MEET THE PRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 1999
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1961
• Content Type: TRANS

NBC RaA6Pr(NW
(Nationwi
r)dreokWb I 999/09/4otnwe itD TO
STATINTL
Guest: Allen W, Dulles, Former Director,
Central Intelligence Agency
Panel: Wallace Carroll, The New York Times
John Steele, Time & Life Magazines
Richard Harkness, NBC News
Lawrence E. Spivak, Permanent Panel Member
M E E T T H E P R E S S
Produced by Lawrence E, Spivak
Moderator: Bryson Rash, NBC News
MR. RASH: This is Bryson Rash, substituting for Ned Brooks., and
inviting you to MEET THE PRESS.
Our guest today is Mr. Allen W.. Dulles, the Director of the CIA
from 1953 until he resigned just a few weeks ago? He has the unique
record of having served the United States under 8 presidents beginning
with Mr, Woodrow Wilson,
Now here is the first question from Mr. Lawrence E. Spivak, who
is the permanent member of the MEET THE PRESS panel.
MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, you have often been called America's
master spy, and the CIA, America's master spy organization.
Can you tell us how important undercover activity is today in
intelligence operations?
MR. OULLES: Mr. Spivak, I think I would rather be called America's
chief intelligence officer, as I was for a time until I resigned a
little while ago. I am rather inclined to think, because of the
appeal everything to do with espionage has, that tends to overweight
other sides of the work of the CIA. The end item, the end product
of CIA are these estimates and these appriasals that we give to
the policy makers. The job of CIA, its biggest job, is to pull together
all the intelligence that comes from all parts of the world, comes
through all channels, the various other agencies of government
such as State Department, Defense Department, that collect intelligence
and from others, and then add to it its own product and then try,
with the best analysts, the best students that we can get, to
pull together a final product in conjunction with the other intelligence
agencies of government so that our policy makers,, the President,, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, have a solid basis
for reaching their conclusions on which our policy is made.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. SPIVAK: Well, it is true,-isn't it, there was a time when
intelligence activities was largely spy operations? Have these
techniques changed in recent years?
MR. DULLES: Yes, Mr, Spivak, they have changed. As science
has made these tremendous strides forward, scientific methods are
very much competing with the methods -- the human methods, I might
call them -- and we get a great deal of intelligence through the
most sophisticated methods of science, today.
Now, we haven't given up the other. The other side is very
important, and you can't get along without the human element, but
the scientific element has come forward very rapidly.
MR, SPIVAK: Do you feel that in our lifetime, for example,
something like spy satellites will take the place of most of our
undercover work?
MR. DULLES: I would doubt that.
MR. SPIVAK: Mr, Dulles, the Soviet Union during the past year
or so has arrested a great many so-called "Western spies," Is there
some special explanation for this?
MR: DULLES: Well, Mr. Spivak, I would say that anybody who
goes to the Soviet Union, even under the most innocent circumstances
and tries to get information about what is going on there, he is
prima facie viewed as a spy. We just consider that -- I mean in
this country if anybody comes over here and wants to get information,
it is all wide open and we give it to them,
In Russia, a great many things are classified and a great many
people there are picked up who are utterly and completely innocent.
However, once in a while they get spies, too,
MR, SPIVAK: This has always been true, but they seem to have
arrested a great many more people recently whom they call spies.
Is this due to the fact that the Western nations have increased
their activity inside the Soviet Union, or are the Soviet Union
officials just picking up more people?
MR. DULLES: Wells I think they are more sensitive. The security
that the Soviet tries to protect in great parts of the whole Soviet
Union? that security area is so dear to them, such a grey"art of
their whole system of national defense, and is becoming more so as their
scientific weapons come into play.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. SPIVAK: I know it is very difficult for us to get information,
secret information out of the Soviet Union, but how hard is it for
our enemies to learn what they want in an open society like ours?
MR. DULLES: Well it is very much easier, Mr. Spivak,, obviously.
They can read the press. They can watch television shows. They
can read the Congressional Record. They can read the mass of material
that we are putting out all the time. Papers that are issued by the
Defense Department; presentations for budgets; all of that is grist
to their mill. Now in a free society you can't prevent that,
MR. SPIVAK: Are you however, able to get what information you
need in order to make the estimates that you do make from a closed
society?
MR. DULLES: Well,, I would like to get a lot more.
MR. SPIVAK: But you do all right now?
MR. DULLES: I don't think in intelligence you ought to ever say
you do all right. We are doing better, I think, each year.
MR. RASH: Thank you. We will be back with MEET THE PRESS and
more questions for our guest, Allen Dulles, in a minute, but first
this message.
(Announcement.)
MR. RASH: And now, resuming our interviews our guest today is
Mr. Allen W. Dulles., who was Director of the CIA from 1953 until his
resignation just a few weeks ago.
You have just met Mr. Lawrence Spivak, our permanent panel
member. Our other reporters today are Mr, Wallace Carroll of the New
York Times, Mr, John Steele of Time and Life Magazines, and Richard
Harkness of NBC News,
We will continue the questions with Mr. Carroll,
MR. CARROLL: Mr. Dulles, at the Communist Party Congress in
Moscow last month, some of the disagreements between the Soviets and
the Communist Chinese came into the open, Now you have has an
exceptional opportunity to study the relationships between these two
countries. How deep do you think these disagreements are and what are
the underlying causes? _ 3
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. DULLES: Mr, Carroll' I think these differences run very deep.
However, I do not think we should delude ourselves by thinking they
run so deeply that there is likely to be an open split between Moscow
and Peiping. The basic difference, as you know wel.l., is the difference
in approach to their master program of taking over the world.
Khrushchev, having repudiated Stalin, and Stalinism, now says it ought
to be done under the guise of co-existence. That is, we can take over
the world peacefully. The doctrine of Stalin., the Doctrine of Mao, is
to the general effect that that is not vsyou'veegottto?beemore
more aggressive, you've got to be more ready to use military least., affectsethevital
difference and Khrushchev image he is trying to create.
I do not think though, we should begile ourselves though, by
believing that the basic goal Moscow
Theyabothdifferent
believe that Communism
basic goal of Peiping, or
is going to take over the world.
Khrushchev has been very anxious to show that Lenin was a co-
existencist. That is, he believed in the doctrine of co-existence,
Molotov wrote a rather interesting letter that was referred to
as you may have seen, in the proceedings, of the 22nd-Party Congress.
We haven't got the copy of it, and some day that copy is going to
turn up, though.
MR. CARROLL: Why do you suppose Mr. Khrushchev chose this
moment to take open issue with the Chinese Communists? Are they
particularly vulnerable to pressure from the Soviets at this time?
DULLES: Well this goes back, you see quite a ways. It
MR.
really goes back to the meeting a year ago last June, I believe it
was, in Bucharest, And the open breach between the two started at
the time and then was carried through the Party Congress
held in November of 1961, so that what we have today in the 22nd
Party Congress is really a reflection of what has been going on for
many, many months and many years, really, that came into the open.
MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, some critics of the Central Intelligence
Agency insist that it is too powerful, that in some cases it has
worked against established American foreign policy and that it is in
short, a meddler.
What answer do you have to this type of criticism?
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. DULLES: Well, I know well of that criticism. I can say,,
however,, that no actions have been taken in the political field by
CIA over the years that have not had basic policy approval.
Now,, that does not mean that everything we are alleged to have
done has been done and hence had any policy approval? Every time
anything happens anywhere in the world,, the Kremlin? if it sees any
advantages in it, says that we have done it,, and that has been their
policy right along,
MR..STEELE: You have been also a favorite whipping boy on the
part of Moscow. Do you think that is a token to your agency's
effectiveness?
MR. DULLES: Yes,, I think it is. I haven't any doubt whatever
that Moscow has been trying to destroy this agency for many,, many
years,, the CIA,
MR. STEELE: Now there has been a slightly different kind of
criticism and it is based on broader grounds. It is suggested that
clandestine underground operations really have no place in our kind
of a democratic society.
How do you feel about this?
MR. DULLES: Well, if the entire world was a democratic society
like ours,, I would agree,, but when we have a vigorous, vicious
opponent that is using these methods, it is sometimes said you have
to fight fire with fire, whether you like it or not.
MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, this question touches on the edge of
the U-2 flights. Back in '59 and through '60 we had a lot of talk
about a missile gap. I think figures that were probably in the ball
park said that by mid-1961 that Russia would have,, on launching pads,,
upwards of 200 inner-continental missiles and we would have in the
middle of '61 54.
Now the Republican Secretary of Defense,, Mr* Gates,, denied that
missile gap and he has been backed up by the Democratic Secretary of
Defense,, Mr. '.Mc Namara.
Did the U-2 flights let you look _down_ the Russi_an's throats and-
know the real state of their missile _pre aid ess and do you say there
is a missile gap now?
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR, DULLES: Well, that is a kind of a complicated question, Mr.
Harkness, and I will do my best to answer it, We have never given
out any figures obviously, and we don't do that, Further, in the
Central Intelligence Agency we do not make what you might call net
appraisals. It is not our job to appraise a net position between
ourselves, the United States, and the Soviet Union. That has to be done
by others, particularly by the Defense Department, It is our job to
try to present as clear a picture to the policy makers of where we
think the Soviet Union is in all of these fields, including the
missile field. And I will say myself that it is fair to assume that
they have had their problems in the missile field as well as others --
as well as ourselves.
It is not up to me to say whether there is or is not a missile
gap, but I think it is fair to say that in certain fields they have
not made the progress in missiles that we thought they might be able
to make some years ago,
MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, there is a new book out which purports
to tell the inside story of CIA, it says, for instance, that in Germany
you trusted an ex-Nazi to tell you pretty much everything you wanted
to know about the Russian operation in Europe. It said that you
aided and abetted the 1953 uprising in East Germany and it says -- this
is a direct quotes it says that you "gave aid and counsel to the
Hungarian Freedom Fighters in advance?" Do.:you have any comment on
such material as- that?
MR. DULLES: I have glanced over the book to which you refer, I
would not call it the inside story of the CIA, I would call it the
"up-side-down" story of the CIA, if I had to quickly appraise it. I
regret to say there is a great number of inaccuracies and a good deal
of material which has been pulled from far-leftist sources which I
think should not have been in the book,
MR. HARKNESS: You say "far-leftist sources," Would, you say
they have fallen for some Communist propaganda? Would you go that far?
MR. DULLES: The Communists have tried to sell their propaganda
and unfortunately they have succeeded in many cases. They have
placed their propaganda -- first it comes out in their own publications
and radio and other ways, then it is picked up by leftist journals
and then it gets more and more respectability until you find people
quoting Communist propaganda, sometimes without knowing what they
are doing.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. SPIVAK: Mr. Dulles, one of the CIA''s jobs is to interpret
capabilities and intentions on which foreign governments operate,
isn't that true?
MR, DULLES: That is correct, yes,
MR. SPIVAK: Can you tell us now what you see as the Soviet
intentions in 1962?
MR, DULLEST. Well, I feel quite clear as to Soviet intentions
over the longer run than 1962, As I have said before, the Soviet
program is to try to take us over, and Khrushchev has indicated that
very clearly, Mr. Spivak,
Now as to the shorter run, you are all very well familiar with
the areas of crisis, We have Berlin, we have Laos, we have South
Viet Namf we have the Congo, and we have a good many others I
could mention.
I believe that they will continue to keep up the pressure in
Berlin and then they will try to attack us on the flanks, particularly --
Laos and South Viet Nam and other areas far distant from us.
Berlin will be the focus point and the other areas may well be
the areas where they will try to make the immediate progress,
MR. SPIVAK: You say they haven't.changed their intentions any and
their long-run intentions remain the same, and that is to take us over?
MR. DULLES: That is my view.
MR, SPIVAK: Do they want to take us over physically or do they
just want to destroy our power? Do you think they are stupid enough
to believe they can conquer this country and hold it and run it, or
do they just want to destroy our power?
MR. DULLES: By "take over" I mean,, as Khrushchev has clearly
said, he believes that our grandchildren will live under a Communist
system, I don't mean that they are going to march in with armies.
I believe they-feel that they can work about a change in our system
so that we will, as he indicated, we will adopt a Communist system
and like it.
MR. SPIVA K; Can you tell us how you see their military capabilities
at the present time,, for 1962? There was a time you know when a great
many people said by 1962 we would be in serious trouble, Now what
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
are their capabilities for the immediate future, in your judgment?
MR. DULLES: Well, they are a very strong military power. It
is not my view that they intend to precipitate general war because
I think as they have themselves said, that that would mean mutual
destruction. They are strong on the ground, they have the great
land mass from which they could use their military forces. They are
highly sophisticated as we must realize, in missiles and they are
highly sophisticated in the nuclear field and this last test which
was concluded just before I retired, this last test showed that
they had made certainly a leap forward in their capability in the
nuclear field.
MR. SPIVAK: If their intentions are to destroy us, how is. this
thing going to end, can we ever live in real peace with them, or must
one system or the other in your judgment be destroyed?
MR. DULLES: I think there is hope. I think that with
education, if you could get more of an opening up of the Soviet
Union, that the Russian people -- I don't think the Russian
people have the ambitions that Khrushchev himself has. I think
it is quite possible -- it is going to take a long while, it may take
decades -- but it is not impossible that the Russian people themselves
would force a change in the worldwide ambitions of the Soviet Union,
MR. CARROLL: Mr, Dulles, last spring many officials here in
Washington were worried about the spread of Castroism. The
influence of Premier Castro in Latin America. Now that indeed was
supposed to have been one of the reasons why you and others felt
we had to make an attempt to overthrow Castro in Cuba. Has Castro's
influence in Latin America grown in the meantime, or was that a
miscalculation?
MR. DULLES: I think that Latin America is far more alerted to
the danger of Castroism and communism as a danger to their system
then they were let s say a year ago, or last April.
Many countries in Latin America have now broken diplomatic
relations with Cuba and I think therefore the impact of Castroism
has decreased in many Latin American countries over the last six
months because of their understanding of what has taken place in
Cuba and their apprehension of what might take place in their own
countries.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. CARROLL: Is it true that the Chinese Communists are very
active in Latin America in propaganda against this country?
MR. DULLES: They are quite active* yes,.
MR. CARROLL: Do you have evidence?
MR. DULLES: We have some evidence of that and they are also
fairly active in Africa.
MR. STEELE: Mr. Dulles, I want to ask you very frankly whether
the failure in Cuba was an intelligence failure?
MR. DULLES: I don't think it was, Mr. Steele. There was no
military hardware that appeared that was a surprise to us. Some of
the material was handled a little better than we expected. There is
quite a general popular misapprehension that it was felt that there
would be a spontaneous uprising. We have never contemplated that.
In the -cis of the war I worked a
y great deal with the drench under-
ground, The last thing we wanted was spontaneous uprisings,'to be
slaughtered by the Nazi troops, In the same way we were not
looking for a spontaneous uprising, but for other developments.
MR. STEELE: Did we anticipate the appearance of Castro`s jets
and also the inability of those who reached the beach to get to the
mountains when the major objective failed? Were these two things
foreseen?
MR. DULLES: There we are getting into areas about which I have
not done any talking and I don't think I will start now. Obviously
the air situation was a very important element in the whole picture,
MR. STEELE: Mr, Dulles, was the abortive invasion attempt more
or less inevitable and did it have perhaps any long-range results
on the plus side?
MR. DULLES: Well, looking back at it, Mr. Steele* sort of from
the background of history, or as history will look at its, I think the
historians of the future will probably say that if any move was to be
made to get rid of communism in Cuba short of actual military inter-
vention with all the power of the United States, that effort would
probably have to have been made sometime between, say November and
April.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. RASH: Gentlemen may I say that we have just about two
minutes left and if you will keep your questions and answers
short accordingly -- Mr, Harkness --
MR, HARKNESS: Quickly on Cuba, Mr. Dullest I heard after the
invasion a military expert say that invasion was the last chance
to overthrow Castro without direct United States intervention,
Do you agree with that?
MR. DULLES: Well, I wouldn't go quite that far, but I would
go well along the line. We knew, as I was just going to say in
answer to Mr, Steele, we knew that the Cuban pilots were being
trained in Czechoslovakia. We knew they were going to have very
shortly available under Cuban direction Migs in considerable numbers
and I am inli,ned to think as I said before, that if a move were to
be made short of intervention? prpbably this was the area of time
when it had to be made. About November to April --
MR. HARKNESS: Mr. Dulles, you are always able -- you have to
acknowledge your mistakes but you can't boast about your accomplish-
ments in the CIA field. How do you evaluate U. S. Intelligence
vis-a-vis, say, the Russians and the British?
MR. DULLES: Well, I think we have a very competent intelligence.
I think it has been growing. We have a devoted body of men and
women working there, They have worked there for many years. They
are now becoming highly competent. We are getting some of the
ablest young men in the United States to join with us and I think we
have one of the best intelligence services in the world. In the
counter-intelligence field we have been doing extremely well this year.
MR. SPIVAK, Mr, Dulles, from time to time it has been suggested
that Congress set up a joint watchdog committee over the CIA. What
is your opinion of the value and the disadvantages of such a
committee?
MR. DULLES: I think the situation as it now exists is pretty
good. We have committees$ you know. The idea that we are not looked
at by Congress is a fantasy. I appeared before a subcommittee of
the Appropriations Committee and a subcommittee -- when I was
Director -- and a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee any
time they wanted, Those two committees know about all our work,
all our activities. We bar no information from them that they want,
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
 Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6
MR. RASH: Gentlemen, I am sorry,, but I am going to have to
suspend our questions at this time.
Thank you very much? Mr. Dullest for being with us. I will
tell you about next week's guest on MEET THE PRESS after this
message,
(Announcement)
THE ANNOUNCER: For a printed copy of today's interview send
ten cents in coin and a stamped, self-addressed envelope to Merkle
Press., 609 Channing Street, N.E., Washington 18, D. C.
MR. RASH: Next Sunday at our regular time MEET THE PRESS will
have as its guests the two Republican Congressional leaders,
Senator Everett M. Dirksen and Senate Minority Leader, and
Congressman Charles 0, Halleck, the House Minority Leader.
Next Friday, January the fifth, a special edition of MEET THE
PRESS will be presented at 10:30 o'clock Eastern Standard Time.
Consult your local television listings for further information.
Now, this is Bryson Rash saying good-bye for Mr. Allen )ulles
and MEET THE PRESS.
Approved For Release 1999/09/16 : CIA-RDP70-00058R000200110001-6