STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND IN ADJACENT AREAS DURING WW II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000500080002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 130
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 1, 1964
• Content Type: STUDY

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STUDY OF
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND IN
ADJACENT AREAS DURING WW II
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STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ON THE EASTERN FRONT AND IN
ADJACENT AREAS DURING WW II
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1. Germany launched its attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941,
and the Security Service (SD) of the RSHA immediately went into
action. 114 Poles and White Russians were arrested on 23 June, and
on the following day 906 Soviet citizens were detained. 4995 Soviet
citizens were reported to be under arrest as of 3 July 1941. During
the first month of the German-Soviet war, the SD in Germany,
Belgium, France, and other parts of Europe arrested some 12, 000
persons considered to be dangerous to the security of the Reich.
As the German military forces advanced, so did teams of the SD.
But, despite their speed, they captured very few NKVD documents.
Reaching NKVD installations, they found that the files had been
removed or destroyed. They did, however, make a large number
of arrests on the basis of information they already had had in their
possession. Losing intelligence assets in large numbers, the Soviets
made desperate efforts to repair the damage. On 3 August 1941, 250
members of the 212th Soviet Parachute Brigade dropped behind the
German lines in Byelorussia (White Russia) and West Ukraine. On
9 August, 200 more agents were parachuted behind the lines between
Rowno and Luck, most of them quickly rounded up by the German SD.
So great was the Soviet need for intelligence data about the rapidly
advancing German armies that hundreds of agents were sent behind
the lines, apparently in the hope that a few might survive and provide
the sorely needed information.
2. Operational groups of the SD were soon deployed in the
occupied territory between the Baltic and the Black Sea, their task
being to control their respective regions by neutralizing or exterm-
inating elements hostile to Nazi domination.* The groups reported
to their headquarters (i. e. , the RSHA) in Berlin, which, in turn,
drew up periodical studies for distribution to high SS and other Nazi
officials.
3. . The jurisdiction in security and police matters was divided
territorially into three segments, each under a high official representing
the SS and SD. Headquarters for the Northern area was in Riga, for the
Middle area in Mogilev, and for the Southern area in Kiev. Subordinated
These activities included the so-called "final solution" (i. e. , liquidation
of the Jews).
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to them were the "Einsatzgruppen"* of the SD, and the still-lower
echelons, the "Einsatzkommandos"*, which operated closer to the
front. Einsatzgruppen A and B were located in the Northern and
Middle sectors respectively. Groups C and D were located in the
Southern sector.
4. As the war progressed, German civilian administration
was introduced into the rear areas of the Eastern occupied terri-
tories which were administered by two large departments, one
called I 'Reich skommissariat-Ostland" (RKO) and the other,
"Reichskommissariat-Ukraine". Each department was divided
into general administrative districts (Generalbezirke). The
civilian administration did not in any way relieve the SD from its
responsibility in matters affecting the security of the Reich. **
5. One of the SD?s tasks was to get rid of Communists and
Soviet agents, and the Nazis tackled this job with determination. On
16 July 1941, the SD arrested and executed 117 Communists and Soviet
agents in West Ukraine, and arrested another 130 on 20 July. 67
Soviet agents were executed in the Brest-Litovsk region in late July,
and 41 were arrested near Leningrad in late August of that year.
Many arrests in smaller numbers were reported from various other
districts. Yet, despite this effort, the SD estimated on 9 January 1942
that about 500 agents remained in the Soviet espionage net behind the
German lines in the Leningrad area alone. And the Germans had good
reason to expect more, because at Mogilev they had captured pictures
of about 1000 agents trained at an NKVD school in that area. All told,
the arrest of 3742 Soviet agents was recorded between 31 July 1941 and
2 April 1943, in addition to 365 persons listed as Communists. A far
larger number of Communists was liquidated in the mass executions
that occurred under the auspices of the Nazi program for political and
ethnic purification of the occupied territories.
Special Action Groups--also known as Extermination Groups.
On occasions the SD and SS units ruthlessly conducted executions
despite the protests of the civilian administration. See pp. 74-77,
The Case Against Adolf Eichmann, published by The New American
Library.
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6. With the outbreak of war, mass executions started almost
immediately on the eastern front.* A great majority of the persons
thus liquidated was Jews, but occasional executions of Communists,
NKVD informants and Soviet partisans were included in the mass
executions. Generally'_;the operating units simply listed their victims
as so many "Jews" or '-''mostly Jews", and there is no indication that
the RSHA asked for more precise reporting. The SD teams led the
action. They also did the reporting, although a police battalion might
have done the actual killing, as was the case when one such battalion
slaughtered 2000 Jews and Russians in the Czebetowska area in early
August 1941. Einsatzgruppe A, situated further north, reported the
execution of 29, 000 persons in the rear areas of Latvia and Lithuania
at about the same time. SS Major fnu BARTH was commended for
leading the action "in an outstanding manner" when he was in charge
of the execution of 2300 Jews in Riga in July 1941, Day after day this
program of extermination continued, in Grodno, in Slonin, in Brest,
The Case Against Adolf Eichmann, published by The New American
Library, contains a report by General Stahlecker, the Commanding
General of Einsatzgruppe A. He wrote: "But it was desirable that
the Security Police should not put in an immediate appearance, at
least in the beginning, since the extraordinary harsh measures were
apt to stir even German circles. It had to be shown to the world that
the native population itself took the first action by way of natural
reaction against the terror exercised by the Communists during the
preceding period." Also: "It was no less important in view of the
future to establish the unshakable and provable fact that the liberated
population themselves took the most severe measure against the
Bolshevik and Jewish enemy quite on their own, so that the direction
by German authorities could not be found out."
While the Germans obviously did stir up the local population, and did
enlist the aid of the auxiliary police, anti-communist partisan groups,
and "Self-Defence" forces in carrying out mass executions, the RSHA
studies do not play up this aspect of the situation, although the SD
filed unit reports may possibly have done so. There is no evidence
that the SD and SS units may have assumed the role of spectators at
any place or at any time. They reported executions by the thousands
and were credited with these executions in the RSHA studies with no
dissimulation.
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in Kishinev, and in the rear areas all along the line. In the months
of July and August 1941 alone, a total of some 150, 000 executions was
reported.* In a September report concerning Einsatzgruppe C, the
following notation was entered: 50, 000 executions "foreseen" in
Kiev.
7. The statistics regarding these executions were embodied
in the periodical studies issued by the RSHA and distributed in 48
copies. Although most of the copies were apparently sent to other
Nazi government agencies as well.
8. The RSHA studies made but infrequent reference to the
attitude of the local populace towards the anti-Jewish campaign.**
Only the Latvians were reported to be "not very enthusiastic" about
the campaign; nevertheless, "Self-Defence" forces of Latvia, as
well as those of Lithuania and Estonia, were used for carrying out
executions. Reportedly, the West Ukrainians were ardent supporters
of anti-Jewish action and, as such, made contributions to it. In
Dobromil they set fire to a Jewish synagogue. In Sambor they mobbed
approximately fifty Jews, and in Lvov (Lemberg) they rounded up about
a thousand of them and turned them over to the Germans. The Poles
were reported to be anti-Semitic, and in favor of the anti-Jewish
campaign by implication.
9. As the German military forces moved ahead, local political
groups came out into the open in Soviet held areas which were about to
be seized:by the Germans. On 25 June 1941, three days after the out-
break of the German-Soviet war, a West Ukrainian uprising in Lvov
was ruthlessly suppressed by the NKVD. Among the 3000 rebels shot
on that day were many intellectuals wh o were supporters of the OUN
(Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). MELNIK was the recognized
head of the OUN at the time, but immediately after the uprising and the
departure of the NKVD, Stefan BANDERA declared himself leader,
Careless field reporting by the SD makes it impossible to arrive at
precise totals; for example, in July 1941 Einsatzgruppe B reported
"200 executions daily in Minsk" for an unspecified period.
It is probable that the RSHA rejected field comments that were
repugnant to the official point of view.
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which gave rise to an OUN (Bandera) as opposed to OUN (Melnik).
Under BANDERA's leadership, a Ukrainian National Committee
was formed. The Committee, in turn, formed a provisional
government in Lvov, with the following line-up:
STECZKO
Dr. PANYSCHAN
FEDUSEWICZ
Iwan KLIMIW
Dr. JACIW
HOLOWKO
Rico JARY
10. On 12 July 1941, thirty members of the OUN (Bandera)
set out on a march to Kiev for the purpose of proclaiming independ-
ence for the entire Ukraine, East (Soviet) as well as West. The
Germans arrested BANDERA and kept him under detention-at Graeow,
presumably to put a brake on his aggressive brand of nationalism.
Then, on 1 August 1941, they incorporated West Ukraine into the
General -Gouvernment.* OUN (Bandera) protested this action, but
the intelligencia,** not at all pleased with the STECZKO type of
government, seemed ready to help the Germans adopt the national
life to Gene ral-Gouvernme nt standards.
11. In early October 1941, the SD arrested several members
of OUN (Bandera) in Zhitomir because they were organizing a
Ukrainian Militia and also for trying to gain control over local
government posts. The SD learned that an order had been issued
to OUN (Bandera) members to search the woods for abandoned Soviet
rifles, implying that the leadership planned to form partisan groups.
This discovery led to numerous arrests, because the Germans did
not delude themselves with the idea that hatred of the Soviets nec-
essarily made the OUN (Bandera) pro-German. OUN (Bandera)
The government established by the Germans in the part of Poland
occupied by Germany in 1939.
Generally speaking, "the supporters of OUN (Melnik)".
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members followed the advancing German armies, propagating the
idea of a future "Sovereign Ukraine", and placing their own men
in local governments which sprang up in the cities along the way.
They were successful except in the important city of Kiev, where
OUN (Melnik) was able to gain and hold control until the German
retreat. OUN (Melnik) was able to achieve this gain, through the
help of Bishop HILARION of the Autokephale (sic) Ukrainian Church,
apparently more the politician than the church leader. From its
agents, the SD learned that Bishop HILARION was somehow
associated with the NKVD. But, as of January 1942 the SD had
found no valid evidence confirming this allegation.
12. The Germans perceived a difference between the
people of West Ukraine and those of East Ukraine (Soviet).
Although those of the East opposed chauvinism and stood solidly
against secession from Russia. The name BANDERA was unknown
to them and no movement for independence seemed to exist among
them. Two members of OUN (Bandera), fnu KONRAD and fnu
KRIZE were appointed Militia Commandant and Mayor in Cherson,
East Ukraine respectively, and they tried to use their positions to
propagate BANDERA's ideas. But, because they were from East
Galicia and hence aliens to the people of Cherson, they were unable
to build an OUN organization or to interest anyone in the concept of
a unified, independent Ukraine.
13. Despite the fact that the OUN (Bandera) was more
aggressively chauvinistic and (in this sense) less pro-German than
the OUN (Melnik), the SD concluded that the Bandera faction rep-
resented less potential danger to German objectives than did the
Melnik faction.'
14. As they played with Arab nationalists, so the Germans
toyed with the nationalists of the Eastern territories. By maintaining
a discreet silence about what the future held in store, they permitted
the leaders to believe that independence was just around the corner.
At the time of the report, the SD had been told that OUN (Melnik)
was British oriented and anything but sympathetic to the anti-Jewish
campaign.
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While this policy of devious procrastination did not make for solid
friendships, it did avoid stirring up dangerous enmities.* In 1942
the SD reported that the OUN (Bandera) and OUN (Melnik) were
rivals which contributed greatly to the German cause.**
15. Upon entering Latvia, which had been under Soviet
occupation for only a year, the Germans did not quite know what
political developments to expect. They merely seemed to be
certain that numerous groups were prepared to cooperate with
the German authorities, When the German troops arrived, the
officers of the former Latvian Army immediately tried to form
a government, and a "committee" came into being under the
leadership of KREISCHMANIS and SKAISTLAUKS, two Colonels
of the regular pre-war Latvian Army. The Committee, given
recognition by the German authorities, set about organizing a
"Self-Defence" force as the first step towards bringing the
country to normalcy. Two Latvian officers, Colonel PLENZNERS
and Lt. Colonel DEGLAVS, were brought from Berlin*** to help
build up the "Self-Defence" force (Selbstachutz); but, with the
arrival of the German General ROQUES, the SS took command.
At this point, Colonel PLENZNER became ill, and Colonel
DEGLAVS committed suicide.
16. In August 1941, the assignment of a German High
Commissioner to Latvia, as well as district commissars, was
accepted without question in the rural areas, but it had an
unfavorable impact in the urban centers. The Germans pointed
Editorial comment.
The reasoning behind this observation is obscure. If OUN
(Bandera) contributed to the German cause, it is difficult to
understand why the members of that organization were
arrested in such large numbers. (See Addendum F. )
***PLENZNERS had been the Latvian Military Attache in Berlin
until the Soviets occupied Latvia in June 1940. (Correct
spelling PLENSNERS).
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out that this arrangement would bring about improvements in the
Latvian economy, but the Latvians could see that it ran counter
to their plans for a sovereign state. Most surprised by the German
maneuver was the Latvian pre-war fascist group "Perkonkrusts"*
which had expected the Nazis to be as generous to Latvia as they
had been to Slovakia. Although the use of German commissars
continued to evoke criticism, in January 1942 the SD was able to
report that the Latvians were still friendly toward Germany, still
thrilled at being free of the Communist yoke. The "Perkonkrusts"
was about to organize a Latvian volunteer division, and young
Latvian officers (but not those of the older generation) were thought
to be pre-German.
17. When the Germans entered Estonia they found the economy
in a chaotic state. During their one-year occupation, the Soviets had
taken railway rolling stock and had destroyed what they could not haul
away. They had also taken away two-thirds of the horses. Some
factories had only two weeks' supply of raw material while others had
none. The Estonians welcomed the Germans, thinking that they would
restore the country to the status it had enjoyed in 1940, before the
Soviet occupation. But this hope could not have been very strong,
because the Germans noted no opposition to the German commissars
whom they brought into the area. The people manifested interest in
everything German: German classes, movies and literature. How-
ever, this aimiable disposition did not place the Estonians in a
favored category, because the German occupying authorities were
under orders not to treat them any better, or worse, than the Latvians
and Lithuanians.
18. In Lithuania the story was much the same as in Latvia.
In Vilnyus, a National Committee was formed under the leadership
of Stasys ZAKEVIZCIUS, and it received German recognition.
Colonel SKIRPA, former Lithuanian Ambassador to Germany, tried
to form a government, but the Germans found it unacceptable and put
SKIRPA under house-arrest. Other political groups, such as the
Christian-Democrats, Socialists, and the Waldemaras group, tried to
gain status, believing that they were on the verge of independence.
* Swastika (League)
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But this hope faded in August 1941 when the Germans appointed
a High Commissioner and assigned a quota of district commi-
ssars. This set the Lithuanian nationalists upon a propaganda
campaign for an independent state. They warned the people
against siding with the Germans, on the grounds that inde-
pendence would come only with the defeat of Germany, which
would certainly result when the United States entered the war.
Despite such propaganda, the Germans, generally, were able
to get cooperation from the Lithuanians by stirring up Lithu-
anian hatred of Jews and Communists. Two companies of
Lithuanian (anti-Communist) partisans were incorporated into
the "Einsatzkommandos" and were assigned to guard bridges,
ammunition dumps and Jewish concentration camps, and to
help liquidate the Jews in various cities of the country.
19. The Germans found the people of Byelorussia to be
strongly anti-Communist. Although neither for nor against
the Germans, they did entertain the hope that the Germans would
improve the standards of living.* They compared the equipment
and personnel of the German Army with that of the Red Army
and found the Nazis superior.
20. The Germans used two approaches to the problems
of Byelorussia, one for the portion that was Polish before 1939
and another for the portion that was originally Soviet. Con-
cerning the Polish portion, the Germans went straight ahead
with the decentralization of the economic system. Collective
farms were dissolved and the properties returned to the origi-
nal owners. Provisional local governments were set up,
comprised of Byelorussians. In the territory that was origi-
nally Soviet, the Germans indefinitely postponed decentralization
of the former Soviet state system. German farmers were made
supervisors of collective farms and German officials were
placed in key positions.**
When the Germans arrived, the attitude of the people was fav-
orable toward the victors, but the reports do not record the
changes which may have occurred with the passage of time.
The intelligencia asked why they were treated differently than
the people in the adjoining region, but the documents examined
do not provide the answer given by the Germans, if in fact they
did answer the question.
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0 _u'
21. As the German military forces advanced farther
into Soviet territory, problems of a civilian nature mounted.
The retreating Soviets had demolished power-stations, govern-
ment buildings and warehouses. Food was scarce, particularly
in the urban areas. People who had fled from their homes were
not returning. A dependable system of personal documentation
and controls had to be devised in order to combat Soviet intel-
ligence activity. Therefore, German military commandants
were assigned to the cities and towns and travel without an
identity document, signed and sealed by the German commandant,
was not permitted.
22. The people on Soviet territory seemed genuinely
friendly toward the German conquerors. In Kiev they were
reported to be cordial and anti-Communist, In the Crimea, the
tartars wanted to organize a volunteer unit to fight alongside
the Germans, and much the same proposal was made in the
Leningrad area. Only in Smolensk the people were found to be
neither for nor against the Germans. Everywhere the intelligensia
plagued the invaders with questions about German-Russian relations.
They wanted it understood that there was a difference between
Russians and Soviets. The citizens of Klinsy proposed activation
of an association to promote Russo-German friendship. Although
the feeling against Communism was widespread, the intelligensia
expressed concern about the possibility of the USSR becoming a
second-rate state (or a conglomeration of protectorates and
colonies) under the control of Germany*.
23. There was a difference in the behavior of the people
near the front lines and that of the people further to the rear. Near
the front, people were restless and nervous, under pressure of
Soviet propaganda and agents. They were afraid the Soviets might
return; they lived in terror of the partisans. Food was scarce, jobs
hard to find. Under these circumstances, the German bonus of 100
rubles for each Red Army soldier turned in, and 1000 rubles for
each partisan, could not have offered much of a future. *>,
But in that area as elsewhere in occupied territory, the Germans
seemed unable or unwilling to tell the people what the future held
in store.
The effectiveness of this German bonus is not revealed in the
documents examined.
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24. In July 1941, Red Army Captain M. PUGATSLOW,
then a German prisoner of war, said that at the outbreak of war
the Soviet High Command had given no thought to partisan warfare,
believing it impossible that a large number of Red Army troops
could be encircled by the enemy. Further, the High Command
believed that partisans could only exist with the support of the
civilian population, and they knew that the population was not
sympathetic to the Soviet regime.
25. Before his capture, Captain PUGATSLOW, had
served in the Red Army's XI Mechanized Army Corps. As the
Corps retreated from Grodno, it encountered a demolished
bridge at the Neman River and was forced to abandoned its
heavy weapons and trucks. Realizing that the corps was now
encircled by the Germans, the corps commander, MOSTAVENKO,
summoned his staff and other selected personnel into a nearby
woods. After .distributing hand weapons among them, he said
that they must try to break through the German lines near
Borisow; if that failed they were to return to the woods and wage
partisan warfare, requisitioning their food from local farmers.
Captured soon thereafter, Captain PUGATSLOW could not
contribute much information about the nature of partisan, activity;
but local farmers testified that the partisans brought terror to
the villages. Hiding in the woods by day, they came out at night
to kill cattle, raid villages, and rob farmers of their meager
supply of food and clothes.
26. The Germans soon concluded that most of the Red
Army officers and soldiers who had managed to escape capture
after encirclement had also contrived to regroup into partisan
groups. Other groups were comprised of Communists. In
Latvia one unit consisted of old-believers (Starovers) evicted
from Russia by the Czar decades before. But that was only a
beginning.
27. If members of the Soviet High Command had given
no thought to partisan warfare before the outbreak of war, they
must have given thorough attention to it soon thereafter, because
in mid-July 1941, near Witebsk, the Germans captured a Soviet
liaison plane carrying secret instructions for partisan warfare,
issued by fnu MECHLIS, the chief of the Red Army?s Political
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Management. And it soon became evident that groups were being
dropped behind the lines by the Soviet Air Force, groups consisting
principally of refugees who had fled before the German Army and
desired to return to their homes. The Soviets helped them get
back--at a price. Other groups, trained in the use of explosives,
were taken to the Latvian shores from'.the Soviet island, Oesel.
Wherever they were, the partisan groups generally employed the
same tactics. They hid in woods and swamps and came out for
surprise attacks, demolishing bridges, telephone lines and German
installations. The Soviet Air Force supplied them with food and
explosives, and with leadership in the form of Red Army officers
and commissars. What they could not get from the Soviets, they
procured from the civilian population, usually by force.
28. The Germans learned from captured partisans and
documents that the Soviets had organized partisan training sbhools
in most large cities. Preference was given to athletes, not necessarily
members bf.th:e Communist Party. As a rule, 200 Soviet agents at a
time were trained in each school in radio communications, and in the
use of weapons, explosives, etc. A headquarters in Leningrad,
comprised of eight sections, was active in recruiting and training
agents for espionage and partisan activity. The curriculum of a
center near Orel provided an example of the training: espionage at
the front lines and behind them; utilization of terrain in approaching
the target; transmitting intelligence; destroying bridges, buildings and
military objects; techniques of arson; mining of streets, fields and
railroads; destruction of vehicles; use of hand-grenades. In order to
improve their effectiveness in destroying trains, trucks and heavy
equipment, partisans were given "new" weapons. Some agents, usually
high CP officials, were given false identification cards and infiltrated
into Germany territory as workers.
29. The fight against the Soviet partisans;vwas entrusted to the
SD units, whose stated objective was to apprehend the Soviet officers
and commissars providing the leadership. The SD hued agents as
informants and guides, low-flying aircraft for spotting of partisan
hideouts, and bloodhounds in an unspecified manner. The thought that
bitter winter weather would force the partisans to give~tltemselves up,
seems to have to have been a wrong guess, because according to
subsequent reports, some partisans sought refuge in their villages,
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refuge in their villages, while the remainder erected headquarters
in the woods. Winter merely slowed up partisan action and the
Germans expected to have them come out with increased strength
in the spring.
30. During the year that followed, partisan activity more
than met SD expectations. At times the SD had to call on military
units for help. By the end of 1942, partisan groups of army size
were being encountered, as was the case in operation "Franz",
when Einsatzgruppe B encircled a "brigade" of 2000 partisans in
Byelorussia and succeeded in killing 1400 along with 900 of their
supporters (Bandenhelfer). At about the same time, Einsatzgruppe
B reported the existence of another group north of Loknja, under the
leadership of Soviet Colonel fnu WASSILJEW; the estimated strength
of that group was 1500. Although the SD killed partisans by the
score, there always seemed to be more of them ready to take the
place of their fallen comrades.
31. As noted in paragraph 1 above, the SD was able to
capture relatively few NKVD documents** as the Germans moved
deeper and deeper into Soviet domain; from captured agents, however,
they were able to get a good idea of the methods used by the Soviets
in dispatching people behind the lines. A few cases are cited below.
32. Marija PLATONOWA, twenty years of age, was working
at the Kolpino radio broadcasting center at the outbreak of war . In
December 1941, she was trained at the radio school located at
Krestowski-Ostrow and became a w/t instructor. At the school she
also received instruction in map-reading and was told by her instructor
that she was to be dropped behind the German lines although she never
had received parachute training. He then introduced her to twenty-
year old Marija SCHTATNOWA, who was to be her companion on the
mission.
Although it is not stated in the RSHA reports, the captured doc-
uments provide ample reason for believing that more and more
people joined the partisans as it gradually dawned on them that
the Germans were not "liberators" but tyrants of a new order.
Among the Soviet records seized were those of the All-Union
Communist Party, Smolensk District, 1917-1941. But these were
not records of the NKVD,
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33. On 16 April 1942, Marija PLATONOWA and Marija
SCHTATNOWA were taken by auto to the Liwaschowo airfield in
the Leningrad suburbs. After two hours in the air, they para-
chuted into a swamp behind the German lines. Hiding her
parachute, Marija PLATONOWA shouldered her ration bag and
her w/t set and walked to Witchera III (sic) (S.eredka district) where
she presented herself as a refugee. On 27 April she went to
Maslogostizy; there she registered at the local German military
headquarters and was issued a regular personal identity document.
Although she was to transmit messages to the espionage center in
Leningrad every noon on the 53 meter band, and every midnight on
80 meters, she was unable to send any messages because of
antenna trouble.
34. After leaving the swamp, Marija SCHTATNOWA lived
in the woods for four days before going to her -native village,
Witchera III. There she divulged her mission to Anastasia
FEODOROWA, an old friend who happened to be in contact with
Soviet partisans. It was not long before the partisans asked her
to transmit their messages to the partisan center in Leningrad.
She was, however, unable to comply, because of a malfunctioning
antenna and battery. Anastasia FEODOROWA then urged. her to
turn her w/t set over to the partisans, on the basis that its presence
in the village could have serious consequences for the villagers.
Seeing the logic of the argument, SCHTATNOWA went to Aksentchewo
village on 4 May 1942 and delivered the set to the partisans. Both
SCHTATNOWA and PLATONOWA were arrested soon thereafter.
35. Alexej DSEMESCHTSCHIK, a thirty-year old engineer,
was working in a tobacco factory at Wassiliewski -Ostrow in
August 1942, when he was approached by an unknown civilian and
asked to fill out a questionnaire. Soon he received orders to
report to an NKVD school located in the area. There he met Wladimir,
his brother, and Simon RUBAKIN, his brother-in-law. His supervisor
at the school was "SINOWEI LWOWITSCH', the civilian who had handed
him the questionnaire. He received instructions in the use of explosives
and weapons, and theoretical lessons in the art of hiding in German
occupied territory. He was also taught how to reconnoiter German
military establishments. He was then made the leader of a four-men
group which included the above-mentioned relatives.
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36. On 8 October 1942 the group was told to proceed
to the Pleskau (PSKOV) area (behind the German lines) and to
blow up the flax machine factory, the fur factory, the electrical
power works, and a railway bridge. The group was given the
names of eight people in Pleskau, whom they could approach for
help, but was cautioned that these people should be addressed
only by their aliases. Provided with rations, pistols, rifles,
explosives, grenades, axes, a first-aid kit, and a "Sever" type
w/t set, the group was dropped (in pairs) behind the lines on the
night of 5 November 1942. Alexej DSEMESCHTSCHIK recovered
the equipment, but could not find the other members of the group
and started out for Pleskau, hoping to find them there. He was
apprehended by the Germans on the way. His companions, also
separated from one another, started out in various directions,
hoping to make contact. All were arrested in short order.
37. Radio-trained Victor FEODOROW had barely reached
the age of twenty when he received orders to go on a mission behind
the German lines. In Leningrad he was provided with a false
passport and a false certificate citing him as unfit for military
service. Supplied with pistols, grenades, compasses, a "Sever"
type w/t set, and 200 German marks, FEODOROW and a companion,
Iwan MICHAILOW, were taken to a Leningrad airfield at midnight of
3 August 1942. An hour later the pair landed near Radilowskoje Lake.
FEODOROW stayed in the woods while MICHAILOW--according to
plan--went to Schabinez village to see an uncle. MICHAILOW returned
to report that his uncle was dead. The pair moved on toward Pererosten,
and again FEODOROW stayed in the woods while MICHAILOW went to
the village of Podmoschje. While waiting in the woods, FEODOROW
established radio contact with Leningrad and the following messages
were exchanged:
FEODOROW: Landed O. K. Found parachute, but not
big bag of rations.
FEODOROW: No German troops around Pererosten,
Alexejewka, Pawlowo and Schabinez villages.
No troop movements on Porchow-Nowoselle
highway or 5.8.1942.
FEODOROW: German passes are used in this area. Land
is divided between the farmers. Soviet war
prisoners work on the highways.
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Leningrad:
Leningrad:
FEODOROW:
Leningrad:
Leningrad:
MICHAILOW uncle dead. MICHAILOW
went to his native village Podmoschje.
Promised to return within 24 hours.
Report immediately why MICHAILOW
went to Podrnoschje village
MICHAILOW went to Podmoschje to
visit his uncle. I waited for him for
five days and am running out of food.
Ration your food. Help is coming.
Food is gone.
Food will be dropped I September 1942.
Send coordinates and direction.
Coordinates plate 31, 35. North-South
Radilowskoje Lake.
No airplanes. Waiting for an answer.
When one is asleep one cannot.)hear
flying aircraft. Bag with food was
dropped at the agreed place.
On the verge of starvation, FEODOROW reported to the
mayor of Pererosten on 9 September 1942, and soon found himself at
the German police station in Karamyschewo.
3.? When MICHAILOW left FEODOROW in the woods for the
second time, he apparently had no intention of returning. He went to
Podmoschje, where an uncle of his was the town mayor; he told his
uncle that he was a Soviet spy and that he had just walked all the way
from Leningrad. He hid his pistol, map, and compass under the roof
of his uncle's house, and burned the false passport given to him by the
Soviets. He then, went to Dubowo and officially registered himself in
his true name. During August 1942 the partisans attached Dubowo and
made off with all the documents in the mayor's office, therefore,
MICHAILOW had to get a new passport, this time from the local govern-
ment in Porchow. He then obtained employment in a sawmill in
Podmoschje, but was soon arrested by the German SD, presumably as
a result of FEODOROW's confession.
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39. If NKVD agents were a hazard to the Germans in
general and the SD in particular, the local communists were a
positive menace, because they were already living behind the
lines under natural cover and in sufficient strength to create
organized havoc. Within days after the outbreak of German-
Russian hostilities they had disseminated subversive leaflets
in Greece, Vienna, Duesseldorf, Berlin and Zagreb. The SD
confiscated mimeographs and stencils in Prague; and 2000
Communist functionaries were arrested on 3 July 1941, presum-
ably in Bulgaria.
40. The Communist activity, varying as it did with
each area according to the political and military situation,
included. the formation of partisan units; the formation of cells
for passive resistance; the assassination of German officers; the
sabotage of radio stations, communications cables, telephone
lines, railway equipment and bridges; raids on radio stations,
armament plants, towns and villages; the dissemination of
leaflets and posters, as well as the dissemination of news heard
on foreign broadcasts. What bothered the SD was the organized
character of this activity. The CP organization in the city of
Kiev may be used as an illustration.
41. Established shortly after the outbreak of the Russo-
German war, the "Secret City Committee of the Communist Party
in Kiev" took on a structural composition analogous to the old
Party organization. The secretary of the "Secret City Committee'
had at his disposal nine secretaries of district committees in Kiev
and kept in touch with them by means of five or six liaison men.
Reliable Party members were assigned to the district committees
to carry out Party objectives, and these individuals, in turn, were
instructed to recruit other "resolute" members for the same purpose.
Financial aid in support of this work was promised by the parent
committee.
42. According to Committee documents captured by the
SD, the Party objectives were: distribution of leaflets, dissemination
or rumors, distribution of Communist literature, and the collection of
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T
information on measures taken by the occupying authorities and on
the public mood. Activity along these lines was not to be started
until special orders had been issued by higher Party echelons; these
orders were expected within four to six weeks after the Germans had
occupied Kiev.
43. The regular Kiev CP functionaries had left the city for
Borispol on or before 19 September 1941, in accordance with Stalin's
orders. The secret organization was formed on the principle of
strict secrecy on the part of the functionaries among themselves and
toward outsiders; the functionaries were to know only their immediate
superiors and subordinates. Functionaries selected for secret Party
work were provided with aliases, false passports, and were relocated
in various zones of the city. They were given two to three thousand
rubles in cash; and almost without exception they had been given pistols
before the actual seizure of Kiev.
44. A Party membership book of the secretuCP, captured by
the Germans in March 1943, contained the following:
"The illegal Communist Party (Bolsheviki), NKP (b)*,
is a section of the Bolshevik Party, hence it is
based on the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism.
The objectives of the NKP (b) are the liberation
of our socialist homeland from German-Rumanian
national fascism and the reestablishment of a
socialist regime in our homeland. Another task
is to inform (by agitation and propaganda) the
western nations about the aims of the murderous
Hitler and his hordes, which have come to our
country; and to inform them about the aims of the
Bolshevist Party, with Stalin, the bright genius,
at its head.
"NKP (b) must prepare the population of occupied areas
for rebellion against the invaders. For that purpose
the NKP (b) forms a vast political-propaganda
organization, and forms fighting forces which will
help disarm the occupational forces. It will mobilize
citizens to help their brothers who are at the front
fighting the enemies of mankind.
"Nelegalnaja KP" i. e. , "Illegal CP".
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"Statutes of the NKP (b) Only he can become a member
of the NKP (b) who vows to devote the whole of
his life to his socialist homeland, who vows to
bear his honor membership in the Party organi-
zation, and who vows to fulfill without reservation
all orders of the Central Committee.
1'The Central Committee, which is at the top of the
NKP (b), is responsible to the Central Committee
of the WKP (b)--the central committee of the
All-Russian Communist Party.* The district
groups answer to the Central Committee of the
NKP (b); the sub-groups account to the district
groups; individual members are responsible to
the units to which they belong. Disobedience is
considered treason. it
45. Alongside the illegal Communist Party in Kiev, there
existed an illegal youth organization (Komsomol), using the same
methods and pursuing the same objectives. This illegal Komsomol
group, organized along the same lines as the NKP (b); its members
were generally between 17 and 25 years of age. Although a parallel
activity, it was subordinate to the CP in Kiev.
46. While the documents under review throw light on the
organizational structure of the secret CP in Kiev, they do not
indicate what success the organization may have had in the pursuit
of its objectives; but from the details to be found in Addendum F..
it may be inferred that the SD was the source of many difficulties
for the Communists, no matter where they operated.
47. In the initial stages of the German-Soviet war the
Germans directed their propaganda effort toward Red Army troops,
dropping leaflets. that encouraged them to desert. Using the same
frequency band as the Moscow Comintern Radio Station, and aping
the voice of that station's announcer, the German, radio station
beamed false news to the east, hoping to disconcert the Red Army
6 Now Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
C7.1
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troops and the Soviet people as a whole. For example, the capture
of Kiev and Leningrad was announced when these cities were held by
Soviet troops. As the Soviet military forces retreated they abandoned
Soviet radio stations, newspapers and other media, creating propaganda
opportunity which the Germans were not slow to seize and exploit.
48. At first, leaflets in the German language were dropped
over occupied Soviet territory, but it soon became apparent to the
Germans that they would have to use a language the common people
could read. Berlin suggested to the German military authorities that
a more intense propaganda campaign be started through the use of
newspapers, magazines, posters, motion pictures and radio."
Accordingly, a propaganda team was formed, consisting of the
following: Captain fnu STOFFROGEN, Sonderfuehrer fnu NAGS,
Sonderfuehrer Dr. fnu SCHULE, and Sonderfuehrer fnu KAISER.
49. The first newspaper to appear was the bi-weekly
Smolensker Nachrichten (Smolensk News), printed in Russian.
A similar paper, Glocke (Bell), was published in Witebsk shortly
thereafter. Both papers were read eagerly by the news-hungry
Soviet people, especially because they got more truth from these
publications than they had received from the press under the
Communist regime. In February 1942, Retsch (Speech) came out
in Orel. Initially, the propaganda program called for a fight against
Soviet saboteurs and partisans, but increasingly the attack turned
against the kolkhoz system, with stress laid on impending land
reforms. Another favorite topic concerned the working conditions
in Germany, depicted in terms calculated to promote the recruitment
of Soviet people for labor in Germany.
50. In May 1942 the demand for reading matter was so great
that the Germans resorted to putting newspapers and posters in public
places in order to reach a wider audience. Otherwise the demand could
not have been met, owing to a shortage of paper, and a lack of qualified
interpreters and trained propagandists. Two propaganda organizations,
"The Committee for Peace and Tranquility" and "Drushina", were
The propaganda campaign was not under the jurisdiction of the SD,
but the SD did report on it,, presumably because of its interest in
the "public mood".
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formed in Gomel. Movie theatres in Orel, Roslawl and Mogilew
were reopened. The use of loud-speakers in these cities was
considered. All in all, the Germans considered their propaganda
to be vigorous and effective, especially in the urban areas.
51. People were eager for information about Germany,
about the Nazi Party, and about Adolf Hitler himself. They
wanted to know all about the NKVD, because this subject had
been taboo under Communist rule. Fnu ALBRECHT's book
about the NKVD was very popular, as were his pamphlets Is This
a Building-up of Socialism, In the Cellar of the GPU, and Stalin's
Rule. The mayor of Sytschewka was sent to Germany and--upon
his return--he became an effective propagandist. Russians who
had been German prisoners of war during World War I also
contributed to the German propaganda campaign.
52. In addition to Glocke, two other publications appeared in
Witebsk: Das Neue Leben (New Life), an illustrated newspaper, as
well as Die Geisel (The Hostages), a comic paper. Monatschrift
fue Politik'.und Kultur (Monthly Review of Politics and Culture) was
also published there. A special newspaper for the Tartars was
printed in the Crimea. In Dnepropetrowsk, press propaganda was
limited to one newspaper, Dnepropetrowsk Zeitung (Dnepropetrowsk
News), published in Ukrainian. In Kiev, both newspapers, Novo
Ukrainske Slowo (New Ukrainian Word) and Poslednie Nowosti (The
Latest News) reportedly had shrunk in size by October 1942, probably
owing to the paper shortage.
53. Motion pictures were considered to be especially effective
propaganda instruments. In Sytschewka, the German motion picture
Wiener Blut (Vienese Blood) was shown, and the theatre was packed
long before the show started. Besides this feature picture, the
Russian audience was shown the assault upon Sevastopol. In Bryansk
the German picture Sieben Jahre Pech (Seven Years of Bad Luck) was
used as a feature film. Especially impressive were German news reels.
The result: the movie theatres were always filled to capacity and the
people asked for more pictures depicting life in Germany, but liked any
picture as long as it had quality.
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54. In Zhitomir, loud speakers were used on market
days to bring news to the Russian people in their own language.
In Charkow, the Germans organized an anti-Communist exhibition
entitled Nieder mit dem Bolschewismus (Down with Bolshevism).
Exhibited were materials dealing with problems of youth, health,
and the economy. Posters showing two radiant Ukrainian boys
who had just volunteered for the labor force in Germany were to
be seen elsewhere while other posters depicted life under
Communist rule- -starvation, purges.
55. Yet, by the end of 1942, German propaganda was
running into heavy criticism. The Russian intelligencia kept
asking the Germans to clarify their political plans.* Others
protested against false statements made about Communist
leaders. Also, the program for the recruitment of labor began
to falter badly. Letters from Russian workers who had gone to
Germany described conditions very different than the Sauerbraten
and Bier idyl spewed up by the mechanisms designed to glorify
Germany.** In the Ukraine, where the Germans were trying to
combat the influence of Soviet propaganda, they were asked why
they did not expose Soviet lies about the "new spirit" of the
Soviet army, religious freedom, and agrarian reform. (German
authorities in the Ukraine sent a letter to the OMI (Ostministerium)
in Berlin about this matter.) The Soviet victory in Stalingrad in
January 1943 gave German propaganda one of its most damaging
blows. Sensing the change, Berlin instructed German authorities
in Byelorussia to pay more attention to the psychology of the
people. ***
See also paragraph 22 above.
~e For a realistic picture see William Shirer?s "Rise and Fall of
the Third Reich", pp 949-951.
The Byelorussians were still protesting against being treated
differently than the people in the area once held by Poland.
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56. German propaganda in the Baltic States failed to
achieve any marked results, although German controlled news-
papers (some printed in German) were widely read. Motion
pictures were popular and widely used. Cars equipped with
loud-speakers were employed to keep pedestrians abreast: of
the times. But somehow the Baltic people, particularly the
intelligensia, remained singularly unaffected by German
blandishments. The Germans were well aware that the
Baltic countries had enjoyed cordial relations with Great
Britain and other Western countries in the past, but apparently
decided this was a question best left alone. Although the
Germans were also not happy about the Finnish broadcast
beamed at Estonia, which touched on controversial questions
such as Estonian independence, liberal socialism, etc., there
is nothing in the available captured documents to suggest that
they were prepared to make an issue of that irritation. *
The Germans apparently directed their propaganda effort
primarily at occupied Soviet territory rather than at the
Western Ukraine or the Baltics.
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1j ILI
NKVD OPERATIVES AND PERSONS CONNECTED WITH THEM
IT,
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NKVD Operatives and Persons Connected with Them
fnu ABRIKOSOW Serial 735 Frame 266682
A member of a Crimean auxiliary police force; also a
member of a terrorist and sabotage group* in Simferopol in 1942.
"AGEJEW" 735. * ........... 266782
A Soviet lieutenant who was chief of a sabotage group
known as "Young Comrades", in Priluky, Ukraine, before his
arrest by the Germans on 26 March 1943.
Tolja AHONIN 3647 ............. 2885
A Jewish NKVD agent, arrested and executed by the Germans
on 16 October 1941.
Simon ALEXANDROWISCH 3647 ............. 2885
A Jew, executed by the Germans in Byelorussia in 1941
for having explosives in his possession.
fnu AWDEJEW 3647 ............. 3069
An NKVD captain in the special unit of the 42nd Army in
Leningrad in 1941. He expressed the opinion that Leningrad would
surrender to the Germans.
e