INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM MONTHLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00059A000400160009-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 4, 2000
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 1, 1950
• Content Type: PAPER

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ORE Committee on International Communism
Office of Reports and Estimates
Central Intelligence Agency
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM MONTHLY
August 1950
The material used in this publication was
reported during the month of July 1950.
WORKING PAPER
Notice: This document is a working paper,.not an
official CIA issuance. It has been coordinated
within ORE, but not with the IAC Agencies. It
represents current thinking by specialists in ORE
and is designed for use by others engaged in simi-
lar or overlapping studies. It is intended solely
25X1A for the information of the addressee and not for
further dissemination.
Copy for:
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TAB COMMITS (Cont.) Page
3. AREAS OF IrtC'LASASD COP ST ACTIVITIES
Mongolia . . . ? . 18
Pakistan . ? . . . . . 18
British Africa -Basutoland. ? . . . . . 19
Panama ? ? ? ? . ? ? . ? ? ? ? 06 ? ? ? ? 20
4. xtIFILTRATION
Malaya . . . . . . . ? ? ?. . . . . . . . ? 20
Ir dia? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . ? . r . ? . 21
5. w5 LTT3AC' S
Cormirrist losses in the International
labor riovemont . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
taern ny. . . . . . ? ? ? . . ? ? ? . . . ? 22
British Africa - Southorn Rhodesia ? 22
*atin Ame'ric'a. ? ? ? . ? ? . . ? ? ? ? ? ? 23
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Secret
PART I
MAJOR DEVE LOP'MCNT S IN WORLD COMMUNISM
DURING RILY
During the month of July there was no conclusive evidence
that the international Communist movement is preparing for or
is expecting a world war a.n the wake of the Korean hostilities,
It a.ppeai s rather to anticipcte a period of unre,3t and localized
conflict. Although the Communist parties cont=inue; relentlessly
to wage psychological warfare against the US wherever and when-
ever possible, there was no indication that they are developing
concerted action in anticipation of a general war. The absence
of such overt preparations is in keeping with the U SR0., own
carf~ful avoidance of openly implicating itself in the Korean
conflict or of giving the impression that it regards this con-
flict as anything more; than a "local." issue.
In Wcstorn and Northern Europe, the tendency toward restraint
on the part of the Communists has been 9trikinY. Although the
usual. sporadic outbursts against American warmongers have con-
tinued, no overt subversive action has occurred. While it may
be true that summer vacations have dulled the political
st7 uggie~
particularly in France, still the surprisingly calm behavior of
the Coiiunun:i,.st rovolutionaries ' seems to indicate that appropriate
orders have been passed along. One motive for this rostr mint
is probably the fear that insurrection at this time may lead to
the outlawing of the parties, a situation which the Communists
would like to avoid. Nevertheless, they continue further to
consolidate their-party organizations, specifically with the aim
of being pr. opa.redy lest they be forced underground.
The major Communist parties of the Near East anJ South
Asia appear to be concentrating on effort, to ;strengthen their
organization rather than on immediate act i_on, The outlawed KISS,
in Greece and the Communist Party of India, which are also uti-
lizing the united front tactic with some success, have, both just
undertaken drive; s to recruit and -brain effective revolutionriry
organizations. There have recently been few signs of overt
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activity on the part of the outlawed pro-Soviet Tudch Party in
Iran, which is probably also engaged in organizational work.
In the Far Fast the Communist parties have continued to
demonstrate, a more belligerent attitude. In this area there
appears to be more emphasis on the claim that by intervening
in Korea the ITS has embarked on a war against the whole of Asia.
The usefulness of the Japanose war propaganda slogan of "Asia
for Asiatics" has bean recognized by the Commr.ani st>, and will be
increasingly applied to anti-Western, anti-ITS propa;Tanda. The
Chinese Communist regimes whose recent propaganda has already
reflected. this sentiment, may be expected to exploit the slmran.
On the other hand, the Korean war is not being interpreted ri
an indictition that World. Wrrr III has begun.
If the Soviet Union were preparing for hostilities on a
global scale, it is improbable that it would allow a sudden
increase of Conmiuni.st preparations outside the Soviet orbit to
forewarn the Western world. Therefore, an estimate of Soviet-
Communist intentions based on this evidence alone: is, at bost,
fry>.gmentary and inconclusive. Such evidence should be evaluated
only within the context of an overall estimate of Soviet inten.-
tions and capabilities. Moreover, the North Korean Commun:i.st
aggression, has demonstrated that extensive revolutionary .-ictivi-
ties in a target area are no longer regarded as a nocessary
pro-requisite for overt organized Cornnunist aggression, partic-
ularly in areas where the USSR is in a position to implement
Communist strategy militarily under any pretext it closes.
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PART l:I
REPERCJSS OS OF OPRAN WPRWPR
ZON COMM[TN >T PAk~TIk,
Conununi.st China has faithfully followed the Soviet line in
regard to developments In Korea, but the Peiping regime has not
been given a major role in the Korean venture, Apart from the
past and perhaps current transfor, from Manclhu.ria to If;.c~rea, of
Korean units of the People' s Liberation Army, Peiping has
restricted itself to (1) sending an Ambassador to Pyongyang,
(2) rejoicing over US-UN reverses, (3) expressing confidence
in the-ultimate (not speedy) victory of the northern Korean
forces, (4) instituting an "anti--US aggression week" --
extended indefinitely, (5) claiming to have "peace" petition
signatures of more Chinese than are. able to read and write,
and (6) promising that the: Chinoae'~eople:" would "lend every
support" (later stated as "moral support") to northern Korea.
Peiping has stated that "the Chinese people must liberate Taiwan
and the. Korean people must liberate the whole of Korea," and
that the Chineso Communists would be giving "efficient ii&l to
northern Korea eb~r actively preparing for the Liberation of Taiwan",
and Premier CIIOU En-lai has indicated, in private conversat:I.on,,
that Peiping hopes to stay clear of the hobt:ilit e in Korea,
The Peiping regime probably does not contemplate mJ.li.tary,
aggression against other, objectives outside China at this time.,
although operations against Taiwan and Tibet, which Peiping
regards as parts of China, remain possible, International
communism. apparently is not yet prepared. to abandon its current
Asian strategy of relying primarily upon then effo-rts of indige-
nous "liberation" movements, assisted as practic :.b1e, but not
to the point of direct military support, by neighbor. in.g Co:rnrau-
ni.st regimes, The principal deterrents to such ag,"res;,=ivo
action by Chinese Communist armies are believed to be the Soviet
unwillingness to increase the risk of such a general conflict,
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the Soviet desire to retain control over the various Asian
"liberation" movements, the short--term Soviet-Chinese interest
in conciliating and "neutralizling" India and some other Asian
nations, Peiping's desire to be represented in the UN, Peiping's
internal security problems, and. Peiping's desire to extend its
control over ally actual and alleged Chinese territory. Chinese
Communist aggression remains,, however, a distinct future possi-.
bility.
Western Europe , General.
Western European Communists have continued to propagandize
their strong opposition to US action in. Korea but have refrained
from overt acts of insurrection in order to prevent, the outlawing
of their party organizations. Indeed, during July, the activity
of the French and Italian parties decreased; on the other hand,
however, the parties have pushed the training of elements that
could be used for direct action ar, in the event of the suppression
of the parties, for underground work.
There are no firm indications at present as to when, and
in what connection, the Communists intend to use their direct.-
actioncforces. Unsupported by the Soviet Army or even satellite
armies, the Communists would not be able to seize power in.
either France or Italy, although they could cauae a great deal of
trouble. In the event of a general wars, the Communists would be
able to hamper very seriously French and Italian war efforts,
particularly in the vital first few days or weeks, At, present
Western Europe is in no position to defend itself against an
attack by the USSR, therefore the question is academic.
There have been practice alerts for the paramilitary Francs-
Tireurs et Partisans; party militants have been instructed.to
disobey Government mobilization orders; and the Comnmuni.st-con-
trolled General Confederation of Labor (CGT) plans to engage in
work stoppages. Furthermore, there has been an intensification
in the training of mobile commando groups which could be used to
incite widespread riots and to effect sabotage.
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From Italy there have not been as many reports of pre-
pared.ness for direct action as for France, Togliatti, as if
trying to rali.nimize the danger of suppression of the PCI by
the Government, a course which-elements of the Ccnt,eer are
joining the right in domanding;, has adopted a relatively
moderate tone. In a recent speech in the Chanbor of I)eput1e9,
he glossed over the idea, previously advanced by other Commu-
nists and fellowwtravel.lers, that South Korea had attacked
North Korea, He ,i.lso declared that Korean development,, were
not to be feared as tho beginning of World War III, because
the "peaceful" US,.P. will. not go to war unless it is attacked,
Since returning - from Berlin, Togliatti has made a more bol-
1:tgerent speech,., telling the Italians to "chase out" the
Americans if they attempt to set up bases in Italy. Although
his second speech went fur. ther than the first, it still could
not be termed violent, and was sufficiently restrained to
avoid giving the Government an excuse for cracking down.
The Netherlands Communist Part; T ordered its regional
offices to send certti.tn lists to party headquarters for
destruction and ordered the burning of the fi.la of vari niis
front organizations after the names of their members had been
transferred to special, carefully hidden re i.stc::rs, Dutch
officials -r.ntorpretod this action as being basod on the fear
that the Government will. soon outlaw the Communist Party.
Howeve?, the same officials do not -anta.cipato such action in
the near fuu.ture.
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The Netherlands
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America
Lati in
During July more and more Latin American Communists took
up the Korean propaganda themes which were first emphasized In
Soviet publications. Stressed were "Hands Off Korea' e "US
Aggression in Kore&'; and "USSR is Peaceably not Intervening".
Other than this propaganda and two attempted anti-US demon-
strations reported in Argentina., there have been no Communist
activities reportedly taken as a result of the Korean situation.
On the other hand, there has been a considerable increase in
anti-COmmu.unist agitation and feeling rosulting from the Korean
affair.
Near and Middle East
The Koreans issue has not figured directly in Cormmzni.st
activities in the Near and Middle East other than the "peacel-
campaign. Indirect allusions to it have included: (a) an
early July propaganda reference to "Kor etan parallels" on the
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Greek frontiers; and (b) efforts by Peace Partisan groups in
the Arab states to take advantage of tendencies towards neu-
trality.
USA
Communist leaders throughout the US advised their followers
not to resist induction into the armed forces, Communists were
told, that if drafted, they were to use the opportunity for sowing
discord in the armed forces.
Simultaneously, the US Communist Party was requested by the
World Federation of Trade Unions to aid the North Koreans. An
"aid. council" was to be formed consisting of CP :Leaders and
leaders of C20 left-:wi.ng trade unions affiliated with the WFTU.
The councils program is to consist of: (1) a propaganda cam-
paign to urge withdrawal of US forces from Korea and acclua:i.rt.t-
ing US people with the "true' nature of the war ; , (2.) form..,Alon
of women's councils and of "united front committees" to demand
an end to the war; and (3) nation-wide mass meetings denouncing
the war and promoting the peace movement and the Stockholm
Petition, The Communist Party was reported to be planning a
conference of all left-wing trade union leaders in August at
which time the "aid council" is to be formed,
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PART III
SUR.VIfY OF SIGNIFICANT TRENDS
Thi.s survey of significant trends
in the iI:Lterriational Coranunis'u movement
which have become apparent during the
month of July, contains only those do-
ve7opineiats which are believed to have an
important effect on the potential. of
world corrununism.
1. ATT IFT,S AT C%YUNIS'i' CONSOLL)AT OWN
Korea
A. N o r t h e r n occu ctition tactics
The northern Korean, regime in occupied southern Korc,a
is ma?tci.ng a show of a rapid introduction of political.. and
economic "reforms' and is attempting to induce the local
population to return to normal pur. suits.
The primary northern Korean effort follows a
line which i.s designed to gain popular support and acceptance
for the northernl force N. and government as the rightful agents
of the unification movement and defenders of the people against
the "military aggress:i.on and intervention of US :impe ?alitim in
internal Korean affairs",
In the political field, the Communists have
moved quickly to reconstitute the r?Peoplc t s Committees" as
organs of local government. (These "Committee?" were outlawed
in southern Korea In 7.915 by US Occupation forces after. they
were la41 gely taken over by infiltrated Communists and had
assumed illegal powers of government). Plans have also been
announced for early "elections" to place the local governmont
on ?a "democratic"basis. Membership of the Seoul "Peoplets
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Committee" - as announced by the Communist radio --- and
includes a facade of we1.l--known southern political figures
previously identified as "moderates", "independents", or
"rightists".
In the economic field the Communists are, seeking
popular support and. an appearance of permanence for the "liber-
ation" by attempting quickly to restore normal operation of
municipal public utilities and local.. trade. Beyond the
"rehab l.litation" program, plans were in nediately announced to
Carr, out a. land reform on the northern Korean pattern of
confiscation and free distribution to tenants, the unemployed,
and small land owners.
Little information is available on the effectiveness
of these measures in gaining willing cooperation from sotizthorn`
Koreans,in the war effort, It is evident from sketchy reports,
however, that in actual application, greater reliance is being
placed on (1) secret police who followed behind the invading
army and (ti) those Commmunists already in southern Korea who
emerged from the underground, were released from jails, or
discarded their cover as loyal citizens to take over control
functions in the "-liberated" areas.
Dospito the heavy propaganda barrage from Pyong-
yang and Seoul, it is doubtful if much has actually been done
to implement the announced plans beyond. the holding of rallies
for indoctrination.
The principal Cozummist effort now is directed
toward mobilizing all available resources for the Korean war
effort. A mobilization decree of the northern regime makes all
material and manpower resources in both northern and occupied
southern-Korea subject to requisition for the war effort, In
practice,, this has meant a progressively more e,xtenaive confis-
cation of food and supplies in southern Korea and the con-
scription of uouthern manpower for service both as laborers and
combat troops. Earlier, the northern army apparently attempted
to win the favor of the southern people by refraining from such
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confiscation, but, with the unexpected prolongation of the war
occasioned by the entry of UN force.;, the Communists have been
forcod to forego the politically desirable policy of formal
requisitions and payznent,
B. Guerrilla andpro i?z iea to a
waning interest in "peace" campaigns particularly as the I orean
fighting has continued. In addition, some propagc.nda against the
Communist "peace" campaign has reportedly dcvel.opc:d.
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3. ARIAS Or, INCPJASFD COiM ITIST ACTIVITIES
rzon~*ozi.a
Northern Korean leader Kim Il Sun_g's recent "wish"
for a new people's entire Mongolia," to be established by tho
Soviet-contrclled i?iongolian Poople's Republic, may be a Soviet-
sponsored trial balloon, preliminary to a Soviet attempt not only
to unify Outer and Inner Hongolia but also to bring under Soviet
control Hongols in Chinese areas and thus further to strengthen the
Soviet position in all the northern border regions of China. Al-
though the"Peiping rogi.mc has recently boon attempting to increase
its on control over the Inner Monp.,oli.an .Autonomous Gov eri c:crt (IMAG )
by zihrorbin~g Inner Mongolian armed fo cc's into Ci inese armies and
transferring the DRAG c~pita1 southcra.rd to Kalgan -- a Nonhol uni-
ficatryon program under Soviet auspices would probably be successful.
The iiongols generally, and certain of the IP'iAG leaders, arc resent-
ful. of past Chinese oppression, are suspicious of Peiping c s promises,
have intense racial pride, and would be vulnerable to pan Hongol
propaganda, It is possible that an E press>ion of Poip].n_g's dis-
pleasure o*er the prospect of thus losing a large slice of western
Hanchuria and northern China, will deter the Kromi.in from pressing
such a vor-tune at this time. If tha USSR persists, the Ch:incse
Comr-11ists might l.o,e, together with Inner Uongclia., some of their
enthusiasm for "proletarian internat4 onalism", although the iIon-
golian issue probably will not becorie sufficiently ir7portar..t in
itself to threaten the Sino-Soviet alliance.
Pakistan
The following cvents in Pakistan indicate increasing
Communist activities:
(1) Reportedly on Zia June. 1350 a mcotinz of loading Karachi
Communists was hold for the purpose of ox gr.nizinp; a mor. o active
"peace" move :gent in Karachi. Faiz .L zad F-ulz, a key f:'gure in
Cormunist ativities in rest Pakistan, stated t'Zt:t the poaca move-
ment is by far the best "united front" yet better than
civil liberties--rind should be strongly cuphasized; that the war in
Korea would help the drive, if properly exploited. A Karachi Pace
Committee was established on, 23 July, demanded reversal of the
GOP position on Korea and denounced US interference in Asia as a
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"threat to the peace of the 7rorid." A later report indicates
that the campaign for signatures to the Stool>holia Poaco Resolu-
tion has ben intensively carried on in Lahore but that elsewhere
in Pakistan the emphasis has been placed on "hands off Korea"
propaganda.
(2) It has also been reported that the Soviet Ambassador
to Paicjst^n has boon much noro active in recent weeks in his
contacts with leftists, including now rlembcrs of the press. Ilis
activities r.1ay have a bearing on the continued slanting of nears in
sorjc local papers, although there has boon a general improvement
(from the US viomipoint) in the handling of factual nct,rs on Korea
The Karachi 'l'ass office has been making available extensive hand-
outs on the Korean situation end, in addition, the Second 'ccre-
tary of -the ; bviet :hbassy has boon travelling in the Punjab and
Northwest P`rontier Province Yiaking particular efforts to contact
leading ueubers of the press. In this connection, it is reported
from HIoscow that the attention given Pakistan in the Soviet press
is ?.ne c".sing,
(3) The two functions cormersoratinC the death of i axin Gorki
arc significant principally in pointing up the degree of effective
cooperation which has developed between the Soviet Ltubassy and
Karachi Co_:ern nist leaders. The exhibition of photo raphs and the
public rivet`-n,,,, worc ofiiciently organized, well attended, favorably
reported in the press and, frori a propaganda point of view, highly
successful.
(4) A AL injab police union organized by uorixrs of the local
Corll;lunist-led Railway Union was banned by the Govomient a treoi;
after its forrml organization.
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British Africa - La-p-goland
Officials of the British territory of Dasutolc rid (which
is surrounded by the Union of South Africa) have expressed great
concern over the appearance there for the first time of Cor :aunist
sympathics, A high official who recently toured Africa to
coordinate: anti-Communist rscasures, reportedly said that he was
concerned with the Urotith of core nunisn in South Africa only in
13asuto1 nd, This concern stons partly from sorlc sub-chiefs'
petitioning the UN to replace the UK
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as protector, and it is thought that they intend ultimately to
seek the protection of the "color-blind" USSR. This endeavor
pre; uuaably reflects loss a sympathy for Comiaunist ideology than
a fear that the UK will lend over Basutoland to the extremely
color-conscious Union of South Africa (as the British South Africa
Act of 19C9 establishing the Union envisaged) in response to
renewed overtures rorn the Union's Malan Government.
Propaganda of a local nature reported from Panama
indicates that Coln nun??.sts sparic?d a movoment to demand P. corridor
across the Pcn ax!ia Canal Lone, and in this project unlisted tho
support of one of Pa: ri,.ls Terper civic organisations. In a.&di-
tion, they are reported to have attcmp+terl to raiso an issue of
sovereignty and to have roundly crit cizcd various aspo is of US
policy affe ,tiny; Panana. This propaganda is succeeding in c.,qDloit-
in"; troublesome issues which make US relations with Panana more
difficult.
4. Ii FIL'1P.ATION
s'!4_,a ja
Increasing Communist ac-d.vity on all levels in a?,aiaya
would seen to indicate that the movement continues to gain m.o:,:icentum
in that Br .fish dependency. Terrorist incidents, whic:!h reached a
now p,&k for tho, tt.ro-year period of the cmorgcr_oy during the month
of T?`a.y, have continued to remain high tiw?ozi ,,hou.t July. The per-
cent Q c of serious incidents has also risc:.?i and the 3.n^a7eascd
military 'apabili.t?es ma,nifostcd by the terrorists would seem to
point up their ac :ess to an a,doqua.te supply of arr and ammunition
despite reports of shorter;e.a and the paucity of reliable evidence
of outside assistance.
Distribution of Col uri,3t propagarda ha. also been
expanded throu:~-bout educatior_al institution a a ?,oca,ti bit,,- British
confiscation of large supplies at sovcral. Chincso sec _.oolo. In-
filtration and subvorsion among trade unions and. labor groups con-
tinues with definite progress having been reported amozz ; the Rubber
Workers Union.
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Terrorist activities continue to threaten rubber
production. Slashing of rubber trees appears to have increased
during; July; destruction of rubber processing eguipnent on tlc
estates continues; and it now appears that systematic efforts
are being made, by specially trained er.ewc of arsonists, to
destroy rubber warehouses in the Singapore area.
The Overseas Affairs Committee of the Chinese Conmrau-
ni.st regirzr it Peiping is also reported to be znahing; efforts to
cotablish offices with the Plan Chiau Jit Pro, loft wing newspaper
oemod by Tan Kah Keo. A representative there, yet to be appointed,
w.-111 apparcrntly: (1) analy?c the cffectivonoss of the Peiping
rogimc l s propaganda, (2) submit znomhly reports on general affairs
a:ezeO, spco-ific problorzw to the Overse^ s Affa7 rs Cor: ;iittoe in C,: nton,
(3) gather material on the Overseas Chinese population in Ial.aya,
and (f4) possibly arrange for the cxchange of students.
India
Recent information indicates that the Coa:amunists have
prepared a mater map of all 11-military depots in India, that Cor_?Ynu-
nist s have it-filtr. aced a nurzbcr of those depots, and that a nmibcr
of dopots have a1m dy bcon succesmully sabotagcd. This in: ornna-
tion suggests that Communist planning in India is thorough and that
the Ccmrnunists will nako stronr sous efforts to prevent military
stores from being used against them. It also suggesto that the
Commmi Its may b : capable of capttring some of those Stares for
tlh.ei: own use when they decide that the time is right.
51 "1 ` BAC111'1
Co r?mni t 1R.-,
e in t eje .rrtcm tiona! L bor movemont.
One of the most scrioa,s setbacks in Corrrrar.ist strength
durt.ng; July was the unmistakable decline Ir. JP inf!ucn^c over non-
Commimi t labor. This doolino, which had set in wc:l? Lo "oro the
North Korean attack, seems to have been g'oa:l.y ~atcd by
that event. The Socialist labor oreani zations of lies Bern .Ev.xope,
which have often been easy dupes for Communist "polit. c&l" :strikes,
are now almost solidly supporting the US--UN course in Korea.
Moreover, the progress which the Southeast Asian I?iission of the
ICF'TU has made towards establishing closer links with non-Cozrnnunist
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Asian labor and building up resistance to the Cormunist drive will
probably out increasingly into the Communist potential for revolu-
tionary action in this area.
Other najor Communist losses in the labor movement
wore: (a) The French Govcrntaer_tt s action declaring illegal the
International Seamen and Dockers Union which the UJFTU act up
last sunm or in AMarseilles; and (b) the decision of the Tunisian
nationalist labor federation UGTT to leave the UFTU. While it
is too early to cotiinate the full effect of the .French ban on
the WFTU Secraens International, this a :tion sets a pi~eccdent for
similar moasusc by other L uro can go-verr mcnts and riav threaten
the. continued rrae dom of action of o?',-.her ` .1'TU int',;ernationais such
a those or anize;. for the I1incrs (in Brus jols ), the Metal 1!orkors
and the Teachers (in Pa:L-Is) and the Building Construction I:Torkors
(IIc 1s .nk1). 1 he defection of the powerful Tunisian UGTT deprives
the Soviet-di ectcd UFTU of its last Trnportant non-Communist
affiliate in the Mediterranean basin and will seriously handicap
Conr:imtIst cffDrts to prorloto a working nationalist-Communist
al ianco against the colonial pourers in Northern Africa.
t? rna
The Boffin Bar_dos tag has lifted the parliamentary immu-
nity of KFD loader Max Rcimann, opening tht way to his early in-
di etm,rnt on chi rg9s of aid.in in the a ilcgcd kidnapping of former
KPD 1^ad.er Kurt S&ic11er, now in a GDR jail. W&?-I.-or Fisch, another
KPD dcpaty vas cuspondcd for thirty days as a result of his
attentr-ts to proteut the steps against Rein a.nn, 11-its reduced
currant KPD represcntation in the Durdos tag to eight.
British Africa - ouihc n Rhodesia?
A "subversive activi tics" bill recently introduced
by the overtncoiining Govornricn'.; majors ty in the self- go'rcrning
British tei ritory of Southern Rhode; ..a . is r.adci d a "toy, ym:i.lar
legislation cnactod in the ncighbori g Union Of Saout.h i i'r .c:r.
?Jido powers arc given to the Govcrzunent to activit:"ios
defined as subversive. Prime Minister RIu,[-; ns has explained that
although corimu7.li,si is almost non-existent in Southern Rhodesia,
the Measure will prevent that potential danger from ever becoming
serious in the future. The weak opposition to the bill has come
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from labor and liberal circles.
Latin America.
In Panama, the administration continued its efforts to
eliminate Cor?nmuniuts frog the Coveriu:rent. A Coannunjst alternate
jud7c of the Supreme Court was prevented from serving by prompt
appointxicnt of a now non-Cor, ;mist judge when an ailing Jurist
retired, Sote efforts i-rorc also Wade to oust Corunuriist teachers.
In Costa Rica, the; local. Communist Party was deft ni?tcly outlaered
as a result of i1 efforts to get its legal stati?s clarified. The
usual police repi es sion of Communism continued in and the
polico c cvo oped plans to cope with poosible Corr:.lvnizt inspired
disorders. In addlblon the Roci;fo City Chrnnbor expollcd tho Corunu-
nist councilmen and their altornatcs.
Ar L4cr;t iic Coriununists were prcvcntcd frori demonstrating
on several occasion; by police action and arrests, but won a
moral victory trhon a measure to outlaw the CF did not pass the
1c isl a uurc , Tho G.a,iaton lan_ Goveri ant fired two Communists who
had boon in charge of the official newspaper and radio station,
but, conscrvativc-inspirod demonstrations against the administration
have probably c'ciaycd further isolation of the Commaunists.in that
coon a'ry . Gohl an Con.-. nists have boon fight ,ng off attempts to out-
law the Party and attempts to wrest control of the newspaper HHOY
from thorn. In ad6iti.on, the Elcctrioa.l Workers I t hicn adopted a
rc:soi tion pcrm1tling expulsion of Conm nun3 sts, and the Cornrsanist
front Women's OrCanizatlon was denied a pcrrmx.t to hold a ixeting.
23
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PART IV
GURR' I1T ATTD FORTHCOIITNG COiLUHIST EVENTS
August
indefinite
New York
Hiroshima
Prague
International Sports Festival.Sponsor:
Young Progressives of America
Atom Bomb Memorial Day and Anti-Uar
Struggle Day
UFTU Postal, Telegraph, Telephone & Radio
ZJorkors International
13-20
Nice
Franco-Italian Youth Rally
14-28,
Prague
Second World Congress, Inter, Union of
Students
1G-17
Prague
World Committee of Peace Partisans
25-26
Berlin
National Front Congress
30 Auk;-3 Sep Berlin
Third Congress, ;?ast German Labor Organi-
zation (FDGB)
September
indefinite
in_dtfinite
Warsaw
Rumania
Polish Peace Defenders Congress
Ruranian Congress of Peace Cor1rn tteos
3
Ravensbrucck
Peace Rally, German Democratic Women's
League
10
Germany
Uomorial Celebrations, Society of Per-
sccutees of the Nazi Regime (VVN)
18-20
Warsaw
'.JFTU Transport Workers International
20
Berlin
All-German Peace Conference
30 Sep-1 Oct
Dortmund
Congress of Young Peace Fighters of West
Germany
1-15
Tunis
National Congress of the Tunisian Committee
for the Defense of Peace
6-8
New York
American-Slav Conference for Peace
24
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October
16-21
tlorsat,
Second World Congress of the Partisans
of Peace
November
indefinite
Czcc1oslovakia
Award of Czechoslovak Annual National
Peace Prizes
it
9-12
France
Congress of the Union of the Republican
Youth of France
it
10
worldwide
World Youth Day
It
11-17
worldwide
International Studentst Week
it
.17
worldtirlde
International Students' Day
December
21
Allard of Inter. Stalin Peace Prizes
25
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