THE CONTROVERSIAL OPERATION PHOENIX: HOW IT ROOTS OUT VIETCONG SUSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP72-00337R000300060022-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: February 18, 1970
• Content Type: NSPR

NEW YORKARq% For Release 2001/080A`ICFfA-6 A R00d G 09-2-
usually two or inree ocner, mont The prop i
The Controversial Operation Phoenix: provincial ay
o ncial lcouncil isaal
ruling body, not a judicial body.
1t~ Roots ~r The evidence is examined, and
" oL.!iq I~C01~I Suspects the suspect is either released or
d Of +11 ects who
c sus
t
By JAMES P. STERBA .
Speclil to The New York Times
SAIGON, South Vietnam, Feb.
17--As a controversial opera
!tiol} }known as Phoenix moves
into.1ts third year and ]to center
stage today at Senate `Foreign
Reiati,Qns Committee hearings
in Washington, American of-
privately fical, ere : continue
to call it one of the most im-
por6 t and least'i successful
programs in South Vietnam.,
f Designed by the United States
Central intelligence. Agency. to
p
ence .
sen
If someone decided to make agents and local pacification of- make it this far, an estimated
a movie about Phoenix, one ficials are supposed to pool in- 30 per cent are released for
critic joked,' the lead would be telligence data and compile lack of evidence.
more a Gomer,lAthal3,>a dossiers on suspected Vietcong' "I've never heard of anyone
John Wayne. agents within the surrounding having a defense," said an of-
Differing i- Vf"ews communities. ficial familiar with the proce-
,While both American and When they feel they have dure. "Generally these guys are
South Vietnamese ' o ficiais in enough evidence, they attempt pretty good and if the district
Saigon believe the program to to find and arrest the suspect. people haven't turned up
1e -vital, some local: officials "The trouble is that in many enough evidence, the suspect
are less than enthusiastic:, Sai- cases, there is a complete lack will be released."
gon officials contend.. that un- of dossiers, said one civilian 20 Per Cent Jailed
less the Vietcong's, . highly official. "You might have a council determines
skilled political apparatus is single sentence in a dossier say- If the the suspect is a Vietcong
destroyed, the Communist ing that so and so heard tha, agent, he can be "detained"
weed': put an estimated, 75,000", prosper . regardless of how
Vi'etcojig political leaders and many guerrillas and . enemy
kill
I
a
d
agents from the civilian popu-
lation,,: the program is. not the
sinister, cloak-and-dagger, ter-
ro'rbperation that some critics;
inducing the Vietcong, have
portrayed it to be, these of-
ficials insist.
"Tfiat's nonsense," one of
them said. "Phoenix nonsense," just not
a killing organization. The
kinds cspf things they. [Foreign
Relations Committee members]
are probably looking. for are
not happening that much .
which Js not to say. -they are
not happening at all."
Sebtence Without Trial
Briefly, Phoenix -works this
way: When local officials feel
they have enough evidence
against a person suspected of
being, connected with the Viet-,
song; they arrest him. If he is
not released quickly'-suspects
often: vanish out the back doors
of police station within two
,hours,,-, of their arrests-he is
ta1 ei,:' o a province interroga-
tion center.
"'A-dossier on the' suspect' is
tthen- given to the. provincial
Security Counci, whose powers
are those of a ruling, body,. not
a judiciral one. The council inlay,'
however, free the suspect or
:order him jailed for as. long
t?' twa years without trial.
Qnce the suspect. has
served., a term in:'.jail he' is
considered to have be.en re-
habilitated.
,Some officials concede that
many abuses have occurred
under Phoenix and that the
program has potential for sari-
ous harm if it were used,-: for
example, to harass legitimate
political opposition.-Yet in the
overialli.- portrait of - Phoenix
paintgdd here, A he program. ap-
pears more notorious for inef-
ficiericy, corruption and bung-
ling than for terror.
L11~ufi] many other programs
in Vietnam, Phoenix looksbest
on -'paper. Officials here -argue
that its controversial reputa-
tion has been built more on its
secrecy than on Its actions.
ny
n m
e
.
soldiers are
contested areas, however, the
local people appear hesitant to
upset any informal accommo-
dations made for the sake of
survival.
"The local officials are per-
fectly capable -of carrying out
this program if they thought
they were winning," one Amer-
ican said.
The Phoenix program, called
PhungHoang by the Vietnam-
ese, was established with the
money and organizational tal-
ents of the C.I.A. in late 1967.
It was officially sanctioned by
President Nguyen Van Thieu
July 1,"I968. '
_Under the Ministry of the
Interior, administrative commit-
tees and intelligence-gathering
centers were set up in the 4.4
province capitals and most of
the country':, 242 districts.
About 450 Americans were
sprinkled among these groups
to serve as advisers and pay-
masters. A large number were
C.I.A. agents or military intel-
ligence officers borrowed by
the agency.
Military Now in Charge
Gradually, the C.I.A.'s role
was, taken over by United
States military men so that at
this,moment according to offi-
cials, of the 441 Americans in-
volved in Phoenix, all six are
military men. Last July 1, over-
all 'authority for American. ad-
sorbed by U.S. military - head-
suspect talking about such an without trial for up to two
such." years. But he usually isn't.
Finding the Suspects The program's American ad-
Sometimes the arrest may visers estimated recently that
involve a single local police- about 20 per cent of the sus-
man, Other times, it may take pects in 1969 were sentenced,
a combined police-military and that only a fraction of
operation to go into a hamlet those were imprisoned for the
and find a suspect. maximum two years. Most sen-
In the course of normal mil,- tences were from three to six
tary operations, some suspected months.
Vietcong agents may defect, or Theoretically, those given the
be killed or captured. When re- maximum sentence are to be
ports of these operations filter sent to federal prisons, such as
Some
Island
C
.
onson
back to the Phoenix district the one on
headquarters, officials simply provincial officials are reluc-
call out the numbers and add tant to do this, however, be-
them to their scores. This helps cause by imprisoning a man
them meet quotas set by higher lin their own jails they receive
m
f
headquarters.
"One thing about the Viet
namese-they will meet every
s established for
that'
t
quo
a
them," said: one critic of the la Government identification
program. "That's what makes card and released on parole.
the head count so deceptive. He is supposed to check in
How do you know they are not from time to time with local
olice officials.
assigning names and titles to p
dead 'bodies?" Having to arrest or capture
In 1969, according to official the same suspect two or three
figures, 19,534 Vietcong were times is frustrating, according
"neutralized." That number in- to some local advisers in the
eluded 8,515 reportedly cap- program, and may have some
tured, 6,187 killed and 4,832 effect on the statistics in the
who 'defected. column relating to slain sus-
Once a suspect is captured, pests.
he automatically becomes a Probably the most controver-
"neutralized" Vietcong and part sial arm of the Phoenix pro-
of the offical tallies for the gram in each province is a
year. This is true despite the group called the Provincial
fact that many suspects are Reconnaissance Unit. It con-
released an hour or two later sists of a dozen or more South,
through the back doors of local Vietnamese mercenaries, origi-
police stations. Starting this nally recruited and paid hand-
year, officials say,- suspects will somely by the C.I.A. to serve
have .to be sentenced before under the province chief as the
they will be counted as "neu- major "action arm" of the
quarters here. J tra ized."
The program was set up to. - If the suspect is not released
operate at the local , level, at the local level, he is taken
where the problems begin. to a province interrogation cen-
At each "district intelligence
coordinating and operations
center," as they are called,
teams usually consisting of a
South Vietnamese military intel-
ligence . officer, an American
intelligence adviser-usually a
lieutenant -- special police
ter for questioning and then
confined until his dossier 'comes
before the Province Security
Council, composed of the prov-
ince chief, his deputy for intel-
ligence, the top national police-
Imen in the province, and
ro
a prisoner-food allotment
the Saigon, Government.
After having. served a jail
sentence, the suspect is given
program.
The members of these units,
usually an assortment of local
hoodlums, soldiers of fortune,
and draft-dodgers, receive 15,-
000 piasters a month. An ordi-
nary soldier gets 4,000 piasters.
Some Saigon officials con-
cede that these units have been
employed in extortion and ter-
ror: But the officials insist that
the units' foul reputations have
been exaggerated.
In October, after second
thoughts about the program's
secrecy, Premier Tran Thien
Khiem appealed in a speech to
the people for aid in identify-
ing Communist agents among
them. In many areas, "wanted"
posters were distributed.
In one Mekong Delta town,
an American official said, Phoe-
nix operatives had worked for
months trying to find a Viet-
cong agent. Within an hour
after his "wanted" poster was
displayed, a woman appeared
at the police station and said
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