PRE-WAR GERMANY-HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000500050019-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: R
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2001
• Sequence Number: 19
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1
RESTRICTED
PRE-VAR GERMANY - HIGI AY TRANSPORTATION
A. ZQLICIES
1. Information on transportation policy in general is contained in
A-i of the Pre-War German study on railway transportation.
Germany, like practically every other government of Continental
Europe, was intent on protecting the government-owned railroads
against the competition of the highway carriers. Licensing re-
quirements for existing long-distance freight carriers were very
stringent, and no licenses were issued to new carriers from August
1933 to the summer of 1938. More important, the law of June 26,
1935 kept automobile trucking rates aligned with-those of the rail-
roads,
The civilian passenger car, as long as the Volkswagen remained an
unkept promise, was important. There were numerous bus lines, run
by the Reichspost, the Reichsbahn, and private enterprise, but
about 90% of passenger traffic, both to-g distance and local, used
the railroad. In view of the relative unimportance of trucking
and passenger traffic, and of the civilian motor car, the famous
Autobahnen, and indeed Hitler's whole road-building program, can
be explained only as a rather grandious gesture. Probably the
larger purpose of the scheme was to provide employment, with con-
siderations of prestige and military strategy playing a secondary
part.
3. See A-3 of Railway Transportation for a general discussion of
strategic and military considerations.
4. The financial maintenance of the Reichsautobahnen was entirely
secured by subsidies from the Ministry of Finance in the form of
a certain share of taxes. While in theory these roads were entitled
to collect contributions from their users, no such contributions
were in fact ever levied. During 1937 allotments from tax and duty
receipts to the Autobahnen totaled 197,092,534 RM. Of this total,
104,600,000 RM came from the mineral oil duties, 61,700,000 RM from
the mineral oil tax, and 30,800,000 RM from the transportation tax.
Any temporary financing was obtained by short and medium-term bills,
drawn on the Reichs Autobahnen-Beschaffungs G.m.b.g., which was a
department of the Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit A.G. (the banking institu-
tion of the Reichsbahn.) These bills could be rediscounted by the Reichs-
bank with the indorsement of the Deutsche Verkehrs-Kredit Bank. The
total indebtedness of the Autobahnen on December 31, 1937 was stated
to be:
1.
Acceptance Credits
450 million RM
2.
National Railway Loan
400
3
National Une
l
e
t
.
mp
oym
n
Insurance
375
"
"
4.
Old Age Insurance Office
100
5.
Ministry of Finance
300
n
n
6.
National Association of
Insurance Companies
237.2
"
"
7. Others 33.6-
RESTRICTED
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1
RESTRICTED
PRE-WAR GERE::ANY HIGIhIAX TRATdSYORTATION (A-L CLJ_ 'D)
The foll.or:.ng table shows the expenditures of Reich, states and
municipalities for the hia,htway system:
Expenditures for Construction and Main-
tenance of German Roads (Millions of R&;)
Autobahnen
building
ense,
?aintenance
and re-
pairs
Other Roads
Construction
& Reconstruc-
do
Average
,,
1927-29
---=
427.0
5700
104200
11;c32
----
28765
150,8-
438?3
1633
1105
33117:
36001
70303
1934
2120
334.1
43100
99,7,4
1935
4769
344.9
4373
1259 ,1
1936
617,8
31703
471.5
1406.6
1937
663.5
315.0
525,,0
1503=5
1538
850.0
310.0
5400
1700.0
Neither passenger nor freight r ad traffic were subsidized by the
Reich, The transport tax for long-distance freight traffic was 7%,
and that for passenger travel was 12%.
5, See Railway Transportation, A-5,
B. CRG.,NiZI,TION
1? All the local political authorities charged with the administra-
tion and upkeep of, the highways were subject to the supervision
and control of the Inspector General -f German Roads, Important
highways, classified as national roads, were financed by the Nation,
and administered by the inspector General through the state and lo-
cal authorities, Roads of primarily regional significance were des-
ignated as first or second-class roads, according to the importance
of the area they served,
First-class state roads were financed and administered by the State
and provincial authorities; second-class roads by the counties and
districts, The Inspector General appointed the technical members
of the administrative boards for these roads. The layout and manner
of construction of the super-highways (,:utobahnen) was his personal
responsibility, although actual construction and management were
handled by the specially created Reichsautobahnen Company, original-
ly a subsidiary of the National Railroad.
The decree of October 6, 1531, as subsequently arr.ended, gave the
1inister of Transport the all-important power of fixing minimum
rates for freight traffic;, In 1935, all firms engaged in the trans-
port of goods fnr the account of a third parson in operations over
50 kilometers were required to become members of the Truck C perators
Association, or Reiehs-Kraftwagen-Betriel)sverband (RKB), The
main functions of this association were the organization snd regu-
lation of long-distance road freight transport, the distribution of
freight orders among members, the invoicing and collecting of bills
Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : -k TP%6 -00059A000500050019-1
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01 : CIA-RDP67-00059A000500050019-1
RESTRICTED
'RE-WAR GERMANY - HIGHWAY TRANSPORTATION jB-1 CCNTID)
r
on behalf of its members, and the compulsory insurance of all freight.
At the same time, the RKB was incorporated bodily into the structure
of the National Transport Group as the sole representative of private
trucking.
See also B of Railway Transportation study.
C. P NISTRA.,, T,_IIQI+
1. This question is not strictly applicable, since the governmental
policy was one of restricting rather than expanding transport
facilities and enterprises. For specific information, see the
relevant sections of this report.
Under a law of 1934, amended in 1937, the operators of road pas-
senger services were required to obtain licenses, and sanction for
alterations to licensed services, from the Ministry of Transport.
Passenger traffic was in the hands of three groups of operators,
namely, "private ent-rprise" (usually a municipal corporation), the
Reichapost, and the Reichsbahn. Private enterprise was regulated
by Under-Secretary K in the National Ministry, and represented in
the National Transport Group, The Reichsbank and-the Reichspost
were exempt from licensing, being required only to notify the local
authorities of their intentions 4 weeks before beginning a service.
2. The emergency decree of October 6, 1931 on "Inland Traffic with
Motorized Vehicles" compelled the common-carrier long-distance
truckers to adopt the Reichsbahn tariff rates in t In 1935-
36 the entire German trucking system was organized under strong state
pressure for the purpose of compelling the truckers to abide by
the prescribed rates. The public organization so founded, the
Reichs-Kraftwagen Bertriebsverband (usually abbreviated RKB) pro-
cured orders for individual firms through a new-work of cargo space
distribution agencies (Laderaumverteilur.gsstellen), took over the
"billing, collecting and paymsr.t of freight monies" (to avoid the
possibilities of price-cutting), and insured the freight carried.
To all intents and pur',oses, the truckers became employees of the
RKB. The freight rates established by the Reich Trucking Tariff of
March 30, 1936, were worked out by the RKB in agreement with the
Reichsbahn, with the Minister of Transport as arbiter. The basic
principle was that railroad and trucking rates for the 4 most ex-
pensive classes of commodities (keichsbahn classification A to D)
were to be the same. That commodities in the cheapest classifica-
tions (Reichsbahn classifications E to G) were to be forwarded by
the highway carriers only at class D rates was relatively unim-
portant. The unfavorable position of high value goods in less than
wagon loads on the railroad, as for example, paper, beer, chemicals,
is obvious. The tariff nullified the technical advantages of the
truck over the railroad. In addition, the embargo on licenses was
continued. Thus the membership of the RKB declined from 9,230 mem-
bers in 1936 with 12,791 trucks to - 8,752, members with 19,201 trucks
in mid-1938.
In 1938, when the transportation crises occasioned by the building
of the ?lest 73all, the incorporation of "irredentist" lands to Ger-
many, and the increase in military preparation became clearly vie-
-3-
Approved For Release 2009t'1fil 'CIA-RDP67-00059A000500050019-1
 Approved For Release 2001/11/01: CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1
RESTRICTED
G Hi..,J,'Y fI Gfl4aY THAP:SPJRTaTION ( 0-2 C:. NT'D1
ible, restricti'-ns on licensing were lifted, But the action came
too late to be (,f nean:ng, A truck ordered in 1538 would have been
received in 1940, :r}en the shortage of gasoline kept all vehicles
off the road,
3, Since the fixing of tariff rates is the single most important in-
strument or regulating transport competition, this question is
implicitly answered in the answers to question C-2o
4.- There were no peculiarities in the German administrative system of
safety regulation and inspection vrhich require enumeration }:ere,
The only difference from commonly accented practices lay in the
high degree of centralization .-Thin the Ministry of Transport.
5:, The rational Socialist _.utonu bile Corps (P3ationalsozialistische
Krrtfahre0 Ko s), usually abbreviated N3KK, was, t, use the Nazi
language, the primary "organ of the political will to motorization."
The NSKK arranged a schooling scheme Mulder the title "Youth at the
rotor." By 1,38, it was estimated that 200.9000 young men had re-
ceived preliminary training designed to make them better recruits
for the nanzer and motorized divisions. The Motor-Hitler Youth,
with a membership of 100,000 in 15`38, was under NSKK tutelage, as
were parts of the German Labor Service, On January 27, 1939, a
Fuhrer decree made the NSKK the exclusive organ for all pre-and
post-military training in the motor field, The decree was im-
plemented by an organization of 23 motor sport schools, for "leaders"
and "experts", 2 national schools, and a technical driversO univer-
sity at i.`unich,
By 1438, there were 5,5 million licensed vehicle drivers in
Gernanyo The licensing process was begun by an application to
the local police, who forwarded it to the regi"nal police. The
examination of the candidate was made by an "expert" (Sachver.
standiger) , appointed by the t.,inister of Transport and usually
an NSKK man, with a degree in mechanical engineering and 2 years'
experience. The licensing standards were in all essentials com-
parable to those of the United States. However, there were 4
classes of licenses, in nccordance with the type of vehicle to be
driven:
1, it'.otorcycles with a cylinder capacity of over 250 c.c.;
20 i.:otor vehicles, weight over 3.5 tors, and truck trailer
combinations with more than 3 axles, regardless of weight;
3o Vehicles with cylinder capacity of 250 c.c, or less, and
maximum speeds less than 20 kilometers per hour;
4. All others,
6? As of September 1, 1438, Germany had ratified the road and motor
traffic convention of the League of I?;ations, Germany also be-
longed to the International Federation of Commercial Lotor Users,
RESTRICTED
Approved For Release 2001/11/U1 : CIA-RDP67-00059AO00500050019-1