(sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP65-00756R000500050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Counter Intelligence War Room
London
THE
GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
APRIL, 1945.
This document supersedes
EDS/G/9 The German Intelligence Services
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ipwg VlacagiisFor Release 1999/09/07:
A.:
B.
SECURITY AND REPRESSION ...
Paras.
14-27
Amt III (SD) ...
15-19
Amt IV (Gestapo)
Amt V (Kripo)
?
27
C.
INTELLIGENCE
28
Amt VI . ? ? ?
29 16
Sections of Amt VI
29-39
Addresses of Amt VI
40
Outstations of Amt VI ...
? ? 7
41-42
Stay-behind agents of Amt VI
43
Political Penetration
44-45
Divisions within Amt VI ,..
?
?
46
Amt VII
47-48
The Mil. Amt ..?
49
D.
Static organisation of Mil. Amt
(i) At HQ
(ii) Within Germany ...
(iii) In neutral territory ...
Organisation in the Field ...
Stay-behind agents and line-crossers
Summary and Conclusions ...
SABOTAGE ...
General ...
Amt VI S
SS Jaegerbataillon 502
SS Jagdverbaende
150 Panzer Brigade ...
Mil. D. FAK and FAT ...
Hitler Jugend ...
Results of operations?
E. ASSOCIATED ORGANISATIONS ...
I/KG 200 .:.
? ? .
Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende...
F. CONCLUSIONS
G. DIAGRAM
' 2
50-60
50-58
59
60
61-67
61 67
68-71
72-93
72-74
75
77-78
79-88
- 89
90
91
92-93
_ 94-109
95-104
105-109
110-121
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tui GERMAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES
A. GENERAL
1: The present constitution of the G.I.S. dates from the summer of
1944, when Himmler won his victory over the OKW. Till then, there
had been two parallel and often competing organisations, the Abwehr
(being the intelligence service of the OKW), and Amt VI of the RSHA
(being the foreign intelligence service of the SS). By February, 1944,
it was clear that the inefficiency of the Abwehr could not be corrected
by such administrative changes as had hitherto been carried out.
More drastic measures were required. Admiral Canaris, head of the
Abwehr, was dismissed; and after a period of compromise, which only
veiled the real struggle for power between Himmler and the OKW,
the Abwehr, as an independent organisation, was dissolved (June 1st,
1944), to be recreated as a subordinate office (the Militaerisches Amt,
or Mil. Amt) of the RSHA. Thus the defeat of the Abwehr was com-
plete even before the conspiracy of July 20th, 1911 ;' but the par-
ticipation of some of its surviving ,directors in that conspiracy enabled
Himmler to prove that his defeated rivals had been not only inefficient
but also disloyal, and thus to clear away the debris of his victory.
2. The victory of the SS simplified the constitution of the G.I.S.
insofar as this now became one organisation instead of two; but in
another respect it made it apparently more complex and illogical.
Though the directors of the old Abwehr were almost all either dis-
missed (like Canaris) or ruined in the plot of July 20th (like Hansen
and Freytag von Loringhoven), many of its component elements were
taken over intact by the RSHA. The result, therefore, while it repre-
sents on the highest level a complete triumph for the SS, represents a
compromise in the lower strata. There the broken and fossilised relics
of the Abwehr are still to be found, the pressure of time and events
not yet having allowed ' their assimilation. The new organisation is
thus in many respects still confused and experimental and subject to '
the inconsistencies and improvisations inevitable when one organisa-
tion takes over another that is at least as fully developed as itself.
Much that is stated in the following pages about the constitution of
the G.I.S. may therefore become out of date and subject to revision.
This is especially true of the paragraphs dealing with the sabotage
organisations under Ostubaf. Skorzeny.
3. In order to see past this structural confusion, it is first necessary
to indicate the nature of the two organisations at the time of their
fusion. The following is a brief summary of (a) the Abwehr, (b) the
RSHA, at that time.
4. The Abwehr was divided functionally into three sections, numbered
I, II and III, and responsible, respectively, for the following three
kinds of work:
I. The collection of operational intelligence;
II. The, organisation of sabotage and subversion in enemy, or
potential enemy territory;
III. Counter-espionage and the safeguarding of the security of the
Wehrmacht.
These sections were further subdivided into appropriate subsections.
Inside Germany, and in occupied territory, the regional organisation
of the Abwehr was dependent upon, and parallel to, that of the OKW ;
there was an Ast in every Wehrkreis in the Reich, and an Abwehr-
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leitstelle with every Heeresgruppe in the occupied countries. In
neutral countries the Abwehr was represented ? by so-called K O's
attached to the German diplomatic missions. In addition to this
static organisation, the Abwehr had mobile Abwehr Kommandos and
Trupps operating with the armies in operational areas. All these
features, or adaptations of them, still exist in the new organisq tion.
Abwehr Abt. II also disposed of a private army, the Brandenburg
Division, used both as a pool for linguists and other specialists and a
task-force for sabotage and subversion. This was returned to the
OKH in September, 1911, to be reconverted into an .ordinary Wehr-
macht formation.
5. The RSHA, which now controls the whole German Secret Service
for intelligence, sabotage, and security, both inside and outside Germany,
is the 'GHQ of the Sipo and SD, whose head (Chef der Sipo und SD,
abbreviated CDS), SS Obergruppenfiihrer Kaltenbrunner, reports
directly to Himmler. Of the main German police, security, and special
services, only the Orpo, or uniformed constabulary, is outside its
control. The Sipo and SD between them comprise three services:
(1) Geheimestaatspolizei (Gestapo)..
Sipo
(2) Kiiminalpolizei (Kripo)
(3) Sicherheitsdienst (SD)
The SD is further subdivided into two departments, one collecting
intelligence from inside Germany and- German-occupied territory, the
Other froin outside the Reich.
?The Kripo and Gestapo are well-known executive police agencies.
The SD, both inside and outside Germany, is a fact-finding depart-
ment, which takes no official action, and tries to be as little known as
possible.
6. The RSHA is divided into seven departments (Aemter), with the
following official functions: .
I and II Sipo offices responsible for the administration of the ,RSHA,
particularly for pay and personnel.
III " HQ of SD within the Reich.
IV HQ of Gestapo.
V HQ of Kripo.
VI Foreign Intelligence.
VII Culture.
The exact nature of these functions will be dealt with later.
7. The character of the RSHA has of curse been subject to changes
caused by historical and personal forces, and it is necessary to supple-
ment this summary of its technical organisation with some account of
its recent development.
The first important figure in the history of the RSHA was Reinhard
Heydrich, the first Chef der Sipo und SD, who, with Himmler, was
responsible for combining the security service of the SS and the State
police in 1939. As head of the RSHA, Heydrich concentrated
almost entirely on eliminating opposition to the totalitarian state at
war. Espionage abroad had been defined by a `: Gentleman's Agree-
ment" between Heydrich and Canaris as largely the function of the
Abwehr; Amt VI was then still an insignificant depai !Anent, and its
head at that time, Brigadefiihrer Jost, was unimportant in comparison
with the heads of the Gestapo. Although' Himmler had given orders
that he must have a foreign intelligene.e, service of his own, the RSHA
did not have the right kind of men for the work; very few of the
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officers of the RSHA had any knowledge of foreign countries or
languages. Schellenberg himself, the future architect of Himmler's
intelligence service, was in Amt IV in 1939.
8. The character of the RSHA was changed after 1942 by the intro-
duction into key positions within it of two new figures, Kaltenbrunner
and Schellenberg.
9. Kaltenbrunner, who eventually became head of the RSHA after the
assassination of Heydrich in 1942, is an Austrian, and is regarded as the
leader of a so-called " Austrian " group whose antagonism to a "North
German" group within the RSHA is frequently and reliably reported.
Before his appointment, he was a Higher SS and Police leader in
Austria. Though he had a long and "good " record in :the SS, he was
not as prominent or as powerful as Heydrich had been, and with the
growth of his responsibilities has been in some respects overshadowed
by his more forceful subordinates, and in particular by Schellenberg
and Muller.
16. Schellenberg who succeeded- Jost as head of Amt VI, is a North
German. He is ambitious and able, and has the ear of Himmler;
from 1942 onwards, Amt VI, under his control, has ceased to be a
neglected corner of the RSHA. Since 1943, when it became clear
that Himmler's personal power in Germany was growing at the expense
of the OKVV, Schellenberg's authority steadily increased at the expense
of the Abwehr, until, in May, 1944, he took over its espionage and
sabotage sections. With this sudden accretion of power, as the official
head of both Amt VI and the Mil. Amt, Schellenberg controlled a
large and unified intelligence organisation working for Himmler.
11. Recent reports suggest that Schellenberg has since attempted to
make the G.I.S. as far as possible independent of Kaltenbruimer and
the RSHA as a whole, thus dividing the RSHA. into two distinct
services, a police and security service (largely under Muller; see
below, para. 25), and a secret intelligence service under Schellenberg.
To these two services, a third has been added by the gradual and more
recent development of a terrorist organisation under Ostubaf Otto
Skorzeny.
12. Until the incorporation of the Abwehr, the RSHA was in theory
uninterested, and in practice only slightly interested in sabotage,
subversion, and terrorist activity, these functions being left to Abt II
of the Abwehr, and its organ the Brandenburg Division; but with the
growth of Himmler's power, the, RSHA began to intervene in this
field, and when the Abwehr was dissolved, and. the Brandenburg
Division returned to the OKH, the new opportunities were exploited
by the setting up of special formations under Skorzeny. Skorzeny is
an Austrian, and was a member of the Students Freikorps and the
illegal Nazi party in Austria, He was thrown into prominence by his
spectacular rescue of Mussolini in 1943. When first put in charge of
sabotage and subversion in the RSHA, he was subordinated to Amt
VI; but the subsequent progress of the war has favoured the growth
of his department, and he is by now almost independent ofSchellenberg.
He belongs anyway to the Austrian group in the RSHA, and is
naturally a follower of Kaltenbrunner. rather than of Schellenberg.
He reports direct to Kaltenbrunner, or more often to Himmler, and
sometimes to Hitler himself. He is not an intelligence officer, or
naturally a part of Schellenberg's service; he is a terrorist leader.
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13. Thus the RSHA is gradually becoming divided functionally into
three departments concerned, respectively with espionage, subversion,
and security?comparable in their definitions, but not in their scale,
to the old divisions of the Abwehr. (For the differences between them
are more important than the superficial resemblances). These con- -
venient divisions, however, are not yet represented in the constitutional
structure of the RSHA, which, as stated above, is still conditioned by
the survival of old elements both of the Abwehr and o'f the former
character of the RSHA. The arrangement of this handbook in detail
must follow the structural arrangement of the G.I.S., but in general
it* will as far as possible follow the main divisions of activity; viz.:
(1) Security and Repression.
(2) Intelligence.
(3) Sabotage.
B. SECURITY
14. Security and Repression are the functions of the Gestapo and
Kripo, i.e., of Amt IV and Amt V of the RSHA, using information
collected by the SD, i.e., Amt III. Counter espionage and the security
of the Wehrmacht had been the functions of Abt III of the Abwehr,
but as this section was broken up between Amt IV. and Amt VI of the
RSHA, and did not survive into the Mil. Amt, it does not now require
separate notice. The only survivals from the former Abwehr Abt III
are the III FAK's and FAT's, which after a short period under the
OKW, reverted to the Mil. Amt. These III FAK's. and FAT's will be
more conveniently treated in conjunction with the other FAK's and
FAT's (see below, para. 61 foll.). The present sections will deal only
with Aemter III, IV and V of the RSHA.
.AMT
15. Amt III is the headquarters of the SD as it works within the
frontiers of the Reich. It controls, and receives reports from, the SD
stations which are to be found in every town of any size in Germany.
These SD stations called SD Abschnitte?or, in large towns, Leitab-
schnitte?employ paid agents and casual informers of all kinds to
report on morale and opinion in every sphere of German life. (A
Leitabschnitt exercises authority over an area roughly but not exactly
equivalent to a Wehrkreis.) The reports are used in two ways: firstly,
to tell the Gestapo when opposition is growing and where repression
may be needed; and secondly, to keep the Government and Party
offices informed of public opinion. It is sub-divided into sections
specialising in, for example, church affairs, press, minority groups, the
learned professions, economic conditions.
16. Amt III grew out of the SD Hauptarnt which was the head-
quarters of the Intelligence Service of the SS Party organisation. It
has a long tradition of espionage and penetration going back to the
days when the Party was-in opposition. It has its agents in every
important institution in Germany, and particularly in the higher ranks
of the German civil service; its chief, Gruppenfiihrer Ohlendorf, is
himself a high official in the Reichswirtschaftministerium. Not eyen
Goebbels can be certain who are the SD agents within his department.
17. Amt III is reported to keep a card index recording the political
sympathies of all suspect or potentially suspect persons in Germany;
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and Amt III stations issue periodical situation reports on morale in
their area. Amt III documents, if captured, will be of the greatest
value to the occupying authorities.
18. Amt III has two tasks of special importance?the surveillance
and penetration of communities of German origin living outside
Germany, the Volksdeutsche ; and the surveillance of foreign workers
within Germany. The Volksdeutsche, particularly in central Europe,
were used by Amt III for ordinary espionage, Amt III to this extent
encroaching on Amt VI's sphere. Amt III places its agents among
the hundreds of thousands of foreign workers in Germany, and receives
regular reports on all subversive movements among them. It can be
assumed as certain that when the foreign workers from Germany are
repatriated there will be a fair proportion of SD agents among them.
It would be dangerous to think of Amt III as restricting itself entirely 44
to espionage inside Germany.
19. Amt III spies on the whole German people on behalf of Himmler
and, the SS, and in this sense must be considered as a department of
the German Secret Service. The: static organisation of Amt III can
be easily mapped and easily destroyed; and as Germany falls under
Allied occupation, Amt III's network of agents and informers will no
longer be able to send in reports to the local SD stations. But it is a
service whose efficiency depends on the number and secrecy of its
contacts; these contacts will not easily be traced, and some of them
will already have had experience a reporting to clandestine head-
quarters._,.
MT TV
20. Amt IV is the headquarters of the Gestapo. Like Amt III, it
directs' and receives reports from local stations in every town of con-
sequence in Germany, called Gestapostellen, or, in the federal and
provincial capitals, Gestapoleitstellen. Further, the Gestapo had a
huge organisation in occupied territory. The task of the Gestapo is
to suppress opposition of all kinds to the Nazi State and movement.
It iS now the only complete security and C.E. service in Germany,
having taken over in May, 1944, almost all the personnel and functions
of Abwehr III (a small section of Abwehi- III was taken into Amt VI,
see para. 39 below).
21. Its headquarters is divided into two sections, Amt IVA and
Arht IVB, which are further sub-divided into numbered subsections;
the local Gestapo stations in Germany and in occupied territory are -
sub-divided on the same principle. The Sections of IVA deal with
traditional Gestapo subjects?Communism, Right-wing Anti-Nazi
Groups, frontier control, sabotage, etc. Amt IVB is the counter-
espionage section which has taken over the tasks of Abwehr III,
except for purely military security. Its sections are divided geo-
graphically, e.g., IVB I A combats French and Belgian espionage,
IVB I B Dutch, English, American and Canadian espionage.
22. At the centre of the Gestapo organisation, and the strength of
its method as a .security service, is a large card index of persons and
cases which have passed through its machinery. Wherever it goes,
the Gestapo creates a card index.
23. In operational areas the Gestapo works in mobile formations
known as Sipo and SD Kornmandos. Th,ese Kommandos pm-sue
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guerrillas, spies and saboteurs on German lines of communication.
They fought against Partisans in Yugoslavia, the Underground in
Poland, and the Maquis in France. 'The Gestapo has now assumed a
mobile organisation in -battle zones inside Germany. Sipo and SD
Kommandos are composite formations, including SD personnel who
are normally responsible to Amt III, but their work, and most of their
personnel, belongs to the Gestapo. They are commanded by a Kom-
mandeur of the Sipo and SD. Within Germany the Einsatz Kom-
mandos may be expected to try to kill or remove anyone who is likely
to collaborate with the Allies.
't4. Within Germany the powers of the Gestapo are unlimited. It
makes arrests, tortures and executes. . It supervises concentration
camps, censors telephones, telegraph and mail, and may intervene
'whenever it chooses. Outside Germany it has had considerable
successes in the penetration of Allied Intelligence Services. It is
represented in neutral countries by a Police Attach?or by someone
with diplomatic cover, and also by the C.E. officer attached to the
Kommando der Meldegebiet (see below). Very often the same officer
represents the interests of both Amt VI and the Gestapo in a neutral
country.
25. Amtschef IV is Gruppenfiihrer Muller, a Bavarian, who camqo
the RSHA from the Bavarian political police. He was a Gruppe -
fiihrer in 1941, and has retained and enlarged his powers throughout
the war. In 1942 he was expected to succeed Heydrich, and ha s
recently received new decorations. Apart from the power which is a
natural consequence of controlling the greater part of the RSHA, he
is deputy to Kaltenbrurmer and is now certainly one of the most
powerful of all Himmler's officers.
26. The Gestapo has been compelled to receive a large influx of new
recruits to do the work of repression in occupied Europe, and SD men
in Allied hands have reported that many of these are not reliable
Party men. Amt IV has been diluted by a host of police officials, and
because"of this dilution, the SD has planted its agents within the
Gestapo itself to report signs of disloyalty. There is a tradition of
animosity between the two services.
AMT V
27. Amt V is the Headquarters of the Kripo, which is in no sense
part of the G.I.S. It is mentioned here only because it is part of the
RSHA, and because it works in close conjunction with the Gestapo.
Many of the officers of the Gestapo have been, and are being, recruited
from the Kripo. It is possible that members of the SD and the
Gestapo may try to cover themselves by transference to the Kripo.
Gruf. Nebe, formerly Amtschef, was involved in the conspiracy of
July 20th; it is probable though not certain that Muller now com-
mands both Kripo and Gestapo.
C. INTELLIGENCE ?
28. The collection of intelligence is the function of Amt VI and Amt
VII of the RSHA, and of the Mil. Amt, excepting one section of the
Mil. Amt (Mil. Amt D) which deals with sabotage and will be more
conveniently coesidered under that heading, and the II and III FAK's
and FAT's which still carry out 'their old functions of Abwehr II and
III work, but which will for convenience be treated together with
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I FAK's and FAT's in this sectioft. Both these services are under the
control of Brigadefiihrer Schellenberg, who has a small group of SD
officers to exercise his authority over both Amt VI and the Mil. Amt.
Those best known to us are Staf. Sandberger, responsible for adminis-
tration and personnel, and Staf. Steimle, responsible for all espionage
in Western Europe. Although the two offices are thus combined at
the top, they are formally separate, and their organisation can be
described separately.
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AMT VI
29. Amt VI is divided into lettered sections known as Gruppen,
which are further' sub-divided into numbered subsections called
Referate. Unfortunately the principle of division is partly geo-
graphical and partly according to function; in fact there is no clear
principle of division; further, since Amt VI has grown rapidly in the
last two years, absorbing new people and new work, its organisation
has been constantly changing, and any description of it As soon out of
?
date.
30. Apart from the principal Sections of Amt VI, Schellenberg is
reported to have a cabinet of confidential advisers who are in fact
more important than the heads of the various sections. Stubaf, Eggen,
one of Schellenberg's economic advisers, is one of the most important;
but as such men do not normally 'come into direct contact with Amt VI
agents, our knowledge of them is small and needs to be supplemented.
31. The known sections of Amt VI are :--
VI A Administration?pay and personnel.
VI B Western Europe?France, Low Countries, Switzerland,
the Iberian Peninsula, and French and. Spanish Morocco.
VI C Eastern Balkans, Near and Far East, Turkey and Russia.
VI C Z Special section for sabotage operations on the Eastern
Front.
VI D U.K., Dominions, U.S.A., and South America.
VI E Italy, Central Europe and Scandinavia.
VI F The technical section responsible for equipment and
training of all kinds. -
VI G A small research section which collects enemy equipment,
works of art, records and scientific apparatus.
VI S Sabotage and -disruption.
VI Wi Economic intelligence.
VI Wi/T Technical intelligence?inventions and new weapons, etc.
, VI Z Counter-espionage and penetration in enemy occupied
and neutral .territory. ?
The heads of some of these sections and their more active officers are
known, but it must be remembered that they are constantly changing.
The known activities of the more interesting sections can be described
briefly:
32. VI B. Amt VI is now exploiting various collabomtionist
groups in Western Europe which fled to Germany. The best known
example is Joseph Darnand's Milice. The policy is to encourage these
groups to form their own intelligence services without too obvious
German interference, and to assist them in the training and despatch
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of agents. Staf. Bidder, an Alsatian who was head of Amt VI in
France now directs this work as head of Leitstelle VI West.
33. VI D has one active section, VI D 4, under Hptstuf. Karsten,
which built up a large network in South America?particularly in the
Argentine. Amt VI has always been particularly interested in South
America, and in the use of the large German colony and the big German
firms there. It is possible that the heads of the RSHA hope to use the
SD's connections in South America for post-war espionage and asylum.
VI D used Spain and Portugal as a base for espionage against England
and the Americas.
34. VI E is largely Austrian in its personnel and works independently
of the other sections of Amt VI. Part at least of the VI E office is in
Vienna and its most important officers, Ostubaf Waneck and Stubaf.
Hoettl, report directly to Kaltenbrunner rather than to Schellenberg.
35. VI F is the largest and (excluding VI 5) the most important
section. It has its own laboratories and workshops and supplies
forged documents, secret inks, wireless and sabotage equipment of all
kinds. It organises W/T training schools and provides lecturers in the
use of explosives. Amt VI has its own W/T system which is adminis-
tered by VI F. The Havel Institute, hitherto the main W/T station
of Amt VI, has been dissolved and two new stations have been set up,
one south of Nurnberg, and one near Prague. Stubaf. Faross has
succeeded Stubaf. Siepen in charge of Amt VI's W/T stations and
operators.
36. VI S was established in August, 1943, under Skorzeny's com-
mand, because Himmler was dissatisfied with the achievements of the
small Amt VI sabotage section which preceded it (see below, para. 75).
37. VI Wi was originally set up under Stubaf. Seidler to recruit
German business men for espionage abroad. It has been swelled by
absorbing in June, 1911, the whole of the Economic Section of the
former...pwehr (Abwehr Eins Wirtschaft). The new section is called
VI Wi/T. Abwehr Eins Wi was one of the most active sections and
its chief, Obstltn. Focke, was one of the few Abwehr directors who
survived the various purges. Focke is believed to have remained in
VI Wi/T serving under a SD officer. VI Will' is very active in neutral
territory, particularly in Spain.
38. VI Wi/TIT is a technical subsection of VI Wi/T, which has good
connections in the Spanish commercial world.
39. VI Z is unique among the sections of Amt VI in that all its
known officers, including its head, Obstltn. Freund, are old Abwehr
' men. It is a small section taken over from Abwehr III F for counter-
espionage and penetration in neutral territory where the Gestapo
cannot easily reach.
Addresses of Amt VI
40. Nothing can safely be said about the whereabouts of Amt VI,
? since these are liable to constant revision. There is evidence that the
main H.Q. of Amt VI formerly partly in the Berkaerstrasse in Berlin
and 'partly at Schloss Banith, near Berlin, have been moved early
this year to Bad Berka, near Weimar; other parts of Amt VI have
been reported at Berlin-Wannsee ; probably VI E, and possibly VI C,
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are (or were until very recently,' in the There:sianum Gasse in Vienna.
It is reasonable to assume that the offices of Amt VI will concentrate
first in Thuringia and Bavaria and finally perhaps in the Obersalzberg
area.
Out-Stations of Amt VI
41. The organisation Sipo and SD in German-occupied territory need
not be described again. The general rule was that Amt VI had one
.or more officers on the establishment of the Sipo and SD Headquarters
in all capital or near-capital cities in Occupied territory. These Amt
VI officers would generally, but not always, report directly to Amt VI
in Berlin and not to the local Sipo and SD Commander.
42. In every neutral country there are one or more Amt VI officers
some of whom are camouflaged as members of the German Embassy;
but they report directly to Amt VI and do not disclose their activities
to the German Minister. In Turkey there were five or six SD men,
some of them diplomats, working for Amt VI. This was perhaps an
exceptionally large station. Ordinarily a station consists of two or
three officers with a number of agents and contacts; the Amt VI
representative in neutral territory usually has a reputation among the
well-informed as " Himmler's political observer." He has his own
communications independent of those of the much larger Mil. Amt
station; it is Schellenberg's policy that the two services although
centrally controlled, should as far as possible be kept separate at the
lower levels.
Stay-behind agents of Amt VI
43. Imitating the Mil. Amt, Amt VI had for a year or more before
D Day been planning a stay-behind network of WIT agents in France
and the Low Countries. This network was recruited largely by the
Amt VI officers attached to the Sipo and SD headquarters in Paris,
Brussels and The Hague. A special W/T control station was set up
for the purpose at Buhl, near Baden. The agents recruited were
generally ill-trained and unwilling to work for the Germans when they
had retreated. Consequently, the stay-behind network was a failure.
Amt VI's experiments in line-crossers and stay-behind agents have in
general been no more skilful or successful than those of the old Abwehr
or of the Mil. Amt.
Political Penetration
44. Amt VI has had its greatest successes in political penetration,
particularly in France and Italy. With the retreat into Germany of
pro-German parties and their leaders from almost every country in
Europe it now has magnificent opportunities of political penetration.
It has set up special liaison sections to control and set in motion these
Fascist refugees. Only two of these special liaison sections have been
? identified in the West and we are in urgent need of more detailed in-
formati_n about them. We know that there is liaison with the Rou-
manian Iron Guard, the Hungarian Arrow Cross, the Italian Fascist
republicans, and the four French Fascist parties (P.P.F., Milice,
Francistes, and R.N.P.), and with the Belgian Rexists. These special
liaison sections must have initiatHre and independence with the result
that the headquarters section of Amt VI can no longer retain control
of policy. Until the summer of 1944 almost all reports were received, ?
and instructions issued, from Berlin; the orga-nisation could have been
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paralysed by destroying its centre. It will now be necessary to
identify and destroy each of these special sections whose tentacles
extend outside Germany.
45. Agents recruited from Fascist emigrants are now being used on a
large scale as saboteurs to disturb Allied lines of communication, both
in the West and in the Balkans; their instructions are to form cells
and foment a counter-revolution to embarrass the Allies. This is the
short-range programme, but it may be expected that there is also a
long-range programme not designed to affect current operations but to
come into action after the war, There are thousands of potential and
aetual SD agents in RSHA training camps in Germany, and not all
of them will have been despatched before the end of hostilities. Amt
VI has in fact become the General Staff of the Intelligence Services of
the extreme Nationalist and Fascist groups in Europe.
Divisions within Amt VI
46. It must not be forgotten that Schellenberg's I.S., of which Amt
VI is the centre, although in theory single and centrally controlled, is
in fact like the RSHA itself composed of mutually suspicious cliques;
in particular reports that there is an Austrian faction within Amt VI
over which Schellenberg has no authority have been too persistent to
be disregarded. Part of Amt VI may try to continue its work under-
ground, but part will almost certainly try to establish contact with
one or other of the Allies as soon as possible.
AMT VII
47. Amt VII is the most mysterious of all the departments of the
RSHA, and almost certainly the smallest. Recent Teports suggest that
it has been reorganised within the last few months. It is an SD office
and its original function was the dissemination of Nazi culture. Its
head was Gruf. Dr. Six, who Was also a head of the Kultur Politisches
Abteilung of the German Foreign Office. Kultur Attaches are to be
found i1i several German Embassies abroad, whose task it is to make
contact with learned individuals and societies, and with writers and
journalists. Dr. Six directed this work both for the SD and for the '
Foreign Office, Ribbentrop being compelled to accept the fact that one
of his depatiments was also working for Himmler and the RSHA.
We know that Amt VII initiated political whispering campaigns and
, that it has been used as a cover for Amt VI's espionage.
48. Latest reports suggest that Schellenberg may try to use Amt VII-
as the research section of his I.S., but we need more information. Some
of the more educated, respectable and less obvious SD men will be
found in Amt VII, which could be used to prepare post-war espionage.
THE MIL. AMT
49. The Mil. Amt, as its name implies, is the military section of the
intelligence service controlled by the RSHA. It has no personality or
policy of its own apart from that of the RSHA, and it is wrong to think of
its activities as separate from those of AMT VI described above. In fact
its head and the most important of its directing personnel are also the
head and directors of Amt VI. But the historical chances of its creation
make it convenient to consider it separately. It was established in the
early ? summer of 1944 to replace the hitherto separate intelligence
service of the German High Command (0.K.W.), generally known as
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the Abwehr, and its rank and filt were (and still are) largely former
Abwehr officials retaining their Wehrmacht ranks and uniforms. This
explains why the regional organisation of the Mil. Amt is based on the
military divisions of the Reich, and why the personnel of the Mil.
Amt, particularly on the lower levels, is drawn from the Wehrmacht.
50. The Static Orginiiation of the Mil. Amt
(i) At Head Quarters
To direct the work for which it is responsible the Mil. Amt is
divided at its headquarters into seven sections lettered from A to G
as follows
51. Abt. A. This section is responsible for the internal administra-
tion of the Mil. Amt. It also includes the personal bureau (Mil, A/I A)
of the Amtschef, Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg. Thus, in addition to
holding the central registry of reports and agents, cover-addresses, etc.
(Mil. A 1), keeping accour_rts (A 2), arranging the posting of personnel
within the Amt (A 3), and recording the allocation of vehicles and fuel,
etc. (A 5)?all essential but unimportant activities?it acts as the
channel for policy directives froln Schellenber to the regional and
territorial stations, and as the sieve through which questions requiring
a decision of policy have to pass. Its head is Staf. Sandberger (see
above, para. 28) ; he is assisted on the I A side by three Wehrmacht
officers who are the Mil. Amt's links with the German services, and it
is significant that the only one of these known for certain, the I A/Marine
Kapt. z. See von Bechtolsheim, was not previously a member of the
Abwehr but was brought in from active service with the German Navy
when the Mil. Amt was set up.
52. Abt. B is responsible for the collection of operational intelligence
in the West. It is divided into an evaluation section (Sichtung =---
Mil. B/S), which receives all reports and passes them to the interested
service staffs (0.K.H., Fremde Heere West, 0.K.M., Seekriegsleitung,
and 0.K.I.,., Fremde Luftwaffen West), and a general administrative
section (Beschaffung) which administers and plans espionage in the
West. The latter is subdivided territorially into four numbered sec-
tions covering Norway and Denmark (Mil. B I), Holland, Belgium and _
France (Mil. B II), Spain and Portugal (Mil. B III), and Italy and
Switzerland (Mil. B IV). Great Britain and the Americas are naturally
targets of this section, but the agents? deployed against them were
evidently regarded as too few to merit a separate administrative
division. The head of Mil B is Staf. Steimle of Amt VI (see above,
para. 28) ; Steimle's chief assistant is a Wehrmacht officer, Major i.G.
Taysen, who was not previously in the Abwehr.
53. Abt. C is responsible for the collection of operational intelligence
in the East. Its internal organisation is parallel to that of Abt. B
except that its administrative section is not subdivided numerically
but by the initials of the countries covered, e.g., Mil. C/R for Russia,
Mil. C/SK for Sweden, or by the points of the compass, e.g., Mil. C/O.S.
for South-East Europe. As an exception to the general rule of control
by members of Amt VI, the head of Abt; C is a G.A.F. Staff Officer,
Major i.g. Ohletz, who was, brought into the Abwehr in the spring of
1941 as the result of pressure from the G.A.F. for better service in the
realm of air intelligence. He is assisted by another G.A.F. officer,
Major Elting, a former Abwehr officer of long standing and the only
one to hold such an important position in the Mil. Amt.
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G. DIAGRAM of the RSHA
RSHA
Amt (Kaltenbrunner)
Mil. Amt
VII
Personnel (? Ehrlinger)
Administration (?Haenel)
S.D. (Ohlendorf)
Gestapo (Mueller)
Kripo (?Mueller)
A
Admin.
Secret Intelligence
(Schellenberg, (Sandberger)
Deputy, Steimle)
West Europe C
(?Bernhard)
East Europe D
and East ?
U.K.,
Dominions,
and Americas
Central
Europe,
Italy
Scandinavia
Technical S
(?
Sabotage
(Skorzeny)
/WWI' Z-Penetration
Economic (Freund)
Espionage
Culture
A
Admin.
A I/A Personal
Bureau of
Amtschef
(C5718) Wt8975-63 1,000 4/45 G.S.St. Gp 338
0.I in West C
(Steimle)
B/Sichtung
B/Beschaffnung
0.1. in East D
(Ohletz)
C/Sichtung
C/Beschaffnung
Sabotage, etc. E
(Skorzeny)
D/West
D/Ost
D/Technik
Signals
(Poretchkin)
including
Nach Regt. 506
' 0
Control of FAK & FAT
(Buntrock)
F/I
F/II
F/III
FfQ
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?
G Forged papers and Secret
writing (Boening)
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54. Abt. D was created out of the former Abt. II of the Abwehr with
the same task of organising sabotage and subversion in Allied territory
or areas likely to be of assistance to the Allies. In the manner of Abt.
II it is divided into eastern and western sections which are in turn
split into sabotage (S) and insurrection (J) departments, and includes
a technical section (Mil. D/T) for the supply of sabotage materials.
Its head is Ostubaf. Skorzeny (see above, para., 12), and his deputy,
only recently appointed, is a certain Major Loos, another officer to be
brought in from outside the old Abwehr- clique. Since the work of
Mil. D is also done by Amt VI S. its importance can only be seen in
its true perspective in relation to the total activity of this type con-
ducted by the 1$SHA (see below, para. 72 foll.).
55. Abt. E was created out of the Abwehr section I i; it has the
task of maintaining the secret communications of the Mil. Amt by
WIT, land-line, carrier-pigeon, etc., but not by secret writing. By far its
most important function is the organisation of the W/T network of the
Mil. Amt. In this capacity its heaviest task is the supply of men (W/T
operators) and materials (W/T sets), both of? which are in increasingly
short supply. It also supplies ciphers and checks their security. It
controls all W/T operators who are enlisted in a special signals regiment,
Nachrichten Regiment- 506, which was set up in the late summer of
1944 for this purpose. The head qf Mil. E, Major Poretschkin, is also
commander of this regiment and all officers of Mil. E are technically on
its strength. Poretschkin himself was brought into the Abwehr
towards the end of 1943; his chief assistants were all formerly long-
standing Abwehr officials, but they are retained for their efficiency and
special knowledge as technicians and represent no party or policy of
their own.
56; Abt. F was set up in December, 1944, as the H.Q. department of
the Mil. Amt responsible for the administration of the Frontaufklaerung-
kommandos and Trupps (FAK and FAT) attached to the German armies
in the field (see below, para. 62). Originally part of the Abwehr and
known as Abwehrkommandos and Trupps, these units were not put
under the Mil. Amt when the Abwehr was dissolved but were sub-
ordinVed to the 0.K.W., Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, though their,
personnel was transferred to the Mil. Amt. This illogical division was'
bound to be only a temporary solution; its Purpose is obscure even
now, but it was presumably designed to save the face of the O.K.W.
at the time of the dissolution of the Abwehr. The establishment of
Mil. F to control the FAK's and FAT's was therefore a natural develop-
ment. The head of this section is Oberst. d.G. Buntrock and his
deputy, who may also act as Schellenberg's military adjutant (IA/Heer)
is Obstltn. d.G. von dem Knesebeck. Neither of these officers was
previously in the Abwehr; Buntrock is a reserve officer, which suggests
that he was hand-picked for this post by RSHA.
57. Abt. G is the section of the Mil. Amt responsible for the provision
of forged dqcuments, secret writing materials, photographic apparatus,
etc. It was formed out of the former I G of the Abwehr and retains
many of the Abwehr specialists in this work; but recently a new officer,
Obstltn. Boening, has been called in as head of the department.
58. All the above sections were until recently concentrated around
Berlin; but with the Russian advance they have been evacuating to
the Weimar-Plauen area in Thuringia, where parts of Mil. A, B, D
and E have already arrived. ? This evacuation is part of the general
movement of Amt VI to the same area (see above, para. 40).
14
(ii) Within Germany
59. The regional organisation of the Mil. Amt was taken over bodily
from that of the Abwehr. The latter had stations (Abwehrstellen
Asts) in each military district (Wehrkreis), and the Asts had in turn
controlled sub-stations (Nebenstellen =Nests) in the important towns
in their areas. With characteristic indifference to rigid forms the
RSHA adopted this structure as a working basis but renamed the Asts,
Kommando der Meldegebiete (KdM) and their subsidiary stations,
.Aussenstellen (Aust). In the same way it allowed the old Abwehr
forms and terminology to be retained within the KdM's ; e.g., espionage
remained as I-work administered by Gruppe I. But it also imposed
a great increase of central control on the activities of the KdM's which
were no longer allowed to work on their own, independently of each
other and of their headquarters, as the old Asts had done. This
centralisation may by now have extended to the total suppression of
the II-Gruppen within the KdM's; certainly the tendency since
Skorzeny took over the direction of the Mil. Amt's sabotage section
has been for the execution of this work to pass increasingly into the
hands of his other organisations (see below, para. 72 foll.). If this is
so, then it follows that no serious threat of sabotage or insurrection is
to be expected from the KdM's in Germany, and that the latter should
be regarded purely as the executive arms of the operational sections
Mil. B and C according to their geographical placing; i.e., KdM's
west of the line running north and south through Berlin acting for
Mil. B, and those to the east of it for Mil. C. But even here a further
modification is necessary. Not all the KdM's are equally. active. For
in practice another effect of the RSHA's policy of centralisation has
been that the incompetent KdM's have withered into insignificance.
So in the west only KdM's Hamburg, Cologne, Wiesbaden and Stutt-
gart are worthy of notice. Under the Abwehr Cologne had been a
subsidiary of Ast. Minster, but its activity had always been greater
than that of its technical parent, and it is typical of the development
under the Mil. Amt that it should have been encouraged while Munster
has been ignored. In the same way the formal rule by which each
KdM is responsible for intelligence activity in its own Wehrkreis has
been ignored when convenience has demanded it should be; recently
the Mil. Amt extended the areas to be covered by KdM's Cologne and
Wiesbaden in establishing their stay-behind agent network to the East
of the Rhine to include parts of the Wehrkreis areas immediately to
their rear. The general conclusion from this is that the form of the
Mil. Amt's regional organisation in Germany is not a reliable guide to
the areas or intensity of the Mil. Amt's activities,
(iii) In Neutral territory
60. The Mil. Amt's organisation in neutral territory was also based
on the structure left by the Abwehr. This consisted of a headquarters
station in each country, called Kriegsorganisation or K.O. (e.g., K.O.
Spain, K.O. Sweden, etc.), which was attached to the diplomatic
mission. The K.O. controlled subsidiary stations generally tied to
Consulates, though sometimes consisting of only one or two local
German business men. Internally a K.O. was divided like the Asts
into I, II and III Gruppen. The Mil. Amt continued this form, save
that the Gruppe III was incorporated in the local Amt VI station and
the name K.O. was changed to KdM, so bringing all its regional stations
at home and abroad under one form. At the same time the Mil. Amt.
extended the policy of centralisation to cover the stations abroad.
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Under the Abwehr the work of the K.O's had been handicapped by
the fact that the Asts in Germany and occupied countries had been
free to organise their own networks in neutral territory with the barest
reference to the K.O. concerned. This led to situations in which a
K.O. would often suffer from diplomatic action taken against it because
an agent of some other Ast, of whom it had known nothing, had been
uncovered. This trouble increased as Germany's diplomatic position
grew weaker; and one of the immediate causes of the ? Abwehr's dis-
solution was its failure in the neutral countries of Argentina, Turkey
and Spain. The tendency under the Mil. Amt has been to counter
this weakness by bringing together all its activities in neutral countries
under the local KdM, and by encouraging close liaison between the
heads of these KdM's with the corresponding heads of the Amt VI.
stations. At the same time the staffs of the KdM's have been drastically
reduced, partly as a result of diplomatic protests by the Allies and
because of the increasing call-up of the able-bodied into the Wehrmacht,
but mainly in pursuance of a definite policy by which only the essential
specialists would be accredited to the diplomatic mission, while head-
agents would be dispersed under commercial cover and if possible
made to take the nationality of the country in which they were working.
This policy will have important results; the work of the Mil. Amt in
neutral countries will become less dependent on diplomatic privilege
and counter-action will accordingly become more difficult, since the
closing of German missions will not break its organisations.- This
point is particularly relevant to the II-work of the KdM's in neutral
territory. Whereas in Germany sabotage and subversion seems to
have been,withdrawn from the competence of the KdM's (see above,
para. 59), there is evidence that at least in Spain and Portugal the
preparations of the KdM's in this sphere have been greatly intensified
in the past nine months, and that great care has been taken to divorce
-these preparations,from the appearance of Embassy control.
The Organisation of the Mil. Amt in the Field
61. Tile Abwehr had made special provision for conducting its work
in the field by setting up mobile formations with the status of military
units in uniform attached to Wehrmacht H.Q's. These formations
were known as Abwehrkommandos and Trupps, and were of three
types corresponding to the three kinds of Abwehr work. Towards the
end of its life the Abwehr provided within the framework of the
1-Kommandos specialised. Luft and Marine units which might be
attached to an independent Naval or Air command. Kommandos
were designated by means of three-figure numbers with the first digit
in each number indicating the type of work in which they specialised:
e.g., Kdo 120, or 210, or 306?and in the case of the specialised naval
and air Kommandos by the addition of the letter M or L: e.g., Kdo
166 M, or Kdo 180 L. Each Kommando controlled subsidiary Trupps
which were numbered on the same principle: e.g., Kdo 120 controlled'
Trupps 131, 132 and 133; Kdo 210 controlled Trupps 251, 252, etc.
The numbers of a Kdo and its.subsidiary Trupps would sometimes run
straight through; e.g., Kdo 140 controlled Trupps 141, 142 and 143?
but this was not, and still is not, a general rule so that the numbers of
the Trupps under a Kdo cannot be inferred from the number of the
Kdo itself. The subordination of these units had reached a common
form by the time the Abwehr was dissolved. Corresponding to each
front there would be attached a Leitstelle for each kind of work,. I, II
and III; e.g., Abwehrleitstelle I West, II Ost, III Stied Ost, etc. ; to
every army group on a front there would be attached a I, II and III
Kommando; and to every army within an army group there would be
attached one or more I, II and III Trupps. Lower t1lai this the form
varied with the course of operations and the type of work done.
Normally each Trupp would have a forward or battle echelon perma-
nently in being which moved with the forward H.Q. of the army, and
this was also the normal procedure for Kommandos; as operations
required a Trupp would set up reporting-posts (Meldekoepfe=--MK's),
often attached to Corps or even divisional H.Q's which would be
formed out of its establishment and be re-absorbed into it as soon as
the situation no longer required their existence. Among the III
Trupps this form was slightly varied. A Trupp attached immediately
to an army command would sometimes be known as a leading Trupp-
(Leittrupp) and in place of the MK's of the I and II Trupps it would
control permanent III Trupps in the area of its array. On other
occasions an army would have attached to it two or more III Trupps
of equal standing. But in general it was, and still is, safe to assume
that where a I or II Trupp is reported, there a German army H.Q. will
be found. In addition to its forward and rear echelons and occasional
MK's, a Trupp would often control an agent training-camp which would
be in the rear area generally with the 2nd echelon of the Trupp. For
the most part these camps would be used for the brief training and
temporary housing of short-term line-crossing agents of all nationalities.
The training of longer-terra agents would be in the hands of similar
camps attached to the Kommandos and Leitstellen ; these camps
would ordinarily concentrate on agents of particular nationalities. So
in the summer of 1944 one of Kdo 120's three training camps was
restricted to French-speaking Arabs and another to metropolitan
Frenchmen and Belgians. Finally some mention must be made of the
special units set up to supply false documents, secret-writing materials,
forged money, etc., to the Kdo's and Trupps. These were called
G-Trupps and were formed out of personnel of the Abwehr's section
I.G. which became Mil. Gin the MU. Amt (see above, para. 57). Though
called Trupps they were ordinarily attached at Army Group level to
the I Kommando of the area concerned, and they were responsible to
a similar unit attached to the I Leitstelle at C-in-C level and known as
the G-Staffel of the C-in-C.
62. After the Abwehr was dissolved there was a brief interval ( June
to December 1944) when the whole of this structure was subordinated
to the 0.K.W., the only changes made being changes of terminology, in
particular the prefix Abwehr being replaced by Frontaufklaerung
(abbreviated F.A.). ?But since December 1944 it has been. in the
hands of the Mil. Amt through its Abteilung F. (see above, para. 56).
Yet it would be Wrong to lay much stress on this change. Alike under
the Abwehr and the Mil. Amt the Kommandos and Trupps haire been
essentially dependent on the Wehrraacht command to which they have
been attached. Day-to-day direction comes to them from the C.-in-C.
of the area in which they are stationed and there is and always was a
special chain of command for this purpose. Their reports are routed
for action to the Ic (i.e. senior intelligence officer) of the Wehrmacht
unit to which they are attached, and this Ic has authority to issue
directives to and to control the activities of the Kommando or Trupp
in his area. It follows from this that the Ic of the C.-in-C. (Ober-
_ befehlshaber=-0.B.) of an area has authority over all Leitstellen,
Kommandos and Trupps on that front. This authority is used through
the agency of an officer of the Mil. Amt attached as liaison officer to the
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Ic of an Oberbefehlshaber, army-group, or army who is known by his
old Abwehr title still as Ic/A.O. (=Abwehr Offizier). A Ic/A.O. is
responsible to the Ic to whom he is attached and not to the Mu. Amt. In
this way the Leitstellen, Kommandos and Trupps receive direction
from the Wehrmacht authorities in the field at their respective levels
without reference to the Mil. Amt. This is highly important since it
means that in the event of the Wehrmacht being defeated or broken up
on any one front the Kommandos and Trupps on that front will dissolve
with it.
63. This dependence of the Kommandos and Trupps on the Wehr-
macht authorities is reflected in the work that they do. In the I-sphere
* they make use of two types of agents :?
Stay-behind agents
64. These are long-term agents ordinarily left in territory abandoned
by the Wehrmacht in the course of operations, and communicating by
W/T to central stations well within Germany. In the past six months
many such agents have been dropped by parachute in areas abandoned
during1944 to reinforce or replace those originallyleft, while many others
have been trained and left behind in areas near the front since occupied
by the Allies.
Line-crossers or front-runners
65. These are short-term agents usually slipped through the lines
when the front is static or left tobe over-run when it is being moved
back, and reporting back in person after a period of a few days. or
weeks.
66. In general terms the division between stay-behind agents and
line-crossers is that between strategic and tactical intelligence. Both
are designed to serve the army commands, but as is natural the Mil.
Amt shows a greater interest in the use of the first than in the second,
while the army commands from Oberbefehlshaber down tend to favour
the use of the second. But no hard and fast line can be drawn in this
matte'?; what is certain is that the Kommandos and Trupps conz
centrate on training and putting into operation the type of agents
required at any given moment by the army commands to which they
are attached. Recent events demonstrate this point. Before the recent
Allied offensive the highest priority was given to the establishment of
stay-behind agents between the front line and the west bank of the
Rhine, whereas during the German offensive of December 1941 the
maximum efforts of the Trupps were directed towards line-crossing.
The point is sharpened by the reported complaint of the Army
Commands since the start of the present Allied offensive that the
stay-behind network West of the Rhine has proved inadequate. Accord-
ingly it has been abandoned in favour of a new arrangement by which
the line-crossers will be equipped with W/T and will work for longer
periods than usual before attempting to return.
67. The same dependence is true of the II and III Kdos, and Trupps,
which use both stay-behind agents and line-crossers to carry out their
respective duties of sabotage and counter-espionage though much less
is known of their activities in detail than of the I units. During the
present Allied offensive several III-Trupp agents have been arrested in
the course of crossing the lines on I-work because on the orders of the
O.B. West II and III units had been thrown in to do espionage tasks
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in an effort to fill the gaps in the Gellman knowledge of Allied intentions
and dispositions: In general therefore it can safely be assumed that no
long-term danger is to be expected from the Mil. Amt's units in the
field.
Summary and Conclusions
68. The Mil. Amt is a section of the RSHA and should only be
studied in this light. Though formed largely out of Abwehr personnel
and often organised internally along the lines of the Abwehr, its head
and directing personnel are also the head and directors of RSHA
Amt VI and it does not represent, nor will it be able to represent, a
policy contrary to that of the RSHA.
69. The Mil. Amt is chiefly concerned with obtaining operational
intelligence. It is also concerned with planning and executing sabotage
and subversion in territory held by, or favourable to, the Allies. In
the second case its activities are dwindling, except in neutral territory.
It has no responsibility for security or counter-espionage except in the
field.
70. The Mil. Amt is organised into
(a) Headquarters sections.
(b) Static regional stations (KdM's) within Germany and in neutral
countries.
(c) Mobile units (Kommandos and Trupps) attached to the commands
in the field.
The nerve-centre of the Mil. Amt's H.Q. is the Amtschef's personal
bureau; the majority of the H.Q. Sections are concerned with day-to-
day administration. The regional stations within Germany are decreas-
ing in importance. In the west their work has been concentrated in
?the hands of an efficient four; Hamburg, Cologne, Wiesbaden and
Stuttgart. In neutral territory the regional stations have been re-
organised with fewer personnel under cover of the diplomatic missions
as an insurance against future diplomatic changes. In the field the
Kdos and Trupps work under the immediate control of the army
commands, and their work is likely to come to an end with the collapse
of these.
71. The Mil. Amt is not likely to be used by the RSHA for long-term
action. In the field its units will collapse with the armies. Within
Germany its stations are already of diminished importance. Only in
neutral territory are there any signs of future vitality.
D. SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM
General
72. By the end of the summer of 1944 the organisation of all German
sabotage and political subversion had come under the control of one
man within the RSHA by the appointment of Obersturmbannfuehrer
Otto Skorzeny, already head of VI.S, the sabotage section of Amt VI,
to be head of Mil. Amt D. Skorzeny has his headquarters in Schloss
Friedenthal near Oranienburg, but it is believed that this place may
shortly be. evacuated.
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73. The functions of Skorzeny's sabotage services are of two general
types
(i) To threaten Allied lines of communication by sabotage and by
fomenting political trouble in Germany and the former occupied
countries, using for these purposes German nationals or Fascist
' and anti-Allied elements of the countries concerned.
(ii) To mount military operations of a special type which the
? regular army would not normally undertake.
? 74. To carry out these functions Skorzeny has at his disposal the
following units whose headquarters and training camps are widely
dispersed throughout Germany :?
SS Jaegerbataillon 502.
SS Jagdverbaende.
Frontaufklaerungskommaridos and Trupps of Mil. Amt D*.
Amt VI.S
75. Amt. VI.S, though a small department now dwarfed by the SS
Jagdverbaende, has been responsible for two ambitious failures in
sabotage and subversion, one in Greece and one in France; in both
cases the plan was the same?to train an indigenous pro-German group
to resist the invading Allies by terrorism and sabotage. In Italy
Stubaf. Begus of VI.S has trained and despatched a steady stream of
largely unsuccessful saboteurs. Hptstuf. Besekow directs all the under-
takings of VI.S in Western Europe on behalf of Skorzeny. He has sent
several groups of inadequately briefed saboteurs to France to destroy
the pipe-lines.
The headquarters of VI.S are (or were until recently) at Schloss
Friedenthal. VI.S is now practically merged in the general staff of the
? SS Jagdverbaende though individual agents may consider themselves
as agents of VI.S and not of the Jagdverbaende.
The SS Jaegerbataillon 502
76. The SS Jaegerbataillon 502 was formed some time in the autumn
of 1943to incorporate the agents of various nationalities then employed
by Amt VI.S. It probably took over the functions and personnel of
SS Sonderverband zbV Friedenthal, founded by Obersturmbannfuehrer
Dorner of Amt VI.F, when that section was responsible for Amt VI
sabotage. At one time or another, nationals of most of the European
countries, in addition to Arabs and Indians, have been incorporated
in the battalion. Its headquarters are at Schloss Friedenthal.
? 77. Attached to the Jaegerbataillon 502 at Schloss Friedenthal in
the autumn of 1911 was a Sondereinsatzabteilung from -which were
recruited men for the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbande, as
swimming saboteurs and one-man torpedo operatives. There is a
close association between Skorzeny and this naval unit, although its
exact nature is not clear. (See below, para. 108.)
78. The SS Jaegerbataillon 502 was probably Amt VI's answer to the
Brandenburg Division during the time of rivalry between the sabotage
sections of the RSHA and the Abwehr. Since the formation of the
SS Jagdverbaende, the Jaegerbataillon has become redundant and at
present seems to be a base holding and training unit for agents to be
despatched directly to the field without further attachment to the
Jagdverband in the area.
* For 150 Pz. Bde? now dissolved, see below, para. 89.
SS Jagdverbaende
79. When the Branden? burg Division, with the exception of the
Lehrregiment Kurfuerst, passed from Abwehr control to be used as an
ordinary fighting unit, many members of that Division were transferred
to Skorzeny's organisation. In November 19144 new types of units were
formed to take over this personnel and the former tasks of the Branden-
burg Division. These units were named SS Jagdverbaende.
80. The specialist personnel from the Brandenburg Division were
used for the cadre of officers and NCOs of the newly formed Jagdver-
baende. In some cases complete units of the Brandenburg Division
were transferred intact, the men retaining their Brandenburg pay
books in which an entry " Ubernommen in SS Jagdverbaende" had
been made. Officers and men who refused to serve with a SS Unit,
were transferred to other Army units; certain officers were, however,
unofficially allowed to keep their Army ranks and uniforms. Similarly
some of the Brandenburg Companies which were transferred in their
entirety are still referred to by their old Brandenburg names. Additional
members went recruited from the Waffen SS and all branches of the
armed forces.
81. Three types of Brandenburg personnel may therefore be en-
countered :?
(a) Ordinary prisoners of war who belonged to the Brandenburg
Division during the time that it was under Abwehr control; these
have information, although out of date,of C.I. interest.
(b) Members of the Brandenburg Division who have been transferred
to the SS Jagdverbaende and are therefore of direct C.I. interest.
(c) Members of the Brandenburg Division who either individually or
in whole formations have been incorporated into ordinary fighting
units; these are of no C.I. interest.
82. Until recently new members of the Jagdverbaende have been
mainly of foreign nationality, but with the continuance of the war
within the Reich there will be an increasing tendency towards the
recruitment of German personnel. The main sources of fore.ign recruits
in the west have been the collaborationist organisations of France,
Belgium and Holland which retreated with the retreating German
Armies; in the case of the French contingents, many recruits have
come from the PPF, LYF and Milice.
. -
83. The training of members of the SS Jagdverbaende follow the same
lines as that of the Brandenburg Division, and includes training in
sabotage, demolition and single combat, in addition to the usual
infantry training.
??/'
84. Functions. Skorzeny's agents are sent back individually or in
small groups to their country of origin with the mission of reactivating
the, post-occupational sabotage and subversive networks and to carry
out individual acts of sabotage against specifio? targets. Such agents
also have terrorist assignments including the assassination of important
political figures or former German agents who have gone over to the
Allies.
8 The SS Jagdverbaende are also responsible for organising groups
of men who will undertake commando raids- on isolated posts and
particular targets, wearing in these cases either German uniforms,
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Allied uniforms, or German uniforms of a type likely to give a superficial
appearance of Allied uniforms but sufficiently German to ensure
prisoner of war treatment for the agent.
86. Another function of the Jagdverbaende personnel is the abduction
of important characters. Since the rescue of Mussolini in September
1943, Skorzeny has been responsible for an abortive undertaking
against Petain and the successful removal of Horthy from Hungary to
Germany.
87. In so far as it is necessary for Skorzeny to have intelligence both
44 a political nature on which to base his further operations and of
targets for subsequent missions, Jagdverbaende personnel may be sent
on such espionage missions. Cases are also known of Jagdverbaende
Kommandos being used to work against the underground resistance in
Holland and on straightforward espionage missions on behalf of the
Army.
88. Organisation. The SS Jagdverbaende are organised on a
geographical basis, the following being known :?
SS Jagdverband Nord.
SS Jagdverband Mitts
SS Jagdverband Nordwest
SS Jagdverband Sued
SS jagdverband Suedwest
SS Jagdverband Suedost
SS Jagdverband Ost.
The SS Jagdverband in any given area is sub-divided into SS
Streifkorps, believed to have a status equivalent to that of a battalion.
The Streifkorps which are known either by their geographical location,
e.g. North-west, or by their Field Post Numbers, have an administrative
and training function as well as a tactical function; they receive
orders through the parent Jagdverband and are themselves divided into
a numtier of Kommandos. These Kommandos which are the actual '
operational units responsible for handling and despatching the agents,
vary in size. The Kommandos are usually referred to by the name of
their Commanding Officer, e.g. Kommando Well,
150 Panzer Brigade ?
89. The operations of the 150 Panzer Brigade as part of the German
offensive in December 1944 demonstrates the other function of
Skorzeny's organisation, that of special types of military operations.
This Brigade, composed of between 2,000 to 3,000 men, wearing
American uniforms and using American vehicles and tanks, was
designed as the spearhead of the attack to cause confusion amongst the
U.S. front-line troops; strategic points were to be seized for exploita-
tion by the following SS units, and parties were to be infiltrated for
special tasks behind the Allied lines. These tasks were to be undertaken
by the Einheit Stielau, a unit composed of approximately 200 men,
picked for their knowledge of the English language and specially trained.
Skorzeny is believed to have been directly responsible for the formation
and training of the 150 Panzer Brigade, which was officially disbanded
on 17.1.45, itsi members being encouraged to volunteer for the SS
Judverbaende.
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Frontaufklaerungs-Kommandos and.Trupps of NU Amt D.
90. Agents of the Frontaufklaerungs-Kommandos and Trupps
of Mil. Amt D are given sabotage and reconnaissance missions similar
fa those undertaken by the SS Jagdverbaende personnel; there is no
indication that the former are being used on long-term political sub-
version. All the Frontaufklaerungs Units of the Militaerisches Ault are
organised on the same lines, and the Mil. Amt D Units are discussed
under that general heading.
Hitler Jugend
91. A large number of Hitler Jugend have been given training in
sabotage and terrorism at special schools in Holland and throughout
Germany, some have also been trained at Skorzeny's .training schools.
It is probable that use will be made of such material in Skorzeny's
plans for resistance within Germany.
Results of Operations
92. Since the invasion of north-west Europe in June 1 44 the German
Sabotage Services have had few successes. The Abw. II post-
occupational networks with their large amount of buried 'sabotage
equipment, both in France and Belgium, failed to operate, as did also
that of Amt VI. S. Since that date efforts have been made to re-
activate these networks by the infiltration of further agents. In addition,
agents have been sent by parachute and through the lines with specific
sabotage or assassination missions. These undertakings have failed
because ;the agents were either known collaborationists and were
arrested for that reason, or they had no incentive to carry out work
for what appeared to be the defeated side. This type of agent gave
himself up either in the hope of reinstating himself or of using his
mission as a chance of returning to his country, knowing that if he was
caught in Germany he could expect no mercy. Many agents of the stay-
behind organisation had allowed themselves to be recruited without
ever having the intention of working. Further, the lack of security
during traning and the recruitment from the same collaborationist
organisations meant that many agents have known of each other's
activities, and the arrest of one has led to the arrest of others.
93. Training. In some cases sabotage training has been thorough,
in others quite inadequate. Sabotage equipment which is now of
German origin is comparatively efficient and suitable for use by relatively
untrained agents.
E. ASSOCIATED ORGANISATIONS
94. To carry out its operations, the G.I.S. has recourse to service
organisations which are placed at its disposal by the parent services,
and which are specialised to meet its requirements, but which are not '
under its control. The two most important of these are I/KG 200 of
the Luftwaffe and the Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende of the
German Navy.
I/KG 200
95. For certain operations the G.I.S. requires the co-operation of
the Luftwaffe, and thus comes in contact with KG 200, a special and -
secret Kampfgeschwader used for various specialist tasks under the
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command of Oberstltn. i G. Werner Baumbach. Of the Gruppen of
KG 200 only the first (I/KG 200) is relevant to the ordinary operations
of the
96. I/KG 200 is responsible for the ferrying, parachuting, and
supplying by air, of agents. It has been active since at least the summer
of 1942, and has grown in that time from a Staffel to a Gruppe consisting
of three and perhaps four Staffeln, of which Staffeln 1 and 4 operate
on the Western Front. It has previously been known as 2 Staffel
Versuchsverband Ob.d .L. and Staffel (later Gruppe) Gartenfeld (after
its former commander Major Gartenfeld, who has long been associated
with this kind of work). Its activities, and even existence, are officially
kept secret from other G.A.F. personnel.
97. The present Kommandeur of I/KG 200 is probably Major Koch,
who appears to have succeeded Major Gartenfeld in the spring of 1911.
Its H.Q. have been at Berlin-Rangsdorf, Finow, Berlin-Finsterwalde,
and (as at present) at Hildesheim.
98. I/KG 200 is a single organisation operating indifferently on all
fronts, and using a chain of aerodromes suitably situated for all opera-
tions. At different times it has used aerodromes at Simferopol (for
operations in Persia, Iraq, and the Caucasus), in Roumania (for South
Russia), at Athens-Kalamaki (for Egypt, Transjordan, and Libya), at
Marseilles (for Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), at 'Bergamo -(for Italy,
Istria, etc.), at Wiener Neustadt (for the Balkans), and at Echterdingen,
and other aerodromes on the right bank of the . Rhine, for tactical
-Operations on the Western Front. It has also operated to Ireland, and
has planned, but not executed, an operation to India.
99. The establishment of I/KG 200 is not known, but it has used on
its operations at any rate the following types of aircraft :?
F.W. 200.
S.M. 75.
Ju 88.
Ju 188.
Ju 252.
Ju 290.
He 111.
Fieseler Storch.
Flying Fortress B.17.
The last-named are captured aircraft and are used particularly for
long-distance operations. B.17 was used for an ambitious and partially
successful operation in North Africa in the spring of 1911 involving the
construction and maintenance of a chain of secret landing grounds and
petrol dumps in the desert. For this operation the B.17 was fitted with
additional petrol tanks. A B.17 was also used to drop agents in
Transjordan in October 1911, and another was intended for the Indian
operation. B.17's have also been used on the Western Front. I/KG 200
is known to have other foreign aircraft also, and it is probable that any'
operation on which captured Allied aircraft are used is an operation by
I/KG 200. The B.17's used by this formation are, or were, known by
the cover name of Do 288 (a non-existent type). Captured Russian
a/c are also reported to be used on the Eastern front.
'100. The personnel and crews employed by I/KG 200 are members
of the Luftwaffe, with the exception of W/T operators, who are often
-drawn from the Mil: Amt.
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101. The operations and upiis of I-/KG '200 are known by cover-
names. A number of operations in Russia carried out by a detachment
of I/KG 200 based on the Roumanian aerodrome of Zilistea were known
as the "Richard Wagner" concert; units operating in the Mediter-
ranean were designated by the names of operas?Tosca, Traviata,
Rigoletto, Aida, Carmen, etc.; more recently, feminine names have
been used, e.g. Olga for the unit in the West, Klara for that at Wiener
Neustadt.
102. I/KG 200 was used equally by the Abwehr and the SD even
when these were entirely independent and often competitive organisa-
tions. On one occasion at least a mixed party of Abwehr and SD agents
was conveyed to Persia in a single I/KG 200 aircraft. Co-operation
between the two organisations in such matters seems generally to have
been good.
103. The variety and extent of the liabilities of I/KG 200 impose a
considerable strain on its resources. It is constantly being hampered
by lack of fuel or aircraft for its responsibilities, and few of its under-
takings have not been impeded Dr delayed by such shortages. Recently,
the general war and supply situation, combined with the increase of
tactical, short-range operations to which it has been less accastomed,
have led to particular difficulties in the west, where I/KG 200 has lost
several aircraft and failed (partly through bad luck) in a series of
operations. In consequence of this, FAK and FAT have been authorised
to make direct application to the local Luftwaffe units for the short-
range, tactical dropping of agents, while leaving detachment Olga of
I/KG 200 to specialise in long-range, strategic enterprises. In con-
sequence of this, agents are frequently dropped in this area not by
I/KG 200 but by TG 30, which operates from the same airfields and
is ordinarily engaged in supplying the Atlantic fortresses.
104. I/KG 200, and the agencies for which it works, make use of a
parachute-expert, Ltn. Paulus, who is consulted in connection with
nearly all important parachute operations, often personally supervising
the preparations. Ltn. Paulus is the designer of a container in which
three men and their gear can be parachuted together, and which has
recently been used in operations in Western Europe.
Kommando der 'Kleinkampfverbaende
105. The activity of the G.I.S. in naval matters was originally
confined to naval espionage carried out by Abw. Abt. I.M., of which the
most effective example was the naval reconnaissance and harbour-
exploitation directed by KzS Obladen in Greece and South Russia;
but a certain amount of sabotage was practised by Abt. II in Spain
against allied shipping in Gibraltar harbour. One of the discoveries
made by the Abwehr in this connection was that the Italian methods of
naval sabotage and midget-warfare were far superior to the German, and
'both in Gibraltar and in Alexandria the highly specialised sabotage
carried out by the Italians, using underwater swimmers (Gamma-
swimmers) and midget submarines, produced results which the Abwehr,
relying on hired Spanish divers, never achieved. The organisation
which controlled these Italian saboteurs was the Xth M.A.S. Flotilla,
stationed at La Spezia under the command of Prince Valerio Borghese,
with schools at Valdagno, Venice, and SiEsto Calende (on Lake Maggiore).
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106. After the Italian armistice, and the German occupation of North
Italy, arrangements were made for the exploitation of Xth M.A.S. -
Flotilla bY the Germans. At first the independence of Xth M.A.S., as
an organ-of the Republican Fascist government, was recognised, and
co-ordination with German policy was maintained through liaison
officers; but in the end the Germans acquired virtual control of its
establishments, equipment, and operations. Abwehr II, S.S., and
German Navy were all 'interested in obtaining control; and have all
.contributed some elements to the present situation; but the initiative
was taken, and has been maintained, by the German Navy, which set
up a new naval organisatioir to carry out all kinds of special naval
operations and sabotage, profiting by the experience and exploiting
the resources, of Xth.M.A.S This new organisation was at first known
as M.E.A. (Marine Einsatz Abteilung), and is now called K.d.K.
(Kommando der Kleinkampfverbaende), and is under Vice-Admiral
Heye. Heye is a regular naval officer, and the K.d.K., as at present
organised,-is a purely operational service; it is not a secret service,
although it is inspired by a strong sense of security and armed with
secret weapons, and uses secret tactics and devices, many of which'
are orginally of Italian invention. There, is no evidence that the K.d.K.
uses the methods associated with espionage; its personnel are naval
officers and ratings, or specially seconded Army or SS officers, wearing
uniforni on all proper occasions; there is no evidence of "dirty fighting"
or " chamaeleon " tactics.
107. The H.Q. of the K.d.K. have been at various places on the
German coast, and are believed at present to be at Timnaendorferstrand,
between Lubeck and Kiel. It has schools on the German coast, in
Denmark, and in Italy, where it has taken over those of Xth
It has operational units?numbered M.E.K. (Marine Einsatz Kom-
mandos) and specialist flotillas at Pola, Venice, San Remo, La Spezia,
-and in Holland, Denmark, and Norway, as formerly in the Aegean, at
Dubrovnik, Toulon, and Brest, and in the Normandy beachhead. It
has planned, or -conducted, ad hoc operations in the river Orne, at
Nijmegen and against the Antwerp docks and the Remagen bridge.
Its special weapons and methods may be summarised as
(a) Salt water: Midget submarines, explosive motorboats, one-man
torpedoes:
(b) Freshwater or coastal M.K. (Meereska,empfer) or underwater
swimmers (equivalent to Italian gamma-swimmers) 'used against
locks, bridges, etc. They are equipped with airtight rubber suits
with breathing device b enabling them to stay several hours, and
swim long distances, under water. German and Italian champion
swimmers are employed as 4K. Their greatest fear is of barbed
wire. Midget submarines and explosive motorboats may also be
used in large rivers. Floating mines camouflaged as driftwood.
(c) Combined operations and commando raids on islands to destroy
installations, take prisoners, etc.
The contribution of the Abwehr consists in the incorporation in the
K.d.K. of Abwehr officers, such as KzS Obladen, at first with his naval
recce parties which worked for the K.d.K. in the Aegean. These
functions of naval recce have since been dropped by the K.d.K., but
Qbladen is still employed on its staff. Another Abwehr figure employed
by the K.d.K. is the Abwehr sabotage expert, Hellmers, who, after
being in charge of sabotage in Spain, returned to undertake experi-
mental sabotage work in Germany, and was thence transferred to the
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K.d.K., which he has recently kft to be-comek, Leiter II West. The
Abwehr has also direct liaison with the K.d.K.; thus Abwehr reports,
if of significance, are passed direct to the local K.d.K. H.Q., and the
K.d.K. may provide personnel, vessels, and other facilities- for such
Abwehr operations 'as require its assistance. But it should be noticed
that though the Abwehr has been concerned in the history, and has
contributed to. the staff, of the K.d.K., the latter is not in any sense
under G.I.S: control or direction; in fact, the influence of the G.I.S.
in the K.d.K. has diminished rather than increased in the past eighteen
months.
108. It is to be expected that the S.S., which has so notoriously
gained at the expense of the 0.K.W. and has obtained a monopoly of
other sabotage work, should have sought to control the operations of
the K.d.K.; and the evidence at pPesent available suggests that it is
in fact extending its influence here. In the early days after the Italian
collapse, Amt VI intervened with Xth M.A.S. Flotilla, and seems to
-have set up its own swimming schools at Bad Hoelz.(in the Taunus) and
Friedenthal ; but although there is evidence that Skorzeny is seeking
to elbow his way into the direction of the, K.d.K., he does not seem yet
to have achieved any direct control, although if it is true (as is said)
that Heye is a friend of Skorzeny and Himmler as well as of Doenitz,
it may be that the S.S. exercises an indirect influence. This is not
incompatible with the statements which have been made that the
growing interference of Skorzeny is causing jealousy between him and
Heye. It is known that S.S. men are being inserted into the K.d.K.,
and are retaining S.S. ranks while in it, and there is some evidence that
special operations of the K.d.K. are directly ordered by Himmler or
Hitler. Skorzeny himself is known to have made a tour of inspection
of K.d.K. training camps, etc.
109. Since the K.d.K. is an operational, not a G.I.S., organisation,
no detailed account of its activities is necessary here; but it should
be stated that the greatest importance is attached to its operations by
the German high command; its members have passes giving them,
special priorities and facilities; and the K.d.K. has received a great
deal of build-up and publicity inside Germany. The efficiency of the
organisation is not at present equal to its claims, and it is impeded by
internal feuds and the usual shortage of equipment and transport;
but its members are keen, and the high priorities it receives may out-
weigh some of its administrative difficulties. The British Admiralty have
fairly full information about its constitution and activities, and inter-
rogation of prisoners from the K.d.K. is an Admiralty responsibility;
but the connection of the K.d.K. with the G.I.S. is close enough and
changeable enough for a general knowledge of its activities to be useful.
In particular the exact position of Skorzeny in respect of the K.d.K.
is .undertermined, and would be of interest.
F. CONCLUSIONS
110. It is now reasonable to ask in what form if at all, and how
effectively, the G.I.S. or parts of it may survive the defeat of the German
armies, and present a danger to the occupying authorities; in order to
suggest what counter-measures are necessary, and what targets must
be given the first priority. Here it will be clear that the differences
between intelligence work and sabotages and between long-term and
short-term intelligence, at present conducted under single authority,
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will become so wide that the organisation of the RSHA may be com-
pletely broken tip, and the two kinds of activity be conducted quite
separately. The existing antipathies within the RSHA may therefore
be the beginning of a more complete rift, which will repay exploitation,
between those who seek to perpetuate the Nazi idea by acts of terrorism
controlled by an outlawed faction still resisting in the mountains, and
those who seek to preserve the possibilities of independent politics by
keeping in being an intelligence service. This latter party may as
readily pursue its aims by apparent accommodation with, or sub-
servience to, Allied authorities, as by committing themselves to a
Maquis. In dealing with the possible future of the G.I.S., we will there-
'fore preserve the distinction already made between intelligence and
terrorism.
111. But first, in order to cleat the ground, the Mil. Amt must be
disposed of. It will dispose of itself. Already a makeshift within the
RSHA, preserving the anomalies and inefficiencies of the old Abwehr,
it will soon collapse, in defeat, and the survivors be absorbed into the
RSHA proper. The FAK and FAT will collapse with the Wehnnacht,
and any line-crossers or stay-behind agents of the future will be agents
of the terrorist resistance movement. The only survival from the Mil.
Amt will be some elements of its organisation in neutral countries
which will be considered under Intelligence below.
112. We will therefore conclude by considering the future possibilities
of (a) Resistance, and (b) Political Penetration by :the G.I.S.
The Resistance Movement
113. it is assumed that Skorzeny's services will be able to retire to a
Resistance Headquarters, with their personnel and equipment, in
sufficiently large numbers to enable them to continue operations.
Operations will be organised not only by Skorzeny's services but also
by special Waffen S.S. Units, some agents of which have already been
captured. These Waffen S.S. Units will be organised regionally and led
by S..S. officers who have had experience of anti-German partisan
movements in the former occupied countries. Both services will plan
to retain their headquarters staffs; they will recruit from the Waffen
S.S. and Wehrmacht in increasing numbers as organised resistance
collapses, and from the thousands of collaborators who have fled from
the former occupied countries. Most of these collaborators, who retreated
with the German armies, have by now either been incorporated in
Skorzeny's S.S. Jagdverbaende or in such foreign S.S. units as the
Charlemagne Division. Like the Nazi leaders, they have nothing to
expect from surrender except execution, and are therefore likely to be
found amongst the last of the resisters.
Future operations
114. Allied Countries. If the Nazis are endeavouring to perpetuate
their doctrines in Germany it is to their advantage to have sympathetic
governments in the adjacent countries. For this reason, and because
Skorzeny has a large number of potential agents for use in France and
the Low Countries, it is probable that operations against these countries
will be continued. Agents will not generally be given straightforward
sabotage missions; they will be told to contact known pro-Nazi
members of the former collaborationist movements, and with their aid
to build an underground resistance movement. Such movements can
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be used to cause political upheavals by assassinations, terrorism, and
acts Of violence at political meetings, in such a manner as to make the
blame appear to rest with Left-wing elements and Communists.;
propaganda on anti-Russian and anti-Semitic lines will be spread. The
Germans believe that large-scale acts of this type will encourage a
reaction in favour of governments sympathetic to a revival of a similar
government in Germany.
115. Such agents with anti-personnel equipment will be dropped by
parachute or parachuted container, or be returned to their own countries
as repatriated prisoners of war or foreign workers.
Germany
116. Within. Germany itself the first phase will again be terrorism,
taking the form of assassinations of important Allied individuals and
possibly of Allied troops. General sabotage should also be expected as
part of the resistance plan. German nationals working for the Allies
will be a spa ssinated as a warning to other collaborators. Agents for
these purposes will be. mainly of German nationality, although foreign
members of the Waffen. S.S. may also be -used. Some of these agents
will have already been left behind in the areas in which they are to
operate with hidden dumps of equipment. -Others will be parachuted
or will pose as refugees returning to their homes. They will bring
camouflaged anti-personnel equipment, or will be told the location of
previously hidden dumps.
117. Skorzeny's SS Jagdverbaende are likely to organise raids of a
Commando type with the object of killing or abducting important
figures in Germany. Such raids will be undertaken by small parties
wearing civilian or Allied rmiforms and strongly armed.
118. All these operations within Germany will be directed towards
the perpetuation of the Nazi terror with a view to dominating the
German population and preventing collaboration with the Allies. The
knowledge that there is still a Nazi headquarters and the possibility
of a Nazi revival would keep alive Nazi doctrines and encourage
the formation of autonomous underground movements throughout
Germany.
Counter measures
119. First priority must be given to the discovery of the head-
quarters of the S.S. Jagdverbaende and of new units under Skorzeny's
command,. and to any S.S. terrorist movement. It is particularly
important that any information about their equipment and com-
munications should be immediately disseminated. It is known that the
training of these units is still incomplete, and they can probably be
demoralised and dispersed by swift action.
Political Penetration
120. In order to maintain and revive a political and economic
espionage service after the war, the Germans must use people who have
not been publicly associated with the S.S. or S.D. Many of the agents
and some of the officers of the existing RSHA and the G.I.S. could be
used for this purpose.
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(a) Amt III has highly placed agents within the German Civil
Service who are not known to their compatriots or to us as agents of
the S.D. Unless Amt III is thoroughly penettikted, and its records
exploited, such agents may maintain and exploit their position in the
administration during the occupation.
(b) Amt VI, Amt VII and the Mil. Amt have connections in neutral
and former German-occupied territory which are founded on common
political interests, and which can therefore be expected to survive
defeat. The agents of :the G.I.S. outside Germany may be protected by
parties or governments who wish to revive the power of German
nationalism; many of these agents would be willing to report to, and
accept guidance from, any clandestine remnarit of Amt VI.
121. Particular attention must therefore be paid to :-
1. Those parts of Amt VI which have been in close contact with
Fascist movements and leaders outside Germany.
2. Those sections both of Amt VI and of the Mil. Amt which 'during
the last few years have built up good connectiOns in the commercial
world, particularly in Spain and South America.
Lastly, it is certain that Amt VI will use every trick in an attempt
to divide and embarrass the Allies by separate and secret overtures and
disclosures.