MISSILE GAP MYSTERY CLEARS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000200090082-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: April 17, 1963
• Content Type: NSPR

APR 17 1963
Approved For, Release 2000/05/9$A-
WBDP7
Missile Gap Mystery Clears
After much controversy, endless
speculation and going on three years
of Democratic administration, t h e
great mystery of the "missile gap"
stands fully unveiled.
The unveiling confirms what long
has been generally accepted as the
truth of the matter: There never
really was any "missile. gap." Yet
at the same time it frees presidential
candidate John F. Kennedy of the
charge, leveled at him by many po-
litical opponents, of knowingly dram-
atizing a myth in order to i lget
elected to office.
These revelations appear in a
Harper's magazine article by Allen
W. Dulles, former director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. The au-
thor Is without a doubt the best
qualified man In America to set the
record straight.
The CIA, says Mr. Dulles, was
under "great pressure" from the De-
fense Department to evaluate re-
ports that the Russians had begun a
missile buildup. Early figures on
Red missile production had to be
based on estimate* of production and
development capabilities over a
period in the future, he explains. It
was necessary to decide how much
of its total military effort the Soviet
Union would allocate to missile build-
ing. Then It was necessary to pre-
dict whether the Russians would put
their "early awkward ICBM's" into rt
quantity production and deploy them.
or choose a more orderly program.
"The answer, In retrospect," Mr.
Dulles writes, "seems to be that they
chose the more orderly program."
Ile explains that as soon as this
choice became evident it was possi-
ble for the CIA safely to revise down-
ward its estimate of Red missile
strength.
Mr. Kennedy,' when he alleged in
his campaign that there was a "mis-
sile gap," was basing the assertion
on the larger estimate. Ile was not
responsible for the error.
Another, episode related by Mr.
Dulles suggests, however, that there -it
was an objectionable side to the air-
ing of the "missile gap" estimate.
In 1944, Thomas E. Dewey learned
that the government apparently had
not made best use of Its success in
cracking Japanese codes before
Pearl Harbor. The 'Joint..Clilefs of
Staff were concerned that this might
become a campaign Issue Bnd aid P
the enemy. In response to a per-
sonal. appeal from General Marshall
to keep patriotic considerations
above
politics, Mr. Dewey never
mentioned our code success in his
campaign, Mr. Dulles notes.
Approved For Release 2000/05/24: Cl
;JP70-00058R000200090082-0