ALLEN DULLES WARNS 'NEW LOOK' DOESN'T CHANGE RUSS OBJECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100130052-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: September 10, 1956
• Content Type: NSPR

MINNEAPOLIS TRIBUNE SEP 1 (1 1956 FOIAb3b
Circ.: mAp,663or Release 2000/08/24: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100130052-9
S. 621,792
Front Edit
Page Page
Other
Page JW
Allen Dulles Warns New Loo
k"
Doesn't$hange Russ Objectives
1 DITOIi. S NOTE: Allen 31'. Dulles, di-
rector of the re
submitted an di ys. s o curren o u-
nist tactics to the house committee on un-
American activities. Dulles and 120 other
government officials, military leaders, edu-
cators; journalists, labor officials and po-
litical scientists are contributing statments
for a symposium on the techniques of So-
viet cold warfare. Following is a condensed
I have always been im
)ressed at our seeming re-1
uctance to give credence to
fficial statements which are
tide by political leaders in
ther countries when we dis-
warning of intent,_ it iiay be
useful to review bbl some
past examples of Communist
attempts to subvert free gov-
ernments.
Past Communist take-overs:
of free countries have general-
ly featured most if not all of
gree fervently with what these four elements:
hey say or when their state-
nents seem at the time to be From Khrushchev we had The use of force from out-
ombastie or unrealistic. an eight-hour speech and side, or the overhanging threat
For example, Hitler's "Mein roughly 56,000 words, from of force.
Bul anin four hours and 27 - The obtainin b the Corn-
"
written in 1924, had
ampf,
wide circulation in Germany
nd left a deep impression on
he German people. Over here
t received comparatively lit-
tle attention until after the
outbreak of World War II. Yet
in this book was the blueprint
of the Hitlerian policy of the
superiority of the Herrenvolk,
of the manifest destiny of the
German Reich, of the anti-
semitic campaigns and of the
whole trend of Hitlerism.
SIMILARLY, I am afraid we I rewrite a proper Soviet hi - nest elements were Mriven out
Americans do not pay as ! tory, the speechs of the Party of positions of influence.
much to what attention as Communist we leaders, oshould cngress can serve as a texts The best example of t h i s
book. process is, of course, that of
tell us about the techniques Czechoslovakia. Additional
they intend to adopt to under- WHILE WE read in thesie I variants are found in the cases
mine the structure of free ',speec estbat war is no longer of Hungary and Poland, Ro-
government based on the rule inevitable, and that some kind' mania and Bulgaria.
of law. b f co-existence is possible, it
LL OF
h
ese cases, ex-
t
A is clear Soviet objectives re; 11,4 A
from gthe pronouncements learned of main basically unchange cept for Czechoslovakia, t Sh oviet!
the 20th Party congress, held but, they say, can be achieve r actual presence
in Moscow in February 1956. by new methods. forces on the spot played a de
'['his was an extraordinary af- The Communists propose to cisive role. In Czechos'ovakia
fair. Over a period of 12 days infiltrate our free legislative some of the same effect was
Soviet leaders poured out a systems, to take over our par-.[ obtained by the presence, just
cascade of verbiage - theliamentaxy governments and' across the border, of strong
length of the speeches corre-to use the, freedom which our ?Soviet forces- kArid by the fact;
spective positions in the pres- destroy all vestiges of that pie Prague an many other
i'rit Soviet hierarchy. system. important Czech centers and
g $ y
000 words, from Mikoyan two k munists through popular vote
hours and 14,000 words, and of at least an effective minor
so on. The total amounted to ity position.
some five to six million words' The willingness of o t h e r
which the patient party faith- parties, most often the parties
ful had to endure. to the left, but in some cases
The recent de-Stalinizationeven parties of the extreme`
program has rendered obsq- right, to join in political alli-
lete practically all of the his- antes and to admit Commu-
tory books and many standard nists to key position in t h e
textbooks used throughout the government
.
Soviet Union. Something has Communist manipulation of
these books anti'
to re
lac
p
e
until the new historians chi' key ministries"so non-Commu-
 Approved For Release 2000/08/24: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100130052-9
CPYRGHT
Approved For Rel
During all this period, Sta-
lin had cultivated genes and
lulled him into a feeling of
security as to Moscow's in-
_tentions. Meanwhile, the Com-
munists were building up
their control of the Czech
military forces, the trade'
unions and the internal secur-
ity policy. Finally, one of
Mogtow's'-principal "expedit-I
eta, Valeri4n Zorin., now So-'
viet anibassador to Bonn, wa
serif to Prague, and the mi4
nosy Communist ` p a r t y
seized ? power in February
1948 without firing a shot. I
had been able, by their ter-
rorist and infiltration methods,
to gain a positiom..Of strength
which far exceeded`the numer-1
ical representation in the pop-'
ulation at large. In fact, they'
prepared the way for the coup
before they evacuated .their':
troops in 1945.
Beginning in 1945, Moscow,
"xercised heavy pressure on
she free Czech government
headed by President Benes.
hoping to be able to work!
with the Kremlin and anxious
to insure quick withdrawal of .
Russian troops, Benes went to
Mosco' in March of that year.
He sought agreement on the;
forming of a coalition govern-
ment acceptable to the Soviets
which would include some of
the pro-Communist emigres
who had, been collected in
Moscow during the war `'and
who flooded back to their!
home country to play r 01 e s
preassigned to them ' by "thej
Kremlin.
When the parliamentary,
government of Benes was ac-;
tually reconstituted, anti-
Communist forces were bad-
ly divided among four or
more parties. The Communist
party, as usual, presented a
monolithic front.
UNDER THESE conditions.'
elections of 1946 gave the;
Communists 38 per cent of
the votes. Thus they became
the largest single party, their;(
leader Gottwald was named!(
prime minister and the Corn-1.
munists were able to take I,
over certain key ministries, !
-finterior, informa- ?