COMMUNIST INTERROGATION AND INDOCTRINATION OF 'ENEMIES OF THE STATE'

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Communist Interrogation and
Indoctrination of "Enemies of the State*"
Analysis of Methods Used by the Communist State Police (A Special Report)
LAWRENCE E. HINKLE JR., M.D.
AND
HAROLD G. WOLFF, M.D.,
NEW YORK
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Reprinted from the .4. M..4. Archives of Neurology and I'sichialry
_Iuigust 1956, I/ol. 76, pp. 115-17-1
Communist J1n1erroja11on and
inclocirinct ction of c~nemie$ o/ the States
Analysis of Methods Used by the Communist State Police (A Special Report)
LAWRENCE E. HINKLE Jr., M.D.
and
HAROLD G. WOLFF, M.D., New York
Table of Contents
I : Introduction
11: Practices of the KGB
1. Background of the
Russian State Police
2. Present Structure of
the KGB
3. The Suspect
4. The Accumulation of
Evidence
5. The Arrest Procedure
6. The Detention Prison
7. The Regimen Within
the Detention Prison
8. Effects of the Regimen
Within the Isolation
Cell
9. The Feelings and At-
titudes of the Prisoner
During the Isolation
Regimen
10. Other Pressures of the
Isolation Regimen
11. The Interrogator
12. Interrogation
13. Pressures Applied by
the Interrogator
14.The "Friendly Ap-
proach"
15. The Course of the
Interrogation
16. The Psychological In-
teraction Between Pris-
oner and Interrogator
17. The Reaction of the
Prisoner to the Inter-
rogation
18. The "Trial"
19. Public Confessions
20. Punishment
III: Practices in Communist
China
1. A Comparison of Chi-
nese Methods with
Those of the KGB
2. Background and Or-
ganization of the Chi-
nese State Police
3. The Suspects
4. Investigation and Ar-
rest
5. Chinese Prison Routine
6. The Interrogator
7. The Interrogation Pro-
cedure
8. T h e Indoctrination
Procedure in the Group
Cell
9. The Reaction of the
Prisoner to the Pro-
cedure in the Cell
10. The Conversion
11. The Trial
12. The "Brain-Washed"
13. Effectiveness of Chi-
nese Communist Indoc-
trination Procedures
IV: Relation of State Police
Procedures, Military In-
terrogation, and Indoctri-
nation of Civilians and
Prisoners of War in Com-
munist Countries
V : Some Theoretical Consid-
erations
VI : I?pitome
Submitted for publicatiot May 31, 1956.1 New York hospital-Cornell Medical Center.
The information contained in this paper was assembled at a time when the authors were
serving as consultants to the Department of Defense. The opinions expressed are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U. S. Government. The authors wish
to acknowledge that the data upon which this report was based were accumulated through the
selfless efforts of many able people, who must remain anonymous.
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I. Introduction
T HE COMMUNISTS are skilled in the extraction of information from
prisoners and in making prisoners do their bidding. It has appeared that
they can force men to confess to crimes which have not been committed, and
then, apparently, to believe in the truth of their confessions and express sympathy
and gratitude toward those who have imprisoned them. Many have found it hard
to understand that the Communists do not possess new and remarkable techniques
of psychological manipulation. Some have recalled the confessions of men such
as Cardinal Mindszenty and William Oatis and the unusual behavior of the
old Bolsheviks at the purge trials in the 1930's, and have seen an alarming
parallel. These prisoners were men of intelligence, ability, and strength of char-
acter. They had every reason to oppose their captors. Their confessions were
palpably untrue. Such behavior is, if anything, more difficult to explain than
that of some of our prisoners of war in Korea.
The techniques used by the Communists have been the subject of speculation.
A number of theories about them have been advanced, most of them suggesting
that these techniques have been based upon some modification of the conditioned
reflex techniques of I. P. Pavlov, the Russian neurophysiologist. The term
"brain washing," originated by a reporter who interviewed Chinese refugees in
Hong Kong, has caught the public fancy and has gained wide acceptance.
Various authors have attempted to provide a scientific definition for this term.
This has had the effect of confirming the general impression that "brain washing"
is an esoteric technique for the manipulation of human behavior, designed by
"scientific investigators" on the basis of laboratory experiments and controlled
observations, and producing highly predictable results.
Many of the public speculations about "brain washing" are not supported by
the available evidence. However, the Communists do make an orderly attempt
to obtain information from their prisoners, and to convert their prisoners to
forms of behavior and belief acceptable to their captors. They have had some
success in their efforts, and this success has had a good deal of propaganda value
for them. For this reason, if for no other, it is important that we have as clear
an understanding as possible about how these methods originated, how they are
applied, their effectiveness, and their purpose.
The information contained in this report was obtained from a number of
sources. Details of the Communist arrest and interrogation systems, and a
great deal of information about the purposes, attitudes, and training of those
who administer them, were obtained from experts in the area, who for security
reasons must remain anonymous.
Knowledge of the prisoners' reactions to their experiences was obtained by
the direct observation of persons recently released from Communist prisons.
Some of these observations continued for weeks and were supplemented by
follow-up observations over periods of months. They included complete physical,
neurological, and psychiatric examinations, and often psychological testing as
well. They were supplemented by information supplied by families, friends,
and former associates. Among those studied intensively were military and civilian
prisoners of diverse ranks and backgrounds, women as well as men, defectors
and resisters, persons "brain-washed" and "not brain-washed," some who ad-
mittedly cooperated with their captors and some who said they did not.
In supplement to this, pertinent information from investigations carried out
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by the U. S. Army and the U. S. Air Force and from the material assembled
for the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War has been utilized.
The very large public literature on these subjects has been reviewed also, and
drawn upon when it was helpful. Finally, various, laboratory and clinical investi-
gations have been carried out in order to throw light upon the psychological and
physiological processes involved in some of the interrogation and indoctrination
procedures.
The evidence from every source has been consistent with that from the
others and provides a basis for confidience in the validity of the statements which
are made in this report and the conclusions which have been drawn from them,
which may be summarized thus :
1. The interrogation methods used by the state police in Communist countries are elabora-
tions and refinements of police practices, many of which were known and used before the
Russian Communist Revolution.
2. The principles and practices used by the Communist state police in the development of
suspects, the accumulation of evidence, and the carrying out of arrest, detention, inter-
rogation, trial, and punishment arc known. The effects of these upon prisoners are known
also.
.3. The "confessions" obtained by Communist state police are readily understandable as re-
sults of the methods used.
4. Communist methods of indoctrinating prisoners of war were developed by the Russians
and subsequently refined by the Chinese. These methods and their effects are known also.
5. Chinese methods of dealing with political prisoners and "enemies of the state" were
adapted from those of the Russians.
6. The intensive indoctrination of political prisoners is a practice primarily used by the
Chinese Communists. The methods used in this indoctrination are known, and their
effects are understandable.
Part H. Practices of the KGB
1. Background of the Russian State Police
It is illuminating to consider Communist behavior in the light of the doctrines
espoused by those who are committed to Communism. Lenin and the other
old Bolsheviks who established the Russian Communist Party had spent most
of their lives as underground revolutionaries and terrorists, as prisoners, as
exiles in Siberia, and as refugees and plotters in various parts of Europe. They
accepted behavior which would have been called criminal had it not been carried
out in the name of political reform. The unique contributions which they made
to Communism were their willingness to use any means in order to attain
Socialist ends, their insistence upon religious dedication to the Party, and their
demand for unquestioned obedience to Party directives. Their chief concern
was not with ideals, but with means of attaining power, ostensibly for the
Party and "the people."
In the Byzantine Empire, from which the Russians received much of their
cultural heritage, internal espionage and the arbitrary exercise of power by a
bureaucracy reporting only to the Emperor were prominent features. As
Russia developed. from feudalism into a national state under Ivan the Terrible,
a centralized, independent,'and all-powerful bureaucracy was established, respon-
sible only to the monarch. Subsequent Czars were perhaps less terrible than
Ivan, but no less ruthless. The chancery of the Imperial Court was always
independent and arbitrary, and the "rights of individual men" of all ranks never
had the meaning in Russia which they had in Western Europe, even tinder
absolute monarchs. In all of the period prior to 1917 the secret police system
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in Russia was probably the most highly organized, effective, and powerful of
that of any European state.
By the early decades of the present century, most of the features which
characterized present-day secret police systems had already been evolved, and
were exhibited by the Czarist Okhrana. The Okhrana at that time was nation-
wide, and centrally directed. It was empowered to make arrests and to punish
arbitrarily without regard for other legal institutions. Its operations were secret;
they were concealed from other arms of the government and the armed services,
as well as from the general population. It operated through a great number of
spies and informers, who were recruited by payment, threat, or compromise
from among the general population, and especially from among criminals and
those suspected of political activity against the state. Its apparatus extended
even into the highest arms of all branches of the government; neither officials
nor private citizens were immune from suspicion or arrest by it.
The Okhrana had learned to use many modern secret police procedures also.
It had means of getting people to implicate themselves in criminal activity when
there was a desire to compromise them or their associates. It shared with other
police systems practices which had developed over a period of many years
and which experience had shown to be effective in extracting information and
confessions from persons suspected of crimes. These methods were known to
police systems all over the world, and many of them are still in use at the
present day.
Prisoners of the Okhrana were aware that they could be held indefinitely
without trial, under very severe conditions of inadequate food, filth, lack of
sanitation or exercise, and continuous interrogation. They knew that ultimately
they might be banished or executed arbitrarily, if they did not die of other
causes. All of this knowledge, and all of the pressures of their treatment, acted
powerfully upon those who were exposed to it. It would be wrong to suppose
that the Czarist police were either as effective or as thorough as those in modern
Russia and other Communist states, but many of the practices used by these
modern Communist police have been in use for many years and were well
known long before the Communist Revolution.
Reform of the prison system was one of the foremost tenets of all of the
prerevolutionary socialist parties, to which Bolsheviks subscribed no less than
others. As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, these reforms might be
generally stated thus : The secret police apparatus was to be abolished outright,
and those who had taken part in it were to be punished; the old prison system
was to be abolished also. In the new state, the police would be the friends of
the people and the guardian of their interests. Those who had committed crimes
would not be tried before "arbitrary courts," with all the legal apparatus used
in Western nations, for the courts in Western nations were thought of as arms
of bourgeois tyranny, in which the wealthy secured justice and the poor in-
justice. Communist courts. would dispense Communist justice. In the Com-
munist state, the criminal would be detained in a place of detention. This would
be not a prison but a place in which the accused could sit down with those who
arrested him and discuss the crimes which he had committed and the reasons
why he had committed them. No one would be arrested unless it was clear
that he had committed a crime. If the prisoner would not admit his crimes,
or if he were not aware that he had committed criminal acts, by persuasion and
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teaching he would be brought to understand the nature of his crimes and the
reason why they were injurious to the interest of the people. Having come
to understand his crimes, and the necessity for his punishment, the prisoner and
the court might agree upon the type of punishment and reeducation which should
be carried out. The prisoner would have an opportunity to make a written state-
ment of his deposition, with a declaration that no force had been put upon him
in order to obtain it. After the investigation of his case had been completed,
he would be taken before the court, where he could explain his crimes, and his
sentence would be passed. It was only after this sentencing that he would
actually be put in prison. Nor would the new prisons be like the old. In them,
the prisoner would be allowed to reform and rehabilitate himself by whole-
some work and reeducation, instead of being incarcerated in a cell. Ultimately
he would rejoin the socialist society as a "new man."
After the 1917 Revolution the Czarist secret police system was abolished.
For a few months Russia operated without secret police. But when they were
threatened by counter-revolution and chaos, it did not take the Communists long
to turn to the idea of reestablishing a secret police system, this time controlled
by the Communist Party. In November, 1917, Lenin established the "Cheka,"
or "Extraordinary Commission," for the suppression of counter-revolutionary
activities, with the power of summary arrest, judgment, and execution. Under
this euphemism the secret police system was reincarnated. At its head Lenin
placed Felix Dzerzhinsky, a dedicated revolutionary, who gathered around him
a group of zealous young Bolsheviks that were regarded as the cream of the
Communist Party, the guardians of its principles and its power. It was long
a proud boast among Communists when one said that he was "an old Chekist."
But these men also shared a conspiratorial background, a willingness to use any
means to attain their ends, and a freedom from "bourgeois morality."
The Chekists thought of themselves as members of a new order sweeping
away the old, but what they inherited was the old Czarist prison system and all
of the apparatus that went with it. They also inherited the concepts and
attitudes of old Russia to a much greater degree than is generally realized, for
these were the concepts and attitudes under which they and all other Russians
had been reared. Just what proportion of the former personnel of the Okhrana
and the old Russian prison system was utilized by the Cheka at the outset is
not known; but it is a safe assumption that at the working level many of the
police, the jailers, the spies, and the investigators used by the Cheka had been
previously employed by its predecessor.* This is not to say that the Chekists
did not set up their apparatus in accordance with Communist theory. It is
characteristic of the Communists that they organize all of their institutions in
a manner which is nominally in accordance with their theory. A rational and
idealistic purpose is ascribed to every aspect of their actions. This is no less
true of the police system than of any other segment of the Communist state.
Since that time the secret police system in Russia has passed through a
number of reorganizations and has appeared under several names. The relation
between the secret police system and the Ministry of Internal Affairs is con-
fusing to those not intimately acquainted with the ramifications of the Soviet
bureaucracy, for this Ministry also has been reorganized under a number of
* In this connection it is of interest that the Communist parties of Eastern Europe have
absorbed many former Nazis and police operatives from the old regime into their new police
system.
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names, and from time to time the state police have been under its nominal
jurisdiction. It is a popular custom to use the same initials to denote both the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the secret police system, but it is important
to distinguish between the two. Since the purging of Beria, in 1953, the Ministry
of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the State Police (KGB-Committee for State
Security) have been administratively separate. In this report we shall refer to
the Soviet State Police as the KGB. Where the terms Cheka, GPU, OGPU,
NKVD, and MVD are used, it is understood that they refer to the state police
functions of these former organizations, and not to their other functions, which
were various.
There is a wealth of evidence that the methods of pressure, interrogation,
and persuasion which are now used by state police throughout the Communist
world had been developed in all of their essentials before the purge trials of
1936-1939. The differences between these methods and those which we can assume
were inherited from the Okhrana in 1918 are chiefly improvements of organiza-
tion and refinements of technique and the addition of the persuasive activities
of the interrogator with his Communist logic. Tradition has it that these refine-
ments were introduced by the Cheka. According to one report, Dzerzhinsky
himself designed the methods of the Cheka, drawing upon his experience with
the_ Polish police, as well as that of the Okhrana and the Bolshevik Party.
Present-day KGB officers look upon the "ideological approach" and persuasive
activities of the interrogator as the distinctive feature of the method of the
KGB, and the one which is responsible for most of its effectiveness. Careful
planning and the detailed organization of the arrest and interrogation procedures
are important aspects of the KGB procedures, but are not unique.
The mass indoctrination of prisoners of war is a different matter. This
appears to have been originated by the NKVD. At the outbreak of war between
Germany and the Soviet Union, in 1941, the interrogation and subsequent
internment of military prisoners was the function of the Red Army. Prior to
1943 the Russians took few German prisoners, and most of those who fell
into their hands were murdered or otherwise disposed of by front-line military
units. Very few Germans who were captured in 1941 and 1942 survived the
war. This became a problem to the Soviet High Command, which was being
deprived of the military information which might be obtained from prisoners-
of-war interrogation. A directive was issued in the spring of 1942 to the effect
that the lives of prisoners should be protected in order that the information
which they possessed might be obtained from them. The custody of prisoners
behind the area of combat was turned over to the NKVD in 1943. During the
next two years this organization developed the methods of interrogating and
indoctrinating prisoners of war which were subsequently adopted by the Chinese
Communist Army and eventually, with many Chinese modifications, were used
upon our military personnel in Korea.
Because the methods of the Russian state police became the model for those
used in other Communist countries, they shall be considered in detail. At the time
of writing (January, 1956) there are public reports that the Russian state
police are in temporary eclipse, and their activities are said to have been re-
stricted; but there is every reason to believe that this is only partially true.
The reader should bear in mind that, in effect, some form of state police system
has existed in Russia since the 17th century. From time to time public resent-
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inent has caused the organization having this function to be "reformed," or even
"abolished," but it has always reappeared within a few years, often under a new
name, but operating in the same manner. This has been true under the Com-
munists no less than under the Czars.
2. Present Structure of the KGB
The KGB, like its predecessors, is directed from Moscow. Within Russia it
is divided into sections, which correspond to the various federal republics, and
subsections, corresponding to districts, or oblasts. Within each of these districts
the organization has an investigation section, which is primarily concerned with
the detection, arrest, and punishment of those who commit crimes against the
state. The functions of this section are conducted primarily by a group of
relatively junior officers in their late 20's or 30's, each of whom has been
especially trained for this type of work. These men operate under the direction
of superiors, who ultimately report to Moscow. It is the task of these junior
KGB officers to become aware of any political crimes in the area assigned to
them and to secure evidence leading to the arrest and punishment of the criminals.
It is the task of other junior officers in the interrogation section to obtain a
signed deposition from each prisoner confessing to his crimes.
In the following sections the various steps of the procedure used by the
KGB will be outlined. The Communist principle which is the ostensible reason
for using each step in the procedure will be discussed. This will be followed
by a description of the procedure as it is actually carried out.
3. The Suspect
Those who fall under the suspicion of the KGB usually have some reason
for exciting its suspicion. To the victim himself, such suspicion may appear
to be capricious or arbitrary because he may be utterly unaware of the basis
for it. The Russian definition of "crimes against the state," or political crimes,
is a broad one, and the interpretation of these Russian laws is largely in the
hands of the KGB; for all practical purposes, it may find reason to suspect
anyone. From long practice this organization has developed the thesis that those
who conspire against the state will fall into recognized categories. First of all,
there are those members of the Communist Party who have come under suspicion
by the Party apparatus, or who have been criticized for failure in some activity.
Since "the Party can do no wrong," failure may become the equivalent of sabotage
or treason. Second, there are those who have traveled abroad or who have had
association with foreigners. This, of course, includes all foreigners; but it also
includes former prisoners of war, Soviet functionaries who have served abroad,
and even members of the KGB itself. Third, members of certain Soviet national-
ities which are suspected of nationalist aspirations may also be suspected as a
group. The Volga Germans and the Chichen-Ingush are examples. The most
recent example was the suspicion cast upon all Jews during the period from
1950 to 1952, when complaints of "cosmopolitanism" were being made against
this group. Fourth, certain segments of Soviet society, such as the "Kulaks"
of the early 1930's or the Army in 1937-1939, may be suspect. Fifth, there are
those whose class origin- is considered bourgeois or aristocratic. These are fewer
in number than they used to be, but they formerly constituted a large group of
natural suspects. In times of unrest or mass hysteria, such as occurred during
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the purge trials or during World War 11, all persons in a category may become
"suspects" and subject to arrest.
In addition to these "general suspects," there are "specific suspects," who
become such either because suspicion has been cast upon them by one of the
many informers among the general population or because they are relatives,
friends, or former associates of other persons who have been arrested or
are suspected. Other specific suspects are those who either intentionally or un-
intentionally have made statements, or carried out acts, which the police regard
as evidence of criminal, antistate activity.
The following general assumptions can be made:
1. Although the suspect may not know why he is suspected, the KGB has
some reason for singling him out.
2. Because of the broad nature of Soviet laws, and the free manner in
which the KGB can interpret these, any "suspect" has committed some "crime
against the state" as the KGB defines the term.
The implications of this statement are significant. In a nation in which the
state owns all property, where everyone works for the state, and where only
approved opinions may be held, a person who has accidentally broken or lost
some of the "people's property," who has made a mistake, who has not worked
hard enough, who has talked to a foreigner, or who has merely expressed what
he inferred was an innocent opinion, may be ipso facto guilty of a "crime
against the state."
Thus, those who fall into the various categories of "natural suspects" con-
stitute a reservoir of potential victims for the secret police. A person who belongs
to one of these groups may go unmolested for a long period. His arrest, when
it ultimately takes place, will occur when the KGB needs arrests. For ex-
ample, when party policy decrees that there shall be a widespread campaign
against "foreign spies," the KGB will seek its victims from those whom it
regards as potential foreign agents. If the Party decides upon a campaign
against nationalist tendencies among Soviet citizens, the KGB will select its
victims from the nationality which has been singled out as an "example." If
there is a struggle for power within the Party hierarchy, the victims of the
KGB will be selected from those members of the Party who lose out in the
-struggle. Sometimes purely bureaucratic needs within the secret police organiza-
tion are the occasion for arrest. Since the effectiveness of the organization in
the various districts is judged by the number of arrests and convictions obtained,
when the leader of a district fears that his organization is falling behind, he
will generate local pressures for more arrests; the victims, of course, will be
selected from appropriate groups of suspects. The result of all of this is that
many of the victims of the secret police apparatus are seized for reasons quite
beyond their own control, which are not immediately related to anything that
they may have done.
4. The Accumulation of Evidence
It is an administrative principle of the Soviet government that no one may
be arrested unless there is evidence that he is a criminal.
According to the practice of the KGB this means that when a man falls
under the suspicion of a KGB officer, this officer must accumulate "evidence"
that the man is a "criminal" and take this evidence to the state prosecutor,
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who must then issue a warrant before the arrest can be carried out. When a
man falls under the suspicion of the KGB, an officer in the investigation
section draws up a plan for the investigation of his case. The plan describes
why the man is suspected, who are his suspected associates, what evidence is
needed to arrest him, how he shall be placed under surveillance, how the evidence
shall be gathered, and how he shall be arrested. This plan is submitted to his
superiors for comment, criticism, and approval, and is then put into action.
The investigating officer accumulates "evidence" by showing that the victim had
a reason to be a criminal (i.e., that he was a member of a suspect group) and
by accumulating the statements of spies and informers with regard to him. If
this "evidence" is not sufficient to satisfy the officer, he places the suspect
and the suspect's friends and associates under surveillance. These friends and
associates may be held for interrogation in order to supply evidence against the
suspect, the reason for their seizure being that they are associates of a suspect,
and therefore suspect themselves.
Covert surveillance and the arrest of associates are carried out carefully,
but they cannot always be concealed from the suspect. Ile may become aware
of it, or his friends may tell him. As he comes a marked man in the eyes of
his friends, they begin to avoid him. Their demeanor sometimes indicates to
him that he is under suspicion. The knowledge that he will be arrested, without
knowledge of when this will occur, obviously creates anxiety in the intended
victim. Although KGB officers know about the psychological effect which
surveillance has upon suspects, and make use of it, they do not use it with
the calculated cunning that the victim sometimes supposes. Poorly concealed
surveillance, and the arrest of friends and associates, followed after an indefinite
period by the arrest of the main suspect, are not necessarily stage maneuvers
to frighten the victim. Often they are simply evidence of rather slow and
clumsy police activities.
The investigating officer in charge of the "case" is usually not above the
rank of major. His standing in the eyes of his superiors and his future career
in the organization are dependent upon his ability to achieve arrest and con-
victions. His superiors themselves have a similar relation to their superiors.
Thus it often happens, especially in times of internal tension, that members of
the organization compete with one another in trying to turn up suspects and
secure their conviction. To a certain extent, officers are judged by the number
of arrests which they obtain. Since Communist legal principles demand that
no person be arrested except when it is clear that he is a criminal, officers
who arrest men who must later be released are subject to censure. They have
made a mistake because they have arrested a man who is not a criminal.
The consequences are important from the point of view of the victim. In
effect, any man who is arrested is automatically in the position of being "guilty".f
If the "evidence" should be insufficient to substantiate his guilt, those in
charge of his case are subject to censure. In theory, those making the arrest
should have accumulated beforehand sufficient evidence of guilt to satisfy both
their superior officers and the state prosecutor. It is usually not difficult to
satisfy these officials. Nevertheless, this requirement for sufficient evidence of
guilt puts pressure upon the junior officers of the KGB, who are anxious
t A discussion of the Communist concept of "guilt" and the meaning of this term to the
KGB is presented in Part II, Section 16.
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to establish a reputation for themselves, and sometimes they may falsify the
"evidence" which they present to the prosecutor. This is a forbidden practice,
for which the offending officer could be punished if he were "officially" found
out. The officers who took part in staging the famous "doctor's plot" of 1952
were punished later for "falsifying the evidence." But when the KGB is under
pressure to secure convictions, and when this pressure coin.es from high in the
Party, "falsification of evidence," like the use of physical brutality in obtaining
confessions, may be a widespread procedure. It is never "officially" condoned.
Anyone arrested by the KGB must know that in the eyes of the Soviet
state, and in the eyes of those who have arrested him, he is a "criminal." The
only question to be settled after his arrest is the extent of his criminal activity
and the precise nature of his crimes. The officers in charge of his case, both
those who have made the arrest and those who will carry out the interrogation,
have a personal interest in seeing that the arrested man makes a prompt and
extensive confession, for their own reputations are at stake. These officers work
on a "time table" : They are expected to "settle the case" within six weeks to
three months after their victim has been seized by producing a satisfactory
protocol, upon which a "trial" can be based.
It is a Communist principle that men should be arrested in a manner which
will not cause them embarrassment and that the police should carry out arrests
in a manner which will not unduly disturb the population.
In the United States, it is said that a man is "arrested" when the police
seize him, detain him, or otherwise deprive him of his freedom; and United
States law requires that the police obtain a "warrant" or comply with certain
other legal procedures before carrying out an arrest. In the Soviet Union the
KGB may obtain a "warrant" from the state prosecutor before seizing a man,
but it is not required to do so. It may "detain" a man on suspicion and interrogate
him "to see if he is a criminal." What would be called "arrest" in the United
States may be carried out in the Soviet Union with or without a warrant. The
process of seizure is the same in either case.
For more than 20 years it has been the practice of the Russian State Police
to seize their suspects in the middle of the night. The "midnight knock on the
door" has become a standard episode in fiction about Russia. The police are
well aware of the fact that the intended victim, forewarned by his previous
surveillance and the changing attitude of his friends, is further terrified by
the thought that he may be awakened from his sleep almost any night and taken
away. The official explanation for the nighttime arrests is that such a procedure
avoids the embarrassment and alarm which would be created if the victim were
seized in the daytime. It is customary for the arresting officer to be accompanied
by several other men. He usually reads to the prisoner the arrest warrant, if
there is one. It does not, of course, specify the details of the crimes committed.
The prisoner is then taken promptly to a detention prison.
An alternate method of arrest, for which the same official explanation is
given, is to carry out the procedure in a city not the home of the suspect. In
order to accomplish this, men under suspicion are ordered by their superiors
to travel on some pretext or other. Before the victim reaches his destination,
he is arrested and taken from the train. A third ii-iethod, said to be preferred
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11
when there is no warrant, is to seize the victim suddenly as he walks down the
street. All of these procedures create intense anxiety in the victim, and in the
population at large they create all of the alarm which may be generated by the
sudden and unexplained disappearance of a person from the midst of his family
and friends.
6. The Detention Prison
According to Soviet administrative principle, a man who is arrested by the
state police is not "imprisoned." He is merely "detained." In theory, he is
detained in a quiet, healthy atmosphere, where he has an opportunity to meditate
upon his crimes, and a chance to talk them over freely and at length with
police officers, without being prejudiced by friends, associates, or lawyers, who
might induce him to distort the truth.
In most of the large cities of the Soviet Union the KGB operates detention
prisons. These prisons contain only persons under "investigation," whose cases
have not yet been "settled." The most modern of these prisons are separate
institutions, well built and spotlessly clean. In addition to the cells for the
prisoners, they contain offices for the KGB units, rooms in which interrogations
are carried out, and other rooms, usually in the basement, in which prisoners
are executed when such punishment is decided upon. There are attached medical
facilities and rooms for the care of the sick detainees. An exercise yard is
a standard facility. In outlying areas or undeveloped regions, the KGB may
occupy a separate wing of a general prison and use this as a detention prison.
Facilities in these areas may be ancient or inadequate, depending upon what is
available; but the detention wing itself is administered separately from that of
the rest of the prison, and prisoners under detention are segregated from general
prisoners.
Most of the cells in Soviet detention prisons are designed for one occupant.
The typical cell is a small cubicle, about 10 ft. long by 6 ft. wide, containing
a single bunk and a slop jar. It usually has no other furnishings. Its walls
are barren, and it is lighted by a single electric lamp in the ceiling. One wall
usually contains a small window above eye level, from which the prisoner can
see nothing of his outside environment. The door contains a peephole, through
which the guard in the corridor outside may observe the prisoner at will without
the prisoner's knowledge.
There also may be cells which are large enough to hold two or more prisoners.
Except for size, such cells are not different from the others. In general, prisoners
whose cases are relatively unimportant, those against whom the evidence is
"complete," and those who have indicated a willingness to talk freely are placed
in cells with other prisoners, some of whom are usually informers. Those
whose cases are important or "incomplete," those from whom information is
desired, and those for whom public trials or propaganda confessions are planned
are put in solitary confinement.
Such typical cells will not, of course, be found in all prisons, and especially
not in those which are old or improvised; but the general aspect of barrenness
and complete lack of access to the outside world is characteristic.
7. The Regimen Within the Detention Prison
The arresting officers usually do not give the prisoner any reason for his
arrest beyond that in the warrant which they read to him. They usually search
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him, and also search the place in which he lives. They then take him directly
to the prison. Here he is asked a few questions about his identity, and his
personal valuables and outer clothing are taken from him. These are carefully
catalogued and put away.: He may or may not be given a prison uniform. He
is usually examined by a prison physician shortly after his incarceration.
The entire introduction to the detention prison is brief and is carried on
without explanation. Within a few hours after his arrest the prisoner finds
himself locked up within a cell.
An almost invariable feature of the management of any important suspect
under detention is a period of total isolation in a detention cell. The prisoner
is placed within his cell; the door is shut, and for an indefinite period he is
totally isolated from human contact except by the specific direction of the
officer in charge of his case. He is not allowed to talk to the guards or to
communicate with other prisoners in any manner. When he is taken from his
cell for any reason, he is accompanied by a guard. If another prisoner approaches
through the corridor, he turns his face to the wall until the other prisoner has
passed.
The hours and routine of the prisoner are rigidly organized. He is awakened
early in the morning and given a short period in which to wash himself. His
food is brought to him. Ile has a short and fixed time in which to eat it; the
standard diet is just adequate to maintain nutrition. He must clean himself and
police his own cell; but he is not allowed enough tune to keep it spotlessly clean.
At some time in the morning he usually has an exercise period. Typically, his
exercise consists of walking alone in the exercise yard. If he is in rigid isolation,
he may not be allowed to exercise at all. He is usually allowed a slop jar in
his cell which he can utilize for defecation and urination, but sometimes this
is taken away. Then he must call the guard and perhaps wait for hours to
be taken to the latrine.
At all times except when he is eating, sleeping, exercising, or being inter-
rogated, the prisoner is left strictly alone in his cell. He has nothing to do,
nothing to read, and no one to talk to. Under the strictest regimen, he may
have to "sit or stand in his cell in a fixed position all day. He may sleep only
at hours prescribed for sleep. Then he must go to bed promptly when told,
and must lie in a fixed position upon his back with his hands outside the
blanket. If he deviates from this position, the guard outside will awaken him
and make him resume it. The light in his cell burns constantly. He must sleep
with his face constantly toward it.
If the prisoner becomes ill, he is taken to a prison physician, by whom he
is treated with the best medical care available, according to the practices common
to Soviet medicine. If necessary, he may be placed under hospital care; but
as soon as he has recovered, the regimen will be resumed.
Prisoners who attempt to commit suicide are thwarted and carefully nursed
until they recover; then the regimen is resumed.
Deviations from the prescribed regimen are promptly noticed by the guards
and are punished. Disturbed behavior is punished also. If this behavior persists
1 It is an interesting comment on the "legalistic" behavior of the KGB that prisoners who
have been detained, interrogated, tortured, imprisoned at length, and ultimately released after
many years may then receive all of their original clothing and personal valuables, which have
been scrupulously cared for during their imprisonment.
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and the officer in charge of the case is convinced that the prisoner has become
mentally ill, the man may be placed under medical care until his health has
returned; then the regimen is resumed.
8. Effects of the Regimen in the Isolation Cell
The effects upon prisoners of the regimen in the isolation cell are striking.?
It has been mentioned that the man who has been arrested by the KGB is
usually intensely apprehensive. Often he has known for weeks that he would
be arrested, but has had no clear knowledge of when, or for what reason. He
has been seized in the middle of the night and taken without explanation to a
formidable prison. He knows that no friend can help him, and that the KGB
may do with. him what they please.
A major aspect of his prison experience is isolation. Man is a social animal;
he does not live alone. From birth to death he lives in the company of his
fellow men. When he is totally isolated, he is removed from all of the inter-
personal relations which are so important to him, and taken out of the social
role which sustains him. His internal as well as his external life is disrupted.
Exposed for the first time to total isolation in a KGB prison, he develops a
predictable group of symptoms, which might almost be called a "disease syn-
drome." The guards and KGB officers are quite familiar with this syndrome.
They watch each new prisoner with technical interest as his symptoms develop.
The initial appearance of an arrested prisoner is one of bewilderment. For
a few hours he may sit quietly in his cell looking confused and dejected. But
within a short time most prisoners become alert and begin to take an interest
in their environment. They react with expectancy when anyone approaches the
door to the cell. They show interest and anxiety as they are exposed to each
new feature of the prison routine. They may ask questions or begin con-
versations. Some make demands: They demand to know why they are being
held and protest that they are innocent. If they are foreign nationals, they may
insist upon seeing their consular officers. Some take a "You can't do this to
me" attitude. Some pass through a brief period of shouting, threatening, and
demanding. All of this is always sternly repressed. If need be, the officer
in charge of the case will see the prisoner, remind him of the routine, threaten
him with punishment, and punish him if he does not subside.I1 During this
period the prisoner has not yet appreciated the full import of his situation. He
tries to fraternize with the guards. Ile leaves part of his food if he does not
like it. He tries to speak to prisoners whom he passes in the corridors and
reaches back to close the door behind him when he is taken to the latrine. The
guards refer to this as the period of getting "acclimatized" to the prison routine.
After a few days it becomes apparent to the prisoner that his activity avails
? The reaction to be described in this and in the following sections is that of a "typical"
man, previously untrained, who has never been imprisoned or isolated before, and who has
been arrested for a serious, but not specified, crime against the state of which he could be
"guilty." Even among such men, there are wide differences in the capacity to tolerate the
isolation regimen. Some become demoralized within a few days, while others are able to re-
tain a high degree of self-control for months. In addition to this, most men possess the
capacity to adapt to isolation, and those who experience the isolation regimen a second time
almost always tolerate it better, and longer. Previous training and the circumstances of
seizure are important also.
11 The punishments used are described in Sections 10 and 13.
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him nothing, and that he will be punished or reprimanded for even the smallest
breaches of the routine. He wonders when he will be released or questioned.
His requests have been listened to but never acted upon. He becomes in-
creasingly anxious and restless, and his sleep is disturbed. He begins to look up
alertly when anyone passes in the corridor. He jumps when the guard comes to
the door. He becomes "adjusted" to the routine in his cell and goes through it
punctiliously; but he still leaves some of his food, and occasionally he reveals
by small gestures his lack of complete submission to his environment.
The period of anxiety, hyperactivity, and apparent adjustment to the iso-
lation routine usually continues from one to three weeks. As it continues, the
prisoner becomes increasingly dejected and dependent. He gradually gives up
all spontaneous activity within his cell and ceases to care about his personal
appearance and actions. Finally, he sits and stares with a vacant expression,
perhaps endlessly twisting a button on his coat. He allows himself to become
dirty and disheveled. When food is presented to him, he eats it all, but he
no longer bothers with the niceties of eating. He may mix it into a mush and
stuff it into his mouth like an animal. He goes through the motions of his
prison routine automatically, as if he were in a daze. The slop jar is no longer
offensive to him. Ultimately he seems to lose many of the restraints of ordinary
behavior. He may soil himself. He weeps; he mutters, and he prays aloud in
his cell. He follows the orders of the guard with the docility of a trained animal.
It usually takes from four to six weeks to produce this phenomenon in a newly
imprisoned man.
9. The Feelings and Attitudes of the Prisoner During the Isolation Regimen
The man who for the first time experiences isolation in prison is, of course,
experiencing far more than simple isolation. He usually feels profoundly anxious,
helpless, frustrated, dejected, and entirely uncertain about his future. His
initial reaction to the isolation procedure is indeed one of bewilderment and
some numbness at the calamity which has befallen him. This is followed by a
period of interest and apprehension about every detail of the prison regimen,
accompanied by hope that he can explain everything as soon as he gets a chance,
or an expectation that he will be released when the proper authorities hear about
his plight. Such hopes last but a few days, but they keep him alert and interested
during that time.
As hope disappears, a reaction of anxious waiting supervenes. In this period,
the profound boredom and complete loneliness of his situation gradually over-
whelm the prisoner. There is literally nothing for him to do except ruminate,
and because he has so much to worry about, his ruminations are seldom
pleasant. Frequently, they take the form of going over and over all the possible
causes for his arrest. His mood becomes one of dejection. His sleep is dis-
turbed by nightmares. Ultimately he may reach a state of depression in which
he ceases to care about his personal appearance and behavior and pays little
attention to his surroundings. In this state the prisoner may have illusory
experiences. A distant sound in the corridor sounds like someone calling his
name. The rattle of a footstep may be interpreted as a key in the lock opening
the cell.
Some prisoners may become delirious and have visual hallucinations. God
may seem to appear to such a prisoner and tell him to cooperate with his
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1.5
interrogator. He may see his wife standing beside him, or a servant bringing
him a large meal. In nearly all cases the prisoner's need for human companion-
ship and his desire to talk to anyone about anything becomes a gnawing appetite,
which may be as insistent as the hunger of a starving man. If he is given an
opportunity to talk, he may say anything which seems to be appropriate, or to
be desired by his listener, for in his confused and befuddled state he may be un-
able to tell what is "actually true" from what "might be" or "should be" true. He
may be highly suggestible, and he may "confabulate" the details of any story sug-
gested to him.
Not all men who first experience total isolation react in precisely this manner.
In some, these symptoms are less conspicuous. In others, dejection and utter
despondence set in earlier, or later. Still others, and especially those with pre-
existing personality disturbances, may become frankly psychotic. However, frank
psychotic manifestations, other than those of the "prison psychosis" described
above, are not usual, primarily because those having charge of the prisoners
usually break the routine of total isolation when they see that disorganization of
the prisoner's personality is imminent.
10. Other Pressures of the Isolation Regimen
Not all of the reaction to this imprisonment experience can be attributed to
isolation alone. Other potent forces are acting upon the newly imprisoned man.
The prisoner's anxiety about himself is compounded by worry about what may
happen to his friends and associates, and, in the case of those who possess infor-
mation which they wish to hide, apprehension about how much the KGB knows
or will find out. Even in the absence of isolation, profound and uncontrolled
anxiety is disorganizing. Uncertainty compounds his anxiety also. The newly
arrested prisoner does not know how long he will be confined, how he will be
punished, or with what he will be charged. He does know that his punishment
may be anything up to death or permanent imprisonment. Many prisoners say
that uncertainty is the most unbearable aspect of the whole experience. Sleep
disturbances and nightmares lead to further fear and fatigue.
The effects of isolation, uncertainty, and anxiety are usually sufficient to
make the prisoner eager to talk to his interrogator and to seek some method
of escape from a situation which has become intolerable. But, if these alone
are not enough to produce the desired effect, the officer in charge has other
simple and highly effective ways of applying pressure. Two of the most effective
of these are fatigue and lack of sleep. The constant light in the cell and the
necessity of maintaining a rigid. position in bed compound the effects of anxiety
and nightmares in producing sleep disturbances. If these are not enough, it is
easy to have the guards awaken the prisoner at intervals. This is especially
effective if the prisoner is always awakened as soon as he drops off to sleep.
The guards can also shorten the hours available for sleep, or deny sleep al-
together. Continued loss of sleep produces clouding of consciousness and a
loss of alertness( both of which impair the victim's ability to sustain isolation.
It also produces profound fatigue.
Another simple and effective type of pressure is that of maintaining the
temperature of the cell at a level which is either too hot or too cold for comfort.
Continuous heat, at a level at which constant sweating is necessary in order to
maintain body temperature, is enervating and fatigue-producing. Sustained cold
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is uncomfortable and poorly tolerated. Yet another method of creating pressure
is to reduce the food ration to the point at which the prisoner is constantly
hungry. This usually involves loss of weight, which is often associated with
weakness and asthenia. Furthermore, deprivation of food produces lassitude,
loss of general interest, and some breakdown of courage. Some people become
profoundly depressed when deprived of food. Chronically hungry people can
sometimes be induced to overcome a surprising number of their inhibitions in
order to relieve their hunger.
The effects of isolation, anxiety, fatigue, lack of sleep, uncomfortable tempera-
tures, and chronic hunger produce disturbances of mood, attitudes, and behavior
in nearly all prisoners. The living organism cannot entirely withstand such
assaults. The Communists do not look upon these assaults as "torture." Un-
doubtedly, they use the methods which they do in order to conform, in a typical
legalistic manner, to overt Communist principles, which demand that "no force
or torture be used in extracting information from prisoners." But all of them
produce great discomfort, and lead to serious disturbances of many bodily
processes; there is no reason to differentiate them from any other form of torture.
The KGB officer who has charge of a case during the period of suspicion,
surveillance, and arrest is now supplanted by another officer who is charged with
the interrogation of the prisoner and the preparation of the deposition. (Prisoners
commonly refer to this document as the "confession"). The officers who special-
ize in interrogation are relatively junior also; they come from a generation which
has grown up under the Communist regime and are selected for the KGB in part
because of their evident devotion to the Party and its program. The majority
are first recruited from the ranks of the armed services, or the Komsomol. They
are usually chosen on the basis of demonstrated Party loyalty and a "horseback
opinion" of their aptitude for KGB work. Nearly all of them have had the
equivalent of a secondary school education, and some have had more schooling.
Many of them are ardent Party members, with an almost religious dedication to
the organization.
Within the KGB, assignments to interrogation are not highly regarded. Most
KGB officers prefer to go into offensive espionage or join paramilitary units.
Relatively few of them wish to become involved in political counterespionage,
investigation, and interrogation. Such work is not looked upon as glamorous
or exciting. Very often it involves assignment to outlying and relatively dull
regions of the Soviet Union, and usually is hard and thankless. The interrogation
of prisoners is a tiring and an emotionally trying procedure. Thus, there is
often a deficiency of applicants for work in this section of the secret police,
and local district officers of the KGB must assign men to fill the necessary quota
at the state police school. The assignment is often given to the least desirable
men in the organization. It can be assumed that a majority of those involved
in the investigation and interrogation of unimportant prisoners are men of average
ability with no great enthusiasm for their job. However, the KGB does also
possess highly skilled, well-educated, extremely knowledgeable, experienced, and
able interrogators who are devoted to their profession and proud of their abilities.
The interrogator assigned to an important prisoner can be expected to be a man
of such high caliber.
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Some of those who go into secret police activity receive only a sort of "on-
the-job" training under the guidance of more senior and experienced men, but
a fair proportion of these police officers are especially trained at a KGB school.
The course in the conduct of interrogations includes a description of the various
interrogation methods that will be discussed shortly. Trainees are allowed to
observe a demonstration interrogation, but do not actually conduct interrogations
themselves. No formal training in psychology, psychiatry, pharmacology, or
physiology is included in the curriculum. There are no representatives of any
of these sciences on the faculty and, as far as we have been able to ascertain,
there never have been. Trainees do receive information from experienced police
officers on how to prepare a dossier, how to "size up" a man, and how to estimate
what sort of methods to use in "breaking" him; but the instructors draw entirely
upon police experience. They have a contempt for theoretical psychiatry and
psychology, and for instruments such as the polygraph, which most of them
regard as a useless gadget.
12. Interrogation
When the prisoner has been arrested and incarcerated in his cell, the officer
in charge of his case submits to his superiors a plan for the interrogation of the
prisoner. This plan is drawn up on the basis of what is already known about
the prisoner. It describes the methods to be used upon him, the attitudes to be
taken toward hire, the type of crimes which he is believed to have committed,
and the assumed motivation for them. His superiors may criticize or comment
upon this plan and offer added suggestions, based upon their own experience.
The purpose of this plan appears to be primarily that of making the interrogator
approach the prisoner with a definite conception of what he wants to do and how
he is going to proceed in doing it. The plan need not be adhered to rigidly if
the development of the case indicates that changes should be made. In some
prisons the interrogator reviews the plan with his superiors after each session
and describes to them how he intends to conduct the next session.
If a prisoner indicates at the time he is seized that he is aware of his guilt
and is prepared to describe his crimes, the interrogator may begin to question
him very soon after his imprisonment. This is true especially when the police
already possess a great deal of "evidence" and the prisoner readily confesses
to the "crimes" which the interrogator wishes to establish.
Likewise, if the prisoner is seized without a warrant, the interrogator is
likely to begin the questioning early. Soviet law specifies that if a man is "de-
tained on suspicion" the first protocol of his interrogation must be given to the
state prosecutor within 10 days, so that an arrest warrant may be issued or the
man may be released. In general, interrogators are constrained to comply with
this regulation, and they try to produce enough evidence to obtain an arrest
within 10 days. In many such cases, because they have little except suspicion to
guide their questioning, they are necessarily vague in describing the prisoner's
crimes to him. They must be cautious lest the prisoner get wind of what they
want him to say and refuse to say it. It is probably this, more than any calculated.
cunning, which causes them to make to the prisoner such enigmatic statements as,
"It is not up to me to tell you what your crimes are; it is up to you to tell me"-
statements which lead the perplexed prisoner to rack his brain for an answer.
The prosecutor is not hard to satisfy, and the interrogator nearly always obtains
enough evidence to make an "arrest." If not, he can apply for an extension of
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the detention period. The law provides no real protection for the prisoner.
Interrogations, once begun, are continued until "the case is complete," but
in some circumstances they are intentionally delayed in their onset. It appears
that his delay is imposed when the prisoner is defiant, when he is thought to be
withholding information, when the KGB is seeking a confession to crimes other
than those for which it has "evidence," and especially when it wants to use the
prisoner for a public trial or to obtain a propaganda confession from him. In
such cases, the interrogation begins when the officer in charge feels that the
prisoner is ripe for it. This is usually when he observes that the prisoner has
become docile and compliant and shows evidence of deterioration in his mood and
personal appearance.
Interrogations are almost uniformly carried out at night. It is said that this
practice of night interrogation originated not from any preconceived idea of its
effectiveness, but because the early Chekists were so overburdened with police
duties during the day that they could find time for interrogations only at night.
For one reason or another, it has become standard procedure, possibly because
the physical and psychological effects of night interrogations produce added
pressure upon the prisoner. He is deprived of sleep, and placed in a state of
added uncertainty by never knowing when he will he awakened and questioned.
Typically, he will be awakened suddenly by the guard shortly after he has dropped
off to sleep. Without explanation, he is taken from his cell and down several
corridors to a small and barren interrogation room, equipped with a desk and
chair for the interrogator and a stool for the prisoner. The lighting is arranged
so that the prisoner can be placed in a bright light, while the interrogator sits
in relative darkness. Sometimes a stenographer is present in one corner of the
room to take notes. More frequently the interrogator makes his own notes,
writing as the prisoner speaks. Usually only one interrogator is present, but
occasionally other officers are introduced. Sometimes interrogators alternate, for
psychological reasons, one being "friendly" and the other "hostile." If his work
is successful, the original interrogator may carry the case through to a conclusion;
but if he does not achieve the desired goal, he may be removed, and a new officer
takes over the interrogation.
The atmosphere of the interrogation room generally has some degree of
formality about it. The interrogator may be dressed in full uniform. If he
wishes to impress the prisoner, he may take out a pistol, cock it, and lay it on
the desk before him; but this psychological gambit does not seem to be a required
part of the protocol. The interrogator adjusts his attitude toward the prisoner
according to his estimate of the kind of man he is facing. If the dossier indicates
that the prisoner is a timid and fearful man, the interrogator may adopt a fierce
and threatening demeanor. If the prisoner is thought to be proud and sensitive,
the interrogator may be insulting and degrading. If the prisoner has been a man
of prestige and importance in private life, the interrogator may call him by his
first name, treat him as an inferior, and remind him that he has lost all rank
and privilege. If the prisoner is thought to be suggestible, the interrogator will
try to influence him by suggestion. If the prisoner is known as venal and self-
seeking, the interrogator may try to bribe him with promises of reward for
cooperation. If the prisoner has a tendency to blame others, the interrogator
may try to let him place the blame upon others, while describing his own activities
as harmless. If the prisoner is known to have a wife and children for whom he
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cares deeply, the interrogator may threaten harm to them if the prisoner does not
cooperate, and promise to protect and help them if he does. If it is known that
the prisoner has been unfaithful to his wife or has committed some crime, such
as embezzlement, the interrogator may blackmail him by threatening exposure or
punishment unless he cooperates. All these, and many other tricks, may be
employed. They are not based upon a scientific theory of human behavior; they
are tricks of the trade, so to speak, developed out of police experience and
applied on a "rule-of-thumb," "common-sense" basis.
Almost invariably the interrogator takes the attitude that the prisoner is
guilty and acts as though all of his crimes were known. Almost invariably he
points out to the prisoner that he is completely helpless and that there is no hope
for him unless he cooperates fully and confesses his crimes completely. Almost
never does the interrogator state specifically what the prisoner's crimes actually
are. This is left up to the prisoner, who is told, in effect, that he knows the extent
of his own crimes and need only make a complete statement of them.
Almost invariably the interrogator does not accept the early statement of the
prisoner. No matter what crimes he confesses, the interrogator forces the prisoner
to repeat his statements again and again, and to elaborate on them endlessly.
Almost always he uses any discrepancies as indications of lying and questions
the prisoner at length about them.
The first interrogation sessions are nearly always concerned with a complete
review of the entire life experience of the prisoner. The interrogator wishes to
know about the prisoner's background; his class origin; . his parents, brothers,
and sisters; his friends and associates, and everything that he has done throughout
his life. If the case is of any importance, no detail is overlooked, and every period
of the prisoner's life must be accounted for.
This review of the prisoner's life may occupy several interrogation sessions.
It has several purposes. The primary one is to con plete the prisoner's dossier.
It gives the interrogator a thorough picture of the type of man he is dealing with
and further guides him to the man's weaknesses, which can be exploited. Further-
more, requiring a man to account for every detail of his life produces a volu-
minous and involved story, and the prisoner can scarcely avoid being trapped into
inconsistencies if he is concealing anything. The information obtained from the
life history can be compared with that already in the police files, which are usually
extensive. It enables the police to know the associates of the prisoner-informa-
tion which is important, because these may be his "accomplices in crime," who
can be made suspects also, and interrogated for further information. Perhaps
its most important purpose is that it reveals many "criminal" features of the
prisoner, such as "reactionary class origin," "membership in reactionary organ-
izations," and "association with enemies of the state," which are, by Communist
definition, "crimes" no matter how long ago they were "committed."
The prisoner, taken from his cell after a long period of isolation, anxiety,
and despair, usually looks upon the first interrogation as a welcome break. The
mere opportunity to talk to someone is intensely gratifying. Many prisoners
have reported that after long periods of isolation they eagerly anticipate interro-
gation sessions and try to prolong them simply for the companionship which they
afford. Not infrequently the prisoner also regards interrogation as an opportunity
to justify himself, and feels a false assurance that he can "explain everything"
as soon as he is given a chance.
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Usually he is much taken aback by the fact that his crimes are. not specified
and that his guilt is assured. He is further distressed when his protestations of
innocence are greeted as lies. But the opportunity to talk about his life experi-
ences is generally looked upon, especially by a person from Western society, as
an opportunity to justify his behavior. Many men willingly divulge all that they
can remember about themselves, because they feel quite sure that they have done
nothing which may be regarded as criminal: They are unaware that, from the
point of view of Communist theory and of the KGB, much of their past behavior
undoubtedly will be construed as "criminal" and held against them. If the
interrogator offers them the opportunity to have paper and pencil in their cells
and to write out their biographies, they seize upon this avidly as a means of
relieving the boredom of the tedious, lonely routine to which they are exposed.
13. Pressures Applied by the Interrogator
As the interrogation proceeds, the interrogator changes his behavior according
to his previous plan and the development of the case. If the prisoner is cooper-
ating and talking freely, the interrogator continues to show a relatively friendly
attitude. But sooner or later he invariably expresses dissatisfaction with the
information which the prisoner has given, no matter how complete it may be.
He demands new details, and usually shows an especially great interest in the
"accomplices" of the prisoner and the "organization" to which he is supposed
to have been attached. When the prisoner protests that he has told all, and denies
any other crimes or accomplices, the interrogator becomes hostile and begins to
apply pressure.
Some of the pressures which can be applied simply by altering the routine
within the cell have been described. The interrogator has many others at his
command. Continuous and repetitive interrogation is an effective and very
common form of pressure. Another which is widely used is that of requiring
the prisoner to stand throughout the interrogation session or to maintain some
other physical position which becomes painful. This, like other features of the
KGB procedure, is a form of physical torture, in spite of the fact that the
prisoners and KGB officers alike do not ordinarily perceive it as such. Any fixed
position which is maintained over a long period of time ultimately produces
excruciating pain. Certain positions, of which the standing position is one, also
produce impairment of the circulation. Many men can withstand the pain of long
standing, but sooner or later all men succumb to the circulatory failure it produces.
After 18 to 24 hours of continuous standing, there is an accumulation of fluid
in the tissues of the legs. This dependent edema is produced by the extravasation
of fluid from the blood vessels. The ankles and feet of the prisoner swell to
twice their normal circumference. The edema may rise up the legs as high as the
middle of the thighs. The skin becomes tense and intensely painful. Large
blisters develop, which break and exude watery serum. The accumulation of
the body fluid in the legs produces impairment of the circulation. The heart rate
increases, and fainting may occur. Eventually, there is a renal shutdown, and
urine production ceases. Urea and other metabolites accumulate in the blood. The
prisoner becomes thirsty and may drink a good deal of water, which is not
excreted but adds to the edema of his legs. Men have been known to remain
standing for periods as long as several days. Ultimately they usually develop
a delirious state, characterized by disorientation, fear, delusions, and visual hallu-
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cinations. This psychosis is produced by a combination of circulatory impairment,
lack of sleep, and uremia.
Periods of long standing are usually interrupted from time to time by interro-
gation periods, during which the interrogator demands and threatens, while point-
ing out to the prisoner that it would be easy for him to end his misery merely
by cooperating.
The KGB hardly ever uses manacles or chains, and rarely resorts to physical
beatings. The actual physical beating is, of course, repugnant to overt Communist
principles, and is contrary to KGB regulations also. The ostensible reason for
these regulations is that they are contrary to Communist principles. The practical
reason for them is the fact that the KGB looks upon direct physical brutality
as an ineffective method of obtaining the compliance of the prisoner. Its opinion
in this regard is shared by police in other parts of the world. In general, direct
physical brutality creates only resentment, hostility, further defiance, and unre-
liable statements.
It is a general policy that the interrogator must obtain the written permission
of his superiors before using extreme coercive measures of any sort upon
prisoners. In actual practice such permission is sought only if the officer in
charge of a case feels that there is a need for a direct brutal assault. The KGB
recognizes that some men who are intensely afraid of physical assault may break
down if beaten once or twice, and it does use this procedure deliberately, though
uncommonly. Generally speaking, when an interrogator strikes a prisoner in
anger, he does so "unofficially." The act may be a true expression of his exaspera-
tion, and evidence that he, himself, is under emotional strain.
The use of brutality in the Russian secret police waxes and wanes in cycles
that recur throughout the years. When feelings of insecurity develop within those
holding power, they become increasingly suspicious and put great pressures upon
the secret police to obtain arrests and confessions. At such times police officials
are inclined to condone anything which produces a speedy "confession," and
brutality may become widespread. Later, when the Party leadership again feels
secure, its suspiciousness subsides. Meanwhile, demands arise for "reform," and
the cessation of "irregular practices" by the secret police. Soon stern orders
are issued that prisoners shall not be subjected to brutality, and some unfortunate
police officers are punished for their past behavior. After this, brutality will be
scrupulously avoided until the next wave of suspicion arises.
Regardless of brutality, it can be taken for granted that some period of intense
pressure and coercion will be applied to every prisoner, no matter how cooperative
he tries to be at first. This period of pressure will be accompanied by expressions
of displeasure and hostility from the interrogator, and sometimes from the guards
also. It appears to be a working principle of the KGB that no ;man ever reveals
everything voluntarily. It has been a universal experience of prisoners of Com-
munist state police that no matter how much a man tells, he is always pressed
to tell more-in fact, those who talk are often the ones who are hounded
the longest. Men who immediately, and without pressure, volunteer all that they
know do not thus allay the suspicions of their interrogator. Eventually, when
their flow of information runs out, and persuasion yields no more, they find
themselves put through the same routine of repetitive torture which more re-
calcitrant prisoners encounter.
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14. The "Friendly Approach"
The interrogator will continue this pressure until he feels that the prisoner
is nearly at the end of his rope. At this point he introduces a psychological gambit
which is probably the most successful of any of the tricks at his command. He
suddenly changes his demeanor. The prisoner, returned once again to an interro-
gation session that he expects will be a repetition of torture and villification,
suddenly finds that the entire scene has changed. The interrogation room is
brightly lighted. The interrogator is seated behind his desk, relaxed and smiling.
Tea and cigarettes are waiting on the table. He is ushered to a comfortable chair.
The guard is sent away, and sometimes the secretary also. The interrogator
remarks about his appearance. He is sympathetic about the discomfort which he
has been suffering. He is sorry that the prisoner has had such a difficult time.
The interrogator himself would not have wished to do this to the prisoner-it is
only that the prison regulations require this treatment, because of the prisoner's
own stubbornness. "But let us relax and be friends. Let us not talk any more
about crimes. Tell me about your family"-and so on. The usual line is to the
effect that, "After all, I am a reasonable man. I want to get this business over
as much as you do. This is as tiresome to me as it is to you. We already know
about your crimes; it is a mere formality for you to write out your confession.
Why don't we get it over with so that everything can be settled and you can be
released ?"
Prisoners find this sudden friendship and release of pressure almost irre-
sistible. Nearly all of them avidly seize the opportunity to talk about themselves
and their feelings, and then go on to talk about their families. Most of them
proceed from this almost automatically to giving the information which the inter-
rogator seeks. Even if they do not provide everything the interrogator wants
at this time, he may continue his friendly demeanor and the relaxation of pres-
sure for several more sessions before resuming the old regimen of torture. But
if the prisoner ?does reveal significant information and cooperates fully, the re-
wards are prompt and gratifying. The interrogator smiles and congratulates him.
Cigarettes are forthcoming. There is a large meal, often excellently prepared and
served; and after this the prisoner returns to his cell and sleeps as long as he
likes, in any position that he chooses.
15. The Course of the Interrogation
Such friendly and rewarding behavior will continue for several days-usually
as long as the interrogator feels that a significant amount of new information is
being produced. At this point the prisoner may conclude that his ordeal is over;
but invariably he is disappointed. For as soon as the interrogator decides that
no new information is being yielded, the regimen of constant pressure and hostile
interrogation is resumed. Again it is carried to the point at which the prisoner
is near breakdown. Again it is relaxed, and again the prisoner is rewarded it
he cooperates. In this manner, proceeding with regular steps, alternating punish=
ment with reward, the interrogator constantly presses the prisoner to revise and
rewrite the protocol until it contains all the statements which he desires, and is
in a final form which meets with his approval. When it has at last been agreed
upon and signed, the pressure is relaxed "for good"; but the prisoner continues
to live in his cell, and remains under the threat of renewed pressure, until such
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the prisoner and the interrogator. In many respects this is like the relationship
that grows up between a psychiatrist and his patient. The prisoner, for all the
pressure that he has been under, eventually finds in the interrogator the one human
being in his environment to whom he can relate. The interrogator, on his part, has
no personal hostility to his victim. He may actually like him. Especially when
dealing with a Communist, he may feel that but for chance he would be in the
prisoner's place. Interrogator and prisoner spend many hours of many clays
together. A certain comradeship and understanding grows up between them.
Many of these KGB officers impress the prisoner by the sincerity of their
dedication to Communism and its ostensible ideals. The interrogator often dis-
plays a patient sympathy which becomes apparent to the prisoner. His attitude that
"this is something we must go through with, and neither you nor I can stop until
you have cooperated and signed a proper confession" is to some extent a genuine
attitude. The KGB system allows of no other solution from the interrogator's
point of view. It is in fact true that the interrogation will have to go on until a
proper deposition has been signed. The prisoner often comes to recognize this
sincerity. Many see that indeed the interrogator must follow the system, and there
is nothing which he can do about it. Thus, the prisoner, in his need for com-
panionship, may displace his hostility from the interrogator to the "system." Many
interrogators genuinely plead with the prisoner to learn to "see the truth," to "think
correctly," and to "cooperate."
There are instances of prisoners who signed depositions largely out of sym-
pathy for their interrogators, because they felt that these men would be punished
if a proper deposition were not forthcoming. In other words, the warm and
friendly feelings which develop between the prisoner and the interrogator may
have a powerful influence on the prisoner's behavior. Not infrequently, the
prisoner develops a feeling that the interrogator is the only warm and sympathetic
person in the hostile and threatening world in which lie exists. His need for
human companionship and acceptance is such that he overlooks the pressures
which the interrogator puts upon him and ascribes them to the necessities of the
system rather than to the willful activity of his "friend." If the interrogator
rejects the prisoner or implies that lie disapproves of him, the prisoner may feel
bereft. He may blame himself for having let the interrogator down or for not
having cooperated with the man who was trying to help him. His efforts to
maintain his good standing in the eyes of his "friend" become an important
motive for him to seek a rationalization which will allow him to produce a
protocol of the type his "friend" needs. This same desire "not to go back on a
friend" also becomes one of the reasons why he does not repudiate the protocol
later when it is presented in court.
17. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Interrogation
The way in which a prisoner reacts to the whole process of interrogation is to
a great extent dependent upon the manner of man he is, his preexisting attitudes
and beliefs, and the circumstances surrounding his arrest and imprisonment. All
prisoners have this in common : They have been isolated and have been under
unremitting pressure in an atmosphere of hostility and uncertainty. They all find
themselves in a dilemma at the time that the interrogation begins. The regimen
of pressure and isolation has created an over-all discomfort which is well nigh
intolerable. The prisoner invariably feels that "something must be done to end
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this." He must find a way out. Death is denied to him. Ultimately, he finds
himself faced with the choice of continuing interminably under the intolerable
pressures of his captors or of accepting the "way out" which the interrogator
offers. The "way out" is a rationalization. It allows the prisoner to meet the
demands of his interrogator by degrees, at the same time retaining within him-
self some shred of belief that by his own standards he has not capitulated.
With rare exceptions prisoners always accept this "way out," provided the pres-
sures are sufficiently prolonged and intense and the interrogator can adjust his
persuasiveness in a proper manner.
Various categories of prisoners respond to, different types of persuasion.
Persons who have been lifelong members of the Communist Party are familiar
with the Communist concept of "crime" and the functions of the KGB. Further-
more, they have all been trained in the ritual of self-criticism, confession, punish-
ment, and rehabilitation, which has been part of Communist procedure since
before the Revolution. Many Communists can rationalize a belief that they are
actually criminals, as specified by the KGB, and come to see their punishment as
necessary for the good of the State and the Party. To the true Party member,
martyrdom for such a reason carries with it an air of triumph.
Those who have studied the purge trials of the old Bolsheviks are convinced
that this form of reasoning was behind their apparently peculiar behavior at the
trials. These men held nothing sacred but the Party. They had dedicated their
lives to the principle that the Party could do no wrong. They themselves looked
upon deviationists as criminals worthy of the ultimate punishment. Zinoviev,
Kammenev, and their followers knew themselves to be chronic oppositionists.
Lenin had expelled them from the Party during the 1917 revolution and had
reinstated them after they had confessed and recanted. In 1927 they had again
been expelled by the Party and temporarily exiled; they had made abject recan-
tations and had again been reinstated. But these 'men were chronic noncon-
formists. In some way, by their attitudes rather than by any deed, they had
continued to be in partial disagreement with Stalin and other members of the
party leadership. When they were arrested in 1936, it is said that the NKVD
did not have very great difficulty in convincing them that they were criminals.
They readily agreed to it. There was more difficulty in convincing them that the
good of the Party demanded that they be publicly tried and executed; but after
much tortuous logic they accepted this also. It is said that the interrogators and
prisoners broke down and wept together when the final agreement was reached.
Their "confessions" before the court contained an exposition of their crimes of
which they were guilty "according to Communist theory," expressed as if these
crimes had "actually been committed" in the Western, or popular, use of the
word, whereas they were actually only "objective" or "consequential" crimes as
defined by the Communist theory.
Non-Communist prisoners of idealistic beliefs or Socialist sympathies appar-
ently make ready targets for the logic of the interrogator. Such persons are
usually compelled to agree that the ostensible and idealistic motives of the Com-
munist Party are "good," and that those who oppose these ideals are "bad." The
rationalization in this case takes the form of getting the prisoner to say that the
Communist Party has the same value system that he does. Something which the
prisoner has done is "bad" by his own definition. From this point the prisoner
proceeds through the usual steps to the ultimate signing of the deposition.
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Persons who carry with them strong feelings of guilt associated with highly
organized systems of moral values likewise become ready targets for the persua-
sion of the interrogator. Very few people are entirely free of guilt feelings, but
often such feelings are found in the highest degree in those in whom they are
least appropriate. For example, many strongly religious people have a profound
sense of sin. They feel guilty of shortcomings of their own, which are much
smaller than those found in most of their fellow men. They constantly see them-
selves as transgressing their own moral code, and in the need of forgiveness for
doing so. Skilled interrogators make use of this. They point out that many of the
ostensible ideals of Communism are the same as the ideals to which the prisoner
himself subscribes. Since he has transgressed his own code, he is a criminal in
Communist eyes also. Thus, Chinese interrogators who are experienced in the
interrogation of priests develop an extensive knowledge of the Bible and Christian
theology. They can draw parallels between Christianity and Communism, and,
in fact, often identify the two as being different aspects of the same philosophical
system. It is not hard to show the prisoner many points at which he has failed
to live up to the Christian code. It is usually not very difficult to create within
him a feeling of guilt about this. From here, it is also not difficult to get him to
agree that, because of his un-Christian acts, he has injured "the people," whom
Christ loved. The Communist Party is also interested in the welfare of "the
people"; therefore, all the prisoner needs to do is confess that he has sinned
against "the people" and has committed crimes against them. A confession of
"crime against the people" is a satisfactory confession in a Communist court.
An additional vulnerability of highly moral people is that they find it difficult
to tell a lie under any circumstances. Priests, for example, often give aid and
comfort to those oppressed by Communist states. It is not too difficult for the
police to find out about this, and it sometimes is very difficult for the priest to lie
about it when presented with the evidence. From this point, it is not difficult
to persuade the priest to confess that he has indeed given comfort to the enemies
of the regime.
On the other hand, persons with so-called sociopathic or psychopathic person-
alities, who have few or no moral scruples, may also be vulnerable. Such
persons have very little attachment to friends and to moral principles. They may
be readily accessible to bribes and to various promises of reward. Under pres-
sure they quite readily reveal all of the information they possess and freely
implicate their associates. They readily rationalize the necessity for finding a
"way out" of their situations and have little or no conflict about deserting any
principles which they were supposed to possess. They need only to see what the
KGB wants in the form of a "confession" in order to fabricate one without
compunction. KGB officers are not entirely taken in by this lying. They do not
hesitate to use the "confession," but they edit out the more fantastic parts from
the final deposition.
Persons who are "caught with the goods" in actual crimes are equally vulner-
able. This includes persons who have "actually" in the Western sense of the
word committed espionage or treason. If the KGB has uncovered real evidence of
this, it is quite likely that sooner or later, with constant pressure and interroga-
tion, they will get the prisoner to admit it also. In this instance, the facts of the
case are agreed upon by all concerned, and it remains only to determine the
punishment.
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The maze in which any prisoner finds himself has so many ramifications that
it is almost impossible for him to escape from it without signing a protocol and
being convicted. Anything he has done may be a crime. He has been adjudged
guilty before his arrest. He is put in a situation of intolerable pressure. It is
made clear to him that his only way out of this situation is to cooperate with the
interrogator. He is offered a reasonable rationalization for doing so. Sooner or
later tinder-these circumstances, the prisoner and the interrogator almost inevitably
come to an agreement upon a deposition which satisfies the interrogator. But not
inevitably : There are reported instances of prisoners who have refused to sign
any form of deposition and have remained in detention indefinitely, with their
cases still unresolved, or have been tried summarily by an administrative court
of the state police. Gomulka resisted the Polish UB. Elizabeth Lermolo, a woman
who was implicated in the Kirov murder, resisted the NKVD and later escaped.
It is alleged that she remained in - detention, with periodic interrogation from
1936 until 1941, when the Germans overran her prison and she was released.
It is said that she never signed a deposition. Whether this is a true story or not
is not known. But it is known that of all the millions who passed through the
hands of NKVD during the time of the purges, and who have fallen into the
hands of its successors since then, few have escaped without signing a deposition
which amounted to a confession of crime, as crimes are defined in Communist
Russia.
18. The "Trial"
When the prisoner has finally reached the point of admitting his "crimes,"
and he and the interrogator have agreed upon a protocol satisfactory to both of
them, he experiences a profound feeling of relief, which is sometimes shared by
the man who has been questioning him. Even though his crimes may be serious
and the punishment for them severe and of unknown degree, he welcomes a
surcease from the unrelenting pressures and miseries of the interrogation pro-
cedure. Whatever the future may hold for him, he has for the moment found
a way out of an intolerable situation.
When a satisfactory deposition has been prepared and signed, the pressures
upon the prisoner are customarily relaxed. He is allowed to sleep as long as he
wishes; he may have reading and writing material in his room. Sometimes he
can join with other prisoners in periods of exercise. His meals improve and his
guards become friendly, or even solicitous. This easy treatment is continued
until he is thoroughly rested and his health has been restored. Then, in most
cases, he is taken before a "court." The state prosecutor presents the court with.
the signed protocol and questions the prisoner about his crimes. Sometimes a
"defense attorney" is assigned; this man invariably limits himself to requesting
leniency from the court. The whole procedure is usually brief and formal. There
are no verdicts of "not guilty." The function of the "judge" is solely that of
presiding over the trial and passing upon the prisoner a sentence which has usually
been agreed upon beforehand by the prosecutor and the KGB officer in charge
of the case.
It is this aspect of the proceedings which is most bewildering to Western
observers. It is easy to understand how prisoners can be tortured into signing
confessions of crimes which they did not commit, but it is difficult to understand
why the prisoners do not renounce these confessions later at the public trials.
Beginning with the purge trials of the 1930's, the NKVD and its successors
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and offspring in Russia, the Easccrn European nations, and China have presented
the world with a series of public trials at which the prisoners calmly and seem-
ingly without coercion make outrageous "confessions" of unbelievable crimes,
praise their captors, and ask for the severest punishment for themselves. These
prisoners have included important Communist officials, former NKVD officers,
non-Communist citizens of various categories, and foreigners of the most diverse
backgrounds. All of these p. isoners were apparently "innocent"; some faced
certain death, and many were profoundly anti-Communist. Men of the highest
caliber and integrity, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, William Oatis, and Robert
Vogeler, seemed to have the strongest possible motivations to resist; but none of
them stood up in court and denounced the confession and his captors. This
phenomenon demands an explanation.
The explanation is available, but it is not simple. It is necessary to examine
the proposition in detail in order to view it in its proper light.
First, it is by no means true that "all prisoners confess freely at a public trial."
Only a very small minority of prisoners of the Communist state police ever appear
at a public trial. The KGB will not expose a prisoner to a public trial unless it is
convinced that he will go through with his confession as planned. If there is
any doubt about this, no public trial is held. But even with this precaution the
KGB is not infallible. At the purge trials several of the prisoners tried to recant
parts of their confessions. When a prisoner tried to recant, the prosecutor halted
the examination of that person. Usually, when the man returned from his cell
several days later, he was again docile and cooperative. In the Bulgarian trials,
Traicho Kostov repudiated his entire protocol on two occasions. Some of these
so-called "public trials" have not actually been public. They have been carried
out in the presence of a select audience while movies and recordings are made
of the prisoner's words, which are later transmitted to the public.
The majority of prisoners do "come to trial," but these trials are not public.
They are held in camera. The state police are concerned only with political crimes
and espionage. Their prisoners are tried before "military tribunals," which are
not public courts. Those present are only the interrogator, the state prosecutor,
the prisoner, the judges, a few stenographers, and perhaps a few officers of the
court. At such a trial there is no opportunity for "public protest," and any protest
which is made can be readily expunged from the record. So far as the prisoner
is concerned, this so-called trial appears as nothing more than the next step in
his process of imprisonment. He has been imprisoned, tortured, and interrogated
and has signed a "confession." Following that, he has experienced more lenient
treatment and has had a period of rest and rehabilitation. But he has not been
out of the prison. He has not seen any of his friends or family or anyone inter-
ested in defending him. He has remained entirely in the hands of his interro-
gators and guards, with access to no one else. When he finally comes before the
"court," he sees no one except the state prosecutor, the judge, and the court
officials. The defense attorney, if one is assigned, shows not the slightest interest
in refuting any of the "evidence" in the confession or in establishing a plea of
"not guilty." He never questions the fact that the prisoner is guilty as charged.
Sometimes he asks the judge for leniency; but not infrequently he informs the
court that he is convinced the prisoner is just as big a monster as the prosecution
says he is, and that he cannot bring himself to ask the court for leniency. The
judge likewise shows no interest in the question of guilt or innocence. He limits
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himself to maintaining order in the court and passing sentence. If the prisoner
has any illusions that the prosecutor, the judge, and the defense attorney are
going to allow him any opportunity to dispute the "facts in the case," these are
soon dispelled.
By no means do all prisoners receive a "trial" of any sort. Those who are
stubborn or repeatedly recant their confessions during the interrogation procedure
will not be trusted, even at private trials. Uncooperative and stubborn prisoners,
and those who might make embarrassing statements are "dealt with administra-
tively." For many. years the state police have had the right to carry out "ad-
ministrative" trials for any prisoners whom they do not wish to expose to the
usual trial procedure. These administrative trials consist of simply presenting
the prisoner to a group of three senior police officers (the Troika), who pass
sentence immediately and have it carried out forthwith. These administrative
trials took place within the detention prison. Sometimes the prisoner was not
even present at them; sentence was passed by the Troika merely upon the basis of
the signed protocol. Sometimes the alleged records of these trials were made
public, but generally the fact that such a trial had taken place was never revealed.
For every Soviet citizen who has appeared at a public trial, there have been
thousands who have been tried only at private trials b jt military tribunals, and
hundreds who were dealt with administratively by the police themselves. Thus,
a great number of high Communist officials, captured German officers, and similar
prisoners"who fell into the hands of the Russian secret police were not tried at
all. So far as the public was concerned, they merely disappeared.
During the last few months there have been press reports that the right of
administrative trial has been withdrawn from the KGB. It remains to be seen
whether or not this is true.
19. Public Confessions
If we exclude from consideration all those prisoners who are dealt with ad-
ministratively, two questions remain : 1. Why do all of those prisoners who are
tried in private confess almost without exception? 2. Why do some prisoners
confess at public trials, where there is actually some opportunity to make an open
denial of guilt?
In response to the question of why prisoners at private trials confess almost
without exception, the following answers can be given :
1. The setting of. the private trial, as we have just described it, makes it
apparent to the prisoner that any attempt at recantation is useless.
2. The prisoner at a private trial is always tinder actual threat by the KGB.
The officer in charge of his case has clearly indicated to him that any attempt
to alter or. recant any part of his confession will lead to an immediate resumption
of the interrogation-torture regimen. This threat is as poignant as a cocked pistol.
The prisoner has just finished being carried through torture and interrogation
over and over again to the point at which it is absolutely intolerable to him. He
has already decided that, whatever his sentence may be, he prefers to receive his
punishment rather than to return to the horrible ordeal through which he has
just passed. In the opinion of KGB officers, this is the most potent reason why
no. prisoner changes his story.
3. Warm and positive feelings between prisoners and their interrogating
officers often develop during the interrogation process, and many prisoners come
to trial with the feeling that if they attempt to alter their testimony they will be
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dishonoring an agreement with their interrogators (see Section 16).
4. Finally, it is to be emphasized that, in spite of all these detriments, some
prisoner; do recant at their private trials. The court then decides that these
prisoners have not yet reached a full awareness of their crimes. They are sent
back to the detention prison and once again put through the torture-interrogation
regimen. Sooner or later, they learn that pleas of "not guilty" are not acceptable
in Soviet courts, and that they must behave themselves at their trials. Otherwise,
they are indefinitely detained or executed.
In answering the question of why some prisoners confess publicly when there
is some opportunity for them to renounce their confessions and thereby embarrass
their captors, one must consider the various categories of those who have been
tried in public. Widely publicized trials are staged by the Communists only under
exceptional circumstances and always for propaganda purposes. They are care-
fully managed "set pieces" in which every performer must play his role exactly
as prescribed. The KGB and other Communist police organizations select the
prisoners for these shows with great care.
The first category of those who have made public confessions are prominent
Bolsheviks who have fallen from grace: Zinovicv, Kamenev, Rykov, Bukharin,
Radek and their associates, at the time of the great purges; more recently, Laslo
Rajk, in Hungary; Traicho Kostov, in Bulgaria, and Slansky, Clementis, and
-others, in Czechoslovakia. The list is extensive, but not nearly so extensive as
the list of prominent Communist officials who were liquidated administratively.
But why did those confess; who did so? The old Bolsheviks "confessed"
primarily because they were lifelong, dedicated Communists. They had com-
mitted their lives to the belief that nothing is sacred but the Party, and the Party
is always right. If there be a central point in the Communist creed, it is this.
These men all subscribed to the belief that opposition to the Party line, as ex-
pressed by the Party leaders, is a crime. Whatever else they were, they were
"chronic oppositionists," and knew themselves to be so. They all subscribed to
the Communist ritual of public self-criticism and punishment. Nearly all of them
had at one time or another publicly criticized themselves and had been punished.
Several had been expelled from the Party, not once but several times. They all
knew themselves to be in. opposition to the Party leadership, and they all felt
guilty about this. In spite of this, they still considered themselves to be Bolshe-
viks, and were prepared in principle to accept any demand which the Party might
make upon them, even to the point of death.
All of the evidence points to the fact that the NKVD, using the interrogation-
pressure process which we have described, persuaded these men to accept the
concept that because they were opposed to Stalin, the leader of the party, they
were wrecking the Party. As good Bolsheviks, the Party called upon them to
make the ultimate sacrifice by denouncing themselves and giving up their lives
so that the world could know that opposition to the Party leadership was both
criminal and futile. The "crimes" to which they confessed publicly were not
"actual" crimes in the Western sense of the term, but were "objective" or "con-
sequential" crimes, which must result from their opposition according to Com-
munist theory. Ultimately they made their confessions almost with an air of
triumph, and went to their deaths seeing themselves as martyrs to the cause to
which they had devoted their lives. Some of them-Krestinsky, for example-
had difficulty, recanted a bit, and defied the prosecutor briefly; but after a few
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days of persuasion they resumed their roles and carried the trial through to its end.
This behavior on the part of the highly disciplined and religiously dedicated
"old Bolsheviks" is not unusual in the annals of human behavior. It is not inex-
plicable that these men who hated Stalin nevertheless played their roles and went
to their deaths for the sake of the Party. The reader has but to consider how
many soldiers, in wars throughout the course of history, have proceeded to certain
death in response to what they knew to be stupid and disastrous orders, given by
incompetent officers whom they hated; and how many wives have spent a lifetime
in supporting and defending drunken and brutal husbands, whom they detested.
People dedicated to a cause will destroy both their lives and their reputations for
it. That Communists will do this we know well from our experiences in this
country. The Rosenbergs could have escaped death had they been willing to
confess to their espionage and reveal their contacts, but they refused to do so.
The information available to us about the trials of the Communist leaders in
the Eastern European satellites indicates that their behavior can be explained on
the same basis as that of the old Bolsheviks. These trials were not the success
that one might assume from their awesome popular reputation. Rajk confessed
obediently and went to his death like a proper Bolshevik; but Kostov denounced
his accusers and proclaimed his innocence. The Polish police never dared to
expose Gomulka to a trial of any sort. Tito defected and purged his would-be
purgers. There have been no truly public trials since those times. The trials of
Slansky and his colleagues were recorded in private, and selected excerpts of the
transcripts were broadcast. Beria and Abakumov were tried entirely in camera
by a military tribunal.
Another category of those who have confessed publicly is that group of
intellectually or idealistically motivated people who were thought to be opposed
to Communism, or at least to be non-Communist, prior to their arrest. Most
prominent in this group is Cardinal Mindszenty; also included in this are other
Roman Catholic priests from the satellite countries.
The Mindszenty case is the best known. In the public mind Mindszenty is
the prototype of "Communist brain washing." Among the known facts of his case
are these :
Cardinal Mindszenty came from an old and aristocratic Hungarian family;
he had many friends among the Hungarian aristocracy and the nobility. He had
always supported the monarchical form of government. During the period be-
tween the wars, when Hungary was a regency, he had been in favor of the
restoration of the Hapsburgs to the Hungarian throne. He was a man of strong
religious convictions, who held himself, as well as others, to a high code of moral
conduct. Governmental administrators sometimes found him a difficult man to deal
with because he was inflexible in upholding his moral principles.
During the Second World War he came into open conflict with the Nazis,
and with the members of the Hungarian Fascist Arrow-Cross organization; but
these organizations did not dare arrest him because of his position in the church
and because of the respect and admiration in which the Roman Catholic popula-
tion of Hungary held him. It was partly because he had become such a symbol
of the integrity and independence of the church that he was elevated to the
position of Cardinal in 1945.
Cardinal Mindszenty did not hesitate to make known his opposition to the
Communist regime. He made no attempt to conceal his sympathy for many of
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those oppressed by it. Ile maintained his association with his friends among the
former aristocracy. He gave support and encouragement to those, both inside
and outside the country, who, he thought, might end the Communist dictatorship
and restore a legal government. Ile was arrested in December, 1948, after a
propaganda campaign had been carried on against him for several years. Approxi-
mately six weeks later, he "confessed" at a public trial. All of the evidence
indicates that the treatment which Cardinal Mindszenty received during his period
of interrogation did not differ in any important detail from that which is used by
the KGB, which we have described above. The only drugs which the Cardinal
received were stimulants to keep him awake during the long hours of interroga-
tion, and possibly sedatives to allow him to sleep when he was exhausted. There
is no reason to believe that any new, esoteric, or unknown method was used in
handling him and no need to assume that there was.
Cardinal Mindszenty's confession is published in the "Hungarian Yellow
Book." In his published depositions, he' acknowledges that he is a royalist, that
he had favored the restoration of the monarchy, and that he had hoped that the
international situation would develop in a way which would cause the United
States to intervene and allow the monarchy to be restored. He agrees that he
had continued to communicate with his monarchist friends, both in Hungary and
abroad, and with various American authorities. Ile agrees that he was hostile
to the Communist regime. "It was in the interests of this that I did everything
to support American politics in Hungary, partly by my activity against the
Hungarian Republic, and partly by constantly urging their interference, by a
regular service of facts, and by espionage." This sentence, translated by Hun-
garian Communists, is typical of those found in Communist depositions; it can
equally well be interpreted to mean that Mindszenty had committed espionage (in
the Communist sense of the word) or that he had urged the Americans to make
known the facts and to commit espionage. The "facts" in the "Yellow Book,"
even if accepted at face value, reveal the Cardinal to have been a Hungarian
patriot and a vigorous anti-Communist, but not a spy.
Cardinal Mindszenty's trial was "public," but not all of his statements were
broadcast. The broadcast portions were cut, evidently at points where he made
significant reservations. But, even so, his widely publicized confession was no
declaration of profound guilt. At his trial Cardinal Mindszenty stated that he
recognized that some of his activities had been contrary to the laws of the Com-
munist state. Ile stated that he was sorry lie had violated the laws. If his actions
had in any way harmed the people of Hungary or the Roman Catholic Church,
he asked forgiveness for this. He agreed that he would be willing to step aside
as leader of the Hungarian Church if this would be in the best interest of the
people and the Church.
On the basis of this confession the Communists convicted him of being a
"reactionary criminal" and of taking part in a "treasonable monarchist plot" to
secure United States intervention and to overthrow the government of Hungary.
He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Still a third category of those who have confessed publicly are various foreign
businessmen, newspapermen, and military men who were arrested or captured
in the course of their routine duties, of whom Robert Vogeler, in Hungary, and
William Oatis, in Czechoslovakia, are examples. In all these cases the following
factors are evident :
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1. The confessions made by the prisoners were "actually true" in the sense
that some of the specific acts described in the confessions actually occurred,
although not necessarily in the way in which they were described.
2. The interpretation put upon these acts was the Communist interpretation.
3. The prisoner had been brought to agree that in the country in which he
was arrested the Communist laws applied and, therefore, these acts constituted
a crime. The prisoner, therefore, pleaded guilty to "crimes" which were "crimes"
by Communist definition, but which he had not intended as crimes, or considered
to be crimes at the time that he carried them out. This qualification, however,
was missing from the statements made by the prisoners at the trials.
4. All of these prisoners were under the threat of renewed interrogation-
torture if they recanted or changed their confessions.
5. Many of them had the actual or implied promise, as well as the firm belief,
that they would be released if they cooperated with the police.
6. Furthermore, all of them were able to rationalize that their confessions
would not be believed by Americans in any case. This rationalization was essen-
tially a correct one-their confessions were widely disbelieved in the United
States, but in some other areas of the world their confessions are accepted as
factual.
20. Punishment
The period of interrogation and detention, no matter how long and terrible
it may be, is not considered imprisonment. The "punishment" begins only after
the sentence has been passed. Sometimes a "lenient" judge will allow the prisoner
to count his period of detention as a part of a prison sentence, but often this
period is discounted altogether. According to Communist theory, the purpose
of prison systems is to rehabilitate criminals through wholesome work, productive
activity, and education. For this "purpose" prisoners are transported to Siberia
or the Arctic, where most of them spend their terms working in mines and
construction projects under brutal and primitive conditions. Those who are
fortunate enough to receive any education during this procedure are "educated"
by further indoctrination with Communist ideas.
III. Practices in Communist China
1. A Comparison of Chinese Methods with Those of the KGB
The methods used by the state police in China are basically similar to those
used by the KGB, but they are not "carbon copies," like those of the Communist-
dominated countries of Eastern Europe. They are different in several important
details.
1. The goal of the KGB detention and interrogation procedure is the prepa-
ration of a protocol upon which a suitable punishment can be based, so that the
KGB can then deal with the prisoner according to its preconceived idea of what
must be done for the good of the Party and the Soviet State. In a minority of
cases, this includes a public trial for propaganda purposes. The KGB does not
appear to be greatly concerned about the future attitudes and behavior of the
prisoner, so long as he behaves properly during the period of trial and sentencing.
The goal of the Chinese detention and interrogation procedure, on the other
hand, is primarily that of ensuring that the prisoner will develop a relatively
long-lasting change in his attitudes and overt behavior, which will be sustained
after his release, so that he will not again constitute a danger to the Communist
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state.li The securing of information by interrogation, the preparation of proper
protocols and "confessions," and the participation of the prisoners in public prop-
aganda trials are secondary to this primary goal.
2. Unlike the KGB, the Chinese make extensive use of group interaction
among prisoners, in obtaining information, applying pressures, and carrying out
indoctrination.
3. Whereas in the Soviet Union and Eastern European states the ritual of
public self-criticism, confession, self-degradation, punishment, and rehabilitation
is a Party procedure confined to Communists, the Chinese have extended this prac-
tice to the non-Party population, and to the prison population in particular, and
have made it an important feature of their indoctrination procedure.
4. In China, at the moment at least, the period of detention is greatly pro-
longed. Whereas in the Soviet Union trial and sentencing take'place fairly soon
after the completion of the interrogation and the preparation of a suitable pro-
tocol, in China the preparation of a first confession is only a prelude to a long
period of indoctrination and reeducation, which may go on for years, and is not
terminated until those in charge of the prisoner believe that he has finally adopted
a "correct" attitude and behavior. It is only then that the "trial," the "sentencing"
and the formal term of imprisonment or other punishment begins.
Procedures in China are much less standardized than those in Russia, and
many variations upon them can be expected. This is in part the result of the
newness of the Chinese Communist regime and the lack of homogeneity of its
personnel and facilities. The procedure outlined below is carried out in the large
prisons in major cities. In outlying areas there may be differences in detail, but
the general principles and practices are the same.
2. Background and Organization of the Chinese State Police
The Chinese Communist Party was formed in 1919; from that time forward
a steady flow of young Chinese Communists were trained in Russian Party
schools. Nevertheless, Chinese Communism developed along lines which were in
many ways different from those of Western Communist parties. Communism was
able to sustain itself only in rural China, where it fed upon poverty and discontent
of the Chinese peasants. Mao's army lived off the countryside and of necessity
became closely identified with the value systems of the peasant group, from which
most of its numbers originated.
In the years from 1936 to 1946, while these Chinese Communists were busy
expanding and recruiting new members from the general Chinese population, they
gradually developed a highly organized and vigorous indoctrination program. It
was aimed at all potential recruits who happened to fall into their hands. Un-
educated peasants, city workers, and captured KMT troops, as well as interested
students from the universities, were subjects for this indoctrination.
In order to create in this heterogeneous group a feeling of comradeship and
identification with the peasant Communists, it was necessary to make them "cut
their ties to the past." Therefore, the training program included a deliberate as-
ff The official regulations for Chinese detention prisons include the following statement :
"In dealing with the criminals, there shall be regularly adopted measures of collective study
classes, individual interviews, study of assigned documents, and organized discussion, to
educate them in the admission of guilt and obedience to law, political and current events, labor
production, and culture, so as to expose the nature of the crime committed, thoroughly wipe
out criminal thoughts, and establish a new moral code."
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sault upon all of the traditional "bourgeois," "reactionary," "tipper-class" at-
titudes, beliefs, and practices the recruits brought with them. Trainees were forced
to abandon their refinements of speech, manner, and behavior, their reverence for
family ties and worldly goods, and to adopt the crude and earthy attitudes and be-
havior of the new "people's army." This questioning and discussion of behavior
and value systems was accompanied by the inculcation of a fanatical enthusiasm
for the Communist movement, built around the ideal of the rejuvenation of China
and its reestablishment of a dynamic, modern society (an ideal which had been
shared by the majority of Chinese intellectuals and reformers since the days of
Sun Yat Sell). The combination of Communist practices, such as public confession
and self-criticism, with traditional Chinese methods of learning by rote and rep-
etition resulted in a highly effective method of persuasion. These methods, as
applied to the general population following the success of the revolution in 1949,
have been referred to as methods of "thought reform" or "ideological reform"#;
and, as we have seen, these phrases were finally transferred into English under
the generic term of "brain washing."
The Chinese have shown great skill in the development of these methods and
their application, but, like he Russians, they developed their methods by trial
and error, through practice, and through the application of known principles.
There is no evidence- that psychologists, neurophysiologists, or other scientists
participated in their development.
After the Communist triumph in 1949 a large number of "special advisers"
were sent from Russia to help set up the Chinese state police and espionage
systems, and to train the Chinese in Soviet methods.
The Chinese state police are organized on the same lines as the KGB. The
central direction is at Peking and resides in the "Ministry of Public Safety,"
which is similar to the MVD. This Ministry has diverse functions, such as the
control of frontiers, the uncovering of economic and political offenses, the man-
agement of traffic on waterways, and even the administration of certain public
health measures. Those under its control include 2,000,000 members of the
"Public Safety Corps" (similar to the paramilitary units of the KGB) and
10,000,000 "militia," or local police. Both the rural and the city police are respon-
sible to it. The secret police organization, itself, is only one part of the over-all
structure of this Ministry.
There are administrative divisions of the state police in each of the adminis-
trative areas into which China was divided after the Communist take-over. In
each village and hamlet, in addition to the militia and rural police, the Communists
set up what they call "Public Safety Subcommittees." These have three to five
members selected from the local citizenry on the basis of their loyalty and en-
thusiasm for the new regime. Their job is essentially that of carrying out "census"
investigations. The "census" is an all-embracing record of everything that goes
on in the village. It covers the name, sex, age, nativity, occupation, education,
family status, political affiliation, social relations, economic condition, and activities
of every resident. Everyone who wishes to change his residence, change his oc-
cupation, or visit a friend is supposed to report this fact to the Public Safety
Subcommittee. Those who wish to travel from one locality to another must obtain
a travel pass in order to do so.
# The term "brain washing" is not used by the Chinese, and should be avoided, for it has
no precise meaning. The Chinese phrase is "Szu hsing K'si Tsao," which means "ideological
reform." It is sometimes shortened to "K'ai Tsao," or "reform."
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Undoubtedly, the records maintained by these rural subcommittees are not
so voluminous or detailed as they are alleged to be, and it is quite probable that
the peasants have developed various means of circumventing their surveillance.
Nevertheless, the men who make up these committees know their villages, and
all that goes on within them. They are urged to increase their knowledge by
frequent and unexpected visits among their neighbors, and evidently they do so.
The result is that the committee is able to extend to the individual Chinese the
direct control of the administrative apparatus of the central government to a
degree to which this control has not been felt for many centuries. The "census"
and the "Public Safety Subcommittee" have been among the most important means
by which the Communists have fastened their control upon the vast Chinese pop-
ulation. They are, in effect, an all-pervading arm of the state police.
The local prison is usually at the "hsien," or county, headquarters. This head-
quarters, like its Soviet counterpart, is divided into an "inquirY and detection"
section, "detention" a section, and other sections dealing with staff and admin-
istrative work and open police activities. Also, like their Russian counterparts,
the Chinese police exercise both police and judicial powers. They not only "inves-
tigate" and "arrest"; they also "try" and "sentence." This is one reason why
Western prisoners of the Chinese often refer to their interrogations by the police
as their "trials." The Chinese state police make no clear distinction between the
"trials" and the "interrogations," in spite of the fact that they often carry out
a pro forma trial and sentencing at the end of the detention period.
The original members of the Chinese Communist police system were drawn
from the guerrilla training schools. After 1949 the Communists established large
police-training academies. Each of these has a student body of several hundred,
who receive a training similar to that of KGB officers. Many former Nationalist
police have been retrained and absorbed directly into the Communist apparatus.
3. The Suspects
In China, as in the Soviet Union, those whom the Party decides are a threat
to its program automatically fall into the category of suspects. Because China is
still in the midst of its revolution, there are large groups of people of "bourgeois"
or "reactionary" class background, all of whom are automatically suspect. This in-
cludes all members of the "official" class, all of the rural gentry, all of the business
and commercial classes of the cities, and property owners in general. All of those
who were in any way connected with the Nationalist government are suspect.
Unlike the Russians, the Chinese apparently have not yet decided that any national
minority groups indigenous to China are automatically suspect. However, all
foreigners, and especially all those of Western European or American background,
are automatically suspect. All Christians, and especially Roman Catholics, are
suspect.
As in Russia, there are "specific" suspects, as well as general categories of
suspects. Such specific suspects include persons who are the associates and re-
latives of other suspects, persons about whom police spies and informers have
reported derogatory information, and persons who have been accused of acts or
attitudes which threaten the Party or any of its programs. That those who are
actual enemies of the regime are all potential suspects goes without saying. In
China, as in Russia, nearly anyone in the population may become a suspect;
and when he is arrested, the police always have some reason for making the arrest,
whether or not this is apparent to the victim.
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4. Investigation and Arrest
Observations of the investigation methods of the Chinese state police indicate
that they are similar to those used by the KGB. When local security officers de-
cide that a person is a threat to the Party or its program, they satisfy themselves
that he should be arrested and then arrest him. From the point of view of the
victim, it is important that the Chinese investigating procedures sometimes are
not as prolonged and comprehensive as those of the KGB and the prospective
victim may have much less opportunity to get wind of what is afoot. Apparently,
the Chinese occasionally make quick and arbitrary decisions to carry out arrests,
basing these upon the report of a single informer; thus the police may swoop down
suddenly upon an unsuspecting victim, who is utterly unaware that they might
have any interest in him. There are, however, other occasions on which friends,
relatives, and associates have gradually disappeared, or have been questioned
by the police over a period of weeks before the final arrest of the central victim,
who becomes all too aware of what is in store for him.
As in Russia, the arrest procedure is usually carried out suddenly, and often
at night ; but the Chinese make no pretense at carrying out their arrests covertly.
Often they make a large show of force. The arresting authorities may drive up
in a truck with a squad of heavily armed soldiers, surround the home of the
victim, and cart him off with much military ceremony. If there is a desire to im-
press the populace, the arrest may be staged in broad daylight under humiliating
circumstances. The arresting officers do sometimes read a "warrant" to the victim.
As in Russia, this warrant does not name specific crimes, but names only general
ones. The victim is given only a few moments to gather together the barest of his
personal essentials before being taken away.
Usually the prisoner is taken first to a police station, where he is immediately
interrogated by several police officers. This initial interrogation is relatively brief,
and takes the form of an accusation. Usually, it is carried out by three officers, in
full uniform. Their demeanor is invariably arrogant and hostile. As in Russia,
they never state specific crimes, but they tell the prisoner that he is accused of
"crimes against the people," "treason," "espionage," or some similar broad cate-
gory of malefaction. Sometimes they simply state to him that he knows why he is
there, and what has he to say for himself ?
Usually this initial shouting and accusatory interrogation is a brief one, and
the prisoner is promptly placed in a cell. However, for psychological reasons, and
because of lack of prison facilities, some prisoners are put under "house arrest"
immediately after their initial arrest. A single room in the prisoner's home is fixed
up as a cell, and guards are assigned. The prisoner stays in this room for a in-
definite period of time and is transported back and forth to the prison for further
interrogations (which the prisoners often call "trials"). Under standard condi-
tions, however, the prisoner is confined immediately to a prison cell and usually
goes through an initial period of solitary confinement.
Chinese prison facilities are much more primitive than many of those in Russia
and are utterly inadequate to the prison population which they must at present
sustain. Crude, improvised, and extremely primitive prison conditions are often
encountered.
The Chinese prisons, like the Soviet prisons, are separated into "detention
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prisons" (often called "detention houses"), where prisoners are kept during the
period of "investigation" up to the time the cases are "settled," and "punishment
prisons" and labor camps, in which sentences arc served. The "detention prisons"
in large cities are modeled along the lines of the Soviet detention prisons.
In important cases, when there is a need to elicit a good deal of accurate in-
formation from the prisoner, the Chinese utilize a routine of isolation, pressure,
and interrogation, which is almost identical with that used by the KGB and is
described in Part II. The prisoner is placed in a small and barren cell in total iso-
lation. His food, his sleep, his exercise, his position, his activities, and even his
eliminative functions are rigidly controlled. After a suitable initial period he is
interrogated nightly with increasing pressure until he capitulates. Usually his cell
is dirtier and less well heated than those in Russia, and his regimen is different in
details-some minor and some major. In China, for example, prisoners in iso-
lation may be required to sleep with their hands inside the blankets rather than
outside. The Chinese have a predilection for severely restricting the activities of
their prisoners. It seems to be much commoner for them to require men in total
isolation to sit rigidly on their bunks at all times when they are not eating, sleep-
ing, or exercising. This adds greatly to their discomfort.
An aspect of their isolation regimen which is especially onerous to Western
prisoners is the arrangement for the elimination of urine and feces. The "slop
jar" that is usually present in Russian cells is often absent in China. It is a Chi-
nese custom to allow defecation and urination only at one or two specified times
each day-usually in the morning after breakfast. The prisoner is hustled from
his cell by a guard, double-timed down a long corridor, and given approximately
two minutes to squat over an open Chinese latrine and attend to all of his wants.
The haste and the public scrutiny are especially difficult for women to tolerate.
If the prisoners cannot complete their action in about two minutes, they are ab-
ruptly dragged away and back to their cells. The guards customarily allow only
this one opportunity for defecation, but they may allow one or more other oppor-
tunities to urinate during the day.
All Western prisoners experience extreme discomfort and marked disturbances
of bowel function when first exposed to this regimen. Many of them think of it
as one of the most fiendish tortures devised by the Chinese Communists, but the
practice may simply be an old routine which has been customary in China for
many years. It seems to be common to all Chinese prisons, even those in the
provinces. Open latrines and public defecation are the custom in rural China, and
they do not seem to be regarded as unpleasant by most Chinese.
Similarly, the diet in Chinese prisons is often regarded by Western prison-
ers as a device for creating discomfort. Rice, millet, and bean soup are the
staples. As in Soviet prisons, these are presented to the prisoner in an
amount just sufficient to maintain his nutrition if he eats all that he is given.
Some Western prisoners regard Chinese prison food as nauseating or dis-
tasteful and suffer accordingly. However, there is reason to believe that the
Chinese Communists intend to provide in their prisons a diet equivalent to
that of an average Chinese peasant or soldier.
The chief features of the isolation regimen in China are the same as
those of the Soviet Union : total isolation, utter boredom, anxiety, uncer-
tainty, fatigue, and lack of sleep; rejection, hostile treatment, and intolerable
pressure ; and reward and approval for compliance.
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6. The Interrogator
The interrogation in Chinese prisons is sometimes carried out by two
or three officers ; but usually one of these is in charge of the case, and it is
he who acts as the "friendly" interrogator at times when pressure is released.
As in Russia, there may be only one interrogator, and sometimes two in-
terrogators alternate. These men are relatively junior officers. Like their
KGB counterparts, many of them are dedicated Communists. They may ap-
proach the prisoner with a set of preformed ideas, which are impervious to
logic. Some Chinese interrogators are university graduates, and some of
them have studied abroad; but many others are men whose limited educa-
tion has been entirely in Communist Party schools. Such men have an ig-
norance of the outside world and of Western ideas which makes it even
more difficult for Western prisoners to cope with them.
On the whole, Western prisoners have reported that one of the most
persuasive features of Communist Chinese interrogators is their evident
devotion to their cause and the enthusiastic idealism with which they sub-
scribe to the ostensible goals of Communism. Their patient attempts to
teach prisoners "the right attitude" and to get them to understand the Chi-
nese Communist viewpoint has a potent effect upon unsophisticated or ideal-
istic people. At the same time, the relative ignorance of some of these police
officers and their dogmatic adherence to Communist beliefs in the face of
obviously contrary facts may be profoundly exasperating. Under the pres-
sures of interrogation, prisoners are usually prepared to admit to acts which
actually occurred and in time to accept the Communist definition of the na-
ture of these acts ; but they have great difficulty in bringing themselves to
make confessions which are wildly contrary to fact. The interrogator may
insist upon such confessions because of his erroneous beliefs about the na-
ture of Western institutions and Western motives. This may in part explain
why protocols are rewritten so many times in Communist prisons, and why
the confession is so often rejected as unsatisfactory after the prisoner thinks
that he has finally written it in an acceptable form.
7. The Interrogation Procedure
The interrogation procedure is much the same as that used by the KGB.
It is usually carried out at night and in a special room ; it proceeds step-
wise, with a gradual building up of pressure upon the prisoner to an intoler-
able point, sudden release of pressure, friendly interrogation, rewards for
cooperation, and then a repetition of the whole process until a presumably
satisfactory first protocol is signed. As in the Soviet Union, the Chinese in-
terrogators adjust their attitudes to the type of man with whom they think
they are dealing. They are more likely to shout, revile, and humiliate. Pos-
sibly they take this attitude more toward Western prisoners than toward
members of their own populace. Their procedures seem to be less formalized,
and their pressures are more apt to be primitive and brutal. Important or
recalcitrant prisoners are usually interrogated during a period of isolation
in a detention cell, under a routine similar to that used in Russia. Less im-
portant prisoners may be interrogated while incarcerated in "group cells."
In this case the members of the cell group alter their behavior to fit the needs
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of the interrogators. Prisoners in group cells may be isolated if their "con-
fessions" are not developing in a satisfactory manner.
In addition to the procedure of long-continued standing, which is fre-
quently employed, the Chinese also use manacles and leg chains, devices
which arc no longer used by the KGB. Leg chains are hobbling and uncom-
fortable, but the most excruciating discomfort is produced by the manacles.
These are commonly in the form of iron bracelets, several inches in width,
and joined rigidly together. The prisoner's hands are placed behind his back,
and his wrists are locked within the manacles. The rigid joint of the man-
acles holds his forearms together side by side, tightly behind his back.
This position is a painful one to assume for even a few moments. When a
man's arms are held in this position for many hours, he develops almost un-
bearable pain, primarily in his shoulders and hands. The circulation to his
hands is interfered with also. They become swollen and exceedingly tender.
The manacles may cut into his wrists and produce wounds which become
infected. The Chinese may manacle a prisoner for days or weeks at a time.
Such a prisoner is helpless and degraded. In order to eat, he must lie on
the floor and lap up his food. Ile cannot urinate or defecate without help,
and frequently he soils himself. Ile cannot find a comfortable position for
sleep. Lying on either side causes pain in the shoulders, and lying on his
back is impossible because of tenderness of his hands.
Chinese interrogators and prison guards are more likely to resort to direct
physical brutality than their Russian counterparts. When asked to explain the
difference between Chinese methods and those of the KGB, one Russian said
simply, "The Chinese use torture." This is the exception rather than the rule in
their behavior, but nevertheless it occurs. Angry interrogators may slap or beat
prisoners and kick them in the shins. Guards may do likewise. Among their
most sadistic practices are milking the fingers of manacled prisoners and binding
the ankles of those who are forced to stand. Milking pressure on the swollen
fingers of a manacled hand is excruciatingly painful. Whenever loose gauze
bandages are applied around the ankles of a man who is forced to stand, they
seriously constrict his legs as they begin to swell. This also produces intense
pain.
As in Russian prisons, medical attention is given prisoners. This is not in-
tended to be inadequate, but it is usually grossly so by Western standards. Some
Chinese physicians, like their Russian counterparts, are skilled in estimating the
capacity of prisoners to withstand punishment, and usually call a halt to tortures
before death or irreparable physical damage occurs.
The content of the interrogation procedure is not merely the tortures which
are applied. As in Russia, the persuasion and discussion of the interrogator,
which seems to provide a "way out" for the prisoner, is an essential tool in pro-
ducing the desired confession.
The Chinese more frequently ask the prisoner to write out, rather than relate,
his own biography, and often require him to revise it in detail. The interrogation
sessions themselves can be taken up with the discussion of this biographic ma-
terial, but only rarely is the biography itself obtained by direct questioning. All
of the psychological devices used by the KGB interrogators are also used by the
Chinese interrogators. Night interrogation, with repetitive questioning, undefined
crimes, changing attitudes, and increasing pressures alternate with periods of
relaxed pressure, "friendship," and reward. Cigarettes, tea, and a friendly
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attitude may be the sum total of a reward for cooperation; but even this provides
profound relief from the usual interrogation procedures.
The KGB rarely requires a prisoner to fabricate a completely untrue act which
is logically absurd. They concentrate more upon persuading him that his actual
acts constitute crimes. Chinese interrogators, on the other hand, when they are
intent upon establishing charges, such as bacteriological warfare or espionage,
may insist that the prisoner include in his confession detailed statements which are
not only untrue but logically absurd. One has the impression that this insistence is
based upon a combination of ignorance and ineptitude. Prisoners usually balk at
making such statements and tend to retract them even after they have been made.*
This seems to produce a profound exasperation in many interrogators. It is in
such settings that much brutality occurs. Men have been kicked, beaten, starved,
locked up in small boxes, hung up by their thumbs or legs, or subjected to other
primitive tortures under these circumstances. This has happened especially in
POW interrogations.
. Persuasion and friendly discussion nevertheless play a major part in the
preparation of the original confession. The same types of rationalization are used
by the Chinese as are used by the KGB, and the peculiar forms of Communist
logic are common to both.
8. The Indoctrination Procedure in the Group Cell
At the time the first protocol or "confession" is signed, the prisoner is usually
sullen and only half-convinced, if at all. It is at this point that the Chinese pro-
cedure diverges radically from that of the other Communist countries. The
Chinese are less interested in immediate trial and punishment; they are more con-
cerned with reforming the prisoner's thoughts and acts.
At some stage in his imprisonment the prisoner can expect to find himself
placed in a cell with about eight other prisoners. If he was initially isolated and
interrogated, this may be shortly after his first "confession" is accepted; but many
prisoners are placed in group cells from the outset of their imprisonment. The
cell is usually barren, and scarcely large enough to hold the group it contains.
There may be a sleeping platform, but all of the prisoners sleep on the floor; and
when all lie down, every inch of floor space may be taken up. The atmosphere is
extremely intimate. Privacy is entirely nonexistent. Poor food and all of the
other hardships of the prison routine are present, and a new and extraordinary
hardship is added as well-the psychological atmosphere.
In societies which require a rigid conformity of belief and provide severe
punishment for deviation, periods of great fear may be accompanied by widespread
hysterical accusations and brutal punishments. This has been an outstanding
feature of the present Communist Revolution in China. Under the pressures of
the Communist demands for conformity and the fear of relentless punishment, men
have turned against men and children against their parents. People compete with
each other to demonstrate their loyalty to the new regime and freely accuse their
neighbors of deviations or suspected crimes. The Chinese Communists have in-
tentionally fostered this fear among the general population and use it for their
own ends. Certainly, they do so in the prisons. One of their most ingenious
*A person who has finally been forced into making an absurd confession will sometimes
accept the confession after the most absurd parts have been deleted, even though the remain-
ing protocol is patently untrue.
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prison devices is that of turning prisoner against prisoner, and requiring the
enemies of the regime to beat each other into conformity.
During his original interrogation, as he is urged to confess his crimes, the
prisoner is told repeatedly that only when he has completely confessed his crimes
and has come to realize the error of his ways can his case be settled. After he is
transferred to a cell with other prisoners, it becomes clear to him what this entails.
It is necessary for him to compete with other prisoners in studying, in thoughts,
and in behavior until he has demonstrated to them, as well as to his jailers, that
he is thoroughly "reformed" and a true adherent of Communism.
The regimen in the new cell is completely organized. The prisoners arise at
a fixed hour, have a brief period for cleaning themselves, cat a frugal breakfast,
and have the usual march to the latrine. Thereafter, they spend the morning in
lectures, discussion sessions, and brief exercise periods. They spend the afternoon
in the same sort of routine-more lectures, more discussions and self-criticism
sessions. In the evenings, the discussions and self-criticism go on continuously
until bedtime.
The lectures are relatively formal study sessions given by an instructor, who
is either a member of the prison staff or a prisoner who is further along in his
indoctrination. The textbooks are the standard books of Marxist theory.t The
lecturer assigns topics for reading in these books. These are later taken up in
"discussion sessions." Such group discussions of general topics are designed
to ensure that everyone understands what he is being taught. On each point it is
necessary for everyone in the group to come to precisely the same understanding,
which is the one that meets with the approval of the teacher and the more
thoroughly indoctrinated students. These sessions are held in the cell. Everyone is
forced to participate. Attempts at non participation are noticed immediately by the
other prisoners, who then insist upon an expression of an opinion from the
recalcitrant member and a thorough discussion and dissection of his views.
Prisoners and instructors are equally assiduous at ferreting out other standard
devices for avoiding commitment, such as platitudinous statements, or the mere
parroting of the words of the instructors and the group without conviction.
Prisoners who attempt to escape by the use of such maneuvers find themselves
set upon by the other students and sharply criticized for their insincerity.
The exercise period is like that in Soviet prisons. During the earlier phase of
indoctrination it usually consists of walking in the prison yard or doing calisthenics.
At later stages, more advanced prisoners are permitted to play games, such as volley
ball or baseball.
Further lectures and more group discussions take place in the afternoon. In
addition, there are the "self-criticism" sessions, during which each prisoner is
supposed to criticize his behavior in the light of proper Communist behavior and
to admit all his faults. Not only one's present failures but all of one's past actions
are subject to review. The biographical material from each prisoner's life history
is available, and sooner or later he must review most of the items. Furthermore,
all prisoners must take part in vigorous criticism of other prisoners. One is not
allowed to criticize vaguely or lightly. One must criticize specific points and
criticize them forcefully. The result of this is an intense outpouring of hostile
accusations upon the prisoner who is the recipient of the criticism. The hostility
t For example, "The Communist Manifesto"; "Socialism-Utopian and Scientific" ; "Imperial-
ism-the Highest Stage of Capitalism"; "Foundations of Leninism" ; "The History of Social
Development"; "The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)."
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of the group grows in intensity and continues until the uncommitted prisoner
shows a genuine emotional reaction that indicates a satisfying willingness to
reform.
A special aspect of the group criticism is what prisoners call "the struggle."
This takes place when prisoners are undergoing interrogations while being con-
fined to group cells. The cell group is made aware of the progress of the inter-
rogation, apparently by direct instructions from the jailers to the group leader.
When the prisoner returns fatigued after an interrogating session, the group
surrounds him and "struggles" to help him with his confession. They stand
around him in a group, shouting at him, reviling him, and accusing him for hours
at a time, constantly telling him that he must confess all in order to be treated
better. Such "struggles" are often initiated when a prisoner returns from an
interrogation session wearing manacles and leg chains as a sign of his unsatis-
factory performance. When the prisoner finally produces a satisfactory confession
and the interrogator changes his attitude, the cell group is made aware of this
also, and changes its attitude toward the prisoner to a milder one.
Another technique used is that of stopping all interrogations and instructions
for a period of days and ordering the prisoner to concentrate upon writing his
confession and self-criticism. During this time, he is not allowed to speak to
anyone in his cell, and his cell mates do not speak to him. The effect of this is
to produce anxiety and doubts in the prisoner, who continues to expand his
writing in the hope that he will finally produce something which will satisfy his
interrogators.
This routine of lectures, discussions, self-criticism, and group criticism goes
on from morning until evening throughout the week. The formal lectures alone
may occupy as much as 56 hours a week. Literally no part of the prisoner's
waking life is left free.
9. The Reaction of the Prisoner to the Procedure' in the Group Cell
Whether by design or by accident, the psychological atmosphere within one
of these group prison cells is such that ultimately the prisoner comes to see that
the only hope for a "solution to his case" lies in his complete conformity in speech
and behavior to the doctrine outlined by his jailers. He also learns that he must
demonstrate his zeal not merely by his own behavior but also by vigorously
tearing down the defenses of many other prisoners. Fear and tension in the
group are thus maintained at a high pitch, and the cell mates vie with one another
in accusing, criticizing, degrading, and brutally punishing their fellow prisoners.
A prisoner newly introduced into one of these cells finds himself faced with
an almost irresistible assault upon the integrity of his personality. Often he is
already tired, discouraged, and psychologically whipped by the previous extraction
of a "confession." Furthermore, he is usually somewhat confused about his value
systems, and at least partly convinced that, by Communist standards, he is a
criminal. He enters the cell as a newcomer and an unregenerate. He finds that his
cell mates are all people who have "changed their attitudes." Regardless of their
status prior to arrest, they all seem to regard themselves as criminals ; some take
pride in the fact that they were the worst criminals in the lot. He may be surprised
to find that the cell leader who has charge of the discussion and criticism sessions
is a former Nationalist officer, or possibly a priest, or a former high Communist
official.
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The new prisoner's protestations of innocence are not accepted by his fellow
prisoners. They derisively tell him that he will soon change. They all tell him
that resistance is useless, that the Communist party is all-powerful, and that no
one who is innocent is ever imprisoned. They promptly turn upon him and begin
to "help him" in his reform. They criticize him vigorously and brutally. They
point out every error in his thinking. They detect his every attempt to evade
commitment and destroy it.t They do not allow protestation of innocence.
Thenceforth he has no moment of peace and no shred of privacy.
The brutalities of prisoners to other prisoners are far more frequent than
those of the guards. This is another interesting example of Communist legalism.
The Chinese, like the KGB, have a regulation that prisoners shall not be tortured,
beaten, or otherwise maltreated. Usually the interrogator and guards follow this
rule. They leave physical brutality to the prisoners themselves. Amid the tensions
of the group cell., prisoners can revile and degrade their fellow prisoners to an
unbelievable degree. When the group decides that a prisoner is recalcitrant or
reactionary, they may turn upon him and beat him mercilessly. They may deprive
him of sleep, take his food away from him, spit upon him, make him stand all day,
and insist that he be manacled. It is said that prisoners have even killed or
seriously injured other prisoners. Occasionally the guards even intervene to
protect prisoners from their cell mates. Such pressure of prisoners upon other
prisoners is intentionally permitted and is interrupted only when danger to the
? life of the prisoner, or the policy of the prison officials, indicates that it should be
stopped.
Hence, in addition to the physical discomforts inherent in this situation, the
prisoner is placed under profound psychological. pressure. To reiterate: Man is a
social animal. His health is as much dependent upon the maintenance of satis-
factory relationships with his associates as it is upon his food and drink. Even
if nothing else at all were done to a prisoner, he would find it almost intolerable
to be confined so intimately with seven other people who revile him and openly
despise him. Some sort of psychological modus vivendi leading to a degree of
acceptance is necessary for any man who exists in a group of other men. Absence
of such an adaptation is profoundly disturbing. Added to this burden is the fact
that the prisoner is a bewildered, anxious, and beaten man from the start. Further-
more, he has no privacy whatever. Every moment of his life is spent within a few
inches of his fellow prisoners. There is nothing that he can do or say that escapes
them. Not even his past and private life is sacred to him. Everything he has
ever done or said may be held up before him. On top of this, he is physically
abused, fatigued, and degraded to the point of complete collapse; but, as in the
interrogation situation, he is never allowed to die and is always snatched back just
before the final breaking point.
Here, again, is an intolerable situation in which no man can exist indefinitely.
The prisoner must conform to the demands of the group sooner or later. Indeed,
one is amazed not so much at the fact that prisoners ultimately conform as at the
remarkable amount of punishment which some prisoners absorb before they do
so. One would think that no man would actively resist these pressures for more
than a few months ; but even men who were predisposed toward conforming in
the first place have been known to put up some degree of resistance for years
$ Various names have been given to the tricks commonly used by prisoners to avoid com-
mitment, such as "finding a loophole," "assuming an appearance," "spreading a smoke screen,"
"window dressing," etc. Each of these can become a subject for special criticism.
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before finally conforming in all minor details to the demands put upon them.
Even those who have a wholehearted desire to embrace Communism find them-
selves faced with some demands which they cannot accept, and seem to find it
necessary to exhaust themselves in resisting these points before they finally "give
in." It is as if the prisoner cannot accept total conformity as a solution until he
has convinced himself that it is indeed inevitable.
Prisoners who enter into the cell groups may be defiant for a while but they
soon learn that this brings punishment upon them, and they try some trick of
ostensible compliance. This is detected, with further punishment, and rejection.
Other ruses fail also. Finally, many reach a point of emotional breakdown. The
mood common to this is profound depression, with crying, whimpering, and the
loss of all care about personal appearance. Some prisoners become disoriented.
Evidently a few have delusory experiences, but this is less common. Sometimes
these emotional disturbances go on for several months, and they may recur.
In this new situation of intolerable pressure, the prisoner is again offered
an attractive "way out." This attractive way out lies in the adoption of the
ostensible ideals of Communism. At the expense of belaboring the point, it must
be said again that the "exoteric" or "open" doctrine of Communism purports to
be an espousal of the ideals of self-sacrifice, equality, peace, freedom from want,
and freedom from fear, which are common to most of the major ethical systems
of mankind. The prisoner is told, in effect, that the reason he is being punished
is that he has failed to live up to this set of ideals. When he realizes his errors,
has cleansed his thoughts, and has become a wholehearted believer, his ordeal
will end. All the rationalizations of Communist logic are brought into play to
make his conversion easier. From morning until night he has this drummed into
him in teaching sessions from which he cannot escape.
Not only do prisoners revile and criticize each other ; some of then show a
sincere desire to help the new prisoner to "reform" himself. The behavior of
prisoners to other prisoners cannot be seen as simply the free acting out of
hostility and aggression. Intermingled with this there is a truly sincere desire on
the part of some to make the new prisoner see that only by conforming and
adopting the proper attitudes and beliefs can he ameliorate his situation. Some
of them have sincerely adopted Communism and see themselves as actually' trying
to make the prisoner into a better person; others see themselves as only trying
to get him to do what he must do in order to survive. In all cases this rationaliza-
tion enables the prisoners to take the attitude that they are "only punishing the
new prisoner for his own good." This attitude causes no difficulty for those who
are Communists, or who truly regard the new prisoner as a criminal ; but it is a
source of great conflict for some, including some priests and missionaries, who
realize that their efforts to convert the new prisoner may stem from some selfish
motives on their own part, and that they have the effect of causing him to deny
principles to which they themselves are dedicated. In any case, the new prisoner
does become aware of the fact that there are members of the cell group who have
partly concealed sympathy for him and are sincerely trying to help him. He
responds to this offer of help as much as he succumbs to the constant rejection
and brutality.
From time to time, he is taken out of the cell to see his interrogator for private
discussions and further opportunity to confess. Private persuasion is thus added
to group persuasion. The attractiveness of the "way out" is as effective in pro-
ducing conversion as is the necessity of escaping torture.
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The duration of the period of imprisonment in the group cell does not appear
to bear any direct relation to the progress made by the prisoner in adopting Com-
munist views. The prisoner may assume that he has been converted, but his men-
tors are hard to satisfy. The interrogator and the other prisoners make conversion
difficult to attain. It is common practice for them to ask for a new deposition
and a new "confession" from a prisoner as soon as he appears to have achieved
a certain amount of "progress." This new "confession" usually goes so far
beyond the previous one that the prisoner has great difficulty in accepting it. This
initiates a new period of conflict and resistance on his part and starts the cycle
over again. Western prisoners find it especially difficult when the interrogators
ask them to confess to belonging to nonexistent espionage rings or to make other
grossly invalid "confessions."
10. The Conversion
The prisoner faced with a KGB interrogation in preparation for a trial is
placed in a position in which he must rationalize only a portion of his beliefs
and actions in order to reach a tolerable modus vivendi, but the prisoner in a
Chinese prison has a much more difficult adaptation ; he must rationalize all of his
beliefs and actions. It gradually becomes apparent to him that his ordeal may be
of indefinite duration, and that there is no escape from it short of complete
compliance with the demands of his captors. Sooner or later most prisoners make
the necessary adaptation. They come to the point of being able to say and do the
things required of them. They are able to change their thinking enough to begin
to identify themselves with the values held by the prisoner group.
Here, again, the rewards of rationalization help the prisoner, just as they
helped him to confess. For example, most people are not without some sense of
guilt about parts of their past behavior. Such guilt, possessed by prisoners, is
greatly enhanced by the criticism and accusations of their fellow prisoners.
Confession, even if it is entered into with some reservations, gives a sense of
relief. The feeling of "joining," "belonging," and "being accepted" by the prisoner
group provides a most intense satisfaction to one who has been rejected and
reviled. Nor is it always very difficult for him to accept the ostensible ideals for
which the group is working. Prisoners make rationalizations such as "after all,
Communism and Christianity are essentially the same thing," or others, such as "I
did not think of myself as a spy, but, after all, I am a foreigner, and foreigners
have done great harm to China." All evidences of "reform" and "conversion" are
fostered by the patient help and teaching which the prisoner receives from some
of his associates and by the approval of the interrogator.
When he finally submits, the prisoner receives a substantial reward from a
feeling of acceptance and belonging. Suddenly, he has "friends." Ile may even
be a "hero." He unites himself with the others and is buoyed up by a sense of
dedication to the "mission" that they are carrying out. At this stage, he may be
transferred to a "free and easy cell" where conditions are less harsh. Here he has
an opportunity for reading, and he may be allowed to teach other prisoners and
to take part in games. His new-found enthusiasm is abetted by recurrent "drives"
that take place within the prison-drives against "hypocrisy," "waste," "graft,"
"corruption," and the like-all of which are fostered with enthusiastic fervor by
competitions among the cell groups.
Those who have been through the Communist prison procedure often come
out with the feeling that no matter how difficult it was, it was worth while. They
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may even feel grateful to their mentors. They feel as if they had been destroyed,
and then had been reintegrated. Some feel as if they were more "mature" than
they had ever been before. This is especially true of those who had previously
felt at loss for a goal in life, or who had not been committed to a set of beliefs,
friendships, or an occupation. It is also true of those who have carried a heavy
load of guilt about earlier behavior. In this last group, something akin to a
religious "conversion" is recognizable. Such prisoners have experienced a period
of degradation and intense punishment, which they find not entirely unacceptable
because of their preexisting 'feelings of guilt and unworthiness ; following this,
they experience an "acceptance" and "group identification" which is more valuable
to them than ever before because of the fact that they have already ".confessed"
and "atoned" for their sins. The previously uncommitted, and those who felt
rejected by their society, may develop an exhilarating feeling of "purpose" and
"belonging" which they never had before.
Even those prisoners who were previously well integrated and on good terms
with their fellow inen, and who were committed to certain goals and beliefs,
experience a profound feeling of relief when they are finally able to make the
necessary rationalizations and to join with the prisoner group. This feeling of
relief probably stems from the release of tensions and restorations of body
processes that occur in a man when he is finally able to make an adaptation to a
very difficult environment.
Long after the prisoner has developed a willingness to conform, he continues
to be exposed to an unremitting course of Communist studies. During all of his
imprisonment he is denied access to any information which might contradict what
he is being told. Over a period of years this combination of misinformation and
absence of contrary evidence produces some areas of distorted belief in even the
most skeptical.
The period of indoctrination within Chinese detention prisons has been known
to continue for as long as four years. A prisoner's release from the detention
prison often appears to be decided upon on the basis of general policies rather
than any specific aspects of his case. The release of foreign nationals is usually
determined upon the basis of propaganda needs or the requirements of inter-
national agreements. Often release comes upon a prisoner quite unexpectedly.
He is suddenly told that he will be freed. Within a few days he is taken before a
"court," which is much like a Soviet military tribunal. There is a "judge," a
"prosecutor," perhaps a few stenographers, and sometimes a "defense attorney."
The prisoner repeats his confession in what he has long since learned is the
proper manner. The defense attorney asks for lenience. (There are no pleas of
"not guilty.") The "judge" then "passes sentence." If it has been decided to free
the prisoner entirely, he is usually sentenced to a term in "prison" equal to the
amount of time he has spent in the "detention prison," and then (if he is a
foreigner) to deportation. The "lenient" judge then allows the prisoner to count
his time in the "detention prison" as if it were "real imprisonment," and he is
forthwith released. But if he is "to be punished," he will be sent to a labor camp
or to some other punishment institution to begin his sentence.
The people who have been described in the public press as "brain-washed"
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have been prisoners suddenly released after periods as long as four years in
Chinese detention prisons. Such persons have appeared at the border at Hong
Kong, looking calm, fit, and sane. They praise their captors, praise Communism,
and damn "American imperialism." It is said that their old acquaintances are
amazed, and that their political attitudes seem to have "changed completely."
The fact that they praise their captors is regarded as the most amazing of all,
for it is known that they have been through many horrible experiences in the
course of their imprisonment. It is from this pattern of behavior that the impres-
sion has arisen that the Chinese possess esoteric and devilish methods of "thought
control" which no man can resist.
A number of people called "successfully brain-washed" have been studied
intensively. A great deal is known about these people and what was done to them.
The study of these people reveals that they possessed certain characteristics in
common before they were imprisoned. These can be enumerated.
1. They were people who, long before their imprisonment, were in rebellion
against their parents and the way of life of the segment of society to which their
parents belonged, including many of its standards, beliefs, and practices.
2. They were people who had few friends within their homeland, and no place,
organization, or occupation there with which they were firmly identified., So far
as their native country was concerned, they were emotionally rootless.
3. They were people who had previously identified themselves with the "under-
dog." They felt a strong sympathy for all people whom they regarded as
"oppressed" or "exploited," and especially for minority groups of different racial
or cultural origin.
4. They all spoke Chinese fluently, and for many years had had. a strong in-
terest in China and all things Chinese.
5. Most of them were previously familiar with the exoteric concepts of Marx-
ist socialism, and most of them had been intellectually sympathetic to socialist ideas
for many years before their imprisonment. Several of them had been members of
Communist and fellow-traveler groups, and at least one of them is known to have
been a Party member.
6. These people had been offered repatriation after the Communist Revolution,
but they had elected to remain in China, most of them primarily because they were
both sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Revolution and curious to see how
it would work out. They were anxious to help develop the new China, if they
were allowed to do so. For months prior to the time of their imprisonment, sev-
eral of them were engaged in studying Chinese Communist literature and trans-
lating it into other languages.
Most of these people were not actually Communist Party members before
their arrest and imprisonment. Most of them were sympathetic to Communist
ideas and to the new China, but they had not committed themselves to Commu-
nism. They had toyed with their beliefs and found them intellectually attractive,
but they were content to let their identification remain at this level. They had
studied Chinese, and some went to Chinese schools; but they continued to asso-
ciate with the members of the Western colony, and the forms of their lives were
those common to expatriate Americans and Europeans living in Chinese cities.
At the time of their arrests they were still rootless, uncommitted people.
7. Nearly all of these people were arrested on charges which included "espio-
nage." The treatment which they received in prison was that which has been
described above. These people confessed to "espionage," and after their release
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some of them continued for a while to state that they had been "spies." None of
them had actually committed espionage, and none were actually associated with
American intelligence organizations. But all of them had, with innocent intent,
done various things, such as describing economic conditions in letters or discussing
the morale of Communist troops with their consular officials, which were "osten-
sibly" espionage by Communist definition and which were forbidden by Chinese
Communist law. By Communist definition, all of them were of "reactionary back-
ground" and "the agents of an Imperialist power," and they had all "committed
espionage." During the course of their imprisonment, they "admitted" their acts
and accepted the Communist definition of them. The rationalizations which- they
utilized in making their confessions were like those which have been described
above.
8. To a certain extent, they were also "converted" to the acceptance of Com-
munist doctrine. That is to say, after much soul searching and profound emo-
tional turmoil, they committed themselves to have faith in, and to work for, some
of the overt Communist ideals which they had previously accepted only on an
intellectual basis. Some of them emerged from prison with a sense of purpose
and worthiness which they had not felt before. They remained overtly and
actively pro-Communist for periods up to several months. After that time most
of them appear to have reverted to their former positions of intellectual acceptance
of some Communist beliefs, while outwardly conforming to a proper middle-class
life.
In summary, the study of these "successfully brain-washed" people revealed
them to be persons who had previously lost their identification with the society in
which they originated, and who under years of intense pressure were temporarily
persuaded to "commit" themselves to beliefs which most of them already found
intellectually attractive.
Just how effective are these procedures? How long-lasting are their effects?
Do they actually affect brain function? Are they "irresistible"? The answer to
these questions, like the answer to those about Russian "public confession" trials,
is not simple, but it is available.
The Chinese prison indoctrination procedure is never more than partly effec-
tive, but it always has some effect. No human can live through months or years
of this experience without suffering emotional turmoil. In order to survive and
not suffer an emotional breakdown, he must make some rationalization which
allows him to identify with the prison group and to relieve some of the pressures
upon himself. The extent of this rationalization need not be greater than a belief
that his present situation justifies his present behavior and statements. Usually,
it goes further than this. He usually finds some aspects of Communist doctrine
which he can admire and which he can identify with his own value systems. Also,
because of his long period (sometimes years) of incarceration and exposure to
propaganda, with a total absence of accurate information from the outside world,
he may unwittingly adopt some Communist beliefs about current events. On some
other questions, he may have at least a tentative acceptance of Communist atti-
tudes because he has been presented with a great deal of plausible propaganda
"evidence."
Thus, a man who spends a long period in a Chinese civil prison and survives
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51
can be expected to have experienced anxiety, despair, and doubt; he must have
complied with the prison rules; he must have "confessed" to something, and he
must have taken part in the various aspects of the indoctrination procedure. If
the procedure was as vigorous and thoroughgoing as that described above, he
must have shown enough evidence of conversion to satisfy his cell mates and
jailers, and this usually means that he must have found at least some part of the
Chinese Communist value system which he can identify with his own and can
tentatively accept.
On the other hand, even though some of his attitudes and beliefs may have
changed, his capacity to think is not altered. So-called "brain washing" produces
no permanent changes in the function of the brain. Any form of imprisonment
may induce a prison psychosis, and inhuman treatment may produce physical
damage to the nervous system; but these effects are not peculiar to "brain wash-
ing."
Nor is there any unexplainable deficiency in the memory of former prisoners.
Prisoners do not remember things which happened when they were delirious or
otherwise psychotic. They may forget minor details of their experiences with the
passage of time. Many of them do not wish to discuss some points of their treat-
ment, because the memories of these are painful and the discussion of them is
disturbing. But even the "most brain-washed" are capable of a vivid recollection
of what occurred during their imprisonment.
Furthermore, the majority of those released carry with them an intense bitter-
ness about some part of their imprisonment. Usually this is directed at certain
other prisoners or jailers, but it may be directed at the whole Communist system.
All prisoners come out with a realization that they have been cut off from the
Western world for a long time, and with a suspicion that not everything in the
outside world will turn out to be as it was presented to them in prison. All of
them have a tentative orientation toward whatever new beliefs they may have,
and most of them have reservations about their entire experience.
Upon their release, former prisoners set about a process of "reality testing."
Without committing himself, each newly released roan characteristically begins
to talk to friends, and to listen to accounts of what has happened while he was
away in prison. Ile begins to read back copies of books and magazines. He begins
to compare what was told him with the facts as observed and reported in the
American press. The available evidence suggests that within a period of months
he readjusts himself to the outside world and resumes a set of beliefs roughly
similar to those he held prior to his imprisonment.
Thus, it is quite erroneous to think that those who have experienced prison
indoctrination in Communist China emerge as thoroughly indoctrinated Commu-
nists who express praise and admiration for their captors. Such people are as
unusual as the public confessors in Russian purge trials. The vast majority of
released, prisoners say little or nothing. What pro-Communist beliefs they have
they keep to themselves and express only in private. Many are bitterly anti-
Communist. Although they are willing to admit that there are good aspects about
the regime and agree that they cooperated and "confessed" while in prison, they
do not have any genuine identification with Communism.
[V. Relation of State Police Procedures, Military Interrogation, and
[ndocrination of Civilians and Prisoners of War in Communist Countries
In Western states the custody of prisoners of war is in the hands of the armed
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52
forces. In the Soviet Union during the latter part of the Second World War this
was not the case. In 1942 an arrangement was arrived at between the Red Army
and the NKVD which gave to the army custody of prisoners shortly after their
capture and during the period of field interrogation, but turned over to the NKVD
the problem of their ultimate custody and utilization. The fact that the NKVD
was primarily a police organization was probably responsible for the methods and
attitudes which it adopted in handling the war prisoners. In the extraction of
information from prisoners, it simply applied the standard secret police techniques
which had found to be so effective in handling civilian prisoners during the pre-
vious 25 years. The NKVD training program rapidly produced a large body of
interrogators who were proficient in speaking German. A dossier was prepared
on each German prisoner of war, which included a long biographical statement
from him, as well as information gathered from the interrogation of other prison-
ers and from captured records. This was used in his interrogation. When
prisoners gave information voluntarily, no additional pressure was put upon them;
but when the interrogators felt that the prisoner was withholding information,
they put him through the standard isolation pressures-repetitive interrogation
techniques of the NKVD.
In typical Communist legalistic fashion, the NKVD rationalized its use of
torture and pressures in the interrogation of prisoners of war. When it desired
to use such methods against a prisoner or to obtain from him a propaganda state-
ment or "confession," it simply declared the prisoner a "war-crimes suspect" and
informed him that, therefore, he was not subject to international rules governing
the treatment of prisoners of war. This legalism later had great importance for
the United States, because it was also used against American military personnel
in the Korean War. We can expect that it will be used against us in any future
conflict. When it signed the Geneva agreements in 1949, the Soviet Union made
specific exceptions to the effect that prisoners accused of war crimes would not
be protected by the code, but would be subject to the laws of the nation against
whom the crimes were committed.
Thus, German prisoners of war found themselves the subjects for criminal inter-
rogation by secret police interrogators at the will of their Soviet captors. Similarly,
they found themselves exposed to the same type of treatment that the Soviets
provide for civilian political prisoners. The officers were separated from the en-
listed men, and the enlisted men were utilized as a source of labor. Those prisoners
who lived together in camps were also exposed to the type of indoctrination which
the NKVD had developed for civilian prisoners according to the Communist
philosophy of "'rehabilitating" prisoners by "education and healthful work." This
indoctrination consisted of lectures on Communism and group-discussion sessions,
using the standard Marxist texts. The prison camps were infiltrated by large
numbers of informers, who created internal dissension among the prison, group
and prevented the development of any organized resistance. In spite of this, the
indoctrination program does not seem to have been outstandingly successful. It
is estimated that only some 10% of German prisoners of war developed any sym-
pathy for Communism, although many more cooperated with the Russians in
order to secure better treatment. This proportion of successful converts is not
especially high when one considers the fact that Germany had a large and vigor-
ous Communist party before the advent of Hitler. The German army must have
contained a fairly large number of men of underlying Communist sympathies.
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Against the Japanese, the Russians used methods which were essentially the
same as those which they used against the Germans, and with perhaps equal
success. It is noteworthy that during the period 1945-1946 the deliberately
increased the hardships and neglect within their prison camps, and thereby caused
the death of a large number of prisoners they then held. Their policy was as much
one of extermination as of conversion, but a higher proportion of those who were
cooperative or converted survived because of the better treatment which they
received.
The conversion of POW's always played a much greater role ill the Chinese
Communist military program than in that of the Soviet. It has been said that the
Chinese Communists looked upon the entire Chinese nation as potential converts.
They made their conversion and indoctrination program one of the most important
aspects of their revolutionary effort. In 1943 this program was placed in the
hands of Liu Shao-Ch'i, who was responsible for the form which it took there-
after. The conversion program within the Chinese prisons, which we have pre-
viously described, was developed out of the program which Liu Shao-Ch'i
developed for use against the population in general.
Every prisoner or potential convert who fell into the hands of the Chinese
Communists was evaluated on the basis of his life history, class background, edu-
cation, and abilities. Those with revolutionary sympathies who possessed the
proper background and abilities (especially students, intellectuals, and some prole-
tarians and peasants) were trained to become Communist activists. These are
the people whom the Communists commonly refer to as "cadres," both individ-
ually and in groups. For the purpose of the cadres' training, schools were set up
offering a course of one year's duration. Students who entered these schools were
isolated from the rest of society. They were put through an intensive and unre-
mitting program of study and physical work, which occupied every moment of
their waking hours and left them no time for reflection. The first phase of this
program consisted of "tail cutting," or the devaluation of old methods of thought
and behavior and old value systems. This was accompanied by the use of the
self-criticism and group-criticism techniques zind by exhaustive lectures on Com-
munism. As in the prisons, the emotional fervor of the group was maintained at
a high pitch by the stimulation of intense competitiveness and the organization of
"moves" and "drives" of one sort or another with "voluntary, participation,"
from which no student could shrink because of group pressure. An atmosphere
of fear was created by the occasional disappearance of students who were doing
poorly, accompanied by rumors about their imprisonment or transfer to labor
battalions.
In many respects the atmosphere within these training schools paralleled that
within the prisons. Under the relentless pressure of hard work, fatigue, increas-
ing demands, group pressures, criticism, doubts, and ridicule, the majority of
students ultimately reached the point at which they went through an emotional
crisis associated with tears and depression. At this point some dropped out, but
most found themselves able to make the necessary adaptation by reorienting their
value systems and identifying themselves with the Communist group. A religious
fervor and a feeling of "conversion" frequently accompanied this emotional break-
clown and recovery. His new Communist fervor and group, identification corn
tinued as long as the student remained an active member of the class group and
often later in his party group, but it is said that a fair proportion of students
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54
suffered from one or more relapses of tears and doubts. It is known that some
defected later when the opportunity presented itself.
In the population at large, the Chinese Communists have not been able to carry
out indoctrination in nearly so tightly organized a fashion, but their approach has
been essentially the same as their approach to the cadres. They aim their indoctri-
nation primarily at the younger groups and carry out their programs with a special
vigor in the schools and universities. Villages have been exposed to propaganda
and a certain amount of lectures and teaching. Group-discussion and self-criticism
sessions have been held. These- are accompanied by an attempt to devalue the old
practices and substitute the Communist value system. An atmosphere of fear
produced by liquidations, arrests, and accusations is exploited. All of this has
had the effect of producing superficial conformity and acquiescence.
Americans have had firsthand experience with the Chinese methods of indoc-
trination of prisoners of war. These methods have been made the subject of
exhaustive studies by the Army and Air Force and by the Defense Advisory Com-
mittee on Prisoners of War. We shall not attempt to add to their voluminous
documentation. However, we may consider briefly the experiences of our prisoners
in the light of what we know about Russian and Chinese practices in general.
It is evident that the North Koreans were ill prepared to cope with American
prisoners from any point of view. They possessed very few English-speaking
interrogators and had no prepared facilities for the semipermanent custody of
prisoners of war. Much of what appeared to be calculated brutality and deliberate
extermination on the part of the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists in
the winter of 1950-1951 was, probably the result of lack of facilities, the break-
down of supply and communication, and callousness of Oriental peasant soldiers.
The initial demoralization of American prisoners by the physical hardships of
their captivity was probably not intentionally designed. Attempts to indoctrinate
American prisoners were poorly organized and ineptly carried out when compared
with the procedures used by the Chinese on their own populace. All too often the
lecturers were absurdly ignorant of American conditions. The preparation of
dossiers on individual prisoners was not nearly so thoroughgoing as that em-
ployed by the Soviets or by the Chinese in their own prisons. But the use of
informers among the prisoner group and the isolation and removal of natural
leaders were relatively successful in demoralizing the prisoners and in prevent-
ing the organization of active resistance groups.
The Chinese used the technique of accusing American prisoners of "war
crimes" when they wished to expose them to a "criminal interrogation" with
the aim of obtaining a propaganda confession, or when they wished to mete out
some "appropriate" punishment to a marked man. This device was primarily
used in obtaining bacteriological-warfare confessions from the aviators captured
during the period of 1952-1953. All told, 78 aviators are known to have been
exposed to such interrogation within North Korea. Of these, 38 "confessed,"
and 40 did not. The methods used in obtaining these confessions were similar to
those used in the Chinese-Soviet prisons. They were characterized by a striking,
and often extreme, degree of physical brutality. These officers were isolated,
sometimes in unheated huts or water-soaked holes in the ground. They were
deprived of sleep, food, warmth, and exercise. They were insulted, threatened,
beaten, and repeatedly interrogated, and they were intermittently offered kind
treatment if they assented to the demands of their captors. One gains the im-
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ss
pression that a good deal of this brutality, which included such things as mock
firing squads, dousing prisoners with water in subzero weather, and the in-
carceration of men in small boxes, was simply a result of lack of sophistication and
callousness on the part of the North Korean interrogators. Also, brutality was
precipitated by the exasperating resistance of many of the prisoners. These men
were being asked to confess to something which they knew to be palpably untrue,
and there was no way of looking upon if in any other fashion. It is notoriously
difficult to get men to make such confessions.
The resistance of these prisoners appeared to bear no direct relation to the
amount of physical pressure put upon them by their Communist captors. Some
men were brutalized for months without giving in; others succumbed almost im-
mediately, sometimes with scarcely as much as a threat. Statistical correlations
made by research groups of the U. S. Air Force indicate that resistance did not
correlate with rank, education, religion, geographical. area of origin, length of
service, or regular or reserve status. The information from our own studies sug-
gests very strongly that resistance or nonresistance is related to highly personal
factors involving motivations, value. systems, character structure, and the circum-
stances of imprisonment.
The available information all points to a readily understandable explanation for
the defection of those few Americans who elected to remain in Communist lands.
Nearly all of these men were of limited schooling and experience. It appears that
few of them had any real interest in Communism. They defected primarily because
they were afraid to be repatriated. Most of them had been regarded by their fellow
prisoners as informers and collaborators, and they all had good reason to expect
charges to be preferred against them if they returned to the jurisdiction of the
United States. They were lured into defection by what amounted to rosy promises
of further education and economic betterment if they went to China. When it
turned out that their situation in China was far less rosy than they expected it to
be, some were sorely disappointed and returned to the United States.
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the behavior of our prisoners of
war. This has been dealt with ably in publications of the U. S. Army and U. S.
Air Force, and in the report of the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of
War. Suffice it to say that in every case that has been. investigated, the statements
and behavior of the men have been found to have a readily understandable basis.
A central. theme of this paper has been the proposition that there is no need
to assume that the Communists utilize occult methods in managing their prisoners.
The results obtained are readily understandable on the basis of the methods known
to be used. Theory has been avoided, because many present-day concepts of human
behavior are still in a formulative state. Notwithstanding this, there is a sufficient
body of evidence to allow us to state that we understand why the results obtained
flow from the methods used.
It is helpful to consider the individual man as a living system entirely dependent
upon maintaining a satisfactory relationship with his total environment. A man's
life is dependent upon his ability to maintain a satisfactory body temperature; a
satisfactory intake of food, fluids and air; a satisfactory elimination of waste
products, and a satisfactory amount of rest and activity. It is equally necessary
for him to maintain a satisfactory relationship with the other human beings in his
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environment, and especially with those humans who by kinship or long association
have acquired a special meaning for,him.
When any of these necessary relationships between a man and his environment
are disturbed, there develop within him feelings which are unpleasant, and which
stimulate him to take whatever action is necessary to bring them to an end. Among
these unpleasant sensations are hunger, thirst, fatigue, sleeplessness, excessive
warmth or coldness, and all sorts of pain. These sensations originate within the
human body as a result of disturbances of bodily processes. There are other un-
pleasant feelings, such as anxiety, fear, anger, loneliness, sadness, and dejection,
which arise out of disturbed relations to the total environment and the people in it.
When beset by these feelings, man is strongly motivated to make whatever adjust-
ments in his relation to his environment are necessary.
The Communist arrest-imprisonment procedure has the effect of seriously dis-
turbing man's total relation to his environment. It produces many disturbing and
unpleasant sensations within him. In the description of the procedures of arrest,
isolation, interrogation, and torture, it was mentioned that these produce anxiety,
fear, tension, resentment, uncertainty, loneliness, boredom, fatigue, sleeplessness,
hunger, coldness, and pain.
When men are put into situations which produce pressures similar to those
produced by the Communist imprisonment situation, many follow a similar pattern
of reaction. The first part of this reaction is a period of patient and purposeful
exploratory activity. The man carefully tries every possible solution to the situation
which may relieve him of the pressures upon him. If one arranges the experimental
situation so that the man cannot find a satisfactory solution by his exploratory
activities, his next reaction is an increasing and random exploration, with a general
increase of motor activity and an overflow of this activity into other behavior, of
a nonpurposive nature. He appears to "become excited" and shows evidences of
anxiety, hyperactivity, and sometimes panic. If the pressures of the experimental
situation are continued, the hyperactivity of the subject will gradually subside, with
the exception of isolated repetitive acts. Ile may settle upon one form of response,
which he repeats endlessly and automatically, even though this endlessly repeated
action can never produce a solution. If the pressures are continued long enough,
his ultimate response is one of total inactivity. He becomes first exasperated, and
finally dejected and dependent upon anyone who offers to help him. He becomes
unusually receptive to approval or human support.
For want of a better term, the experimental situation just described has been
called a "situation of frustration." Situations of frustration are the common de-
nominator of many of the Communist prison experiences. The reaction of the pris-
oner to the isolation routine closely reproduces that which occurs in an artificially
frustrating situation. It is a more all-embracing reaction, slower in its development
and more devastating in its effects, but it is basically similar. Situations of frustra-
tion also occur in the interrogation situation, where the prisoner must prepare a
satisfactory confession and finds that no matter what he does or says he cannot
satisfy the interrogator. Likewise, situations of frustration occur again and again
in a group cell in the Chinese prison. Here also the prisoner finds that no matter
how much he attempts to comply with the demands of the interrogator and the other
prisoners, his confession is never satisfactory, and his ordeal is renewed. Much
the same situation occurs in the training schools for Communist cadres, where
there are increasing demands for more thorough study, more work, more en-
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thusiasm, and more self-criticism, until the student ultimately breaks down, show-
ing emotional reactions, such as crying and behavior of hopelessness and despair.
Thus, all of the Communist interrogation and indoctrination programs have
much in common. In all of them the subject is faced with pressure upon pressure
and discomfort upon discomfort, and none of his attempts to deal with his situation
lead to amelioration of his lot. Psychiatrists may refer to a man in such a situation
as "emotionally bankrupt." Some of the patients who seek the help of psychiatrists
are in a similar state. The pressures and convolutions of their lives have reached
a point at which they can no longer deal with them, and they must have help. It is
recognized that such a state of "emotional bankruptcy" provides a good opportunity
for the therapist. Indeed, there are therapists who are of the opinion that successful
psychotherapy is rare unless a patient has reached such a state of readiness. This
appears to be a recognition of the fact that a man will not turn to a therapist for
help as long as he feels that, there are other means of deliverance.
When a man is at the "end of his rope," he accepts avidly any help that is
offered. In the experimental situation of frustration, the subject who has reached
this stage will readily accept suggestions for solving the experimental problem,
however absurd. His response to words of encouragement is striking. His own
intense needs have prepared him to accept suggestions which he previously would
have rejected. Similarly, the patient who has reached a point of desperation may
abjectly put himself into the hands of a psychiatrist toward whom he has previously
displayed contempt and hostility, and he will enter into a course of treatment, how-
ever painful it may be.
A characteristic of those who are "bankrupt" and need help is their need to
talk. They obtain deep satisfaction simply from unburdening themselves to another
human being. In Communist prisons this need to talk is greatly fortified by the
regimen of total isolation. This is an important reason why the Communist in-
terrogator, being the only man to whom the prisoner talks, is in such an advanta-
geous position for obtaining information from him. The interrogator is dealing
with a man who might be looked upon as an intentionally created patient; the
interrogator has all of the advantages and opportunities which accrue to a therapist
dealing with a patient in desperate need of help.
Although the Communist management of prisoners was not designed by psychi-
atrists or neurophysiologists, and those who carry out this management do not
have formal psychological training, nevertheless the interrogator does deal with the
prisoner by using many of the same methods which the physician uses in the man-
agement of his patients. He allows the prisoner to talk at length about his family
and his life. This produces in the prisoner a warm and dependent relationship
toward him. The interrogator approves and rewards proper attitudes and behavior,
and disapproves and punishes improper attitudes and behavior. Because of his
dependence upon the interrogator, the prisoner develops an intense desire to please
him. The prisoner glows when he is rewarded, and is deeply disturbed when he is
rejected.
The interrogator has in his hands knowledge of most of the life history of his
victim. He does not hesitate to pick out from this history the disturbing and un-
pleasant episodes. He uses them as a lever to humiliate the prisoner and to increase
his feelings of guilt and unworthiness. The potent effect which this procedure can
have upon man has been demonstrated many times in the laboratory. It has been
observed that when threatening episodes from a patient's life are. introduced by the
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physician and discussed intensively with indications of disapproval, the patient may
be greatly disturbed. Not only are his mood and behavior disturbed, but pro found
and potentially dangerous alterations in his bodily processes occur also. Thus, the
power which the interrogator possesses in dealing with the prisoner is great; his
ability to manipulate both the physical and the interpersonal aspects of the prisoner's
environment place his victim in a highly vulnerable position.
It is readily understandable that the prisoner ultimately adopts the suggestions
of the interrogator with regard to the protocol. It is not at all incomprehensible
that some prisoners can be carried to the point of confessing to crimes for
which death is the certain punishment. Since the intimate interpersonal relation
between prisoner and interrogator continues through the period of the trial, it is
also understandable that prisoners may continue to play their prescribed roles
before the judge and the state prosecutor.
The situation within the group prison cell in the Chinese prison is akin to
that of the interrogator and prisoner. Here, the important relationship is
between the prisoner and the group, with the prisoner striving to gain the
acceptance of the group and to identify himself with them. In this setting the
pressures are more prolonged and the situation of frustration may be repeated
many times, because the prisoner is called upon not only to accept a protocol
or confession but to adopt a whole new attitude. It may take a long time before
such a state of utter defeat is achieved; but when it is, the prisoner's reaction
has many of the features of a religious conversion.
Those who have experienced a true religious conversion maintain their new
attitudes and behavior for an unpredictable length of time. It has been a general
experience that most of the religious conversions experienced at camp meetings
or revivals are of evanescent nature. The experience is a powerful one, but
the convert usually reverts to his former patterns within a short time. But this
is not necessarily so. Some religious conversions have long-lasting, or even
permanent, effects. So it appears to be with the conversion which takes place
in Communist prisons or indoctrination schools. Those who go through the
experience often feel that it was unpleasant but worth while. Its effects upon
their attitudes and behavior are usually evanescent. They disappear within a few
weeks after the convert is removed from his Communist environment. But a
small proportion of converts appear to experience long-lasting, or even per-
manent, changes in their attitudes and behavior, especially if they are among
the "most susceptible group."
VI. Epitome
The methods used in Communist countries for the interrogation and indoctri-
nation of persons regarded as enemies of the state have their roots in secret
police practices which go back for many years. These methods have been refined
and systematized by much use and experience. Data about these procedures
have been collected and analyzed. The general dynamic features which underlie
them are understandable.
Those who live in Communist states recognize that at times the state police are
almost unlimited in their power and their action may be swift and arbitrary.
When residents of such communities become aware that they are suspected by
the police, their feelings of impotence and uncertainty are greatly augmented.
As they are increasingly avoided by their friends and associates, they feel isolated
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and rejected, and develop intense anxiety, often colored by feelings of guilt.
Their sudden seizure under dramatic circumstances is additionally traumatizing.
They usually enter upon their prison experience feeling fearful, vaguely guilty,
helpless, and completely uncertain of their fate.
When the initial period of imprisonment is one of total isolation, such as
that used by the KGB, the complete separation of the prisoner from the
companionship and support of others, his utter loneliness, and his prolonged
uhicertainty have a further disorganizing effect upon him. Fatigue, sleep loss,
pain, cold, hunger, and the like augment the injury induced by isolation. The
cumulative effects of the entire experience may be almost intolerable. With the
passage of time, the prisoner usually develops an intense need to be relieved of
the pressures put upon him and to have some human companionship. Ile may
have a very strong urge to talk to any human and be utterly dependent upon
anyone who will help him or befriend him. At about this time he also becomes
mentally dull and loses his capacity for discrimination. Ile becomes malleable
and suggestible, and in some instances he may confabulate.
The interrogator exploits the prisoner's need for companionship. Ile uses
items from the prisoner's biography derived from police files, from the prisoner's
associates, and from hours of interrogation to arouse further guilt, conflict,
and anxiety. Ile makes use of the dependence of the prisoner, which is
strengthened by the intimate sharing of information about his life. He frustrates
and further disorganizes the prisoner by rejecting his statements. He scolds.,
punishes, and threatens him when he does not cooperate, and approves and
rewards him when he does. Then, by suggesting that the prisoner accept half-
truths and plausible distortions of the truth, he makes it possible for the
prisoner to rationalize and thus accept the interrogator's viewpoint as the only
way out of an intolerable situation.
The methods of interrogation and indoctrination used in Communist China
are in many respects similar to those of the Russian state police, from which
they were in part derived; but in some respects they are quite different because
of the special needs and traditions of the Chinese. In the Chinese prison, the
individual interrogator is still important, and in occasional cases the management
of the prisoner may quite closely duplicate that of the KGB. But in most
instances the efforts of the interrogator are supplemented by the effects of the
interaction between the prisoner and six or eight of his fellow prisoners with
whom he is incarcerated in a crowded cell. Here the group replaces the
interrogator as the focus of the prisoner's relationships. In this setting of
complete lack of privacy, there is an unremitting routine of self-criticism sessions,
group-discussion sessions, rote learning, constant repetition of Communist view-
points, and the repeated rewriting and rejection of autobiographical essays.
The group exploits the feeling of emotional nakedness and unworthiness which
the self-criticism sessions engender, dwelling upon items obtained from the
prisoner's life history during these sessions which arouse in him guilt, conflict,
and anxiety. These feelings are greatly potentiated when the group rejects,
isolates, and reviles him because of his "improper" attitudes and past behavior.
The prisoner is thus placed in a situation in which he cannot avoid having his
past life reviewed and questioned and cannot avoid hearing an exposition of
the Communist position. Moreover, for a period, sometimes of years' duration,
he has access to nothing but Communist-oriented history and Communist inter-
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pretation of current events. Like the KGB interrogator, the group rewards and
approves the prisoner when he cooperates and behaves in accordance with their
aims, and thus indicates to him that the only possible solution to an intolerable
situation is the acceptance of the "proper" point of view.
Under pressures such as these, prisoners usually rationalize a change in
attitude and hold it for an indefinite time. In general, this change in attitude
is only so great as the prisoner feels it must be to enable him to relieve
himself of the intolerable pressures under which he labors. In the KGB pre-
trial interrogation, the achievement of a successful rationalization and a satis-
factory protocol is usually accompanied by a profound feeling of relief, and an
unspoken agreement with the interrogator that may even have overtones of
warmth and friendliness. In the Chinese group cell, where the pressures are
much more prolonged and the demands upon the prisoner are correspondingly
more intense, the ultimate achievement of a proper rationalization and group
acceptance is associated with feelings of relief that are occasionally exhilarating,
and sometimes show some of the features of a religious "conversion."
Men under the complete control of Communist police have been made to say
and do many things which their captors desire. Some people have proved to
be much more malleable than others; but even tinder the most strenuous circum-
stances some men are remarkably refractory and refuse to cooperate with their
captors up to the point at which they develop confusional states and delirium.
The most effective features of the Communist procedures are those which
would operate even in the absence of control. Prisoners who were not ex-
cessively abused and who encountered men who appeared to be dedicated,
selfless, and even "idealistic" in their attachment to the ostensible goals of Com-
munism have acknowledged these features of their captors; and those who
were presented with plausible evidence have accepted it tentatively. When they
have discovered that they would be rejected, reviled, and punished for non-
cooperative behavior, they have refrained from doing or saying anything which
would bring such abuse upon them when they were in Communist control. Those
whose past lives have been colored by feelings of much guilt, by lack of purpose
or commitment, and those who were previously sympathetic to Communist views
have been more amendable to the Communist methods.
Prisoners who have been released from Communist control and have been
able to assure themselves that they will no longer be punished for "improper"
opinions have gradually readjusted their attitudes to their new environment.
Their memories of the punishments and brutalities which they have endured
have been lively. For most prisoners these memories override all others.
When they have felt safe to acknowledge their resentment, they have expressed
extreme hostility toward those responsible for their bad prison experiences,
and they have nearly always rejected. Communism and all those connected with it.
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