GEOGRAPHIC AREA, ORR, CONTRIBUTION TO SNIE 11-7-59 PROBABLE SOVIET POSITION AT A CONFERENCE ON ANTARCTICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00680R000200190043-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 1998
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: May 28, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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GEO 7APHIC AREA, ORR, CONTRIBUTION TO SNIE 11--7-59
PROBABLE SOVIET POSITION AT A CONFERENCE ON ANTARCPICA
(,,# WHR 0/I 5937
1?R Pro jeer. 69-1778)
3 May 1959
;BAR I~iG
THIS MATERIAL CC TTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE
IIATI34AL LF..FLN;>E OF THE UNITED S'1'ATF.S WITHIN THE
[MINPWG OF THF. ESPIONA LAW TITLE 18, USC8
SEA,,, 793 M) 794s THE TRANSMISSION OF HVELATILN
OF WHICH553INMYyg iMA? iyEtR TO AN UNAUTHORIZED t'3^a~,.SON
`! s 11-11 dITE BY A Pie
C 1 i"4'"R" '-.b IN TFJ ,LI (c. V CF A GEN CI
O!f-s_e? ef Research and Reports
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r. -j? ~a y 2; :.+_. ,~J ~. fir,>I b`~t.:e~ .~.
!:a tLe
to CUkiR?E~-1T7~REVIEW OF TIE STATUS .3~ S(.JIf,: ITEMST
IN AN ,I,JiJ,1kJ1.b.\A . . . . . . . . . . 4 ? e O ? % 0 0
? o a
U0 Post-IQ! Expansion . . . . . o . . 4 . e ? . . 11 .
C. Rocent Activities . . a a o O a O ? a O O f O 6
D, Future Activities . . a . . o o ? e o O n . . .
Strategic Tnterest.5 . . . . . . . w o . ? . _+ d
H. Political Interests . . . . o o . a o o o . a V
IT, SOVIET PCLICY OBJECTIVES AT A C34Y REN E . . o O .
A. Basic Soviet Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . Er,
B. Position on a Trcraty for Antarctica . . . . . . .
0. Position on Clai:e=. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Position on the I'r rention of Iiiiitary Use of
Antarctica . . . 'i. di~.. . . . . . n . o 6 . t..,
E. Area of AppiicabU
y . . . . . o ? o . w e . o 4 f? .. :i.~'~
F. Broadening the Conierenoe and Accession to the
Treaty, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . o . . Li;
Go Nature of irtcrna :Lonai Administration . . . . . . . 15
H. Regix1atit.on of ,i'coniuni.c Activities . . . . . . . . . . 16
Ili. POSSIBLE S J"V:Ck~I' ACT 3 ;Tiff Thint EVENT CF CC ?I:`ERE! C 1,1
J~ AILUB1A a . . a ? . c . . o n . . . . . o o ? o . . a . . 6
A. Avoidaancep o: eesponsibilit for Failure . . . a ? a a 16
B. Posaible alld Act: o_1 . . . . . o a . O a [-. c . a o o . 'i7
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A. Introduction
1. Soviet post-IGY plans for Antarctica announced at the Second
Meeting of the Special Committee on Antarctic 9esearch of the International
Council of Scientific Unions? held in Moscow in August 1958, reveal an
expansion in the territorial extent of Soviet activities and confirm
previous estimates of Soviet intentions to remain in Antarctica for an
indefinite period in the future. The announced plans show a continued
soviet determination to :1aL- tain a level. of activity higher than that of
most countries and at least equal. to that of the United States. If other
suggested activities are undertaken in the future., 3io doubt would re-rain aR
to Soviet intentions to surpass the US in Antarctic operations and scientific
preeminence. The activities and plans of the past year demonstrate an
increased Soviet consideration of political objectives, including some
related to the forthco..ng Antarctic Conference. The Soviets may even
attempt ultimately to develop ostensibly scientific projects,, using
mi:l itary-type facilities (rockets,, earth satellites, scientific subr_;arines),
that could have an adverse psychological effect,, particularly on the
peopled of the Southern Hcrnlsphere.
B. Post-IGY E.xpansiouu
2, Main features of the expansion include (1) the immediate
estaVlishment of a new station in Queen Maud Land about 1,800 miles
rest of Mirnyy? (2) preparations for undertaking a 3,600-mile transcontinental
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o(, ientific traverse to the rye-v :ueen NN: ud station,) (3) plans for st tion
activity in the region of the Unclaimed Sector, (4) overland geographic
and geologic studies in the coastal conies of the new stations, (5) oceano-
graphic research in the adjacent waters, and (6) Soviet-initiated proposals
for the international mapping of the entire Antarctic Continent,, With
little prior indication, Poland was suddenly introduced into Antarctic
research with the Soviet offer of its Antarctic station, Oasis., to Poland,,
Organizational changes 'wee also made to establish a more permanent form
for the planning,, coordinati one, and direction of the Soviet Antarctic
operations and research. The former Council for Antarctic Research was
elevated to the rank of Interdepartmental Antarctic Commission under the
Praesidium of the Academy of Sci-encesr ! SR; and the long-standing Arctic
Scientific Research Institute of the Chief Directorate of the Northern
Sea Route the ooeratiorroa.l agency - was expanded into the new An=tic
and Antarctic Scientific Research Institute? Other activities in Antarctica
that have been indicated in published statements include: (1) the
possibility of using scientific submarines -- possibltiy even nuclear=
powered -- in the Antarctic as well as in the Arctic;
(2) the use of atomic
emery, presumably for power generation; and (3) the pos:ibiiity of
launching earth satellites from both polar areas.
C. Recent Activities
3? The Soviets have been continuing their extensive IGY operations
the p os =ICS pw .^a T.^t~- . ?~ -Itat onq were set up (Sovetskaya,, 880
miles from Mirny February :19f8; Pole of Inaccessibility, 1,366 mil e
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from Mirnyy, December 1958; and Lazaryev, 800 of longitude west of Mirnyy,
February 1959) raising to 8 the total number of stations set up. Of these,;,
3 (Mirnyy, Vostok, Lazaryev) are operating this year (1959), 2 more
(Komsozaol'skaya, Pole of Inaccessibility) are to resume activities during
the next Antarctic sunmwr season, and the former Qazis station will be
operated by the Poles. Oceanographic, geologic,, and geophysical observations
were made,
/including the launching from the Ob' of 22 meteorological rockets (50-60
miles altitude)z: at Mirryy; along the coast to Balleny Islands; en Tcute to
New Zealand and Australia,, the Ross aeao the approaches to the Amundsen
Sea,, Easter Island, and Chile; and exiting through Drake Passage Geo-
physical observations were also undertaken at all stations and along
extensive traverses into the interior? In addition, geologic investigatiotas
have now been made along the coast from 5705 to 165?E.9 and the aerial.
mapping and hydrographie t.harting of the coastal zone between 40?E and
166?E has been completed. In the Antarctic waters the scientific vessels
of tree Soviet Antarctic whaling fleet, have made biological' meteoro,' og'Lcal,,
limited-type oceanographic-,, and ice-distribution observations. Particularly
noteworthy was the dispatch of the entire 22--vessel fleet, after the
termination of whaling off Balleny Islands (1640E),, to explore ice
conditions and penetrate as close as possible to the coast of the Unclaimed
Sector (900m150?11). Soviet air oxoloratlon extended westward as far as
the S,dr Rondane Mountains (25?:E longitude), partly in connection with the
Belgian rescue mission. Observation a? visual and radio - of the third
Soviet earth satellite was ben U. May l958h
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Ul Future Activities
Its In addition to the normal observations at the 6 Bloc stations,
the major task of the present Fourth Soviet Antarctic Expedition at the
beginning of the 1959-60 season will. be the completion of the scientific
traverse from Vostok to the South Pole, the Pole of Inaccessibility, and
Lazaryevo Extensive geographic and geologic investigations are to be
undertaken, using Lazaryev station as a base,, partic^wlarly in connection
with the selection of a route for the trans-Antarctic traverses In view
of the recent assignment of the Soviet whaling fleet to explore the
approaches to the Coast of the Unclaimed Sector, the Soviets may be
planning to set up a station along this coast sometime in 1960-61. The
launching of the first Soviet scientific submarine, followed by disclosure
that the Soviets intend to launch additional units for charting In variour,
parts of the world .,- "particularly in the Southern Hemisphere" A- lends
further credence to a previous indication that a scientific submarine will,
be operated in Antarctic waters., The initiation of the systematic recording
of satellite observations points to the likelihood of preparations for
the expansion of observation of satellite tracking as the number of
polar-orbit satellites begins to increase,
B. Scientific Interests
The extension and continuation of Soviet scientific activities
underscores previous ertiws.tes that a major Soviet concern is the coU.ect.on
of scientific data in z?. ir.re variety of fields,, including basic researcho
Moreover, counting evidenccc indicates that Antarctic research is an
Integral part in the dic vi et stuwly of the Earth as a oleo The Soviet
h -a
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note of 1950 mentioned the importance to the Northern Hemisphere of
Antarctic weather observations. Since then, repeated Soviet references
stress the value of Antarctic observations to the study of worldwide
meteorological processes, the study of the dynawics of the "World Ocean,"
the study of the earth's crust, and the compilation of a unified geologic
may of the Earth, The goal of the Earth-wide study is to make possible
the fullest utilisation of the useful characteristics of the natural
environment and to develop the means for defense against harmful and
unfavorable phenomena. The Soviet scientists, therefore, "labor unceasing''
to make man the true master of nature in Communist society" (AcademiN,lan
Igor Kurchatov addressing the XXI Party Congress). For so broad an
objective, there is an ever-increasing need for observations covering as
much of the earth as possible for increasingly long records, This is an
additional reason for the Soviet persistence in its efforts to continue
the IGY observation under the international Geophysical Cooperation (10C)-
1959, and to continue international Antarctic research through the formation
of the Special Committee on Antarctic,- Research (SCAR) under the International
Council of Scientific Unions (iCLIU). The Soviets recognize that organized
international arrangements, could provide the numerous research orgat*izatioue
In the Soviet Union with the most productive flow of geophysical, g4 ologiO,
and geographic data.
6. There are indications that the Soviets may develop soptttsticat: d
scientific pro?;raius in which they could utilize components of weapons
systems Mention already has been made of the possible appearance of
Soviet scientific submarines in Antarctic waters, Although the reported
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future launchings of manned vet i= les> The successful firing of 22 rrocket:
in Antarctica last year and the Firing in the USSR of high-altitude (neariy
300-mile-altitude) rock. tc; for geophysical observations suggest the
possibility that such f.ra_ ngs ;niit be attempted from the icy conti lento
In fact, it is not impiau;aille that the Soviets, who. lack a long;-range
missile test range, mi g:it even titter fit to use interior An ar. ctica a the
terminal point for irateacont:i,aeratal Fnit:siie testing from. ;he USSR; Such
a test might be undertaken csteneibly r s a. geophysit:al research prO sect
with the missile carrying an :a.nstruwanted nose cone for geophysical
research? In addition .o any st.z;h &aoo hysicai research data, the )Nieta
would also acquire data c.i niasile pperfotaance and target. accuracy )ver
a range distance not now to theT,o
Soviet contemplation of l; un.chin rear tb satel L.ites from both polar ireas
(Nesme'ranov, 1958) has not been -onfirned# the recent findings about the
Van Allen radiation belt and the fact that the belt is thinnest ova) the
polar areas lends some oredence to this possibility, particularly fixr
F. Strate f.c Interests
7, Recent inuication- ,.uggest that the Soviet l1rLtO1n ?;right eke
use of Antarctica for mil:iary xe.searcl,., The possibility of using eu:brnarrnel;
hac been discussed., There Ar~: also ineications that both the Gb' a. d:
Siava have been engaged is ; -i`.it,arr teats of sow un?aowa type Th_3
tracking of satellites and Mspr~cc vehic:..es used for _recor;r ai.3sanee i i also
likely to be of military Pa:.ut t? tinatc-l , Regardless o ' lhetnc:r r 3. earcb
projects using rockets r;is d We. or subraxi.nes are :tnte,rded for ,(d i teary
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or scientific use, they are likely to cause anxiety among the people of
the Southern Hemisphere.
0. Economic Interests
8. Soviet economic interests in the Antarctic are likely to
increase with the addition of at least two moref eats to the one that
has been in operation since 1946. Although the economic exploitation of
minerals seems improbable for a long time to come,, it is noteworthy that
the Soviets have engaged in mineral exploration as a part of their geologic
studies and have reported the discovery of what appear to be extensive
graphite, rare mineral ss and iron. ore deposits. The significance of such
discoveries may take on importance earlier.than is warranted stimulating
concern in the forthcoming Antarctic Conference over the definition and
control of national rights under an international administration.
H. Political Interests
9. We believe Soviet basic political interests are concerned
with (1) streng;theing of Soviet rights in Antarctica in order to maintain
freedom of access to and research. in Antarctica, (2) the fostering of the
expansion of scientific activity;. (3) the exploitation of expanding Soviet
achievements to propagandize the superiority of Communist science and the
Communist system, and (4) the 1) ,lding yap of a posture of peaceful intent
and friendly cooperation. For the Soviets to make claims at this late date,;
in face of the already nunerous c,onfJJcts, would run the risk of interfering
with existing scientifically productive arra.ngemntse The reassertion
of Soviet rights has therefore been held to a minimum and the commonplace
type of cold-war propaganda h^ s been al:mo st nonexistent n
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10. To strengthen their rights in Antarctica and maintain their
freedom of access, the Soviets appear to be depending on the high level
of their activities and accomplishments. Discreetly but persistently,
Soviet publicity and propaganda emphasize (1) the great areal extent of
their interior operations and the acquisition of unique types of data
under difficult conditions, (2) the collection of information over
previously untrodden areas, (3) the discovery and naming of numerous
geographical features, and (4) the correction of errors or scientific
inadequacies of previous expeditions. In addition to an extensive
reporting of their activities through regular press and radio media, the
Soviets are also able to gain widespread attention through voluminous
publication of selected scientific results and active participation in
all possible international. scientific?,- symposia and conferences. During
the 195758 season, the Ob' visited 7 countries and was boarded by over
26,000 visitors. The purposefulness of such visits was disclosed recently
by the captain of the vessel, who criticized Soviet maritime training of
young officers as inadequate in public relations in view of the opportunities
afforded by visits at foreign ports.
11. It is also noteworthy that the Soviet policy of seeking the
widest possible contact and exchanges concerning Antarctic research activities
and their results differs markedly from the restrictive policy in the
Arctic, where the Soviets avoid all contacts, visits to stations, or free
exchange of data. In the Antarctic the Soviets have gone to great lengths
to establish the closest possible rapport with all Antarctic scientists
through radio exchanges of operation-Al experience among the various
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Antarctic stations, support of proposals to broaden scientist exchanges
between stations, willingness to answer calls for assistance, and the
development of greater inter-lose of facilities among expeditions. The
rapport developed is subsequently utilized in Soviet publicity to establish
an image of a friendly, cooperative Soviet Union engaged in peaceful
research for the benefit of humanity. Furthermore, the wish is.also
repeated that such peaceful relations might be extended to other parts
of the world.
II. SOVIET POLICY OBJECTIVES AT A CONFERENCE
A. Basic Soviet -Objectives
13. The basic Soviet objectives in the forthcoming Conference
are to (1) secure for themselves an indisputable right to conduct scientific
operations anywhere in Antarctica, (2) eliminate all possibilities or
grounds for the use of military force against them, (3) prevent the use
of Antarctica for any direct military use as a base or as a military test
area by the US, (4) secure for themselves political equality in any future
definitive resciution of sovereignty, (5) foster arrangements that would
encour.'ge the expansion of international scientific activity, (6) secure
membership in full status in any international regulatory or administrative
body in which substantive decisions would be adopted by unanimous vote.
As a corollary to these objective3, it is expected that the soviets will
also strive to keep any treaty agreed upon and related adninistrative
arrangements as simple and general as possible.
B. Position on a Treaty for Antarctica
14. The Soviets are lively to make a sincere effort to draft and
accede to a treaty that would secure their objectives. They probably
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recognize that such a treaty would formalize political acceptance of their
presence in Antarctica, reaffirm the spirit of cooperation and friendship
already developed through the IG! and SCAR, better the prospects for
increased scientific research aril for a greater flow of data, and help
improve public relations (particularly in Latin America). These objectives
would be of value to their "world peace" campaign. As various additional
features are included over and beyond these objectives, the Soviets are
likely to become more difficult, particularly if these features were at
the expense of or threatened to compromise their objectives. We feel that
the Soviets are likely to subordinate political differences as long as
prospectsfor drafting a treaty containing their minimum objectives appear
favorable. To obtain their objectives, they are likely to resort to
propaganda pressure, especially if in their judgment the prospects for
a treaty begin to died nish, We believe that the Soviets may be
difficult on (1) the principle of unanimity of vote on all subbtant1vz
matters, and (2) the final referral of disputes to the International
Court of Justice:.
C. Position on Claims
,15, In the present phase, with its conflicting claims, the Soviets
are aware of the weakness of their historical positions resulting in large
measure from th 135-;;?ear gap between the alleged 1820 Bellingshausen
discovery of Antarctica and the Soviet entry into the IGY program in 1955.
We reaffirm our previous estimate that the Soviets completely subordinate
their interest in territorial claims to their scientific interest in
increasing data collection. The assertion of a Soviet claim at this time
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would seriously upset the current favorable and productive international
scientific arrangements. Since the Soviets have found an abundance of
scientific data availa~les notwithstanding the confused conflicts of
claims, they probably want to avoid stirring up the problem and merely
want to insure that scientific cooperation takes precedence over claims.
D, Position on the Prevention of Military Use of Antarctica
16, We feel that the underlying Soviet
military uce of Antarctica are fiveiolda (x) to
equipment and personnel that might otherwise be
considerations in preventing
eliminate all !dlitar7
available for use against
Soviet personnel and facilities, and might prevent Soviet activities;
(2) to prevent the possible longterm future build-up by the US of an
alternative military base in the event that Communists gained control
in Latin America; (3) to prevent the US from building up its Arctic warfare
capabilities through cold-weather testing of military equipment and training
of troops; (4) to prevent other JS tests -- such as the Argus project --
which are overtly military in nature; and (5) at little or no sacrifice
of their an limited military interests in the areas to provide a
contribution to their general "world .peace" campaign. The Soviets are
well aware of the several skirmishes between some of the Western powers
on the Antarctic Continent and on the adjacent seas,, Furthermore, they
are sensitive concerning the inclusion of an extensive sector of Antarctica
within the Security Zone of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance
and are anxious to eliminate any possible military threat against them.
17. Since the primary Soviet interest in Antarctica is for basic
research rather than for ovart rilitary research, the Soviets will be
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willing to accede, at least in principle, to inspection and demilitarization.
An agreement to this effect would not substantially limit even their
military research, since the Soviets probably feel capable of undertaking
practically any type of research without disclosing its military intent,
using scientific research as a cover. Thus, a major problem in any treaty
may be encountered in defining the limits of acceptability in the tins
of military-type facilities -- submarines, rockets, missiles, and earth
satellites. Although ostensibly of scientific value, the scientific gains
from such devices might be far outweighed by the adverse psychological
effects o# the show of Soviet military power, particularly among countries
of the Southern He.:iisphere. Any attempts to exclude the devices, however,
would be resisted as an unwa.rran-Led limitation on scientific research.
18. The Soviets may object to arrangements that would subject all
Soviet commercial vessels -- tankers and whaling fleets - to inspection
within the extended limits of the zone of Antarctic couvcr ,ence as proposed
by the Soviets. Since there are good grounds to suspect that both types
of vesFel.s have been associated with milLit:ary tests, the Soviets may argt:e
that tankers are used only for the w plying of whalers and that the
inspection of the whaling fleet would force disclosure of commercial
secrets and unfairly duplicate the control of whaling operations exercised
by the International Whaling Convention. On the other hard, we anticipate
no Soviet objection in principle to a policy of free access to any station,
19. Contrary to their policy in the Arctic, the Soviets have
favored exchange visits at stations and ever-increasing contacts between
Antarctic scientists. Year-round exchanges have been effected between
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the US and the USSR, and several exchange visits have been made between
Soviet and Australian station personnel. The increase in exchanges
proposed by SCAR has been supported by the USSR. In fact, the Soviets
may well seek to develop such ever-widening contacts and closer scientific
ties in order to derive the benefits of closer political rapport and to
propagandize the superiority of Comrmuiist sciences Some difficulties,
however, may arise, in making arrangements for exchanges, particularly for
year-round observer residence at interior stations where billets are
limited. In this connection the Soviets are likely to argue for a strict
quid-pro-quo exchange. Although the Soviets may agree in principle to
inspection, some difficulties may arise concerning the form in which it
is to be organized,, We feel that the Soviets, in order to create only
a minimum precedent for the broader problems involving inspection within
the USSR, are likely to agree to an observer program organized along
national rather than on supra-national lines.
E. Area of Applicability
20. The Soviets would prefer to have a treaty that would cover
the widest possible area, e.g., the zone of Antarctic convergence, although
they would be willing to compromise on the 60th parallel. This is related
to their basic objective of preventing the employment of military force
against their facilities or expanding activities. By extending the arean
of applicability the Soviets would hope to exclude the presence of warships.
Such a restriction would not, limit their own activities significantly
since they have alreacr announced the operation of a scientific submarine
in the Northern Hemi.sphccre, and such a unique vessel presumably would not
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be subject to exclusion if and when it was introduced into the Antarctic
waters. Even if the 60th parallel were decided upon, it would still
help to legitimize the presence of Soviet ships anywhere in Antarctic
waters, and would also help foster the expansion of international
oceanographic activity.
F. Broadening the Conference and Accession to the Treaty
21. The unexpected introduction of Poland into Antarctic rcaearcha
followed by its hurried application for membership in SCAR and a request
for participation in the pre-Conference meetings, appears to have been an
attempt to test the mood of the clevprt nations concerning possibilities
of broadening the Conference and, indirectly, of the prospects of open
accession which the Soviets want. The Soviet preference apparently is
motivated by a dosire to overcome the voting disadvantage of the Soviet
Union at the Conference. Ultimately,, it would offer a means for building
up within any future international organization a bloc consisting of
states having no vested political interests or rights as a counter to
those states that have such rights This would enable the Soviets to
confound the settlement of Antarctic sovereignty along the present alignment
of claims and prevent the claimant nations from using their rights as a
pretext for interfering with or reducing Soviet or Bloc scientific activity.
An additional consideration attractive to the Soviet Union Is the prospect
that the right of accession to the treaty may stimulate an increase in
scientific activity, which would both dilute present claims and increase
the flow of scientific data. Althoagh we believe that the Soviets will
not insist on free accession, there is still a possibility that they may
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seek a compromise that would allow accession to countries that become
members of SCAR. This would still leave ample opportunity for the
accession of some countries which the Soviet Un'.on could maneuver, as
in the case of Poland.
0. Nature of International Administration
22. The Soviets will probably seek to limit international
administration primarily to the attainment of their minimum objectives --
the guarantee of freedom of access, prevention of the use of Antarctica
for military purposes, and the stimulation of scientific research. If
adequate provision is made for freedom of research, the Soviets are
likely to attempt to limit further international administrative arrangements
to provision for inspection and de.iilitarizatiorr and leave all scientific
planning, coordination, exchanges of scientists, and information to the
SCAR and its working groups and subcommittees. Through SCAR, the Soviets
anticipate a continuation of the international arrangements that proved
effective during the IGY. It has become evident to the Soviets that this
effectiveness is the result of the relatively informal and flexible nature
of program planning, acceptance, and coordination carried out in an
atmosphere essentially devoid of political restraints and rigidities.
The lack of formality became evident recently when the Soviets succeeded
in securing ex-post-facto approval of the Lazaryev station site as a gap-
area addition to the previously agreed-upon SCAR list of gap-areas.
This approval was granted after the Soviets had already announced plans
to seta iltatien at the Lszaryev site. They US scientific representative
protested at the irregularity of this procedure but was not upheld
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by his Western colleagues on the ?rounds that the action represented
an addition to the post-IGY scientific programs In an atmosphere such as
this, the Soviets expect to have maximum freedom for scientific expansion,
including even the possible approval of projects involving the use of
overt military weapons and equipment that might not be approved by a
political body.
23. We feel that the Soviets will object to any final referral
of disputes to the International Court of Tustice. They will insist that
substantive matters would require political agreement and not adjudi-0ation
and that technical differences must be resolved by technical experts,
H. Re xlation of Economic Activitieso
24. Since current economic activities in Antarctica are entirely
limited to whaling,, and prospects for future development on the ice
continent are at most highly speculativf3, the Soviet Union is likely
to. object to any attempts at this time to make provision for econoic
development. In view of the control already exercised by the International
Whaling Convention, the Soviets would object to adding any other foam of
control over whaling.
III. POSSIBLE SOVIET ACTION IN THE EVENT OF CONFERENCE FAILURE
of Responsibility for Failure
25. It is our judgment that the Soviets are truly interested
in the conclusion of a treaty incorporating their basic objectives. In
fact, any reasons for possible failure to secure a treaty are more likely
to originate in the excessively precautionary and over-regulatory demands
of some of the other countries -_-' chiefly Australia and the Latin American
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nations. We further believe that the Soviets would go to great lengths
to avoid being saddled with the onus of being the cause of the failure.
To avoid failure, they rA ght even urge a treaty that contained nothing
more than the pious hope of "peaceful use and scientific expansion,"
B. Possible UN Action
26. Failing to achieve a treaty of any sort, the Soviets would
probably encourage the initiation of UN action, although they might prefer
to do so through other countries -- Poland, for example. They would also
support any initiative on the part of a neutral country such as India.
In either event, the peaceful use and increased scientific activity by
any interested country would form the premise on :which their action would
be based. Here agains the objectiva would be to secure the greatest
possible assurance of freedom of activity and protection against any
military, action.
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