DEPLOYMENT OF AQUATONE TO FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200020035-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 28, 1956
• Content Type: MF

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IF SECRET
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 28 November 1956
SUBJECT : Deployment of AQUATONE to Far East
1. On 14 November you sent a memorandum and covering note
to General Twining requesting Air Force support in the provision of facilities
for AQUA TONE Detachment C in Japan. We have now received (28 November)
General Twining's reply to your letter. In effect it states that the Air Force
is unable to support both AQUATONE and BLACK NIGHT in the Far East
and recommends that we hold Detachment C in reserve to use as an augment-
ing force whenever and wherever the world situation dictates.
2. On 15 November we had our meeting with the President in the
course of which you explained our intention of deploying a Detachment to
Japan. The President after some discussion agreed that this unit should be
based in Japan unless on further consideration the State Department expressed
objection to such a location. He made clear by at least two remarks that he
was aware that our aircraft possessed a greater capability than the B-57D's
available to BLACK NIGHT and that if any choice had to be made AQUATONE
should receive a priority. I would interpret this conversation not as a firm
order to us to deploy to the Far East but as a permission to do so and I
am sure the President was left with the impression that the deployment would
be carried out.
3. The more important facts that seem to me to have a decisive
bearing on this issue are the following:
a. The AQUATONE aircraft and associated equipment is superior
to that in the hands of BLACK NIGHT in: range, altitude, quality of photog-
raphy, quantity of photography per mission,
I hich the x4mur iaircrait o not
carry). us e u- ircr, s safer, can reach targets beyond the range
of BLACK NIGHT, can produce more and higher quality photography as well
addition the AQUA TONE detachment as soon as
In
operational can begin
b. It will require at least two months to prepare facilities for
AQUATONE from the date a firm favorable decision is made. By our
enforced indecision earlier in the autumn and by Air Force opposition for
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the last six weeks, we have already postponed the earliest possible
operational date to mid-February. Every day's further delay postpones
our operational date correspondingly.
c. The AQUATONE C Detachment's staffing and training are
complete and its equipment wilt be complete long before it wilt be ready
for deployment. In other' words, it is all bought and paid for. Neither
this unit nor its aircraft are required in the European Theater. These
resources could not be efficiently utilized there even if we were permitted
to operate virtually without restriction. While awaiting deployment the
Detachment is helping with further development work at but 25X1 A
essentially this valuable and costly asset is unemployed and will remain so
unless and until it moves to the Far East.
4. Although there are persuasive arguments both for and against
the actual initiation of wring the winter, I
hardly need point out that' there are overw e m ng reasons for deploying the
Detachment just as soon as possible so as to have this Government's best
capability in place in the Far East in case it is needed. We are in the midst
of two major political crises which have given rise to a sharp renewal of
tension between East and West. Any situation in Europe or the Middle East
that comes close to boiling over carries at least a threat in the Far East.
And there is always the possibility of a new crisis arising in that area.
Under the circumstances,, it would be criminal to keep our reconnaissance
capability, developed with such urgency and effort, waiting idle in the U. S.
whence it could not be moved without two months' notice, merely because
the Air Force desires to protect its BLACK NIGHT project from competition.
5. I believe we have fooled around with this problem tong enough
and I recommend just as strongly as I can:
a. That a meeting be arranged promptly with General Twining,
after careful consideration by you and General Cabett of its
composition which should be designed to maximize the chance of
frank discussion leading to a favorable outcome,
b. That your position with them be substantially as set forth
above, with the one additional element that CIA should offer to finance
(in the amount of approximately the cost of preparing
facilities for AQUATONE at (or any other suitable base in
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c. That if th I Air Force will not agree to support AQUATQNE
in Japan, you invie Secretary Quarles and General Twining to join
with you and General Cabell in setting the essential facts before the
President and ascertaining his desire.
I would like especially to urge upon you that, before such a meeting, you
and General Cabell determine exactly what arguments you will use and
whether you are prepared, as here recommended, to take this issue to the
top if necessary.
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RICHARD M. . ?
Project Director
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