LETTER TO MR. CARL DUCKETT FROM ROBERT F. FROEHIKE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000800290002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 5, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 11, 1969
• Content Type: LETTER

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ASSISTANT SECTIZLf , Y O= ^=:::NSA
July 11, 1969
OSD Declassification/Release Instructions
~Mr. Ca---' Duckett
Depu--y = hector (Science & Technology)
Room 6E60
Attached. is my interim report to Mel and Dave on
Defense intelligence.
Hopefully, I have addressed all of the major issues
--a_ r in a manner which is satisfactory to you. On the
sr a chance that there is some disagreement, give me
a c411 and I'll be very happy to discuss the report with
you.
I don't hear from you by July 21, I'll assume.
ag eement or disinterest. I'll accept either, and assume
the .orr:.er.
Sincerely,
Robert F. Froeh-.lke
15-4?
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11 July 1969
Tentative Report on Defense Intelligence
Introduction
A number of weeks ago I was appointed focal point for the defense
intelligence community. In addition I was assigned to make a study of
the community and present to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of
Defense my recommendations to improve defense intelli gence.
It was my feeling that it would be unwise to insinuate myself into
t 'he defense intelligence community as a "focal point" for a short interim
period. As a result, I have done very little in the capacity of a focal
point. Instead all of my time on this as signment has-been spent on the
s zudy.
My effort has extended over approximately a 60 day period. In that
time I have reviewed many studies and reports that have accumulated
over the years. More importantly, I have visited all agencies and have
talked to most of the leaders active in the intelligence community. As
a result of my efforts I feel that I have a reasonably good understanding
of the intelligence community as it now exists, its problems and possible
solutions. (I was surprised to find that there was a reasonable consensus
as to the problem areas and their solutions. )
Today Mel Laird and Dave Dackard'will receive a copy of this tenta-
tive report. I am also sending a copy to all agencies visited and to indi-
viduals with whom I talked. I am asking these people to react to my
recommendations. If I do not hear from them within ten days, I am
assuming general agreement.
Those who receive a copy of this report and who disagree in whole or
-in part, should get in touch with me. I will sit down with those in dis-
agreement and either change my report in line with their thinking or
.explain to them why I cannot do so. In the latter case, they certainly are
free to contact Mel and Dave directly. I will not discuss this report with
Mel and Dave prior to 22 July.
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History
As a result of my investigation I have. concluded that the primary
need-in the defense intelligence community is for a special assistant
for intelligence reporting to the Secretary/ Deputy Secretary of Defense.
He would be primarily responsible for the development and supervision
of an all-encompassing review and decision-making process for the
management of intelligence. This need has been recognized by many
over the years.
A limited focal point was established as early as 1953, when the
Secretary of Defense established the position of Assistant to the Secretary
.of Defense (Special Operations). This Assistant recommended policies
and provided guidance on planning and program development to DoD
intelligence agencies and components, reviewed plans and program's,
developed DoD positions on intelligence problems, and made recommen-
dations to the Secretary on the actions necessary to provide for more
efficient and economical operations. The position, however, was
weakened by the lack of a charter to function as the focal point for DoD
intelligence resource management.
In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick,
was directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the
intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment
of a focal point to exercise broad management review authority over mili-
tary intelligence programs within the Office of the Secretary of Defense,
and to provide overall coordination of all foreign intelligence activities
conducted by various defense components. The solution was the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). The DoD press release of 2 August 1961,
announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a "more efficient
allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective management
of all DoD intelligence activities, and the elimination of duplicating
facilities and organizations" was expected. The position of Assistant for
Special Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establishment
of 'DIA.
Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidated Intelligence Program
(CIP), the DIA "manages" only about 30% of the DoD resources devoted
to satisfying both military and "national" intelligence requirements. The
bulk of the resources are found in a number of other programs such as
the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), or are treated outside any
formal program. '
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The Secretary of Defense is faced with the problem that there is
no review which compares the resources in one program targeted
against a requirement with the resources committed against the same
requirement in another program. Similarly, there is no arrangement
for evaluating requirements in terms of objectives. In addition, this
situation has been complicated by excessive classification and security
compartmentation, which tend to isolate programs and thwart comparisons.
Objectives
Any organizational or personnel changes resulting from this report
should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in priority.
(You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed at resource
management and intelligence policies, and not management of intelligence
operations of a day to day nature. This does not imply that the manage-
ment of the intelligence community is flawless. On the contrary, there
is substantial dissatisfaction with certain operations of defense intelli-
gence. However, improved management can better result through improved
personnel and policies rather than a new organization. ) The objectives are:
Objective J. To establish a review and decision-making
process for intelligence resource allocation. By resource"
allocation I mean determining the level and mix of resources
to be distributed among the components of the DoD as the
basis for the DoD budget. There are inseparable reinforcing
objectives which are essential elements of this overall
Objective. These inherent objectives are: (1) To establish
a single Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP)
as the framework within which DoD decision-makers can
select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting,
processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence; (2)
to improve Defense intelligence resources allocation planning
for the mid-range period by establishing a Five-Year Intelli-
gence Plan updated annually; and (3) to focus attention on
decisive points in this program by developing major issue
studies on unresolved problems of intelligence resource
allocation and management.
Existing DoD intelligence resource programs (CIP,
CCP, and others) are institutionalized and not evaluated
in relation to mutual target objectives or in terms of mission-
oriented information needs. Thus, decisions made concerning
resources in one functional intelligence activity -- collection,
for example -- seldom take cognizance of their impact on the
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other functional areas: processing, production and dis-
semination.
The DoD intelligence community at the present time
does not know the minimum level of information that will
satisfy a stated requirement. While there is no upper
boundary on intelligence requirements, there is a limit on
resources applied to collection. Therefore, resource
limitations make it important to ascertain requirements as
precisely as possible. We need to insure that all valid re-
quirements are met to some minimum level, without going
,to higher levels on some requirements while ignoring other
valid requirements. In other words, the risks involved in
acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts must be
known.
The focus of intelligence planning and programming
activities tends to be in the near term period (one or two
years ahead). Long lead times for modern technical
collection systems, automated processing systems and
automated analytic and production aids create the need to
develop a long term intelligence plan. Without such planning,
intelligence decisions rely on short term considerations.
Further, there is a- tendency to develop options made avail-
able by rapidly expanding technology simply because they are
available.
In the present programming process, recommendations
reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show fluctuations
in manpower and money from previously approved levels but
more significant issues do not tend to surface within DoD.
Frequently, past decisions on elements or systems having
high dollar value or significant ramifications in a functional
area have been reached through the mechanism of ad hoc groups
convened by the Secretary/ Deputy Secretary of Defense to study
each problem when it arises -- generally in a time frame which
does not permit in-depth analysis.
Objective 2. To improve information flow and policy trans-
mission on intelligence matters between the DoD and other
government agencies concerned with intelligence resources
by functioning as DoD focal point on intelligence matters.
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Currently, below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary
of Defense level, no single agency or individual has the
authority to participate across the board in an effective
dialogue at the highest levels with non-DoD agencies.
Representation today is fragmented among a number of
DoD intelligence officials none of whom possesses the
necessary responsibility or breadth of knowledge about
all DoD programs.
Objective 3. To obtain a more efficient distribution of
the functional responsibilities of the DoD intelligence
agencies and organizations through an evaluation of their
organizational relationships, roles, and missions.
The U. S. Congress and other government agencies
have been concerned that the military Services are per-
forming functions specifically delegated to the DIA which,
in turn, is performing operations which, in some instances,
could be better undertaken by the military Services.
Additionally, the relationship of the National Security
Agency (NSA), to counterpart agencies in the military
Services has been questioned. The institutional structure
of the Defense intelligence community is the result of an
evolutionary process which seldom addressed the inter-
relationships of the elements in the community as a whole.
Objective 4. To improve intelligence flow by a realistic
reappraisal of security policies and procedures with a
view toward relaxing standards which lead to unnecessary
classification and over-compartmentation of intelligence
information.
Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelligence
programs is restricted ta such a degree that at times those
officials charged with reviewing existing programs are
denied information essential to the formulation of recom-
mendations' for their particular programs.
Organization and Staffing
The primary organizational change I recommend is to name one
individual to act as the Special Assistant to the Secretary/ Deputy
Secretary of Defense for defense intelligence and to provide him with
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a minimum staff. The solution to our current problems in intelligence
management will not be found in the panacea of mass reorganization.
Directors of all DoD intelligence agencies would report directly
to this Special Assistant, except that the Director, DIA, would report
through the JCS. The Special Assistant would be responsible for all
DoD intelligence management. It should be stressed, however, that
resource management has the top priority. It is not intended that the
Special Assistant will become involved in the day to day operations
of the various DoD intelligence agencies. .
I recommend that the individual selected as the Special .Assistant,.
as a management technique, informally create a DoDIntelligence Board..
This Board should be made up of the Directors of thevarious DoD
intelligence agencies, chaired by the Special Assistant. In a sense
therefore, the Special Assistant will primarily serve as the coordinator
of the Board. Ideally that is all he would need to be.
Inasmuch as this is an imperfect world, there will be times when the
Board will not reach a consensus. For that reason the Special Assistant
must have the authority to not only coordinate but also direct.
'-he breadth of management possibilities for the Special Assist-.ant
ranges from a monitoring role to complete and close supervision of all
DOD intelligence activities. There are, of course, intermediate possi-
bilities between these two extremes. A series of alternatives are herein
described which provide varying levels of capability to achieve the ob-
jectives outlined. Under any of these arrangements, however, the function
of the Special Assistant would interface with operational aspects of in-
telligence conducted by the various DoD components. _ Existing channels
of command and control would be used for direction of operational matters.
Staffing Alternatives
Three alternatives to provide staff support to the Special Assistant
have been considered:
Alternative 1. Provide a nucleus of intelligence expertise
for the Special Assistant, leaving currently assigned respon-
sibilities of OSD elements essentially as they are now. It
is estimated that it would require five professionals and two
clerical spaces for this staff.
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Alternative Z. Transfer professional positions and the
necessary clerical support currently dealing with in-
telligence resource management from OSD offices to
the office of the Special Assistant. The objective would
be to consolidate a number of existing OSD intelligence
management activities in one office. The transfer of
positions might be accomplished as follows. (This does
not necessarily mean incumbents would transfer with
the position):
ASD (A)
3.
DIA
5
DDR&E's Office of Special
Intelligence
4
ASD (SA) -
2
Alternative 3. Enlarge the proposed intelligence staff
to a level at which it would be capable of performing, on
a totally centralized basis, the full range of intelligence
resource management functions: development and ranking
of requirments, mid-range planning, program and budget
development, and review of intelligence issues. While a
detailed analysis of personnel requirements has not been
made, it is estimated that it would take about 150-200
professionals to accomplish these functions.
In determining which staffing Alternative to recommend, I considered
each in light of the objectives listed earlier:
Objective 1. (Establish a review and decision-making
process for intelligence'management. )
The Special Assistant and his staff would have to establish and cor.-
duct an objective-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program
(CDIP) which would encompass all DoD managed intelligence resources
(probably excluding tactical); establish a Five-Year Intelligence Plan to
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improve intelligence resource allocation planning for the mid-range
period; and formulate major issues of intelligence resources allocation
and management.
Initially it will take a considerable number of man years to achieve
this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for the initial
surge of personnel needs. This initial surge could be met on an ad hoc
basis from within OSD.
This is the highest priority Objective.. Presently it is not being met.
Decision makers need a framework for selecting alternative options and
corresponding levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to provide this frame-
work, and conducting an annual review has primary claim on manpower
assigned to the Special Assistant. (The Directors of the DoD intelligence
agencies will be directly responsible for the development of their respective
programs.) If the Special Assistant is undermanned for the CDIP, work
.Will have to be processed by cooperating agencies and departments with
attendant loss of control.
The Five-Year Intelligence Plan will strive: (1) to permit resource
allocation decisions to be made as early as possible, especially for long
lead-time items; (2) to explore the adequacy of resources to meet future
needs; (3) to present the costs and benefits of satisfying various levels
of intelligence needs, and (4) to understand better the resource implica-
tions of satisfying.various future requirements.
major factor in the development of the Plan is the requirement to
estab_sh a continuing system for review of intelligence collection re-
quire.nents against collection resources; taking into account costs and
risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this, since there is
no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows how much
information is essential and we have only sketchy estimates of what it
costs to obtain the information. (This problem has been recognized for
some time. DIA has an analysis underway which, hopefully, will
structure a solution to this problem. Other efforts are under way to help
solve this problem. )
The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding
objectives, and much of it can be accomplished in the process of gaining
those objectives. Formulating,major issues has never been attempted
successfully in the DoD intelligence community. It is, however,
necessary in order to determine the proper courses to follow.
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This Objective could be accomplished by either of the three staffing
Alternatives. However, if Alternative 1 (the minimum staff) were
selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a monitor,
with the major effort fragmented among DoD agencies.
Objective 2. (Improve intelligence communications
between DoD and other agencies. )
It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD
intelligence management contact with DCI, BOB, PFIAB and other non-
DoD members of the intelligence community.' One of the less obvious
responsibilities would be to keep communication channels open at all
times, unimpeded by a lack of rapport and understanding.
Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this
Objective.
Objective 3. (Evaluate the intelligence organizational
relationship, roles and missions.
It appears that this could best be accomplished by an Ad Hoc study
group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely candidate).
As a result, this could be accomplished under any of the Alternatives.
Objective 4. (Re appraise security policies and eliminate
unnecessary classification and over compartmentation in
the intelligence field.
This Objective would necessitate a review of current security policies
and procedures. It.is a continuing effort because of the ever-present
tendency to ove rclas sift' and overdo compart.?n.entation.
There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classification
and over -compartm_entation exists. It is a natural tendency and I observed
evidence of it. If it is present in any significant degree, it certainl-,- is
bad because over-classification impedes the flow of information and over-
con ?ipartmentation excludes agencies and individuals who may have a
legitimate need for the information.
Both Alternatives 2 and 3 (the middle and maximum staffing Alternatives)
could accomplish this Objective. Alternative 1 (the minimum staffing Alter-
native) could not accomplish it unless the function was farmed out to other
OSD elements.
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Recommendation- Staff
The primary advantage of Alternative 1 (minimum staff) is that it
requires a minimum number of people under the Special Assistant.
Cosmetically, this is advantageous.
The primary disadvantage of Alternative 1 is that it would be im-
possible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated Objectives with-
out relying almost entirely on a number of other elements in DoD. This
raises.the distinct possibility of the Special Assistant having the image
of responsibility but not the ability to carry it out.
Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing suffi-
cient staff to meet all of the objectives and establishing the Special
Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense. All the staffing would be' under the supervision of
the Special Assistant and could be obtained from existing OSD billets.
It also clearly reduces fragmentation of OSD responsibilities for intelli-
gence.
T".-_6 disadvantage, if it really is one, is. that this level of staffing will
not allow-the Special Assistant to become involved in the day-to-d .y
operations of the intelligence agencies. Another disadvantage, if it is
one, is that the Special Assistant will spend a good deal of his personal
time coordinating with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence
community because staff will not be available.
Alternative 3 (maximum staff) has the advantage of being able to
accomplish all objectives -- and then some. It not only allows the Special
Assistant to be primarily responsible for intelligence management but in-
volves him deeply in the day-to-day intelligence operations. The primary
disadvantages of Alternative 3 are the cosmetic ones of added manpower
and major reorganization. Both Congress and the existing intelligence
agencies would react adversely to this.
Alternative 3, because of the considerable additional manpower,
doesn't make sense at this time, Alternative 1 would be an improvement
over the present but the lack of sufficient staff supporting the Special
Assistant would probably leave responsibility diffused.
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I. recommend Alternative 2. It is a happy compromise. It would
accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of reorganization
and without adding any personnel to the OSD staff.
Location of the Special Assistant
The number of options available for the location of a Special Assistant
for Intelligence narrows down to five:
Option 1. "Normalize" present intelligence' resource
management and allocation with a rive-Year Intelligerce
Plan, Development Concept Papers (RCP's) from the
Director, Defense Research and Engineering, and Major
Program Memoranda (MPi/1's)from the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Systems Analysis), with a minimum role being
played by the Special Assistant.
Option 2. Assign to an existing Assistant Secretary of
Defense the additional duty of Special Assistant for
Intelligence.
Option 3. Establish the Special Assistant under the authority
of the joint Chiefs of Staff.
Option 4-. Establish a Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Defense (Intelligence) as a separate office directly sub-
ordinate to the Secretary.
Option 5. Establish an Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Intelligence).
Analysis of the Ontio-.ns
Option 1 does not truly integrate the DoD intelligence effort, and it
puts sizing, and development of intelligence forces under officials who
have an interest in intelligence -roducts for use in developing weapons
or in setting force levels. It - s the effect of placing the intelligence
management responsibilities in the hands of officials who are customers
for various parts of the intelligence product. (This Option actually lends
itself only to staffing. Alternative ).
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Option 2 furnishes the Special Assistant with the prestige and
authority, both inside DoD and with other government agencies,
possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Further, the intelli-
gence management function envisioned should not require the full time
attention of an ASD. However, when required, the authority of his
office as an ASD is available.
Option 3 -- The JCS is oriented primarily toward strategic planning
and direction and to those activities of the military Services which support
these functions. To charge them with the intelligence management role
as envisioned herein would assign them .a type of responsibility heretofore
not possessed. Such an assignment would short-circuit those responsi-
bilities for resource allocation and management charged to the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. The JCS
responsibility in intelligence management is more properly one of pro-
viding views based on the intelligence needs of the JCS and the combat
forces.
Option 4 would probably accomplish the objectives but is handicapped
by the lack of position and authority normally associated with an ASD,
particularly in interagency activities and relationships. The Special
Assistant in this Option is solely dependent on his relationship to the
Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As a result, there is an aura
of the "ad hoc" about a separate Special Assistant.
Option 5 would require redesignation of an existing ASD or Con-
gressional action to add an ASD because of the statutory numerical limit
of seven Assistant Secretaries. The magnitude of the intelligence function
suggested in staff Alternatives 1 and 2, in terms of manning levels and
percentage of the total DoD budget managed, is relatively small and there-
for militates against Option 5.
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I eliminate location Options 1 (normalize present practice) and 3
(JCS) because it appears to me that either could result in the Special
Assistant being unable to achieve the stated objectives.
I recommend Option 2 (assign to an existing ASD).
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If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would
recommend that Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5
(New ASD).
I further recommend the establishment of an Executive Council
for' Defense Intelligence, to supersede a similar committee. This
Council would properly consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense
as Chairman, the Chairman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director
of Defense Research and Engineering, and, because of their obvious
interest, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the. President's
Scientific Advisor. The Special Assistant for Intelligence would sit
ex officio.
The Council will advise the Secretary of Defense on intelligence
matters, and it will provide broad technical and organizational advice
to the various DoD components. It would also provide a helpful
communications channel to other interested >.,fencies' in the government.
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