U.S. POLICIES ON ENFORCEMENT OF CONTROLS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP63-00084A000100160011-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 7, 1955
• Content Type: STUDY

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CONFID.1AL
CFEP DRAFTING GROUP
ECONOMIC DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW
25X1A
Staff Study No. 16
Draft of June 7, 1955
U.S. Policies on Enforcement of Controls
This draft of Staff Study No. 16, on "U.S. Policies on
Enforcement of Controls", is transmitted for your use in connection
with the work of the CFEP Drafting Group on Economic Defense Policy
Review.
In compliance with the request of the Chairman of the
Drafting Group, the Executive Secretary, EDAC, is providing repro-
duction and distribution facilities as a service to further the work
of the CFEP Drafting Group.
Irving I. Kramer
Executive Secretary
Distribution:
CFEP Drafting Group
DOS & DOC declassification & release instructions on file
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CP Drafting Group
Economic Defense Policy Review
U.S. Policies on Enforcement of Controls
Staff Study lE
(AC Draft of June 72 1955)
(in consultation with State and
Commerce)
I. COCOM Enforcement
A, Present Control Arrangements and Understandings
1.Frimary_sarlr2ls over th_m_t_ee;tofstralods
It has always been understood in COCOM that the main responsibility
for applying and enforcing strategic controls rests with the oountry from which
the shipment originates. In the first two years of COCOMs relatively small
attention was given to the manner in which the participating governments
implemented the International Lists. Member governments were assumed to have
the means of applying and enforcing export controls.
As various ancillary controls and greater emphasis on enforcement
have developeds this has been modified to the extent that the cooperation of
other countries involved in the transaction as importers shippers forwarders
etc0 may be enlisted (in accordance with. IC/DV s voyage licensings TAC controls).
However it remains a basn principle that the exporting muntry must exercise
its export controls (normally based on a requirement for individual export
license) with due care as to the reliability of the exporter and the final
destinees including end-use checks when necessary. End-use checks are
particnlarly important where the destinee is located in a non-PC with, sensitive
transshipment areas.
2. A.J..al..itrols
a. The IQ/DV (222ELspEilas2te AeLill_Try_vprification) sytem
? .
was the first of the ancillary controlss adopted early in 1951 with. the
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objective of deterring diversions otherwise enabled by transshipment facilities
and assisting export control authorities in determining the legitimacy of an
export application. IC/DV has become an important adjunct of primary export
licensing procedures exercised by ?3COM PC's and to a limited extent by several
non-COCOM countries.
Operating problems and proposals for improving the effectiveness
of the system have been discussed periodically among COCOM countries. The most
notable improvement has been the government-to-government transmittal of copies
of IC's. Tills together with other improvements appear to have substantially
eliminated forgery at least of IC's and other fraudulent devices used by illicit
traders.
b. The TO transit authorization certificate) s stem was put into
effect in January 1955 by the COCOM countriess and was the main new enforcement
feature of the 1954 revision of ODCON controlss providing a basis previously
lacking for preventing transshipments of embargo items to the Soviet bloc.
The TAC scheme has not been in operation long enough to permit a real testing
and evaluations but it seeme clear that several of the PC's have taken a
narrower view of the TAC system than had been anticipated by the US and otherss
reducing its effectiveness as a means of stopping diversions as well as
raising questions as to the proper operation of TAC and complicating
considerably present efforta to extend the TAC system to non-COCOM countries.
(as source countries)
c. Transactions controls are in effect in the USs UK and Canada.
_
Other COCOM countries have indicated that their existing financial oontrols
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would accomplish acmmplish the intent of transactions controls in controlling offshore
transactions between their residents and Sovietbloc countries in goods of
strategic significance. The Dutch have long claimed that they made no
distinction between strategic goods exported from the Netherlands and those
commodities which were purchased abroad and sold by a Netherlands firm to
a third country. In discussions prior to the 1954 revision they refused to
adopt transshipment controls (i.e. TAC) until the UK would agree to exercise
transactions controls. The British agreed to adopt transactions controls as
a result of the 1954 list reduction.
While there are questions under study in the Executive Branch
as to the adequacy of UK transactions controls 9 there has not been sufficient
experience with them to identify positively any major problems. Other questions
as to interpretation of transactions control regilati.ons have arisen in the
context of stoppages under TAC.
d. ITs/H,1Licensin unkeinonrols. Viaved in the context
of the comprehensive system of special China controls voyage licensing and
bunkering controls have been of considerable value in restricting the flaw of
strategic goods to Commaniet China and North Korea from countries not cooperat-
ing in the UN embargo by.pre7enting the carriage of embargoed goods to such
destinations in flag vessels of PCS and denying bunkering to any vessels
carrying embargoed goods.
Many of the shortcomings in the voyage licensing system have
been eliminated. However its effectiveness would be increased were it to
be applied to any shipment known to be destined to Communist China whether or
not they were actually delivered there by the vessel in question. Its
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effectiveness would would also be increased were it to apply to voyages to all Far
East Communist ports (and not only Communist China and North Korea) in View
Of the possibility of subsequent transshipment. The UK has considered such
extensions of the system to be unwarranted in the absence of conclusive
evidence as to these shortcomings. Thus far the U.S. has not been in a
position to bring forward such evidence as would be necessary for the
negotiation of tightened controls.
3. Multilateral Exchame of Infor.111E1191ILuall1E-kilsaIliasis
Transactions.
In June 1954 COCOM worked out a procedure for multilateral
consideration of diversion cases (COCOM Doc 1634). This provides for
coordination by interested COCOM delegates of live cases in order to prevent
the diversion of strategic shipments and also for discussion of closed cases
to illustrate loopholes in enforcement techniques. It was the US intent that
this procedure would serve to develop greater awareness in other COCOM countries
of the need for stricter enforcement and would also stimulate direct represent-
ations by them to countries responsible or involved in diversion cases rather
than relying on US representatives as intermediaries.
To date relatively few discussions of cases have been initiated
in COCOM under these procedures. There have been various reasons s including
apathy or reluctance on the part of various PCS and some limitations on
initiation of cases by. the U.S. Means to bring about increased discussion of
enforcement cases in COCOM are under consideration in the EDAC agencies, in-
cluding a proposal for meetings of technical investigative and enforcement
officials of the PC's under COCOM auspices.
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4. on of COC.Atements and Understandi ng to Non-COCOM
Countrie s
In the enforcement field this is likely to remain a significant
and time consuming exercise. Those third countries which have an export trade
in strategic items have for the most part indicated their intention to
cooperate with the purpose of the International Lists or Battle Act List in
not allowing direct exports of embargo items to the bloc. However, it is in
connection with better application of source controls and adoption of TAC and
IC/DV, so as to prevent indirect shipments to the bloc, that greater success
is needed.
The cooperation of a number of non-COCOM countries appears to be
especially important to the success of the TAC scheme. The US, with help
from the UK and France, have conducted most of the third country approaches on
behalf of COCOM. A few non-COCOM countries have already agreed to cooperate
in TAC.
IC/DV procedures have already been adopted in whole or in part by
Austria, Switzerland (blue certificate), Yugoslavia, Peru, Mexico (sabre de
Mexico), Chile (some copper exports).
The problem countries comprise those which are significant as
transit points in Europe and the Mediter-anean area and a few which have a
significant export trade in strategic items, such as Chile and Mexico. Certain
of these have posed delicate negotiating problems, however, made more complex
by the fact that the Netherlands and possibly other COCOM transit countries
appear to expect fairly complete export control systems on the part of the
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third countries countries and public identification with the TAO scheme before they can
be recognized as participants in TACO
II. U.S. Enforcement Measures Taken on a Bilateral an or Unilateral Basis
A. US Measures
1. Battle Act Termination of Aid Provisions Title I and Title II)
On seven occasions s the President has announced his decision to
continue aid to specific countries when there had been shipments of items
specified under Category B Title I Of the Battle Acts on the basis that it
would be contrary to US security interests to terminate aid. These shipments
have amounted to F. There has been no instance of termination of
aid under the Battle Act. Most of the ODOOM countries have been the subject
of Battle Act exceptions s as well as Austrias Israels and Iran. Most of the
cases arose from prior commitment and were discussed in COODM prior to
inclusion in trade agreements?
COCOM procedures for prior consultation and exceptions have served
to deter the inclusion of embargo items in new trade commitments and in
bilateral discussions pursuant to Battle Act termination of aid provisions
have also worked toward this end. In addition9 there have been reports from
certain non-ODCOM countries that improvements were instituted in the application
of local controls following discussions with local officials of cases whichs
had they not arisen from administrative errors would have been the subject of
Battle Act.determinationso
2, Administrative Action Program
This program (which is one of withholding certain US privileges
from foreign firms which are reported to have participated in diversions) in
the past year has had some revisions designed to encourage the other partici
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pating countries to assume their responsibilities in enforcing strategic
trade controls. Solo efforts by the US to pollee international controls may
have tended to expend goodwill unnecessarily and to "wear out our welcome".
These revisions have also been intended to make the program more adaptable
to the circumstances which generally prevail in individual cases and mare
acceptable to foreign governments.
3. Proceedings
While criminal penalties are provided in the Export Control Act
of 19495 it is seldom that evidence can be obtained in a form that is required
under US criminal law for the conviction of either a US or foreign national.
Thus, increasing emphasis has been placed on the employment of administrative
sanctions against both US and foreign violators, using the compliance proceeding.
Unlike the black list techniques of World War II, compliance
proceedings have served to give foreign countries and their nationals an
assurance that the US would give them the same fair notice and hearing, the
same kind of due process, that it would extend to US nationals.
The sanction itself is imposed by a published order issued by the
Department of Commerce. Since the beginning of the cold war about 200 cases
have been instituted, of which about one-third have been against foreign
nationals. (The total of US and foreign nationals suspended is well over Soo,)
The decision of whether or not to institute a case against a
foreign national involves consideration not only of the offense itself but
also such factors as the impact of the case on the country of the violator
and the deterrent effects that the case may be expected to have on other
traders and possibly even other countries.
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pating countries to assume their responsibilities in enforcing strategic
trade controls. Solo efforts by the US to pol:!ce international controls may
have tended to expend goodwill unnecessarily and to "wear out our welcome".
These revisions have also been intended to make the program more adaptable
to the circumstances which generally prevail in individual cases and mare
acceptable to foreign governments.
3.,ianceProceedComl.tmentofCommerce
While criminal penalties are provided in the Export Control Act
of 1,949, it is seldom that evidence can be obtained in a form that is required
under US criminal law for the conviction of either a US or foreign national.
Thus, increasing emphasis has been placed on the employment of administrative
sanctions against both US and foreign violatorss using the compliance proceeding.
Unlike the black list techniques of World War I-4 compliance
proceedings have served to give foreign countries and their nationals an
assurance that the US would give them the same fair notice and hearing2, the
same kind of due process, that it would extend to US nationals.
.The sanction itself is imposed by a published order issued by the
Department of Commerce. Since the beginning of the cold war about 200 cases
have been Instituted, of which about one-third have been against foreign
nationals. (The total of US and foreign nationals suspended is well over 5000)
The decision of whether or not to institute a case against a -
foreign national involves consideration not only of the offense itself but
also such factors as the impact of the case on the country of the violator
and the deterrent effects that the case may be expected to have on other
traders and possibly even other countries.
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L.!Align Assets Control
5. ales of S
Consideration of the problem of working out control measures to
prevent the diversion to the Soviet bloc of strategic items sold locally from
US overseas surplus was undertaken some time ago when it came to light that
strategic goods from surplus stocks s in particular automotive parts s were moving
by indirect means to the Soviet bloc following normal overseas surplus disposal
sales. Recommendations for safeguards which should bring about adequate controls
were devised by representatives of USRO/STs CINCEURs USAFEs USAREURs and USFA
and are under review in Washington. A member of the USRO/ST staff returned to
Washington early in June to participate in an inter-service conference called
by the Department of the Army on overseas surplus property disposal,
6. Diversion Control Net and RelatitipjcludirtrIcs.
Collecti
on
Arrangements for preventing diversions of strategic shipments to
the Soviet bloc have constituted a major part of the enforcement program.
In Washington this led to the development of the Diversion Control Network (DCN)s
an inter-agency group ohaird by MDAC with the Departments of State (ECD),
Commerce (BFC) Treasury (FAC)s Defense (OSD)s and CIA all. represented. In
the fields Economic Defense Officers were designated in all the principal
posts s and a European reeonal opordinator designated in USRO/ST.
The DCN has served to improve the coordination and pooling of
efforts and to ensure that in any particular case each agency knows who has
action responsibility. It has also been concerned with evaluating the
effectiveness of controls s uncovering weak spots and developing improved
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enforcement techniques, backstopping and instructing US missions and the
delegation to COCOM in specific diversion control activities?
The importance and magnitude of the diversion control problem
was illustrated recently by a
25X1C
study on shipments of
copper from the Free World to the Soviet bloc in 1954. The study concluded
that about 809000 tons of embargoed forms of copper reached the bloc despite
COCOM controls.
The DCN is heavily dependent upon intelligence support and an
effort is now being made to increase covert intelligence collection support
for DCN and other enforcement activities.
7. Watch List and Other Com rations.
All of the US agencies which administer export controls maintain
and exchange information about US and foreign individuals and firms suspected
or known to be engaged_ in illicit, East-West trade and other kinds of violations
of export- control regulations. These are confidential lists and are mainly
used in the screening of applications for export licenses. The BFC Special
Check List is often called. the "Watch List" by those officials who work with
it. It also serves to alert Foreign Service and other Government officials to
partieular firms or individuals whose activities might require more than routine
attentions end-use inquiriess etc.
There haal never been acceptance in. ODCOM of an international watch
list of suspect firms or individuals s except for identifying Communist controlled
firms in Austria.
8. Exchan e of Technical Teams
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There have been visits to the US of technical teams from all
but three of the COCOM countries; while teams of US experts have now visited
seven of the most prominent COCOM countries, These have served to bring about
better knowledge and mutual understanding of each other Us control policies;
licensing procedures; enforcement techniques; and inspection methods. There
have also been occasional informal discussions of policy questions in con-
nection with these visits.
Just as greater initiative in enforcement activities by other
PCs is desired; it has long been felt that the most desirable future develop-
ment in exchanges on technical team would be exchanges between the European
PCs themselves. The most promising field for this appears to be in imple-
menting and improving the TAC scheme.
Analvsie of Problems and Deficiencies of Encorcement
The problems and deficiencies -in the enforcement program may be placed
into two categories -- one relating to the multilateral aspects; the other to
the unilateral or bilateral phases. Strictly speaking; it is difficult to
separate the two since activities in which we engage unilaterally cannot fail
to have some effect on our multilateral relationships.
On the international side the development of the enforcement program
has been achieved only with considerable negotiating delays and difficulties.
Agreement on TAC and a transactions cpntrols were part of aattLd. aa ala for
the August 1954 list reduction. )Five months of additional negotiations were
r't '
required before' these control
.1
actually were implemented.)
The lack of enthusiasm for the enforeement program is based on a
number of factors. Possibly the most important of these is the current
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political climate climate prevailing in Europe at this time which influences the
attitudes of PC governments toward the entire control program. As the hope
for coexistence grows, it can be expected that enthusiasm for the program will
diminish.
More specifically there are the following
a) Reluctance of some countries to adopt enforcement measures
unless all interested countries adopt similar measures;
b) Emphasis of foreign government economic agencies on trade
promotion rather than trade control;
c) Confidential nature of controls in some countries;
d) Understaffing of enforcement agencies; insufficient
orientation of enforcement personnel re the objectives of
the program;
e) Reluctance of foreign enforcement personnel to discuss
mutual problems with US Embassy officers;
f) Poor or unreliable intelligence information; inability to
investigate unevaluated intelligence information.
Additional problems arise from the non-uniformity of controls between
PC's and from inadequate legal bases for such controls. Without adequate legal
bases not only is it impossible to exercise satisfactory licensing controls.,
including the use of end-use checks and other precautionary measures, but it
is also difficult to impose strong enough punitive action to deter violations
of controls, A corollary problem is the frustration of the officials
responsible for the implementation of controls caused by personnel shortages
and other factors.
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Perhaps the most active and troublesome problem in the enforcement
area is that caused by the differential level of controls over trade with the
Soviet bloc in Europe and Communist China. At the time afthe 1954 List
reduction the PC's agreed that the List changes would not be applicable to
trade with China, that exports to the Soviet bloc (Europe) should not
frustrate those covering trade with China, and exports to the Soviet bloc in
Europe should not be approved if it was likely that they would be diverted to
China. There has been little evidence of denial of exports under these cir-
cumstances. In fact, the quantity and value of known diversions to China
via the European Soviet bloc Europe and Western countries have been
significant. Diversions on non-I/L I goods to China have been facilitated
by the removal from licensing, except to China, of most I/L III and China
Special List items and by the applicability of IC/DV to only Munitions, AE,
I/I 13 and II items and of TAC to only Munitions, AE, and I/L I items.
Of thepmblems referred to above only the last (relating to the
differential level of controls) is a serious one. However, with the general
resistance by the PC's to any extension of controls, albeit small, plus the
desir, on the part of mos , PC's to reduce the vel of China controls Lto the
)COM level )it is most doubtful if we can obtain any tightening of enforce-
ment measures applicable to China trade. Our future course of action in this
area is dependent on the outcome of the over-all review of security trade
control policy, in particular that covering trade with China.
For the other problems we can only point out to the PC's deficiencies
as they occur and press for the small modifications required to effect ini
provements. To thie end the exchanges of teams of technical experts initiated
by the US can go far to impress upon the PCs the importance which we attach
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tfilmakia4143&PailleferneakiNot.aile. prctizi?
(0) ikna011,7,141-,
The DS1as also experienced ce
LLvik JA40- t,??
am n problems originat g in its
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unilateral enforcement activities. From the beginning the US has found it-
self in the position of international policeman in the enforcement of trade
controls, particularly in cases involving non-US goods. We have passed on to
foreign governments intelligence information relating to diversions of non-US
origin goods, have conducted our own investigations, have pressed for foreign
investigations and appropriate action, have coordinated action by several PC9s2
sand have taken administrative action against foreign firms involved in illegal
trade. Our activities have been received by the PCs with mixed feelings. ----I-t-
Ifr-410wat?44?4*-40654.10--.v.r--"ted-?-tx*-tla.--P.cY
awe_ --g4II;4.A4ImplaaIlams. Our
4erv-tpte4.
ability to act in the enforcement area varies from country to country, to the
extreme that in certain countries we are restricted to contacts with the
Foreign Offices and may be politely told that investigations involving non-US
origin, goods or Dationals should not be of concern to us. Our taking of
administrative action is usually resented, at best only tolerated. This
attitude on the part of foreign governments is especially pronounced when
their firms have actually not violated local laws or regulations and they
accordingly consider US interest and action as unjustified interference.
Because of this feeling the US modified its Administrative Action program
last year to change its basis from one of prejudging liability under foreign
law and to encourage investigations of AAP cases by foreign governments.
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The ex nt to ich U.S. :'.dwill is
for ment c be e uated par y in term to wh er the ds in ?estion
U.S origin. lso it 5h,1 d be asized t t it is ot a
merehpendi e of goo 11 that ould cone us as uch as que ion of
witether t ? expenditu e is made sely or wasteful
With respect to illicit East-West trade in non-US origin goods, the
most serious U.S. problems come from friendly countries' embarrassment when
we expose inadequacies in particular cases or in the general aspects of their
programs. Much of this$ of courses hinges on haw we make our approaches. If
we give to the countries concerned the information that we obtain about
diversions so that they can take actions themselves$ we will naturally cause
less embarrassment than if we publicize to others their weaknesses. Essentially
our problem for the future would seem to be to find the most diplomatic ways of
bringing pressure so as to persuade friendly governments themselves to improve
their controls and to take action against violators.
In the case of U.S. origin goods$ some countries have taken the
position that U.S. strategic materials which are processed or made components
of products of more or less different nature are "nationalized" (i.e, origin
changed) by those actions, accordingly the U.S. should have no right to object
to shipments to the bloc of the finisied pr9duct. This brin s up $ of courses
OS
the whole problem oP In addition; so countries object
to investigations conducted by U.S. Foreign Service personnel of the
activities of foreign nationals engaged in illegal diversions of U.S. goods
on the grounds that such investigative activities constitute an invasion of
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sovereignty or even commercial espionage. Certain countries have objected to
our imposition of sanctions against participants having only a marginal role
in diversions -- e.g., freight forwarders, carriers, banksx etc. However,
since the beginning of security controls we have had only one cause celebre
involving complaints by a foreign country against the U.S. for imposition
of compliance action against one of its nationals. Under these circumstances
claims of embarrassment and fruitless expenditure of goodwill may not be too
well founded. t,,t4
? -lu( 011.4 1? a
On the question of enforcement of U.S. controls overadMircommoditiesA
we must bear in mind our long time premise that COCOM controls are only the
(41.0.0e
minimum which any PC is gprmitted to impose over its commodities. Further, it
has been agreed in ODCOM that source countries have primary responsibility
for the control of their own goods. Our problems vary depending on whether
the goods are Positive List items or under only General license control. Our
determination that goods are sufficiently strategic to warrant unilateral
control regardless of COCOM agreement should be made with the. realization an&
14-tar 4,out 4,114., 1100, inegA
to enforce these controls.
ClotiVA^.0, te(C-1 -
Goods undefe control (i.e., non-strategic or non-shart supply) do not
^
provide similar justification for full enforcement control and the needless
expenditure of goodwill. However, we cannot ignore them completely since
domestic considerations such as political and public relations enter into
even this field. Obviously, from the U.S. point of view, the problems in
trying to use U.S. export control enforcement in the general license commodity
field are quite substantial, the present U.S. control system as applied to
such commodities represents a number of administrative and public relations
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r0.kos ?L.A. c4rt
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Possible Futur ourses of Action
'
It would be desirable if the problems and deficiencies in the enforce-
ment field as described above could be corrected. However, without some
drastic change in the over-all control policy it is unlikely that more than
routine procedural modifications can be effected in existing controls. Such
measures as the TAC scheme, transactions controls and voyage licensing are
not completely adequate in complementing the entire range of primary controls.
We have been unsuccessful in past efforts to extend these controls to cover
a wider range of items, i.e., I/L II, III and the China Special List or to
a
have them apply to the China trade area. Without/further downward revision
in the lists or a basic change in the differential levels of control in trade
with China, few PC's will be willing to adopt more rigid enforcement measures.
If we were to embark on an extensive program of negotiations with other PC's
we would only antagonize them and dissipate the negotiating goodwill required
for more important problems not only in the economic defense field but also in
the broader area of East4lest policy.
If we assume that the need for control of exports will continue for
the indefinite future and that during this time there is little likelihood
of obtaining any substantially tighter and broader international control, the
question arises as to what we should do about US export controls. At the
present time US export control enforcement is admittedly not the most
effective that could be devised j this condition of course has obtained
since the commencement of the cold war. The enforcement program has repro-
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sented a number of compromises which have taken int( account business and
administrative limitations and the lack of appropriately trained personnel to
conduct investigative operations abroad, the spot checking on a percentage
basis of shipments by customs, etc. The licensing processes and the size and
position of the enforcement organization are illustrative of what might be
called a realistic evaluation of the relative importance of enforcement in the
over-all program. Consequently when we think of the future we should not only
think of a possible continuation of the present level and kind of enforcement
common
versus a dilution to the lowest/denominator of international controls, but
also give some thought to possibilities of unilateral tightening of US controls,
if it appears that need exists for such. We must always remember that our
control system and enforcement program with all its limitations is at a
substantially higher level than the comparable programs of cooperating countries.
Realizing then that our enforcement program could be tightened, with
justification in the List reduction and al agreement for improved enforcement,
let useonsider some ways in which this tightening could be accomplished. For
one thing we could consider using additional es ecially trained personnel
abroad to supplement the present activities f SO's]in this field; recognizing
the inadequacies of the TAC scheme to cope with diversions, we could if such
action is warranted, as the British did in World War II, institute a system
whereby we would permit US strategic goods to move only to freight forwarders
who would sign written undertakings not to accept or carry out instructions
to divert to the bloc. Since the forwarders are key institutions in the
transit countries this would have a substantlal preventive effect. In
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addition we could require the destination control notice on all bills of lading
and commercial invoices.
The advantages of tighter enforcement procedures would be increased
security with less risk of diversion and possibly greater Congressional
approval for the implementation of the export control program. On the other
side, however, would be the additional foreign criticism which would result,
slow up in movement of exports (with probable complaints from the US export
trade), and increased costs of operating the extra controls. These latter
arguments could be used with equal effect in support of lower standards of
enforcement. In favor of maintaining the present level of enforcement we
may state that our current policies and procedures are already known to and
accepted by foreign governments as well as Congressional, trade, and other public
groups; further they are reasonably efficient at an easily assessed cost which
is not out of line with other control operations. On balance, and in the
light of the conclusions outlined above for the international program, it
probably would be preferable to maintain the status quo in U.S. enforcement
policy (except for obvious changes which can be made to plug loopholes)
pending some major change in our overall economic defense policy.
A second course of action is to continue our efforts to enlist non-
PC cooperation and participation in enforcement measures. The most immediate
problems in this regard are our pending negotiations with certain Latin
American, European, and Near Eastern countries for the institution of the
TAC scheme and IC/DIT system. Additional study can also be given to the
inadequacies in the basic control systems of these and other non-PCs.
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The general general consensus of the EDAC agencies is that there is an open
field for improvement of:
1) intelligence collection and dissemination;
2) better collaboration between US element abroad which would
assist in the more satisfactory implementation of already
existing enforcement measures.
It is generally not considered an appropriate function of the Foreign
Service to engage in the covert collection of information on illegal East-West
trade and for this reason is neither staffed nor organized to do so. An
expanded effort on the part of the intelligence collection agencies in the
field of East-West trade would undoubtedly bring forth an increased volume of
information.
Another important course of action is to eLcourage cooperation and
multilateral exchanges of information in the handling of illegal East-West
trade transactions. Specifically we should press other PC 'sto employ the
COCOM procedures outlined in DIM. and to support the activities of
the 0000M Sub-Committee on Export Controls. An additional proposal would
be for the establishment of a COCOM Sub-Committee for the interchange among
the technical investigative and enforcement experts of the PC's of useful
investigative and related information. Such a Sub-Committee would provide
a basis for understanding and cooperation among the investigative and en-
forcement staffs of the various PCs not obtainable through the existing
Sub-Committee structure. Our efforts toward these ends should be with a view
to encouraging more active participation by other PC's and toward a de-emphasis
of U.S. initiative and bilateral pressure. To the extent that other countries
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adequately assume their full responsibilities in the program, the U.S. can
withdraw from its unpopular position abroad as policeman and agitator for
increased controls.
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