ADDRESS OF ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100120048-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: May 9, 1956
• Content Type: OPEN

CONGIISSIONAL RECORD MAY 9 1956
Approved ForC5VaffgSMAA/P {~ OI s-R SV
about giveaways by the Eisenhower ad-
ministration and former Secretary of the
Interior Douglas McKay.
I.now see in the column The Political
Mill, by Gould Lincoln, which appeared
in the Washington Evening Star, that
Mr. Rex Ellis, a well-known farmer and
legislator who served 16 years in the
Oregon Senate, has offered $1,000 if
these gentlemen can substantiate their
giveaway charges. It will be interesting
to see how soon any of them collect the
$1,000.
Under leave to extend my remarks, I
wish to insert in the RECORD a portion of
Mr. Gould Lincoln's The Political Mill
column, as follows:
Former Secretary of the Interior Douglas
McKay gave up his Cabinet post not long
ago to run for the Republican senatorial
nomination in Oregon. If he wins the pri-
mary election May 18, he will be Senator
MORSE's opponent. The Oregon Senator has
attacked President Eisenhower and Mr. Mc-
Kay frequently, accusing them of giving
away natural resources of the country to
private interests.
A Pendleton, Oreg., rancher, Rex Ellis,
has deposited a certified check of $1,000 with
E. C. Sammons, president of the United
States National Bank in Portland, to be given
to anyone "who can prove by due process of
any transaction or ruling made by the Resi-
dent or by the Secretary," giving a any
Mr.. Ellis said he was making the offer in
the interest of fair play-and that he did
not consider the charges made against Gen-
eral Eisenhower and Mr. McKay fair play.
He wants Senator MORSE or any one else
making these charges to prove them "or
admit they have been making false and ma-
licious statements."
The Federal Civil Defense Administration
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. JOHN W. McCORMACK
OF MASSACHUSETTS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Wednesday, May 9, 1956
Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker,
last October, I attended in Boston the
national conference of the United States
Civil Defense Council, which is composed
of city and county civil defense officials.
At that time, I became impressed with
the difficult job faced by some 400 State
and local civil defense directors at the
conference and by the overall respon-
sibility of the Federal Civil Defense Ad-
ministration.
in order to help civirdefense, and par-
ticularly its education and training pro-
gram, which is of interest to all Amer-
icans, I introduced H. R. 10432, which
will help develop national civil defense
training schools. The following facts
are of interest by way of background:
The Federal Civil Defense Administra-
tion expects to offer a graduate course
during the coming months for civil de-
fense command and staff personnel.
Approved For Rel
fense emergency, natural or manmade.
The course will be about 3 months in
length.
Experience with the 1-week cours
which have been conducted since 1991,
have shown that many civil defense
officials at the State and local levels who
should attend such courses are not able
to do so because of their budgetary limi-
tations. Passage of this bill will enable
more State and local officials to attend,
thus assuring a greater uniformity in
organization and training in civil defense
throughout the Nation. If this bill is
not enacted, most civil defense officials
who so badly need this training will be
unable to attend andL the civil defense,
effort will be seriously handicapped.
The bill recommends payment of
travel expenses and per diem allowances
in accordance with Government travel
regulations. Enactment of the bill would
result in no additional increase in the
Federal Civil Defense Administration's
budget as the cost of the program would
be absorbed in FCDA's 1957 appropria-
dress of Allen W. Dulles, Director of
Central Intelligence
EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF
HON. PATRICK J. HILLINGS
OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Monday, May 7, 1956
Mr. HILLINGS. Mr. Speaker, I wish
to call the attention of the House to a
speech by Hon. Allen W. Dulles, Director
of Central Intelligence, before the Los
Angeles World Affairs Council on April
13, 1958. Mr. Dulles' excellent and ex-
pert analysis of the recent change in the
Communist Party line is worthy of care-
ful study.
The address follows;
PURGE OF STALINISM
(Address of Allen W. Dulles, Director of
Central Intelligence, before Los Angeles
World Affairs Council, April 13, 1956)
There is never a dull moment In my job as
Director of Central Intelligence. Events
which seem to defy analysis happen some-
where in the world every day. Few trends
seem to follow a predictable course.
These last few weeks there have been de-
velopments in the Soviet Union which have
puzzled all the experts who generally have
ready answers-sometimes more ready than
accurate-to explain Soviet conduct.
Just at a time when some are saying that
everything is going wrong with foreign policy
in the free world countries but that every-
thing in the Soviet Union is progressing ac-
cording to some great master design, the
Soviet collective leadership, as they call it,
comes forward to beat their collective breasts
and indulge in the most extreme self
criticism.
The men in the Kremlin now tell us that
all they said earlier about events in the
U. S. S. R. during the 20 years preceding
Stalin's death is quite wrong; that in fact
this was an era of infamy, crime, and shame.
They admit that their past adulation of
Stalin was based on fear not on fact. The
man they themselves used to call the "glori-
ous Stalin, genius of mankind" is now being
publicly accused of "grave errors" and pri-
vately described as a malicious monster.
58R00010012004 5
A3741
for 3 years after Stalin's death to tell it to
their people. - They do not make a very
satisfactory showing as to why they them-
selves sat acquiescent in the seats of the
mighty during all the period of Stalin's
dictatorship, exercising great powers as mem-
bers of his inner circle.
Possibly, as Khrushchev is reported to have
admitted, the price of nonconformity was a
bullet in the head. This is a very human
excuse but a poor qualification for high office
on the part of those who now assert the
rights and prerogatives of leadership. In the
free world, where we-aspire to build on the
great traditions of the past, not to repudiate
them, we revere as our heroes and leaders
those who refused to conform, whatever the
risks, when the principles of liberty were at
stake.
In the U. S. S. R., evidently, acquiescing
in crime as the price of simple survival un-
der a political tyrant is sanctioned as legiti-
mate conduct. As they put It: "The point
was not to save one's own life; the point was
to save the revolution."
Before going further into the details of this
strange development in the Soviet Union it
may be worth while to review briefly what
had been taking place there during the years
of Stalin's power. Here we may find clues as
to why the men in the Kremlin now take the
serious risks of repudiating their late hero
for having put the individual above party
and substituting a personal dictatorship fora
collective one,
Stalin himself ran through a series of
revolutionary combinations, somewhat akin
to collective leaderships, during the 1920's.
For example, in 1924-25 he combined with
Zinovlev and Kamenev against Trotsky.
From 1925-27, a new alliance between Stalin,
Bukharin and Rykov was formed and routed
a Trotsky-Zinoviev-Kamenev combination.
And finally, from 1927-29, Stalin worked
with Molotov, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and
others to crush Stalin's recent allies, Buk-
harin and Rykov.
It was during the 10 years which preceded
Russia's entry into World War II that Stalin
completed the consolidation of his control
over the Communist party machinery. By
that time he had placed his loyal stooges in
all important positions of authority through-
out the Soviet Union and the Army was
brought under political control.
Among the major charges said to have
been leveled against Stalin by Khrushchev
is the charge that in the late thirties he
deliberately liquidated Marshal Tukha-
chevsky and thousands of the best officers
in the Soviet Army, presumably to insure
his political control of the military appara-
tus. Certainly today there is good reason
to believe that Marshal Tukhachevsky was
falsely accused of conniving with the Ger-
mans. There is some evidence that there
was a clever German plot to discredit
Tukhachevsky, which happened to fit in
with Stalin's own plans.
We do know that during and after the
war there was burning resentment among
the Soviet's professional soldiers at Stalin's
interference in the conduct of the war, his
unjust and capricious belittling of heroes
such as Zhukov and his arrogant claims to
personal credit for Soviet victories. A senior
Soviet general, for example, is recently re-
ported as having privately branded their
so-called documentary film, 'The Fall of
Berlin," which shows Stalin as the great
military master mind, as a "tissue of lies."
Today the collective dictatorship 1s as-
siduously repairing the injured dignity of
the military and incorporating its leader-
ship into Communist Party membership.
They must realize that, following the usual
pattern of revolutions, the military leaders
might tire of being the pawn of dictators,
whether individual or collective.
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A3742 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - APPENDIX May 9
But whatever the faults of Stalin in the was these successes which led the Soviet That calculated risk must have been taken
prewar decade, one can harly ascribe them to Union to conclude that a peace treaty with deliberately by men who knew they had to
his old age or senility. Stalin was then in Austria was necessary to build up their badly have a scapegoat, if they were to hope to
his prime. Furthermore one can hardly shattered reputation as peace mongers and preserve the dictatorship on which their own'
believe that the acts of the dictator in a to prepare the way for a summit conference, power and very survival rested. By attacking
war from which emerged as a hero are their efforgtetofline then Soc Socialist s excesses of his rule, theythope ato be abler to
the motivating causes for the present at-
tempt to liquidate liquidate his memory. In fact, into new popular fronts. preserve many of the essentials of the Stalin-
the most recent Soviet pronouncements are But the foreign scene, alone, by no means ist system, now labelling it Leninism, the
tending to refer to "good" and "bad" Stalin explains the urge the present Kremlin lead- monopoly of all power by a single party, the
eras. Naturally, there is no desire to re- ers felt to break with the hard Stalinist past, complete subordination of the courts and
pudiate such measures as farm collectiviza- They were already making progress in allow- individual rights to arbitrary party decree,
tion and the rapid industrialization under ing the memory of Stalin to fade in interna- the governmental control of the press and of
the Five Year Plans, which are so closely tional recognition and 'prestige without going all organs of public information.
associated with his name. The beginning to the extreme of total destruction of the This basic structure is meant to be pre-
of the 'bad" period was in 1934 when the Stalin myth with their own people. Thus served intact. Already the regime has pub-
great Stalin purges began. If they denounce the clue to their present policy lies more in licly warned that some rotten elements have
his war record, the purpose here must be to the internal Soviet situation than in the taken the de-Stalinization campaign too
eliminate him from the hero class and to requirements of their foreign policy. literally and are "trying to question the cor-
give the military some of the credit he had Domestically they have been caught in a rectness of the party's policy." This, Pravda
arrogated to himself. dilemma. In order to compete with the thundered, is "petty bourgeois licentious-
But to find the real reasons for the de- western world in the fields of science and ness" of a kind the "party has never tolerated
Stalinization campaign, we must, I believe, Industry which was vitally important for and will never tolerate." A dead and da-
look to the more recent past, particularly their economic growth and their rearmament honored Stalin, therefore, is likely to be
to the hard autocratic period during the last program, it was essential for the Soviet to merely a device-here possibly a Trojan
6 or 7 years of Stalin's life. Here we find speed up the education of their people, espe- corpse rather than a Trojan horse-with
two major motivations for cutting away cially in the scientific and technical field. which the long-sufferiftg Russian people are,
from Stalin worship. After Stalin's death the regime encouraged . I fear, to be deceived in their expectation of
Internationally, from about 1947 onward more objectivity in scientific inquiry, and put a freer and better life.
to the time of his death, Stalin's often belli- on the shelf some pseudo scientists such as Obviously the Soviet rulers concluded that
cose policy in the international field had Lysenko. After all they had found, out early it would take something more than a mere
been a failure and had tended to unite the in the game that in the present nuclear age repetition of the old cliches to have any
free world against international commu- one could not fool around'with scientists who effect. Apparently the necessity was deemed
nism. Domestically during this period his tailored their art to the whims of Marxism. to be urgent and impelling. They had tried
Police state was meeting ever-increasing dis- Obviously, the Soviet leaders could not to do the trick with the liquidation of Beria,
favor, not only with the helpless people, limit their educational processes to the scien- but the secrecy surrounding his execution
but with the top politicians, generals, and tific fields and more and more young men was hardly a persuasive bit of evidence of a
industrial managers who were essential to and women are graduating from schools, new dawn of liberty. It was in the worst
the working of the Soviet system. This be- which correspond to our high schools and tradition of the Stalin era, and he, after all,
gan to create problems for the regime. colleges, and are taking advanced degrees generally gave his victims at least a drum-
First, let us look at the international pic- comparable to our degrees of master of arts head public trial.
ture. In the immediate postwar era, riding and doctor of philosophy. Even with all the , When the present Soviet leaders took the
the crest of the common victory and main- indoctrination to Communist teachings risks involved in their present policy, they
taining military strength and power, Soviet which they give to their young students it must have carefully weighed the conse-
had notable successes. It consolidated is impossible to prevent education from de- quences. They must have realized the grave
olic
p
y
the grip on the European satellites and veloping the critical faculties which every issues it would raise in the Communist world
helped the Chinese Communists to victory. thinking human being possesses. outside of the U. S. S, R., among the party
But beginning with about 1947 in Europe, Furthermore, as part of their new cam- faithful in every free country, and among
somewhat later in Asia, the free world at last paign of sweetness and light, they have found their own peoples.
began to realize the implications of the for- it wise to take down some of the bars which Abroad they probably hoped there would be
ward drive of international communism and have impeded travel between the Soviet some counterbalancing advantages. If it
started to take countermeasures, and the Union and the free countries; and while the would bring about a feeling of relaxation in
tide began to turn. Iron Curtain still remains and there is a the free world, defensive rearmament here
What happened in these years? The Mar- careful selective process as to those who are and among our allies might slow down, de-
shall plan, which Stalin and Molotov indig- permitted to leave the Soviet Union or to fensive alliances might tend to weaken, the
nantly rejected and tried to defeat, was put visit it, it is obvious that today there is far possibility of peaceful coexistence, for which
into effect and Europe was saved from eco- more contact between the people of the everyone yearns, might be more and more
nomic chaos. In Greece, the Soviet effort to U. S. S. R. and outside countries than at accepted. All this they hoped would give
take over by guerrilla tactics was thwarted. any time in recent years. them time to build up their own strength,
When the Soviet attempted to take over All this has tended to build up pressures economic, and military. If we are naive, then
Berlin and destroy this outpost of Western upon the Soviet ;rulers to create an impres- the Soviet Union may get some international
freedom, the Berlin blockade was frustrated sion not only internationally but also do- benefits from their present tactics.
by the airlift and West Berlin remains a mestically, that a dictatorship of the Stalin But there is another side to the picture
showwindow of what the free world can type was dead forever. which bears pondering. The Soviet leaders
do. Tito survived his ejection from the The Soviet leaders are trying to meet their may have had no real alternative and took
Cominform and the wrath of Stalin and external and internal dilemmas by finding a the course which they felt held out the best
struck back with telling criticisms of Sta- convenient "devil" which they can use to chance of keeping their own power. The
linist policy-almost identical with what explain away past Soviet sins to the world Kremlin leaders, as I mentioned, were under
Soviet leaders are now themselves saying. abroad and to their own people as well as heavy domestic pressures to do something to
Later the North Atlantic Alliance was to demonstrate that the present rulers of the persuade their people that a new era was in
organized and despite Soviet threats the way Soviet are different mentally and morally the making. During recent years the leav-
was opened for Germant rearmament in close than they were under Stalin. Thus they ening process of education has developed the
union with the West. hope that their own people will accept their critical faculties of millions of Russians. The
Thus frustrated in the European field Sta- protestations that the days of government Kremlin can no longer sell the old line to all
lin turned to the Far East and, working with by arbitrary policymaking, secret trials, de- of their people. They must now rewrite not
the North Korean and Chinese Communists, portations, and prison camps are over. Fur- only the history of Stalin but rewrite the
attempted to take over Korea as the first thermore, they are again promising that they story they have been telling their people
step toward driving America from the west- will do something to raise the standard of about the outside world.
ern Pacific.,. Again the Communists were living so that the promise of individual These leaders-Khrushchev, Bulganin,
blocked and, most important of all, an freedom will be seasoned with a greater share Mikoyan, Kaganovich-have got over the
alarmed and awakened American public of consumers goods and a more abundant hump of Stalin's death without losing their
opinion proceeded to the defensive rearma- life. grip on his power. They profess a great deal
rent of this country. Our nuclear power The extent of the opposition to the Stalin- of confidence in their ability to perpetuate
was vastly, increased. 1st type regime must have been gaged by the system of collective dictatorship they
It is understandable that Stalin's succes- the Kremlin as far stronger and deeper have instituted by basing it more broadly
sors should have found it convenient to among the Russian people than we had dared on the top layer of elite party managers,
place upon him the blame for Greece, Berlin, to hope. Nonetheless, the destruction of generals, engineers, and intellectuals who
Korea, Yugoslavia, German rearmament and the Stalin myth carries with it a very real have a stake in the Soviet regime.
"".the like, and in particular, for the generally threat 'to the internal discipline and unity Only time can tell whether the present
'hard Soviet line which has led to the buildup of the Soviet Communist Party and the in- leaders with their past close association with
of. American. defense forces and NATO. It ternational Communist movement. Stalinism really can do this and make the
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