CBS REPORTS 'THE HOT AND COLD WARS OF ALLEN DULLES' AS BROADCAST OVER THE CBS TELEVISION NETWORK THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 1962 10:00 - 11:00 PM, EST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100150009-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: April 26, 1962
• Content Type: REPORT

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CBS REPORTS
"The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles"
as broadcast over the
CBS TELEVISION NETWORK
Thursday, April 26, 1962
10000 - 11?00 PM, EST
PRODUCER.- Edward M. Jones
EXECUTIVE PRODUCER.- Fred W. Friendly
REPORTER.- Eric Sevareid
All copyright and right of copyright in this transcript and
in the program are owned by CBS. This transcript may not
be copied or reproduced or used in any way (other than for
purposes of reference, discussion and review) without the
written permission of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
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ANNOUNCER:
Tonight, on CBS REPORTS - The Hot and Cold Wars of Allen Dulles.
Reporter - Eric Sevareid.
SEVAREID: I1. Dulles, we all know about the failures
of American Intelligence. Are there any
successes we don't know about?
DULLES: Yes, there are a good many. As the President
said when he came out to say goodbye to me out
at the new building a few months ago -- he
remarked: "That your failures are always
advertised and your successes are unsung."
There's also a, quote, as I remember, I can't
remember the exact quote, but in a different
connection. He said something like this.
I think it was after Cuba. "That success
has a thousand parents and failure is an orphan."
Sometimes, you know, I feel a little like an
orphan, but there have been successes too.
(MUSIC) ---
ANNOUNCER:
CBS REPORTS - The Hot and Cold Wars of Alen Dulles. Here is
CBS NEWS Correspondent Eric Sevareid.
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SEVAREIDo Allen Welsh Dulles is an original in American
political history. He, more than any one else,
put the United States into the business of massive,
peacetime intelligence -- a role forced upon us by
the world-wide communist drive, but a role that is
still alien in spirit to our open society and
alien in practice to the traditional public
accountability of our government. Many Americans
dislike this role. They have called Mr. Dulles
our "?master spy." They have accused the Central
Intelligence Agency of murder, incitement to
revolution, of protecting dictators, of
undermining official foreign policy, even, in the
case of the U-2 and the Cuban invasion, of
usurping presidential powers. In Washington, Mr.
Dulles has as many warm admirers, perhaps, more
than he has hot opponents. He has known many
triumphs - and many tragedies. The Korean War
crippled his only son. The Cuban invasion disaster
clouded his last year in office. But when he
recently retired, President Kennedy awarded him the
National Security Medal. Allen Dulles, one-part
cloak and dagger expert, two parts elder statesman,
has not yet written his C.I.A. autobiography, but
he has agreed to share with CBS REPORTS a few
electronic memoirs.
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, when Khrushchev was here, did you
get a chance to talk with him at all?
DULLES: Yes. I didn't have a long talk with him, but I
had a very -spite an amusing encounter with him.
It took place at the dinner that President
Eisenhower gave for Khrushchev, and the President
introduced me, and said: "This is Mr. Dulles.
You may know Mr. Dulles." He turned to his
reporters, kind of a twinkle in his eye, because
he's got a keen -- you must admit, he's got a
good sense of humor, and he said: "Oh, yes, I
know you. I read your reports."
SEVAREID: Really?
DULLEST Yes. And I said: "I hope you get them legally."
And, "Oh," he said, "you know, you know how we
get them. We all pay the, same agents and we all
get the same reports." And, "Well," I said,
"That's kind of sharing the wealth, isn't it?"
And then we had a laugh and that ended it.
SEVAREID: Did he mean your public or your private reports?
DULLEST Ah, he never told me. I think he had in mind. that
he read agent reports.
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SEVAREID: Do you think it's possible that he has?
DULLES: Every once in a while somebody gets caught,
but that game goes both ways.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, the Russian writer and propagandist
Ehrenburg once wrote: "That if the master spy,
Mr. Dulles, ever got to heaven by anybody's
absent-mindedness, you would mine the cloudes
and begin to slaughter the angels."
DULLES: Shoot the stars aid slaughter the angels.
SEVAREID: Have you ever committed any act of violence in
your life?
DULLEST No. Too much emphasis is put by the general
public on what they believe is sort of traditional
espionage. People rushing around and stealing
peoples' papers and getting information in that
way. Not very much information is got in that way.
EVAREID: Mr. Dulles, before we talk about the Central
Intelligence Agency directly, I'd like to ask
you a little bit about your World War II
experiences in Switzerland for the O.S.S. How did
you go about setting up that European espionage
network?
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DULLES: Eric, I think in a sense, I was lucky in that
I had to scrape around myself, and I couldn't
call on great corps to come and join me from
the United States. Maybe that is a little
ambiguous, but I didn't get cluttered up with the
bureaucracy of a large organization, because until
the frontier opened up two years later, no
American could join me there and work there,
because no American could come legally into
Switzerland. Some would come in by parachuting
into France, and then moving over, but they could
not work with me, so I had to use my ingenuity as
best I could, and try to find people with whom
I could work. There was, from the beginning, a
group of Germans who never cowtowed. to Hitler,
who were opposed to him from the beginning, for
ideological and other motives, and working through
them, it was very helpful.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, would it be accurate to say that
because of your work in World War II, in
Switzerland, Washington kept informed on those
plots against Hitler's life?
DULLES. They knew about the last plot. I did have the
details of the last and most serious plot that
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almost succeeded on the 20th of July, 1944, and
a German who was working with Canaris, kept me
informed of the details, and he went up, at the
risk of his life, because he then was suspect to
the Himmler people, and took part in the plot.
Before he left, he left me a long memorandum
about it, which I reported to Washington a week
before the plot took place. It came very close
to succeeding. If Hitler, as he went by, he was
having -- Hitler was having a briefing at the
time. He was up on the East Front in East
Prussia, and he was having his regular morning
briefing, and Stauffenberg, who had the bomb, was
in the room. He was -- had a special message for
Hitler, so he was admitted. He put the bomb down
in this briefcase against a leg of a table. It
was a -- you know, one of those long tables that
are in barracks with legs at various intervals.
He put it down on the leg nearest to where Hitler
was. Here was a long map, twenty feet or more
long, with maps of the East Front, the West Front,
and so forth, and so on. And Hitler was being
briefed there, and just before the bomb went off,
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Hitler went off here to see how the front was,
let's say, in Pinsk, and that took him ten
feet away from the bomb. The bomb went off and
he was blown out of the building, but he wasn't
seriously wounded. It was a shack -- it was
just a barracks there.
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SEVAREID: Well, nobody could predict his movements to that
fine degree?
DULLEST Not to twenty feet - no.
SEVAREID: It must have been a great disappointment to you
and every one else?
DULLES: Well, it was. I was waiting to see whether they'd
get hold of the radio that day, and they never got
hold of the radio. You know, that's one of the
modern revolutions -- one of the great things to
note is, have they got control of the radio, and
again and again as I've sat back, either when
revolutions were upcoming, the indication to you
as to whether one side or the other is winning, is
who has got control of the air? Who's got control
of the radio? I don't know whether you as an
expert in this field realize how important that is.
Generally, you know, the Intelligence business, I
know it well -- generally, you can scoop us.
SEVAREID: It's a terrible thought, you know.
DULLEST Well, our messages have to be coded and decoded,
and so forth, and so on, and so that the flash that
you get, that you get on the air comes first.
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SEVAREID: You apparently knew very early in '45, Mr. Dulles,
that the Japanese were in very bad shape. How
did you know that?
DULLES:
Eric, at that time, I had access to information
that was reaching the German Foreign Office, which
was smuggled out to me in Switzerland, in the form
of certain cables that the German Foreign Office
was receiving from various parts of the world.
Among those cables were messages from the German
Ambassador in Tokyo, the German Air Attache and
the German Army Attache. Those cables showed,
very clearly, the plight of the Japanese Air Force,
and the plight of the Japanese Navy. By the end
of '44 and early '45, their position, both air and
sea, was becoming almost untenable, far more than
the public realized. Word came through to me from
certain Japanese sources with whom I was in
contact, that the 'Jaanese would like to find a way
of negotiating for a surrender. By this time, the
negotiations in Italy for the German surrender,
were somewhat public property.
SEVAREID: You mean the surrender of those twenty-two German
divisions in Italy that you negotiated a week or
so before the collapse of the rest of the German
Army?
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DULLES.- Yes - because by that time, the surrender had gor
through and the armistice had been signed and put
into effect. So the Japanese said.- "Well, this
is the channel for us." So they turned to me on
that. They made quite interesting proposals, and
as result of these proposals, I was asked to go
up to Potsdam in the time of the Potsdam
Conference, when President Truman met there with
Stalin you remember and Churchill. I took to
Stimson, at that time, the proposals that had
come through this channel with regard to an early
Japanese surrender.
EVAREID: Do you think that the dropping of those first
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki might
have been unnecessary in terms of bringing about
the Japanese surrender?
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have the deepest respect for the men who made that
decision. I do feel that there was a failure
to interpret available intelligence as to the
extent of the Japanese collapse, and their
inability really effectively to carry on the war.
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, during the last war when you were
in Switzerland, isn't it true that you used to
meet with Dr. Carl Jung, the psychiatrist, to
try to figure out how Hitler and the Germans
would act and react to certain situations?
DULLES: I did go to him very often, and I found his
judgments as to what a man like Hitler, who was
an introvert, I believe. I'm not a psychologist,
but I -- would do, as compared to what Mussolini,
who was an extra-extrovert would do. At that
time, when I was talking with him and we were
getting toward the and of the war, and one of the
questions I was interested in was, "Would Hitler
hole up in the mountains?" You know, in the
famous but non-existent redoubt - and carry on the
war indefinitely? Or would he commit suicide, or
what he would do? Jung was very, very good on
that, and also very good on many other matters.
SEVAREID: Do we make any progress or even any attempts to
do that with a man like Khrushchev? Any
long-range psychoanalysis?
ULLES: Yes, there's quite a lot of study being made of
Khrushchev's actions and reactions. I'm, myself,
somewhat of a disciple of Pavlov, as an interpreter
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Semitire
of what Khrushchev does. You remember the theory
of Pavlov is that if you train a dog to respond to
three bells -- you open the door and you ring
three bells, and you give him sugar, and then you
do that for a month, and then all of a sudden, you
open the door and the three bells, instead of
sugar, you beat him over the back with a stick.
The dog's puzzled. The dog doesn't know what's
happened, and you vary this business, and so forth,
and pretty soon, the dog's gone pretty well crazy.
SEVAREID: Eventually, it reduces the animal and perhaps the
human being too?
DULLES: Well, does a human being react? We spend all our
time trying to decide what does Khrushchev mean?
Today, it's co-existence and everything, and then
the next day, there's something else. Take the
breaking of the test ban and starting to test.
What day does he choose for that? He can choose
among days -- he chooses the day of the opening of
the unaligned nations conference in Belgrade.
Khrushchev thinks, this is the thing. This shows
I'm strong. This shows I don't worry about what
you unaligned nations are going to decide here, or
do here. I'm going to test. I know you're going
to protest, so protest.
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SEVAREID: Well, in the Pavlovian theory, the animal, and
we think now of human beings reacting to
communist propaganda instead of the animals, is
reduced, eventually, to confusion and finally to
apathy.
DULLES: Apathy or insanity -- whatever you like of it, yes.
For example, in May of 1960, you recall that
Khrushchev brutally broke off the conference in
Paris with President Eisenhower and Macmillan
and the French, at a time when he had known for
years that the U-2 was flying, and yet he used
this as an excuss in truly Pavlovian manner, so
that all this rage and ao forth, and so on -- that
was fabricated. He wanted to destroy the
conference and he took that method of doing it.
His actions at the U.N., when he took off his
shoe and beat the table, and certain of his
other actions there.
SEVAREID: Can you say anything about the effectiveness
of those U-2 flights over Russia? Were they
worth it?
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DULLES: Well, I would like on that, refer to the
statement that the Secretary of Defense made in
the hearings that was published at the time, in
which he indicated that -- I don't remember his
exact words,but generally, that most valuable
information had been obtained with regard to
missiles, aircraft, other military installations,
which were obtainable by no other means, is
that some statement of record that he made at
that time.
SEVARIED: Is there not a real possibility that satellites
could not get this kind of information in spite
of Russian secrecy?
DULLES: That I'll have to leave to the Department of
Defense to answer. It's perfectly true that the
Soviets consider that their ability to maintain
great zones of security and secrecy is considered
by them as a major asset. They've said this
very frankly. They've said, "We're not going to
let you get in there, because that is of vital
importance to our national security and we're
going to keep it. That's the attitude they're now
showing at the Geneva Conference and there we
are -- I mean -- we're up against that -- and
that is why, when the U-2 can come along, they
felt so sensitive about it, because a method had
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een found for overcoming the restrictions they
had placed and the security they felt they had.
SEVAREIDe Is there anything you'd like to say, Mr. Dulles,
about the Pilot of the U-2, Francis Powers?
DULLES. I never shared some of the public and maybe of
the press criticism of Powers. While it was
difficult to tell and---until after we---the agency
had talked with him and had made their report
how well he had done, I think on the whole, he
handled himself properly. You must remember that
he was an aviator. He was a great navigator.
He had a very difficult assignment merely on
the aviation-navigation side and to expect
of him---to make of him a great undercover agent
was impossible, one of these two professions, or
a fine aviator---one of these two professions
took all a man's time---all a man's concentration
and thought and I'm not sure that point has been
brought out fully enough.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, some people said that the pilot, Mr.
Powers, should have taken his own life. Is there
any way you can have a man sign a contract to
commit suicide?
DULLES: No---no---you couldn't---first place, it would be
ineffective of course. In the second place, I think
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 it would be immoral and we just didn't do it.
We said, "Here, you have this. If you get into
a situation where you think that death is better
than what awaits you, use it.
SEVAREID: 11r. Dulles, about the foulup on all the
explanations of the U-2 affair when it first
happened. The government went through a lot of
agony. We looked very silly. Now, is it
necessary that we go through all that? Do we hav
to explain? I remember the British had a
frogman who disappeared in a British harbor near
a Russian ship. There were great accusations and
suspicions of espionage on their part, but
the British government---as far as I
remember, said nothing about it at all and the
matter finally died away. Much as it would harm
the interests of a man looking for news, can't
Washington operate the same way?
DULLES: I doubt whether, in the two situations to which
you probably refer, one the U-2 and the other
Cuba probably, too --one could have ever rested
on the answer "NO COJVUJNT".
SEVAREID: You could not?
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DULLEST I doubt whether you could have. It seems to me it
would have raised an even more serious problem
! 1. 4.ti_
that the problem of disclosing intelligence
operations, namely the problem of responsibility
in government.
SEVAREID: How do you mean?
DULLES: Well, I mean this. Do we have a kind of a
government here that would let---say, me as then
Director of Central Intelligence, send an airplane,
even seventy thousand feet high over Russia?
Is that a responsible kind of government?
Or mount an expedition, or have something to do
with an expedition for the training of Cubans
that were going to Cuba? It seems to me that that
kind of thing can only be don with the approval
of the highest authority and," e American people
or the world began to think that-we had a
government here where that kind of thing could
be done without approval by the highest authority
here might be a feeling of uneasiness, that there
are some people here who could do things that
might lead to serious international complications
without knowledge at the highest level.
So could the President have ---have declined
knowledge of these situations, or said, "I won't
say anything about them."
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SEVAREID: Well, doesn't this bring up the question then, as
to whether there ought to be a formal watchdog
committee in Congress to look at the C.I.A.
constantly and what it does?
DULLES: We have had from ---for many years a Sub-Committee
of the appropriations committee of the House and
the Senate, that went over our entire budget, to
whom we disclosed any information they wanted.
SEVAREID: Would you inform those men in advance of any
consequential operation?
DULLES: Certainly.
SEVAREID: You would feel obliged to?
DULLES: Have you forgotten, Eric, have you forgotten that
after the U-2 incident, Clarence Cannon, got up
and I'll send that to you---Clarence Cannon got up
in the House ---May 15, I think it was, or
thereabouts when this thing broke and he said,
"I knew all about this. We appropriated the money
for this. Our Committee was told about this."
Well, I don't want to quote all his words, but
it was a---it was quite a thrilling speech and
when he got through, he---the house rang with
applause. Now, you ought to look at that, and
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that's an answer and if we told the House
Committee about the U-2, which was the most
secret thing we had and the best kept secret for
five years of any other operation that I've over
known, obviously we told these committees of
other things. We told them everything they wanted
to know.
SEVAREID: At any time, have any of those Congressmen so
informed, of highly secret operations, broken
secrecy?
DULLES: Never sir. Never.
ANNOUNCER:
CBS REPORTS - The Hot And Cold Wars Of Allen Dulles - will
continue, immediately after this message.
COl ERCIAL:
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ANNOUNCER:
CBS REPORTS - The Hot and Cold Cars Of Allen Dulles - continues.
Here, again, is Eric Sevareid.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, there's been much critisicm that
we took much too long to recognize the danger
of Castro and tried to do something about it?
DULLES: Maybe we were slow about it. Certainly, we got
disturbed about Castro at a fairly early date, but
what were you going to do about it? Castro was in
there, with the great support of the majority of
the people, and if we had planned any expedition at
an earlier date, that might not have been of any
more success than the one that we did after rather
mature preparations.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, if you can, would you tell me, in
regard to the Cuban affair of last spring, where you
think the central basic mistake was?
DULLES: The President has said that he assumed responsibility
for the action taken. That was his own initiative.
In matters of that kind, where they wish the
director of Central Intelligence Agency to assume
responsibility, he's always prepared to do it and I
have never discussed the Cuban operation. I think
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21
there were certain factors which bore upon the
timing of any operation if it was carried out,
namely, that we knew that Cuban pilots were being
trained in Czechoslavakia, that MIG's were in
crates in large numbers in Cuba and that if these
trained pilots got back and these MIG's became
operative, the possibility of any invasion by a
Cuban force, or even by an American force, would be
greatly -- the dangers and the problems would be
greatly increased.
SEVAREID: But what about the philosophical and the legal
argument that the Cuban invasion was both immoral
and illegal?
DULLES: Well, I think I'd respond to that by asking you a
question. Here, you had a group of fine young men --
these Cubans -- formed the brigade that went into
Cuba, who asked nothing other than the opportunity
to try to restore a free government in their
country, who were ready to risk their lives and have
done so, whether they should have been told that
they would get no sympathy, no support, no aid from
the United States: That's the question -- I just
pose that question. I don't ask you to answer it,
but I'll answer your question with another question.
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SEVAREID: Is it true, that we did not inform the Cuban
underground in Cuba of the date -- the place and
the timing of that landing?
DULLES: Eric, we didn't inform them. As I recall, we
informed very few people when we started the
invasion of France in June of '44. You can't do
that. We did not inform the Cuban underground of
the time and place of the invasion. To do so would
have been informing Castro and it would have been
catastrophe for the invading force.
SEVAREID: We did achieve some element of surprise, did we?
DULLES: Complete surprise was achieved as regards the
place of landing.
SEVAREID: But not timing, because that was published...
DULLES: No, they did not know the exact timing. They had
been crying invasion for weeks and months before,
and as you note, they're even now crying that
invasions are being planned.
SEVAREID: It's been said in one of these books about the
C.I.A., Mr. Dulles, that the C.I.A. people refused
to put into effect the Presidential order to keep
out all former Batista supporters from that
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DULLES: Well, it's not true at all, Eric. It was an
absolute rule that no Bastistianas were to be
accepted. Now, there may have been, in fifteen
hundred people, there's always a possibility you
make one or two mistakes, a few mistakes, but
nobody was knowingly selected by the Cuban
selectors of the members of the brigade who favored
Batista.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, after the failure of the Cuban invasion,
there were predictions and requests that inside the
C.I.A., operations and intelligence be separated as
functions. What has happened in that area?
DULLES: There was a committee set up by the President to
look into all phases of the operation. I won't
deny that the conclusion was reached and it was
unanimous, that this operation took on a character
that -- particularly in its latter phases, which
exceeded the scope of the normal activities of
the C.I.A., and I agreed with that -- I agreed with
that.
SEVAREID: You think the C.I.A. got too deeply into that
of fair?
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DULLEST Well, I feel that operations of the C.I.A. should
be of a character if they get into operations,
and that is up to the Executive, if they get into
operations, those operations should be of a nature
that could be kept quiet and be of the concealed
type.
SEVAIEID: Mr. Dulles, what about this whole problem of
briefing Presidential candidates on very secret
matters? How, this came up in Mr. Nixon's book
recently, when he said that "Mr. Kennedy, having
been briefed during the campaign by you on the
Cuban operation, took advantage of that and took
a very strong line against Castro in his campaign
speeches, while he -- Mr. Nixon -- also knowing
what was going on, felt he was obliged to take a
different line -- that he was put in a bad
position." In your public statement, at the time,
you said that your briefings of Kennedy did not
cover and actual Cuban operation.
DULLEST As far as this last incident you've mentioned,
Sanitized
I don't think there's any use going into that
any further. The statements have been made --
there is an honest misunderstanding and I don't
propose to go into that any further. I think,
~Pt 04~~~~0 ~~-5
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25
get the briefing of candidates a little better
organized.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, if I could change the subject
somewhat -- Walter Lippmann, who's not uninformed
about Washington, said on one of these programs
in fact, "That your brother Secretary of State
Dulles paid rather little attention as such,
because he had his own State Department or foreign
service," namely your Intelligence service.
What would be your reaction to that statement.
DULLES: Well, I don't know. I know you're a very accurate
quoter of others, but I wouldn't agree with that.
SEVAREID: Well, wouldn't it be a fair inference that since
you were his brother -- after all, he would give
,an undue importance to your information, or be
prejudiced in favor of it over that of his own
State Department.
DULLES: I don't know. It might be just the opposite. You
can't tell. I do not think that he did so. And we
didn't always agree. He had strong feelings and,-
sometimes I had strong feelings. On our huay.
philosophy of life and approach to the world, yes,
we agreed, but every once in a while, we would have
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, I have found, personally, that overseas,
a good many of our ambassadors and ministers
express some irritation about the activities of
C.I.A. people in their area?
DULLES
That's correct. There have been cases where a
diplomat in a foreign country has looked at the
picture somewhat differently than it has been
looked at in Washington.
SEVAREID: Are you saying, Mr. Dulles, there have been no
cases abroad where the activities of C.I.A. have
conflicted with our official State Department
foreign policy in those countries?
DULLES. There have been none.
SEVAREID: None at all?
DULLES- None at all.
SEVAREID: One of the new books about the C.I.A., Mr. Dulles,
makes a claim that in Iran a few years ago, at the
time of Mossadegh, the C.I.A. people spend literally
millions of dollars, hiring people to riot in the
streets and do other things, to get rid of
Mossadegh. Is there anything you can say about
that?
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DULLES- Well, I can say that the statement that we
spent many dollars doing that is utterly false.
SEVAREID: There's been a general argument in the Left, or
liberal press writers in this country...
DULLEST Yes.
SEVAREID: That the C.I.A. people have sort of automatically
tended to support very extreme right wing groups
in foreign countries because of an obsession
with communism, and have therefore set back
progressive democratic possibilities in foreign
countries.
DULLES- I think just the opposite is thecs,se. If you go
over a situation like the situation in Korea and
many others I could cite, I would say that by and
large we were quicker than others to recognize
the dangers in these situations. Because I have
often felt in many countries that the strongest
antagonists of the communists, and those who knew
them best were often -- not always -- but often,
some of the socialist leaders.
SEVAREID: The story of C.I.A. agents supposedly encouraging
the revolting French generals was apparently
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t..
encouraged, or at least believed, by some French
government officials at fairly high level. How
do you account for that?
DULLES- Well, I don't know whether they really believed
it, but it might have been convenient at that
time not to deny it. But any time a revolution
happens anywhere, the Soviet will begin by saying
the C.I.A. did It. Now, if that's believed,
that's bad. 1 have collected -- over the years
I was there as director, I collected literally
thousands of items of Soviet propaganda, just
along these lines, and now books are being
published that say that we got rid of Farouk in
Egypt - probably that was a good thing if one
had done it. We didn't -- we -- put in Nasser
too, which we didn't do. That we've done all
kinds of things in various parts of the world and
it's hard to dual with it. You just say it's not
true, but here it appears. It's repeated in books
that seem to come from reputable sources. 1 don't
know. I think mayb e you can give me some good
advice as to what I could do as an individual,
because I know these things aren't true.
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, on this whole question of dealing
with communist tactics around the world, there
are those, as you know, who think we would be
stronger and more effective if we followed the
so-called "passive," or "soft line." That is,
never try anything like an invasion of Cuba, or
an undeclared war in Vietnam and not test the
bombs, whatever the Russians do, a kind of
leadership by moral example. If this were
followed, what do you think would happen?
DULLES: Disaster. I don't think you can meet this form of
evil by merely passive resistance. You recall
well the days of the Thirties? What happened
when Hitler first denounced the Treaty of
Versailles? Withdrew from the disarmament
conference? Invaded the Rhineland? Took over
Austria? Invaded Czechoslavakia? A lot of cheeks
were turned to Hitler then, and look what
happened -- almost happened to the world? Do we
want to repeat that sort of thing again? I don't
think we do. I think you must meet aggression,
open or covert, and you must meet it where it
appears, whether in Berlin or Laos, or South
Vietnam.
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SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, some Europeans, Jean Monnet, for
example, say that Americans are much too
obsessed about Russian communism. Do you think
this is true?
DULLES: I think that is true, in a sense, and not true in
another sense. I think that the one grave peril
that we face is the communist peril. That is
the only peril to our freedoms, to our
institutions, to everything that we hold dear.
Now, I think that it is true that the communists
practice on us and on other countries towards
which they're directing their attack, they try
on us what I would call the overload theory.
They will start a lot of petty annoyances in
various parts of the world, without knowing whether
they are going to seriously push them ahead, in
order to divert our attention, maybe, from the
major points of their attack.
EVAREID, Could
ou
ive
y
g
any concrete examples of what has
turned out to be minor or major?
ULLES: Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger,
let's say in the Congo. They went in there
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with great fanfare. They supported Gizenga.
They established a Lumumba Institute in Moscow,
and it looked as though they were going to make
a serious attempt at take-over in the Belgian
Congo. Well, it didn't work out that way at all.
Now, maybe they intended to do it, but they
didn't find the situation ripe, and they beat
a pretty hasty retreat.
SEVAREID: Would you call Vietnam a serious threat or just
a tactical operation?
DULLEST No, I think that's a serious threat. I consider
South Vietnam of a major importance, and not just
one of the overload theory type of operations.
ANNOUNCER:
CBS REPORTS continues in just a moment with Mr. Dulles on the subject
of communist aims and communist conflicts.
COMIERC IAL
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32
ANNOUNCER
CBS REPORTS - The Hot And Cold Wars Of Allen Dulles - continues.
Here, again, is Eric Sevareid.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, when you and others talk about a
Russian wish to dominate the world, what
exactly do you mean? Is it in terms of Russian
national power over the world, the Communist
philosophy and system over the world--- exactly
what?
DULLES: They have several facets to their policy. They
believe, and some of them believe it fanatically,
that Communism is the wave of the future,is the
form of economic life that is best adapted to push
a country forward. They believe that inevitably,
through economic pressures, and the like, more
and more countries will adopt Communism.
But they also believe that governments don't
generally fall. They---you got along better
if you push them.
SEVAREID: How could they dominate the world in which this
country, with all its power, existed?
DULLES: Well, they would believe that if they could take
over enough of the rest of the world, then they
could encircle us, and then, eventually, we would
have to either adopt their system, or face an
eventual war possibly. They don't believe that
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the United States is going communist in
the next decade or two, anything of that kind,
obviously.
I think they feel that there is a strong tide
in the world, today, to get the rascals out. I
mean, take Latin America, no matter what the
government is, there are a lot of disaffected
people, and where you do not have, as you do
not have in many countries of the world, sort of
organized party system, all of the disaffected
tend to gather together under the communist banner,
or led by the communists, because they're the
best organized, to lead a movement, get the
rascals out. Now, maybe on some cases, they are
rascals. In a good many cases, they're not
rascals. They are just in and have power, and
from the communist point of view, become the
rascals.
SEVAREID: Don't they already have perhaps too much on their
plate? They can't control Albania, or Yugoslavia,
or China--- all Communist systems and states.
May it not be that a pluralistic Communism around
the world would be anti-Moscow?
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34
DULLES: That's quite true, but difficulties at home have
rarely stopped countries in foreign adventure,
sometimes has pushed them on. I believe that
the splits, the fissures, the differences between
various communist countries, is today one
of the greatest pre-occupations that Khrushchev
has. After all, he said what he calls the
Socialist world, if the world becomes all
Socialist, they'll all live -- lie down in peace,
and live together. Well, that isn't what's
happened, and when you see little Albania,
practically throwing out the Russian
representation there, both civil and military,
that is really something. Why they went, hard
to tell, obviously, at that time they felt that
they would have to use force to stay, and they
didn't want another Hungary on their hands at
that moment. Hungary - in a country which was
not contiguous to their own. But anyway, they
got out. The Chinese thing is, obviously, very
serious. And it was they, I believe, although
the experts differ on this, I rather believe
it was they that did the acts that resulted in the
withdrawal of the Russian technicians. Now, I
don't look forward to revolution in the -- in
the communist world.
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A new generation is coming on in Russia, and I
have a feeling that some of the younger generation
of Russians, as they learn more about what goes on
in the rest of the world,are going to bring
great pressure to got more freedom. They'll want
to hear your radio and see your television.
They'll want to learn what goes on in the rest
of the world. They'll begin to see the---the
basic falsity of the whole history of Russia.
They're having a terrible time now in getting
out their histories. What do you say about Stalin?
Twenty-five years of rule. Twenty-five years the
great hero. Stalingrad. Stalin in the tomb. In 1956,
came out the great speech of Khrushchev's---
denegrating Stalin, but they never dared let that
speech circulate in Russia. They leaked little
parts of it and they had to go back to the
attack now--- that was at the Twentieth Party
Congress---but the Twenty-second Pax ty Congress,
they had to go back to the attack, because they
hadn't gotten over to the people.
SEVAREID: Wasn't it your agency that got a hold of that
speech originally?
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DULLES- I'm willing to accept that charge. Khrushchev
charged me with it at one time. You'll find it
in---in one of his statements back two or
three years ago.
SEVAREID: Well, you have to rank that rather high among
the accomplishments.
DULLES- I think it was one of the really important---
accomplishments.
SEVA.REID: Mr. Dulles, I know the problem of Communism inside
the United States is not---has not been under your
jurisdiction, but the F.B.I., but what are your
feelings about it? Is it a serious matter?
DULLES-. Well, I think that due to the vigilance of the
F.B.I. and what J. Edgar Hoover has done, it's
probably much less of an internal menace here with
us than it is with many other countries. I think
that the frustration of the American citizen and
of the citizens of other countries who are told,
"Here's this great menace. You must do something
to meet this menace." And yet the ordinary man,
the man in the street, the man and woman, he
doesn't know how he can contribute. He agrees as
to the judgment that there is a menace, that
our society is menaced by commuism, but what's he
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to do, and that has resulted in certain
aberrations that I don't need to define, because
you and those who are listening and hearing
and seeing will probably know what I have in
mind, to these aberrations and I think a great many
innocent people without realizing the harm they
are doing; they get led astray by this. Well, now,
there's certain things one can do. In the
first place, we ought to learn what we can about
it. We can do it by understanding that our great
strength is showing that our system, our free
system is more efficient and more effective than
the communist system, and we all, on these issues,
we all rally together in support of the actions
our government has taken strongly to defend our
positions where they may be threatened by communism
and the positions of the free world, whether it's
Berlin, or Laos, or Vietnam, or wherever it may
be.
SEVAREID: Mr. Dulles, would this be a fair summation of
your recipe for the average American? Be informed.
Believe in your country, and as the late Elmer
Davis put it, "Don't let them scare you."
DULLES: I'd like to leave it at that.
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Briefing of Presidential Candidates ...... ........P0Pe 24-25
C.I.A. And Congress................. ...... ??????P?P. 18-19
C.I.A.: Failures And Successes........?.?????????P? 1
C.I.A. Influence in Foreign Revolutions..........P?P? 26-28
Congo . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . P . P . 30 -31
Cuban Affair. P.19P P-17-18.,
P.P. M-24
C onnruni sm..
American Obsession with. .......................P.30
Domination of the world ................?.??????P? 32_31
Overload Theory. ?.......???.?.?.?????.?????.?.?P?p* 1-9
Passive Resistence to .. Inside the United p?p. ?6-37
35-36
B e-Stalinizations ...............................
Dulles - John Foster ...........??????????????.??.P.P. 25-26
Ehrenburg, Ilya ................ P. 4.
Kennedy, President John F ........................ P. 1
Khrushchcv, Premier Nikita .......................P. 3- P.P. 11-13
National Security Medal .......... .............e.?F. 2
Nixon, Richard.... ...............................P. 24
O.S.S. And world War II: P.P. 5-8; P. 11
Ad o 1 f . .. ? . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hitler,
10
Japanese Surrender .............................P.P. 9-
Jung, Dr. Karl .................................???P. 1
Radio And Intelligence .................?????P?
Setting up O.S.S. in Switzerland ...............P?P.4-5
Pavlov Theory.... ................................P.P.
11-13
Powers, Francis Gary .............................P.P.
15-16
U-2 Flights...... ................................P,P,
Vietnan'A ............ ............... ............... P, 31
13-16,P.P.18-19
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