COORDINATING COMMITTEE RECORD OF DISCUSSION ON REVISION OF THE STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS - ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES, DECEMBER 17TH, 1958 AND JANUARY 8TH, 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00647A000100150034-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 1999
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: January 12, 1959
• Content Type: MIN

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COORDINATING COMMITTEE
RECORD OF DISCUSSION
ON
COCOM Document No. 2864 76
File NO
SO, Cener'
REVISION OF THE STRATEGIC. EXPORT CONTROLS .? ADMINISTRATIVE PRINCIPLES.
December 17th 1958 and January 8th, 1959
Present: Bolgium(Luxombourg), Canada, Denmark, Franco, Germany, Ita~,y,
Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States.
References: 0000M 2408, 2869.5, 2869.55, 2869.57, 2869.61, 2869.64, 2869.72,
2869.73, Secretariat Paper No. 102.
Administrative Principlo No. 3
1. The CHAIRMAN recalled that at the previous discussion on December 5th
(COCOM 2869.73), four Delegations - those of Belgium, Franca, Italy and the
Netherlands - had boon unable to accept the United Kingdom proposal for a
Momorandum of Understanding concerning unique technological know-how. Ho
invited those four Delegations to give the further views of their authorities.
2. The BELGIAN Delegate said that he had informed his Government fully
of the discussions which had taken place but he had received no instructions
to modify his position.
3. The FRENCH Delegate stated that he had not failed to report the
discussions to his authorities but, like his Belgian colleague, he had
roceivod no instructions to modify his position.
4. The NETHERLANDS Delegate said that after very careful consideration his
authorities remained of the same opinion as before.
5. The ITALIAN Delegate said that his authorities had made a very careful
study of the proposals which had been put forward but he had boon instructed
to reaffirm the principle of national responsibility for granting oxport
licences in cases when uniquo technological know-how was concerned. His
authorities were nevertheless grateful to the United Kingdom for raising
the question which they considered to be worthy of study. They attached
great importance to the items which were continued in the list proposed by
the United Kingdom and they would not fail to bear this in mind when studying
a request for an export licence under the terms of Administrative Principle
No. 3. In case of doubt they were prepared the raise the question in the
Committee.
6. The Delegate continued that in order to facilitate the search for a
compromise his authorities had allowed Izim a certain amount of latitude and
speaking personally he wished to put forward the following proposal in the
hope that it might moot with general acceptance, Each Delegation should
notify the Committee of the fact that their authorities had grantocl an export
licence for an item mentioned on the United Kingdom list as soon as possible
after the licence had boon issued. The Delegate said that he hoped that this
proposal would serve as the basis for a compromise agreement. If it proved
acceptable to the Committee he was sure that his authorities would be willing
to confirm it as an official proposal.
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7. The CANADIAN Delegate stated that he had not so far taken up a
position with regard to Administrative Principle No. 3; he now wished Canada
to be added to the list of Delegations which supported the United Kingdom
proposal for a system of prior oousultstion.
8. The GERMAN Delegate said that he had listened to the Italian Delegate's
personal compromise proposal with great interest. He took it that there were
two points involved:
(a) The principle of the discretion of national authorities but readiness
to submit the case to the Committee if some doubt existed.
(b) When there was no doubt in the minds of national authorities and
an export licence had been granted, the Committee should nevertheless
be informed immediately afterwards.
In his personal opinion this seemed to be a good suggestion. He would be
interested to hoar the views of the French and United Kingdom Delegates on the
compromise proposal before expressing further views.
9. The UNITED KINGDOM Delegate said that his authorities continued to think
that their original proposals wore the essential minimum to fill the gap in the
Committee's rules and they could not see how anything less would be satisfactory.
The United Kingdom Delegate undertook to report the Italian compromise proposal
but his present instructions did not allow him to modify his position that dat.
10. The FRENCH Delegate said that he would report the Italian Delegate's
suggestion to his authorities but since the latter had already stated firmly
that they wore ppposod to the notion of a special list and the It:alian Delegate
referred to such a list, he personally doubted very much that it would prove
acceptable.
11. The DANISH Delegate said that his first reaction to the Italian
Delegate's proposal was not very favourable since the appraisal of the strategic
significance of an export varied from country to country.
129 The UNITED STATES Delegate said that his authorities had made a careful
examination of the problem and continued to fool that there was no adequate
substitute for the United Kingdom proposal and that the special list of items
proposed by the United Kingdom was justified. He understood the Italian Delegate
as saying that all Members of the Committee recognised that one of the objectives
of Administrative Principle No. 3 was to guard against the export of vital
technological know-how. Governments would submit cases of doubt to the Committee
before licensing; where no doubt existed in the Member Government but an item
appeared on the United Kingdom list, the Committee would be notified immediately
after the issue of a licence. The Delegate commented that in trying to protect
vital technology, post notification might not be very effective unless the
Government wore prepared to stop licensed shipments on the basis of Committee
disc$ssion. Tochnolo;nr had to be sent only once to defeat the Cormmittee's
purpose. Ore a piece of equipment had boon shipped it was obvious that little
more could be done.
13. He then referred to the mechanics of the Italian Delegate's proposal.
Principle No. 3 referred to embargoed components of non-embargoed items: it
was open to question whether such items were ovorywh,e re subject to licensing
control.. If a s,.-stem of prior consultation wore ostablisod, such as the United
Kingdom proposed, Governments would take steps to ensure that such items wore
NNbject to licensing control. He wondered whether the Italian Delegate's
proposal also contemplated this; seemingly it would have to do so.
14. The ITLIAN Delegate:,, in answer to the statement of the United States
Delegate, stressed that he had put forward his proposal in an effort to roach
a compromise agreement. He invited his United States colloa~;uo to recognise
that by accepting his proposal the Committee could at least be informed of
exports of those items and express what comments they thought fit on the .,
situation created by such transactions with the Soviet Bloc.
"CIO
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15. The GERMAN Delegate said that all Members of the Committee agreed
that vital know-how should not be exported to the Bloc: the only point at
issue was whether the necessary checking was done on a national basis or before
the Committee.. He agreed with the United States Delegate that post notification
could only register the fact that certain know-how had been export pd, -but. he
thought that no Member Country would authorise the export if it considered
that the know-how was vital. Although he supported the original United Kingdom
proposal, the Italian Delegate's proposal constituted a real concession wU.ch
he was willing to recommend two his Government if it were generally accepted by
the Committee.
16. The FRENCH Delegate pointed out that the Committee was concerned with
preventing the export of now and essential techniques to the Soviet Bloc. The
'ranch authorities wore ready to consider suggestions for stopping the export
of special know-how but the point was what wore those new vital teob iques?
French experts had gone fully into this problem and their arguments had already
been stated in the Committee. They felt that there was no need for any special
treatment of the items contained in the United Kingdom list. The remarks made
fey the German: Delegate did not touch this fundamental aspect of the problem and
in this respect the French position remained the same.
17. The Belgian Delegate said that as in the past his authorities would
consult the Committee if they felt that there was some particular danger
attached to the export of a particular item. Referring to the Italian
Delegate's proposal he did not think that his authorities would be oppposod
to the principle of post notification but the use of a special list would
create a number of difficulties.
18. The GERMAN Delegate, in reply to the statement of the Belgian Delegate,
said that he thought that there must be a list of some sort if a system of post
notification were accepted. He did not think that his authorities would agree
to prior or post notification in general.
3,9. The UNITED STATES Delegate observed that althouth he did not think
that there was an adequate substitute for the United Kingdom proposals, it
did not mean that no substitute at all was possible. The Italian Delegate's
initiative was appreciated and his proposal would certainly be considered
very seriously by the United States authorities. Some Delegates had said that
the present Principle had worked satisfactorily so far: it would be hard to
demonstrate that this was in fact so. He was sure that all Member Countries
had applied the Principle in good faith, but there nevertheless remained some
differences of opinion as to the objectivos of Administrative Principle No. 3.
New that the embargo list had been reduced it was generally agreed that
enforcement should be stricter. The same was true as far as technology was
concerned, that is, the Committee should be in a position to improve the control
of the export of technology to the Bloc.
20. The BELGIAN, FRLNCH and NETHERLANDS Delegates considered that the present
Positions of certain Delegations were too far removed from their own positio;:.s
for a continuation of the discussion to lead to concrete results. They further
considered that the present text should continue to be applied as in the past.
21. The UNITED KINGDOM and UNITED STATES Delegates said that they felt that
it would be useful to give careful consideration to the Italian Delegate's
proposal since it might still form the basis of a compromise agreement.
22. The CHAIRMAN said that although: it was obvious that the United e
Kingdom proposal for a Memorandum of Understanding was not acceptable to all
the Members of the Committee it was still worth while to take the discussions
a stage further. There was no unanimity in recognising that a gap existed in
the control system but such a state of affairs might occur in the future if
technical developments made certain items dangerous. He asked all Delegations
to report back the state of the discussions fully to their authorities.
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23. The COMMITTEE agreed to resume discussion on Administrative Principle
No. 3 on January 26th, 1959.
Administrative Principle No.
24. The COMMITTEE agreed that the following text of Administrative
Principle No. 4 would come into force on January 15th, 1959:
"The object of the embargo should not be defeated by the export
of component parts. Each country will take such action as it
can to achieve this aim, and will continue to sock a workable
definition for component parts which could be used by all the
participating countries."
Administrative Principle No. 5
25.. The COtk,11ITTEE agreed that the following text of Administrative
Principle No. 5 would come into force on January 15th, 1959:
'"So far as practicable, the object of strategic controls should
be maintained by restrictions on the export of technical data,
technical assistance, and any other technology applicable to
the design, production and use of embargoed items."
Administrative PrincipleNo. 3
26. On January 8th 1959, the ITALIAN Delegate informed the Committee that
his authorities had endorsed the proposal he had made in a personal capacity;
it was therefore an official proposal of the Italian Government.
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