THE PATTERN OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 15, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 16, 1954
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865 0200250002-3
*Army/State Declass/Release Instructions On File,*
THE PATTERN OF CO Mu NIST MOVE iTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
A brief survey of international
Communist operations in six countries
25X1A8a
Prepared by
Prepared forF
Case numbero.
Date oyompletada 16 A.prtl 1514.
25X1A9a
25X1A8a
25X1A2g
DOCUMI.NT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CUSS. ^
^ DECLASSIFIED U f ~~
CLASS. CHA!IGED TO., TS S
NEXT ft.EV1EW DATEI -
AUT}1: HR 70.2
PATI. .984-HEVIEWE>;1_ O.J 656le
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
THE PATTERN OF COII1UNIST IIOVLI ANTS IN SCUTHLAST ASIA
SMART
Development of the Coimiiunist movemnt in Southeast Asia ham
followed the line set by the Comintern mcae than 30 years a.goo
Policies of Communist parties in the area have been directed by
Moscow ars1, more recentlys, also by Peiping. Operating under the
guise of nationaliam, these parties have fol ,omed a similar patterns
at ,empting to bring all the colonial areas of Southeast Asia into
tht3 fold of international Commxmi iio Only in Thail.and.g h.lch has
long been an independont natian9 has the pattern varied to mxy
great exianto
Nst countries of the area have more than one Cori=anist partys
eonetimess because of individual differences, sometimes representing
different ethnic groups within a countxy4 Most of the parties are
bun.lt of a hard core of theoreticians and leaders surrounded by
ass ortod hangers on ttho are mzalcontexrvs or seekers of personal gain.
Tmpt7t support comers from the elements of the overseas Chinese
population which still have strong wises to China rev ardless of the
idoological force directing her destigf.
The hands of the Russian and Chinese Ccn uxiiste were clearly
visible in the 19209S and the 193008on most of the Sovtw ast
Asian Comnnmists worked under the direction of the Fear East n
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 %~111!!i~~
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Bureau of the Comintern, Their izflueme was even more clearly
evident in 1948 uchens after represents,ives from Peiping,, No cow and
Southeast Asia met with the Indian Communist Party in Februarys
Conmzunist insurrections broke out in B layas tndonesias Burma and
the Philippines.
Current evidence of Peipingue influence is the ].ogiatic support
given the Viet Minh in Indochina,, the activities of Chinese Communist
agents in Southeast Aeias particularly among the overseas Chinese
and other ethnic minrit r groupas and the financing of the low-
interest loan pro ;r u in Burma. Through the World Federation of
Trade Unions Peiping controls leftist labor or^gsnizatiors in mart
cou.nta-ies of the area0 Through cultural missions traveling business-
mend returning students and sightseeing trips9 Peiping pas.aes vn
instructions where official channels such as embassies are lacking,
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 aam"ro
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
THL PATT1 i N OF Ca,1MUNIST flOVLMENT IN SOUTH AST ASIA
Io IntBerri tiot al Aspects of Sc~:th ast Asian t rn iunisn
II, Com iuni nn in the Southeast Asia". Ccimtri.es
Page
I
9
At
B,
C,
Burma
Ind o china
Indonesia
18
D,
Malaya
25
E,
The Fhilippinss
29
F,
Thailan I
37
III, Appendixs Sources Used
41
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
THE PATTERN OF CON MMUNIST MOVEN dTS' IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Lo International Aspects of Movements in Southeast Asian Communism
The Third Oorrununist International (Cominter?n) and C;mrr_ist
Information Bureau (Conrinforrn), have clearly stated Soviet policy
and tactics for developing Col?"+f=i t .-aoveraents in colonial and semi-
colonial areas. The policy plays down the class struggle emphasised
else there and intenrri? eA the theme of nationalism and anti.-colonialism
seeking to drive the foreign d3vils from the sacred soil of the
fatherland.
Communism in Southeast Asia, appearing there in the early
19200s, has been developed in :Line with this polite and under the
direction of the Comintern, Cominform and Peiping. It is not
accidental therefore that Southeast Asia9 a complex of many nations
and many national and minority ethnic groups., is also a complex of
national and international Communist parties and often competing
parties in majority and mi.norlty ethnic groups,
With these racial compl a es and its pre-war colonial status,,
Southeast Asia was an ear target for Communism,, Playing national
group against European power and cultivating these groups O and minorri-
ties O desires for i ridependence, the Communists sought to divide
and conquer,
In some of the countries of Southeast Asia the i iority Com-
munist partiesp rather than ' e i atior.,a1 p tyq have assmaed the
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
10 ,dershipo The major Communist minority groups in most countries
}
of Southeast Asia are formed from certain elements of the Overseas
Chinese
pOPu].atianQ The Communist groups represent but a mw?. .
.1 r
percentage of the total Chinese popula
tion of the area buts we1J.-
organized and supported by Peiping., they are outspolcen and appear
to represent a far larger portion of the population than they
actually doo
Communist parties in Southeast Asia are composed much as are
those in Europaf, the Western licmisphere or elsewhere in Asiaq with
a smarm hard core of doctrinaire Communists surrounded by a larger
group of dissidents$ .malcontentes social misfits and profiteerso
They are drawn from all segments of the populationngeasantsa
proletarians and intellectuals. In addition to theses marr of the
overseas Chinese-uho normally care little about politics and are
more concerned with earning a living-follow the movement because
of their strong family and cultural ties to China9 regardless of
her politicso Because the Communists now control the mainlcndq
marir overseas Chinese feel that the future lies . with the Co2m ists4
This feeling is often ccrdit1oimd by their ability to trade with
the mainlando
Throughout Southeast Asia the growth of Communism has followed
similar courses,, with one major exceptions Thaiilanrlo While Burma,.,
Malaya.9 Irdochinaa,b Indonesia and the Philippines were alp. colonies
of metropolitan powet?s, Thailand has been a sovereign nation for
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 .tom..,
Approved For Release 2000/08/ : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
centuries, Even under the Japanese occupation., Thailand maintained
a larger degree of self-government than' have most occupied nations.
Thailand has been also relatively set aufficiente with an adequate
food supply and an export surplus in rice,, the most vital commodity
of the area, But perhaps the farmers D ownership of their lard is
the main reason for the different approach to Thailand. C armini=.,
which f?nedson exploitation of the peasant class by wealthy landowners,,
on poverty and on food shortage,, has had difficulty making much
headway with the Thais,, who are mall-fed and clothed by standards
of the area and whose lour classes already on their land. Only
through an alien minority,, the overseas Chinese,, have the Corrnmunists
bcen able to make anything but a minor dent in Thailand,, and the
Chinese Communists have become the largest alien minority party in
Southeast Asia.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia Communist growth has followed a
single pattern,, with but minor variations, Except in Burma and
Thailand,, Communism appeared in the early 192003 under the guise of
nationalism and anti-colonial.ism0 It started among the Thailand
Chinese in the 1920Rs but the appeal was different, In Burma Com-
munism began as a nationalist movement about 1930, In all but Burma
the hand of the Cor nunist element of the Kuomintang (IM) wan
clearly visible,, either directly or through its influence on key
figures in the movement. This direction became particularly
evident -,,Then the Communist elements were thrown out of the Kuomintang
in 19270
30
t"Wamlb
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
The trend until nearly the end of the decade favored formation
of small groupa9 soma organized into parties and eome into leas
formal groups of l1arxist extremistso 'In 192,5 when the Comintern
sent Borodin to China as its chief aCent, he took NGUYI N ai Quoc
with him as an interpreters NGUYEN was by then the leader of
Indochinese Communism and a member of the Far Eastern Bureau of the
Cominterno In the course of his travels through China and Thailand
to organize emigre Vietnamese into Commanist cells, he brought with
him the teachings and orders of the Comintern, NGUYEN helped
found the Communist Party of the South Seas, which had reFresentatives
from several countrieso In 1930 this party split into national
organizations$, such as the Fran Communist Party and the Indo-
chinese Communist Party.
About this time Communism began to appear in Burma, largely
as an indigenous movement but with some impetus from Indian Comm nists*
This move, too, started as nationalism with leftist leaningso
From 1930 until the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific the
nationalistic trend was maintained, with the Far "stern Bureau of the
Comintern guiding the Communists of Indonesia, Indochina, Nal$ya
and the Philippines.
During the war most Communist groups became nationalistic, antic
Japanese guerrilla armies, often cooperating with non-Communist
groups against the common foe. This was particularly true in Burma,
Indochina,, Malaya and the Philippines, There was no guerrillas
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
fighting in Thailand, but the Free Thai Movement, a Communist-inspired
gr?oupg did work with the Allies in obtaining information and carrying
out sabotage missions. The guerrilla activities strengthened the
Communist ? s hands by rebuilding the concept of nationalism and
patriotism as the major motive of these groups. In Indochina and
Burma the resistance groups became the backbone of the postwar
gaverzm ants of their countries. In Indochina however, HO and the
French disagreed over the colonial status of Indochina, and the
Communists, under tho name of Viet Minh, resorted to open warfare to
gain complete controls In Burma the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom
League moved directly fror,- its guerrilla activities into control
of the government4 But, Communist elements have been purged from
the league and it is now dominated by the Socialist Party.
In Indonesia the Communists were not very active during tka
oocupatione, but they did join with other nationalist groups in the
fight against th match which eventually led to Indonesians inde-
pendence:, veterans of this campaign still operate as militant
arms of the two Commmmist. parties of the country,,
The first wi.de-scale Communist action to seize control of
Southeast Asia began in 1948. In February 1948, representatives
from Moscow, the Chinese Communists and Co.;umanist groups in South-
east Asia attended a meeting of ttm Indian Communist party. Within
a year, in a move .somewhat reminiscent of the widespread European
revolutions of 1818,, the Coimrmnists launched rebellious
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
offensives in four countries~--Burma9 Indonssja8 Hale ya and the
Philippinos. Indochina already was rent by open warfare The
Co.runist corabattants were remnants of the "nationalist" guerrilla
forces that fought the Japanese during World War II,* The Indonesian
uprising was put dorm almost immediately arxl the oth: r three 1948
rebellions now have been virtually quelled., The patterns of those
uprisings are too similar to be coincidenta3.0
The series of defeats has hurt the Commanists,, but not vitally.
Wherever possible the Communists are now playing the game of "if
you can?t lick theme, join them0n In Burma,, although the rebellion
has not been Ib y put downs the Corrmmnists have joined the govern-
ment in denouncing their common opponents,, the KID` troops in BBurmaa
In Indonesia the Comm mists are pin the role of full supporters
of the Premier Ali, Sastromid jc jo gravernment9 feigning a "united
frontal' In urrection still continues in the Philippines and Maiayaq
although the Philippine rebels have been virtually defeated and
negotiations reportedly are under way,,
The current pattern of Communist action is not completely
clean particularly on the point of Moscow-Peiping direction
Evidence does not show that Noscow directly conducts Commmi
action in Southeast Asia., except possibly in Indonesia? Semaun9
who some reports state is the actual leader of the Communist Party
of Indonesia (PKl)a has been in Moscow for several years and may be
receiv n,'; and pass;f on the Kremlin o s instructions,
is
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP6 -00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Peipingls hand is more clearly visible than ~IscowOa, The
CUM se Poop1o 0.9 Republic has diplomatic representatives in Burma
and lix onasia and with the Con, mini St: pseudo-government in Indo.
chino Russia has repro contagion only in Thailand and Burma and
it'll ?na.ssions are mar, trade orient,od than political, Moreover,
Peipit g at tinoa operates tbrou the Soviet ".embassy in Bangkok0
The Chinr'3- oe diplomatic channels provide effective communication
bettmon Peiping and Co,-,=uA,>t elements ir. the countries, An
additional channel. is the Peiping soma n tied Asian.-Australasian
Bureau of the World Federation of Trade Unions (VTXU)p representing
Co tiste-cants?olled labor ziovoutents in several of the countries0
Another important Peiping c laann&. is the China Democratic League-0
Teich is particularly active in Bunra, aryl lndones o Overran
Ch ,c. so otudonts rho return to nainlaild. China for adv ced Study
and the Co mr ., mpox redq mainland cultural and sightseeing
trips for leading pro Commutht ovcreaas Chinese provide another
channel of control., indoctr a ti on ;,d infiltration.
There in no doubt that Peiping controls .ost of the Communist
activities of ,:he area; the, only question is the doga~ee of control.,
That Peiping is supplying ar ni s to Coil monist insurrectionists in
'ochiraq Malaya and probably Burxrl.a in i otrn, What these groups
must give in return is not ttxzo The Chinese Commmists in Thai
].and are knot:n to be receiving dLrectti,on from Peiping,, and Peiping
agents operato throughout the area0 Recent newspaper reports from
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RuPM240865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP6 865R000200250002-3
Burma mention the activities of Piping agents among'the ILachins
of northern Burman These activities tine in closely with the pro-
gram of Ttnaticnality autonomous states.!: now under way in Red China.
Using two of tiaose statos in pcwticulara the Thai Nationality Auto-
nomous State and the Thai-Shantou Nationality Autonomous States,
Cormainist China hopes to appeal to the min city groups in Burma and
Laos and the people of Thai a,ths, all racially akin,
The pattern as it now appears is one of Peiping support to
Communist movements in the area so that they may act as a fifth
colunno Toning down militant activities and feigning cooperation
with existing authority - herevor possible? the local Cormmists
act as Peiping tools boring from within Peipiflg is heavily
?riphasizirig the wooing of overseas Chi 1eaee that they too may act
as a fifth column ande even more important in some oountriese may
use their important position in the national economy to disrupt
and weaken their host countries.
o8a
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 :a...oA
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62- 865R000200250002-3
11o Communism in the Southeast' Asian Countries
Communism in Burma is reflected in a complex of partiesq large
and smaJ.19 strong and ?weeakq legal and ill,ega l0 These may be either
peaceful or insurgent and include national and international parties.
Adding to the confusion are the pseudo-party activities of Burma
Chinese Communists. Still further confusing Burmese politics is the
fact that the Anti-Fascist Peoples Freedom League (AFPFL) the
coalition heading the Burmese Government since its independenceD is
dominated by Socialists with Marxist backgrounds who were at one time
or another working with the leaders of all the Communist elements.
The complexity of Burmese Communism disguises its true strerzho
At present only the Burma Wor s and Peasants Party (BWFP) appears
to serve the Communist cause in any greater measure than a nuisance
value. CO=Muiist insurrection begun in 1948 was virtually ceased.
The Communists have obtained much pro, aganda value from the irri-
tation caused by the presence of KPH troops in Burma9 and this irri-
tation has greatly helped the cause of local Chinese Communists.
Agents from Red China are known to be operating in North Burmae in
Kachin State and the Shan Stages., attempting to lure minority racial
groups into cooperation with Red China through the recently-established
autonomous states in Yunnan Province,,
There are at least eight Burmese Communist groupsq of which
four are illegal and operating undergrourd0
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Burma Communist Party (BCP)
One of the earliest Communist groups was the Burma Commuriiat
Party,, or White Flag Communistne founded in 1930Q The party grew
from the left-wing nationalist movement called the Nagani Book
Club, founded in 1937 by Thakins NtU, SOE and THAN TUNo These men
later became the leaders of the AFPFL, the Communist Party of
Burma, or CP(B),s and the BCP, respectivelry. They originally Were
ars oeiated with the Dobama Asi Ayon (DAA), or Thakince Party,
which was founded in 19340 The moderate left program of the DAA
failed to satisfy many of the Thakinse and they foamed the BCP,
which in the pre-war period urged revolution as the means to free-
domo During the war the BCP9 under the guise of collaborating with
the Japanese, worked with British authorities to create a resis-
tance movement, culminating in the formation of the AFPFL in 194,3,
The BCP became the leading member of the leagues and the Partros
leader Thakin THAN TUN (who still heads the BCP today) became
secretary-general.
In July 1946 the AFPFL began to rid its organization of Com-
munist elements and TUN was forced to resign the secretary-general-
shipa In October of that year the BCP was expelled from the leagued
After attempts to heal the breach between the BCP and the AFPFL
failed,, the BCP went underground and started a campaign of armed
rebellion which, Mile at present relatively quiet, has not been
fully stopped, In the fail of 1953 the BOP eras declared illegal, by
the Burmese Covering,
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Cnist Ptof Burma (t;P(S)
In February 1946 rivalry for power within the BOP between THAN
TUN and Thakin SOE9 as well as SQE s s ihsistance upon immediate
rcvolatiana split that party., SOE formed tho CP(B) or Red Flag
Ca, . s't?3n In July 19?46 the CP(B) was declared illegal and SOE
was imprisonaedo Shortly after ards both the ban and the imprison-
merit were lifted* but the ban peen reimposed in January 1947 and
has remained in force since then Efforts to reunite the BCP and
CP(B) have been unsuccossAil thus faro largely because of personal
differences between TUN and SOEO
Peo~alea Volunteer !kgaraization (PVO)
The third illegal, group is the Peoples Volunteer Organizations
which grew out of the wartime Patziotic Forces of Burma (PBF) a an,
armed resistance groups The .PTO has plit into several bands or'
partiesa most of them using some i'orri of the original named When
the PEF -seas ordered to disband and become part of the Birrra, Arrays
a large group refused and formed the semi?-rnil.itary PiiOQ They stayed
within the AFPFL for a short tirn.es and then joined the Socialist
Party in forming the Marxist League,,'
After the outbreak of Coananjst-led in:3urraction against the
Burmese government in early 191,89 the PVO apl.it,, The so-called
Yellow Band PVO remained loyal t the govern7znt ar4 a member of
the AFP1 i-rhile the PVO white Band,, or PVO(W), broke away and
joined the BCP in the Peeples Democratic Fi-ont3 At the time of its
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 _.. i2
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
brew. , with the AFT-Mg the ,x O(W) was declwed A split
f t,E White & 1 L vi Mk'arch 1950 left oxxe 4eg a nt > known as the
rt .roluti,on' r PVO and headed by So ~f_WNT M&USIG,, affiliated to the
front Shortly after the apl to another ge'up#, ?Led by Bo Lt YAUNG,
made peace with the government , It van aUed the Surrenderad PVo(W)
a lator became parer, of the Peo ler Peace Front (.PPF)
People Co u de P PI
Th : March 195Q 3? U t in t h e IN
P10 ca Txaa n Bp PO MV realized
that t lie BCP w,u "ying, to dominate the People a Dexrocratic Frortn
H 1&d, a large segment of the White Ba .Gaut, of the forthtl form the
4
FOop .era Cozrrrader P-ar?}y, la~av'L, : the Revo111 Lion ry PVO sagmant in to
xront0 It was decl ?ad illog.a .in Oo`cmr 19 3a
,'e.axx2ca s Peaos Front IMF),
The .CCoTllmn st Poopl s Peace 11~ -:1r`'i gas #orma.'A ::m :.L95i '
eon$istink; of the Suz rend; r?ed PVVO (1;I ), the At. :_ : i th. _ follower n of
MIG TI-LAsi brother ? of hh mea tyrrAd .ender of the rIKEYL AU?1G SAR, It
is a. legal orgaraizat A.ori z:f : h ; true :a es ? :a :4:,a#, : ;: in the Berme:
Chambea,? of Deput: ea, In 1951 the 'PY joined the Burma %uor -,errs and
Peasant: .'arty and the PJ ;x.ab un Party in vhe so-called Triple
All. e
Th : UAA9 st.'>. a:aaac fated with FPFg has moved f art; er left
than, it ,eras in tho 1930 ? as, a1 .hcu h its leader, ' hatki n TUN OK E, is
conxId ?ed to be morae moderate than most of its member so The parr
is much wo er thaxi it wr at the ttr.e of its i'o?andizig i i9,3O~, w7hon
it war-, the atv`,1e:rin'''9~ poi `x..t Lord- the a ?i~~.1Lr~r ~ `~GL:a : Ct 4d.J?rd ~Sfli~ >:. 6:~ ~, ;i '`?>Ca .. ,.. . l~S.3 ~.i?w~. hi- r"of oerr tha {:a Yl
period , he i-iakJ.nu,,
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Pao U28 Unity Par.y (pup)
In May 1952 the Surrendered PVO(W); still led by Bo LA YAUNG
and desiring to follow a course of extreme Marxism9 which RUNG THAN
1. ,.
opposed, broke from the Peoples Peace Front and formed the Peoplee
Unity Party. It is a legal Coumn-Ast Party without parliamentary
representation,
MRhabama Lim
The Nahabama Party is the weal et link of the Triple Alliance,
It is the successor to the wartime Mahabama Party headed by Dr, BA
MAW, which ,as a national socialist party modeled along Nazi lines
and which cooperated with the Japanese? After disappearing for a
period,, it reappeared in 41a? . 1951 with a policy of nationalism
and Maixim, Since that time it has moved further to the left9
joining the Triple Alliance in late 1951, It has a parliamentary
representation of ona,
Burma WorPxrs and i'easant Party (BWPP
The Burma Workers and Peasants arty is the major overt ComTIUnist
Parr in Burma, It was formed in December 1950 when a group,, headed
by Thakin LWINN9 withdrew from the AFPFLo The BWPP came out almost
immediataly for the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat,
It is considered the most orthodox of the Communist partiess, the best
disciplined and the strongest threat to the stability of the present
government9 an it is believed to be the legal front for the under-
ground Communist parties. It has nine representatives in the Chamber
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Ot Dc pu { . s d i ,ha stronge.t element, a . the Trip .b 1fiance.
The Party has a ninf r Of ,Zront orga 'iizatjons the vio st impor-
tant tant of i latch is the Burma Trades U: io 'C nng'ess (BTTrr` ; _ . " _~~-_i q+.ed.
with thn s amraa:rist orr-Lnna:,~;c: 1,0M. This affiliation provides a
link between the 3GWP? and :Pe dpLago Other with Pei L? -" an3,
Moscow :rte>y exi8t,, But such a eon oration is rather now in Bum
;
Coarr?raun] zarr: which if amocciatw rnith Comma. ;L:?;n;n : am y other ~eou t ;-y
ig ira::L?,.y ?~sa i o1ok.,6: ;-,. "r-di ~n Comm -n J.syt
~ , ~" t:i"sue 3 Comt ird'sts
pro oarax u .at Chine t e work nio utly through the Burma
?3ra3%Wh oi' thChii 2: Democratic League f
Chi 'se ConT 11r-i-.'tr organ l' a, ,ion. 'ha CDL operates in a3uxi is :Lth Lha
bins 3~.nga and fir -ne La . r p prt of the Peiping 2mbassy. Although
the ~.~e'rsi3as Ch1ncss in Burma ar not as uroae as in olUrer
coulr yr~~ ies of Southeast Asia, they wmaxthe,ess conUr l i ppas lum P
Segments of the national nconoiT.r s nc co,xid pose a t 'ea't to he-
B'nmse g ve.p :nenta Fortunw4a1y far the UIL-rwses the sw ar of
hard corgi, ;orr uni,st Chinese is a saU ft-action of the ono-
quarter to on c-- naif million Chi m s ,i i the r-ount. `yo
: m or trtxnt a' j .x , effort to woo the Burma Chine.;e aa~~s its
low-?Lntero S't loan pr: og r ur #inaac d thro u47th Burma far n :: le o of ? th-
Bass.; of China and Saxnk;, of C x uux coat . xas? Und nr this arrar:geaent
rChd.na~.-a -tmre .ai awed to bo.n or money at .bout half th ; goiz:. d" to if
hey a rv%d t o t up .Jcv c Cox Y r1 st
~ qq J. v ad Cearrmxazrxist ca-s,;s a.?~.Ja
C''+:,:7 a,S^I .t:J~S u=tlo.s."?4J .P'ir..7. i:J F~~.q
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 `Approved For Release 00/08/26: CIA-RDP62-00865R0200250002-3
B. Indochina
In Indochinaus three states are fare Communist parties,, In
Vietnam there are the Dang ate, Lao Donf;XWorkers Party j ,q often still
called by the name of the earlier Viet Minh, and a Chinese Com-
munist Party of Vietnam, in Cambodia there are a Chinese Communist
Party of Cambodia a:ad. the Khmer Isserak, In Laos theme is the Lao
Issarako The IQ mer and. Lao Issarak groups (issarak means free) are
dire
tl
o
c
y c
ntrolled by the L :bng T
aooohe tt?o
to be also under its di recti onq but they also ma yy receive cr deers
from Peiping , The four 'lesser parties Care small anJ7 are used
mostly' to appeal to. the national groups they represeit and to imple-
sent instructions to those groupso
The .Communist rebels led by HO chi Minh have created a pseudo.
state 'called the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) which is
completely dominated by the Lao Dong Party* The Lao Do
.. _....~.. ng9 established
in Mardi 1951 is the successor to the Vier Nan Doc Lap Bong Minh
Hoi (Vietnam Independence League) usually abbreviated to ,Viet Minh.
Just as the Viet Minh was created to appeall. to a larger segment of
the economy than its predecessors the Indochine3se-Communist Party,
the Lao Dong was created to broaden that appeal, DRV and Lao Dong
officials have openly stated that no change in orientation or moti-
vation accompanied the change in name Q' HOANG quoc Viet,, an official
of the Lien Viet united front of "democratic parties" forming the
DRV government., stated upon the d lath of Stalling
Approved. For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Ikmr?ng for and grateful to Comrade Stalin the entire
Vietnamese people and cadres are all the more determined
to carry out President HO chi MinhPs behest to learn the
doctrine of 14arx-Engels.Lenin-Sta3dn., apply it to concrete
conditions in Vietnam.9 push the resistancefl wipe out the
French coLonialistsg American interventionists9 and Viet-
namese traitors,, and build Vietnam into a new democratic
country advancing to socialism,
The Lao Dong Party is the leading and controlling element of the
Lien Vietg which exists more in name than in facto HO is president
of the Lao Dong and RANG xuan Khu (aka TRUONG Chinh) is secretary-
gener?el.. (Some reports have said HO is dead an TRU(jNG has taken overt
but these have not been confirmed.)
The history of Indochinese communism is closely tied to the his-
tory of iiO chi Minh (knowm in the prewar period as NGUYLN ai Quoc)
At the Treaty of Versailles Conference HO., then in France working
with French leftish leaders: presented demands for Vietnamese
independence to President Woodrow Wilson. These demands were not
met, HO then became associated with the Third International andq
betty en 1919 and 1925 traveled between Frarpce and the USSR0
In 1925 he went to China ti, ith Borodin, the chief Comintern
agent in China. While in China he organized Vietnamese emigres
into Communist cells and foamed the Viet Nam Cach Nenh Than h Nien
Hoi (Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth League). He also organized
similar groups in Thailand. As a member of the Far Eastern Bureau
of the Cor,.intern he helped form the Communist Party of the South
Seas9 which later split into iadividuall national Cost partiee
including the Indochinese Communist :ea,tr (PCI) in 19303. The
26
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
next year the party was recognized by the Third Intgrnationa2, and
admitted to the Comintornb
Whin the Popular Front Gover unertt . came to power in France in
.1936, the PCI emerged as a legal party in Cochinelainao In 1939,9
en the Po
id van r Front Government fell,, Must of PGI leaders withdrew
to Chita. Dur .rig World War II the party was the leading component of
the Viet Minh and was hardly dist'_nguishahl a frem itb on 11 November
1945 the PCT. was dissolved and replaced by the (,'u1.i;. ^al s.sociatlon
for the Study of 11arxism9 headed by D.ANG xuan I%u,, now -ecretar. ym
gener411. of th Lao Dongo . The Marxist study group continued until
1951,9 when the Lao Doaxg was foxiicd0
The Lao Lone Par t;r i.sy des,.ite its name changezq the Com ist
Party of Irdech!,n 9 openly admitting allegiance to Moscow mid Peipixigg.
The Lao DoM remain the backbone of the DRV pseudo-governments
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Co Indonesia
Three Communist groups exist in Indonesia, two Indonesian and
one Chinese. The native groups are axganized into political parties
fully active in the life of the nation: the Partai Komunis Indonesia
(PKI)'q or Corvnunist Party of Indonesia, and the Partai Murba, or Pro-
letarian Party. There is no Chinese Communist Party in Indonesia
comparable to those in other countries of the area.
The Chinese
are organized in a pro-Communist front organization and operate
through the Chinese Communist Embasv in Indonesia.
Thus far cooperation between the Chinese Communists and the PKI
has been scant; but if they should ever combine, the resulting strong,
leCal Communist party could threaten the Indonesian Govern nta the
rest of Southeast Asia and, thus, the free world.
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI Communist kart of Indonesia)'
The leading and oldest Communist party in Indonesia, the Partai
Komunis Indonesia, was organized in May 1920. Of the early leaders
of the organization, the only one still prominent is Semaun, who is
now and has been for several yearn, in Moscow and actually may be
controlling the ply from there. From its earliest daysq when the
party associated itself with the Comintern, it has been definitely
Moscow-oriented. The leaders in Indonesia, Aidit and L] nina
hale both spent some tix.ie in Moscow and probably received their training
there. In a recent clash between these two, Aidit emerged the victor
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
and Alimin is now out or on the way out of power. Like other
Communist parties of the area organized shortly after World war Ia
the PKI was established with the overt semblance of being a nationa-
list movement to Lain independence for colonial Netherlands East
Indie so
On the local scene, the tactics of the KI have changed in the
past few years. In 1948 PKI policy called for an all-out revolution
to seize control of the government,, and the party launched an abortive
rebellion in Madiun in September of that yearn With the advent to
power of the Wilopo government, the FKI switched to the tactic of
presenting a national fronts through which they hoped eventually to
gain control. They have continued their support of the new Sastroamid-
jojo cabinet as well, although they still have no cabinet representation.
Currently the PKI has 16 runbers in the appointed Indonesian Parlia-
ment,, the third largest delegation, after Masjumi and tie Partai
Nasional Indonesia. The deleLation is headed by Sakirriar and Par-
dedea The party also has six othr seats through two of its
affiliates, SOBSI and the Barisan Tani Indonesia, which have three
each.
The present estimated strength of the party is about 100a000,,
although it prcbably controls a much larger number through its maxim
front affiliateso The largest such group is the Sentral Organisasi
:uruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI),, the largest labor federation in
the country. Its largest member unions are in the fields of trans-
m19-
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
potation and petroleum and among the sugar estate wprkers. SOBSI
is affiliated with the WFTU and possibly acts through it as a con=
tact between the PKI and Peiping,
Another important affiliate of the rKI is the Barisan Tani
Indonesia (BTI, Indonesian Farmers Corps), which holds three seats
in the Parliament, It is strongest in Central Java. The PKI has
many other affiliates, in a]most every facet of Indonesian lifee
particularly among the youth. Like the Partai Murba, it also has a.
militant arm.. PERBEPSI, an organization of veterans. The PKI pro-
bably receives most of its funds through these affiliates.
The PKI is an example of what is called a "soft party." The
top echelons of the party are well-trained and well-or(;anized. Once
past this upper crust the party tends to fall apart except in
carrying on the simplest activities, requiring only blind obedience.
This softness is largely due to the low literacy rate in the country,
which u nits the teaching of doctrinary Communism to the masses.
At present the party is joining in a national front movement,
but what its status will be when definite plans for a general election
are announced is in considerable doubt0
Partai Murba (PN, Proletarian Party)
The party has, at time erroneous r been called a Trotskyite
g'oup. This description is fervently, denied by the .urba.9 which
considers itself a nationalist Communist party rather than an inter-
nationalist party. Although the party does not advocate world
revolution and does not recognize the. leadership of Moscow,, its
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
domestic lin and its attitude toward the US and the rest of the
world is hardly distinguishable from that of the PKI or other Mos-
cow-oriented Communist parties throughout the worldo
The Partai Murba was founded in November 1948 by Tan N1alaka9
the Moscow,-trained Communist who later broke with the Third Inter-
national because of his nationalist principles, He was an early
leader of Communism in Indonesia. In the spring of 1919 he was
reported to have been executed by the Indonesia Government as a
danger to the security of the nation; however, these reports often
have been denied, leaving the question of his present existence in
much the same doubt as that of HO chi Minh,
The present chairman of the party is Sukarni Kartodi$irdjoo
Maruto Nitimihardjo is vice-chairman and Sjamsu Udaya is secretary-
general. In the current Indonesian Parliament, which is not an,
elected one., the party holds four seats,, including the second
vice-chad.r.rnanship of the Communications and Public Works Section.
It supports the Partai Nasional Indonesia (FNI), which heads the
present Governments
Sukarni claims for the party a dues paying membership of 2009000
and about 500,000 fallow-travelers, The first figure seems high to
most observers, although the second figure seems plausible ihen
counting the various groups affiliated with PH. In the field: of
labor the party controls the Sentral Organisasi Buruh Republik In-
donesia (SOBRI, the Central Organization of Indonesian Workers), a
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 SEMTET~
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
rival of the PKIwd ninated SOBSIG. In addition to the approxi-
mately 508000 members in SOBRI,,, the larGest group of which is
firmed of gas and electric workers,,,SUBRI reportedly has infiltrated
many SOBSI unions,
A propaganda arm of the PM is the Pita Murba (Lamp of the
Proletariat),, a weekly published in Bandjermasino The party also
has a small militant arm of veterans of the rebellion against the
Dutch$ called the Laskar Rakjat Murba (Proletarian Peoples Army)o
Recent attempts of the Partai Murba and the Partai Komunis
Indonesia to settle their differences and unite into one party
have failed because of the insistence of each to its own position on
Moscow leadership,, the Pi.I accepting Moscow leadership and the PM
rejecting ito
Activities of Overseas Chinese Communists
The overseas Chinese in Indonesia are not organized into
formal political parties. Instead of the traditional party struc-
ture $ Communist and anticComnunist elements have used the coamiuni ty
organizations of the overseas Chinese. The major Chinese Communist
organization is the ChunL-; Hua Chliao TQuan Tsung Hui (General Or-
ganization of Overseas Chinese Organizations)., which is a federation
of social., cultural and benevolent organizations,, schools and pub-
lications. Included in this federation is the Min Chung Sheng Huo.
She., usually called the Min Sheng She (Peoples Livelihood Society),,,
which is in turn a, sub-federation of societies and is considered
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
to be the loading Communist Group in the larger federation and in
Indonesia, Leading figures among the Chinese Communists are ANG
Jan-Goan and SU To-tjand The organizations are in direct contact
with the Chinese Corramist I mbassy in Djakarta, which ordma their
policies"
The Chinese Communists control nary schools, publication #59 labor
unions and guilds and chambers of coz iiorce, The influence exercised
throuCL these [Youps and the hierarchy of community organizationse
particularly youth groups, gives the Communists an important
advantage in molding Chinese public opinion throuF;hout the country,
And the important economic role of the Chinese in Indonesia makes
them a considerable factor in the life of the country"
Although there is no organized Chinese Commurist Party in Indo=
nesia,q a few Chinese are members of the Indonesian parliament and
are affiliated with regular Indonesian political parties, One
Chinese, ONG Eng Die of the Partai Nasional Indonesia (which is
currently in power), is minister of fianencen But there is very
little organized cooperation between the Chinese Communists in
Indonesia and the Indonesian Communists, even though the Chinese
Communist Embassy in Djakarta may be acting as a communications
center between Moscow, Peiping and Djakartao Most observers believe,
however,, that if the money, 91d,_1 and organizing ability of the
Chinese in Indonesia are eve linked with the Indonesian Communist
movement, the result might well be disastrous for the tree world"
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP6 - 865R000200250002-3
The combination could develop an extremely strong Irnosifn Comte
munist Party.9 capable - of taking over, Ir done sia with its wealth
of resources and its strategic posit oa vi.s' a vis Malaya, the
Philippines and Australia threatening Southeast Asia ands thereforeg
the free worldo
24 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
D. Mal ti
Malaya, including the Federated States and the colony of Singaporeq
is the last major country in Southeast Asia remainitag in complete
colonial status. Malaya differs from other Southeast Asian countries
also in other wayyse most notably in the statue of its Chinese. In
the color q of Singapore the overseas Chinese are in the overwhelming
majority.. making up at least 90 per cent of the population. In the
Federated States they form a very important minority. In all Malaya
the Chinese form more than 140 per cent of the populations, almost
equal in number to the Malay population of the country. Thus the
Chinese cannot ''e considered a minority group but ono of two major
elements in the national community. Despite the Chinese majority in
the Malayan Corm nist Party (110P), the overseas Chinese of Malaya
are predominantly pro-government and politically active local],ya
a national consciousness unique among Chinese communities in South-
east Asia. The two major elemerrta in the countrys, the Malays and the
Chinese9 through their leading organizations, the United Malay Nation
Organization and the Malayan Chine-se Aseeciation9 are now working
together toward establishment of a democratic ~7slay nation.
Nbst of 39000 to 5,9000 members of the k1CP are drawn Aram the
Chinese peasant and laboring groups,, The membership of the MCP is
augmented by two important arms, the Malayan Raceaa Liberation Army
(M1LL) and the Min Yuen or Peoples Movement, The Mme. is the guerrilla
force that has been battling the British in the. jungles since 1948.
M$ 25-
?r?
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Recent news reports from the area indicate that the uerrillas have
been contained although the job of wiping them out will be a long and
bloody one, The Min Yvan in the logistical aria of the MCP and the
Pao Its function is to obtain food, funds, military supplies and
recruits for the guerrillas and, in the course of doing thisq spread
Fropaganda, train party workers and organize attempts to disrupt the
national. economyo The combined strength of the MCP and its two arms
is about 15.,000, with about 4,000 of these armedo
Support for the guerrilla operations, both voluntary and forceda
comes largely from villages on the fringes of the jungle., on both
the Malaya and Thailand sides of the bordero On the Malaya side
were many villages of "squatters" on the jungle edgesa Because of
their assistance to the guerri las,g the British. have moved the
larger part of these people, mostly Chinesea to villages ?urther
from the arena of combat, greatly handicapping the work of the guerril-
las.
The arms and equipment of the guerrillas have cote from two major
sourceso One source is materiel. _aptured from the British in the
course of the fighting since 1948, the same year that fighting
broke out, in Burma, the Philippines and Indonesi 0 The other source
is the arms left from World War II, when the MRU predecessor., the
Malayan Peoples Anti 'Japanese .Army (MPAJA) was posing as a nationalist
group driving the invader from Malayan soil. The methods of obtaining
orna is comparable to that of the Huks in the Philippines,
26
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-R-00865R000200250002-3
The NPAJA and the IICPc 4RLA set-ups are the most recent aspects
of ti Communist movement in Malaya. In the early 1920os pro-Com-
munist Chinese started the movement in Malaya under the guise of
nationalism and anti-colonialism. It followed the same general pattern
of Communism in China working through. the Kuomintang until the Kt4T
ousted the Communist elements in 1927. In 1928 Malayan Communists
were included in the formation of the Communist Party of the South
Seas (CPSS). Directed by the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern the
CPSS helped develop Communist growth and organization in each South-
east Asian country. When the CPSS was dissolved in 1930 in favor of
national parties,, the MCP came into existence. The party continued its
underground operations under the Far Eastern Bureau until the be-
ginning of World War 11 hostilities in the Pacific,, when it emergdd
as the MPAJAQ During the 1930's the MCP endeavored to build up its
strength' particulariy in the labor field* Other activities included
infiltration of schools,, the press and orGa1 izations, Those activities
are still being carried on,, but with very limited success.
The outlawing of Commmunist activities has hampered severely the
work of the MCP since the war. Publications of the party are irregu-
lar and appear in limited numbers. Documents captured by the British
or turned in by surrendering defectors indicate the clear purpose and
direction of the party. They carp for creation of a "peoplesO demo-
cratic republic" based on the principles of "democratic centralization."
This repetition of the standard line indicates that the international
=274
Approved For Release 2000/08/26: 00865R000200250002-3
 "Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CTA-%p62-00865R000200250002-3
Communist origins of IIZa1ayan Conmunismq and in particular, its
Chinese Communist orientation have notrchanged from the days of its
foundinG in the 19209s,
The severity of the jungle campaign and its lack of pronounced suc-
cess has created certain difficulties within the MCP itself. Dissention
and defection increased during 1953 andsome 1eadersa notably AH Kuk,
were slain by guerrilla members. Guerrillas surrendering to the British
brought AH e s head with them.
The actual leadership of the Cwarmtinists is in some doubt. However.;
CIiEPIG Pig (aka CHE -1 r e ing) and YUENG Kwo (aka YANG Kuo) are
believed to be party seeretasy-general and deputy secretary-general,,
respectively. Little is knownof their backgrounds and little as to
training in Moscow or Peiping or length of affiliation with the party.
28
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIAIFLI -00865R000200250002-3
Bo' The Philippines
Two Communist parties exist in the rhilippine Islands, one native
and one Chinese. Because Co.,,munis,.,fis illegal in the country
those groura do not function as political parties running candidates
for election. Bein; ille;;al, they are forced to carry on some of
their activities throuCh front organizations. The chili rAns
Communists have received wide notice because of their militant
arms the Huks. Capture of vgriou,s. leaders has weakened this arm
and attempts to negotiate a truce have been reported. There has
been little known formal contact between the Chinese an,.' Philip-
pine Communists.
Partido Komtanista de P inas (PKPq Ph3?j jMine 00"u ui,1 Partj)
The impetus leading to the formation of the Philippine Communist
Party was mostly from within the country. Burma is the only other such
case in Southeast Asia; groups in other countries received impetus
frora the USSR or China. To this day the PKP still acts fairly
independently of other Communist groups. The party developed as
an outgrowth of a laborers and peasants movement. The earliest
organizations in this movement were the Union.Obrora Democratica do
Filipinas (Democratic Labor Union of the Philippines) founded in
1902, and the Congroso Obrera de Filipinas (1-hilippine Labor Congress).
The Congress, usually called the COF, was founded in 1912.9 uniting
all existing labor groups in the country. It became a means for
dissemira tion of Marxist thinking and supplied ma r of the early
PKP leaders.
29-
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
In the 19200 so the Far Lastc rn Bureau. of the Comintern and the
Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat of ,the Internationale of Red
Trade Unions (Proflntern) made some attempts to spread Communism
in the islands. They worked through foreign Compunist.agenta in
the ?hil..ippinas, including Tan Malaka of Indonesia,, and attempted
to indoctrinate Filipinos abroad at international labor conferences.
Of the latter-day PKP leaderzi Crisanto Evangelista and Guillermo
Capadocia were active in these efforts,, During this period,, Chinese
Comunist agents were active in the country,, but.mostly among the
Chinese minority,,
In 1927 or 1928 Evangelista formed the Partido Obrero (Workers
Party) a which was a direct forerunner of the HP, At the Profintern
Conference in Shanghai in 1928s Evangelista conferred with Malaka
and Chinese and American Communists* In 1929 the party split over
the iaous of the class struggle,@ and Evangelista and hi,e Red"
faction organized a rival group called the Conrp^oso Proletario do
Filipanas (Pr'oletarian Congress of the Philippines). This organization
carried Communist banners for the .first time in the 1929 May Day
parade. Although it wonted cloay with leftist peasant groups,
leadership cmis mostly from the labor eiements0
The PKP, established on 7 November 19303, also had labor leader-
ahipo Shortly after its formation, it set up close contact with
the Communist Party of the United Stateso In May 1931 mar V of the
most prominent PKP leaders were arrested, and in 1932 the Philippic
Supreme Court declared the PK.P to be a seditious and illegal organi?
,= 3O~
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
nation arx, sentenced The leaders to prison terns.
F'ror:i 19,3-1M the party operated u'nderground,, functioning
through the news r organized Socialist; .tarty,, which k U records
described as a "legal front" for its under,:,round activities.
By this time the PxCP was a member of the Comint?rno InV37 President
Quezon er,rrtcd amnesty and legal status to the PKPQ Party records
indicate that this amnesty was obtained through the influence of
US Communist elements. From then until the Japanese asionp
the PKP operated along peaceful "united front against Fascism"
lines in accordance with the intcxnational policy of the Comintern.
During; the Japanese occupation an armed peasants movement
took over leadership of the party,, which had been a shall $ weak
group dominated by trade union leaders. Remnants of Philippire
Chinese Communist influence in the jarty were greatly reduced
during the occupation. In January 42 the Japanese arrested some
of the top PKl? leadersq includin LvanFelista and Caiadocia,.
EvanC'elista was executed and a "Comrade Vyse assumed the leadership0
It is believed the V r was Vincente Java$ the first of the Lava
family to become prominent in :r leadership.
In 19482 the PKP joined other radical groups to form the
Hukbalahap (huk) guerrilla units to fight the Japanese,, eventually
gaining full control of the Huksa In 1943 the Japanese drove the
Huks to the mountains. About the :,same time the Socialist Party
and other peasant organizations were abolished. The Chinese elements
31 p
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
in the party and their on guerrilla units were placUd under the PKP
Politburo in a "Chinese Board." From this point on the influence
of the Chinese in PKP activities declined, In 1944 the Central
Committee of the FKr decided to abandon its waiting policy and re-
commenced active ag;.ression against the Japanese. It also established
local Huk-dominated governments in the provinces for post-liberation
use At this time Pedro Castro and Gecruncio Lucuesta were installed
as party leaders, When the US invaded the Philippines in October
1944, the Hulls seem to have become disorganizedi the local govern-
ment system did not go into effect and many Huks surrendered their
armeb
In the post-war period the .'KY grew stronger, reaching its
apex in 1950, although in 1947 and 1948 a struggle for party leader-
ship disrupted party activities. Jose Lava, Jesus Lava and Luis'
Tatuc., with the support of the Huks, challenged the leadersh p of
Castro and Lucuesta. The Lava.Taruc group came out on top. In 1948
President Roxas declared the Huks illegal, The Central Committee
then conmiitted the PKF to armed conflict. This armed effort began
about the same time as Communist insurrections began in Malaya9
Burma and Indonesia.
In 1949 President Quirino granted legal status to the party,
but his attempts to arrange an amnesty failed, and an investigation
of the PKP was started by the Special Committee on Un Filipino
Activities of the Philippine House of [representatives. From January
-32-
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : 65R000200250002-3
to October 19500 when Pa strength eras' at its peak,, the combined
iKP-Iluk me borship was only about one-tenth of one per cent of t1v
population,, but it was a stronG ar 1.".*ell-orsanized group,, In
June of 1950 Balgos and Capadocia, tw, of the rKP loaders.; left
Manila ared joined the Inuks in the mountains. In a reorganization
of the guerrilla units,,, the name of the Huks was changed to Hukbong
Napagpalaya ng Bayan (11B) (The Peoples Liberation Army). However,,
the name Huks remained- in common use. In October 1950 sevra1
leaders were capturedt and another group was taken in June 1951,
In the interim, in May,' the PIS' wa:; declared illegal again. In
early 1952 the Huks were elimir,..ted from the island of Panay, after
military action brought a mass surrondero In the battle, Capa,docia,,
the last of the pre-war leaders was slain,,
At present the strength of the illegal PKP and Huks is small.
The PKP claims about 3,)00U-5,,W0 members and the Huks about, ' Zf.,,OOQ of
which only about 2.95OO are armed, The party is closer to Communist
China than to other Communists in the Philippines or elsewhere. It
has received technical assi:stanco and advisers from the Chinese,* but
few supplies or funds. It hae had no direct contact with the USSR0
Leadership of the PKP is currently in the hands of Jesus Lava
who is secretary. general and. leader of the party. his most likely
successor,, in case of death or imprisonment, is Casto Alejandrinog
chairman of the National Military Department of the PKP and {commander
in b of of the Hukso Luis Tarucg publicized commander of the Huks
in 1942,, remains the "grand old man' of the liberation movements but
33 w
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-R 65R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
is apparently without poli
cY nE; rower in the arty. However,
if Taruc surrenders to the Philippine Government as current
rumors predicts many Huks are excited to Join him. Jose Lava.,
in prison since 1950, also may be directing operations of the PKP
through his brother Jesus.
Most of the current PKP leaders are young anydj, except for Tarucs
none have been in the forefront longer than 10 years, in contrast
to ldadershi, of other Co munist parties in Southeast Asia*
Corununist Activity Among Philippine Chinese
Cornnunist .Chi,-ese activity is centered in three 'areas of the
Philippines--Mani.lae the Bicol region of Southern Luzon and Iliolo
and environs0 The str'cture of their organization, however* is
not clear. It appears to include at least two facets: The Chinese
Board (C) of the FKP and an undefined underground organization.,
Mich at times has been referred. to as the Chinese Communist Party
of the Philippines and about which little. is known,
The Chinese Bureau is listed under the National Organization
Department of the PKPO It is headed by a secretariat consisting of
a secretary-general and the heads of four subadepartments--education,
organization, eommunicatio^s and finances Reorganization along these
lines was effected in 1952 and is significant in that it provided no
military department like that in the PKP set-upo This omission seems
to indicate that the active Chinese Communist Luerrilla forces of
thfi~ occupation period anc- after. had been disbanded by 1952. The
Bureau was originally founded in 1942 as a liaison unit between the
' 3)4
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CI2-00865R000200250002-3
 M-1 I In
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 CIA-R ~41 0865R000200250002-3
PKP and the Chinese Communist Party in.China. Since it foundingp
the CB seems to have lost most of its i.rdluencej, having fallen
from a strong factor in the PKP and among local, Chinese Communists to
' .y
a minor dot on the riCP organizational chart. This change in
stature is not solely due to increased .tKP dominance in internal
affairs but also to the growing importance of tke underground organi-
zation.
The structure of the underground arm is perhaps one of the best-
guarded secrets in the realm of Asian Communism, if, indeeds such
a structure dbp exist. Some Communist documents obtained by
Philippine authorities and same reports from the islands mention
a Chinese Communist Party of the Philippinese. Little exact
information on such a pertly is available and it is assumed that
if such a cup exists9 it is the undergrcund organization. It is
known that Communist Chinese have been very active in the Philippine
Chinese eomnnuiity.
They have infiltrated many schools and organizations and
attempted to gain control of the newel arerso These methods.
have been tho basic Chinese Communist tactics to gain control of
Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia since the Communists wcre ousted
from the Kuomintang in 1927,
Operating under instructions from Communist headquarters in
China, Chinese Communists for the most part have cooperated with the
PKP, although usually acting on their own in matters pertaining to
the Chinese community, Dur?ng the war several Communist Chinese
35 -
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
guerrilla units cooperated with the Philippine Co..aiupists0 Most
famous of these. were the Hua Chi detachment and the HHssueehh Kan
militia0
S'
In addition to inflitratin,;.various components of the Chines,
community,, the Comimu.tsts have taken advantage of some of the well-
established vices of the area-gambling, bribery* smuggling and
prostitution-to further their cai;.see0 Smug?;li.ng and the extortion
campaign directed at Chirx.se throughout the world have helped swell.
the Communist cofferso
Estimates of Communist Chinese strength in the Phili.pines
have varied from a few thousand to fifty thousanid* Party member-
ship probably numbers a few th usande but the marq sympathizers
who often vacillate with a change of regime, probably swell the
number to fifty thousando
36
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-R
Fo Thailand
R000200250002-3
The pattern of Corimunist activity in Thailand has differed from
that of other Southeast Asian countries in a few important respects,
larger because it has been an independent nation for many years,
Thailand?a independence prevented the Communists from masquerading
as nationalists as they did in.Indoehina and elsewhere. For the
same reason Communism did not app-eal to the Thais and grew up
mostly among minority groups? the Chinese and the Vietnai,:eseo
Communism also has run into other difficulties in Thailanda It
has not been popular with many of the devout Buddhist Thai,, who
regard it as an alien heresy Although the Communists have managed
to infiltrate some elements of the Thai Buddhist. priesthood, most
Thais have not yielded to the Communist appeals. Furthermore,
Thailand - is a fairly properoua country Most Thais are well-fed,
wellalothed,a own their land and have saving, Under such conditions
Communism does not flourish.
At the same time, however, Thais have unwittingly spurred the
growth of Communism among the minority races, Thais are jealous
of Chines: ambition and awl and the fact that the Chinese, almost
to the mane are far more prosperous than the Thais. The Thailand
Chinese control more than 80 per cent of the countryGs economy. a
situation which does not please the Thai people or the Tai Govern-
mexxt4 To counteract the growing foreign influence on the Thai
economy the government has parsed certain restrictive measures on
37
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-0086 000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP6 - 5R000200250002-3
aligns, excluding them from certain
professions and limiting
their landholdings according to type.aind conditionso The regulation
of aliens were aimed at the Chinesq reibut they also affected the
Vietnamese minority4 The Communists have played up these restrictions
to stir discontent among the minorities, and these groups have
been more redeptive to Communism than have the Thaiso
Chinese Communist Party of Thailand
The largest Communist Party in the country is the Chinese
Communist Party of Thailand, Nemberdaip estimates for the party
range from 2,000 to Z0,000a. The actual membership is probably
about 2,939000 hard core members, and the rest members of pro-
Communist organizations, such as th Teochiu Association, a social
organization composed of emigrants, and their descendents, from
the area around Swatows China.
The CCP(T) probably dates back at least to 1927, when the
Comm ni.st elements were + usted from the Kuomintang in Chinao The
party remained underground regardless of changes in its legal status.,
For a brief period after the 1932 coup overthrew the absolute
monarchy, Communism was somewhat open. In 1933 Communism was de-
clared illegal and remained so until 19i6o In that year the Thais
repealed the anti,-Coim unism, law under pressure from the Soviet Union,
to secure Soviet approval of Thailand c s application for UN member-
ship. In November 1952 Communism was again declared illegal, a series
-38-
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
of mass arrests of Communist leaders and sympathizers followed&
and several pro-Communist publications were suspended. Few of
the top leaders were arrested, howovero
While the names of the top leaders are in doubt, Major CHIU
Chi and I Mei-hou are believed to be the guiding spirits of the
party. Direction of party activities is clearly from Peiping,
with the Russian Embassy in Bangkok sometime acting an an on-the-
spot agent between Peiping and the party because Thailand does not
recognize the Peiping regime and has only a Nationalist Chinese
embassy*
Infiltration of the Chinese commmunity is mostly within some
of the dialect associations,, schools and some newspapers and periodim
cals0 The strong grip Communists once had on the important Bangkok
Chinese Chamber of Commerce has been broken.
While the Chinese Communists in Thailand are an active and
loud group? they represent only a small percentage of the Chines:
population of more than 3,,000,000, about one-sixth of Thailand8a
population Many of the pro-Communist sympathizers are only
weakly attached to the party and may easily desert the caused
Yet, their general political apathy causes them to follow the line
of least effort and of allegiance to the homeland. Because of
the strong Chinese hold on the Thai economy,, pro-Communist inclinations
in the Chinese community could make it the unwitting fifth column
of Peiping.
CO 39
_AwiI-
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
Thai Conm uni st Party (TCP)
Coi,mmunism among; the Thais is clouded by confusion. There is
a Thai Communist Party (TCi=),g but reports citing the Communist Party
of Thailand often have not been clear as to whether they refer to
the We or the CCP(T),a tJhile some sources state that the TCP dates
back to 1928,, it appears that these references are to the Chinese
organization. Because many Chinese have also adopted Thai names,
the mere noting of unidentified Thai names does not indicate.which
jroup is meant. The TCP appears to have been of virtually no im-
portance until a tow years ago and of not much more importance now.
The CCP(T) is believed to have established the TCP to attract the
Thais to Communism. Its small membership, believed to be only in
the hundredse is probably composed mostly of Sinn-Thais who are
also members of the parent Chinese group. Except for a few members
of the intellectual or professional communitya it has attracted
little response.
Free Thai Movement
Another Thai ;soup is either Communist dominated or Communist.
duped, The Free Thai movement led by ex-Premier PRIDIa now operating
in the Thai Nationality Autonomous State in Yunnan Province, China.
This movement is the continuation of.the wartime anti.-Japanese
group of the same name that cooperated with the US. PRIDI himself
was referred to as a Communist when? during his 1933 tenure as premiers,
40
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
he submitted an. Lconorc1c :-Ian closely rasorial nr the plans and
l ,.es of the USStt, He adraitted to socjaiist leanin s but denied
he was a Cormrtunist-0. It niay welll be, *'at. he is not a Communist
cvren ,ow,, but that, 11o .~t:nci the Chine ,o Communists are using each
n uher -:F:t7 DI to try to re in over w3 tl1 Communist aid and the phi
nese,. to oa:p.i.ta1auo on -'R.IDIOs prestige and followi.n to set kip
a Coin monist state In Thailand as a satellite of Peiping
Tone, Hoi. Viet Kieu Cuu Te Tai 'Thai (General Association for
M ;?tiu l Assistance to Over eas Vietnam -m"se in Thailand
The :':.etnamese Communists in Thailand, numbering about
O,OCOS are long-time Thailand residents and emigres of the oast
30 years. reports say that about half of this group are
Co,; ?nunists or pro-Commznist sympathizers working with the Viet
Mliih and HO o%i, :41hh of Indochina0 In l929-l930.q HO was in Thai-
land Vi etnsrae se emigre units. The Vietnamese Commuxii.sts
are ~1? x i d., into the; Tons Hal Viet Kieu Cuu T!-,. Tai Thai (General
.Ar,soc:jati_on for Mutual Assistance to Overseas Vietnamese in Thai-
;l ri"1.e association is not active in Internal Thai affat s,
40 41a
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865RO60200250002-3
I, Appendix: SOURCES?USED
State
Despatch 1019 Medan,, 18 Apr 51, Unclassified,
Despatch 1178 Rangoon, 2 Nov 51, Confidential.
Despatch 29, Bangkok, 10 Jul. $3, Confidential.
z2MI
Thompson and Adloffo The Left in Southeast Asia.
New York, William 81o e Assoc" late , , 9
Press reports.
FBIS Daily Reports,
Pqn=
State
Despatch 8509 Rangoon., 16 Jun 33, Secret. $8 Rangoon,, 3-8 Aug tDespatch 299R 53 Secret.
Despatch 298, Soon, 18 Feb $4, Confidential.
Saigon, 25 Jun 53, Confidential.
Despatch 11689 Djakarta, 13 Feb 53, Restricted,
Despatch 2003, Djakarta, 22 Jun 53, Unclassified.
Despatch 230, Singapore, 25 Oct 50, Secret,
Despatch 554, Kuala LUQpur3 23 Jun 53, Secret.
Despatch 287, Bangkok, 26 Oct ,50, Confidential,.
Despatch 486, Bangkok, 24 Jan 51,.Secret,
Despatch 38, Bangkok, 16 Jul 52, Confidential.
Despatch 545, Bangkok, 17 Jan 539 Secret.
Despatch 577, Bangkok,, 28 Jan 539 Confidential.
I -5 82, 4 Dec 52, Secret.
IR-5673, 15 Apr*52, Secret.
3R-5913, 30 Jun 52, Confidential.
IR-6308, 20 May 53, Confidential,
25X1A2g
42 CM
Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3
 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R600200250002-3
Anx
G-2, R-W-53, Singapore, 8 Apr 53# Secret.
(}25, R-88-539 Thailand, 3 Apr 5a Secret.
Overt
Thompson and Adloff a The IALft Wig, in Southeast Asiao New York,
William Sloane #asoc ,tee, 19
Republic of the Philil:pinesp House of Representatives,
Special Committee on Ur.-Filipino Activities. Report,
Corrnmanism in the Philippines, 17 May 520
Press reports.
FBIS Daily Reports.
Approved For Release. 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP62-00865R000200250002-3