BRIEFING NOTES ON AQUATONE FOR 15 NOVEMBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62B00844R000200010037-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: November 15, 1956
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Rele
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECT
"CIA-RDP62B004d4R000200010037-2
TS-I 610 /
ctor of Central Intelligence 15 November 1956
: Briefing Notes on AQUATONE for 15 November
1. It is recom
meeting.
a. Authority
missions to obtain strategic
guided missile programs.
b. Authority
of the USSR in search of tac
is urgently required.
g.
clod that o ake the following three request
to launch just as soon as weather permits two
intelligence on the Soviet atomic energy and
o overfly the Satellite, and peripheral areas
cal intelligence if and when such intelligence
ty to overfly Communist China.
Z. The first grant of authority i's for missions specifically
recommended on their own initiative by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
fundamental consideration which justifies raising again at this time the
issue of deep penetration flights is that, in the present state of world
tension, an unacceptable risk is involved in postponing or abandoning
altogether any attempt to obtain herder and more extensive intelligence
on two of the most critical military programs of the USSR. A special
urgency derives from the fact that declining sun angles will compel the
postponement of these missions until spring if they cannot be undertaken
soon.
The second request is more complex (covering as it does
both Satellite and Russian areas) but a fundamental consideration relevant
to the collection of tactical intelligence is that when it is needed, it is
needed just as quickly as possible and the DCI (perhaps in conjunction with
the JCS and the Secretary of State) should have a broad enough grant of
authority to authorise tactical reconnaissance missions without delay it
might be pointed out in this connection that we can now launch such !missions
in less than 24 hours notice and will shortly be able to process and interpret
the take in a matter of hours. This high state of readiness will be of
limited value if clearance procedures prevent its prompt use.
TS-15$610,
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I.
4. It is recommended above that the authority to authorise
tactic*tsconnaissance missions covering both the Satellites and peripheral
areas of the USSR. In support of this request it might be pointed out:
a. That in the recent European crisin and in any future
one it wilt be difficult to obtain good evidence onSoviet troop movements
or on Soviet ground forces mobilisation unless it is possible to overfly
installations and transportation routes at least up to ZS to 30 miles within
the borders of the USSR proper.
objectives
the largest
the Soviets
and persoun
north of the
for tactical i
b. That it will be impossible to accomplish th. same
overflights of East Germany *ince it normally contains
et concentration of ground forces outside of Russian borders.
c. That with respect to the present Middle East crisis.
ht logically be expected to base an airlift of equipment
n Bulgaria or the Caucasus area or poseibly at airports
ck Sea and that this region is therefore an argent target
elligence.
ti. That usfut tactical intelligence on air and ground
forces OS and on the movement of goods and personnel wilt usually require
repeated coverage of the same targets.
It is recommended that although you seek a rather broad grant of authority,
you state the most urgent requirement for tactical intelligence is that
which would be met by missions over the Caucasus area, Bulgaria and
selected airfields north of the Black Sea.
5. With respect to overflights of Communist China, the main
I. that these involve minimum political risks since a
25X6 and that there
is valuablec intelligence to be obtained. The point might also be
made that the AQUA TONE capability should be in position for the contingency
of any unforeseen crisis in the Tar East. It is recommended, however, that
this grant of authority not be made a major issue at this time but simply
that the views of the political authorities be explored.
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6. An argument which applies to any and all overflight activity
time is that the political risk has boon greatly diminished by recent
. It has been stressed in the past that continued overflights would
diplomatic protests from the USSR and the Satellites that these
would be embarrassing in that they would be difficult to answer and that
ogardless of the answers given the Communist allegations would be
believed widely in other countries with consequent political disadvantages.
It is submitted that in the face of Soviet ixttransigeance with regard to
Hungary and the Middle Vast protests might not be made and if made would
attract less attention and be loss capable of exploitation by the Soviet..
Basically, it is this lower political risk combined with the heightened urgency
of the need that justifies a change in policy at this tiros.
S
Project Director
RMB:djm
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