DD/I ACTIVITY DURING OPERATION ALERT 1957

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00211R000100170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 14, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 30, 1957
• Content Type: MF

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30 August 1957
MEMOR!,-DUE 70R: CIA Emergency Planning Officer
F,U3JECT DD/I Activity During Operation Alert 1957
REFERENCE Memo from DD/S to the DCI, 7 June 1957, subject:
Particio,:tion in Operation Alert 1957; approved
by DCI
1. In compliance with the referenced memorandum, the DD/I
elements did not attempt problem play during Operation ,Llert 1957
as in previous exercises, but rather convened the planning officers
of the DD/I offices at the Relocation Center. The details of the
week's work may be found in the diary attached as Tab "A".
2. As a part of the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM)
"Office of Economic Warfare" was activated.
ORR was the CIA representative on the
Executive Committee of the emergency economic agency. His report
is appended as Tab "B". Recommendations 4.a, and b. have been im-
plemented and c, is under study.
3. The major benefit derived by the DD/I planners from the
exercise was the opportunity to hear for the first time the progress
and forecast of the DD/fl planners for the wartime operation of the
CIA abroad The very able presentation made byl
'made the DD/I officers aware of probable requirement
evies to be made on their offices by DD/P in support of wartime
operation. Accordingly, the offices are considering just where their
best contributions can be made.
4. As a final wrap-up of the exercise, a paper defining the
framework within which the DD/I area could plan operation in wartime
was written by the group under the chairmanship of
1 of ORR. This paper, which is not to be considered official,
is Tab
exercise, a simulated
5. The service and hospitality of the Relocation Center manage-
ment was at the usual high standard of quality, laid the preparations
made by , CIA Emergency planning Officer,
left no unexpectect situations to develop.
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Assistant t4 DD/I (Planning)
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OPERATION IdERT 1957
DIARY
TAB '1"
15 July 1957
An initial assemblage of the DD/I personnel was held at 1100
houmto brief the participants on the administrative aspects of
their stay at the Relocation Center.
At 1300 hours the entire CIA contingent convened in the DD/I
Area to hear presentations by the Senior .4a.s? Planners of the three
Deputy Directors. 1
1 lof the
CIA Relocation Center, welcomed the group. He also described the
two principal missions of the Center; namely, to maintain a state
25X1A of readiness to take care of ersons at all times, and to pro-
vide a RecordsCenter, a Vita materials Center, and a Communications
Training Center as a regular order of business.
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CIA Emergency Planning Officer, dis-
cussea the ClA emergency plan. He pointed out that relocation
planning was necessary to enable the Agency to stay in business in
case of war. The present concept of operation is based on a force
of 1 1 However, we are presently considering a plan in
which all surviving Agency personnel would be members of the emer-
gency team. An additional relocation site or sites are also under
study. The present site may be expanded to accommodate
1I I !also stressed the importance of the
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Program.
JSpecial Assistant for Planning, DD/S,
dis ?,??,, ti.0 pluuu.ems of support planning to prepare for wartime
operation. He pointed out that all such planning must be related
to one or more of the following four categories -- men, money,
materiel, and services. In order to know the necessary future
planning, the support elements of the Agency must know the require-
ments of the Agency.
1Chief of the War Plans Division, PPC Staff,
DD/), aiscussed the CIA Global War Plan. He pointed out that CIA
should have an all-Agency war plan, but that the present plan is
nothing more than a DD/P plan. The Global War Plan for Clandestine
Operation is based on an assumption of nothing less than global war.
The present basic plan, approved 31 May 1956, is being revised and
will have as annexes the Military SurTort Annex; National War; Over-
seas Organization Chart; Administration and Support (some of which
have already been published); Evacuation; Communications; Areas; ISS;
and Redeployment.
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'then discussed the DD/P War Plan Activi-
irom the rollming outline:
1. Why is DD/2 involved in war -olanninc?
2.
a. NrC 10-2 stated, The Agency would be required to
support nilibary in tine of war in field of
clandestine activities.'
b. NrC 10-5 added to this broad directive. This was in
the field of covert activities.
c. NSCID 5 stated, "In time of war the theater camdand
will be responsible for clandestine collection of
intelligence.0
Chart 1:
Commend Relationship During .,-artime
US Theater Command
...??????????????????????=???????mm*sardiomi.......91711."
Joint Staff
Composed of
Army, Navy, F, CIA
Navy
Air Force, FC A
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The Agency has been directed to support the military in time of war.
Assistant to the DD/I (Planning), discussed
the wartime mission of the DD/I. He pointed out that the production
of intelligence will be the DD/Its principal function in wartime
as in peacetime, In addition to this responsibility, the DD/I will
man the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence component of the
CIA Field Commands, DD/I planning has been carried out under the
following four assumptions of type of war:
a. All out total war with nuclear exchange of not more
than 30 days duration.
b. The so-called "broken back" war, which starts out as
a nuclear exchange and then deteriorates to conventional war.
C, The 4mR:(:=4,0=ifiel===t-F7 conventional war, which
eventually spreads geographically and intensifies to
nuclear exchange.
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d. The strictly conventional war from start to finish.
16 July 1957
Chief of the Estimates Staff ONE, dis-
cussed national estimating in wartime according to the following
outline:
ONE turns out estimates that take over a year to prepare
and some that are prepared in six or eight hours. Their program
has to be quite flexible. The all important thing, from ONE's
point of view, is coordinating estimates. Uith the help of other
offices, ONE can produce estimates in wartime but the question of
coordinating them is the problem. One coordinated estimate is worth
a thousand estimates that do not represent the views of the entire
intelligence community. In a wartime situation there would be the
problem of communications with the IAC agencies to consider.
1. What are we going to do in a wartime situation:
We are going to do what the -1\1'0 tells us to do. We
will be working directly.;:cir them. ONE will try to
anticipate their needs.
2. What sort of things will the NTC need:
Coordinated estimates. Herger of political,
economic and military factors. The major lines in any
given situation. In wartime situation it will be very
important that we have National Intelligence Estimates
speaking to these situations.
NIE's will change in character to be more pointed to the
immediate situation.
Exaaples:
a. Likelihood of neutrals to enter war.
b. Liklihood of separate peace.
c. Reaction of USSR to certain peace overtures.
d. What will be the shape of the world at the
end of hostilities?
ONE will require close support from MR, OCI and OSI.
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3. How are we organized to do this job?
Two Sections:
a. Board
ID, Staff
ONE's smallness of size is an asset. _A roster of aln_ruit of-the
organization would. be useful in order....to_call on these people to__
come back to help in wartime.
ONE will operate as follows:
The DCI, NEC, other components of the Age4cy, etc.,
request an estimate.
1. Terms of Reference--not necessary in wartime
situation. Give scope briefly would be sufficient.
2, Contributions from IAC agencies--in wartime
situation these contributions may be oral; informal.
3. Draft--necessary in wartime situation, However,
it may be shorter and sharper.
4. Final.
25X1A2a Special Assistant to the AD/BI, talked
on the use of Basic Intelligence in wartime ..according to the
following outline:
1. In peacetime
The NIS Program operates on the basis that the US Govern-
ment must have the fundamental information on all subjects and on all
areas of the world ready for immediate use in event of war. At present,
over 60% world coverage has been completed, and the amount of coverage
is steadily increasing under priorities for production established
by the JCS. The NIS Program is a broad, interagency activity that
taps the intelligence-producing capabilities not only throughout the
IAC but in certain non-IAC agencies, such as the Bureau of Nines in
Interior, as well. The NIS Committee, chaired by the AD/BI, is a
subcommittee of the IAC and includes members from State, Army, Navy
and Air Force,
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The Published HIS units -- which now number over. 3,700 --
represent only a part of the total contribution made by the HIS
Program. Under the stimulation of the program, all contributing
agencies have collected, collated, and produced basic intelligence
data in a uniform and coherent pattern. These files assembled under
the need for NIS production represent a vast reservoir of informa-
tion available immediately to all departments at the outset of
hostilities.
2. Wartime mission and functions
The OBI concept is that the NIS Program, operating under
the direction of the interagency HIS Committee as at present, is
the proper and most effective instrument to coordinate the production
of basic intelligence required by the Government in the event of a
global war.
The entire NIS mechanism -- the HIS Committee, the inter-
agency allocation of collection and production responsibilities,
the backlog of departmental experience in the production of national
basic intelligence, and the experienced staff in OBI-- will be
available for use as the most efficient channel through which to
direct and secure response to strategic and high-level operational
requirements for basic intelligence. The HIS Committee can, by
extension of its day-to-day peacetime activities, immediately
translate requirements for special wartime basic intelligence into
coherent production schedules organized according to the particular
governmental component with the greatest competence to furnish the
desired information. In other words, the HIS mechanism can generate
a maximum of interaF,ency capabilities with a minimum of interagency
communications.
Establishing communications with the other bIb Committee
members will be the first requirement following relocation.
Another immediate problem which would face 0:1 in event
of war would be emergency printing facilities. 011 has begun arrange-
ments to 1T7)ve printing establishments outside the 1Jashington area
listed to aid in printing the HIS in wartime.
3. Summary
a. The NIS 2rogram will have ready for immediate use
in event of war a large and growing body of published basic intelli-
gence disseminated throughout the Government and at major commands.
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b. The NIS nechanism as it exists during peacetime
would continue to operate in a wartime situation,
both of the Office
of Operations, talked about overt collection in wartime .according to
the following outline:
Chief, Services Division, ORR, discussed
economic intelligence in wartime according to the following outline
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1. Peacetime capabilities
Economic Research Area has about
responsibility in the Intelligence Community ,c)/- tue analyzing of
economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
with primary
2. Wartime plans
Economic Research Area will continue to carry out production
and coordination of economic intelligence with effort directed primarily
to the Sino-F.;oviet Bloc. Will be concerned almost entirely with
current reporting and appraisal of events in the Sino-oviet Area;
status of civilians; "damage assessment."
Current support will be given in four ways:
a.
b.
C.
d.
Through National Intelligence Estimates
Through Current Intelligence Center
Through DD/I and DCI to the Nr-2C
Through appropriate sections of the Office of
the Fecretary of Defense.
It is expected that during
number of conflicting reports will be
to sort out the fact from fiction and
on an interagency basis (through EIC)
3. Long-range plans
the initial phase, a substantial
received. We will be required
to evaluate them. Coordination
will be a very important part,
Economic Research Area has one plan which must be flexible.
Principal personnel changes anticipated:
Personnel will be reallocated to perform priority
tasks. Increases would be mainly military. It is an-
ticipated that an increase of approximately 90% would
be required. The size of the EIC would require con-
siderable augmentation.
as the CIA hember of the Planning Committee for
Economic Warfare, ODM, talked about economic warfare support by.
ORR according to the following outline:
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Economic warfare is the process of developing and implementing
a program for the reduction of enemy war potential by the limitation
of his foreign sources of economic supply.
Modern economy is an exceedingly complex apparatus consisting
of a wide range of exchanges of raw materials and of ,an
elaborate mechanism of exchange involving transport and credit
documents. This mechanism is indispensible to the consummation
of the movements and susceptible to knowledge and intercept by an
effective. collection process.
The assets existing in the Agency include the Trade Controls
Branch in the Cervices Division of the Economic Research Area.
Four avenues of approach showing the status of our war planning
situation are:
1. Indigenous (ORR/ERA) plans .for general economic warfare
support
2. Participation in arganizational planning for Emergency
Agency on Economic Warfare
3. Coordination of intelligence support program through EDIC,
and
4. Development of control channels for effective receipt and
dissemination of information available under emergency con-
ditions.
The function of the ORE/CIA support for economic warfare is to!
1. Provide intelligence essential to the establishment and
enforcement of:
a. Controls over exports
b. Controls over the movement of ships and aircraft
c. Foreign exchange dnd asset controls
d. 'jar trade agreements
2. Provide current information on individuals and organiza-
tions which!
a. Have violated security controls, or
b. may perform unfriendly acts.
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3. Provide economic intelligence upport for
a. Application of military measures against economic
targets
b. Sabotage, and
c. Prevention of enemy eNports.
11 Provide intelligence on Sino-?oviet Bloc external
economic operations.
The intelligence support function for economic warfare is in
large part in place at the present time and is engaged in the produc-
tion of intelligence which would be of direct use in ouickly imple-
menting an emergency prograD. of economic warfare, he must preserve
flexibility of these war plans to reflect changes in the Agency in
case of war.
1 1, Special Assistant to the Chief,
Geographic Research, ORP, described the role of geographic intelli-
gence in wartime according to the following outline
The Geographic Research Area (GRA) is composed of four sub-
activities: (1) geographic analysis; (2) cartographic production;
(3) photo interpretation and (4) map procurement and reference. ny
nature of its data, geographic intelligence is. strongly concerned with
support of operational and :trategic planning, but has considerable
use in support of policy determination, estimates, and current report-
ing. The organization and techniques of geographic intelligence as
we accept them now were established primarily on the basis of ex-
perience in World .1,ar II. The growth and development of the geo-
graphic intelligence effort in Washington and in the field was dis-
cussed. Experience in Pond 'War II established four desirable
features for geographic intelligence operations
1. Should be a team activity
2. Should m-7.ke intensive use of photo interpretation
3. Should maintain capability to apply efforts on a
world-wide basis to a wide range of requirements
L. Should coordinc:te closely with other geographic
elements of community in procurement and utilization
of files.
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GRA presently organized to integrate these four activities
as follows:
1. Geography Division
a, regional analT7is
b. border and route studies
c. urban area analysis
d. unconventional warfare, escape and evasion, and
targeting
e. reporting of trends and developments
2. Cartography Tii,iision -- special subject maps
3. Photo Intelligence Division -- photo interpretation
support
4. Nap Library Division
a. map procurement
b. La'ency and community reference service related to
intelligence
War Plan for GRA
Practically no change from )resent mission. Since specific
types of support are difficult to estimate, Gni, approach to war
plan emphasizes flexibility and widening of capabilities of staff.
We anticipate an immediate and heavy load, primarily in support of
special operations. We would envision field support, under DD/P,
by already experienced field teams of geographic intelligence per-
sonnel.
At Headquarters initially:
1.
2.
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support of evaluations of current situations
support of requests for spot area analysis
assistance from Map Reference service
Next stage:
1, rapid and concurrent increase in requests for
photo interpretation
2. cartographic services
3, geographic intelligence support to targeting
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5.
6.
unconventional warfare
escape and evasion
economic research requirements
Finally:
1. establishment of map collection teams in field
commands
2. prepare special teams of geographic intelligence
and service personnel
Wartime Situation Build-un
Personnel increase of about 40% will be necessary (ex-
cluding Photo Intelligence Division). Moto Intelligence
Divisions estimated increase is 300%.
Summary
Widen range of capabilities, but heavy focus inevitable
on operational support.
Essential to place that support where request originates.
Recognize problem of size of Relocation Center -- seek
25MIgalate quarters for the longer war.
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R aetailea approach to the problem of wartime
operation is set forth in four plans, based on these assumed
-conditions
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a, an increase in the number of incidents (the
cold war becomes hotter)
b. limited hostilities without US participation
how to get US teams into foreign lands
c. limited war with US participation -- field
operations set up in each theater
d. Global war
17 July 1957
Deputy 2,ssistant Director for Production, OSI,
discussed scientific intelligence in wartime according to the
following outline:
Definitions
1. Scientific Intelligence
a. study of foreign scientific capabilities
b. appliction of science to the process of intelligence
2. Technical Intelligence
The study and description of existing foreign materiel
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Funevions in Wartime
1. Fthort, all-out nuclear war (60 to 120 days)
Join others in the community in just trying to survive.
Eainly concerned with technical intelligence
2. Long, drawn-out conflict
Steps:
a. get Zorce to relocation site, with as many necessary
documents on hand as possible and analysts capable
of working on own
b. plan for gradual assumption of liaison relations
with other agencies
establishment of connection with various ex-
ploitation centers
d. maintenance of relations with research and develop-
ment components in military agencies
0. establish relations with key scientists.
Types of DwandsLAnticifiated:
a. assessment of enemy status
b. bomb damage assessment
c. military planning (e.g., air defense system)
Probable Types of Production:
a. contribution to NIEts
b. increase of activity in current intelligence
c. evaluation of information for DDI and DCI
d. self-initiated reports
e. some detailed studies -- research and development
type of thing
f. feasibility study on getting information
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alocaticin of Personnel:
a. some to various types of exnloitation in field
and at home
b. to evaluating of material
c. liaison activities -- relationships with other
agencies
d. joint studies with military agencies.
Chief of the Nuclear Energy Division,
OSI, spoke on technical intelligence in wartime according to the
following outline;
In covering technical intelligence, there are two basic
things to consider:
1. Vffiat subject in terms of military equipment and
weapons systems we are concerned with.
2. -What type of intelligence work we would have to
perform.
In a hot war, scientific and technical intelligence comes into
its own. Technical intelligence is concerned with hardware--
character, design, and methods of production.
Technical intelligence is primarily the responsibility
of the services in time of peace and war.
CIA's responsibilities in technical intelligence:
1. In CIA we have, in large measure, all aspects of
scientific intelligence, and good expertise on them.
2. Our technical intelligence responsibilities;
a. National Intelligence Estimates, etc.
b. large measure proposes departmental intelligence
c. clandestine collection effort, directed to
collection of technical intelligence.
The hard core of scientific intelligence continues, but would
automatically switch to technical intelligence in wartime,
because of:
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1. Our responsibilities in the field as they evolve
during wartime
2. Experience from World War II and Korea
3. Impact or type of war in which we are engaged
(short duration or long term).
Various sides to be considered by scientific intelligence are:
1. Evaluation side--putting together inibrmation that
would help us counteract some of their weapons and
equipment. Support judgment on these subjects.
2. Collection side--directing collection toward the
above problems. Outlined what roles would be
played by the following fields:
a. Nuclear Energy
b. Guided Missiles?collecting information
here and overseas
c. Electronics--in all weapons systems
d. BW/CW?has it been used?. 'All they use it?
Technical Threats.
e. Conventional military equipment?not much work
in this field unless it is a long war.
Sunnnary:
In wartime situation, OSI will evolve technical intelligence
expertise to bring to bear on this problem. They have to get things
going (a) technical teams set up; (b) pilot interrogations; (c) guid-
ing clandestine activities in Agency; and (d) follow-up to getting
technical teams in.
Chief, Planning Staff, OCI, discussed
current intelligence in wartime. He pointed out that there were
two major problems in this connection: (a) a need to put out more
intelligence on a current basis, and (b) how adequately to coordinate
this production. To meet these problems he said that the four main
criteria were:
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1. Where the information comes
2. When the information ceases
3. Who sees this intelligence
4. Ahat will be the production
from in time of war
to be current intelligence
hazards we will have to face.
He then discussed the current intelligence annex to the Global
War Plan for the DD/I Area.
spoke on the war room and support
therefor, according to the following outline:
quoted from a letter which had been sent
from Cdr. Beach at the White House as follows: "...furnish assist-
ance to providing "Situation Room" in the White House... CCI to
provide current intelligence data as need for this "Situation Room."
Criteria for "Situation Room" (two were established: one
in White House and one in White House Relocation Center):
1. Space available
2. Roam not to be elaborate
3. Tthccebt under emergency situations, the President
would be briefed in his office -- this room a
stand-by operation
4. Support for room with other IAC chiefs--Joint Chiefs
of Staff from Pentagon
5. Room to be completed by Operation Alert 1957,
20 July 1957.
The President's Naval Aide is responsible for briefing the
President. "Situation Room" is run on 24 hour a day basis in
the White House.
Problems involved (at Relocation Center):
1. Briefer's lifeline is by wire with outside world
2. Background information provided in each briefing
room (for briefer)
3. Staffing on 24 hour basis
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Physical facilities:
1. Maps -- CIA and JCS consider present maps sufficient
2. nViaw-graph" -- for JCS briefer
3. Communications equipment
Cartographic support Section in OCI. Also receive
support from ORR and, in fact, the whole government
are on call.
The Central Support Services in Wartime to be provided by ORR
and OCR was the subject of presentations by 1, Chief,
Liaison Division, OCR, and I of ORR.
presentation was as outlined below:
Support services to be rendered by OCR
'Ohat the capabilities are in the event of an emergency
situation
Documents Division
Central point in the Agency which receives, codes, indexes,
and disseminates all intelligence documents from outside
agencies as well as CIA:-produced reports. TS control.
Determination of release of CIA documents to outside
offices and overseas areas.
Cable Center (also part of Documents Division above)
Focal point for receiving and dissemination of all
non-CIA cables. Haintenance of a complete file of the
current cables received by the Agency.
Liaison Division
Process and coordinate collection requirements which call
for action in the field.
Collection of information that might have intelligence
significance from non-IAC agencies.
To establish and maintain operational relations with other
agencies in the US Government.
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Conclusion
That tnere is an organization in existence which, in case
of emergency, can Obtain the material necessary to the work
of the community.
presentation was as outlined below:
Support services to be rendered by GRA
Three units are concerned, namely; (1) Map Library
Division; (2) Photo Intelligence Division; and (3)
Cartography Division.
1. Map Library Division
a. History of development
b. Its current activities in support are reference
and procurement related to maps and map
materials on foreign areas.
(1) Reference
Center in government for intelligence type map
materials
Focus on special subject maps
Collection restricted to latest and best maps
(2) Procurement
two-fold responsibility
(a) Foreign
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Run with cooperation of 00. Involves
procurement of foreign map and map
materials as available from domestic
sources. also services spot require-
ments.
c. In Wartime Situation
We anticipate services presently available will
remain essentially the same.
(1) Professional assistance in map and map
materials
(2) Special procurement of maps
(3) Information on coordinates, place names, etc.
(4)
Circulation of Acquisitions Lists
A collection of about 50 thousand maps is presently
in the Relocation Center. These represent what.
we believe would be essential for any wartime
situation, but it would_ be _well for those interested
in this material to check the stock to see that
'their nee-IF?are covered.
Primary effort will be devoted to augnentation of
map-procurement.
Establishment of four-man teams attached to field
commanders.
Community coordination of collection will be
maintained, emphasizing CIA responsibility for
captured maps relating to Headquarters require-
ments.
Need for continued close coordination with other
map collections.
2. Photo Intelligence Division
Entirely a military services development during World
War II, refinement of phot' intelligence in Korean aar.
D/G2 set up in 1953.
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Types of people involved:
a. Photo Reader
b. Photo Interpreter
c. Photogrammetrist
d. Photo Intelligence Officer
In Wartime:
Will continue to be the CIA and NSC Center fcr photo
intelligence services and training. Functions will remain
essentially the same. Will continue to emphasize flexi-
bility, new experience, and a wide range of substantive
training.
Expect wide variety of support tasks:
1. Continuing surveillance of strategic areas
2. Immediate and heavy load in current reporting
3. Expanded support of operational and strategic
planning
4. Direct support of MSC
5. Large contribution to 001, OBI and ORR research
projects as priorities permit
6. Training in 21 will be accelerated and enlarged
7. PI personnel will be prepared for service with
the Geographic Intelligence teas (probably 10
PI men per team)
8. Will require intimate coordination with military
services
Capability of the unit will depend on the extent of expansion
of its personnel. We contemplate a 300 increase will be
necessary.
Establishment of a central Photo Interpretation Center in
the Government may be necessary.
3. Cartography Division
Currently has the responsibility in CIA for production of
intelligence maps, charts and cartograms.
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Present support functions include:
1. Provide maps for intelligence reports
2. Substantive research for background data
3. Review and correction of standard reference maps
4. Handle problems in mathematical geography
5. Technical research
Wartime Situation:
1. The Center has been equipped with material and
equipment considered necessary for minimum
emergency use.
2. It is expected that very shortly after deployment,
a Priority eview Group will be necessary.
3. Special emphasis to support of clandestine operations.
4. Additional support to the President's Situation Room
5. Will prepare cartographic elements for special
Geographic Intelligence Field teams
6. Close coordination with other cartography units
in Government
7. Continue to provide cartographic support to
Department of State
8. Must retain flexibility
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I Chief, Biographic Register, OCR,
discussed the Central Reference services in wartime according
to the following outline
The mission of OCR is to insure that all intelligence
information which is produced in the intelligence community is
sent to CIA, disseminated within CIA, properly indexed by subject
and area, and that the Agency has a library available to it.
In addition, OCR has taken special measures to insure that
this information will be readily accessible.
The wartime plan would depend on the type of war in which we
are involved.
1. Situation where we do not relocate--under these
conditions, there would be very little change from our present
activities and the Central Reference services now available,
would also be available in wartime. However, emphasis would
turn to the area Of primary concern. More reports would be
written and more information disseminated to the field. More
cables would be received.
2. Situation when we do relocate.--vital materials are
available.
Vital Materials
Informal list made by OCR of materials which they felt should
be included in vital materials storage. This list was sent to
all offices for their review with request that they supplement
with the documents necessary to them in the eventof relocation.
Vital Materials Committee of the DD/I is chaired by OCR.
Their mission is to plan for and coordinate over DD/I Vital
Material Program and recommend to the DD/I and the ADYs,
specific action for improvement in the program.
Typical Materials Contained in Vital Repository
1. Photo copies of raw materials
2. IBM cards referencing documents
3. Copies of Intelligence Publication Index and copies
of each document referred to
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5.
...riammo
Non-CIA cables covering period of
one year period
Reference books
six months; TS
This information would provide facilities for
to those available in Washington, D. C.
Facilities in OCR are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
over
research similar
LTrapnics Register?graphics
Industrial Register--target
towns
CIA Library
material
folders on cities
expressed several of his own opinions.
1. We will n ot relocate unless ',,.lashington is
nuclear attack.
_2. Intelligence needs will be limited in the
war to recent cables, NIE's, SNIE's, OSI,
studies, and orders of battle.
and
under
event of
CR,, and OCI
The problem of coordination of intelligence production in
wartime was discussed by k presently of
the Office of the Deputy Director (Coordination), but formerly
Executive Secretary of the Economic Intelligence Committee. Dr.
spoke according to the following outline:
We are here to do some planning on actual facilities which
-would be available in a wartime situation. In connection with this,
the following points should be considered:
1. Personnel--do we have people Wao know about such things
as world-wide petroleum supply, agricultural situation,
etc.?
2. Reference files--do we have all material necessary on
hand or know where we can get it?
3. Communications, channels--can we contact the knowledgeable
people and agencies?
Overall Responsibilities of I,A.0 in Wartime:
NSC
DCI IAC
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What will the IAC do? -- They will be concerned with
integrating political, scientific, economic and military
intelligence into support estimates of:
1. Enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities and intentions
9. Intentions and uncommitted countries
3. Capabilities and requirements (logistics and supply)
of allied and uncommitted countries
4. Postwar economic and political situations
In Wartime, Intelligence Community must:
1. Support IAC in production of NI2s
2. Support other operations and wartime programs
This will require many studies not presently being under-
taken -- for example, analysis of economic and logistic
situations on a world-wide basis. Haw do we propose to
cover those areas presently outside our routine operations?
Especially world food, POL and medical supply situations.
Important that planners in -Aashington are in general
understanding Alith those in the field. Better to "service"
requests from knowledgeable people in the field than to
attempt to press unsolicited )diashington "analysis."
iqhy do we need coordinated (integrated) intelligence
support?
1. Need policy agreements (inter-agency)
2. Need better technical analysis in support of
both policy and operational decisions
Conclusions:
1. Less concern about arrangements for producing NIEls
than for adequacy of detailed technical analysis of
new and different types of problems -- especially
of world requirements for logistics and supply.
2. Ask the working-level people to think in more detail
about the problems they must face, including how
they would expect to get together.
3. More emphasis in contacting knowledgeable individual
Personnel.
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People in other agencies who should be called in.
The key conclusion is that planning should not be so much
to predetermined oanization patterns and delineations of office
responsibility as for arranging to assemble quickly the technical
competence with the necessary back-stopping) necessary to analyze
emergency situations.
18 July 1957
0/DD/I, discussed the recommendations made
by the Killian Committee and how these recommendations: were being
staffed within the Intelligence Community. Two of the recomuendations
have direct bearing on the operation of the DD/I Area in wartime.
One of these concerns itself with the wartime organization of the
Intelligence Community, and tie other with the revision of the
NSCID's.
of the Management Staff, DD/S, described
briefly the Vital Materials Program aadlpointed out that OCR had *
executive responsibility within the_DD/I Area for the accomplisll-
-ffint of the program He was very generous with his praise of the
excellence of the Vital Materials Program within the DD/I Area.
The balance of the day was spent in drafting the paper
attached to this report as Tab "C".
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hEMORANDUM FOR: Asst to DD/I (ring)
THROUGH:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
AD/RR
Chief, FAA
Chief, D/S
Acting Chief, S/TD
S/TD
Report of Participatien in 3:11-ation Alert-1957 as
CIA Representative on the Executive Cemmittee of
the Emergency Economic Agency
26 July 1957
1. Background
A simulated "Office of Econemicllarfare" was established by
Presidential Order in June 1957 during Operation Alert, An 0Ed
uAdministrator" was made responsible f)r the coordination, direction,
and control of all economic activities of the U.S. Government which
would be applied a-ainst the enemy to impair his ability to wage VW*
Placed under the Administrator's aegis were export controls? preclu-
sive buying, blacklisting and financial. controlse(
The name of the Office was changed during the latter stages of
Operation Alert to Emergency Economic Administration at the sugges.
tion of the President, who wanted the emergency character of the war-
time aeencies emphasized, and the new name is used throughout this
report, CIA is one of EEA 's constituent arencies,
The EEA began to take simulated actions when "CR status of Oper-
ation Alert was reached0 During "D" status, its Executive Committee
was moved for the period 12-19 July to the ODM relocation center where
further action was taken.
The Executive Committee participants were as follows:
ODM
Treasury
State
Defense
Commerce
CIA
Fred Winant? Chairman
Edwin F. Rains
Clarence W, Nichols
H. Frank McCaffrey
Nathaniel Knowles
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Copy of the Presidential Order and statement of Administrator's
mission and functions are attached.
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4mill10111?111041?11
KEN0 crA G Mrai. YEW
This report covers the highlights of the exercise to date from
the point of view of intelligence, Resulte of additional discussions
and findings in ODN will be reported. later.
2. General Comments
There is an adequate amount of SinoeSoviet bloc intelligence
available to support EEA? but under wartime conditions ? the commun-
ication of intellieence, especially of lengthy data, may be difficult.
For that reason consideration must be given to having selected. intell-
igence always available to EEA and certain other agencies at their
relocation center. Operation Alert demon .d the advantages an
aggressor has in modern warfare, end the nee,a for carefelly preaplanned?
self.triegering, solfesustaining counter-meaeuxes of say 90-dgy dura-
tion, to avoid ineffectual improv5aations once the attack has started.
The Operation also showedthat the mission and functions and the oper-
ations of EEA roods to be reviewed.ard further developed if the Agency
is to be effective in wartime.
CIA is not directly involved in this aspect of the review, but
the EU and ODM planners are interested in the operational support that
may be expected from the Agency.
3. avific Cements andaseralltio
a. Msattpontrols 7.1art.
Operation Alert, once again demonstrated that in tine of ear
one of the most difficult aseects of export controls is the pro-
blem of controlling trade with allies and neutrals. The "survival"
commodities need to be allocated and the utrals need to be per-
suaded not to make these ccemionities available to the eromy.
Actions aeainst the enaey in 'Airtime such as freeeing of assets
and stoppage of all trade, blecklistingi and nreclesive buying
are well recognized It was generally agreed that econeniontr-
fare measures saint an anew such as the Sino-Soviet bloc would
be of marginal significance as the bloc has a high degree of self-
sufficiency. The EEA "scenario" did., not consider the affects of
retaliatory bombing of the aggressor which would have changed his
economic capabilities and made the problem of preclusive buying
more important.
b.Problems Concernine the -7istabliabrient of EEA
makeermatirafeal.F.Mtirecis.11,...weataromela
, Because of the raey delicate diplomatic eroblems relating to
allies and neutrals, and because there are already in existence
forums such as ACEP under the Secretary of Commerce where such
problems are worked out on an inter-agency besisp some members
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of the EEA Executive Ceeeittee felt that there is no need for 3EAs
Furtheemore, certain laws are in effect which vest seme of the
agencies with reeponsibility for various aopects of export controls;
the powers vested in the BEA need to be reconciled with existing
leaislation, (Congress could ex post facto approve emergency admin.
istrative actions or the Presiaer;i77
Another unresolved problem is the relation of EEA to the Emer.
eenny Production Agency, which would in wartire be given powers
over procurement and allocatior. of "survival commodities"4/ Would
allocetion to neutrals and allies of these commoditiee be accomp.
lished by this seency? or by EEA or by ACE?? Would. .:7.EA or ACE?
hendle the. non "survival" commcdities? What kind of licensing 7Yile
tem is test adapted to wartime? (general ov validated?) Should a
general embargo be imposed at the start of a war? Many other
technical and organizational problems were raised but not resolved
during the operation, which indicate the need of further planning, and
clarification of authority. Or this point there was unanimous
agreement*
c. Et2212Pivz Bwilaq
Operation Alert demonstrated the need of further restudy of
this eroblem. CIA furnished EFA with a. short list of commoditotes
for the guidance of preclusive buying activity. A simulated pre-
clusive buying program was begtn by EEA which reveslod many plan-
ning doficiencies which would 1-ave prevented speedy Imnlementation.
Unle s adequate planning exista the Regressor, knowing his reads
and the time-table will have secured the needed commodities in
neutral countries. Secondly, the problem of buying enecial commo-
dities seems to separate itself into a series of unique country.
commodity blens each one with its awn peculiarities (e.ge anti.
biotics in Switzerland; beryl in India.) The techniealities of
planning and of execution of the simulated eroblem peeved themselves
to be very substantial and much more work needs to be done to devel-
op an effective system. It ME felt that pre.plannilg was vital.
The need for coordination with allies also use streseed. One of
the uninswered questions raised by an Operation Alern cable was the
availability of CIA support to oxecute the preclusive buying program.
de BlaeKELVABI
Operation Alert brought out the difficulties of creating a con.
solidated black list under wartime conditions. In a simulated act-
ion the responsibility was assioned by BEA to Ce with the
participation of other agenciees Many aeencies, (Commerce, CIA,
J The publication or such a list was simulated by the EPA.
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Defenses Treasury) have data for the cenpilation of a black am!.
"grey" listy but the fraMes of reference are not the sane and date
are not freely interchanged in peace ti7ne boccuse of security and
"third agency rules", It .:as agreed that Lore planning is nacci-
ssary. Possibly- a standby list should be t;:ompiled to be used in
an emrgency and provisions should be nsde for coordnating the
list with certain allies in time of war.
Recommendations
a. CIA to continue participation in ODM planning,
b. CIA to consider the proposal that it -2:ender onerational sup.
port to a preclusive hying program in uertime. (Coordinate with
DD/P and APDI/P)
c. CIA to study the desirability. and feasibility of making cer-
tain basic data on Sino-Soviet bloc available to ODN at its relo.
cation center for ready refererce in an emergency (e?g, DCI conntry
hand-booksp selected NrEls, selected data from estimates files)
Attachment:
Presidential Order D-105. (Test exercise only)
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