WE TELL RUSSIA TOO MUCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100090034-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 1998
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: March 19, 1954
• Content Type: NSPR

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with ALLEN W. DULLESps
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
C,yaG?,"WE TELL RUSSIA TOO MUCH"
EDITOR'S NOTE: How does Russia go about get-
ting most of its U. S. secrets? Is laxity by Ameri-
cans responsible for "leaking" critical information?
Conversely, how good is U. S. intelligence about
Russia? Is reliable information being gotten
through the Iron Curtain? If so, how?
To get the real story of just how each side col-
lects its information about the other, on which
vital decisions often are based, U. S. News &
World Report invited to its conference room the
country's top intelligence expert-Allen W. Dulles,
head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The
interview with Mr. Dulles follows.
ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of the U. S. Central
Intelligence Agency, has been ferreting out in-
formation on this country's enemies and their
plans since World War I, when he handled U. S.
intelligence work in Switzerland. In World War
II, he returned to Switzerland for the Office
of Strategic Services and directed a network of
agents within Germany. There, he also was re-
sponsible for negotiating the surrender of German
troops in Italy. Mr. Dulles, a lawyer in private
life, is the brother of John Foster Dulles, U. S.
Secretary of State. He has headed the CIA since
February, 1953.
Q Do the Soviets have an advantage over us in col-
lecting intelligence, Mr. Dulles?
A Many advantages. In the first place, they have
far greater facilities for operating in the United States
than we have behind the Iron Curtain. Also we Amer-
icans publish a great deal in our scientific and tech-
nical journals and in congressional hearings. And, of
course, in our free system of government, what we do
in the field of legislation for national defense is open
to the public. I would give a good deal if I could know
as much about the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union
can learn about us by merely reading the press.
Sometimes I think we go too far in what our Gov-
ernment gives out officially and in what is published
in the scientific and technical field. We tell Russia too
much. Under our system it is hard to control it.
Q Are members of the press in any way utilized as
intelligence agents, do you think, by any of the gov-
ernments of the world?
A We keep out of that. Frankly, the press is a great
source of information for all agencies of the Govern-
ment. We don't enroll on our staff any newspaper
people that are still active in the business. If you start
that you run the danger of throwing a shadow over
all the legitimate press. -
Q The Soviet Government uses them, of course-
A Well, in the Soviet case everybody is a servant of
the Government. A Tass representative works for the
Government almost as much as an ambassador. As
you know, it's a bit different in the United States in
this respect.
Q Would you develop your statement that the legit-
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62
imate press is one of the best sources of information?
Do you mean by what is printed or by word of mouth?
A What is printed mainly but also by radio.
Q Are there many agents running around the world
in the various countries today or just a handful?
A Undoubtedly the intelligence services of many
countries have widespread agent networks. Certainly
the Soviet intelligence leads the field in this respect.
They recruit and run agents in all important coun
tries of the world, and through their "front organiza-
tions" they control a great many more.
Q How would you evaluate what we are learning
about what's going on behind the Iron Curtain? Do
you feel reasonably assured that we are well informed
about what is happening behind the Iron Curtain?
A One has to distinguish between various fields.
We know a good deal more in certain fields than we
do in others. Naturally, for security reasons, I am not
going to disclose just what they are. It's the toughest
job intelligence has ever faced-getting good infor-
mation from behind the Iron Curtain. It is, of course,
very important for our Government that we all suc-
ceed in that. We are not satisfied with the coverage at
the present time, and are trying constantly to im-
prove it.
Q What was your background in intelligence work
before you came into the Government for this par-
ticular job?
A In World War I, I was in the Foreign Service. I
was in Vienna in 1916 and into 1917. When the Unit-
ed States declared a state of war with Germany, we
were given our passports in Vienna as the Germans
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 19, 1954
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Soviet Has World's Biggest Intelligence Net ... Propaganda
Of U. S. Effective in Satellites . Averting "Pearl Harbors"
forced the Austrians to break with us at the time we
entered. the war in April, 1917. Then I went to Bern,
Switzerland, and worked in our legation there. I was
not an intelligence officer-I was a Foreign Service of-
ficer-but my job there was really a political-intelli-
gence job. So, I've been interested in intelligence
since World War I.
Q You were in the Office of Strategic Services,
weren't you?
A Yes, in World War II, I was in the Office of
Strategic Services. Working with Bill Donovan [Wil-
liam J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, Director of OSS], I or-
ganized the OSS office in New York, and then went
again to Switzerland. That was a good place to follow
what was going on in Germany, Austria and the occu-
pied countries of Europe.
Q Were you in contact with agents who worked be-
hind the enemy lines?
A A great many.
0 Therefore you became familiar with these tech-
niques in those days-
A Correct.
Q Did you learn quite a lot in that period?
A There couldn't have been a better school for in-
telligence. At that time, during World War II, I was
in direct contact with one of the right-hand men of
Admiral Canaris, who was the head of the Military
Counterintelligence Service for the Wehrmacht [Ger-
man, Army]. He, like quite a number of Canaris's
men, was anti-Hitler and joined the plot against him.
The fact that there were these anti-Nazis greatly
facilitated our intelligence work.
For example, there were several men in the Ger-
man Foreign Office who worked against Hitler and
Ribbentrop [Nazi Foreign Minister], and I was in
touch with them. Then toward the end of the war a
German S. S. General in North Italy named Karl
Wolff got in touch with me with regard to the sur-
render of the German armies there, and for several
months we had hectic negotiations which finally ended
in the German capitulation in Italy.
All in all, this World War II experience was intel-
ligence by the "case" method and, as a lawyer, I find
this the most practical %tay. of getting an education.
Q Would you say we are as successful in penetrat-
ing the satellite countries as we were in penetrating
Germany during the last war?
A Germany was a pipe dream compared with what
we have to meet now.
0 The satellites as well as Soviet Russia?
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 19, 1954
A Yes. The intelligence service in Germany during
the war, you see, was split. There was great rivalry be-
tween Canaris and Himmier [Nazi Minister of In-
terior]. Also there was in Germany an active, fairly
aggressive anti-Hitler underground. Of course, there
is a situation in the U.S.S.R. today which is somewhat
similar.
0 Was this among the military?
A It included both military and civilians. It was
the Goerdeler-Beck group [Dr. Karl Goerdeler and
Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck, involved in a plot against
Hitler's life in 1944], with ramifications down into
the trade unions. It was even penetrated by the Com-
munists-and partly betrayed by the Communists,
too, at the end.
STIRRING UP REVOLTS?-
0 Since you can't tell us what you do, could you
tell us some of the things that you don't do? For in-
stance, it is often reported in the papers that you send
in provocateurs to stir up revolutions in satellite coun-
tries. What truth is there in that?
A I only wish we had accomplished all that the So-
viets attribute to us. I'm not going to deny all the
compliments they give us in reporting on our activi-
ties. I think it's better for them to be left a little in
the dark as to how much they say is true and how
much is false. -
0 Is that part of your function-to stir up revo-
lutions in these countries?
A Let me answer in this way: The Soviet Union is
mounting a "cold war" on the free world, and is using
all the techniques that Communist inventiveness can
supply. They have built up a whole series of "front or-
ganizations"-associations of youth, lawyers, women,
and Cominform. They penetrate and control the ma-
jor labor unions in France, Italy, Indonesia, and many
other countries of the world-
0 And some of ours-
A In many countries of the world they have very
vigorous political parties spearheaded by a hard core
of Communists, and they use those political parties
for their own ends in order to try to bring about Com-
munist revolutions. That whole movement constitutes
a threat to the stability of the free world. It con-
stitutes a threat behind our North Atlantic Treaty
Organization lines. We would be foolish if we did not
co-operate with our friends abroad to help them to
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"Marxist line doesn't go over well in the Middle East"
do everything they can to expose and, counter this
Communist subversive movement.
Q Could you tell us in a general way whether the
intelligence you gather indicates that Communism is
growing any stronger or weaker n the satellite coun-
tries?
A Two or three years ago I was rather discouraged
about the situation in the satellite countries from our
point of view. I had a feeling that the period of dom-
ination was getting so long that the younger elements
wouldn't know anything about freedom. That, how-
ever, has not proven to be true. People who have
never known freedom as we know it still have an in-
herent love and desire for freedom and that is shown
by the defectors and political refugees who come over.
Q Is there real evidence of that?
A Oh, yes, and it is very encouraging. Take the
Polish fliers who flew those MIG's out. They were
young men. They had known nothing but slavery.
And there are many others from all walks of life.
Q But they realize the difference-
A Yes.
0 Do you have your own system of interviewing
people who escape from behind the Iron Curtain, or
do you depend upon the other Government agencies?
A It's a common enterprise.
Q It's a vast enterprise, isn't it?
A Very important and very large.
Q Aren't hundreds of thousands interviewed every
year?
A No, it wouldn't be as large as that. You have to
be selective. To do a good job of interviewing re-
quires great. skill, a good knowledge of languages,
and takes a long while. What you do is select those
who, because of their background and native intelli-
gence, are likely to be- persons of knowledge. You
have to do that because the field is so vast. Take the
situation when there were thousands and thousands
of East Germans fleeing into West Germany-you
couldn't possibly interview all of them.
AID FOR REFUGEES-
Q What is done to aid the refugees who escape to
the West to get freedom and a better life?
A If they are bona fide political refugees and they
come over to us, we grant them asylum and do not
turn them back. This is in keeping with our declared
policy. Most of them arrive in Germany, Austria,
Turkey, or in the Far East at Hong Kong, for ex-
ample. Here several agencies, both Government and
private, help in providing assistance to these refugees.
The refugees are, of course, initially housed and
fed and provided with clothes and other necessities.
In addition, there 'is a large effort directed at prepar-
ing these people for a new life in the Western world.
Q Do you think these defectors have an innate
sense of freedom which causes them to come over, or
do you think the propaganda we disseminate influ-
ences them?
A I think it's both. Some come out from ideological
motives. Our propaganda, particularly in the satel-
lites, has had a real effect.
Q Is Russian propaganda having much effect on
Europe today?
A I don't think it's having as much effect today as
formerly. It is having substantial effect in Southeast
Asia.
Q What about the Middle East?
A To some slight extent, but not too much. The
Marxist line doesn't go over well in the Middle East.
But when they play the nationalist theme, which they
do a great deal, of course, that's more effective.
Q How about parties, like the Tudeh, in Iran, which
are openly Communist parties, and yet the members
are all Moslems? It used to be said that the Commu-
nists could make no inroads on the Moslems because
the religion was contrary-
A The Communists make inroads in all the reli-
gions. It is quite true that the tenets of the Moslem
religion are not compatible with Marxism, but neither
are those of Christianity or Judaism.
POLICY ROLE FOR CIA-
Q Can you evaluate the use to which you put your
information in the matter of guidance, policy making,
and so on? Is this information being utilized every
day, for instance? Is it used in policy making?
A I think it is becoming more and more so. The
estimates that we make are used as the intelligence
basis of the policy papers. Each week at the meeting
of the National Security Council I have the opportu-
nity to brief the Council on any new developments
during the past week and to give the intelligence back-
ground for papers that may be on the agenda for dis-
cussion. In doing that, I co-ordinate with the other
intelligence services of the Government to see if they
have any intelligence that they would like to have me
give, and so I try to represent not just the CIA but the
intelligence community as a whole.
0 Do you present a positive interpretation, or do
you present two views?
A I would present my views as Director of Central
Intelligence. If there is a dissent from that view, I
would indicate it.
Q Do you present many papers that way?
A Quite a number. I'm inclined to encourage split
papers rather than. a wishy-washy product that comes
when people who don't really agree try to find vague
expressions to bridge a disagreement. I think that's the
worst thing in intelligence. Let's have a clear-cut state-
ment. If there is a clear-cut difference, then let the
policy makers consider that fact.
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'Much of our work 'is related to analysis of intelligence"
Q How would you divide your attention on the
globe? Isn't Latin America getting a lot of attention
right now?
A Well, the State Department gathers the bulk of
the information in the political and economic field.
0 But in intelligence you are the only one author-
ized-
A There's nothing esoteric about the word "intelli-
.
gence." A cable from the State Department regarding
political developments in a country is intelligence..
Normally they would do most of the reporting on the.
political side, and in many countries on the economic
side.
Q Do your estimates have any influence on the
changes in the military budget?
A We do not prepare estimates directed to budg-
etary matters. We just go along about our business
reporting the facts as we see them, and when a situ-
ation comes up that requires an estimate, we make
one.
0 Might it not be a guidance in deciding whether
it is safe or not to make certain cuts?
A Those who prepare the budget would have to an-
swer that. We have given our estimate of what we
think the capabilities and intentions of the various
powers are. Just how that enters into the budget dis-
cussions around the table. I wouldn't be told.
HE CIA OPERATES-
H
W . T
Q Do your operations today in' co-ordinating this
information differ from what was done under the
preceding Administration?
A Then it was the custom for the. Director of CIA
to brief the President alone, but he also attended the
meetings of the National Security Council in the same
capacity as I now do, as adviser.
Q Is the CIA connected with any other department
of the Government, or is it an independent agency of
its own?
A The CIA is under the National Security Council
and, hence, is under the President directly. It is an in-
dependent agency. My relations with the State De-
partment alre exactly the same as my relations with
the Department of Defense. Those are the two depart-
ments, naturally, with which I have the most business
to transact. I also work closely with the joint Chiefs
of Staff.
Q But you operate completely independent of
them-
A Yes, except that I often look to them for policy
guidance and support, and where we are operating in a
zone of U. S. military occupation or operations we have
special responsibilities to the theater commander.
Q What are you occupied with mostly in your work
-with analysis of information that is available to
everybody? .
A Many agencies collect intelligence. Then the proc-
essing of this intelligence is divided among the agen-
cies by National Security Council directives-for
example, the Army handles its intelligence; Navy,
naval, etc. This processed intelligence is then used
on a joint co-operative basis to prepare estimates-
which are analyses of the sum total of all intelli-
gence and a projection into the future of what may
develop.
A great deal of our work is related to the analysis of
intelligence. It is not so much analysis of information
that we get from the public as of information that we
get from all the intelligence sources of Government.
0 Including the military?
A Oh, yes, including the military. We also get in-
formation from the State Department. We get infor-
mation from our own sources. ,
Economic Information: 20% of Total
Q What proportion of that information would you
say could be. regarded as, economic information?
A I should say that 20 per cent would be economic,
possibly more.
0 And the rest of it would be political?
A Political, military, psychological-information
on the attitudes of other people-what are they think-
ing about in a certain country-and also technological
and scientific information.
Q It is your function to evaluate that information
for the benefit of our own Government?
A That's correct-but not to do it all by ourselves.
Q And your job is to disseminate information, too,
when you get finished evaluating it?
A That's right, but we have a check on our own
evaluation. Once a week I sit down with the heads of
the other intelligence agencies of the Government,
that is, the intelligence officer of the State Depart-
ment, the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force in-
telligence, an intelligence officer from the joint Chiefs
and the Atomic Energy Commission, and a represen-
tative of J. Edgar Hoover. We sit around, just about
like this, around a table-
0 To get information?
A No. It is largely to go over the finished product.
Q Your finished product?
A No, the finished product of a joint effort by all
the intelligence agencies. You can divide the informa-
tion that we disseminate into various categories. We
get some raw intelligence. We disseminate that, but
always with a good deal of caution. We haven't evalu-
ated it, but it might fit in with what some other de-
partment knew and, therefore, would be important.
If you waited to evaluate it, it might lose some of its
value.
Then we have intelligence which we process in our
own shop and disseminate. Finally we have intelligence
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"We don't talk much about some of our duties"
which goes through the mill of evaluation with the
other intelligence agencies. That we call "national esti-
mates." We have a high-level board in CIA which in-
cludes distinguished military men, economists,
professional and technical people. This is our
Board of National Estimates. It generally pre-
pares the first drafts of the "national estimates,"
and then we get contributions from the other in-
telligence agencies.
LESSON OF PEARL HARBOR-
0 Why is all of this necessary all of a sudden-or
have we been doing it for many, many years?
A You've heard the story of Pearl Harbor. It seems
to me that here was a typical instance where intelli-
gence was available to the Government, but where
there was not sufficient machinery set up to pull to-
gether the people best able to evaluate it-to get the
information to the proper intelligence officers.
Q Each one had his own interpretation then, is
that it?
A That was one of the troubles. But also the ma-
chinery wasn't sufficient to get the intelligence fast
enough to the appropriate people.
Q Some of us in the press knew that war with Japan
was coming. The Secretary of State gave out a great
deal of information. It is puzzling that Washington
newspapermen should know war was coming, but the
military services didn't know-
A Did you know where it was coming?
Q No. We expected it in Southeast Asia. Was this
machinery of yours available when the Chinese in 1950
decided to come down south of the Yalu?
A That was before I was with the CIA, so I can't
give you the exact date. The particular machinery I
refer to was organized by Gen. Bedell Smith, after he
became Director late in 1950. It was based, in part, on
a report made by a group, including myself, that the
National Security Council had called to Washington
about a year before. We were called down to make a
report on the working of the Central Intelligence
Agency, and we submitted a classified report to the
NSC. Later Bedell Smith came in and carried out the
general recommendations of that report.
Q So that your machinery was really set up after
the Yalu incident?
A It didn't really start functioning until after the
Yalu affair.
Q Well, are we organized now to prevent another
Pearl Harbor?
A We have an organization now to which the intel-
ligence that was neglected at the time of Pearl Harbor
would be submitted, and where it would be processed
quickly. It works on a 24-hour basis. Anything coming
in would go to our watch officer, and to comparable
officers in the Pentagon. If these officers felt that this
intelligence showed up a critical situation, we would
immediately call a meeting of the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee. This is the Committee I mentioned
before which includes the heads of the various intelli-
gence agencies.
At any time of the day or night this Committee
would sit down and go over any critical intelligence
and make an immediate report to the President and
the National Security Council. The machinery is
there to function, and unless there was a "human"
failure it would function.
Q You assume that you would have enough ad-
vance warning so that you could meet and evaluate?
A All we can do is provide the machinery to assure
that, if we do get information that gives us a warning,
we will act on it.
0 Have you ever made a post-mortem of the Pearl
Harbor situation in so far as it relates to messages
that were going back and forth between Honolulu
and Japan in the days preceding the attack, so that
you might have machinery now that would be aware
of that kind of transmission?
A We have machinery to which that kind of infor-
mation would be submitted. Error might creep in in
the handling of this information, but, in my opinion,
we have machinery to which information of that crit-
ical type would now be sent on an urgent basis.
DUTIES ASSIGNED TO CIA-
-0 There is a good deal of confusion as to the exact
duties of the Central Intelligency Agency and its re-
lation to the service intelligence agencies. Can you
set us straight on this point?
. A CIA's duties are spelled out in the National Se-
curity Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949. The 1947
law provided for the unification of the armed services
It also set up the CIA. Under the law we have thes
duties :
We advise the National Security Council on intelli-
gence matters that relate to our nation's security; w
help to co-ordinate intelligence activities throughou
the Government and evaluate intelligence reports
That includes intelligence received by everybody, no
merely what we collect ourselves.
In addition the CIA under this law of 1947 carrie
out certain intelligence services, which the law de
scribes as services of common concern, assigned to
by the National Security Council.
These are the type of activities which intelligen
services throughout the world traditionally carry ou
We don't talk much about some of these duties. Othe
are quite open. For example, we monitor daily mil
lions of words of open broadcasts and in this way pic
up the propaganda line which other countries a
putting out over the air.
Q How big an agency do you have?
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. . . "1 see that the President is kept informed"
A We don't publish our figures.
Q Has it ever been published how much appropria-
tions you have?
A No, but I have seen some speculation in the press
with figures which, were several times exaggerated.
Q What committees of Congress do you have to
deal with regularly?
A We deal with the armed services committees of
the Senate and the House, and we deal with both ap-
propriations committees. Also we make periodic re-
ports to the joint Committee on Atomic Energy.
0 Don't they show in the budget some lump sum
that you use?
A No.
Q Don't you have to appear before committees in
executive session and explain your operations?
A I appear before a subcommittee of the Appropri-
ations Committee and talk with them and give them a
picture of the nature of the work we are doing, tell
about our personnel, and where the money goes.
Q So that there is a check on the Agency-
A Oh, yes, and not only by Congress. We work
closely with the Bureau of the Budget and operate
within policies established by the National Security
Council. We consult on an almost daily basis with
other agencies of the Government, particularly the
State and Defense departments. Further, we make pe-
riodic reports on our activities to the National Security
Council, and I see that the President is kept informed
of all important developments. CIA is not a policy-
making agency: we furnish intelligence to assist in
the formulation of policy.
THREAT IN INVESTIGATION-
0 What can you tell us about the rumors that CIA
is to be investigated by committees of Congress?
A I have no way to judge about that, and, as I just
mentioned, we are already in close touch with the
armed services and appropriations committees. I
would like to say this about investigations. Any inves-
tigation, whether by a congressional committee or
any other body, which results in a disclosure of
our secret activities and operations or uncovers our
personnel would help a potential enemy just as if
the enemy were able to infiltrate their agents right
itito our shop.
If it were necessary to go into the details of opera-
tions before any committees anywhere-the security
of your operations would quickly be broken. You
couldn't run an intelligence agency on that basis.
No intelligence agency in the world is run on that
basis.
In intelligence you have to take certain things on
faith. You have to look to the man who is directing the
organization and the result he achieves. If you haven't
someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't get
U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 19. 1954
results, you'd better throw him out and get somebody
else.
Q I understand a bill has been introduced into
Congress to set up a joint Congressional Committee
on Intelligence which would do in the intelligence field
what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does in
the atomic field. Can you tell us anything about this?
A I have studied these bills. They have been put
in, I believe, by good friends of the Agency who are
interested in finding a way to reconcile the exercise
of congressional authority with the special need for
security in an operation like that of CIA.
However, I don't know whether it would add any-
thing very much to the present system of congressional
control exercised through the armed services and
appropriations committees. I naturally wish to re-
spect the prerogatives of Congress and recognize that
their confidence is essential if the Agency is to receive
appropriations necessary to carry on its work ef-
ficiently.
Certainly I shall co-operate with the .Congress in
every way compatible with the need for security. When
the 80th Congress set up the CIA they recognized this
problem and wrote into the law that as Director
I ,should be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods ? from unauthorized disclosure.
Any disclosure which leads to publicity and gets infor-
mation into the hands of potential enemies would to
my mind be "unauthorized."-
0 How do you get around the fact that the Ac-
counting Office must have a list of your employes and
vouchers of the money you have spent?
A That is not the case. That is not required of our
Agency. We couldn't operate with security if it were.
0 So that it wouldn't be possible for a foreign gov-
ernment to get a list of your employes and their sal-
aries-
A No, by golly. It would be highly dangerous if
they could.
RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS-
Q Do you have any trouble getting well-qualified
people for intelligence work?
A That's the greatest problem we have, because in-
telligence, more than anything else, depends upon the
quality of your personnel. We built the Agency with a
nucleus of those who had worked in intelligence dur-
ing the war, with OSS and other intelligence agencies.
We try to recruit on the basis of a careful study of the
background of a person, if he's a mature person. Or we
take our people after graduation from college or pro-
fessional schools, put them in professional training in.
our own shop, and then try them out. I have wide
powers of hiring and firing, because you have to have
that.
67
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 WNNRF*Nwm
qns"FROMMUM
... a have been using the lie detector for several years"
Q Is your pay scale high enough and your job
tenure secure enough so that when you get good peo-
ple who do a job well you can keep them?
A The hold on the people is their interest in the
work. That, more than the salary, holds them. I'm
holding some people in CIA at great sacrifice to them-
selves. The interest in the work makes them want to
stick with it.
Q How long does it take to clear your employes
for security?
A That depends on the nature of the case. If a man
or woman is just out of college, we ought to be able to
clear security in six weeks or so. If the candidate has
had quite a career, served in various parts of the
world, in various agencies of the Government, it takes
longer. It may then take anywhere from six or eight
weeks to three or four months.
0 Do you find security risks from time to time?
A Oh, certainly.
Weeding Out Security Risks
Q Didn't a great many security risks turn up in
the OSS?
A Proportionately it was not high. The OSS had
thousands of employes. Bill Donovan was told that he
had to organize an intelligence service practically
overnight. That was at a time when there was a tre-
mendous call on man power throughout the country.
Well, you couldn't pull-together thousands of people
under those conditions without getting some bad
apples. I think, however, that the percentage was
very low.
'Q It was a "natural place to infiltrate, certainly-
A Undoubtedly the enemy was trying to infiltrate.
Q Didn't you inherit some security risks from the
OSS?
A If we did, I believe they have been weeded out.
Everybody that carried over has been carefully inves-
tigated in recent years. Further, we keep constantly
checking on our people.
. 0 What about the report that there are Soviet
agents even, in the Central Intelligence Agency?
A I naturally assume that the Soviets will attempt
to penetrate the CIA and all the other intelligence
services of the United States. I have in CIA a security
service of which I have reason to be proud, and I
don't think that the Soviets are going to find it easy
to penetrate us; however, we have to keep on our
guard all the time.
Q I saw a story the other day about the use of the
lie detector by your security people in CIA with some
criticism of your Agency. Have you any comment on
that?
A We have been using the lie detector for several
years, and on the whole have found it helpful. We
don't force people to take the test, but almost every-
body chooses to do it.
Also you should remember that we never use lie-
detector results as conclusive. It merely gives clues to
be followed up in other ways, particularly the ordinary
methods of questioning. No one has any access to the
readings of the lie detector except our own security
office. Since we have been using the lie detector it has
saved us a good many headaches and has also helped
establish the innocence of some people who were false-
ly accused. Of course, you need to have experienced
operators to get the real benefit from the tests.
Q We understand that the FBI is not permitted to
operate overseas. Does that leave you the only oper-
ating, agency overseas?
A The State Department, of course, operates over-
seas.
Q I mean strictly in the field of security?
A We operate overseas in the field of intelligence
and counterintelligence rather than in security. This
security problem doesn't come up directly, except in
so far as we would co-operate with J. Edgar Hoover
in connection with any suspicious characters we might
learn about who were trying to get to the United
States. Also we make our facilities available to the
State Department to'help check visa applications.
Q Do we exchange intelligence information with
allied governments?
A We have cordial and co-operative relationships
with certain services in the free world.
0 Could they be improved?
A Well, you can always improve everything.
CIA: HERE TO STAY?-
Q Now that the CIA has had a trial run of about
seven years, how would you sum up its accomplish-
ments? Is it here to stay, is it doing a good job?
A I am probably a prejudiced witness. The real test
will be whether the CIA properly serves its customers
-those who formulate our policy in national-security
matters. Today's world is a very complicated one. Pol-
icy, whether in the field of diplomacy or defense, must
be based on the best estimate of the facts which can
be put together. That estimate in turn should be given
by some agency which has no axes to grind or backs to
scratch, and which itself is not wedded to any partic-
ular policy. That is our job in CIA. If we can carry
it out honestly and fearlessly we can fill a real need
in Government. And we can't do the job by living in
an ivory tower. We need the help of all the other
intelligence agencies in the Government.
Whether CIA is doing a good job I must leave to
others to answer. In intelligence work one should never
be satisfied and always seek to improve. Personally I
think we are improving. I am proud of the personnel
that we have got together and of their loyalty and
dedication to their work. I. consider CIA an efficient
Organization.
68 U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, March 19, 1954
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