances have put at man's disposal an un-
precedented amount of power. At the same
time, demands for national security, gen-
erated especially by the ideological and power
confrontation between the Great Powers,
have led to the channeling of a large portion
of this power potential into defense and
defense-related projects. Each of these events
has aggravated the other.
During the past two decades questions of
defense and national security have increas-
ingly become the chief concern of the United
States Government. A growing proportion of
our national substance is being channeled
into defense-related endeavors in a search
for increased security. This has created an
astronomical increase in the destructive
power of our military forces. As a result, the
problem in the nuclear age is no longer the
increase but the controlling and curbing of
power.
Without denigrating the legitimate duty of
nations to provide adequate protection and
security for their peoples, we believe that it
is incumbent upon Christians and others to
declare that an increase in military power, is
not necessarily an increase in security,
prestige, or any other value. If the require-
ments of a just peace and the understanding
of a responsible use of power, as suggested
by the National Council of Churches,' have
validity, it is therefore imperative that
Christians in the United States address them-
selves to questions raised by the United
States emphasis on military power in the pur-
suit of security.
The emerging international community is
at present more of a community of risks than
a community of mutual concern and action,
but it is .a historical reality and not simply a
disembodied ideal. The Christian faith must
recognize and celebrate the development of
this new universal community and must
view the policies of nations in this light.
That faith requires no less a perspective than
one that embraces all.nations, and it does not
permit the interest of any nation to become
absolute. Thus, both historical events and the
demands of the Christian faith lead us to
ask for a new approach to questions of na-
tional defense and security by the citizens
and the Government of the United States.
I. THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
Man in his finite freedom can use the
power he has developed in ways useful and
redemptive for humanity or in ways destruc-
tive and dehumanizing. The Christian must
therefore be particularly concerned, along
with all men of compassion and human sen-
sitivity, with the management of power, espe-
cially military power.
For the Christian this concern stems first
from his belief that God is Lord of creation.
Man has been given the whole of creation to
Policy' Statement, "Imperatives of Peace
and Responsibilities of Power," adopted by
the General Board on February 21, 1968.
tend, to develop, and to use in his freedom
for the common good. Creative in the image
of God, man is to be creative also, using
his God-given power anth freedom in ways
that will serve the common good and further
God's loving purposes for His world.
Second, this Christian concern stems from
the belief that God is sovereign over His
creation. The sovereignty of God imposes
limits on all national sovereignties and on
the use of power by these sovereignties. At
the same time it gives a degree of legiti-
macy to national sovereignty since, in our
era, it is the nation-state that is a primary
Instrument through which men work to
shape the conditions of human community?
conditions without which men could not
realize their intended potential.
Third, the concern of the Christian is
based on his belief that God is active in
His creation through participation in its
history. The sovereign Lord of creation is
also the God who "was in Christ, reconciling
the world to himself" and who calls us to be
agents of reconciliation. In our era, when
the political sphere is so determinative for
the direction of history and for human exist-
ence itself, the Christian must seek to dis-
cern and to respond to the political dimen-
sion of this reconciling activity.
Within this theological framework, there
has been historically a diversity of Christian
conscience regarding military power, its le-
gitimacy and use. For some defense is
grounded in the commission of government
to maintain peace and order in a world al-
ways threatened by chaos, to develop and
maintain a positive order of justice as a
work of love, and to provide a stable political
existence within which life may become more
genuinely human. For others, the use of
military power cannot be supported by
Christian teaching. For them, the reconcilia-
tion and love which the gospel proclaims
and to which it summons men are anti-
thetical to the use of military force. Most
would agree, however, that the roots of the
Christian concern for the management of
existing power, i.e., the belief in God as Crea-
tor, Sovereign, and Reconciler, place quali-
fications on its establishment and use. First,
man's responsibility for the created order is
a responsibility to preserve and develop it,
not to abuse and destroy it. The use of large
amounts Of the world's wealth and man-
power for the development of ever-improved
means of destruction calls into question the
quality of the stewardship man, exercises in
his care of the earth. Defense policies that
threaten the destruction of a large part of
the created order are likewise to be ques-
tioned.
Second, God's sovereignty, which imposes
limits on political sovereignty, also places
limits on the moral autonomy of any aspect
of the political order. A government's politi-
cal or military activity that tends to exceed
the limits of its commission or to frustrate
the intentions of that commission is in effect
an act of self-idolatry and a denial of God's
sovereignty. This precludes an uncritical "my
country right or wrong" attitude on the part
of Christians.
Third, God's reconciling act in Christ, the
response to which is the Christian vocation
of reconciliation, denies the ultimady of the
parochial political community and affirms
that the "enemy" is the brother for whom
Christ died. Defense policies that intend or
threaten to destroy the enemy society deny
the inclusiveness of the human community
and in effect reject the Christian mission
of reconciliation.
The function of politics, and the legitimate
concern for security must, according to
Christian faith, be controlled by and respon-
sive to God's creative, ordering, and recon-
ciling work. Man's relationship with man is
marked by much distrust, disorder, and
alienation, particularly in the relationships
among national communities. Technology
has created a community of mutual depend-
ence but not one of trust and mutuality. In
this political realm the Christian vocational
concern is not with establishing a perfectly
moral order. Rather, it is a concern to pro-
vide better conditions for an effective work
of love in which such trust and mutuality
can be more effectively realized, i.e. condi-
tions under which the mission of reconcilia-
tion can be carried on in relatively better
circumstances. The appropriate conditions
to be sought, however, may vary considera-
bly, depending on the situation calling for
a response. While we are to serve the growth
of community and reconciliation, we have
to seek them through an endless variety of
circumstances and in a world that often
does not permit us to seek them directly.
On the other hand, the mutuality of inter-
ests that does exist must be utilized to its
greatest advantage in order to broaden and
strengthen the basis for future interna-
tional cooperation.
I/. SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUA-
TION
As men and nations seek to create condi-
tions under which the work of reconciliation
can be carried on more effectively, there must
be a clear perception of the international sit-
uation to which they must respond.
Under present conditions the instruments
of international order are inadequate to re-
solve the most persistent and threatening
conflicts among the nations of the world.
Given these conditions, which we believe to
be transitional to more integral forms of
International community, it is to be expected
that the various nation-states will assume
the responsibility to maintain their own se-
curity arrangements, either individually or
in concert.
In the pursuit of such security arrange-
ments, however, at least two nations, the
United States and the USSR, have already
developed the power virtually to destroy
whole societies and to lay waste that social
fabric that is indispensable for meaningful
human existence. The goal of the policies
that resulted in this great accumulation of
power has been a legitimate one?national
security or, as it has sometimes been stated,
the kind of world in which we and others
wish to live. But there is real evidence that
this goal has not been fully achieved and
that, in fact, the defense policies and strate-
gies designed to realize it have in some ways
tended to thwart legitimate security goals.
In theological terms, the adequacy of
present defense policies must be questioned
in view of the following dangers: First, they
threaten to destroy the created order for
which man is responsible, not only because
of the immediate effects of nuclear blasts
and fire damage but also because of the long-
range effects of genetic damage and nuclear
contamination of the earth. The ecological
effects of chemical, biological, and radiolog-
ical warfare can be equally destructive of
the created order. Second, the requirements
of present policies seem to have become self-
validating in actual practice and to have
subordinated other values. Such relatively
unquestioned acceptance, often in the name
of military necessity, tends to make the poli-
cies self-justifying ends in themselves. Third,
the possibility of advanced escalation in an
actual nuclear war implies the destruction
of the adversary's population and social or-
der and, in so doing, denies the inclusiveness
of the human community. The destructive-
ness of large-scale conventional warfare may
have the same result. In each instance, then,
there is a breach of the limitations that the
Christian faith would place on defense
measures.
In political terms, the adequacy of present
defense policies must also be questioned in
the light of the criticisms of many knowl-
edgeable observers. There are several aspects
of the present international situation that,
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
H 1278 Approved For RetedraNg9M7ACIfteBEV BOWAll,00300090$13e46Lary
26,1969?'
In view of the positive political goals they
seek, call into question both the wisdom ahd
the effect of current national defense and
security arrangements. Among these are the
following:
(a) The national securifiy of the United
States has declined as the nuclear arms race
has increased. Though ouredefense capabili-
ties already go far beyond, 'the needs of de-
terrence, rarely in history have men been
so fundamentally insecure especially these
in nuclear nations. There le no adequate de-
fense against a sophisticated nuclear attack.
In a nuclear confrontation our massive power
could be employed only at the cost of recipro-
cal national suicide. Thus the mutual escala-
tion of the nuclear arms race increases oxily
mutual destructive capabilities. It does not
increase security.
(b) The distrust and suspicion of the Cold
War are often further exacerbated by some
of the military postures that are designed to
cope with it. Mutual deterrence can easily
generate new fears, lead M higher levels of
unnecessary armaments, and undermine ef-
forts toward arms reduction and mutual ac-
commodation, which ere neeeseary for a sta-
ble international order. Segardless of in-
tentions, actions by either the United States
or the USSR to increase its nuclear capa-
bilities trigger similar reactions on the other
side. So long as this "action-reaction phe-
nomenon," which fuels the arms race, cem-
tinues, fears will be aggralated rather than
allayed and nuclear arsenal's, already greatly
in excess of what Ls needed to be credible, will
continue to grow.
(c) The nuclear arms race and the per-
petuation of the Cold Wax have resulted in
an enormous outlay of money and resources
for military purposes which jc dpardizes other
national programs. With the added impetus
of the Vietnam war, two thirds of our total
national expenditures are now spent for de-
fense-related purposes, Curreetly, the mili-
tary expeeditures of all nations amount to
about $140 billion annually, with the $72
billion United States defense budget for fiseal
1969 more than equaling the defense expendi-
tures of all the rest of the weed combined.
This vast use of our money, manpower, nat-
ural resources, expertise, and energy for de-
fense-related purposes removes these re-
sources from more humane teed constructive
uses, and perpetuates the long-standing ne-
glect of increasingly dew-ems domestic
problems. It also means increasingly inade-
quate efforts to deal with the overwhelming
security problem posed by the world's hun-
gry and deprived majority. The $140 billion
spent by the nations annually for defeese
pales into insignificance the $9 billion spent
by all nations for international development.
(d) The power and influence that inevi-
tably accompany the control of such a large
portion of our national resevrces mean that
military considerations new influence vir-
tually all other national decisions. This is
not to say that some conspiratorial military-
industrial cabal is responsible for this phe-
nomenon. It is doubtlessly more accurate to
see it as the result of a huge military es-
tablishment, whose needs have of necessity
given rise to a large private defense and ee-
search industry. Together, tied by bonds
of common interest, they, have become a
major political force. Nevertheless, the re-
sult has been that the issues of war and
peace, of international trade, of economic
development at home and abroad, and of
science and higher education are being de-
termined increasingly by government deci-
sions concerning strategic deployment of
military forces and weapons and military
technology. The allocation of the nation's
resources, the determination of its priorities
and purposes, and the possibility of free
political debate and acadenak inquiry are all
aft e ate cl by:these decisions,
(e) There are dehumanSing elements in
the nuclear strategies of the Cold War.
Weapons of mass destruction lead inevitably
to calculations of human destruction in
terms such as "rnegadeaths," as opposed to
the more sobering "one million dead human
beings." This effectively dehumanizes the
enemy, especially when he is also thought
of collectively in ideological terms like
"Communists" or "Cong." The remoteness
of push-button warfare, removing the ene-
my from the immediate presence of his ad-
versary and making killing easier psycho-
logically, strengthens this tendency. Dehu-
manization is also a danger within the na-
tion. The agceptance by the populace of a
national commitment to use weapons of
mass destruction can, over a long period of
time, lead to ethical desensitization. This
can also be the result of living in what has
been termed a "weapons culture," a socie-
ty increasingly devoted to and organized for
the production of the tools of war.
(f) An overly ideological approach to the
world's ills on both sides influences the per-
ception of events and causes distorted in-
terpretations of the facts to fit the pre-
conceived ideology. The oversimplified and
now outdated bipolar world view, formulated
at the end of World War II and still adhered
to in some quarters, tends only to perpetuate
the dated dogmas of the Cold War. Such a
world view seems increasingly inadequate
to describe the contending interests within
and between blocs and the neve realization
of common interests between supposedly im-
placable foes. This gap between perception
and reality can only exacerbate the danger-
ous Cold War rivalry, slow down the advance
toward international order, and have a de-
leterious effect on that open communication
between nations that is essential for under-
standing and reconciliation. At the same
time, such an ideologically-colored percep-
tion of reality can set in motion the mechan-
ism of the self-fulfilling prophecy.
III. A NEW CONTEXT FOR SECURITY
The demands of the Christian faith, and
the most salient features of the international
situation to which Christians must respond,
lead us to ask for a new approach to national
defense and security issues on the part of the
citizens and the Government of the United
States. Such an approach should encompass
at least three interrelated requirements:
A. A first requirement is a new under-
standing of security. We believe that present
military planning, with its emphasis on the
continuing buildup of military forces, is out
of touch with the real security needs of the
nation. In our world, security is not to be
found in vast defense establishments, which
in a variety of ways often help to exacerbate
the very insecurity they are meant to alle-
viate. Moreover, excessive preoccupation with
the limited area of military security danger-
ously narrows the national perspective on the
broader meaning of security.
The present threat to United States secu-
rity arises from neglect of social justice?a
result in part of defense spending?and re-
veals a new and tragic dimension to the prob-
lem of security, for which traditional con-
cepts are inadequate. National security in the
modern world must be supplied by interna-
tional processes and institutions for arms
limitation and control, for peace-keeping and
peacemaking, for development, for finance,
and for adjudication, rather than by immense
defense establishments. Only a new under-
standing of national security and its integral
relationship to the needs of the underde-
veloped world can make international secu-
rity possible.
B. A second requirement is a new approach
to the use of national resources. We believe
that, while national security does require the
maintenance of an adequate military force,
the level el armaments reached today far ex-
ceeds that needed for security and is leading
us to ignore the desperate plight of many of
our own citizens and of people throughout
the world. A national security that is sup-
plied by international processes and institu-
tions calls for a use of United States
resources?money, manpower, natural re-
sources, and expertise?eommensurate with
the requirements of justice and peace. The
building of our own nation and the use of
our resources to help others build their na-
tions are the two primary tasks. A major
shift from the objective of increasing mili-
tary capabilities to the objective of sound
development- and nation-building is neces-
sary to meet these tasks.
C. A third requirement is a new emphasis
on human rights and values. We believe that
defense policies should be, in the last anayl-
sis, for the service of human life on earth,
and must be constantly revised in the light
of what they are designed to defend. Other-
wise it may be possible for the defense es-
tablishment to make its work an end in it-
self, to become overly fascinated by the tools
of war and their efficiency, and to forget or
even unconsciously to thwart the purpose
they are to serve. That purpose is, simply, to
act so that man's life on earth may have
the stability required to enable it to become
human.
Emphasis on the human ends of defense
means also that citizens must regain a
greater degree of control over the military
services that seek to protect them. Defense
policy has been increasingly removed from
effective political processes. It is a part of
our present mentality that defense problems
are left to -the "experts," and that largely
without question the citizens pay the im-
mense bills that result. The right and duty
of citizens to debate and to express them-
selves in defense matters must be reawak-
ened. They must insist that their resources
be used to meet real and pressing human
needs, not applied to military goals, which
bear little relation to those needs. They must
reject the tendency, both at home and
abroad, to answer deep issues of human
rights in terms of coercion or suppression.
There is a need for a new establishment of
priorities between the claims of military de-
fense and the claims of human rights and
values.
The foregoing context for reappraising the
meaning of security suggests the preliminary
necessity of acknowledging that the present
policy of maintaining nuclear superiority is
ultimately futile. There ia no advantage to
be gained by nuclear superiority, however it
is computed, when each side is admittedly
capable of inflicting overwhelming damage
on the other, even after being attacked first.
Such effective parity has been operative for
some years. Any effort to achieve superiority
only leads to ever-higher levels of armaments
as it forces the side with the lesser capa-
bility to seek to overcome its inferiority and
forces the side with the greater capability
to seek to maintain its superiority. In the
wake of this action-reaction phenomenon
comes a decrease in both stability and se-
curity.
The political context of international rela-
tions has changed sufficiently to allow for
and even encourage a movement toward a
decline in the importance of nuclear weapons.
That context ineludes positive political forces
that provide opportunities to strengthen the
bonds of international community and to
make possible reductions in military stock-
piles. Once the meaninglessness of nuclear
superiority is acknowledged, those positive
forces can be more widely perceived and
utilized. Communism, for example, is no
longer monolithic. The extreme hostility of
the Cold Wax years has been reduced, and
even in spite of Vietnam a limited but real
spirit of mutual accommodation has de-
veloped.
The United States and the USSR both real-
ize that war between them is unacceptable
and that, while many differences remain,
there are many areas of mutual interest.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
February 26, iwnoved For 851ftsitigliWKOZ iaebtlyt1:671INS&F000300090004-2 111279
Both have critical domestic problems call-
ing for attention. Both also are beginning
to understand that cooperative efforts to help
solve the problems of the developing world
are necessary lest these problems one day
threaten the security of both of them.
The effort to encourage a new approach to
national defense and security issues, there-
fore, does not have to take place in an in-
ternational milieu completely alien to the
goals of that effort or completely unsympa-
thetic to its requirements. That attempt can
and must capitalize on the common interests
and concerns already built into the present
international situation. In addition to the
elements of disorder, there are also elements
of order present. The Christian political vo-
cation must seek to utilize these elements as
it seeks to restore defense to its proper lim-
its and to subordinate it to the demands of
justice and the work of reconciliation among
peoples and nations.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR ACTION
Many years of effort to seek mutual agree-
ments on the control and reduction of the
Instruments of force have netted little agree-
ment. There have been a few successful ef-
forts, most notably the 1963 partial test ban
treaty, the outer space treaty, and the nu-
clear nonproliferation treaty. These have
been constructive steps, and have helped to
lay the foundation for more far-reaching
agreements. The United States' efforts in con-
cluding these agreements are to be corn-
mended. The nonproliferation treaty, now
awaiting ratification by all nations, is an im-
portant and necessary step toward preventing
the further decline in the security of all
nations that would result from the prolifera-
tion of nuclear capabilities, and from the en-
suing regional arms races and drain on scarce
resources. But these agreements have done
little to halt the nuclear arms race among
the Great Powers or to allay the mutual fear
and distrust, which that arms race both re-
flects and perpetuates. Neither have they
brought about a new approach to the prob-
lems of defense and security.
In striving to achieve the objectives re-
quired for a national reorientation on issues
of defense and security, what is called for in
terms of next steps? The following are sug-
gested as illustrations:
A. Arms control and arms limitation
A general prerequisite for meaningful
progress in arms control efforts is a good
deal more flexibility in arms control nego-
tiations and a greater readiness to undertake
such things as unilateral steps, reductions
by mutual example, and relaxation of veri-
fication requirements. Such flexibility can
lead to mutual accommodations that will
offer a more promising prospect for major
steps toward both disarmament and broader
but directly related political settlements.
Specifically, it seems essential that the fol-
lowing measures be implemented:
1. A mutual halt in the further production
and deployment of strategic offensive and
defensive missile systems. The 1961 United
States proposal "to explore a verified freeze
in the number and characteristics of stra-
tegic nuclear offensive and defensive vehi-
cles" deserves renewed emphasis, though ex-
plorations should not be restricted to this
specific formula. A halt in the production
of the weapons of greatest destructiveness
would reduce the fear of the development by
one side of a decisive first-strike capability,
thereby strengthening internal resistance on
each side against pressures for more ICBM's
or antiballistic missiles. A unilateral United
States freeze, at least for a finite period of
time, should also be considered.
A mutual halt in the deployment of mis-
sile systems, at -least for an agreed period of
time, would add to the security of both the
'United States and the USSR. Each can now
assure the destruction of an unnecessarily
large percentage of the other's population,
regardless of enemy defense capabilities.
Such a halt could be effectively monitored by
existing national satellite observation capa-
bilities. Such a halt, in either production or
deployment, not only would increase security
but also would open the way for reduction
In strategic arms and defense spending. Any
such halt should be followed by negotiations
to begin actual reduction of strategic
weapons.
Specifically in regard to defensive weap-
ons, every effort should be made to resist the
pressures to expand the present plan for a
"limited" deployment of a United States anti-
ballistic missile system. Some would even
seek to rescind the decision to begin an ABM
deployment. The decision to deploy the ABM
can have serious consequences for both the
world political climate and the real security
of the nation, particularly if those who see
it as a first step to a heavy, Soviet-oriented
system are heeded.
2. Widespread support for the nonprolifer-
ation treaty. A halt in the further spread of
nuclear weapons to nations which do not
yet possess them is an important and neces-
sary step in reducing the danger of nuclear
war. The development and possession of such
weapons by an Increasing number of nations
would increase the possibility that these
weapons will be used, thereby threatening
the peace and security of all nations. Region-
al rivalries could lead to arms races all over
the world and the draining of scarce re-
sources from more constructive projects.
Thus the nuclear nonproliferation treaty
agreed to by the United States and the USSR
and awaiting the approval of all nations de-
serves strong support.
3. A mutual cessation of the production
of fissionable material for military purposes,
under IAEA-approved safeguards, and the
transfer of agreed quantities to peaceful
uses. Such a step would cut off the supply
of an essential ingredient for the further
production and testing of nuclear weapons.
This would be an appropriate response to
the demand of the non-nuclear powers for
some step toward nuclear self-denial by the
nuclear powers. Recognizing the great need
in the world for new sources of energy for
constructive purposes, and the great eco-
nomic potential available through the peace-
ful uses of nuclear energy, we also urge the
United States to continue to seek ways to
make the peaceful services of nuclear ex-
plosives and nuclear fuel available to non-
nuclear states, through appropriate inter-
national bodies and with safeguards against
their use for military purposes.
4. A comprehensive test ban treaty, taking
into full account available national means
of detection and inspection. Further im-
provements in nuclear weaponry will not
significantly affect the military balance.
Therefore the degree of assurance against
violation of a nuclear test ban can be re-
laxed. Technological developments have also
greatly improved the nation's ability to detect
and identify nuclear weapons tests, thereby
making an on-site inspection provision less
critical. Continued testing only acig as an
incentive to the nuclear arms race.
5. A United Nations declaration forbidding
nations to place weapons of mass destruc-
tion on the seabed. This is an environment
not yet penetrated by nuclear weapons.
Every effort to prevent the introduction
of such weapons into areas that are cur-
rently nuclear-free, as has been done in the
Antarctic and in outer space, is to be sup-
ported. The United States intention to ad-
here to the Latin American nuclear-free
zone treaty is to be commended.
6. Continued study and planning in prob-
lems related to conversion from defense to
nondefense production. Study and planning
on conversion are essential in order to avoid
serious dislocation in the economy and also
to avoid any tendency to prolong wars for
the sake of the economy. Adequate planning
can help to bring about a transition with a
minimum disruption of the economy, can
release funds for the urgent domestic needs
of our nation, and can stimulate thinking
about opportunities for further productive
use of our resources.
7. Efforts to strengthen international
measures against the production and use of
chemical and bacteriological weapons. These
weapons can be developed with relative ease.
Every effort must therefore be made to
strengthen international revulsion against
the use of such weapons, to seek binding
agreements not to use such weapons, and to
develop effective control and verification
measures to reinforce international restraints.
Some of these steps are already United
States policy. Others are not. But in all cases
they are first steps which will do little more
than freeze the status quo. Their significance
will lie primarily in the extent to which they
reflect a new, dominating determination to
proceed more drastically, so that further
steps in the control and reduction of arma-
ments may be achieved.
B. Defense spending and use of resources
1. Significant reduction in United States
defense spending and the channeling of the
funds into development projects both at
home and abroad. The fiscal 1969 United
States defense budget equals our total na-
tional budget of only a few years ago, sur-
passing the total national economies of the
great majority of nations, including China,
and dwarfing our expenditures for both for-
eign aid and our critical domestic needs. New
demands for substantial increases in the al-
ready appallingly large military budget are
constantly being made.
The seemingly sacrosanct nature of the de-
fense budget, as evidenced by the limiting
of calls for economy to "nondefense" spend-
ing and by the minimal critical appraisal of
its size and content, must be challenged. The
imperatives of the Christian faith call for
support for the poor and downtrodden, jus-
tice for the oppressed, and a responsible
stewardship of our wealth and resources.
These demands in this case coincide with
both the best traditions and the highest
interests of our nation. As long as the gulf
between the developed and underdeveloped
segments of mankind remains and even
grows wider, there can be little progress to-
ward a more humane global order or toward
reconciliation among men, either at home OT
abroad. Toward this end, every nation should
reexamine its use of its own resources.
For the United States, only a reversal of its
national priorities, as those priorities are ac-
tually reflected in our national budget, can
hope to have a significant effect. A realistic,
independent assessment of security needs,
free from the rationalizations of dying ide-
ologies and outdated slogans, indicates that
we do not need to wait for complex agree-
ments on balanced military budget reduc-
tions before some cuts can be made. The
termination of the Vietnam war and progress
in controlling the arms race could and should
lead to defense budget cuts of at least $25
billion per year.
2. A radical, curtailing and strict control-
ling of the supply of arms to other coun-
tries. The proliferation and distribution of
non-nuclear weapons, as practiced by the
major industrialized nations, tends to fuel
regional arms races and regional wars, en-
courages military government and the sup-
pression of needed social change, and drains
from underdeveloped nations critically
needed resources for economic development.
It also works to uhdermine both our long-
range national interests and the quest for
better conditions for an effective work of
reconciliation among men.
The supply of sophisticated weapons to
underdeveloped nations should be hated.
Arms competition with the Soviet Union
should stop. The United States, as the largest
supplier of conventional arms to other na-
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
111280 Approved For ReedratORMINACICOMBOIMOE003000900,04,-2
li'eoruary 261' 1969
tions, should seek an agreement with other
suppliers to form a conventional arms mora-
torium on certain conventional weapons,
such as missiles and jet aircraft. It should
also seek agreement on registration of all
arms shipments with the United Nations. In
the interim it should refrain from further
endangering stability, espeffially in sensitive
areas, by unilaterally curtailing its arms
transfers. The long-term consequences of the
uncontrolled and growing world traffic in
arms outweigh any short-term advantage
such as influence over military elites or an
improved balance of payments. Such a
method of solving the problem of interna-
tional insecurity is demonstrably self-
defeating.
C. Peacekeeping, peactiniaking, and
disarmament
1. An increase in United States efforts to
strengthen the United Nations as a peace-
keeping and peacemaking agency. In a nu-
clear age, when no amount of offensive or de-
fensive weaponry can preclude nuclear
catastrophe, there seems to be no rational or
moral alternative to the development of sal
adequate system of international collective
security under the aegis of the United Na-
tions. An effective United Nations peace-
keeping capacity will require a significant
measure of Great Power cooperation. They
and their principal allies must come to the
understanding that unilateral and competi-
tive peace-keeping will be more likely to mag-
nify than to reduce the risk to national se-
curity and that a mutually acceptable and
manageable way of limitingathese risks would
be to strengthen the peace-keeping capacity
of the United Nations. This could lead to a
substantially more effective United Nations,
which could replace the military posturing of
the worldwide Great Power confrontation and
thereby help to relieve the inherent insecu-
rity of nations which are now prisoners of
their mutual distrust.
As examples of appropriate efforts we rec-
ommend that:
(a) Member nations of the United Nations
train and maintain in readiness special forces
that would be available for use in United
Nations peace-keeping operations. Countries
now maintaining forces for United Nations
use for peace-keeping operations should be
encouraged to make bilateral agreements
with the United Nations Security Council,
under Article 43 of the Charter, to specify
conditions, including financing, for the use
of these forces. Other countries should be
encouraged to make similar agreements,
thus putting on a more permanent basis the
availability of national forces to the United
Nations.
(b) The United States -accept the com-
pulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice. The Congress is urged to
repeal the Connally Amendment, which de-
clares that United States acceptance of such
jurisdiction does not apply to matters with-
in United States domestic jurisdiction as that
is defined by the United States.
(c) All nations be encouraged to seek a
nonintervention treaty designed to keep the
Great Powers out of local disputes, to pro-
vide for United Nations observation machin-
ery in such instances, and to allow for an
automatic United Nations investigating
force for use in nations that claim they are
being subverted. Peace-keeping, if it is not
to become war-making, is a task that must
be performed collectively.
2. A major and sustained effort by the
United States, in conjunction with other
nations, for substantial and rapid progress
toward arms control and general disarma-
ment. This has been a goal of United States
policy since 1961, and since 1962 the United
States has participated in-continuing inter-
national disarmament negotiations with
limited but significant success. There must
be a constant awareness of the necessity not
to treat disarmament in isolation from the
political conditions that cause international
tensions or from the total peace-building
process?a process that must include meas-
ures to enable the United Nations to become
an effective agency for keeping the peace.
Within such a context, progressive disarma-
ment through international agreement can
release the resources and manpower of many
nations, thereby making a substantial con-
tribution to the welfare of humanity.
The defense postures and strategies of the
major powers both reflect and to some ex-
tent perpetuate the distrust and alienation
that characterize the fractured international
community. In seeking a just and peaceful
International order, Christians must first
seek to ameliorate the conditions that set
men against each other and to create condi-
tions in which reconciliation can take place.
In doing this, much of the actual work will
of necessity take the form of ground-clear-
ing and obstacle-removing, clearing the way
for a new approach to the issues of defense
and security.
'Present policies call into question our
stewardship of our God-given resources, our
national sense of priorities, and our wisdom
in the management of power. A serious exam-
ination of the assumptions behind these
policies, and their actual effect on real se-
curity in our revolutionary world, could
greatly improve the chances of at least a
limited Great Power accommodation so nec-
essary for a just pease and a stable interna-
tional order. It is in such accommodation
and the "technical" measures of arms con-
trol that will result, as much as it is in
zealous advocacy of peace in general terms,
that our hope lies for avoiding disaster and
for improving the conditions for reconcilia-
tion among nations.
But in order to achieve these measures it
is necessary to stop thinking in obsolete
terms. There must be a new context for look-
ing at defense matters, requiring on the part
of churchmen and all citizens a change of
concepts, disposition, will, and determina-
tion. Such a reorientation can bring the
United States to use its power in the years
ahead to secure the development of nations
and peoples, including its own, and to es-
tablish the international structures neces-
sary for world order, justice, and peace. Only
such a reordering of priorities can lead us
toward real security.
Today's colloquy on ABM has generally
concentrated on the external forces
which have led to the initial deployment
decision. I recognize that external pres-
sures hold a key place in the ABM con-
troversy. I would again want to empha-
size that we must not be deluded from
recognizing that internal factors have
played a dangerous and leading role in
the push for ABM.
Ever since the Vietnam war escala-
tions, policymakers here in Washington
have acted as if all national priorities
were predicated upon the direction of
events in Southeast Asia. That is, do-
mestic policy was secondary to foreign
policy. The result has been a festering of
the ills of our cities and a decreasing of
hopes and aspirations for a better life
by millions of poor Americans while we
continue to pour billions of dollars into
a wasteful war. Very few persons have
gained from such a ranking of priorities,
and, many?both at home and abroad?
suffered greatly.
Today, with whatever chances we have
of peace in Southeast Asia beginning to
brighten slightly, policymakers again
are faced with making hard choices.
Where we go from here can be dictated
by a commitment to some rational sense
of priorities, or we can be thrown back
into the morass of frustration once more.
Our decision on ABM will be pivotal.
If we bow to the superhawks, to the
scarce-merchants, to the profiteers, we
will only be enhancing the arms race. In
the end, relatively few will gain?if any
at a11?and perhaps the whole world will
suffer.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I would
just like to say that I hope we can devote
more time to an analysis of the profound
implications of this issue which, despite
the very excellent debate this afternoon,
we have only begun to touch upon in
terms of all of the various things that
need to be brought into this discussion.
I would be very, very unhappy if I
thought that we were progressing on a
tragic course as a result of political de-
cisions made in 1967, for which there is
no longer any validity, and that we do
not have the guts here in this Congress
to rise up and to question whether or
not the basic security of this country is
going to be furthered or hindered as a
result of actions which we take.
Again I thank the gentleman for
yielding me this time.
Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. REUSS. I yield to the gentleman
from Connecticut.
Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman for yielding.
I want to commend the gentleman
from Indiana who posed several ques-
tions that I believe bring this debate and
discussion into real perspective, and I
am delighted that the gentleman did so,
because to me it indicates the very es-
sense of what we are discussing here, and
what we are trying to accomplish here,
and that is a full-scale review of whether
we should continue along the lines we
have already adopted through authori-
zation and appropriation for the Sen-
tinel system.
But the gentleman from Indiana
raised a question which is significant,
wherein he stated that he was concerned
by the fact that some statements were
made here today that indicate that if
we did not spend the money for defense
items such as the ABM system, we would
have this money available for expendi-
tures on some of our other needs, par-
ticularly the needs of a domestic and
urban nature.
I agree with the gentleman from Indi-
ana that this should not be an "either-
or" proposition, or a guns-or-butter
proposition, because I certainly feel that
the highest priority that we as a nation
can have is our defense and our safety,
as a nation.
Our defense capability, therefore, must
be adequate to assure this, because if we
do not have this we will not exist as a
nation, and will not be able to do any
of the things which must be resolved in
the cities.
Certainly we should not put this de-
bate on the plane that if we stave the
money in defense, or ABM systems, we
would then have this money available to
use in our cities.
I believe that would be an ill-advised
argument on whether or not to go ahead
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
'Febrzcary 26, 1 :?roved FoEl5gffffeSi9Wint@IMP-P-71159M4R000300090004-2 H 1281
with the ABM system. I believe the ABM
system must stand on its own feet as to
whether or not it is an effective weapon
in our arsenal of defense.
The other question that was raised
then was: Why, then, if there is so much
opposition to it does the military feel
disposed to proceeding and going ahead
with it?
It has been obvious for quite a few
years there has been opposition to the
development of an ABM system. Former
Defense Secretary Mr. McNamara was
opPosed to it until he decided otherwise
at a later date. Former Presidents have
been opposed to it. I understand that
President Eisenhower was opposed to it
and that President Kennedy was not dis-
posed toward deploying an ABM system.
The same is true so far as President
Johnson is concerned and President
Nixon at this very date wants a full-scale
study into this matter to decide whether
or not to proceed.
Of course, the military has been in
favor of it. I have the highest regard for
the military. They are our experts in
this area.
But it is up to us as civilians to tell
them when to put the brakes on because
they would otherwise have us proceeding
with all forms of weapons expenditures
as they did in the case of the B-70 or in
the case of the Skybolt and perhaps in
the case of the F-111.
But we have responsibilities as civilians
after being given the facts by our mili-
tary experts to determine whether or
not we should proceed in this area.
I suspect the reason we have so much
opposition by the former administration
to the deployment of the ABM system
and then subsequently were told that it
was in our best interest to proceed with
an anti-ballistic missile system last
year?I suspect the reason for that
change in position was not so much that
it was not scientific and not based on
whether or not it would work effectively
as a defense weapon, but in fact that it
was a political decision?political in the
international sense. Because of the fact
the Russians had deployed a system
around Moscow and Leningrad and be-
cause we were planning to negotiate and
to talk with the Russians on the reduc-
tion of nuclear weapons and nonprolif-
eration and armaments in general.
I believe it became a political weapon?
that we would be in a better bargaining
position with the Russians if we were to
deploy an ABM system.
My answer to that is that we are not
in a better bargaining position if we de-
ploy an ABM system which will not be
effective. The greatest weapon that we
have in any discussion with the Russians
and the greatest argument we bave with
them is?you do not have a first strike
capability against us and we do not have
one against you.
To assure that we do not lose out on
our side insofar as any nuclear deterrent
is concerned, we must rely, as has been
said time and again on this floor?we
must rely on our offensive weapons that
the Russians know about and are aware
of. If they realize and recognize the
strength of our offensive weapons and
they do not have a first strike capability
against us, then this is the greatest
weapon that we could have in any forth-
coming discussion with the Russians to
reduce armaments and to reduce the
threat of nuclear war.
I think this is the reason why there
was a change of position by the former
administration when it suggested to the
Congress to change our position and that
now we should go ahead with the deploy-
ment of an ABM system. I think it is
faulty and I do not think it will really
give us an edge with the Russians. I
think we will be expending billions of
dollars and not be coming up with an
adequate defense system. We will, in fact,
have accomplished nothing but increased
the escalation in nuclear power both in
our own arsenal and in the Russian
arsenal.
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. REUSS. I yield to the gentleman.
(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, I thank
the gentleman from Wisconsin for yield-
ing.
Mr. Speaker, I think the debate today
led by the gentlemen from California
and Wisconsin and by the gentleman
from Illinois who I understand will fol-
low shortly?this discussion of the ABM
system is probably the most important
thing that we will do in this House per-
haps this year.
I was concerned last year when the
Senate?I think a third of the Senate
was exercised enough to vote against
this system and still we had a very diffi-
cult time in bringing this body up to
speed with respect to these problems of
deployment of this ABM system.
About 7 months ago the question of
anti-ballistic-missile deployment was de-
bated on this floor. At that time with
others I made a number of objections to
the deployment program. Since that orig-
inal debate, there has been a mounting
escalation of criticism by both the public
and the scientific community, as well as
by many of my distinguished colleagues
on this floor Said in the Senate. There is
good reason for this growing disenchant-
ment with the proposed deployment of
the Sentinel ABM system. This program
was conceived as the ultimate deterrent
to enemy nuclear aggression, yet the best
scientific advice agrees that the defensive
shield it is supposed to afford is but a
sieve that can be easily penetrated by
over-targeting the defended area with
enough missiles to exhaust the system, or
by the use of semisophisticated decoy or
screening devices. I made these argu-
ments last year, and I restate them again
today. The arguments were valid 7
months ago, and there has been no indi-
cation that the technical situation has
changed. The proposed system is still a
"maginot line."
A very readable and excellent summa-
tion of the technical deficiencies in the
Sentinel system was published in the
March 1968 issue of Scientific American
by Nobel laureate, Hans Bethe, and Prof.
Richard L. Garwin. I would again com-
mend this article to my colleagues.
The arguments presented in this article
have not been successfully contested, but
have in fact been buttressed by the lead-
ing members of the scientific community,
including all the past scientific advisers
to the Presidents?inarguably, a distin-
guished group.
In September of. 1967, this ABM pro-
gram got off the ground with a speech
by the then Secretary of Defense McNa-
mara. In this speech, the Secretary pro-
posed the establishment of the system,
but qualified his endorsement of the con-
cept very strongly. These qualifications
stand out as prophetic and bear repeating
again today. Here I quote:
There is a kind of mad momentum intrinsic
to the development of all new nuclear weap-
onry. If a weapon system works?and works
well?there is strong pressure from many
directions to procure and deploy the weapon
out of all proportion to the prudent level
required.
The danger in deploying this relatively
light and reliable Chinese-oriented ABM sys-
tem is going to be that pressures will develop
to expand it into a heavy Soviet-oriented
ABM system.
We must resist that temptation firmly?,
not because we can for a moment afford to
relax our vigilance against a possible Soviet
first strike?but precisely because our great-
est deterrent against such a strike is not a
massive, costly, but highly penetrable ABM
shield, but rather a fully credible offensive
assured destruction capability.
I would say that we are not just a
group of unilateral disarmorors here to-
day, those that are making some re-
monstrance with the expenditure for the
ABM system. I think the reason for it
is the fact that the Department of De-
fense has not made out their prima facie
case. When they came before my House
Armed Services Committee, they indi-
cated that this was going to be a $5
billion system, that it had been reason-
ably thought out, that the costs were
reasonably within control. However, they
admitted that the system would not be
good as to a cruise missile, it would not
be good as to a fractional orbiting mis-
sile, it would not be good as to multiple
missiles, and it would not be good as to
the MIRV or the independent reentry
vehicle.
A few moments ago the gentleman
from Indiana said, "Well, wouldn't you
be cut short, you folks, if the Chinese
lobbed a missile over in your direction
in about 3 years and you did not have
a defensive system?"
Well, the point is that in about 3 years
this system will not have been completed.
We are going to spend $2 billion this
year, and we are not going to have any
defense this year. We are not going to
have any defense in 1970, we are not
going to have any defense in 1971, 1972,
or 1973?maybe in 1974 or 1975 if these
ideal conditions arise, where we build
our system and the Chinese have devel-
oped a very unsophisticated system of
about 30 missiles, according to the best
scientific advice that we have today. We
will be able to knock out about 80 per-
cent of those missiles, and that will be
good for maybe 1974 and 1975. But then
in 1976, 1977, and 1978, when the Chinese
develop a capability of 40, 50, or 60 mis-
siles, then our defensive capability with
our eurrent technology devolves from
about 80 percent down to about 15 per-
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71B00364R000300090004-2
H 1282 Approved For ReletwipHieggr? 9 - 13113(196M00300090p04-2
eor ry 26, _4969
cent. Then what we suspect is that the
Department of Defense is really engaged
in the most fallacious and speculative
investment ever known to mankind, be-
cause what they want to do is not to
spend the $5 billion that they said they
wanted to spend last year, but to spend
the $9 billion that they have said they
want to spend this year to build the sys-
tem, and perhaps another $40 billion in
trying to keep pace wtih the State of the
art and with the developments of the
Chinese.
We know?and an article was published
the other day on this subject?that when
you are trying to build a system based on
a high-risk development, the costs are
generally 250 percent of your minimum
estimate. The minimum estimate of a
fixed system to handle a complex Rus-
sian system is $50 billion- 250 percent
of that amount is a good figure. For
those of you who think that we are going
to be disarmed if we do not build this
system, keep in mind where we are. My
colleague from southern California men-
tioned a moment ago that perhaps we
cannot afford this system. I think he is
dead right. I think we should keep in
mind that in spite of the fact that we
have toned down the war over the past 4
months, our defense budget is $2 billion
more than last year and at about $83 bil-
lion. We still have an obligation of $6
billion to cover the cost of past wars and
benefits for veterans. That brings the
amount to $89 billion. We have $2 billion
from space fallout for defense; we have
$1 billion cost of atomic energy in fallout
for defense, and a $16 billion interest
share of our national debt, which is the
cost of past wars.
I think we are paying about $107 bil-
lion in expenditures for defense, directly,
and indirectly, and we are trying to live
off an administrative budget income this
year of, I think, about $135 billion.
But we have got a lot of things on the
shelf we are moving ahead with. There
is the thing called VFX. We are hear-
ing a lot about that. We think it is good.
It is a $2 billion system. There is a new
fighter aircraft for the Navy. They did
not like the F-111-B program. There is
another program which is a new fighter
for the Air Force, which is a multi-
billion-dollar program. We have a lousy
antisubmarine warfare program, so we
are going ahead with a VFX program.
We have an intermediate interceptor
program that we have to move ahead
with because it is essential for defense of
our coast. That is a billion-dollar pro-
gram. We want to move ahead with ad-
vanced manned supersonic attack air-
craft, which is essential for our defense.
I do not say this to burlesque these
points at all. The vast majority of our
defense-oriented committees believe
these programs are essential for our
future military posture. We are moving
ahead with an MOL program and we
have $6 million in that this year.
What I have described Is about $17
billion of new defense programs.
The reason we are against this pro-
gram is the fact that to date it just does
not make any sense.
Why did the Department of Defense
move ahead with it a year ago? I think
one of the reasons was the fact that,
as explained by my colleague from south-
ern California (Mr. BROWN) we did not
want an anti-ballistic-missile gap to
evolve for the elections. Second, we were
caught about a year and a half or 2
years ago, when we discovered, as ap-
peared in the newspapers, that our na-
tional intelligence estimates were 25 to
30 percent off base with respect to antici-
pated capability of the Soviets. We got
nervous and decided to employ a light
Chinese system.
Mr. McNamara, our great former Sec-
retary of Defense, stated the case for the
light ABM system, as was specified by
the gentlewoman from Hawaii, but he
said:
Do not get this mixed up with defense
against the Soviet Union. We do not have
a capability to handle the Soviet Union.
Why did he say that? It was not to
confound necessarily the missile abate-
ment talks, but for the simple reason
that we are worse off against a sophisti-
cated country like the Soviet Union with
a poor ABM system if we say the pur-
pose of this missile system is to defend
against a sophisticated system.
Why is that? Because today Moscow
is worse off because of the Galosh system
than before they developed the Galosh
ABM system. Why? Because we changed
a few settings on our computers to
make sure we do the job in Moscow. What
is going to happen now, if we develop this
system, to Boston or to San Francisco?
The computers are already set. All we
had to do was to say what the President
said a few days ago, and I think it bears
repeating. Of course, Secretary McNa-
mara warned against expanding the sys-
tem and against expanding the reason
why we are putting in the system.
But that is exactly what is happening.
First we are asked to approve a highly
debatable Chinese-oriented system.
When the criticism mounted as to the
effectiveness of this Chinese system, the
President on February 7 of this year at
a press conference fielded the following
question:
Mr. President, you know the ABM system
was planned originally to protect us against
the threat of a nuclear attack by Red China
early in the 1970's. Does your Information
indicate that there Is any lessening of this
threat, or greater, or just where do we
stand?
The President answered:
First, I do not buy the assumption that
the ABM system, the thin Sentinel system,
as it has been described, was simply for the
purpose of protecting ourselves against at-
tack from Communist China.
This system, as are the systems that the
Soviet Union has already deployed, adds
to our overall defense capability. I would
further say that, as far as the threat is con-
cerned, we do not see any change in that
threat, and we are examining, therefore, all
of our defense systems and all of our defense
postures to see how we can best make thein
consistent with our other responsibilities.
I say when he said that we blew the
ball game. Unless the Department of De-
fense can come before our House Armed
Services Committee this year and show.
us they can make out a prima facie case
for a reasonable expenditure against the
Soviet Union, the better part of sanity
for us is to go slow on this program.
Of course, Bob McNamara said that if
we had deployed the Nike-Zeus system
at the time a lot of people wanted to de-
ploy, it, then we would have totally
wasted about $2 billion to $3 billion, be-
cause the next state of the art came for-
ward with the Sentinel system here,
about 2 years ago, and we would have
had to change it. We have had to do this
on a number of occasions.
This change in emphasis from Chinese
defense to Soviet defense is exactly what
Secretary McNamara warned against,
and the new reasoning is absolutely fal-
lacious. We have a system which is mar-
ginal even against a simple but con-
certed Chinese attack, and yet when this
system is questioned, the answer is that
it is actually destined to be a defense
against a far more deadly Soviet attack.
I ask again, how can a weapon marginal
against a mouse be useful against a bear?
This is exactly what is happening with
the current ABM system. We had $1 bil-
lion in the budget as of last summer.
I hesitate to imagine how much of that
$1 billion has been spent.
Now that the opposition to the ABM is
growing, confusion reigns among the
ranks of the committed. Last year in the
Armed Services Committee we were
treated to a well-organized argument
clearly designed to prove the efficacy of
the proposed ABM system. Now when
concern has been expressed across the
board, the proponents of the system are
treating us to an array of contradictory
statements and opinions that indicate
only one thing?no one seems to know
where the program is going. The orig-
inal plan envisioned a system of city
defense against a light Chinese attack.
The President states that the system may
actually be directed toward a Soviet at-
tack. The Pentagon indicates that pos-
sibly a "thinner than thin" system is
advisable?one that will protect the hard
site missile bases only. Mr. RIVERS, my
chairman of the Armed Services Com-
mittee, indicates that the whole concept
of missile defense must be gone over
with a view to looking at the options of
entirely new systems, perhaps possible
seaborne or airborne. I think he is right.
The proponents argue that we must
have the system in the deployment stage
before we enter into talks With the Soviet
Union, so as to use the deployment as a
bargaining point with the Russians. On
this question, I can see no conceivable
reason to spend billions of dollars on a
highly speculative system just to use it
as a bargaining position in talks that
have not been scheduled with a country
that has already experimented wit11, an
ABM system of its own, and which ac-
cording to the best intelligence esti-
mates is not going forward to comple-
tion because of serious doubts as to its
effectiveness. How can we seriously con-
front the Soviet Union with an ABM
system in negotiations when the Soviets
themselves know it is useless against a
concerted attack? Moscow is admittedly
worse off today because of our over-
targeting response to the ballistic sys-
tem.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Bwoved For8511mENR915A91 1283
February 26, kFebKINDFR9MR000300090004-2
Secretary of State Rogers on the other
hand feels that such missile talks should
precede deployment of the system.
I agree with him.
Out of this confusion one thing Is
clear?there is considerable confusion
on the part of the administration and
the proponents of the present ABM pro-
gram on both the direction the program
should take and the goals that should
be sought. The opponents of the sys-
tem are disaffected with the whole idea
and are confounded on every turn by
the contradictory replies.
The only sensible action that has been
taken on ABM has been the recent halt
in site acquisition and deployment. It is
eminently clear that this halt should be
continued until a full scale hearing is
held in which all memlers of the scien-
tific communify are able to state their
views on the value of this multi-billion-
dollar boondoggle. I, for one, am not
willing to continually accept the assur-
ances of the military that all counter
arguments have been fully explored and
their presentation is the culmination of
a totally objective indepth study. Ex-
perience has too often shown that the
military does not come totally clean with
us.
Last year I had the opportunity to
question General Starbird, manager of
the Sentinel system, in committee hear-
ings. After a detailed and articulate
presentation of the Sentinel program,
the General during questioning indi-
cated that the price guidelines could be
pretty closely adhered to. Yet now, we
read that the original $5 billion figure for
the Chinese-oriented system is reaching
up to $9 billion.
I was unhappy with the responses to
my questions last year, and I am not any
happier now.
There is absolutely no sense in au-
thorizing and appropriating funds at the
rate of over $1 billion a year for a pro-
gram that could easily be a gigantic
mistake. We must settle down and figure
out the direction we are taking before
we put one more dollar into the hardware
for this program.
[From the New York Times]
PENTAGON CONCEDES SENTINEL WOULD COST
MORE THAN ESTIMATE
(By John W. Finney)
WASHINGTON, February 11.?The Defense
Department said today that the $5.5-billion
cost estimated for the Sentinel missile de-
fense system represented but the first in-
stallment on an effective defense against the
Chinese missile threat.
Just how much height the cost of the
Sentinel system might go, the Pentagon was
not prepared to say. But a spokesman, in re-
sponse to inquiries, acknowledged that ad-
ditional sums would be needed as Commu-
nist China developed more sophisticated in-
tercontinental missiles carrying decoys to
confuse a defense system.
In Congressional testimony made public
today, the Defense Department explained
that the Sentinel missile bases were being
located in urban areas to provide an eventual
defense against a "sophisticated" Chinese
missile attack.
In its initial deployment, the Sentinel sys-
tem is designed to deal with the relatively
simple missiles with single warheads that
Communist China might be able to fire at
the United States by the mid-seventies. But
as the Chinese develop their missile tech-
nology, the presumption is that within a few
years they could add decoys to the warheads
and otherwise make interception more dif-
ficult.
The Pentagon also pointed out that nu-
clear warheads for Nike-Hercules antiaircraft
missiles had been stored in certain urban
areas since 1958 without any adverse public
reaction. It acknowledged, however, that the
public had never been informed which of the
missiles were armed with nuclear warheads
and which were not.
Between the rising costs of the Sentinel
system and the Army's decision to locate the
nuclear missile bases in populated areas, the
Defense Department is finding itself caught
in a rising crossfire of Congresisonal op-
position to deployment of the Sentinel sys-
tem.
When deployment was authorized last
year, Congress was led to believe that the
missile defense bases would be located some
distance from population centers.
The impression was also conveyed by the
Defense Department and its spokesmen in
Congress that the $5.5-billion figure repre-
sented the best estimate of the cost of es-
tablishing a "thin" defense against the Chi-
nese missile threat.
What was not made clear last year in Con-
gressional testimony or debate was that the
Defense Department viewed the initial $5.5-
billion system as but a start in a system that
would grow and become more complex as
Communist China improved its missile force.
As initially presented to Congress, the
Sentinel system was to provide "area defense"
for the entire United States through a com-
plex of radar and missile bases firing the
Spartan missile. With its two-megaton war-
head (equal to two million tons of TNT) the
Spartan is designed to intercept and destroy
an incoming ballistic missile warhead from
400 to 500 miles away.
In the controversy developing over the se-
lection of Sentinel bases, it is now coming
out that the Army is designing and building
the system so that it can be enlarged to fire
short-range Sprint missiles. With their 10-
kiloton warheads (equal to 10,000 tons of
TNT) the Sprint missiles are designed to
provide close-in defense against warheads
that penetrate the "area defenses" of the
Spartan missiles.
SHORT RANGE A FACTOR
In an attempt to meet some of the Con-
gressional criticism Lieut. Gen. Alfred D.
Starbird, Pentagon 'manager of the Sentinel
system, was called before the House Appro-
priations Committee in mid-January for a
secret hearing.
In his testimony, made public today, Gen-
eral Starbird explained that missile bases
near urban centers were being chosen so
that the Sentinel system would eventually
be capable of defending against a Chinese
missile attack using decoying warheads.
To meet this "more sophisticated threat,"
he said, Sprint missiles will have to be added
to the Sentinel system. Because of their rel-
atively short range of around 50 miles, how-
ever, the Sprint missiles would be ineffective
in defending a population center unless the
bases were situated nearby, he explained.
The Pentagon said the cost of adding the
Sprint missiles was not included in the $5.5-
billion estimate presented to Congress., A
Pentagon spokesman said that even a rough
estimate of the cost of adding the Sprint
missiles could not be made available.
Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of
Missouri, a senior member of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, estimated last
week that the Sentinel system would cost
$9.4-billion. This higher cost estimate, ac-
cording to a Symington aide, was based on
the normal cost escalation encountered in
new weapons systems and did not include
the addition of the Sprint missiles.
If the Symington estimate is correct?and
there is reason to believe he obtained his es-
timate from Pentagon sources?the cost of
deploying an anti-Chinese missile defense
system could substantially exceed $10-billion
once the Sprint missiles were added.
In his heavily censored testimony, General
Starbird said the principal criterion for Sen-
tinel base sites was that they be "tactfully
effective . . . both now and for a long range
future if and when the Red Chinese may
have penetration aids."
"There is no indication as yet," the general
said, that Communist China is developing
penetration aids, such as metallic chaff, light
balloons or decoys designed to confuse the
defensive radar so that it cannot pick out
the actual warhead.
But he made clear that the Pentagon was
proceeding on the assumption that Commu-
nist China could and would add such pene-
tration aids to its intercontinental ballistic
missiles. And once they are added, he con-
tinued, the Spartan missiles would have
"only limited capability" in protecting popu-
lated areas.
The reason, he explained, is that the
threatening warhead would not be picked out
by the radar until shortly before it reached
its target thus making it impossible to com-
mit the Spartan to a long-range interception.
As an example of the long-range need for
locating Sentinel bases near cities, General
Starbird cited the 'selection of Libertyville,
Ill., some 25 miles northwest of Chicago, as
one of the sites. He made it clear that, while
there was "no current plan" for installing
Sprint missiles at Libertyville, the site was
selected with that in mind.
[From the New York Times, Feb. 24, 1969]
THE SENT/NEL AND THE TREATY
In his questioning of Secretary of State
Rogers on the nuclear nonproliferation
treaty, Senator Albert Gore has exposed a
fundamental inconsistency in the Admin-
istration's apparent resolve to push ahead
with some sort of Sentinel antiballistic mis-
sile system?a resolve made more explicit last
week by Secretary of Defense Laird. Mr.
Gore noted that under Article VI of the
treaty the nuclear powers undertake "to
pursue negotiations in good faith on effec-
tive measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to
nuclear disarmament."
The Sentinel program provides a critical
test of how seriously the United States
views its obligations under that article. If
there is a "good faith" interest in nuclear
disarmament, then the logical step would
be to postpone deployment of the Sentinel
system while the United States enters into
negotiations with the Soviet Union to limit
offensive and defensive strategic missiles. If,
instead, the Administration decides to pro-
ceed with Sentinel deployment on the dis-
torted logic that accelerating the atomic
arms race somehow leads to nuclear dis-
armament, then it will be apparent that the
United States regards Article VI as little
more than a pious statement imposing no
obligations upon the nuclear powers.
Something far more important is at stake,
however, than just this country's interpre-
tation of Article VI. At issue is the whole fu-
ture of the treaty, a matter that is likely to
come up in President Nixon's European dis-
cussions this week.
So far as the non-nuclear states are con-
cerned, the article was one of the more im-
portant concessions made by the two major
nuclear powers in drafting the treaty. If the
United States and the Soviet Union now in-
dicate that they do not feel bound in any
way by the article, then some of the more
important non-nuclear states, such as Japan,
Israel and India, can ask with good reason
why they should take the treaty vow of
complete nuclear abstinence.
By proceeding with the Sentinel system,
therefore, the United States can jeopardize
the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Even if
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Ret&saingt14102i: ilk.laPj1B198N100030009$02t1r-L
H 1284 Approved For ry 26, 4969
control problem, the business of making
the decision to utilize this system.
We had a situation with a ship called
the Liberty and the messages which did
not get through. We have had situations
with other ships. We have had other
kinds of situations.
Assuming the very best in this system,
that we detect the launch of an enemy
missile immediately upon launching,
from that time we have roughly 30 min-
utes to make the decision to launch the
ABM's against it. I question very seri-
ously, even assuming all of the tech-
nological know-how in the world, that we
are geared in the command and control
area to utilize all of these billions of dol-
lars that we are going to spend.
I have tremendous respect for our
technological capabilities, but there are
always human elements *volved. / have
opposed the deployment of this particu-
lar system for some 2 years now.
(Mr. PIKE asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his re-
marks.)
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, 2 years ago,
when the House Armed Services Com-
mittee reported favorably on the Defense
procurement authorization, only two
members of that committee, the gentle-
man from Michigan (Mr. NEnzi) and I
spoke out against the inclusion of an
anti-ballistic-missile system in that pro-
curement. Then it was called the Nike X,
and I quote part of our minority state-
ment at that time:
At the present time the muted States and
the Soviet Union are engaged in extremely
complicated and sensitive negotiations seek-
ing to limit in some meaningful and re-
sponsible manner a major new round in the
continuing cycle of increased armaments and
increased spending for armaments. The Joint
Chiefs of Staff have endorsed these efforts
and so do we.
The committee report states that regardless
of the outcome of these negotiations "the
committee strongly believes that the thin
deployment would be a useful first step to-
ward meeting the defense needs of the elation
in protecting against ballistic missile attack
from any hostile nation."
First, the report clearly shows that the
so-called thin deployment which they recom-
mend (costing $4 billion) is capable only of
protecting us from an unsophisticated at-
tack by the Red Chinese in the 1970's ($3.5
billion) plus a defense of our own strategic
offensive forces ($500 million). Everything in
the report, however, looks toward moving
from the "thin" defense to the so-called pos-
ture A deployment, optimistically estimated
at $9.9 billion and accurately described in
the report as "a light defense against a Soviet
missile attack on our cities." In the language
of the majority, it's like "learning to walk
before trying to run."
From there, the next logical step would be
to advance to posture B, optimistically esti-
mated to cost $19.4 billion and accurately
described as a heavier defense also designed
against a Soviet attack on our cities %eine
of our cities, but obviously not all of them.
The Secretary of Defense has estimated the
cost of a missile defense would grow to $40
billion over a 10-year period. Whether we
stay with the "thin" defense, or move to pos-
ture A or posture B, the main thing is to get
on with it, says the majority.
We believe that if we as a nation are seri-
ous about trying to prevent a new arms race
with the Soviets, the Armed Services Com-
mittee has a responsibility beyond that of
advocating just such a new arms race.
the military utility of the system were much
less dubious than it is, this would be a bad
risk to run. In the long run., the spread Of
nuclear weapons undoubtedly presents a far
greater danger than the still non-existent
nuclear missiles in Comrnenist China or
the unproved usefulness of Sentinel as a bar-
gaining counter in arms talks with Moscow.
[From the Washington (D.C.) Post, Feb. 17,
1969]
THE BIG ABM BRAINWASH
There is more, obviously, to the Great De-
bate over the Sentinel ABM System than has
hitherto met the eye, judging- from a report
on the front page of this newspaper yester-
day. The report told of two memoranda to
former Secretary of Defense Clifford last fall.
One was from the present Secretary of the
Army, Mr. Stanley R. Resor, and the other, a
supporting document from the manager of
the project to build the Sentinel System, Lt.
Gm. Alfred D. Starbird. Together they spelled
out in breathtaking detail a complex and
comprehensive public relations ?not to say
propaganda?campaign to convince the
American public, and Congressional critics,
and wayward scientists and the citizens re-
siding in or around prospective Sentinel sites
that in every way these weapons are good
for you.
A perfectly respectable case can be made
that, within reason and suitable limits, they
are; something must have recommended the
project to two successive Defense Secretaries
in the Johnson Administration. And if the
Sentinel is not in fact as essential to our
security as it is said to be, there would still
be nothing wrong about the Army arguing
the point. We pay our military men to tell
us what we need for our saesty, and we et-
pect their civilian leaders and the Congress
to weigh the merits of the military argu-
ments, and cast them up against our other
priorities, and make a judgment that takes
more than the military view of things into
account.
So there is no quarrel here with the right
of military men to make their pitch and
there was very little in the Reser and Star-
bird memoranda that added anything new to
the Army's argument. What the Army was
proposing to say about the Sentinel, in short,
was not the startling thing about these
memoranda to Mr. Clifford. Wbat was aston-
ishing and disturbing?the part that had not
met the eye?was the way the pitch was to
be made, the sweep and Intensity of the
Army's intended campaign. That, and the
plain evidence that an important part of the
whole operation was clearly calculated not to
meet the eye; the Army's hand was not sup-
posed to be visible. That's what is genuinely
unsettling?the suggestion, for example, of
clandestine complicity With the contractors
for the Sentinel program in carefully coordi-
nated public relations undertakings to taut
the virtues of this weapons eystem; the un-
abashed intention to plant or inspire favor-
able magazine articles by scientists who are
proponents in direct response to opponents
of the program within the scientific com-
munity.
"Several highly placed and reputable U.S.
scientists have spoken out in print against
the Sentinel missile system," Mr. Resor wrote
to Mr. Clifford, and after nal-fling a few of
them (Hans Bethe, George Kistiakowsky,
Jerome Wiesner) and conejelaining of the
difficulty of replying without disclosing se-
crets, he went on to say:
"It is essential that all possible questions
raised by these opponents be answered, pref=
erably by nongovernment scientists.
"We will be in contact shortly with scien-
tists who are familiar with the Sentinel pro-
gram and who may see elt toelte articles fqg
publication supporting the -U-chnical feasi-
bility and operational effectiveness of the
Sentinel system.
"We shall extend to these scientists all
possible assistance."
So there it is, and what are we to make
now of the next learned dissertation pub-
lished by a scientist in favor of the Sentinel?
Will it be his handiwork, or General Star-
bird's? And what are we to make of some of
the other aspects of this campaign?the in-
structions proposed by the General, for ex-
ample, that "personnel affiliated with the
Sentinel Public Affairs Program will cooper-
ate and coordinate with industry on public
relations efforts by industries involved in the
Sentinel Program"? Will Army officers write
the advertising copy, or merely furnish the
photographs of successful missile shots?
There is less to be said against some of the
other, more conventional plans, for a heavy
round of visiting with Congressmen and
Governors and Mayors and community lead-
ers and editors and publishers, for example,
except that you do have to ask what all this
is going to cost: the junketing, the mobile
displays, the preparation of information kits
and a library of useful quotations, the film
clips and taped interviews and all the rest.
But mostly you wonder whether this isn't
too much?too covert, too all-pervasive, too
overpowering. or if this is standard oper-
ating procedure, as they say, for the Army,
and for all its works, it presumably is stand-
ard for other services, too. And this adds up,
in our view, to a good deal too much brain-
washing of the American public and a good
deal too much intrusion by the military into
American political life.
If this is what's going on, it is too much.
In any case we'd like to know. The Sentinel
is too serious an issue to be settled by an
Army propaganda campaign, on the one hand,
or by a counter-reaction to such a campaign,
on the other, by the antipathy to the idea of
the citizens in one community, or by any-
thing other than the merits of the matter
and a balanced reckoning of where our na-
tional interest lies. That the Army should
embark on so massive a public relations cam-
paign, so far in advance of Congressional
approval of the project, and by the use of
such dubious methods, is a thing apart,
though no less important on that account,
and one which we would hope the Congress
would also like to know a good deal more
about.
(Mr. LEGGETT asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his re-
marks and include extraneous material.)
THE ...A.a3a. SYSTEM
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
STRATTON). Under a previous order of
the House, the gentleman from Illinois
(Mr. YATES) is recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. PIKE. Mr. Speaker, will the gen-
tleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from New York.
Mr. PIKE. First I want to thank the
gentleman from Illinois and the gentle-
men who have taken the time previously
for discussion of this very important
matter. It is one of those rare days on
the' floor, when discussing a military sit-
uation, I find almost nothing with which
I can disagree.
There is one item which we might con-
sider, in talking about this. When we
get into all the technology involved in
the ABM system, let us assume that we
could build a system which could tech-
nologically intercept everything the Chi-
nese threw at us. We still would get in-
Vdived in a Situation which we have seen
entirely too frequently in the last few
years, and that is the command and
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Mfoved ForasleyresgM5/37 playAR000300090004-2 11 1285
Febrliary 26,
Regardless of whether it costs the $19.4
billion that the military predicts, or the $40
billion that the Secretary of Defense pre-
dicts?regardless of whether the Soviets do
not react at all (thereby reducing American
fatalities from 120 million in an all-out ex-
change to 'only' 30 million dead) or whether
they react the same way we are reacting
(thereby leaving American fatalities at 120
million), we would embark upon such a de-
ployment reluctantly, not wtih a feeling of
joy in our military achievement, but of sor-
row in our human failure.
With a minor change here and there
the same statement could be made with
the same validity today. The gentleman
from Michigan and I note that similar
doubts as to the need for this system
have arisen in the committee itself, in
the press, in the scientific community,
and, I assume, in the White House itself.
I have promised my district that my
highest priority in this Congress will be
an effort to find areas in which we can
cut down on our massive arms budget
without jeopardizing our national de-
fense posture, and because of that prom-
ise, and my continuing doubts as to the
necessity and usefulness for this system,
I must protest again today against de-
ploying it.
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, a few days
ago the press carried the story that a
massive public relations campaign had
been launched by the Pentagon to sell
the Sentinel ABM to the American peo-
ple. It was revealed that every propa-
ganda resource at the Army's command
was to be hurled into the effort to con-
vince the public that this highly ques-
tionable exotic system was vitally es-
sential to our national security. Army of-
ficers, men, and machines were to be
used, of course, but this was only the be-
ginning. The defense contractor corpora-
tions were to be enlisted, newspapers,
TV, radio, veterans' organizations, ladies'
clubs?the whole works were to be em-
ployed, all stops pulled. The orders came
directly from the Secretary of the Army
himself. This could well be the military-
industrial complex's finest hour?a real
triumph. And the interesting and amaz-
ing part of the campaign was that it
was to proceed even though the question
of continued deployment of the Sentinel
was presumably under scrutiny and re-
view.
You will recall, Mr. Speaker, how some
weeks ago with much fanfare the new
Secretary of Defense, our old friend Mel
Laird, announced he was going to make a
complete review of the Sentinel. The
Congress and the country thought it was
to be a full, fair, and impartial reassess-
ment, and those of us who oppose the
system were confident that such a review
would result in suspending its further
deployment. But it is now apparent that
no such review was planned or contem-
plated and that in fact the heralded re-
view will be no review at all. With each
passing day the new Secretary makes
statements which indicate that his mind
was made up from the beginning, that he
is not reappraising the question as to
whether or not the Sentinel should be
deployed, but rather, how it is to be de-
ployed, that he never intended to ques-
tion the worth or validity of Sentinel, but
only to find a deployment of the missile
sites which would be more acceptable to
the public and which would serve to abate
the rising storm of public protest.
The arguments he has presented add
little of merit to the inadequate justifica-
tion previously advanced for deployment
of the Sentinel. In great measure they
serve only to cloud the issue, for he has
engaged in what can only be described as
a spurious numbers game, in which he
presents comparative Soviet and Amer-
ican military expenditures to sustain his
position. The Russians, he says, have
spent $3.7 on defensive strategic weapons
for every dollar we have spent on such
systems. In the area of offensive strategic
weapons, they are outspending us $3 to
$2.
Assuming that what he says is true,
one is tempted to reply. "So what?" The
real question is, Are their military ca-
pabilities greater than ours as a result?
Is our national security in jeopardy? We
are not engaged in a spending contest as
such with the Soviet Union, except inso-
far as spending is necessary to achieve
our goals. It surely is not the task of the
Department of Defense to guarantee
that no nation spends more on weaponry
than the United States. Rather, it is its
responsibility to provide for the military
security of the Nation in the most eco-
nomical and effective manner.
If the Soviet Union wants to squander
its rubles on defensive ABM systems that
do not increase its security, then let the
Soviet Union do it. But we are certainly
under no obligation to match those mis-
takes?or to match the money it expends
for that purpose.
And, Mr. Speaker, in spite of Russian
expenditures, it is clear that the Soviet
ABM cannot withstand the might of the
U.S. offensive missile capability. That is
clearly stated in hearing after hearing by
all our experts. It is difflcult to under-
stand, therefore, why proponents of the
Sentinel ABM point with such trepida-
tion to the meager effort of the Russians
in building their Moscow missile sites,
and why they foster the illusion that
an effective ABM system is presently
possible.
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
(Mr. COHELAN asked and was given
permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. COHELAN. I thank the gentleman
from Illinois for yielding.
I think it would be appropriate at this
time to get this into the RECORD. I am
quoting from a very reliable paper in
which there is given the United States
and Soviet intercontinental strategic
nuclear forces, and I shall also supply
this for the RECORD. But, briefly, it shows
that as of October 1968 we have 1,054
missiles as compared to the Russians'
900. As far as the sea-launched ballistic
missiles are concerned we have 656 as
compared to the Russians' 75 or 80. The
total intercontinental missile launchers
are 1,710 on our side and about 980 on
the Russian side. Our bomber force con-
sists of 646 to 155, and that is the top of
the range. We have a total force load-
ings, the approximate number of deliver-
able warheads, of 4,206 on our side as of
October 1968 according to this estimate
and 1,200 on the Russian side. It is over-
whelming.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
to insert the table to which I refer at this
point in the RECORD.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there
objection to the request of the gentleman
from California?
There was no objection.
The table referred to follows:
TABLE 1.?UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET INTERCONTI-
NENTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
United
U.S.S.R.
States,'
October
1968
October
1967
October
1968
ICBM launchers 2
1,054
720
900
SLBM (Sea-launched ballistic
missiles) launchers 3
656
30
75-80
Total intercontinental
missile launchers_
1,710
750
975-980
Intercontinental bombers 4._ _
646
155
150-155
Total force loadings,
approximate num-
ber of deliverable
warheads
4,206
1,000
1,200
The size of the U.S. strategic force has not changed signifi-
cantly since mid-1967.
2 Excludes ICBM test range launchers which could have some
ozeralio n a I capability againsLtH%United totes T Soviets
oavemediumrageism,ssies(mRIM,san
intermediate range ballistic missiles
which are capable
of striking Eurasian targets.
s In addition to the SLBM's on nuclear-powered submarines,
the Soviets also have SLBM's on diesel-powered submarines,
whose primary targets are believed to be strategic land targets
In Eurasia. The Sovitts also have submarine-launched cruise
missiles, whose primary targets are believed to be naval and
merchant vessels.
.1 In addition to the intercontinental bombers, the Soviets also
have a force of medium bomber/tankers capable of striking
Eurasian targets.
Source: Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara, "A pproach lathe Fiscal Year 1969-73"; program
and fiscal year 1969 budget, in U.S. House of Representatives
(90th Cong., 20 sess.), Department of Defense appropriations
for 1969, hearings before a Subcommittee on A ppropriations,
pt. 1 (Feb. 14,1968), p. 147. Some of the figures are based on a
statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, Oct. 25,
1968: (See New York Times, Oct. 26,1968.)
Mr. YATES. I thank the gentleman
from California for his contribution and
I was going to address myself to that
point.
Mr. BROWN. of California. Mr.
Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
- (Mr. BROWN of California asked and
was given permission to revise and ex-
tend his remarks.)
Mr. BROWN of California. As long as
we are making comparisons in expendi-
tures, the latest study of the U.S. Arms
Control Disarmament Agency on world
military expenditures is very revealing,
because it reveals that the United States
continues to outspend Russia by a sub-
stantial margin. But, interestingly
enough, it also has a column labeled
"Special Education Expenditures." In
going down that column we find that the
Soviets expend twice the amount on ed-
ucation as does the United States. I
have never heard a word said that we
are losing the special _education race
with the Soviet Union. Therefore, this
may have a very vital bearing upon our
defense posture.
As the gentleman has pointed out,
the only safety defense against missiles
is likely to be in some now unknown field
such as the field of education or the ap-
plication of labor or something of that
sort.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07_.? CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
H 1286 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE February 26, '1969
I suspect that the amount of money
in scientific education has a great bear-
ing upon how soon you make break-
throughs. Therefore, our security, even in
pure power?which is the type of de-
fense generally supported In this body?
could be substantially harmed by our
concentration upon military weaponry.
Mr. YATES. I thank the gentleman
and I think he makes a very positive
contribution.
Last week before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee the statement was
made that the Soviet Union now has in
being and under construction more
ICBM's than we do. That should come as
no great surprise to anyone who has
read the posture statements by Secre-
tary Clifford and Secretary McNamara.
But in the context in which Secretary
Laird made the statement, one would
think that this was somehow evidence
that we were falling behind in the missile
race and that we had better, therefore,
put an automatic stamp of approval on
any recommendation by the Defense
Department.
The fallacy of all that is that a com-
parison of raw numbers of ICBM's ac-
tually tells almost nothing about our
strategic position relative to the Soviet
Union. Most of the Soviet ICBM's are so
primitive as to be unworthy of compari-
son with our sophisticated, solid-fueled
Minutemen. Moreover, to compare num-
bers of ICBM's without reference to the
overall strategic capabilities of both sides
is misleading in the extreme. The fact is
that our bomber forces, our IRBM's
around the U.S.S.R., and espedially our
submarine-launched missiles provide us
with an overall strategic advantage over
the Soviet Union that will endure for the
foreseeable future. Our own defense ex-
perts have testified to that effect. We
must certainly exercise vigilance to as-
sure that we maintain our present posi-
tion. What is needed for that task is a
reasoned, straightforward evaluation of
our defense needs.
What is not needed, and cannot be
excused, is the quoting of figures out of
context in order to exert political lever-
age for deployment of an ABM system
that has so many technical, strategle.
and political liabilities that it cannot be
promoted on its own merits and which
does not contribute significantly to our
national security.
The Sentinel system will not add sig-
nificantly to our national security. It will
not protect against a sophisticated Rus-
sian nuclear missile threftt, or for that
matter, a sophisticated Red Chinese mis-
sile threat. Our national security still
rests upon our offensive power. As Dr.
John Foster, Director of the Division of
Research and Development of the De-
partment of Defense stated in last year's
appropriations hearings:
The cornerstone objective of our strategic
forces remains assured destruction, to deter
a nuclear attack on the United States we rely
upon a conservatively calculated secure abil-
ity to retaliate and destroy the society or
any attacker under any circumstances.
And he points out in the same testi-
mony that the Soviet AB IA deployment
does not affect Our assured destruction
capability of strategic targets in their
country, including Moscow.
By the same token, our deployment of
the Sentinel ABM system would not
deny the Soviet assured capability to de-
stroy the United States as a functioning
society. As long as both sides maintain an
assured destruction capability, as they
are doing, any discussion of damage limi-
tation is quite meaningless. In an over-
kill situation such as that which charac-
terizes the strategic confrontation be-
tween the United States and the Soviet
Union, an ABM system at the present
state of the art confers virtually no ad-
vantages to either nation. The future
may bring an ABM worthy of deploy-
ment, but that is for the future. The Sen-
tinel is not that system.
The rationale for the system is sup-
posed to be the protection it would offer
from a primitive Red Chinese attack. No
one has explained, Mr. Speaker, why the
same awesome power to retaliate which
is designed to keep all our enemies at bay
is not applicable to deter the Red Chi-
nese from attacking us.
Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. COHELAN. I thank the gentleman
for yielding.
I wonder if the gentleman would re-
spona to the question: Supposing that
the Russians agreed to negotiate, would
we continue to have a Chinese thin mis-
sile defense system?
Mr. YATES. I would hope that the
negotiations would proceed, and I would
be afraid that the Sentinel system would
be a deterrent to it because under the
discussions that I have had with mem-
bers of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices, and with others, they state that the
so-called thin system is the underlying
layer for a much larger system which is
really aimed at the Soviet Union.
Mr. COHELAN. But my point is that
even in the negotiation theory this is
an expendable system, is it not?
Mr. YATES. I would think so; yes, I
would say to the gentleman.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak-
er, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak-
er, I believe the point made by the dis-
tinguished gentleman from California is
significant as revealing in part the incon-
sistency with regard to the justification
for this system. We cannot simultaneous-
ly argue that we need the protection as
against the Chinese, and then hope to
bargain it away with the Russians.
But, there is an even more serious ob-
jection to this Chinese idea, because we
are arguing that a thin system will deter
the Chinese threat, at least when they
have 30 such weapons, but we agree it
will not deter such a threat when they
get to the point of having 100 or 200?or
whatever the magic number is.
So we are caught in the position of
denying the effectiveness of the deterrent,
as the gentleman in the well has so well
stated, or saying that because it is not
the deterrent for the end effect, we need
thes for a period of x years until we get
beyond that point and then the deterrent
will not be there.
The whole thing is completely ridicu-
lous and is, If course, founded or justified
on the theory that the Chinese are irra-
tional and that they would not object to
having their country totally destroyed in
order to send over two or three missiles
to knock out some of our cities.
The Chinese are not quite that irra-
tional. If they were, then they would have
attacked Formosa, for example, because
I doubt if we would retaliate with a nu-
clear attack for an attack on Formosa?
even though it would be a highly irra-
tional action.
But the point is, the Chinese have not
taken any actions that were this irra-
tional, at least in the field of their own
defense. It is highly unlikely that they
are going to deviate from that practice
for a period of 2 or 3 years?in which
time we will possibly have a system which
might deter that irrational tactic.
Mr. YATES. I agree with the gentle-
man. I think it is completely naive to
suspect that. The Chinese have shown
already that they have a great capability
because they have already exploded a
hydrogen bomb. I think it is completely
naive to expect Red China to develop
a system so promitive knowing that the
United States has this Sentinel ABM
system with the capability of thwarting
a simple attack. They would know too
that in the event they were to launch a
missile attack on the United States, the
retaliation would be awesome and terrible
in its intensity from planes and from
submarines ranging near their shores and
from missile bases in our country.
I do not understand this irrationality
argument at all.
Mr. NEDZI, Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from Michigan.
Mr. NEDZI. I want to express my ap-
preciation to those Members who orga-
nized this debate today on this very im-
portant subject.
I think at the present moment in the
discussion we are really reaching the
crucial assumption upon which the ABM
system is based and the rationale for it:
namely, the irrationality of the Chinese.
I do not know what makes anybody
assume that the Chinese are going to be
willing to have their nation obliterated
in exchange for dropping a few missiles
on the United States.
It is reasonable to assume that their
threat is going to continue upsophisti-
cated?and for how long is this lack of
sophistication going to continue? I
think as soon as we deploy a thin system
which has the capability of knocking
down unsophisticated Chinese missiles,
the Chinese are not going to proceed in
constructing and developing an unso-
phisticated missile system. They are go-
ing immediately to devote their resources
to have something that is going to be able
to meet this thing and they are not going
to be building clay pigeons for us to
knock down with our ABM and thereby
render our ABM system totally obsolete
at its incepteon.
Our President is in Europe at the
present time, and talking of a Possible
discussion with the Soviet Union and
looking forward to consulting with our
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved FoENtaits2s0RinnEyoMF_TW8R6gR000300090004-2 H 1287
'Feb ry 26, 1Yuv
allies in Europe?as he indicated in his
inaugural address?in order to lessen the
burden of arms. I am certain it is going
to be one of the topics that is going to
be discussed at these discussions.
Then, too, I would like to see some
effort brought forth, rather than the
deployment of the ABM, which may well
undermine all these discussions before
they begin.
Mr. YATES. I thank the gentleman
for his very fine contribution.
Why must we build an admittedly in-
adequate defensive system to protect us
against a prospective primitive missile
threat when we are willing to accept ,our
offensive strength as suitable to deter
the Soviets who have an enormously
powerful missile threat?
The fact is that many of those who
favor the Sentinel acknowledge that the
anti-Chinese rationale is at best a weak
reed, and say, knowingly, that the sys-
tem is really directed against the Soviets.
President Nixon has declared that it
would be a part of our overall defense
posture which would include the Soviet
Union. If this is true, we are talking not
about the $5 billion thin system, but a
thick system the cost of which will ex-
ceed $50 billion.
It is not likely that such a vast ex-
penditure would be undertaken for an
untested system. A thick system, then,
would require in the minds of many that
we conduct an extensive testing program
to see if the system would work. In turn
this might very well bring pressure to
suspend the nuclear test ban now in
being until the ABM tests were con-
cluded, at least. The international politi-
cal fallout of such a move would cast
serious doubts throughout the world on
our good faith in seeking to bring the
nuclear arms race under control.
It is also generally accepted that a
thick system, with batteries of terminal
defense missiles at all of our major cities,
would only make sense if it were accom-
panied by an extensive air raid shelter
program. As Secretary McNamara
pointed out, an ABM system without a
shelter program will lose at least 30 per-
cent of its effectiveness. Without such a
shelter program the nuclear detonation
of our own defensive missiles would
threaten the city below with blast effects
and fallout. The costs of a shelter pro-
gram are astronomical. When such a sys-
tem was suggested in the early 60s, the
American people made it clear they
wanted no part of it. The ABM system
must inevitably bring with it serious con-
sideration of the need for such shelters.
Moreover, the deployment of a heavy
system, or the Sentinel system for that
matter, would mean the proliferation of
nuclear weapons all across the Nation.
While the chances of an accidental
disaster are admittedly extremely slim,
they will increase with every warhead
that is stationed near population centers.
Deployment of a thick shield would mean
that thousands of nuclear warheads
would be installed around the perimeters
of our Nation's cities. As it is, the Sen-
tinel system would locate -large yield
nuclear warheads around 15 to 20 major
cities, such as Chicago, New York, and
Boston.
What we are faced with, if the de-
cision to go ahead with the Sentinel sys-
tem is approved, is the possibility that
within the next several years the United
States will become a nation of cities
whose undersides are honeycombed with
shelters and whose perimeters are dotted
with nuclear installations. The propon-
ents of the ABM have scarcely addressed
themselves to this question. We must ask
ourselves whether or not we are willing
to accept the further pollution of our
physical and psychological environment
as the price for deploying a system as
faulty as the ABM. It seems to me that
our money could be better spent rebuild-
ing the slums, rather than building
shelters underneath them and surround-
ing them with nuclear hardware. I am
not saying that if we go ahead with the
Sentinel system, the thick shield and the
shelter program are inevitable, but they
would certainly be much more likely. The
first step will have been taken?the ma-
jor step. We ought not to make a judg-
ment on one without understanding the
implications of the other.
Last, but certainly not least, we must
examine the implications of the Sentinel
system on the strategic arms race. The
dynamics of the arms race are very com-
plicated, and it is difficult to predict with
much accuracy what would happen if we
went ahead with the ABM. But if his-
tory is any guide at all, it seems likely
that our construction of the Sentinel sys-
tem would signal the beginning of a new
round in the arms race and have a de-
stabilizing effect on the existing nuclear
balance.
Mr. Speaker, it is true that our na-
tional security requires a posture of mili-
tary strength, but we must realize that
sophisticated scientific technology and
unbridled weapons exploitation has made
war a threat to the very existence of man
on this earth. This is a time for restraint
and for concern for future generations,
for deescalation rather than destructive
buildups. The Sentinel ABM deployment
will not contribute to greater under-
standing and peace. It should be dis-
continued.
Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from Elinois.
Mr. MIKVA. I thank the gentleman. I
want to call his attention to something
that he knows well. I asked a speaker
who was representing the Army the
meaning of the term "essentially nil."
The closest I came to an answer was that
it is some new mathematical term more
than a zero but less than infinity and
cannot be defined any closer. It strikes
me that when the assurance that the
military have about the term "essentially
nil" is transposed into the effectiveness
of the Sentinel system, according to Mr.
Acheson and some of the other experts,
in effect, I worry that "essentially nil"
may mean a lot more than zero even
though, in fact, it may be less than
infinity.
I am struck, when I read some of the
figures and when they talk about the
effectiveness of the system and the as-
surance that they have about it being
safe, that they are sort bf like the
prognosticator who said he was 95 per-
cent right 12 percent of the time.
I am glad the gentleman from Illinois
has brough forth this concern about the
safety of the system.
Mr. YATES. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. BROWN of California. Mr.
Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. YATES. I yield to the gentleman
from California.
Mr. BROWN of California. I wish to
compliment the gentleman on his ex-
cellent statement. I think it is a great
contribution to this debate. I remember
particularly the previous work he has
done in connection with the hearings
concerning the Chicago site. I recall the
discussion in those hearings with regard
to the safety factor.
I would like to say further, on the
safety factor, I know of no way of con-
tradicting the fact that the safety of a
deployed nuclear system is going to de-
pend directly or even arithmetically or
geometrically on the number of nuclear
warheads that are deployed. What we are
talking about with this defense system
is deployment of at least another 1,000
nuclear warheads and probably the de-
ployment of equal numbers by our oppo-
nents to counteract the ones we deploy,
so the total population of nuclear war-
heads in the world is going up by a fac-
tor of 3 or 4, and the danger of nuclear
action is probably going to increase by
the square of that, so even if this danger
of accident is "essentially nil," when we
are finished with this deployment it is
going to be probably 10 times essentially
nil and maybe more than that.
(Mr. YATES asked and was given per-
mission to revise and extend his remarks
and include extraneous matter.)
Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, I also in-
clude the following material in connec-
tion with the subject of my special
order:
STATEMENT BY REPRESENTATIVE SIDNEY R.
YATES, DEMOCRAT OF ILLINOIS, AT A PUBLIC
HEARING ON THE SENTINEL ANTI-BALLISTIC-
MISSILE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL BUILDING,
CHICAGO, JANUARY 13, 1969
I am grateful to Secretary of Defense Clark
Clifford for his cooperation in making pos-
sible this public hearing today, and to Colonel
Robert C. Marshall and his associates for
coming here to answer questions about the
proposed Sentinel ABM site near Libertyville.
The matter under consideration is a most
important one. Public officials in this area
and a great many people are concerned with
the prospects and the risks of having to live
and raise their families close to high-yield
nuclear weapons.
I want to make it clear from the outset
that I have opposed the Sentinel antiballistic
missile system for some time now and I shall
continue to oppose it. In my judgment the
proposed system is of such questionable use-
fulness that its deployment at this time
would constitute an unfortunate waste of
vitally needed resources. Moreover, this initial
step could signal the beginning of a new
round in the arms race that would have
serious consequences for our economy, the
domestic climate of our country, and our
national security. The missile site question
I raise here today is only one of several ob-
jections I have to the deployment of the
system at this time, but it is the question
under immediate consideration.
While only a corollary to the larger ques-
tions involved in missile defense, it is an
important corollary. The possibility of an
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
H 1288 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE February 26,1-`196g
accidental nuclear disaster though quite re-
mote is nevertheless real and must be taken
into account before these sites are installed
around the perimeters of the nation's cities,
raising the possibility that the cure is worse
than the disease. There are many questions
which should be answered-In order that tam
public may know what it involved in the
deployment of the Sentinel system.
I have been urging the Department of
Defense to agree to this public meeting since
last November when I learned to my great
surprise that the Army was going to select a
suburb near Chicago to build a Sentinel ABM
site. This was contrary to what the Congress
had been told. In the words of Congressmen
Sikes of Florida, who waste charge of the
ABM appropriations bill, "inch installations
would be away from centers of population."
The Army contends that it had announced
in November, 1967, that atacago would be
selected. Nothing could be more indefinite
than the Army's announcement. Let me read
it. It says:
"The Department of Defense today iden-
tified the first ten geographical areas to be
surveyed as possible site locations for the
Sentinel system, the Communist-Chinese
oriented anti-ballistic missile system recently
approved for deployment. . .
"The potential areas which will be studied
now are among those which will probably
provide optimum locations for the area-de-
fense weapons and their radars. It should be
emphasized that those areas are not final
choices and that this list Its not complete.
In some cases, even the preliminary poten-
tial areas have not yet been determined."
However, I think the point is unimportant,
for even had the announcement been spe-
cific and precise, it was superseded by what
happened in the Congress subsequently. con-
gressman Sikes' statement and the Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations Subcommit-
tees' hearings both clearly indicate Spartrin
missile sites need not be constructed near
our great cities.
My view was reinforced a week ago Friday
when I spoke to Congressman Sikes in the
House. He said again there was no need to
place a Spartan site near centers of popu-
lation, and that he intended to look into the
matter. This he has done. Last Friday I was
called and asked to testify on this matter
before his Subcommittee an Military Con-
struction of the House Committee on Appro-
priations next Wednesday morning in Wash-
ington, which I will do.
The House Committee on Armed Services
will look into this question, too, later this
month or in February.
I think that many members of Congress
might well have come to another conclusion
had they been told the Sentinel missile sites
were to be placed at the threshold of the
most populated areas in this country. That
is why I have invited all members of Con-
gress and elected local officials from this area
to this meeting, for this is not a question
only for the congressman In whose district
the installation is to be Made. The possi-
bility of an inadvertent explosion of the nu-
clear warhead of the Spartan missile either
in or above its silo affects all our districts.
The Army argues there is no danger of an
explosion at the site. Lieutatant General Al-
fred Starbird, who is the head of Sentinel
Systems Command, stated Categorically at a
meeting in Waukegan a few weeks ago,
"There cannot be an accidental nuclear ex-
plosion." In this, General Starbird departed
from the position previously taken by the
Army, for in the non-claairified materials
being distributed for public consumption by
the Department of Defense- the question is
asked, 'What are the safety implications of
living in an area where nualear weapons are
stored?"
The response given is: "U.S. nuclear weap-
ons are designed with a series of safety
devices so that the likelihocal of any nuclear
yield in case of an accident is essentially nil."
I repeat, "essentially nil." General Starbird's
statement is absolute. The D.O.D. is not will-
ing to go that far. The chance of accident, it
says, is most remote, but it is not impossible.
In order to substantiate its claim that an
accidental nuclear detonation could not oc-
cur at one of the Sentinel sites, the Depart-
ment of Defense cites 20 yeart of accident-
free handling of nuclear weapons. I agree
that so far the Department of Defense has
built a record in handling nuclear weapons
that we can all admire. But I do not think
it makes sense to suggest, as they do, that
since there has never been an accidental
detonation there can never be one.
General Starbird's statement is also at
odds with the handbook prepared by the
Department of Defense and published .by the
Atomic Energy Commission in 1962. In Ap-
pendix A, it states:
"Nuclear weapons are designed with great
care to explode only when deliberately armed
and fired. Nevertheless, there is always a pos-
sibility that, as a result of accidental circum-
stances, an explosion will take place inad-
vertently. Although all conceivable precau-
tions are taken to prevent them, such acci-
dents might occur in areas where the weapons
are assembled and stored, during the course
of loading and transportation on the ground,
or when actually in the delivery vehicle, e.g.,
an airplane or a missile."
There have already been a considerable
number of accidents involving nuclear weap-
ons. The crashes at Palomares, Spain, and
Goldsboro, North Carolina, come readily
to mind. Of the Goldsboro incident Ralph
Lapp, a nuclear scientist, says in his book,
Kill and Overkill, that at the scene of the
accident Air Force experts found that five
of the six safety interlocks had been trig-
gered by the fall.
When he was asked at the Waukegan
meeting about Lapp's statement that all but
one of the safety devices on the bomb which
fell at Goldsboro had been triggered. Gen-
eral Starbird took issue with the statement.
I thought, therefore, it would be well to
check the matter further, so I asked the
staff of the Appropriations Committee to ob-
tain an authoritative answer. The Air Force
gave me this answer: that instead of only
one safety device remaining intact, two re-
mained untriggered.
The deployment of the Sentinel ABM sys-
tem is justified in part on the ground that
It will catch accidentally launched ICBM
missiles from other countries. If an ICBM
can be accidentally launched, why cannot
a Spartan be accidentally launched?
If a Spartan missile can be launched ac-
cidentally, what happens to its megaton
range nuclear warhead? Is there any pos-
sibility that it will be exploded in the at-
mosphere rather than in the target area
above the atmosphere? Is it possible for a
Spartan missile located at a site in a south-
ern state to re-enter the atmosphere and
threaten northern populations?
I realize that a mechanically perfect Spar-
tan will not explode until it is above the
atmosphere where its nuclear yield will
do no damage to this earth or its people.
But we are talking about a less than per-
fect Spartan missile which through mechan-
ical or human failure has been launched.
Can its nuclear mechanism arm itself pre-
maturely and explode its nuclear charge
before it leaves the atmosphere?
The point is that the safety devices are
not infallible?the fact that weapons are
designed not to malfunction does not mean
that they cannot. Nuclear accidents have
been occurring at the rate of approximately
one per year since the advent of the atomic
age more than 20 years ago. As weapons pro-
liferate throughout our states, we can ex-
pect the incidence of accidents to increase.
The possibility of an accident at the mis-
sile site cannot be discounted. Let me read
to you from a Washington Post story of May
23, 1958, describing an accidental missile
launch that occurred in Middletown. N.J.:
"Eight powerful Ajax missiles" reports the
Post "exploded at a New Jersey Nike launch-
ing base today, killing nine men, injuring
three and showering 24 live but non-atomic
warheads over a wide area.
"A tenth man was missing and presumed
dead.
"The Army said one of the missiles went
off at about 1:20 p.m. while a crew of five
civilian technicians and six army personnel
was installing a new type of arming mecha-
nism to insure greater accuracy. Four min-
utes later, seven other missiles on the
launching pad blew up at once with an
earthshaking roar that could be heard ten
miles away. Windows were shattered within
a one-mile radius.
"Army demolition crews scoured the coun-
tryside for the 24 warheads that were sent
hurtling over the area."
Fortunately the accident was non-nuclear,
but I think the remarks of the Mayor of
Middletown is relevant. He said, "The Army
assured me nothing like this would ever
happen. Now we have missiles flying all over
the place, landing on schools, in the streets
and on our houses. The Army assured me
that their things were not armed and never
would be fired unless there was an enemy
attack."
I have great respect for General Star-
bird as a distinguished and able officer. But
despite the best intentions and assurances
of able generals and despite their extensive
and intensive precautionary measures with
men and materials, accidents have oc-
curred?and they will continue to happen.
Mechanical equipment breaks down and
men are not infallible. One has only to read
the article by Dr. Paul Eggertsen in the Au-
gust issue of Psychiatry Magazine entitled
"The Dilemma of Human Reliability" to ap-
preciate the incredible difficulties facing the
leaders of our military forces in seeking to
eradicate human failure in dealing with the
complicated weapons used in today's armed
forces.
Dr. Eggertsen tells of the work of the hu-
man resources committee of which he was
a member and of the task given it by the
U.S. high command. "Our bombs," read his
assignment, "are Increasingly numerous,
they are deployed widely because of the cold
war, and they have quick reaction times be-
cause of the short warning times that ob-
tain in the cold war. We begin to perceive
they may not always be in safe hands. You
know about people. How can we make sure
that only 'safe' people get control of weap-
ons?"
The discussion ended, says Dr. Eggerteen,
in the committee's answer that neither this
nor any other group could insure that only
'safe' people could deal with nuclear weap-
ons.
From all this the conclusion seems obvious
that if it is possible to place nuclear mis-
sile sites away from centers of population
without unduly diminishing whatever ef-
fectiveness the Spartan missile may have,
in the interest of public safety that ought
to be done. In this instance, distance from
the city is important.
Particularly is this true when the public
is required to live with a defense of such
limited capability as the Sentinel. It is one
thing for our people to have to live with nu-
clear weapons that are part of a defense sys-
tem that provides maximum protection. It
is quite another thing to ask them to assume
such risks for a system which will not pro-
tect against the Soviet missile threat, which
will not protect against nuclear warheads
fired from enemy planes or submarines, which
will not protect against a Red Chinese threat
if it carries a missile which is not quite primi-
tive in effectiveness.
Does it not seem naive to expect the Com-
munist Chinese to develop and attack the
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
jejmeEiRlaffiEMBP71115VR000300090004-2
111289
February 26, roved Fort
United States with a missile system so un-
sophisticated that it could be thwarted by the
Sentinel system, especially when the Chinese
would know that our retaliation would be
swift, certain and utterly devastating from
nuclear warheads fired from bombers and
submarines ranging near China's shores and
from missile bases in this country?
, I have voted for ABM research and develop-
ment funds over the years because I believe
that as long as nuclear weapons exist in other
countries, we have no choice except to de-
velop the best antimissile defense we can.
But as yet, the Sentinel system should not
be leaving the drawing board and the labora-
tory. As former Secretary of Defense Mc-
Namara said to Congress: "None of the ABM
systems at the present or foreseeable state
of the art would provide an impenetrable
shield over the United States. . . . Let me
make it clear that the, cost in itself is not
the problem; the penetrability of the shield
is the problem."
There is a time for research and there is a
time for deployment. The first stage must be
completed before the second is undertaken.
As Dr. Hans Bethe states it so well in his
article in the March issue of the Scientific
American:
". . One must distinguish clearly between
the possibility of development and the de-
velopment itself, and similarly between de-
velopment and actual operation. One must
refrain from attributing to a specific defense
system, such as Sentinel, those capabilities
that might be obtained by further develop-
ment of a different system."
It follows that the Sentinel light ABM sys-
tem, to be built now and to be operational in
the early 1970's against a possible Chinese
intercontinental ballistic missile threat, will
have to reckon with a missile force unlike
either the Russian or the American force,
both of which were, after all, built when
these was no ballistic-missile defense. The
Chinese will probably build even their first
operational intercontinental ballistic missiles
so that they will have a chance to penetrate.
Moreover, we believe it is well within China's
capabilities to do a good job at this without
Intensive testing or tremendous sacrifice in
payload.
One remembers the recommendation of the
Army in 1959 to deploy the Nike-Zeus ABM
system, which was a predecessor tO the Sen-
tinel. President Eisenhower turned down the
Army's request. Had he complied with the
Army's recommendation and Nike-Zeus de-
ployed at an estimated cost of $14 billion, in
the words of former Undersecretary of De-
fense Cyrus Vance: "It would have had to be
torn out and replaced almost before it had
become operational."
Yet, "the illusion is being nourished," says
Dr. Bethe, "that an effective system against
ballistic missiles is possible." And the Army
is contributing to that illusion. Many peo-
ple?I should say most people?believe the
Sentinel system is a sure defense against all
incoming enemy missiles. They do not receive
full information about it. For this hearing
the propaganda machine of the Department
of Defense was busy. Friday's Chicago Daily
News showed drawings obviously obtained
from the Department of Defense. The de-
scriptive material says: "These drawings
based on a conference with Army officials,
show how Sentinel missiles would be
launched and guided and haw they would
stop enemy missiles."
To the average reader, this is a picture of
a fool-proof defense. How could anyone, it
suggests, be opposed to this scientific marvel
which renders us impervious to enemy mis-
sile attack? The average reader would not
know that enemy missile attacks do not
Come from individually lobbed firings, but in
a salvo. The Sentinel would be inundated in
a true attack. Should not the public knoW
this?
From the Army's standard presentation we
learn that in 1962 in a test at Kwajalein
atoll a Nike-X missile intercepted one of our
ICBM's launched from our west coast. There-
after, it continues, various major improve-
ments were made in the radar and inter-
ceptors available so that those components
when fitted together into a system could
meet a sizable number of attackers.
How many attackers can it meet? I realize
I am nearing the realm of classified material
and I would not want such data made pub-
lic. But the department's own experts con-
cede that it could not withstand a Soviet
attack. What is its capability? How much can
the public be told?
Will the Spartan installation proposed for
Libertyville protect Chicago from a missile
attack if the attacker uses decoys?
Will that Spartan installation protect Chi-
cago if the attacker creates a Beta-patch
blackout?
The specter of nuclear accidents remains.
Each new ABM site will increase the chances
for a nuclear accident. Those of us who rep-
resent constituencies close to missile em-
placements have a responsibility to make a
judgment as to whether or not we are will-
ing to vote to take the risks implicit in this
deployment. I, for one, am not willing to
jeopardize the well-being of millions of citi-
zens in the Chicago area for the sake of a
system so questionable as the Sentinel ABM.
The citizens of the Chicago area are con-
cerned, especially those who live near the
Libertyville site. I receive mail and phone
calls in my office daily from concerned citi-
zens who want no part of the Sentinel sys-
tem. Numbers of people and groups wanted
to give statements at this hearing today. I
told them time did not permit it because of
the great number of requests.
I have tried to cover some of the questions
that have troubled me and the many people
who have written to me. I don't envy the
Army its task. The threat of enemy weaponry
is serious enough without introducing into
the picture new anxieties concerning our own
weapons. I do It reluctantly and only because
I consider the decision we face with the
Sentinel system and the location of its sites
so serious. I hope and pray the decision we
reach may be the right one.
(Mr. KASTENMEIER asked and was
given permission to extend his remarks
at this point in the RECORD.)
Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Speaker, I
would like to add my voice to those of
my colleagues in opposing the deploy-
ment of the antiballistic-missile system.
While the question has been dramatically
debated by both the proponents and
the opponents of the ABM, I think we
would do well to consider not only the
technical arguments that can be made
against the system, but also the argu-
ments which focus on that subtle and
neglected position that deployment of
an ABM system would tend not to sta-
bilize the situation vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, but rather to heighten the
Instability of an already dangerous
situation.
It is often said that an ABM would not
upset the balance of terror because it
would simply strengthen our ability to
absorb a first strike and still be able to
inflict unacceptable losses upon the So-
viet Union. However, this argument is
generally based on the supposition that
the Soviets will not build up their offen-
sive might in response to the deployment
of the ABM. I believe this supposition to
be wholly unrealistic and dangerous.
The Soviets are as interested in main-
taining an assured destruction capabil-
ity as we are. If we deploy our ABM,
the Soviet Union can be expected to up-
grade their offensive forces to the point
that they can cope with a highly sophis-
ticated and accurate ABM system. In
short, the Soviets must plan their of-
fensive forces in such a way that they
will be able to overcome a 95-percent
effective ABM system if they want to
maintain their end of the balance of ter-
ror. This mad rush for more and better
weapons on their part would certainly
force us to move in a similar direction.
Can we honestly call this a stable situa-
tion, a situation conducive to frank dis-
cussions with the Soviets, conducive to a
secure world in which we can live out
decent lives.
Furthermore, I would like to add a note
of warning to all those persons, ordinary
citizens and leaders alike, who might be-
lieve that because we have an ABM there
is some guarantee against destruction.
Even if we should have an ABM which is
90-percent effective, there is no protec-
tion against annihilation in the event of
a heavy attack. If 10 percent of the war-
heads in a large-scale attack get through,
this is enough to crush our society and
spell the doom of millions of our people.
The grave danger is that someone might
allow himself to be led into the fantasy
that there is some protection after all. I
shudder to think what would happen if
we deploy this system and someone then
thinks that it is effective enough to allow
us to take a few more risks in pursuing
our national goals.
Is it not true that in this case it is
better to be truly afraid of the real dan-
ger of annihilation than to be lulled into
a false security by unfounded promises
about the effectiveness of an untested
ABM system. Let us admit the fact that
it is impossible to defend ourselves
against destruction once the war begins
and abandon now the ABM system. Per-
haps then our realistic fear will drive us
to seek more creative and productive
means of building a secure and peaceful
world in which we can live in safety with
the Russians as well as the Chinese.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gen-
tleman from Ohio (Mr. MINSEALL) is
recognized for 45 minutes.
[Mr. MINSHALL'S remarks will ap-
pear hereafter in the Extensions of Re-
marks.]
LONG BEACH, CALIF.: PROGRESSIVE
RECREATION
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a
previous order of the House, the gentle-
man from California (Mr. HOSMER) is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Speaker, the city
of Long Beach deservedly enjoys a na-
tionwide reputation for imagination and
leadership in education and municipal
services. Fart of this reputation stems
from a very wise decision on the part
of the citizens of Long Beach 40 years
ago when they voted to establish a recre-
ation commission.
That vote was 40 years ago today, and
It resulted in a coordination between
Approved For Release 2002/05/07: CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
111290 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? HOUSE February 26, 1969
the municipal recreation department and
the school recreation program. It has
long since become one of the outstand-
ing such plans in the Nation.
This coordination under the recrea-
tion council has enabled Long Beach to
get maximum benefit from its recreation
dollars, which now have numbered more
than 66 million since 1945. The benefits
of this plan are many and varied. The
city and the school system do not dupli-
cate each other's facilities. Schools may
use city parks, baseball diamonds, and
camping facilities, while the city recre-
ation program has full access to school
gymnasiums, swimming pools, and ath-
letic fields. All this has been a major
benefit to the city's taxpayers.
I would like to take this opportunity
to commend the Long Beach Recreation
Council for its progressive leadership and
dedicated service to the needs of the
people of Long Beach. The council is
headed by Mr. Milton B. Arthur, presi-
dent, and Mrs. Charles F. Reed, vice
president. Members are Mrs. Maurice W.
Johnson, Mr. John Mansell, Dr. Dwight
C. Sig-worth, Mr. Charles A. Stevens,
Councilman Emmet M. Sullivan, Mrs.
Gus A. Walker, and Mr. W. Odie Wright.
- The director of physical education and,
municipal and school recreation. Mr.
Alvin D. Hoskin, recently addressed a
civic group and highlighted the signifi-
cance and accomplishments of Long
Beach's outstanding recreational plan
Mr. Hoskin's remarks follow:
COORDINATION UNEXCELLED
Sound in its concept, effective in its serv-
ice to the children, youth and adults of the
community, and diversified in its scope, the
Long Beach Coordinated Municipal and
School Recreation program has become na-
tionally and internationally acclaimed. The
development of this corporate image did not
Just happen; it became a reality because of
the dedication and sincere desire of leading
citizens of this community, Recreation Com-
mission members and recreation employees
striving to provide for the needs of the com-
munity and diligently working for a quality
type recreation service for its citizens. Most
of us today accept the concept of coordina-
tion between the school district and the city
of Long Beach, but few of us are aware of
the basis for the present inter-agency coordi-
nation,
Let us go back a half century to the year
1917 when Eugene Tincher, now a prominent
local attorney, was elected Commissioner of
Public Affairs. Among his responsibilities WEIS
the administration of the parks and play-
ground. It was during a four-year term that
Mr. Tincher developed cooperative relation-
ships between the municipality and the
school district in the operation of the play-
grounds and recreation programs. With the
help of the school authorities in providing
and lighting two schools, the PTA and the
Public Affairs Department provided the per-
sonnel and the municipality provided the fa-
cilities necessary. Durng the latter part of
this period $1,000 was appropriated for the
operation of the summer playground proj-
ect. Leaders were paid from these funds and
the program was operated at five school play-
grounds. Supplies were furnished by the
PTA of eacn school. In 1920 a Community
Service Committee headed by Josephine Ran-
dall, National Recreation Association recre-
ation specialist, made a study of recreation
in Long Beach.
In 1923 another survey of recreation in
Long Beach was made by Mildred Wiley.
Following this a meeting of the College
Women's Club, now University Women's
Club, was held, at which time a report was
given which included the following state-
ment:
"The visitor in Long Beach during the sum-
mer finds these eight supervised and equip-
ped playgrounds in full swing. He returns
In September and looks again. No play-
grounds. No leaders. A few children about
after school for an hour or two. Are not the
play needs of the summer still existent, or is
play a bad thing for children in the fall,
winter, and spring?"
The survey report also stated:
"No good reaSon can be seen for the ex-
istence of two _separate administrations for
the playgrounds of the City of Long Beach.
On the other hand, there is reason for unify-
ing the command. The purpose of all the
public playgrounds is identical, namely to
furnish play for the children in the daytime
and the adults in ,,the evening. Because cer-
tain sites happen to come under the juris-
diction of the Department of Recreation, and
others happen to be school grounds under
the authority of the Board of Education, is
no reason why one central head should not
be responsible for the administration of all."
Additional efforts were made to establish
cooperation and coordination between the
City and the School Distriet in providing
recreational opportunities. In 1928, Charles
H. Hunt, high school supervisor. of physical
education, was convinced that a'greater use
of the school facilities could be made for
recreation. He suggested a plan to Superin-
tendent of Schools W. L. Stephens, to open
all playgrounds, gymnasiums and swimming
pools for after school, Saturday, and vacation
use. The Board of Education supported- the
plan by appropriating necessary funds.
Later, Mrs. W. J. Kimball, President of
Washington Gladden Club of the Congrega-
tional Church, came to Mr. Hunt and urged
that some plan be developed that would in-
corporate the parks, beaches and other city
areas with the schools. Subsequently, this
Club invited several hundred community
leaders to the Church for a meeting and Mr.
Hunt addressed the group, outlining a pos-
sible plan of coordination and suggesting
that a survey committee composed of school
and community leaders be formed to study
the situation and make recommendations.
The Press-Telegram published and supported
the idea. The PTA under Mrs. Stephen G.
Skinner, President, called a meeting at which
time a Public Recreation Survey Committee
was formed With Clyde Doyle, attorney and
later Congressman, as chairman.
The survey Committee met regularly for
nearly a year and involved many prominent
local citizens and organizations as well as
State and national consultants. It is inter-
esting to read a portion of one of Mr. Doyle's
reports:
"By mail and personal interviews with rep-
resentatives of other cities, documentary ma-
terial, visitations, and all other available
methods and means, this group sought out
the experiences of dozens of other American
cities in this matter, both municipal and
school, relating to parks, playgrounds, school
gymnasiums, athletic field, physical educa-
tion programs, use of public buildings,
grounds and facilities under the Civic Cen-
ter Act of the State of California and other-
wise, having in mind at all times the desira-
bility of Long Beach profiting by the
experiences and mistakes of other cities. At
the time the study commenced, the munici-
pality of Long Beach was conducting virtu-
ally no recreation or playground program,
but the Board of Education was financing
and conducting one which appeared highly
efficient and desirable."
Following the completion of the study,
City officials requested that legal provisions
to coordinate municipal and school recrea-
tion be prepared for submission to the elec-
torate. Mr. Hunt prepared the original docu-
ments which were refined into legal
terminology by Mr. Doyle. The PTA was the
major community organization supporting
the concept and encouraging voters to ap-
prove the Charter Amendments which they
did in 1929.
The City Charter amendments of 1929 pro-
vided for the establishment of a Recreation
Commission consisting of nine members.
Four of the nine members serve because of
their positions within the governmental
structure of the community. The additional
five members are lay citizens who serve terms
of five years with one term expiring each
year.
The Superintendent of Schools and the
City Manager by Charter provision are mem-
bers of the Recreation Commission. The
Board of Education selects one of its mem-
bers to represent it on the Recreation Com-
mission and the City Council selects one of
its members to represent the City Council
on the Commission. The Charter provides
that no more than six of the nine members
may be of the same sex, thereby assuring
that at least three women are represented
on the Commission.
The Recreation Commission is charged
with the responsibility of establishing poli-
cies governing the joint operation of school
and municipal recreation.
Close working relationships with the other
city commissions and departments are essen-
tial for the coordination of recreation. A Co-
ordinating Committee consisting of the pres-
ident of the Park, Planning and Recreation
commissions, the director of each of the three
departments, and representatives from the
City Engineer's Office, City Manager's Office,
and Marina Advisory Committee, meet regu-
larly to consider plans for major facilities
or developments relating to recreation. Rec-
ommendations of the Coordinating Commit-
tee are referred to the respective commis-
sions. After approval of the coordinating
Committee's recommendations by the com-
missions, the City Manager's Office is in-
formed and the recommendation to the City
Council'is forthcoming. Upon approval by
the City Council, the implementation of the
recommendations occurs.
The City Charter further provides that the
Director of Health and Physical Education
of the School District shall be the Director
of Reeleation for the City and that he shall
manage and supervise the public recreation
program. The Director is also the secretary
of the Recreation Commission and has the
responsibility of coordinating the recreation
program Of the schools and of the city.
It has been the concept under the coordi-
nated plan from the beginning that both
school and Municipal facilities may be used
for the recreoion of the citizens. The City
may use theymnasiums, swimming pools.
athletic fields, tc. when these are not needed
for the educa nal program. The schools in
turn may use the recreation facilities, parks,
baseball diamonds and have use of camping
facilities provided by the City. These recipro-
cal uses of facilities are coordinated through
the office of the irector of Municipal and
School Recreation. ? ?
One of the major advantages of the Co-
ordinated Program bf School and Municipal
Recreation is the edonomy of the joint use
of facilities. The Cit does not duplicate the
construction of g asiums, pools, athletic
fields of the schoolsbut builds structures
y
such as social hall clubhouses and youth club
facilities that are used for the activities not
normally conducted in the school plant. Such
coordinated use enables the tax payers of the
community to save a 'great deal on the con-
struction of facilities as well as provide a
much greater utilization of both school and
city recreation facilities.
Recreational services are coordinated at
the Commission level, administration level,
supervision level, and the recreation leader-
ship level. The fact that both agencies of the
coordinated program are represented at the
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP711300364R000300090004,2
S CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENA1 march 13, 1969
4. 20 Private Colleges (Most Baccalaureate Only)
In thousands of dollars]
Pt. 1
Pt. 2
Pt. 3
Total IG
Tuskegee Institute (Alabama) (1,098)
Reed College (Oregon) (450)
Pomona College (California) (543)
Franklin & Marshall College (Pennsylvania) (478)._
Fisk University (Tennessee) (291)
Vassar College (New York) (115)
Knox College (I llinois) (587)
Ea rlham College (Indiana) (92)
University of the South (Tennessee) (102)
Millsaps College (Mississippi) (300)
130
95
102
98
79
62
104
58.
60
80
61
23
26
47
24
33
27
23
18
19
43
17
0
11
12
6
0
1
6
234
135
129
156
115
101
132
82
85
99
Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 3 Total IG
Carleton College (Minnesota)(159)
Washington & Lee University (Virginia) (142)
Kalamazoo College (Michigan) (443)
Morehouse College (Georgia) (171)
Grinnell College (Iowa) (443)
Centre College (Kentucky) (41)
College of Wooster (Ohio)(54)
Spring Hill College (Alabama) (72)
Birmingham-Southern College (Alabama) (125)_ _
Davidson College (North Carolina) (14)
66 27 0 93
64 29 0 93
94 25 0 119
67 21 0 88
94 24 0 118
41 15 0 56
51 33 0
54 25 0 P.
9
63 21 0 84
14 20 0 34
FOOTNOTES
Pt. 2, sec. 2(b)(2)?Formula used: Number of resident students (full and part time) enrolled
in fall 1967 multiplied by $20.
Pt. 3, sec. 2(b)(3)?Formula used: Number of master's degrees in science and engineering
(for 3-year period)xl, plus number of doctor's degrees in science and engineeringx3. Total
number of advanced degree units then multiplied by $700.
Note: The numbers of advanced degrees in science and engineering for a 3-year period (1963-64
1964-65, 1965-66) were:
M.S 100, 390X1 =100, 390
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be received and appropriately re-
ferred.
The bill (S. 1563) to promote the ad-
vancement of science and the education
of scientists through a national program
of institutional grants to the colleges and
universities of the United States, intro-
duced by Mr. HARRIS (for himself and
other Senators) , was received, read twice
by its title, and referred to the Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare.
THE ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE
--- SYSTEM
Mr. GORE. Mr. President, three emi-
nent scholars, Dr. Allen S. Whiting, Dr.
Marshall D. Shulman, and Dr. Carl Kay-
sen, appeared before the Subcommittee
on Disarmament of the Committee on
Foreign Relations this morning.
I have also received a telegram from
the presidential adviser to President
Johnson, Dr. Donald F. Hornig.
I ask unanimous consent that these
statements and the telegram may be
printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
STATEMENT OF DR. ALLEN S. WHITING, PRO-
FESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND ASSOCIATE,
CENTER FOR CHINESE STTJDIES, THE UNI-
VERSITY OF MICHIGAN, MARCH 13, 1969
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of
this committee. I would like to express my
appreciation for the privilege accorded by
your invitation to appear here today. Unlike
Professor Schulman, I can lay no claim to
first-hand contact with the Chinese Com-
munist leadership and people. But twenty
years of analyzing the People's Republic of
China in action does give a basis for evalu-
ating the claim that an anti-ballistic missile
system is necessary to cope with the alleged
"Chinese threat." In addition to past Chi-
nese behavior, we can develop a logical
framework of likely future contingencies
within which we can estimate the range of
probable Chinese actions. And finally, I
would like to offer some thoughts on how our
construction of an ABM, officially justified in
terms of a "Chinese threat," might affect our
future relations with China.
There appear to be two alternative prem-
ises underlying the rationale, which links
an ABM with China's anticipated row
capability, estimated to be available to
Peking in the next four or five years. One
premise holds that- the Chinese leadership
at that time?quite likely after the death of
Ph. D
30,2933......
Northwestern University (17,233)
Indiana University (22,361)
Rutgers University (13,080_
University of Florida (15,832)
California Institute of Technology (16,911)
University of Iowa (15,587)
PLO Pt. 2 Pt. 3
549 670 3,263
561 854 2,366
381 337 1,772
512 775 2,173
555 597 1,657
530 95 1,342
500 722 1,698
484 345 1,320
549 971 1,246
421 544 1,273
463 387 1,306
479 30 914
459. 368 1,048
Total IG
4.482
3,781
2,490
3,460
2,809
1,967
2,920
2,148
2,766
2,238
2,156
1,423
1,875
3-Year Period
611, 014
Pt. 1 Pt. 2 Pt. 3 Total IG
Oklahoma State University (8,167J 338 394 1, 310 2,043
Texas A. & M. University (13,239 424 237 1,068 1,728
Oregon State University (10,025)j 375 266 1,109 1,751
University of California, Davis (l,635) 415 203 860 1,477
University of Pittsburgh (21,00 535 501 865 1,902
University of Kansas (15,444)_.457 316 925 1,697
University of North Carolina, hapel Hill (23,972) 565 307 809 1,680
North Carolina State Univer y (11,892) 403 192 977 1,571
Carnegie Institute of Tee ology (11,557) 398 105 839 8,342
Brown University (8,59 347 101 711 1,158
University of Arizona ,286)
University of Oklah a (8,762) 379 446 1,002 I, 828
350 363 974 1,687
19G5-66.
These 25 institutions plus the top 20 in FeEkral Funds for Acacfemic Science constitute the 45 top-ranking veers of science and engineering Ph. D's for 3-year period 1963 64 throug
Ii
3. 20 State Colleges and Universities ( er's the Highest Degree)
[In thou s of dollars]
PL 2- Pt. 3 Total
Arkansas State University (109)
Son Francisco State C'ollege (California) (1,656)
Southern Connecticut State College (348)
Valdosta State College (Georgia) (182)
University of Northern Iowa (493)
Kansas State Teachers College (600)
TCIWSOn StateColtege (Maryland) (630) ___ _
State College at Bridgewater (Massachusetts) (J01)
Western Michigan University (2,228)
Bemidji State College (Minnesota) (134)
IG
61 128 22 211
160 358 138 655
85 180 8 273
68 49 0 118
29 165 109 373
105 139 230 474
107 138 0 244
011. .100 0 160
184 369 169 722
63 83 8 154
Pt 1 Pt. 2 P1.3 Total
IG
_
Jackson State College (Mississippi) (269) 77 60 0 137
Southeast Missouri State College (134) 63 128 0 192
Chadron State College (Nebraska) (87) 57 37 3 97
Glsssboro State College (New Jersey) (24) 24 159 4 188
SUNY, New Peitz (New York) (355) 86 90 25 701
Fayetteville State College (North Carolina) (65). 53 23 0 76
Southeastern State College (Oklahoma) (245) 751-- 44 36 155
Indiana University of Pennsylvania (346) 85- 168 68 321
Winthrop College (South Carolina) (106) 61 63 1 125
Western Washington State College (405) 91 129 29 249
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
proved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
March-iiirimpitd 6 9 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 2841
to win significant Chinese aid. Incitement
and subversion may be attempted through
propaganda and, to a modest extent, through
money, arms, and training as well. Beyond
this, however, Peking refuses to go, This pat-
tern has remained fairly constant, despite
the heightened militancy associated with
China's Cultural Revolution.
Equally relevant is the low degree of Chi-
nese involvement in Burma's various insur-
gencies, both communist and those of na-
tional minorities. At no time since 1949 has
the Rangoon regime been able to pacify the
entire country. Much of the territory adja-
cent to China has been controlled by various
armed groups hostile to Rangoon's rule. As
in India, Peking's patronage, both overt and
covert, encourages and equips communist
Insurrectionists and anti-Burmese separat-
ists. Yet neither the amount nor the kind
of such aid has seriously threatened the
regime. The situation has ebbed and flawed
and today seems no worse than in the past,
at least in terms of Chinese involvement.
Thailand, of course, has won considerable
attention as a public target of Peking's pro-
paganda. Over the past few years actual
armed insurrection has spread through prov-
inces in the north, northeast, and southern
sectors of Thailand. Most recently Meo re-
volts have further challenged Bangkok's au-
thority. Some support for these various in-
surgencies comes from Hanoi; most comes
from Peking. Defectors provide graphic evi-
dence of training and direction from Chinese
sources on the mainland and in Thailand.
Presumably China could easily infiltrate a
well-trained guerrilla force that would be
wholly Thai in composition, recruited from
the 200,000 ethnic Thais in the nearby Chi-
nese province of Yunnan. However, the pres-
sent insurgents remain a scattered, poorly
equipped, un-coordinated force of less than
2,000. This small effort is what lies behind
Peking radio's grandious claims for "people's
war" in Thailand.
In short, after twenty years of these un-
stable situations on the unpoliced borders of
a nation with six or seven hundred million
people supposedly "supporting" armed
struggles abroad, we must ask: what has kept
China from doing more? Has it been the fear
of 'U.S. retaliation? This could hardly apply
in remote Nagaland or amongst the hill peo-
ples of neutralist Burma. Chinese troops
or an indigenous fifth column could march
into adjacent territory with overwheming
force and establish a "liberated area" without
fear of U.S. power being unleashed against
the Chinese mainland. Moreover, where
China's interests have been seen by Peking
as truly vital, such risks of U.S. retaliation
have been taken?overtly in Korea, and
covertly in Vietnam.
Thus by focusing less on Peking's words
and more on Peking's actions, we can sep-
arate out the lesser from the greater Chinese
interests. Clearly the Peking leadership does
not believe its vital interests include giving
significant material support to foreign revo-
lutionary movements. In fact, Mao's doctrine
explicitly describes national liberation
struggles as essentially dependent on local
resources, a "do it yourself" philosophy. This
doctrine serves Chinese ethnocentric and
practical interests as well. First, it points to
the Chinese as the models for guerrilla war-
fare and prolonged struggle without outside
help. The message is clear: "we did it basic-
ally on our own; you can too." Second,
China' S practical interests are served because
this general doctrine excludes the necessity
of choosing between safe and unsafe situa-
tions in allocating Chinese assistance. All
people's wars will be treated equally; no
risks will be be taken because no Chinese
aid will be that important. This is the con-
stant in Chinese policy, whether with
neutral Burma, hostile India, or American-
allied Thailand.
I see no plausible reason for these Chinese
calculations to change five years hence.
Neither in the first flush of victory in 1949
nor in Mao's last political convulsions during
the Cultural Revolution did Chinese armies
move across bEtclers on behalf of "people's
wars." Mao's successors are unlikely to react
any differently to the role China should play
in advancing communism abroad. They
might conceivably scale down their lip-serv-
ice to "national liberation struggles," al-
though if the Soviet precedent serves any
example, we should not expect this to hap-
pen for many years to come. But certainly
there is no reason to believe they will take
greater risks in staking their prestige, and
possibly their country, behind a local insur-
gency through a show of force or nuclear
blackmail.
Indeed, were one to concede any plausi-
bility to this basis for Chinese nu-
clear blackmail, it would have far more
relevance to Chinese deployment of an 'inter-
mediate range ballistic missile system, tar-
geted against U.S. bases on China's periphery
and against cities of our allies. A Chinese
ICBM and a U.S.-based ABM would be
largely irrelevant to a serious and system-
atic effort by Peking to back local insur-
gencies with nuclear force. But even the
IRBM alternative assumes so fundamental
a change in Chinese doctrine as to raise
serious questions of probability.
Moreover, so long as U.S. nuclear power
remains capable of devastating China, the
credibility of any such blackmail?whether
through ICBM's or IRBM's?is so low as to,
in all likelihood, discourage its use by Peking.
If we assume a burgeoning nuclear missile
program in China, we also assume the con-
comitant infrastructure of technological
modernization and all that is entailed in
supporting so costly and complicated a mili-
tary system. This developmental process has
a double effect. First, it educates an elite in
the long and painful process of pulling a
backward country somewhere near the levels
of advanced nations. Moreover it increases
the vulnerability of their society, no longer
dependent on scattered rice-fields but now
locked into the urban complex, to nuclear
attack. In short, China's acquisition of an
operation nuclear missile capability should
reduce, not increase, the willingness of Pe-
king to risk nuclear war.
If we shift from so-called "people's wars"
to conventional types of conflict, the past
twenty years give far more cause for concern
in projecting the future. The important uses
of Chinese force, with varying degrees of an-
ticipated risk, occurred in Korea, 1950-63;
Quemoy, 1954-55 and 1958; India, 1962 and
1965; and Vietnam, 1965-68. Several charac-
teristics link these events together. Every
clash occurred in immediate proximity to, if
not actually on, China's border. In every case
Peking regulated the level and tempo of its
military actions so as to minimize the risk of
escalation spilling over into China, although
accepting some such risk as basically un-
avoidable. After Korea, Peking never again
openly courted U.S. attack against the main-
land. On the contrary, it very carefully con-
trolled its actions in the Taiwan Strait crises,
and its words in the Vietnam War, so as to
avoid provoking us to use either conven-
tional or nuclear force against targets in
China.
Looking at the specific issues involved in
each clash, these events obviously differ, one
from another. The first Sino-Indian conflict
of 1962 grew out of a festering border dispute,
complicated by Chinese assunaptions of for-
eign exploitation of internal vulnerabilities
in the disastrous aftermath of Mao's "Great
Leap Forward." However, China's attack in
1965 was part of the Pak-Indian conflict
within which Peking had a limited interest
on behalf of Pakistan as well as itself. In both
Korea and Vietnam, Chinese assistance came
on behalf of a besieged neighbor with a com-
mon communist ideology against a com-
monly perceived enemy, "U.S. imperialism."
Finally, the two Quemoy crises arose in the
context of China's unfinished civil war into
which we interposed our force nineteen years
ago and from which we have never dis-
engaged.
One can examine this record much as one
looks at the doughnut or the hole. On the
one hand, it shows the careful deliberation
behind China's use of force in conventional
situations commonly encountered in inter-
national relations over the past two hundred
years. This is the way nations behave, com-
munist or not, Chinese or not. On the other
hand, it does show Peking's willingness to
take risks and to use its force in situations
other than clear and immediate self-defense.
I would suggest that combining both points
of emphasis permits us to project a situa-
tion when China acquires nuclear weapons
which is neither wholly reassuring nor wholly
frightening. I suspect this will be more or
less true so long as nuclear weapons remain
in anyone's hands, other than our own, and
certainly should they proliferate beyond the
present nuclear powers.
There is one aspect of the Chinese situa-
tion, however, which is unique compared
with our relationship to other nuclear pow-
ers: we did intervene and continue to inter-
vene in the Chinese civil war. Moreover, in
the second Quemoy crisis of 1958, we pro-
vided the Chinese Nationalist forces with
eight-inch howitzers publicly identified as
capable of firing nuclear shells. Aside from
whatever role our threats to use nuclear
weapons in 1953 may have played in bring-
ing about a truce in Korea, our nuclear de-
ployment in the West Pacific has taken on a
particular salience for Peking because it has
provided the ultimate deterrent against
Mao's pursuit to the end of his more than
thirty years of struggle with Chiang Kai-
shek.
Here a bit of historical perspective is in
order. For more than one hundred years,
China?long confident of its civilization's
superiority to the outside world?suffered
invasion and exploitation by foreign powers,
large and small, European and Asian, largely
because of China's material inferiority, espe-
cially in weapons. We call this "gunboat
diplomacy." Chinese?whether Nationalist or
Communist?call it the period of "Unequal
treaties and foreign imperialism." Peking's
determination to gain sufficient military
strength to prevent foreign interference in
China's internal affairs made the develop-
ment of nuclear power in China absolutely
essential. Whether against American domi-
nance or Soviet dependence, China's nuclear
capability would provide at least psychologi-
cal, and political strength, if not an actual
strategic equalizer.
I do not doubt that significant elements
in the Chinese leadership?certainly Mao
himself?believe their explanation of former
Secretary of Defense McNamara's announce-
ment to build an ABM because of the Chi-
nese threat, as a step "taken by U.S. imperi-
alists to continue with their nuclear black-
mail and nuclear threats against China" and
"another anti-Chinese measure adopted to
intensify the administration's collusion with
the Soviet revisionist leading clique." If we
continue with the ABM and its present justi-
fication, we will perpetuate the suspicion, if
not the conviction, in Peking that we are
determined to maintain maximum military
superiority over China so as to act at will In-
pursuit of our interests, regardless of the
consequences for Peking. Given our confron-
tation over Taiwan and the offshore islands,
anything which perpetuates or intensifies the
sense of bitterness and frustration in the
Chinese leadership must be justified as nec-
essary on other grounds which-offset this
cost. Seen in this perspective, the ABM is
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R0003000900
S 2842 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
not a guarantee against Chinese irrational-
ity or miscalculation but rather may actually
be a further goad to Chinese assumptions of
our malevolance and permanent enmity.
STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND DISARMA-
MENT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS BY MARSHALL D. SHULMAN,
PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT, AND DIRECTOR,
RUSSIAN INSTITUTE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
MARCH 13, 1969
Mr. Chairman, I address myself to some in-
ternational political aspects of the queetion
whether the United States should now deploy
some form of anti-ballistic missile system,
and in particular, I would like to suggest how
I believe this decision affects, and is affected
by, our relations with the Soviet Union.
I am not competent to testify regarding
the technical aspects of the question, but I
think it is evident that the matter is by no
means a purely technical one, and that even
If the question of technical feasibility were
wholly satisfied, the political context in
which this decision is made deserves serious
consideration.
In the course of the public discussion of
this question, there is no disagreement, Ilee-
lieve, that the central issue is how best to
strengthen the security of the United States.
The disagreements arise over how to think
about security, in the light of the new con-
ditions now prevailing, involving a complex
and rapidly changing weapons technology,
and an intricate process of interaction be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United
States, whose policies are deeply influenced
in both cases although in different ways by
the interplay of political and social forces
which we do not yet understand very well.
My testimony is divided into two parts:
Background and Recommendations.
I. BACKGROUND
(1) Until a few years ago, the strategic
military relationship of the Soviet Unn
and the United States had reached a plateau
of relative stability, based upon a gross bal-
ance of mutual deterrence, despite consid-
erable disparities between the two arsenals.
Experience had taught both countries a con-
siderable measure of sobriety, and in prac-
tice there developed significant tacit re-
straints which introduced some measure of
stability in their strategic military coMped-
tion. However, the quest for superiority by
each country and the appearance of a new
generation of technological innovations mew
threaten to undermine that tenuous sta-
bility. From the Soviet point of view, the
United States has by and large appeared to
be the pacesetter, and the Soviet Union has
been making a strenuous effort in recent
years to catch up. Both countries are now fie
the grip of technological possibilities.?int-
proved accuracy, more target information
from reconnaissance satellite photography,
greater range and yield, multiple guided wan-
heads, advanced computer technology, and
potential military uses of outer space and
the sea-bed?which call Into question the
relative invulnerability of the retaliatory de-
terrence on which the previous stability was
based. This circumstance is an important
part of the context within which the ABM
question arises.
(2) There has been a spiral of interaction
between the two countries, which sterna
partly from the fact that strategic policy ia
often determined by bureaucratic politics
and psychological apprehensions, with ra-
tional doctrine coming along as an after-
thought. The interplay of forces and interests
operating on the decision-making process
within each country is affected by that on
the other side, with the result that a recipro-
cal process of simulation has sometimes been
set in motion. However, there le often a lag
in time involved, during which ideas are
diffused and sink in and get translated Into-
action by cumbersome bureaucratic processes,-
with the result that we have often not
recognized a reaction for what it is, but have
taken it as a new initiative, reflecting a
change in intentions. For example, it appears
probable to me that the increased rate of
intercontinental missile deployment by the
Soviet Union of which we became aware a
few years ago may reflect a deeision taken
in response to the steep rate of increase in
our missile program foreshadowed in the
1961 U.S. budget, which was in turn a
response to our estimate of what the Soviet
missile program of 1958 might have projected.
(3) Soviet policy in the present period,
particularly as it affects domestic and
Eastern European developments, appears to
be dominated by the orthodox wing of the
Communist Party bureaucracy, and is marked
by a preoccupation with ideological con-
formity among intellectuals, artists and na-
tionality groups. While some of the social
tensions stem from factors that also appear
in the United States and elsewhere in the
world, the modernization of the economy
within the Soviet Union and in elastern
Europe raises special and difficult questions
for a centralized system of Party governance,
and this may in part be responsible for the
present tightening of Ideological control. If
there should be a relaxation of the level of
tension with the United States, it is quite
possible that this will be accompanied, as
has been the case at times in the past, by
a further tightening of police and Party
vigilance against "contamination by
bourgeois ideology." However, the Soviet et-
fort to increase its influence in areas where
U.S. influence has receded, as in the Middle
East, sets limits on the degree of detente that
can be expected in the present period.
(4) Among the considerations which weigh
heavily upon the Soviet leadership in the
present period, as it faces the problem of
drafting a Five Year Plan for the allocation
of resources for the period 1971-19'75, is the
drain on resources generally and upon ad-
vanced technology in particular as it con-
templates the upward spiral of the strategic
arms race. One year ago at this time, the
Soviet leadership was engaged in a hard-
fought debate, whether to enter into talks
With the United States to damp down the
strategic arms race. By the late spring of
1968, this Issue was settled in favor of enter-
ing into such talks. We do not know what
coalition of interests may have carried this
decision or how far this coalition would be
prepared to go In actual negotiations?it may
be that the only agreement reached at that
time was to let the talks begin?but it does
appear to be the case that a serious concern
about economic costs has been an important
factor in impelling the Soviet leadership to
want to find out how far the United States
is prepared to go in checking the upward
spiral of the strategic arms race.
(5) As of this moment, the Soviet attitude
toward the new American Administration is
tentatively hopeful, with many reservations
in the background. Despite its past feelings
about the new President, and its anxieties
about pressures it sees toward the militari-
zation of the American society, the Soviet
press and leadership appear to believe that
"objective circumstances"?meaning domes-
tic social tensions in the United States, bud-
getary pressures, and the pacific inclination
of the American people?together with the
practicality of the President may create a
present opportuntiy for moderating the stra-
tegic arms race in some measure.
(6) The rise in publicized hostility be-
tween the Soviet Union and Communist
China is a factor that may, operate in sev-
eral contradictory directions. The Soviet Un-
ion has clearly been anxious about the
possibility of an alliance between China and
the United States, however remote that pros-
pect now appears to us; I do not, however,
see the possibility of a Soviet alliance with
the United States against China in view of
the intensity of the residual hostilities in
OUT relationship. Nevertheless, some quies-
cence in its realtions with the United States
may seem attractive in a period of intensified
conflict on the Chinese border. On the other
hand, this conflict also catalytically increases
Soviet interest in defense, and sets limits on
the possibilities for overt collaboration with
the United States.
(7) Soviet thinking about the significance
of ABM may have gone through changes
with time. The original deployment decision
appeared to be something of a "politician's
compromise" among conflicting pressures,
and it corresponded to a folk-wisdom feeling
about the defense of Moscow. Over time,
however, the decision seems to have been
weakened by a growing realization of the in-
effectiveness of that particular system and
its stimulating effect upon the U.S. strategic
budget. In recent years, serious analytical
writing on the ABM in military doctrine has
dropped out of the public press. With regard
to the U.S. decision to deploy Sentinel, the
Soviet press has not until recently expressed
deep concern, except for the worry that a
thin ABM might soon put on more weight.
Although evidence is lacking, I believe the
ABM by itself may be of less concern than
the ABM in. its context, Which includes the
deployment of MIRVs and other technologi-
cal developments previously mentioned, es-
pecially the improvement of missile accu-
racy. Taken together, these may seem to give
some plausibility to the arguments of those
who claim the U.S. is bent on achieving a
first-strike capability. The Soviet response
could be expected both on the psychological
level and on the level of military strategy?
as Was Our response to the Soviet ABM?and
would involve the acceleration of technologi-
cal innovations which would, in turn, lead
to a further American response.
XL RECOMMENDATIONS
With this background in mind, Mr. Chair-
man, I find myself impelled to the following
conclusions:
(1) In the absence of a compelling case for
the immediate deployment of an ABM, and
a persuasive case for the feasibility of the
proposed system, I believe that any such de-
ployment should be put on "Hold" at the
present time, while continuing our research
and development on. various anti-ballistic-
missile systems. There are risks and costs to
such deferment, but I believe they are less
than the risks and costs of stimulating a
continuation of the upward spiral of the
strategic arms race, and delaying a possible
agreement with the Soviet Union until it be-
comes even more difficult to achieve than it
would be today.
(2) Even more important, I believe, would
be an effort on our part to begin the process
of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the
damping down of the strategic arms race as
soon as possible, with a clear indication of
the seriousness of our intentions to achieve
stability, levelling-off and, when possible. re-
ductions. One essential mark of our serious-
ness would be a clear indication of our will-
ingness to exercise restraint in the further
deployment of Poseidon, Minuteman III and
other advanced offensive weapons. There
axe also risks to this course, but if our secu-
rity is best advanced at this Stage by a Stable
deterrent balance at a moderate level, the
risks are neither disproportionate nor irre-
trievable.
(3) I would recommend that we carefully
avoid creating undue expectations for early
and dramatic results in such negotiations. It
seems likely that these talks may take a long
time, that they may involve procedural
wrangles and set-backs, and that they may
at best produce tacit and reciprocal restraint
rather than treaty agreements. We should
also remind ourselves that these talks are
not likely to produce an across-the-hoard
detente, nor to settle other important politi-
cal differences.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
March 1trIV69
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 2843
(4) The Administration should be com-
mended for its effort to move ahead on a
number of political issues with the Soviet
Union, but the missile talks should not de-
pend upon the successful outcome of these
efforts. It is evident that progress in the
missile talks would be difficult if the Soviet
Union sought to gain political advantage
from the climate created by the fact of the
talks themselves, or if the Soviet Union were
actively fanning the sparks in the Middle
East, or if the United States were engaged in
bombing North Viet Nam. But the point
should be clearly established that there is an
overlapping interest on the part of the Soviet
Union and the United States equally in level-
ling-off the strategic arms race, even though
the political rivalry between the two coun-
tries is not now substantially abated, as it
may not be for some time.
(5) It'follows also, Mr. Chairman, that it
would not be wise to deploy an ABM system
in the belief that it would improve our bar-
gaining position in relation to the missile
talks. To do so would be more likely to
strengthen the position of those on the Soviet
side who are only too ready to argue that the
United States is too committed by its system
or its pressure groups to an arms race to be
seriously interested in its abatement.
(6) I would not argue that every level of
anti-ballistic missile deployment under every
circumstance is necessarily destabilizing. I
can conceive of circumstances arising in the
course of these negotiations in which the So-
viet Union might indicate it would not wish
to contemplate the dismantling of its ABM
installations. It Could then accept with equa-
nimity some moderate level of ABM protec-
tion for the invulnerability of our fixed-site
missiles, our command and control installa-
tions and our Strategic Air Force, as a sta-
bilizing factor in the deterrent balance. In
such a ease, I would think It important that
both by Presidential declaration and by the
physical disposition of these facilities,' it
should be made clear that they will not be
used as building blocks toward a thick ABM
systems for the defense of cities, thus degrad-
ing the Soviet deterrent. In such a circum-
stance, progress in the missile talks and re-
straint in the deployment of advanced offen-
sive weapons would be necessary concomi-
tants to these deployments.
(7) Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would urge
that we never lose sight of our longer-term
objective to work our way out from under
the balance of terror, toward agreed reduc-
tions in strategic weapons as these become
possible, and toward at least tentative first
steps to forms of security that need not hold
our people in precarious hostage.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF CARL KAYSEN FOR THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON DISARMAMENT, SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE, THURSDAY, MARCH
13, 1969
The question to which I am addressing
myself is, "Shduld the Government of the
United States now go ahead with the pro-
posed deployment of the Sentinel Anti-
ballistic Missile System?" This question in
turn must be divided into two parts: first,
whether the deployment that has recently
been proposed should go forward?namely,
that of a "thin" area defenes over the whole
country, relying primarily on the Spartan
long-range, high-altitude interceptor missile
but incorporating also a number of Sprint
shorter-range, lower-altitude interceptors
used mainly to defend the radar installations
of the system?and second, whether, alterna-
tively, there should be a modified deployment
which would be designed primarily to defend
Minuteman missle sites and bomber bases,
but Which would still contain a substantial
element of area defense.
My answer to the question is "No."
This response is based primarily on two
propositions: (1) we do not need such a de-
ployment now to increase our security; (2)
since we don't need it, we must not do it
because it is expensive and there are more
pressing claims on our resources and efforts
which merit higher priority than a large new
military system that is not strictly necessary.
Further, it is my judgment that the de-
ployment of a Sentinel system in either of
the modes -described above is more likely,
to decrease than to increase our security.
Agreement with this third proposition is not
strictly necessary to a conclusion that a de-
ployment decision is not in order, but obvi-
ously it reinforces greatly the more narrowly
based argument that rests on the first two
propositions above.
My first proposition?that we do not need
an ABM system now for security reasons?
requires elaboration. The primary function
of the large, complex strategic weapons sys-
tems we have built up over the last decade
and a half is to insure that no adversary
with a large strategic capability will be
tempted to use it against us. Our present
system does that by its capability to inflict
a very high level of damage on even the larg-
est and most powerful potential adversary?
i.e. the Soviet Union?after that adversary
has made a surprise attack on us. In the
face of that capability, such an attack would
be irrationl. This deterrent posture has been
efficacious in the face of a large build-up in
Soviet striking strength. The present size
and disposition of our offensive forces and
the associated intelligence, warning, com-
mand and control systems, is such as tom-
sure that they can continue to perform this
function effectively in the near future, say
the next three to four years. Whether they
can do so in the further future is a different
question to which I will return in a moment.
The proposed ABM system will add little if
anything to the capability of our forces to
continue to perform this deterrent function.
Their own performance is quite uncertain,
and their effect in adding to our very large
retaliatory capacity?what the Defense De-
partment has come to call our capacity for
assured destruction?is marginal at best if
the system performs well and may be nil or
even negative if it performs badly. You have
already heard from scientists of great tech-
nical competence and experience on the com-
plexities of the system and the difficulties
of predicting its performance. Since I am
neither scientist nor engineer, I can add
nothing from my own knowledge to what
you have already heard. Further, the Soviet
Union can readily take responsive measures
in the way of adding to their offensive force,
improving the penetration capability of their
reentry vehicles and the like, which can be
expected to overcome a very substantial part,
if not all, of whatever defensive capability
the Al3M system possesses.
Second?as far as its supposed function of
defense, in the event of nuclear war, the
proposed system may have some value if the
Soviets do nothing to respond to it. With
the system we might sustain fewer casualties
in the event of deterrence failing and war
coming, than without it. However, we must
remember that our primary reliance is on
deterrence, and that damage limitation is,
and has beep, at best a poor and weak second.
In the past damage limitation has been ar-
gued for in somewhat inconsistent terms,
partly as a kind of nearly free add-on to
what were essentially deterrent forces, partly
as a somewhat euphemistic way of discussing
something that was nearly, but not quite,
a first-strike capability. Even separately,
these arguments are not persuasive. Together
they tend to be contradictory. They become
no more effective when the mode of damage
limitation is defensive rather than pre-
emptive. Further, the more it appears that
the system could achieve a significant de-
fensive result, the more likely it is that the
Soviets will respond to it in such a way as
to negate most of its effect.
Soviet capabilities, both in terms of cur-
rent deployments and development in pro-
duction potential for improving and increas-
ing them are such as to make it impossible
for our strategic forces to do much more for
us than provide mutual deterrence. The ex-
istence of these forces, confronting large and
similarly stable Soviet second-strike forces,
does provide some general extra restraint on
both powers in respect to any action which
might lead to military involvements and the
awful threat of escalation. Even this restraint
Is imperfect, as the recent past has shown.
However, it is clear to me, and I think to
every other careful observer, that strategic
striking power cannot now, has not in the
recent past, and will not in the foreseeable
future, offer the kind of military threat vie-
h-vis the Soviet Union that is translatable
into useful political power, precisely because
the Soviet Union offers and can continue to
offer the same kind of threat to us.
On the scale and, in the mode originally
proposed, the Sentinel system would simply
make no essential difference in respect to
our strategic relations with the Soviet Union
as far as mutual deterrence goes, even if the
Soviet Union does little to respond to its
deployment. Of course, we cannot predict
that they will not respond. If the system is
deployed on a larger scale than is now pro-
posed-1.e. if the "thin" system grows up to
a "thick" one?we must anticipate a Soviet
response. It has never been our policy, and
I think it never should be, to seek a first-
strike capacity vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
If we were seeking such, and an ABM were
big enough, reliable enough, and not capable
of being effectively countered by Soviet re-
sponse, then its deployment might indeed
alter significantly the strategic balance. But
none of these conditions holds.
The original rationale of Sentinel deploy-
ment and "thin" area defense to protect the
whole country against a Chinese missile at-
tack in the mid or late 70's was never con-
vincing. It seems to have been abandoned by
its proponents. An attack on the United
States by the strategically weak Chinese
would be wildly irrational. The U.S. has a
first-strike capacity against China now. Are
we seeking to extend it? To use it? Do we
really believe that while we do deter the
Soviets, we cannot deter the Chinese?
If the rationale for the deployment of
Sentinel is shifted once again and becomes
that of defending our bomber bases and
Minuteman sites, we can say again, "It's not
now needed." The survivability of a sufficient
striking force for effective deterrence is not
in doubt now and does not appear likely to
be in the near future. To the extent that,
In the further future, it becomes In doubt,
the question of whether the Sentinel system,
designed for quite another task, is the ef-
ficient mode for increasing that survivability
deserves careful examination. For example, it
is obviously cheaper, simpler and quicker to
increase the survivability of the bomber
force by spending the extra money required
to increase the number of planes on air-
alert or provide for a large number of addi-
tional bases, rather than to erect an elaborate
missile system for close-in defense of bomber
bases.
My second proposition hardly needs elabo-
ration. Deployment of the Sentinel system
will cost us $5 to $10 billion over the next
several years. The Senate needs no instruc-
tion on the variety of pressing needs for
which these sums could be used. If, as I have
argued above, Sentinel is not a necessity for
our security, then there is every reason to
seek higher priority uses for Federal funds.
Not only is the money important, but the
question of political effort and priority is also
important. The question of how we value
What may at best be a marginal addition to
our defense in relation to what are clearly
major urgent needs in domestic areas is
deeply involved.
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
S 2844 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
In my own view, the argument goes beyond
the two points that I have made. A decision
to begin now to deploy the Sentinel system
will detract from our security, not add to it.
The argument for this view is complex; it in-
volves a further forecast into what is in-
evitably an uncertain future and includes an
important element of Judgment, but so, of
course, do the arguments the other way.
Forecasts and judgment cannot be escaped.
The military technology embodied in the
forces that we and the :loviet Union now
have deployed is such as to make the main-
tenance of deterrent stability relatively se-
cure. The nature of the forces is such that
a would-be attacker can...hardly entertain a
belief in his ability to succeed. Further, each
side has a clear notion Of the forces which
the other side commandt. The next stages of
the evolution of the technology of strategic
weapons will change that situation in a
drastically unfavorable way. The combina-
tion of ABM defense, MJItVs, and mobile
missiles, toward which bola sides appear to
be moving offers much less prospect of cer-
tainty and stability of deterrence. Our most
urgent task in maintainipg our security is to
Insure the kind of arms-control negotiations
which have a good protpect of closing off
movement in this direction. An immediate
decision to deploy will do nothing to help
that process and may hinder it. It will stimu-
late forces both within Saar own governmen-
tal system and within the Soviet system that
will push toward further radical changes in
weapons.
It has been stated by some that, if we fail
to deploy the ABM, we will be throwing away
a bargaining card for negotiation with the
Soviet Union. I cannot understand this argu-
ment. The future capacity to deplay, and per-
haps to deploy a better _conceived and de-
signed system is all the bargaining card we
need. Actual deployment, by revealing what
we are doing, diminishes rather than in-
creases the effectiveness of our bargaining
position.
Finally, there is an even larger and deeper
Issue. Do weapons dictate policy, or do we
decide on the basis of our policy concepts
what weapons we wish to deploy? As new and
frightening technological passibilities open
up before us, I think this a the most Im-
portant question that the ''nate, the Gov-
ernment, and the country must face.
PrrisT qt,D,
141,trch 13, 1969.
Senators ALBERT GORE AND JoHn SHERMAN
COOPER,
Subcommittee on Disarmain nt, Foreign Re-
lations Committee, OW Senate Oftice
Building, Washington, D.C.:
During my five years as science advisor to
President Johnson I studied, with the aid of
distinguished consultants, the question of
ABM systems, their technical capabilities
and their relations to our ....serail strategic
position. I came to the conclusion then apd
believe now that the deployment of any of
the proposed ABM systems would impair the
security of the United Stales and retard
progress toward a stable, peaceful world.
I can see no necessity for the deployment
of a system to protect us from the Chinese.
If our ICBM, Polaris and bomber forces are
adequate to deter the Soviet Union, which
possesses very large nuclear forces of its own,
the deterrent against China is overwhelming
for the foreseeable future.
As for an ABM defense against the Soviet
Union, there is no present prospect of a de-
fense which could stop a large-scale attack.
Any system which I have examined was vul-
nerable in various respects, and in any case
could be relatively easily countered by new
developments in offensive weapons and
tactics.
ABM systems cannot be considered in iso-
lation. They would become part of an offense-
defense game in which, at present, the of-
fense seems to have the advantage. In any
case, whatever initial system we deploy would
have to be constantly elaborated and im-
proved and eventually replaced by newer
generation of ABM systems as the other side
increased the quantity and quality of its
offensive forces. This it would inevitably do
if the ABM system had any effectiveness, so
that even the cost of the so-called full sys-
tem would only be a down payment on the
eventual expense. More important still, it
would lead to continual e.scalation in the
armament level of both sides with no in-
crease in security. Indeed, if one reflects that
in the face of a stronger Soviet force we
would rely on a fantastically complicated
system which could never be tested full scale
and whose overall reliability would never be
known, I believe that our Security would
decrease,
In my view the question of whether we
would be defended better with or without
an ABM system can only be answered by
considering our overall strategic situation..
Since so much is at stake, this should be
reviewed free from historical Or partisan bias
or vested interest. For this reason I support
the ,proposal by Dr. Killian that a broadly
based national commission be created to
study the total problem.
At this time I believe deployment of ABM
would be contrary to the national interest
and might well impede what I consider the
most urgent business, to get on with talks
aimed at the possibility of limiting the fur-
ther expansion of nuclear armaments.
DONALD F. HORNIG.
Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I am op-
posed to the Sentinel anti-ballistic-mis-
sile system. I was opposed to it when
President Johnson first proposed that it
be deployed, and I voted twice in the
Senate to postpone deployment. There
is nothing which has occurred since I
cast those votes to change my mind and
I intend to vote against deployment once
again.
The country and the Congress are in a
state of anticipation today as the count-
down continues at the White House. It
is expected that the President will an-
nounce his decision on the ABM at his
press conference tomorrow. I ask him
to call a halt on ABM. I cannot believe
that with all of the hard facts?the sci-
entific facts?he has at hand, that he will
decide to resume emplacement of this
system which is so obviously ineffective
at this point in time.
If a nuclear war ever starts, it will be
lost in that moment. I do not hold with
the argument that we might, with an
antiballistic system, reduce casualties
from 100 million people to maybe 70 or
80 million people. Does one call that a
victory? To any but the military mind,
tie call thia a victory is absurd.
What the administration is talking
about is a thin system which it hopes
would be an effective guardian against
the Chinese. To me it is unbelievable that
China with its primitive missile arsenal,
would attack the United States, since we
have the capacity to retaliate by wiping
out most of their cities within minutes.
But, even if a case could be made for
a thin missile system as a defense against
the Chinese, once such a thin system
were adopted it would be a short step to
the thick system urged as a defense
against the Soviet Union, and we would
be thrust in a monstrous open-ended
weapons race which could escalate the
cost of ABM, now billed as a $5 billion
Venture, to $100 billion a year. And still
no assurance that it would be really
effective.
ZaZ*41:77, 1969
The scientific community is opposed
to the Sentinel system, and some of their
spokesmen have told us why with bril-
liance and clarity in the last 2 days.
Many of our military leaders have little
faith in it. Millions of Americans are
opposed to it, not only because they feel
It would be useless, but because it would
add an even greater threat to our cities
than they now face.
Mr. President, the ABM system would
not be, as some insist, America's best
mainstay against attack, enhancing our
security, but instead would become
America's biggest miscalculation, because
it would escalate the arms race to an
ever higher rate of peril, and make it all
but impossible to bring the deadly com-
petition in overkill under effective con-
trol.
If a nuclear war ever starts, which
God forbid, it will be lost in that mo-
ment. We know that the Soviets have
a limited defense system, but we do net
know how good it is. If we insist, because
the Russians have one, that we must
adopt a similar system and a better sys-
tem, we will be triggering an arms race
whose end we cannot foresee. If we build
the Sentinel system, it will merely in-
crease the possibility that it will have to
be used. We must have the courage to
move toward a more peaceful world, to-
ward nuclear weapon limitation.
SENTINEL SYSTEM
Mr. KENNEDY. 1%./-e -President, this
week, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions has heard the testimony of six emi-
nent Americans?all of them opposed,
for various and differing reasons, to de-
ployment of the Sentinel anti-ballistic-
missile system. Taken as a whole, I find
this testimony so compelling and per-
suasive that I believe it should be made
widely available.
I noticed in the last few minutes that
the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Goss),
who is chairing the hearings, placed that
testimony in the RECORD and I urge all
my colleagues to read it very carefully.
I do not think that the arguments
these gentlemen made need restating on
the Senate floor today. Instead, I should
like to point out that the expertise they
brought to their testimony?expertise in
science, in foreign relations, in public
policy service at the top of our Gov-
ernment?is unique in its breadth. I
hope, as a result, that their testimony
is closely studied.
One particular suggestion by one of
the witnesses?the chairman of the
board of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Dr. James R. Killian?de-
serves further comment. In his testi-
mony, Dr. Killian made the suggestion
that there be created an ad hoc com-
mission or task force to make an "in-
dependent, comprehensive study in depth
of our weapons technology and of the
factors which bear upon the decisions
the Nation must make regarding ongoing
strategic forces and policies." I do not
think the value of this proposal can be
overstated.
In Dr. Killian's words, the work of
such an ad hoc commission or task force
would have special value to the Nation
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
March, 1-069 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
and the Congress for the overriding rea-
son that its proposals would be inde-
pendent conclusions reached by a group
of competent- citizens who were free of
organizational loyalties. It was precisely
this kind of thinking which motivated
me to ask Dr. Jerome Wiesner and
Prof. Abram Chayes to organize a re-
port to me and to the Congress on the
Sentinel ABM system. I was concerned
that we would not have available to us,
as we debated the Sentinel and the
budget requests to support its deploy-
ment, any comprehensive and coherent
body of information which presented the
arguments of those who opposed deploy-
ment.
Were Dr. Killian's suggestion adopted,
then we would have a dispassionate eval-
uation available to us not only on the
Sentinel ABM system, but on our entire
strategic and other weapons systems as
well. The experience of the Gaither Com-
mission, appointed in the early 1950's
and whose recommendations both great-
ly altered and still influence the direction
our weapons policies take, is an instruc-
tive example of the worth of this con-
cept. Coming as it would at a crossroads
in our history, such a report could prove
of signal value in bringing us closer to
a safe and sane world. It is my hope that
such an ad hoc task force or commission
Is appointed soon, and that its work is
available in a relatively short time.
Dr. Killian's suggestion raises a larger
and deeper issue, which Dr. Carl Kay-
sen phrases this way in his testimony:
Do weapons dictate policy, or do we decide
on the basis of our policy what weapons
we wish to deploy?
There is a growing feeling that for far
too long weapons have dictated policy,
and that President Eisenhower's warn-
ing about the influence of the military-
industrial complex has not been closely
heeded.
We must be vigilant to assure that the
dedisionmaking process for matters so
vital as our weapons, policies is an order-
ly and open process. If it is not, then we
will continue to have our priorities dis-
torted and our security imperiled. This
is the lesson of the current debate over
the Sentinel system, a lesson whose im-
portance we cannot neglect.
STRIKING OF MEDALS IN HONOR
OF THE DEDICATION OF THE
WINSTON CHURCHILL MEMORI-
AL AND LIBRARY
Mr. SPARKMAN, Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the Senate pro-
ceed to the immediate consideration of
S. 1081.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill
will be stated by title.
The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. A bill to pro-
vide for the striking of medals in honor
of the dedication of the Winston Church-
ill Memorial and Library, reported with
amendments, on page 2, line 2, after the
word "President.", strike out "There is
hereby authorized to be appropriated the
sum of $3,000 to carry out the purposes
of this section." and insert "Provided,
That the Vulton Area Chamber of Com-
merce, Incorporated, agrees to pay, un-
der terms considered necessary by the
Secretary to protect the interests of the
United States, all costs incurred in the
striking of such medal,"; and, in line 11,
after the word "than", strike out "ten"
and insert "five"; so as to make the bill
read:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of Amer-
ice in Congress assembled, That (a), in honor
of the dedication of the Winston Churchill
Memorial and Library at Westminster College
in Fulton, Missouri, in May 1969, the Presi-
dent is authorized to present in the name of
the people of the United States and in the
name of the Congress to the widow of the
late Winston Churchill a gold medal with
suitable emblems, devices, and inscriptions
to be determined by the Fulton Area Cham-
ber of Commerce, Incorporated, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury.
The Secretary shall cause such a medal to
be struck and furnished to the President.
Provided, That the Fulton Area Chamber of
Commerce, Incorporated, agrees to pay, under
terms considered necessary by the Secretary
to protect the interests of the United States,
all costs incurred in the striking of such
medal.
(b) The die from which such gold medal
is struck shall be marred and donated to the
Winston Churchill Memorial and Library for
display purposes.
SEC. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury
shall strike and furnish to the Fulton Area
Chamber of Commerce, Incorporated, not
more than one hundred thousand duplicate
copies of such medal in silver and bronze
(of which not more than live thousand copies
shall be in silver). The medals shall be
considered to be national medals within the
meaning of section 3551 of the Revised
Statutes (31 U.S.C. 368 ) .
(b) The medals provided for in this section
shall be made and delivered at such times as
may be required by the Fulton Area Cham-
ber of Commerce, Incorporated, in quantities
of not less than two thousand, but no medals
shall be made after December 31, 1969.
(e) The Secretary of the Treasury shall
cause such medals to be struck and furnished
at not less than the estimated cost of manu-
facture, including labor, materials, dies, use
of machinery, and overhead expenses, and
security satisfactory to the Director of the
Mint shall be furnished to indemnify the
United States for full payment of such costs.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection to the present consideration of
the bill?
There being no objection, the Senate
proceeded to consider the bill.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I move
that the committee amendments be
agreed to n bloc.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the amendments are agreed
to en bloc.
The bill is open to further amend-
ment. If there be no further amend-
ments to be proposed, the question is on
the engrossment and third reading of
the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed
for a third reading, was read the third
time, and passed.
S. 1560?INTRODUCTION OF A BILL
TO AMEND INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1954 TO PREVENT FARM
OPERATION LOSS WRITE-OFFS
Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, for my-
self and Senators GRIFFIN and Coox, I
introduce for appropriate reference a
bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code
S 2845
of 1954 to prevent farm operation loss
write-offs for tax purposes in the case of
taxpayers whose principal business ac-
tivity is not farming. I ask unanimous
consent that the bill be printed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without
objection, the bill will be received and
appropriately referred; and, without ob-
jection, will be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of the Senator's remarks.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. MILLER, Mr. President, this bill is
basically the same as the one I intro-
duced last year?S. 3443, with amend-
ment.
Its approach is to prevent any tax loss
writeoff, with certain exceptions to cover
off-farm wages and salaries and losses
resulting from flood, drought, hail, and
other type casualty. In this respect, my
bill differs from several other bills intro-
duced recently on this subject which per-
mit varying amounts of tax loss writeoffs
and, to this extent, fail to plug the loop-
hole.
These other bills also tend to force
farmers to change their accounting sys-
tems from the cash basis to the accrual
basis, which is considerably more com-
plicated. They do so by excepting accrual
basis farm operations from the prohibi-
tion against tax loss writeoffs within the
varying amounts specified in the bills.
My bill would leave cash basis farmers
alone. Furthermore, by excepting accrual
basis farm operations, the loophole per-
mitting tax loss writeoffs would not be
closed.
The policy behind my bill and others
introduced on this subject is to protect
the commercial farmer from unfair com-
petition which results when individuals
and corporations not primarily engaged
in farming operations can deduct losses
from farming operations against income
in high income tax brackets. The tax
law developed on so-called hobby farm-
ers is inadequate for this purpose, be-
cause the court decisions permit loss
writeoffs if there are businesslike op-
erations with "a reasonable expectation
of profit." Most loss writeoffs involve
businesslike operations, and the line be-
tween those with a reasonable expecta-
tion of profit and those without a rea-
sonable expectation of profit is extremely
difficult to draw. Meanwhile, Uncle Sam
absorbs a large amount of the loss bur-
den, ranging up to 77 percent, depending
on the income bracket of the taxpayer.
Worse yet, a top income bracket tax-
payer can, using proper planning, con-
vert $1 of loss into 77 cents of tax sav-
ings; and then, by selling off his farm
assets lock, stock, and barrel realize long-
term capital gain of $1 with maximum
tax of 25 cents.
The extent of these tax loss writeoffs
is reflected in a study of 1966 income
tax returns by the Internal Revenue
Service which shows that 75 percent of
the 4,778 individuals who had farm op-
erations and incomes over $100,000 de-
ducted $72 million in farm losses against
their other income.
A more complete breakdown shows:
Millionaires: of the 103 involved in
farming operations, 15 showed a net
profit and 88 or 85.4 percent showed a
net loss; $500,000 to $1,000,000: of the
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
S 2846
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
228 in farming, 27 showed a net profit
and 201 or 88.1 percent showed a loss;
$200,000 to $500,000: of the 1,104, 209
showed a net profit and 895 or 81.1 per-
cent showed a loss; $100,000 to $200,000:
of the 3,343, 986 showed a net profit and
2,357 or 70.5 percent showed a loss;
$50,000 to $100,000: of the 14,202, 5,622
showed a net profit and 8,580 or 60.3
percent showed a loss.
A U.S. Department of Agriculture
study, released about the same time as
the Internal Revenue Service survey, dis-
closes that nonfarm business income was
reported most frequently by those with
the largest farm losses. Although tbe
USDA study was based on 1963 income
tax returns, it shows the depth of the
problem, which is even greater today.
The study shows that individuals' with
farm losses reported nonfarm income
nearly twice as often as those with farm
Profits, and their noilfarin business in-
come averaged more than twice that of
persons with farm profits. Out of a group
classified by the study as "well oft" com-
prising almost a quarter of a million in-
dividuals, approximately 111,000 re-
ported farm losses and more thari. 38,000
reported farm profit's of less than $7.2,000.
Of the 66,000 individuals who wer clas-
sified as "wealthy," more than two-t irds
reported farm losses, with the aye ge
losses reported being $14,110. ",..
A properly designed tax law is needed.
Tax loss farming is detrimental to the
regular farmer in that it tends to push
up the price of farmland. This, in turn,
pushes up the land values and property
taxes of regular farmers. Furthermore,
the fact that farmowners with non-
farm income in high-income brackets
may consider a farm profit, in the eco-
nomic sense, unnecessary for their pur-
poses places the ordinary farmer at a
disadvantage when competing in the
marketplace. Because he does not have
to depend on his farm operations for a
livelihood, the high-income bracket tax-
payer can demand less for his products
than the regular farmer, who needs to
make a profit to be able to stay in
business.
If farm losses could not be offset
against nonfarm business income, these
multibusiness individuals and corpora-
tions would get out of farming or they
would help fight for better prices and
lower costs of production.
The bill I have introduced follows an
uncomplicated formula. It would provide
that, except in the case of a taxpayer en-
gaged in the business of farming as the
principal business activity, the deductions
attributable to the business of farming?
which include losses?may not exceed the
gross income derived by the taxpayer
from the business of farming for the tax-
able year plus, in the case of an individ-
ual residing an the farm, the gross in-
come derived by such individual and his
spouse from wages and salaries, timber
located on the farm, and royalties derived
from property on which the farming
operations are conducted.
A taxpayer is deemed to be engaged in
the business of farming as tile principal
business activity if net income trona
fanning for the 3 preceding taxable
years?or so many of such preceding
years as the taxpayer has been engaged
in the business of farming?equals or ex-
ceeds two-thirds of total net income for
such years. This conforms to the con-
gressional definition of a "farmer" for
purposes of filing a declaration of esti-
mated tax.
The bill defines "business of farming"
to include the holding of property used
in farming. Thus, the so-called "inves-
tor" in livestock operations is prevented
from benefiting from lois writeoffs.
Appropriate exemptions are provided
to the general rule. Thus a deduction
would not be disallowed if it is attrib-
utable to drought, abnormal weather
conditions or other casualty; to a re-
.search or experimental farming opera-
tion conducted under a Program ap-
proved by the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, a State department of agricul-
ture, or an agricultural school of an ac-
credited college or university; or to
farming operations consisting of egg or
broiler production?which is a special
situation not involved in the tax loss
writeoff problem.
A farm enterprise acquired from a
decedent and a farm enterprise acquired
by foreclosure are also excepted from the
limitation of the bill for the taxable year
In which the farm enterprise is acquired
and for two succeeding taxable years.
This would give taxpayers acquiring, for
example, a farm by devise Or debt settle-
ent a reasonable opportunity to place
th farm on a profitmaking basis or to
sell within a reasonable period of time.
The nal exception is in the case of a
farming nterprise which comprises a
part of an tate. In such a case the limi-
tation woul not apply to the estate for
the first 2 taxable years if the business
of farming wasVe principal business ac-
tivity of the dedent for the last full
taxable year befoxe his death.
The bill authoriks the Secretary of the
Treasury to prescribe regulations to carry
out the purpose of, the bill including
specific regulations ziealing with a tax-
payer who has morelthan one business
of farming and a blziness of fanning
which is carried on b , a partnership or
by a subchapter S cdirporation. Under
these regulations, the 1Secretary would
make it clear that if la taxpayer had
more than one businessof farming they
would be treated together, and the in-
come and deductions of a partnership or
a subchapter S corpcniation would be
treated as the income and deductions of
the members or shareholders, respective-
ly,
Mr. President, the 411 I have intro-
duced would not prohibit farming opera-
tions by nonfarmers. I would simply put
an end to the use of !farming as a tax
avoidance mechanistri by some individ-
uals and corporations which results in
unfair competition I with the regular
farmer.
The bill (S. 1560 to amend the In-
ternal Revenue Cede of 1954 to limit
losses allowable with respect to farming
operations which are incurred by tax-
payers whose principal business activity
Is not farming, introduced by Mr. MILLER
(for himself and other Senators), was
received, read twice by its title, referred
to the Committee on Finance, and or-
dered to be printed in the RECORD.
March 1969
EXT-T1TTT 1
S. 1560
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That (a)
part IX of subchapter B of chapter 1 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to
items not deductible) is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new sec-
tion:
"See. 277. Limitatiins on deductions attrib-
utable to certain farming oper-
tions.
"(a) General Rule.?Except as provided in
this section and except in the case of a tax-
payer engaged in the business of farming as
the principal business activity, the deduc-
tions attributable to the business of farm-
ing which, but for this section, would be
allowable under this chapter for the tax-
able year shall not exceed an aggregate
amount equal to the sum of?
"(1) the gross income derived from the
business of farming for the taxable year, and
"(2) in the case of an individual whose
principal residence is on a farm, the gross
Income derived by such Individual and his
spouse for the taxable year from (A) wages
and salaries for personal services, (B) timber
located on a farm, and (C) royalties derived
from property on which the taxpayer's farm-
ing operations are conducted.
"(b) Business of Farming.--For purposes
of this section, the term 'business of farm-
ing' includes the holding of property used
in farming.
"(c) Farming as Principal Business
Activity.?
"(1) In general?For purposes of subsec-
tion (a), the business of farming is the
principal business activity of a taxpayer for
a taxable year only if the net income from
the business of farming for the three pre-
ceding taxable years (or so many of such
preceding years as the taxpayer has been
engaged in the business of farming) equals
or exceeds two-,thirds of the total net in-
come of the taxpayer for such years.
"(2) Net income from business of farm-
ing.? For purposes of paragraph (1), the
net income from the business of farming
of a taxpayer for any taxable year is the
sum of?
"(A) the gross income derived from the
business of farming for such year minus the
deductions attributable to such business, and
"(B) the full amount (if any) by which
the gains from sales or exchanges of property
used in the business of farming (within the
meaning of section 1231 (b)) which are
treated as gains from sales or exchanges of
capital assets exceed the losses from such
sales or exchanges.
"(3) Total net income?For purposes of
paragraph (1), the total net Income of a
taxpayer for any taxable year is the tax-
payer's adjusted gross income (taxable in-
come, in the case of a corporation) deter-
mined without regard to gains from sales or
exchanges of capital assets or of property
used in a trade or bnsiness, other than the
business of farming. For the purposes of the
preceding sentence, adjusted gross income
and taxable income shall be computed by
recognizing the full amount (if any) by
which the gains from sales or exchanges of
property used in the business of farming
(within the meaning of section 1281(b))
which are treated as gains from sales or ex-
changes of capital assets exceed the losses
from such sales or exchanges.
"(d) Exceptions for Deductions Attributa-
ble to Drought, Flood, and Other Casualties
and to Certain Farming Operations.?
No deduction shall be disallowed under
subsection (a) if such deduction is attribu-
table?
"(1) to drought, flood, hail, or other ab-
normal weather conditions, disease, fire,
storm, or other casualty or theft:
Approved For Release 2002/05/07 : CIA-RDP71600364R000300090004-2